Big business and the Blitzkriegswirtschaft: Daimler-Benz AG and the mobilisation of the German war economy, 1939-1942
Big business and the Blitzkriegswirtschaft: Daimler-Benz AG and the mobilisation of the German war economy, 1939-1942
Since the end of the war itself, research on the German economy during the Second World War has focused – explicitly or implicitly – on the search for an explanation of the disparities in armaments and output between the first and second halves of the war. In the first half of the war, up until the winter of 1941–2, the development of armaments production was characterised by more or less stable levels of output against the background of the series of swift and successful military campaigns in Poland and in the West. This stands in stark contrast to the second half, which witnessed a radical increase in aggregate armaments output which lasted well into the summer of 1944, and which saw tank production reach 589 per cent of the level at which it had stood in January 1942, weapons production reach 382 per cent of its January 1942 level, and aircraft production 367 per cent of its January 1942 level over the same period, to name some of the most obvious successes. These increases were all the more astonishing for the fact that they were achieved against the background of a massive war of attrition on the Eastern Front which placed demands on German resources and drew male labour from German factories into the Wehrmacht on a scale out of all proportion to that experienced in the first half of the war.
193-208
Gregor, Neil
ee3a0bc7-3779-4dd8-ad67-aad07359ca51
July 1997
Gregor, Neil
ee3a0bc7-3779-4dd8-ad67-aad07359ca51
Gregor, Neil
(1997)
Big business and the Blitzkriegswirtschaft: Daimler-Benz AG and the mobilisation of the German war economy, 1939-1942.
Contemporary European History, 6 (2), .
(doi:10.1017/S0960777300004525).
Abstract
Since the end of the war itself, research on the German economy during the Second World War has focused – explicitly or implicitly – on the search for an explanation of the disparities in armaments and output between the first and second halves of the war. In the first half of the war, up until the winter of 1941–2, the development of armaments production was characterised by more or less stable levels of output against the background of the series of swift and successful military campaigns in Poland and in the West. This stands in stark contrast to the second half, which witnessed a radical increase in aggregate armaments output which lasted well into the summer of 1944, and which saw tank production reach 589 per cent of the level at which it had stood in January 1942, weapons production reach 382 per cent of its January 1942 level, and aircraft production 367 per cent of its January 1942 level over the same period, to name some of the most obvious successes. These increases were all the more astonishing for the fact that they were achieved against the background of a massive war of attrition on the Eastern Front which placed demands on German resources and drew male labour from German factories into the Wehrmacht on a scale out of all proportion to that experienced in the first half of the war.
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Published date: July 1997
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Local EPrints ID: 394103
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/394103
ISSN: 0960-7773
PURE UUID: 5beb69ee-eeb1-4db8-832f-509471055379
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Date deposited: 26 May 2016 15:20
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 00:16
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