UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES

Politics and International Relations

Climate Change and International Security in the European Union: Discourse and Implications

by

Rafaela Rodrigues de Brito

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2015

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND HUMAN SCIENCES

Politics and International Relations

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISCOURSE AND IMPLICATIONS

Rafaela Belina Rodrigues de Brito

The last two decades have seen the emergence of discourses that depict climate change as a major threat to security. This thesis seeks to explore the consequences of using security narratives to speak about climate change. Focusing on the EU as a case study, the thesis aims to answer two central questions. First, has the climate change and international security discourse become dominant in the way climate change is conceptualised in the EU? Second, has this discourse solidified in concrete policies or institutional arrangements? To this end, I use Maarten Hajer's framework for discourse analysis, which enables the uncovering of the narratives, metaphors and storylines through which climate change is being constructed as a security problem, but also the institutional consequences following from such discourse. I argue that, in the EU, the storyline that depicts climate change as a 'threat multiplier' has managed to gain considerable influence in the EU climate change, and security discursive spaces. While other conceptualisations of the climate problem co-exist, EU climate actors now accept that climate change should be viewed as a security issue. At the same time, EU security actors now include climate change in their comprehensive definition of security. Regarding the policy consequences of the discourse, I contend that these are mainly visible in the context of external climate policies, as the security dimension of climate change is now part of EU climate diplomacy strategies. In addition, climate change considerations have been increasingly included in the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises. These findings, I argue, can shed some light on the normative debate over the securitisation of climate change as a positive or negative concept.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Rafaela Belina Rodrigues de Brito

declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

Thesis title: Climate Change and International Security in the European Union: Discourse and Policy Change

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
2. Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. None of this work has been published before submission:

Signed:.....

Date:.....

Acknowledgements

I am sincerely grateful to my supervisors, Professor David Owen, Professor Will Jennings and Dr. Kamil Zwolski for their support and guidance in the writing up of this thesis. I would also like to thank those who, at different stages of the research, integrated the supervisory team, namely Dr. Claire Sauders, Dr. John Glenn, Dr. Chris Holmes and Professor Rod Rhodes.

I owe a special thank you to Professor Graham Smith, who was my main supervisor during my first two years at Southampton. This thesis would not have been possible without his guidance and encouragement during those early stages of research, as well as his willingness to read its final draft.

I am truly indebted and thankful to each of my interviewees for taking the time to share their knowledge and views with me. My thesis benefited a great deal from their contribution.

Thank you also to my colleagues at Southampton for sharing with me the highs and lows of the PhD journey and for making my time there more enjoyable.

I would not have made it to the end without the support of all my family. I want to express my gratitude to my father, José, for his financial assistance in times of need, even if he thought that I should be looking for a normal job instead. Special thanks are also owed to my brother Diogo and my cousin Samuel for their hours of tedious proofreading. I would also like to thank my partner Avelino for tolerating my ups and downs during the last two years.

Last but not least, I want to thank my mother, Fatima, for loving me unconditionally and for always believing in me, even when I did not believe in myself. I dedicate this thesis to her.

Rafaela Rodrigues de Brito
London, May 2015

Acknowledgment of Funding

I would to thank the Portuguese *Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia* (FCT) for the Doctoral Grant SFRH/BD/71976/2010. Without this grant, the three years of research that led to this thesis would not have been possible.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Southampton for providing the funding that made my fieldwork in Brussels feasible.

Finally, I am grateful also to the Centre for Citizenship, Globalization and Governance of the University of Southampton for its financial support in the undertaking of one essential methods course.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CCIS	Climate Change and International Security
CLIM	European Parliament Temporary Committee on Climate Change
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CS	Copenhagen School of Security Studies
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG CLIMA	European Commission Directorate-General for Climate Action
DG DEVCO	European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG RELEX	European Commission Directorate-General for External Relations
ECHO	EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
EEAS	European External Action Service
EDA	European Defence Agency
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
G8	The Group of Eight Industrialized Nations
HR	High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission

IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MOD	United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PIFS	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNGA	General Assembly of the United Nations
US	United States of America
WBGU	German Advisory Council on Global Change

Chapter 1: Introduction

> We, the human species, are confronting a planetary emergency – a threat to the survival of our civilization
>
> – Al Gore, Nobel Lecture

> […] climate change […] is not an academic exercise but rather a matter of life or death
>
> – Kaire Mbuende, Security Council Speech

Climate change is one of the key issues of our time with anticipated impacts that will affect virtually all aspects of human life. According to the most recent predictions from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013), the 21st century will continue to witness an increase in extreme weather and climate events such as heat waves, heavy precipitation, droughts and extreme high sea level.

Already, deadly natural disasters such as floods in Bangladesh, typhoons in the Philippines and forest fires in Europe have been attributed to the effects of climate change. Climate change has also been acknowledged as a key driver of conflict in Darfur and Syria. In the future, rising sea levels threaten to submerge whole island nations, permanently displacing over 60 million people.

Against this background, the last two decades have seen the emergence of discourses that depict climate change as a major threat to national, international and human security. Numerous actors – including policymakers, analysts and campaigners – have increasingly argued that climate change should be addressed as a security issue due to its potential to create, inter alia, food and water scarcities, political instability, climate refugees and climate induced conflicts.

Given the increasing prominence of political and public discourses linking climate change to security, it is timely to examine the effect of addressing climate change as a security issue. This thesis analyses the policy and institutional consequences

that follow from framing climate change as a security threat, focusing on the European Union (EU) as a case study.

Since the end of the Cold War, academic literature has increasingly debated the effects of securitising non-traditional issues, including the environment. More recently, as climate change became the focus of environmental security research, an academic debate on the implications of establishing a link between climate change and security has emerged.

Mainly drawing on the work of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, researchers have investigated the consequences of using narratives that frame climate change as a security issue. While some analysts anticipate it as a positive development because, they believe, it transforms climate change into a priority for policymakers, a considerable number of analysts have expressed strong concern about establishing a link between climate change and security. Following the assumptions of the Copenhagen framework, analysts who see securitisation as a negative concept, fear that the securitisation of climate change will lead to a militarisation of responses to the climate problem.

In such normative debate over securitisation as a positive or negative concept, writers end up predicting the outcomes of reframing climate change as security according to their own conceptions of security, but generally with little empirical evidence to back their assertions. As a consequence, there is considerable scope for contributions to the normative debate that empirically address the implications of transforming climate change into a security issue.

This thesis seeks to address this gap in research, by analysing a concrete case of securitisation of climate change and assessing its institutional consequences. Using the EU as a case study, I analyse the narratives through which climate change is being constructed as a security issue, as well as the policies and institutional practices resulting from the adoption of such narratives.

1.1 Why the European Union?

In enabling a deeper understanding of the implications of addressing climate change through a security perspective, the EU appears as a valuable case study. Internally, the EU has set itself ambitious mitigation targets, with EU leaders agreeing on the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% compared

to 1990 levels (European Council, 2011: 6). At the external level, the EU has sought to position itself as a global leader in the fight against climate change (Parker and Karlsson, 2010), and is in fact recognised as a leader by many analysts (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007; Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 2008). The active pursuit of leadership in international climate change means that developments in EU climate policies are likely to be disseminated outside the EU and, consequently, affect international policies.

