The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden

Nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden
Nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden
If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.
ambient tax, asymmetric information, differential games, moral hazard, nonpoint source pollution
0924-6460
229-251
Karp, Larry S.
aeaa7666-ca88-4f47-85c5-81043cdd8e8a
Karp, Larry S.
aeaa7666-ca88-4f47-85c5-81043cdd8e8a

Karp, Larry S. (2005) Nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden. Environmental and Resource Economics, 31 (2), 229-251. (doi:10.1007/s10640-005-1772-8).

Record type: Article

Abstract

If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.

Full text not available from this repository.

More information

Published date: 2005
Keywords: ambient tax, asymmetric information, differential games, moral hazard, nonpoint source pollution

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 39697
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/39697
ISSN: 0924-6460
PURE UUID: 70e69abe-a57d-4494-aedb-3facdc54380b

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 29 Jun 2006
Last modified: 17 Jul 2017 15:35

Export record

Altmetrics

Contributors

Author: Larry S. Karp

University divisions

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×