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Trembling hand equilibria of plurality voting

Trembling hand equilibria of plurality voting
Trembling hand equilibria of plurality voting
Trembling hand (TH) equilibria were introduced by Selten in 1975. Intuitively, these are Nash equilibria that remain stable when players assume that there is a small probability that other players will choose off-equilibrium strategies. This concept is useful for equilibrium refinement, i.e., selecting the most plausible Nash equilibria when the set of all Nash equilibria can be very large, as is the case, for instance, for Plurality voting with strategic voters. In this paper, we analyze TH equilibria of Plurality voting. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing a TH best response and establish many useful properties of TH equilibria in Plurality voting games. On the negative side, we provide an example of a Plurality voting game with no TH equilibria, and show that it is NP-hard to check whether a given Plurality voting game admits a TH equilibrium where a specific candidate is among the election winners.
440-446
AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Obraztsova, Svetlana
5a201770-908c-44a8-8e22-62cb16d92bf6
Rabinovich, Zinovi
573422bf-523d-466b-a047-7a92917102e7
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Kambhampati, Subbarao
Obraztsova, Svetlana
5a201770-908c-44a8-8e22-62cb16d92bf6
Rabinovich, Zinovi
573422bf-523d-466b-a047-7a92917102e7
Elkind, Edith
7a013473-5cd0-4e41-b907-66b30a04a400
Polukarov, Maria
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Jennings, Nicholas R.
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Kambhampati, Subbarao

Obraztsova, Svetlana, Rabinovich, Zinovi, Elkind, Edith, Polukarov, Maria and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2016) Trembling hand equilibria of plurality voting. Kambhampati, Subbarao (ed.) In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. pp. 440-446 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

Trembling hand (TH) equilibria were introduced by Selten in 1975. Intuitively, these are Nash equilibria that remain stable when players assume that there is a small probability that other players will choose off-equilibrium strategies. This concept is useful for equilibrium refinement, i.e., selecting the most plausible Nash equilibria when the set of all Nash equilibria can be very large, as is the case, for instance, for Plurality voting with strategic voters. In this paper, we analyze TH equilibria of Plurality voting. We provide an efficient algorithm for computing a TH best response and establish many useful properties of TH equilibria in Plurality voting games. On the negative side, we provide an example of a Plurality voting game with no TH equilibria, and show that it is NP-hard to check whether a given Plurality voting game admits a TH equilibrium where a specific candidate is among the election winners.

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Accepted/In Press date: 5 April 2016
e-pub ahead of print date: July 2016
Venue - Dates: 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2016), New York City,, United States, 2016-07-08 - 2016-07-14
Organisations: Electronics & Computer Science

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Local EPrints ID: 396877
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/396877
PURE UUID: d2cd8307-0d00-4f89-9a47-84c7961f4d27

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Date deposited: 16 Jun 2016 08:21
Last modified: 07 Oct 2020 16:40

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Contributors

Author: Svetlana Obraztsova
Author: Zinovi Rabinovich
Author: Edith Elkind
Author: Maria Polukarov
Author: Nicholas R. Jennings
Editor: Subbarao Kambhampati

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