At the same time, the EU is one of the main actors pushing for the integration of climate change in the international security agenda. EU actors have recognised climate change as a threat multiplier, with predicted security impacts that will directly affect European interests (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 2). Concern over the security impacts of climate change, including the exacerbation of conflict in the EU neighbourhood and the intensification of migration, have led EU actors to include climate change as a key threat in the European Security Strategy (ESS).

To implement action on climate security, EU actors have launched a Process on Climate Change and International Security (CCIS), a group of initiatives that aimed to institutionalise a European response to the security implications of climate change. As part of this process, the EU is now seeking to promote an international response to the issue, in its bilateral relations as well as through its work with international organisations such as the United Nations (UN).

By being at the forefront of the securitisation of climate change, the EU is well positioned to provide a valuable in-depth case study for the analysis of climate-security discourses. In addition, as the EU pioneered the adoption of policies aimed to address the security implications of climate change, analysing the emergence and consequences of this discourse presents an opportunity to examine the policy and institutional implications of addressing climate change through a security framework.

1.2 Theoretical Framework and Research Design

As discussed above, being one of the first political entities to identify climate change as a security threat and a pioneer in adopting climate-security policies, the EU provides an interesting revelatory case study. As such, analysing the EU

discourse on climate change and international security presents an opportunity to study a phenomenon that was previously inaccessible to researchers.

The main aim of this thesis is to understand how the emergence of this discourse is being taken up in practice and what sort of policy and institutional changes (if any) the discourse is producing. To this end, the research builds on argumentative discourse analysis, a framework developed by Maarten A. Hajer (1995; 2009) which enables the understanding of how discourses are played out in environmental policy-making.

Hajer's discourse analytical approach assesses the influence of a discourse by measuring discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation. Discourse structuration occurs when a new discourse starts to dominate the way a given social unit conceptualises the world (Hajer, 2005: 303). In other words, a discourse becomes structured in a political unit when its main narratives and storylines become part of the way central actors speak of a given problem in that unit.

Discourse institutionalisation is the process whereby the theoretical concepts of a given discourse are translated into concrete policies and institutional practices (Hajer, 1995: 61). Because different ways of defining a problem advocate different policy solutions, a discourse becomes institutionalised in a given political unit when the specific solutions it proposes give way to new policy instruments or new institutional practices.

Therefore, in addition to discursive change, the approach enables the identification of policy and institutional change resulting from new discourses. Using this framework, I believe, avoids immersing the analysis in traditionalistic security debates, which has been characteristic of previous research drawing on the Copenhagen securitisation framework.

The two central research questions in the thesis build on Hajer's discourse analytical framework. The first question concerns the structuration of the discourse. More precisely, it asks whether the climate change and international security discourse has become dominant in the way climate change is conceptualised in the EU. To examine the structuration of the CCIS discourse in the EU, I seek to understand whether CCIS metaphors and storylines have become an integral part of the way EU actors understand climate change and its consequences.

The second central question in the thesis asks whether the CCIS discourse has led to policy or institutional change. This question aims to assess what Hajer terms discourse institutionalisation. As such, I seek to understand whether the CCIS discourse has led to changes in policies and instruments, or even to the creation of new structures such as committees and working groups.

To answer the two central questions in the thesis, the research combines the analysis of official documents with elite interviews. Given the focus on discourse, official EU documents are essential to understand the structuring concepts and ideas of the CCIS discourse. The analysis of official documents is complemented with in-depth semi-structured interviews with central actors in the CCIS process, to understand the context in which the CCIS discourse emerged, as well as to identify evidence of policy and institutional consequences of the said discourse.

To analyse the data generated by both official documents and interviews, the research uses qualitative textual analysis to uncover argumentative structures such as the metaphors and storylines through which climate change is constructed as a security issue and how they relate to policy solutions.

The time frame for the research spans the period from 2003 to 2014. While the CCIS discourse mostly developed from 2006 in the EU (see chapter 4), in order to understand how it relates to established discourses, the analysis begins earlier. The year 2003 was chosen because, while climate change was already established as an issue in the EU at this point in time, it was the point in time when the EU's security identity was defined with the publication of the first ever European Security Strategy.

The research is restricted to the analysis of the specific discourse on climate change and international security that emerged in the EU around 2006 with the so-called CCIS Process (see chapter 4). While other specialised discourses such as water security, food security and energy security have close associations with climate change, they encompass concerns that are beyond the climate issue. For example, while energy security - which has become quite prominent in the EU as a major policy area - is frequently discussed in the context of climate change, it is more connected with other concerns. As Richard Youngs (2009: 2) has pointed out, energy security became an urgent concern within the EU due to 'a combination of high oil prices, demand and supply trends and the nature of political developments in a number of crucial energy providers'.

From a discursive point of view, the energy security discourse draws on storylines that are distinct from the broader climate change and international security discourse. As discussed later in the thesis, the EU CCIS discourse draws mainly on the storyline of climate change as a 'threat multiplier', which is predominantly concerned with the external effects of climate change, especially how climate change will impact on conflict drivers in developing countries. The EU energy security discourse, in comparison, focuses on storylines such as 'security of supply' and the 'coordination of national energy policies'.

Hence, while energy issues have undeniable connections to climate change, the discourses of energy security and of climate change and international security need to be addressed independently. This thesis focuses on the latter discourse only.

By analysing the discourse through which climate change is being constructed as a security issue in the EU, as well as whether and how this discourse is transforming policies and institutional practices, this thesis seeks to contribute to the debate over the securitisation of climate change as a positive or negative development.

1.3 Overview of the Thesis

In the next chapter I present and discuss existing literature on the links between environmental issues and security. The chapter covers academic literature spanning from the 1970s – when redefinitions of security to encompass environmental risks were first proposed – to the more recent focus on the links between climate change and security. Since the early 2000s, climate change has taken the centre stage in discussions about environment and security as it is increasingly viewed as the most pressing environmental issue facing the world. I analyse the main contributions in the literature that discusses the potential threats posed by climate change to national, international and human security, as well as the normative debate surrounding such analysis.

Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical framework and methods used in the research. Following from a debate of the strengths and shortcomings of the Copenhagen School securitisation framework – which has been the preferred approach to the analysis of discourses of climate change and security – I propose an alternative

framework to carry out this task. Hence, I introduce Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis as a key tool in the understanding of how the emergence and acceptance of a given conceptual language is taken up in practice and the sort of institutional innovations such discourse brings about. The chapter then turns to present the research methods, starting with a discussion of the use of single case studies to investigate phenomena in depth. It then discusses the methods employed for accessing and generating data, as well as for analysing that data.

The first empirical chapter, chapter 4, addresses the emergence of the climate and security discourse in the EU. Focusing on the period between 2006 and 2008 when CCIS began to be sketched as a discourse, the chapter has two main aims. First, to provide context through the description of the main events that led to the emergence of a climate change and international security discourse in the EU. Second, the chapter also intends to be analytical as it identifies and discusses the main metaphors and storylines that construct climate change as a security issue in the EU. In addition, it identifies the main actors in the emerging discourse coalition on climate change and international security, as well as the practices through which these actors have sought to disseminate the new discourse.

