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Strategic buyers and privately observed prices

Bergemann, Dirk and Valimaki, Juuso (2002) Strategic buyers and privately observed prices Journal of Economic Theory, 105, (2), pp. 469-482.

Record type: Article


A model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed. The set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring. With private monitoring, i.e., when prices are not observable to the competing sellers, all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payoffs coincides with the stage game subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. This is in sharp contrast to the game with perfect monitoring where the folk theorem obtains. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43.

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Published date: 2002
Keywords: repeated games, private monitoring, collusion


Local EPrints ID: 39629
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: bb83ffd1-6997-4633-b0d2-e51722604456

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Date deposited: 29 Jun 2006
Last modified: 21 Oct 2017 18:47

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Author: Dirk Bergemann
Author: Juuso Valimaki

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