The wealth effects of acquiring foreign divested assets
The wealth effects of acquiring foreign divested assets
We compare the wealth effects of acquiring assets from a divesting firm (i.e., acquisitions of divested assets) with the acquisitions of an entire organization (i.e., acquisitions of non-divested targets) abroad. We hypothesize that the ability to select the most valuable assets and leave the unwanted ones behind affords bidders greater flexibility in acquisitions of assets as opposed to acquisitions of non-divested targets. We apply event study methodology on a sample of 2137 cross-border M&As from 1986 to 2009 to test our hypothesis. Consistent with our proposition, we find that bidders fare better in acquisitions of divested assets. Our various market-based measures of performance are overwhelmingly in favor of these kinds of acquirers. Consistent with the wealth effects, we also find that the cost of capital charged to buyers of divisions/subsidiaries/assets of an organization is lower compared to buyers of whole/parent corporations abroad. Overall, our findings suggest that bidders who are in a position to bid for specific divisions or subsidiaries or assets of a foreign corporation rather than acquire the whole corporation can extract larger benefits
235-245
Jory, Surendranath
2624eb24-850a-48f6-b3c6-c96749b87322
Ngo, Thanh N.
54ed0c1a-89c8-4cc0-a5fe-8a4b91490265
April 2015
Jory, Surendranath
2624eb24-850a-48f6-b3c6-c96749b87322
Ngo, Thanh N.
54ed0c1a-89c8-4cc0-a5fe-8a4b91490265
Jory, Surendranath and Ngo, Thanh N.
(2015)
The wealth effects of acquiring foreign divested assets.
International Business Review, 24 (2), .
(doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2014.07.013).
Abstract
We compare the wealth effects of acquiring assets from a divesting firm (i.e., acquisitions of divested assets) with the acquisitions of an entire organization (i.e., acquisitions of non-divested targets) abroad. We hypothesize that the ability to select the most valuable assets and leave the unwanted ones behind affords bidders greater flexibility in acquisitions of assets as opposed to acquisitions of non-divested targets. We apply event study methodology on a sample of 2137 cross-border M&As from 1986 to 2009 to test our hypothesis. Consistent with our proposition, we find that bidders fare better in acquisitions of divested assets. Our various market-based measures of performance are overwhelmingly in favor of these kinds of acquirers. Consistent with the wealth effects, we also find that the cost of capital charged to buyers of divisions/subsidiaries/assets of an organization is lower compared to buyers of whole/parent corporations abroad. Overall, our findings suggest that bidders who are in a position to bid for specific divisions or subsidiaries or assets of a foreign corporation rather than acquire the whole corporation can extract larger benefits
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Accepted/In Press date: 18 July 2014
Published date: April 2015
Organisations:
Southampton Business School
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 394269
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/394269
ISSN: 0969-5931
PURE UUID: ff002aa5-fb8d-46dd-9d9b-c05aebbd38b5
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Date deposited: 12 May 2016 12:39
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:45
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Author:
Thanh N. Ngo
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