Chapter 5 assesses the impact of the climate change and international security discourse in the EU climate change sphere. Following Hajer's discourse analytical framework, the impact of a discourse is measured in terms of discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation. Hence, the chapter is divided in two main parts. The first part aims to understand whether the central actors in the climate change discursive space have accepted the rhetorical power of the new discourse and, consequently, whether the new discourse has started to dominate the way in which climate change is conceptualised in the EU. The second part of the chapter analyses whether the EU climate change and international security discourse has transformed climate policies and institutional practices.

Chapter 6 looks at the impact of climate change and international security discourse in the EU security sphere. Mirroring the structure of the previous chapter, the first part of the chapter addresses the structuration of the climate change and international security discourse in the EU security discursive space. In the second part, the analysis turns to the analysis of the impacts of the discourse in EU security policies.

Finally, in the Conclusion I reflect on the findings presented in the previous chapters, seeking to understand what they mean for international climate governance. Given the normative debate on the links between climate change and security, and through the findings of the EU case study, the chapter will discuss what it actually means to address climate change through a security perspective.

Chapter 2: From Environmental Security to Climate Security: a Critical Review of the Literature

After the end of the Cold War, the traditional security approach became increasingly criticized for its military and state-centric agenda. Critics argued for the broadening and deepening of security studies, to include non-military threats and other referent objects of security beyond the state (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 187). In this context, environmental problems, and more recently climate change, have emerged as new security issues.

This chapter provides a critical overview of the main academic literature on the environment and security more broadly, as well as on climate change and security more specifically. As such, the chapter is divided in two main parts. The first one looks at the emergence and development of research on the links between environment and security. The aim is to contextualise this literature and to give an account of its main debates. This review provides an important context for the subsequent emergence of literature addressing specifically the links between climate change and security, which has become the focus of the environment and security debate.

The second part of the chapter focuses specifically on research on climate change and security. While aiming to give an account of the key debates in this literature, it also seeks to identify its main gaps, as well as show how the research in this thesis aims to bridge those gaps.

2.1 The Environment and Security

Towards the end of the Cold War, environmental security emerged as a concept, opening up new debates regarding 'the nature of the threat, the appropriate referent object of security and also the meaning of security itself' (Floyd, 2008: 51).

In the next paragraphs I analyse academic literature on environmental security. For analytical purposes, I divide the literature in three main phases. Although these overlap to a great extent, the first phase of environment and security research focused predominantly on environmental degradation as a threat to national security, the second one sought to develop empirical research on the links between environmental degradation and conflict, and the last phase focused on the impacts of environmental problems on human security.

2.1.1 The first proponents: environment as a threat to national security

Although environmental security became more visible as a concept with the end of the Cold War, in the 1970s scholars had already began to critique conventional security discourse and practice for its inability to manage environmental risks. Richard A. Falk (1971), for example, argued that mankind was endangered by a crisis of planetary proportions, caused by the interaction of wars, population pressures, insufficiency of resources and environmental overload. In the context of this crisis, he argued that the emphasis on national military power was inadequate to assure the survival of mankind.

Lester Brown (1977) also warned that national defence establishments were useless against new threats caused directly or indirectly from the changing relationship between humanity and the earth's natural systems and resources. Ecological stresses and resource scarcities, he argued, would later translate into economic stresses that would ultimately convert into social unrest and political instability (Brown, 1977: 37). As a result, Brown argued for a better distribution of public resources to address both the traditional military threats and the newer th reats to national security.

From the 1980s criticism of the excessively narrow definition of national security increased. Authors such as Richard H. Ullman (1983), Norman Myers (1989), Jessica Tuchman Mathews (1989), and Arthur H. Westing (1989) argued for a re-definition of the concept of national security that went beyond military reasoning and encompassed environmental issues.

One of the arguments for making the environment a component of the concept of security was the idea that environmental degradation had the potential to cause violent conflict over resources (Mathews, 1989; Ullman, 1983; Westing, 1989).

However, this was not the exclusive focus, as resource scarcities were predicted to affect national security in many different and more direct ways (Ullman, 1983: 139), particularly through economic decline and consequent political instability (Mathews 1989; Myers, 1989).

While these proponents emphasised the underestimated relationship between the environment and security, sceptics either rejected such relationship or downplayed its significance (Rønnfeldt, 1997: 473). Notably, Daniel Deudney (1990) strongly opposed linking environmental degradation and national security because, he argued, this link was dangerous and self-defeating. Deudney believed that security had a nationalistic appeal that would undermine the globalist political sensibility that was needed to address environmental issues. In addition, he anticipated the link would engage the wrong type of institutions to deal with environmental problems, namely national security institutions (Deudney,1990: 465).

Deudney also downplayed the significance of claims that environmental degradation could cause violent conflicts. He argued, that the robust character of the world trade system and the increasing difficulty to exploit foreign resources through territorial conquest, would make it unlikely for environmental degradation to cause interstate wars (Deudney, 1990: 470)

The above mentioned group of writings is referred to in the literature as corresponding to the first generation of environment and security research (Dalby et al., 2009; Rønnfeldt 1997). Dalby et al. highlight how during this phase environmental security emerged as a discourse in the United States (US), focusing on the environment as a threat to national security (Dalby et al., 2009: 781). In fact, although some authors see the individual and/or the environment itself as referent objects of security (Ullman, 1983; Westing 1989), security is still predominantly equated in terms of national security. Rita Floyd points out that, even though these writers had a broad interpretation of security, they chose to advocate environmental security as a national security issue because they realised that their voices were more likely to be heard if they remained within the traditional state-centric reading of security (Floyd, 2008: 52).

2.1.2 The second phase: environmental degradation and conflict

While the first phase of environment and security research was characterised by a conceptual debate on whether environmental issues should be incorporated into the security agenda, in a second phase researchers sought to investigate the assumptions of the first phase and to operationalise the concepts in field research (Dalby, et al. 2009: 781). From the early 1990s, researchers responded to criticisms regarding the lack of empirical evidence to back up claims (Rønnfeldt, 1997: 475).

The most influential research was conducted by Thomas Homer-Dixon and his team in the University of Toronto. Arguing that the environment-security theme was too encompassing, Homer-Dixon proposed to narrow the scope of this research problem by focusing on how environmental change affected acute national and international conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 77).

Working with selected case studies, Homer-Dixon's research sought to develop a theory of causal links between severe environmental scarcity and violence. While this research found little empirical evidence to support the claim that resource scarcity would cause conflict between states, it found 'substantial evidence to support the hypothesis that environmental scarcity causes large population movement, which in turn causes group-identity conflicts' (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 20).

However, research supporting a relationship between the environment and armed conflict was also criticised by a number of authors from a methodological point of view. Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998), for example, highlighted various shortcomings of this research, including the neglect of important variables such as political and economic factors which have a strong influence on conflict and mediate the influence of resource and environmental factors. Also Marc A. Levy (1995) highlighted the complexity of the phenomenon of conflict and questioned the possibility of isolating the independent contribution of environmental degradation. According to Levy (1995: 58), there appeared to be no purely environmental mechanisms leading to conflict and, consequently, focusing on environmental issues was misguided.

