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Corruption top down or bottom up?

Corruption top down or bottom up?
Corruption top down or bottom up?
This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.
0095-2583
688-703
Waller, Christopher J.
c1a3afc9-3b1d-4de9-b633-fe91cd236ccc
Verdier, Thierry
87c483ea-f473-408f-9776-d0381cab6454
Gardner, Roy
343c5552-1cd6-480e-815a-57a00e79a374
Waller, Christopher J.
c1a3afc9-3b1d-4de9-b633-fe91cd236ccc
Verdier, Thierry
87c483ea-f473-408f-9776-d0381cab6454
Gardner, Roy
343c5552-1cd6-480e-815a-57a00e79a374

Waller, Christopher J., Verdier, Thierry and Gardner, Roy (2002) Corruption top down or bottom up? Economic Inquiry, 40 (4), 688-703.

Record type: Article

Abstract

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.

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More information

Published date: 2002

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 39686
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/39686
ISSN: 0095-2583
PURE UUID: bb1d6526-526b-473e-b05d-0a00d34f340e

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 29 Jun 2006
Last modified: 22 Jul 2022 20:47

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Contributors

Author: Christopher J. Waller
Author: Thierry Verdier
Author: Roy Gardner

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