The value of the virtues
The value of the virtues
I argue that debates about virtue are best settled by clearly distinguishing two questions:
(a)What sort of character trait is there reason to cultivate?
(b)What sort of character trait is there reason (morally) to admire?
With this distinction in mind, I focus on recent accounts of what consequentialists ought to say about virtue, arguing that:
(1)The instrumentalist view of virtue accepted by many prominent consequentialists should not be accepted as the default view for consequentialists to hold.
(2)The main rival view, the appropriate response account, not only avoids the major objection facing the instrumental view, but gives the correct diagnosis of where it goes wrong.
(3)Two objections that seem to face the appropriate response account can in fact be convincingly met in ways which leave it looking stronger.
(4)The appropriate response account is also to be preferred to a disjunctive view or a mixed view.
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Mcelwee, Brian
7e1ceac9-766b-412a-9597-98caab46f07b
March 2015
Mcelwee, Brian
7e1ceac9-766b-412a-9597-98caab46f07b
Abstract
I argue that debates about virtue are best settled by clearly distinguishing two questions:
(a)What sort of character trait is there reason to cultivate?
(b)What sort of character trait is there reason (morally) to admire?
With this distinction in mind, I focus on recent accounts of what consequentialists ought to say about virtue, arguing that:
(1)The instrumentalist view of virtue accepted by many prominent consequentialists should not be accepted as the default view for consequentialists to hold.
(2)The main rival view, the appropriate response account, not only avoids the major objection facing the instrumental view, but gives the correct diagnosis of where it goes wrong.
(3)Two objections that seem to face the appropriate response account can in fact be convincingly met in ways which leave it looking stronger.
(4)The appropriate response account is also to be preferred to a disjunctive view or a mixed view.
Text
The Value of the Virtues Utilitas 2015 Final Version
- Accepted Manuscript
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e-pub ahead of print date: 15 April 2014
Published date: March 2015
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 397378
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/397378
ISSN: 0953-8208
PURE UUID: 8ddee565-3ee9-46a3-8a2f-4691fcc75edf
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Date deposited: 30 Jun 2016 13:47
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 01:13
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