Regarding the work of Homer-Dixon in particular, Gleditsch argued that some models had become so large and complex that they were virtually untestable (1998: 390). For Levy (1995), Homer-Dixon's results were explained by a central

flaw in the research program: Homer-Dixon and colleagues only investigated cases where environmental damage and conflict were underway or imminent. In the writer's opinion, in order to identify the conditions under which environmental degradation generates violent conflict and when it does not, research should compare societies facing similar environmental problems but exhibiting different levels of violent conflict (Levy, 1995: 57).

Overall, the second generation of environment and security research was characterised by methodological and empirical discussions. According to Dalby et al. (2009: 782), what emerged from this debate was a recognition that environmental degradation was less likely to lead to international violent conflict than had been supposed in the first phase.

2.1.3 The third phase: environmental degradation and human security

While research in the second phase narrowed the scope of environmental security by focusing on conflict, by the mid-1990s researchers were discussing environmental impacts on other dimensions of security. Moreover, concerns moved away from the scope of national security and focused more on the impact of environmental issues on human security. Nina Græger (1996: 112), for instance, argued that, given the high level of international interdependence regarding security and the environment, the question of environmental security should be posed at the regional and global level, focusing on individuals as the primary unit, rather than on states.

Another characteristic of this phase is that it resumed and expanded the normative debate on the implications of linking environment and security which was characteristic of the first phase. Although the majority of writers agreed that the degradation of the natural environment could threaten security in some way, there was disagreement on whether the environment should be linked to security. Hence the focus of research was not so much on determining if environmental degradation *was* a security issue, but whether it *should be* addressed as a security issue.

On the one hand, the securitisation of the environment was acknowledged a positive role, mainly because it was seen to attribute a sense of urgency to environmental issues and attract political support as a consequence (Græger,

1996: 111; Matthew, 1995: 16). However, there was also strong concern in the literature that linking environment and security could represent a militarisation of the thinking about the environment (Brock, 1991: 419; Elliott, 2004: 218) or lead to a state-centred approach to environmental problems (Græger, 1996: 111).

As Richard A. Matthew has noted, disagreements regarding the advantages and disadvantages of linking the environment and security 'reflect different levels of analysis, different interpretations of empirical evidence and causal chains, and different normative biases' (Matthew 1999a: 11). Despite the differences, Matthew (1999b: 293) argues that this debate has been key in elevating the profile of environmentalism in the security community of academics and policymakers.

2.2 Climate Change and Security

The review of the literature on environmental security sets out the context for the emergence of research on the links between the specific issue of climate change and security. Climate change has become the focus of the environment and security debate because it is increasingly viewed as the most pressing environmental issue facing the world.

Overall, the climate and security debate seems to differ from the previous environmental security debate on the fact that it is not possible to distinguish waves or phases of research in a temporal sense. However, it is possible to differentiate four main themes in the climate security research, which mirror the different themes in environmental security research: climate change and national security, climate change and human security, climate change and conflict, and a normative debate on whether climate change should be addressed as a security issue.

Following these divisions, this section reviews the main literature on climate change and security. It starts however by looking at writings produced by think tanks, which in addition to informing policy debates on the links between climate change and security, set the scene for subsequent scholarly work on the issue.

2.2.1 First wave of proponents

The first writings on the links between climate change and security were produced by think tanks and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), in an attempt to call attention to the issue. A 2003 report commissioned by the US Department of Defense outlined an abrupt climate change scenario and explored how such a scenario could destabilise the geopolitical environment, leading to violent conflict over limited resources (Schwartz and Randall, 2003: 2). The report suggested that, given its potentially dire consequences, the risk of abrupt climate change should be elevated to a US national security concern (Schwartz and Randall, 2003: 3).

Also in the US, a military advisory board, composed of retired military officers, warned that the projected impacts of climate change would pose a serious threat to America's national security (CNA Corporation, 2007). According to the panel, climate change would act as a threat multiplier, causing widespread political instability and the likelihood of state failure. These tensions would then increase migratory pressures for the US and Europe (CNA Corporation 2007: 6). They recommended the full integration of the security consequences of climate change into national security and national defence strategies.

In 2007, a study by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), clearly identified climate change as a threat to security, arguing that it would 'overstretch many societies' adaptive capacities within the coming decades (…) jeopardizing national and international security to a new degree' (WBGU, 2007: 1). The report argued that climate change amplified mechanisms of insecurity and violence, thus creating climate-induced conflict constellations, and identified a number of regional hotspots for security risks associated with climate change (WBGU, 2007: 3). Among the threats to international stability and security identified were the proliferation of weak and fragile states, an increase in international distributional conflicts, the intensification of migration and an increase in the potential for violent conflict (WBGU, 2007: 5-6).

Also in 2007, International Alert, an international NGO supported by the UK Department for International Development, warned that the effects of climate change would add to other pressures in under-developed states, increasing the risk of violent conflict (Smith and Vivekananda, 2007). They highlighted four key elements of risk, namely political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity and large-scale migration. The authors identified 46 states with high-risk of

climate induced armed conflict and a further group of 56 states with risk of violent climate induced conflict over the longer term (Smith and Vivekananda, 2007: 17).

The publication of these reports was followed by an increased engagement of the academic community with the issue of climate change and security.

2.2.2 Climate Change and National Security

One of the ways in which climate change has been addressed in academic literature is through the lens of national security. This is particularly apparent in the US, where a considerable number of writers have focused on understanding the national security implications of climate change. Joshua Busby (2007), for example, has argued that despite lacking human intentionality, climate change can constitute a threat to national security. According to Busby (2008: 500), even if one takes a narrow definition of national security, 'climate change likely poses a national security risk for the US and its overseas interests, particularly from extreme weather events that may directly affect the US homeland and countries of strategic concern'.

Also Campbell and Parthemore (2008) have argued that climate change has become accepted alongside comparable threats to national security. The authors developed three scenarios based on expected, severe, and catastrophic climate cases and asked national security experts to consider how the projected environmental effects could affect peace and stability. According to their results, in the case of expected climate change, the national security impacts could include internal and cross-border tensions caused by large-scale migrations, conflicts over resources, increased disease proliferation, economic consequences and geopolitical reordering. The national security implications in the case of severe climate change included massive nonlinear societal events, armed conflict and the possibility nuclear war, while in a severe scenario 'the world will be caught in an age where sheer survival is the only goal' (Campbell and Parthemore, 2008: 19).

More recently, Daniel Moran (2011) coordinated a country level analysis that sought to determine the intermediate-term security risks that climate change may pose to the US, its allies and to regional and global order. Considering climate

change impacts in triggering disruptive change, the likelihood of conflict or migration, the risk of state failure, social resilience and ingenuity in societies and behaviours of the state, Moran argued that the most significant consequences of climate change during the next few decades are likely to arise from human response to natural phenomena, rather than the phenomena itself (Moran, 2011: 5).

Despite this, a number of writers have opposed the view that climate change should be linked to national security. For Jon Barnett, for example,

> the crux of the problem is that national security discourse and practice tends to appropriate all alternative security discourses no matter how antithetical. It absorbs and then militarises and nationalises other security problems and referents in ways that neutralise their efficacy whilst maintaining the power of the security establishment (2003: 11).

Also W. Neil Adger (2010: 281) highlights the dangers of framing climate change as a national security issue, which underemphasises the equity and individual security dimensions of the issue and distorts decision-making.

