Inferentialism and our knowledge of others’ minds
Inferentialism and our knowledge of others’ minds
Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good inferential explanations of our knowledge. This conclusion is an epistemological one. The motivation for it is independent of metaphysical concerns about functionalism or about the best way to model the cognitive architecture which produces our knowledge of others’ minds. Given this it is compatible both with the truth of functionalism and theory–theory construed as a cognitive model.
1435-1454
Mcneill, William
be33c4df-0f0e-42bf-8b9b-3c0afe8cb69e
June 2015
Mcneill, William
be33c4df-0f0e-42bf-8b9b-3c0afe8cb69e
Abstract
Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good inferential explanations of our knowledge. This conclusion is an epistemological one. The motivation for it is independent of metaphysical concerns about functionalism or about the best way to model the cognitive architecture which produces our knowledge of others’ minds. Given this it is compatible both with the truth of functionalism and theory–theory construed as a cognitive model.
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IKOM journal issue 2015
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e-pub ahead of print date: 5 August 2014
Published date: June 2015
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 393212
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/393212
ISSN: 0031-8116
PURE UUID: 3392c369-ca15-4d68-a5b6-829106b9582f
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Date deposited: 05 May 2016 12:59
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:53
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