When promoters like scalpers

Karp, Larry S. and Perloff, Jeffrey M. (2005) When promoters like scalpers Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, 14, (2), pp. 477-508. (doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00049.x).


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If a monopoly supplies a perishable good, such as tickets to a performance, and is unable to price discriminate within a period, the monopoly may benefit from the potential entry of resellers. If the monopoly attempts to intertemporally price discriminate, the equilibrium in the game among buyers is indeterminate when the resellers are not allowed to enter, and the monopoly's problem is not well defined. An arbitrarily small amount of heterogeneity of information among the buyers leads to a unique equilibrium. We show how the potential entry of resellers alters this equilibrium.
The moment a performance begins, that seat is dead … . It's like fruit. It's perishable. — Jeffrey Seller, producer of Rent. New York Times, July 20, 2003.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00049.x
ISSNs: 1058-6407 (print)
ePrint ID: 39699
Date :
Date Event
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2006
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 21:54
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/39699

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