2.2.3 Climate Change and Human Security

Climate change has also been addressed as a human security issue. This literature focuses on the threat climate change poses to basic human rights. Addressing issues of equity, ethics and environmental justice, Karen O'Brien et al. (2010) have sought to show how human security can serve as a critical lens through which climate change can be discussed, analysed and addressed. From this perspective, the authors argued, it is possible to link environmental changes directly to the factors that create and perpetuate poverty, vulnerability and insecurity (O'Brien et al. 2010: 215).

Similarly, Adger (2010) proposed examining climate change through a human-centred view of security, which emphasises issues of vulnerability, capacity to adapt, equity and justice. In this view, climate security is a state whereby individuals and localities have the necessary options to respond to threats to their human, environmental and social well-being imposed by climate change, and have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options (Adger, 2010: 281).

Christian Webersik (2010) also argued that climate change impacts are primarily a human security issue. According to the author, it is important to focus on individuals because they are both agents of change and victims of climate change impacts. This approach highlights the importance of climate change impacts on social interactions, rather than focusing on the causes of climate change, shifting the focus to adaptation and resilience (Webersik, 2010: 127).

Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger (2007) have linked the human security impacts of climate change with conflict. They started by showing how climate change may undermine human security by reducing access to natural resources that are important to sustain livelihoods. This, in conjunction with reduced state capacity resulting from climate change, may in certain circumstances increase the risk of violent conflict, the authors argue (Barnett and Adger, 2007: 640).

2.2.4 Climate change and conflict

The link between climate change and conflict has been one of the focuses of the climate change and security debate – both in the traditional national security conception or the human security conception. In a similar way to the earlier debate on environment and security, the first wave of writings about the potential of climate change to create conflict was promptly criticised for its lack of empirical evidence.

Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2007: 628), for example, criticised government and IGO-sponsored focus on climate conflict, for being mostly based on secondary sources, largely unsubstantiated by evidence and not backed up by peer-reviewed studies. They argued for the need for a more systematic theoretical and empirical assessment of the potential security implications of climate change. Idean Salehyan (2008: 317) also pointed out the pitfalls of what he termed 'deterministic' approaches, which place the emphasis on structural features of the environment rather than on social processes and the decision making capacity of actors. He argued that future empirical research must take into account how, given the reality of climate change, political processes and institutions shape the incentives of actors to engage in violence (Salehyan, 2008: 320).

Attempts have been made to address this issue. Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal (2007), for example, have developed testable hypotheses about the

expected relationships between climate change and violent conflict and concluded that demographic and environmental variables only have a very moderate effect on the risk of civil conflict, being second to other drivers of armed conflict. Cullen S. Hendrix and Sarah M. Glaser (2007) estimated the impact of both long term trends and short term triggers on the onset of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and argued that, although both variables have a significant impact on the likelihood of conflict onset, interannual variability in rainfall is a more significant determinant of conflict.

Richard S. J. Tol and Sebastian Wagner (2010) looked quantitatively at the relationship between climate change and violent conflict in Europe. Investigating the period from 1000 to 2000, they found that conflict was more intense during colder periods, although the relationship weakens in the industrialised era (Tol and Wagner, 2010: 67). Drawing comparisons with previous studies with similar results, Tol and Wagner (2010) argue that it appears that global warming does not lead to an increase in violent conflict.

Despite the attempts to construct a more sophisticated and carefully conducted empirical analysis of the nexus between climate change and armed conflict, the general impression in the literature is that empirical research on these links is at a very early stage. Moreover, there is wide agreement that the links between climate change effects and violent conflict are very difficult to assess. Subsequent work on the links generally acknowledges that it is highly improbable that climate change will lead directly to conflict but argue that it can interact with other factors, thus increasing the risk of conflict.

Analysing the impact of climate change on state failure and conflict, Jeffrey Mazo (2009) concluded that the environmental impacts of climate change are only one small input into a complex and dynamic system. However, Mazo argued that climate change interacts with economic, social and political factors, affecting state stability. While he predicted that climate change will contribute to instability and conflict in various regions over the next few decades, he argued that the conflict in Darfur can already be labelled the first modern climate-change conflict (Mazo, 2009: 74).

Scheffran and Battaglini (2010: 30) also argued that, although the research literature does not provide sufficient evidence to support a clear causal relationship between climate impacts and conflict, ‘by triggering a cycle of environmental degradation, economic decline, social unrest and political

instability, climate change may become a crucial issue in security and conflict'. They categorised possible paths to conflict into four major conflict constellations, namely water stress, food insecurity, natural disasters and migration. As the climate change effects in developing countries could trigger population movements and regional conflicts, they argued that developed countries cannot ignore the economic impacts and the migratory pressures and may be drawn into climate-induced conflicts in regions that are hit hardest (Scheffran and Battaglini, 2010: 37).

2.2.5 The Normative Debate

A considerable amount of academic literature has discussed the implications of linking climate change to security. The focus of this debate is not on whether climate change has the potential to threaten the security of states and individuals, as most writers acknowledge it does in some way, but more on the consequences of using narratives that frame climate change as a security issue.

The underlying issue in this normative debate regards the existence of different understandings of security. As Floyd (2008: 63) pointed out, 'the literature shows that those that speak security to climate change often mean entirely different, even opposing things'. As demonstrated in the previous sections of this chapter, while some actors, for example, conceive of security as the defence of national sovereignty, others have a more human-centred conception of security.

Following different assumptions regarding the meaning of security, some analysts acknowledge a positive role for the securitisation of climate change, mainly because it is seen to attribute a sense of urgency to the issue (Barnett, 2003), speeding the implementation of mitigation and adaptation policies (Brown et al., 2007: 1154). The concept of security is also seen by some as being able to encapsulate danger much better than other concepts such as sustainability, vulnerability or adaptation (Barnett, 2003: 14).

However, there is also a strong concern in the literature that linking climate change to security could lead to a state-centric approach to climate change (Detraz, 2011: 106). Perhaps even more significant, are fears that securitising climate change would lead to a militarisation of the responses to the issue, which would be counterproductive (Barnett, 2003; Brown et al., 2007). While authors

such as Dabelko (2009: 18), for example, stress that military actors commonly possess significant engineering and medical capacity that can be valuable for dealing with the impacts of climate change, many fear that climate change might be used as a justification for military intervention (Hartmann, 2010: 242). These concerns regard especially the links between climate change and conflict, which are closer to a traditional approach to security (Brown et al., 2007: 1154; Detraz, 2011: 114)

In order to address this normative debate, a number of researchers have analysed discourses that link climate change and security with the aim of understanding what type of measures these discourses promote.

Hans Günter Brauch (2009), for example, has analysed the discourse of scientists, policy analysts and representatives of states and international organisations. The author identifies the year of 2007 as a turning point in the process of securitisation of climate change due to the fact that several governments and experts addressed climate change as a major security danger with potential to lead to internal displacements, forced migration, as well as crises and conflicts (Brauch, 2009: 65). Brauch identified three distinct framings of climate change as a security issue, according to the referent object that is seen to be threatened. Hence, while most EU countries discuss climate change in terms of international security, in the US climate change is primarily framed as a matter of 'national' security. In the countries of the Human Security Network, Brauch argues, climate change is viewed as a threat to human security.

