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Dynamic common agency

Dynamic common agency
Dynamic common agency
A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting.
common agency, dynamic bidding, marginal contribution, Markov perfect equilibrium
0022-0531
23-48
Bergeman, Dirk
74490d49-c2bc-4e90-9e13-877ac2d50715
Valimaki, Juuso
6cb468e1-96a7-4632-8db2-906714498ce2
Bergeman, Dirk
74490d49-c2bc-4e90-9e13-877ac2d50715
Valimaki, Juuso
6cb468e1-96a7-4632-8db2-906714498ce2

Bergeman, Dirk and Valimaki, Juuso (2003) Dynamic common agency. Journal of Economic Theory, 111 (1), 23-48. (doi:10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00079-6).

Record type: Article

Abstract

A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a game of agenda setting.

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More information

Published date: 2003
Keywords: common agency, dynamic bidding, marginal contribution, Markov perfect equilibrium

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 39675
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/39675
ISSN: 0022-0531
PURE UUID: 47a1cb6d-25ec-44f0-972d-cb9fe09a326f

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Date deposited: 29 Jun 2006
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:36

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Contributors

Author: Dirk Bergeman
Author: Juuso Valimaki

University divisions

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