Mcelwee, Brian (2010) Should we de-moralize philosophical ethics? Ratio, 23 (3), 308-321. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00469.x).
Abstract
Some philosophers, such as Roger Crisp and Alastair Norcross, have recently argued that the traditional moral categories of wrongness, permissibility and obligation should be avoided when doing ethical theory. I argue that even if morality does not itself provide reasons for action, the moral categories nevertheless have a central role to play in ethical theory: they allow us to make crucial judgements about how to feel about, and react to, agents who behave in anti-social ways, and they help motivate us to act altruistically.
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