Nicole Detraz (2011) has also examined connections between security and climate change in academic, media and policy discourses. In comparing the data across these sources, she identified two main storylines through which climate change is discussed: environmental conflict and environmental security. According to the author, the environmental conflict discourse includes concerns about violent conflicts, environmental migration, state instability, and the threats that each of these elements poses for the international security in general. Discourses that draw on the environmental security storyline, on the other hand, tend to focus on the human security implications, including food security, health problems, and poverty issues (Detraz, 2011: 114).

Detraz found that most of the texts analysed used both the environmental conflict and environmental security narratives, although there were slightly more texts using the former. Assuming that policymakers' actions on climate change

will largely depend on how they perceive the issue, Detraz (2011: 115) showed concern that if the environmental conflict discourse dominates the debate, policies may focus on state security over human security, 'drawing attention away from existing human vulnerabilities like extreme poverty and loss of livelihood'.

In a similar vein, Matt McDonald (2013) has sought to map the multiple ways in which actors conceive of the relationship between security and climate change. Looking at discourses on climate security by a number of actors, including policymakers, lobbyists, environmental advocates and academic analysts, McDonald (2013: 49) asked 'who is in need of being secured, from what threat, by what actors, and through what means'. He distinguished four main discourses of climate security, namely national security, human security, international security and ecological security. He argued that, those discourses that have achieved most prominence and political support are not those that could feasibly inform an effective global response to global climate change, but rather the discourses of national and international security which are oriented around the preservation of the status-quo (McDonald, 2013: 49).

Even though these authors focus their analysis on the discourses of climate security, their conclusions regarding the effects of securitising climate change are still predominantly based on their own interpretation of the different narratives. There are only a few examples of empirical analyses of the political consequences of such narratives. Mostly drawing on the framework of securitisation of the Copenhagen School, these writers seek to understand what concrete measures have emerged from framing climate change as a security issue.

Michael Brzoska (2012), for instance, has analysed the effects of the securitisation of climate change specifically on the security sector. Brzoska looked at national security strategies and defence planning documents from over thirty different countries and asked whether climate change was seen as a security issue, what type of measures were advocated to deal with the issue and whether any measures had already been adopted. The author found that although climate change has become widely accepted as a security issue among security elites, 'the climate change and security nexus largely remains a rhetorical figure in security strategies with little effect in security policy and planning' (Brzoska, 2012: 175). Nevertheless, Brzoska stressed that the overwhelming majority of security documents analysed promote disaster management as the prime activity for the armed forces in climate security.

Focusing on governmental discourse in the US and Europe, research conducted by Maria Julia Trombetta (2008) has sought to understand whether and how climate and security discourses were transforming security practices. According to the author, appeals to security in these discourses have 'emphasized the relevance of preventive, nonconfrontational measures and the importance of other actors than states in providing security' (Trombetta, 2008: 600). As a result, Trombetta (2008: 586) argues that climate security discourses are challenging existing security practices, bringing about new roles for security actors and different means to provide security.

Regarding the outcomes of securitising climate change, Trombetta argues that it has mobilised political action and attempts to institutionalise the debate at an international level. More specifically, she argued, it has persuaded the Bush administration to undertake discussion on emissions reduction, contributed to the formulation of the Bali Roadmap, and contributed to the development of a common energy policy in the European Union.

Delf Rothe (2012) analysed the use of security discourses in international climate negotiations. Focusing on the period between 2007 and 2009, which includes pre-negotiations of the COP15 in Copenhagen as well as the UN Summit on Climate Change in September 2009, the author concludes that 'the securitisation of climate change is a highly contested, interactive process where different argumentations and very different security conceptions are applied' (Rothe, 2012: 253).

According to the author, this process of argumentation around the concepts of war, struggle and security has two apparently contradictory policy implications. On the one hand, climate change is becoming a matter of high politics. On the other hand, the author warns, the process can lead to the de-politicization of international climate governance. According to Rothe, by constructing climate change as an external enemy, storylines on climate change and security blur fundamental socio-political antagonisms between different actors in the negotiations. In addition, the notion of urgency reinforces the view that there is no alternative to a global climate deal, reducing political options. As a consequence, Rothe (2012: 254) argued, negotiations focus on a very narrow set of technical matters while 'fundamental political decisions concerning the Western way of life, and the impossibility of infinite growth are excluded'.

Zwolski and Kaunert (2011) analysed the role of the EU in developing the security dimension of climate change. The authors have identified a group of EU officials, member states and think tank activists, which has since 2007 been promoting a norm on climate security in the EU. This group of actors, brought together in the EU Steering Group on Climate Change and International Security, can be considered an epistemic community on climate security. Regarding policy implications, Zwolski and Kaunert (2011: 32) identify the activities of the 'Steering Group' as the major policy outcome of the epistemic community. The authors argue that the EU Steering Group has been successful in diffusing climate security norms within the EU and at the UN level.

These writers make a significant contribution to the research on the links between climate change and security because their analyses start to shed some lights on the policy implications of addressing climate change through a security perspective. However, it can be argued that this research remains very speculative, as it does not provide enough empirical evidence to support claims. For example, Trombetta (2008: 598) asserts that the framing of climate change as security played a decisive role in the re-engagement of the US in climate politics. However, the connection is not made clear.

This can be explained by the relatively recent emergence of climate and security discourses. The fact that these authors are investigating early stages of the securitisation process means that policy outcomes may not be visible yet. This can, at least in part, explain why most authors identify a mismatch between rhetoric and action. While researchers of climate change securitisation have established that climate change is increasingly acknowledged as a security issue by policymakers, they argue that this rhetoric is not matched by significant policy measures. As such, authors have until now looked for clues of potential institutional impacts in the discourse itself.

Overall, what the literature shows is that the normative debate is far from being resolved. As research has not yet been able to trace substantive policy change as a result of discourses linking climate change to security, much is still in the open. As a result, authors' predictions regarding the outcomes of securitisation are still very much based on their own understandings of security. As Floyd (2008: 63) eloquently puts it, at present the securitisation of climate change can be described as a 'double-edged sword'. On the one hand, addressing climate change as a security threat can be instrumental in elevating the issue to the top of the policy-making agendas due to the fact that security constitutes a high

politics matter par excellence. On the other hand, it can have adverse effects that are connected to traditional understandings of security. As such, there is a need for further research that addresses the main assumptions of the normative debate more systematically.

2.3 Contribution to the Literature

This thesis contributes to the normative debate on the linkage of climate change to security by analysing a specific climate-security discourse. In doing so, the research seeks to address some of the gaps in existing literature.

First, as suggested above, analysis of the links between climate change and security remains very focused on the discursive features of different narratives, with conclusions regarding the effects of securitising climate change based on little or no empirical investigation. In order to address this gap, this thesis seeks to analyse the effects of employing such narratives of climate change. To do so, the research combines discourse analysis with in-depth interviews to identify evidence of policy and institutional consequences of the climate change and international security discourse.

Moreover, most analyses of the securitisation of climate change are very broad in scope. With the exception of Zwolski and Kaunert (2011), the literature focuses on climate security discourses across an extensive range of actors, making it difficult to trace policy change. Grouping narratives together, although very useful for conceptual mapping, does not allow the researcher to understand how different actors adapt the climate security arguments to their political realities. This thesis, analyses the specific EU discourse on climate change and international security, to enable a deeper understanding of the implications of addressing climate change through a security perspective.

