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Detecting Byzantine attacks without clean reference

Detecting Byzantine attacks without clean reference
Detecting Byzantine attacks without clean reference
We consider an amplify-and-forward relay network composed of a source, two relays, and a destination. In this network, the two relays are untrusted in the sense that they may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the destination. Note that every symbol received by the destination may be altered, and hence no clean reference observation is available to the destination. For this type of networks, we identify what kind of Byzantine attacks can be detected in the physical-layer, and further investigate how the channel conditions impact the detection against the identified attacks. Firstly, we show that it is possible to handle a particular kind of Byzantine attacks, where one of the relays carries out an arbitrary attack that allows the stochastic distributions of altered symbols to vary arbitrarily and depend on each other, while the other relay’s hostile behavior embodies a certain stationary stochastic property. Then, we prove that if and only if the network satisfies a non-manipulability condition, such identified Byzantine attacks can be asymptotically detected by only using a sufficiently high number of channel observations. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the detection of the identified attacks, which demonstrates the value of physical-layer security techniques for counteracting Byzantine attacks.
Byzantine attacks, physical layer security, network security, amplify-and-forward relay network, clean reference
1556-6013
2717-2731
Cao, Ruohan
5a033409-9b40-44ac-ad1d-b3261983119b
Wong, Tan F.
286150f6-39f7-48ab-9e88-6b18afc59f4d
Lv, Tiejun
fb465673-1068-4cae-bb94-93ab1dd63f4d
Gao, Hui
d1b095e6-df29-4eb6-b7fb-efa6baf8e162
Yang, Shaoshi
df1e6c38-ff3b-473e-b36b-4820db908e60
Cao, Ruohan
5a033409-9b40-44ac-ad1d-b3261983119b
Wong, Tan F.
286150f6-39f7-48ab-9e88-6b18afc59f4d
Lv, Tiejun
fb465673-1068-4cae-bb94-93ab1dd63f4d
Gao, Hui
d1b095e6-df29-4eb6-b7fb-efa6baf8e162
Yang, Shaoshi
df1e6c38-ff3b-473e-b36b-4820db908e60

Cao, Ruohan, Wong, Tan F., Lv, Tiejun, Gao, Hui and Yang, Shaoshi (2016) Detecting Byzantine attacks without clean reference. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 11 (12), 2717-2731. (doi:10.1109/TIFS.2016.2596140).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We consider an amplify-and-forward relay network composed of a source, two relays, and a destination. In this network, the two relays are untrusted in the sense that they may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the destination. Note that every symbol received by the destination may be altered, and hence no clean reference observation is available to the destination. For this type of networks, we identify what kind of Byzantine attacks can be detected in the physical-layer, and further investigate how the channel conditions impact the detection against the identified attacks. Firstly, we show that it is possible to handle a particular kind of Byzantine attacks, where one of the relays carries out an arbitrary attack that allows the stochastic distributions of altered symbols to vary arbitrarily and depend on each other, while the other relay’s hostile behavior embodies a certain stationary stochastic property. Then, we prove that if and only if the network satisfies a non-manipulability condition, such identified Byzantine attacks can be asymptotically detected by only using a sufficiently high number of channel observations. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the detection of the identified attacks, which demonstrates the value of physical-layer security techniques for counteracting Byzantine attacks.

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1607.05332v1_Byzantine attacks.pdf - Accepted Manuscript
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More information

Published date: 19 September 2016
Keywords: Byzantine attacks, physical layer security, network security, amplify-and-forward relay network, clean reference
Organisations: Southampton Wireless Group

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 394176
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/394176
ISSN: 1556-6013
PURE UUID: f0cf6d92-5a99-4a06-abcd-d904bed35aa4

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Date deposited: 12 May 2016 11:12
Last modified: 14 Aug 2019 18:20

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