Finally, while one of the main issues in the normative debate regards fears of militarisation of climate change, the majority of the literature has thus far focused on the effects of securitisation on climate policies. In order to provide a more balanced analysis, further research needs to look also at the impact of climate security discourses in security policies. This thesis takes a comprehensive approach, examining the effects of the climate change and international security

discourse in EU climate policies, EU security policies, as well as other policy areas that are seen to contribute to security, namely development cooperation.

To address the above identified gaps in the literature, this thesis uses an alternative theoretical approach to the analysis of the securitisation of climate change. While this issue has been predominantly analysed through the lenses of the Copenhagen School (see chapter 3), I use a conceptual approach based on Maarten Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis (ADA) to examine the discourses through which climate change is being constructed as a security issue in the EU. This approach brings added value to the study of climate security discourses because it enables the understanding of how such discourses play out in policy-making and institutional re-ordering. [1]

In addition to this analytical contribution to existing scholarship, the thesis seeks to make an empirical contribution. Most research has thus far focused almost exclusively on the discursive features of different climate-security narratives. By complementing documentary analysis with in-depth research interviews, this research generates new empirical findings that add to the understanding of the link between climate change and security.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has critically reviewed existing academic literature on the links between climate change and security. It has started by addressing the emergence and development of scholarly work that links the environment more broadly to security, in order to set the context for the emergence of more specific literature on climate-security. It has identified three main phases of environment and security research, the first of which sought to call attention to the links between environmental degradation and national security. The second phase, I argued, has focused on developing empirical research on the links between environmental degradation and conflict, while the third phase has concentrated on the potential impacts of environmental degradation on human security.

[1] In the next chapter I discuss in more detail how this approach is able to respond to the limitations imposed by the CS securitisation approach.

The chapter then turned to the analysis of literature on the links between climate change and security, which has become the focus of the environment and security debate. Though it is not possible to distinguish different waves or phases of climate change and security research in a temporal sense, it is possible to distinguish different emphases of research, which mirror the different approaches to environmental security. As such, while some writers focus on the impacts of climate change on national security, others concentrate on the links between climate change and conflict, and others investigate the consequences of climate change for human security.

A fourth group can be identified in the literature which concentrates on a normative debate regarding the securitisation of climate change. Rather than investigating whether or not climate change has the potential to threaten the security of states and individuals, writers in this group are more concerned with the consequences of discourses that frame climate change as a security issue.

Discussions about the implications of framing climate change as security are bound up with policy change. Proponents of the security framework have expectations that the issue will take priority due to the nature of security, while opponents fear changes in policies that go towards the use of military means or supress normal democratic procedures.

These claims are, for the most part, based on researchers' interpretations of the different climate security discourses, which are in turn informed by researcher's own conceptions of security. I have argued that this is understandable given that these authors are investigating early stages in the securitisation of climate change, where security rhetoric is not yet matched by significant policy measures.

However, there is a need to look at cases where climate security discourses have gained enough momentum so as to allow the researcher to analyse concrete institutional impacts of reframing of climate change as a security issue.

Following from this assumption, this thesis seeks to provide a more systematic analysis of the implications of using security language to speak of climate change. Focusing on a single case study, I will analyse the emergence of a specific climate-security discourse and examine the impact of such discourse in climate policies, security policies, and adjoining policy areas that are seen to contribute to climate goals and security goals. Hence, even though this thesis focuses a great deal on the discursive features of the EU climate change and

international security discourse, it also analyses the policy and institutional consequences of the climate change and international security discourse.

In light of the normative debate on the implications of securitising climate change, such research has an important contribution to make, by enabling a better understanding of what it means to address climate change as a security issue. Does the securitisation of climate change lead to policy prioritisation and resource allocation or does it led to a counterproductive militarisation of the issue?

Chapter 3: Theory and Methods

The main aim of this thesis is to understand the effects of defining the climate problem through a security narrative. As a result, I am interested in how discursive constructions influence the development of climate (and security) politics. In this chapter I introduce the basic foundations and principles of the discourse analytical framework I use to analyse EU discourse on climate change and international security and its implications.

Discourse analysis is becoming increasingly established in the social sciences as a qualitative methodology that focuses on how language and communications construct social realities. In environmental studies, discourse analysis has been used to analyse how environmental problems are constructed (e.g. Dryzek, 2013; Hajer, 1995). In security studies, discursive approaches have also become increasingly influential, especially among proponents of the Copenhagen School, as well as poststructuralists (see Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 212 – 221).

To address the normative debate on the consequences of securitising climate change, I apply Argumentative Discourse Analysis (ADA) – a discourse analytical approach developed by Maarten Hajer (1995; 2009) – to the analysis of the discursive construction of climate change as a security issue in the EU and the policy implications of this specific framing of the climate problem. By using this theoretical approach, I aim to overcome limitations in current approaches to climate change and security.

The chapter starts by presenting discourse analysis as a relevant qualitative methodology to the study of political issues. Subsequently, it reflects on the Copenhagen School's securitisation framework, the main discursive approach to the analysis of climate change and security discourses, and discusses its limitations to account for the complexities of climate change politics.

Building on the limitations of the securitisation framework, the chapter then seeks to elucidate why Hajer's argumentative approach is the most suitable approach to study the development and effects of the EU climate change and international security discourse. The chapter then gives a brief overview of how central concepts in Hajer's framework will be applied to the analysis in this thesis.

The final part of the chapter presents and discusses the research design, including the methods used for accessing and generating data, as well as for analysing that data.

3.1 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is becoming increasingly established in the social sciences. It can be defined as a qualitative methodology that focuses on the role that language and communications have in shaping the social worlds. From this perspective social reality is constructed through discourses and social interaction (Burnham et al., 2008).

However, rather than a consolidated approach, discourse analysis comprises a wide range of traditions, theories, and methods. Understandings of discourse are based on scholarship from a number of academic disciplines, not only the ones in which models for understanding, and methods for analysing, discourse first developed, but also disciplines that have applied and often extended such models and methods (Schiffrin, 1994). But while approaches vary significantly at the level of methods and techniques employed, all approaches seek to respond to positivist and essentialist approaches that privilege causality and laws (Glynos et al., 2009). Language is thus problematized: while in the positivist tradition 'language was seen as a *means*, as a neutral system of signs that described the world', language is now recognized as 'a *medium*, a system of signification through which actors *create* the world' (Hajer 1993: 44, italics in original).

David Howarth (2000) and Jacob Torfing (2005) distinguish between three generations – or traditions – of discourse theory. In the first generation discourse is defined in the narrow linguistic sense and the focus is placed on the semantic aspects of spoken or written text. This includes socio-linguistics, content analysis, conversation analysis, and speech act theory.

The second generation broadens the definition of discourse beyond spoken and written language. Influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, discourse is extended to a wider set of social practices, including 'all kinds of linguistically mediated practices in terms of speech, writing, images and gestures that social actors draw upon in their production and interpretation of meaning' (Torfing, 2005: 7).

Finally, the third generation, further expands the scope of discourse by including non-discursive practices and elements (Howarth, 2000: 8). Authors such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe enlarge the scope of discourse analysis to include all social practices. For authors working within this tradition it is not possible to distinguish between discursive and non-discursive phenomena, as ultimately everything is constructed through discursive systems of difference (Torfing, 2005: 9). In light of these transformations, Torfing (2005: 9) argues that discourse theory has gradually developed towards a more inclusive and quasi-transcendental notion of discourse and towards a broader constructivist notion of power.

3.1.1 Discourse analysis in the study of environmental politics

Recently, approaches to discourse have been directed to the analysis of policy issues. Discursive approaches have gained prominence in this field due to a growing dissatisfaction with mainstream positivist models of policy analysis (Glynos et al. 2009: 21).

Rather than seeking to develop law like explanations, discursive approaches emphasise the role of interpretation in policy analysis. As Dryzek (2013: 13) suggests, the existence of competing understandings of the world and its phenomena is the reason politics exists. Discourses provide the concepts, categories, and ideas which enable us to develop such understandings.

According to this conceptualisation, policy-making is seen as a constant discursive struggle (Fischer and Forester, 1993: 1). For this reason, in their seminal book *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, Frank Fischer and John Forester (1993), praise the focus on discourse as an advance in the field of policy studies. Focusing on argumentation, the authors argue, allows a closer examination of the communicative and rhetorical strategies used by planners and analysts (Fischer and Forester, 1993: 14).

As Glynos et al. (2009: 21) have pointed out, although there is a broad range of discursive approaches to policy analysis, overall these approaches stress the importance of concepts such as narratives, storylines, interpretation, argumentation, and meaning in the analysis of policy initiation, formation, implementation, and evaluation in various settings.

In the context of a growing importance of discursive methodologies in policy analysis, a number of authors have used discourse analysis to study developments in environmental politics. Focusing on the negotiations of the ozone regime, Karen T. Litfin (1994: 3) has analysed the 'influence and substantive content of discursive practices in international environmental politics'. By using a discursive approach, the has challenged the dominant approaches that view science as standing outside of politics and argued that knowledge and interests are mutually interactive (Litfin, 1994: 5)

Hajer (1995) has also used discourse analysis to study environmental issues. Focusing his empirical research on the acid rain controversy in Britain and the Netherlands, Hajer demonstrated how in the late 1980s, environmental politics was characterised by a competition between two distinct discourses: 'traditional-pragmatist' and 'ecological modernisation'.

Perhaps most notably, John S. Dryzek (2013) has used discourse analysis to identify and critically compare the main environmental discourses and their consequences for environmental politics and policies. While the two previous mentioned authors have analysed specific environmental discourses in depth, Dryzek has sought to work with the broader picture, mapping the dominant discourses in environmental politics (Dryzek, 2013:11).

Discourse analysis brings added value to the study of environmental politics because it brings to light the discursive struggles through which basic environmental concepts are given meaning. As a result of these struggles over meaning, the way we think about environmental concepts changes dramatically over time, with significant consequences for environmental policy-making (Dryzek, 2013:5). In defining the concepts through which environmental problems are discussed, discourses delimit the range of policy solutions available to address those problems (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 179).

In this sense, discourses are bound up with political power (Dryzek, 2013: 10). As Dryzek has argued, sometimes it is a sign of power that actors can get the discourse to which they subscribe accepted by others. Discourses can also themselves embody power in the way they condition the perception and values of those subject to them, such that some interests are advanced, others suppressed (Dryzek, 2013: 10).

3.2 Discursive Approaches to Climate Change as a Security Issue

In the previous chapter I have argued that the emergence of discourses on climate change as a security threat has been mainly analysed through the concept of securitisation developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and their collaborators at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (Wæver, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998). The securitisation approach stems from a discursive conception of security, in which the definition of security is 'dependent on its successful construction in discourse' (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 213).

The securitisation approach enables a structured analysis of the processes of construction of security that highlights the mechanisms through which issues reach the security agenda, as well as the actors involved in the process. According to this framework, securitisation occurs when an issue is successfully moved from the politicised level, where it is part of the public policy sphere, to the securitized level, where it justifies actions outside the normal boundaries of political practice (Buzan et al., 1998: 24).

The framework draws heavily on language theory, having one of its main roots in speech act theory (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 2013). Drawing on the works of Austin and Searle, securitisation is seen as a speech act: 'the *word* "security" is the *act*; the utterance is the primary reality' (Wæver 1995: 55). Accordingly then, a statement can be an act in itself, i.e. 'by saying words something is done' (Buzan et al., 1998: 26).

Despite the focus on the speech act, the successful elevation of issues to the securitised level is believed to occur in a two-stage process. First, a securitising actor presents something as an existential threat to a referent object. This first stage, in which rhetoric of existential threat and urgency is used to frame an issue, corresponds to a *securitising move*. In a second stage, the relevant audience must accept the securitising move, thus allowing for extraordinary measures to be adopted or even imposed.

Researchers who have applied the securitisation framework to study the implications of framing climate change as a security issue have found that at the empirical level the construction of a security issue is more dynamic, nuanced and complex than assumed by the Copenhagen School (Rothe, 2012: 243; Trombetta,

2011: 135). A number of shortcomings of the framework, which have been extensively debated in the literature, are potentially relevant to understand the challenge of analysing climate politics through the securitisation framework.

The speech act approach of the framework has been criticised for focusing on a single security articulation at a particular point in time, which as Holger Stritzel (2007: 377) has argued, is too limited to allow the study of the entire process of securitisation. Focusing on securitisation as a moment is incompatible with 'a broader understanding of the inter-subjective processes through which security is constructed in different contexts' (McDonald, 2008: 576). This point is of relevance for the study of the securitisation of climate change as previous studies show how different discourses of climate change and security compete in the global arena (e.g. Brauch, 2009; McDonald, 2013; Detraz, 2011).

An additional common point of criticism of the securitisation framework concerns its root in a Schmittian understanding of security as exceptional politics. According to this view, enemies create an emergency that leads to the suspension of the normal rules of politics, giving way to executive decision-making (Huysmans, 2006: 133). Applying such logic to climate change could be problematic as it could mean, for example, restricting individual liberties through rationing carbon emissions (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 337). However, as the Copenhagen proponents themselves acknowledge, in the environmental sector, '"emergency measures" are still designed and developed in the realm of ordinary policy debates' (Buzan et al., 1998: 83). This denotes an internal contradiction in the theory.

Finally, a frequently mentioned problematic feature of the Copenhagen School's approach to securitisation is connected to its roots in traditionalist security debates. In keeping with a national security conception, the end product of a successful process of securitisation is the adoption of extraordinary measures. The focus on extraordinary measures has been criticised because it evokes military conceptions of security. McDonald (2008: 579), for example, has argued that this constitutes an important normative problem in the securitisation framework because it reifies traditional militaristic approaches to security.

However, authors who have applied the Copenhagen framework to analyse the securitisation of climate change have found that appeals to security have thus far not brought about military measures to deal with climate change (Brzoska, 2012;

Trombetta, 2008, 2011). Consequently, authors such as Maria Julia Trombetta (2011: 136) argue that the focus on extraordinary measures unnecessarily constrains the account of securitisation because such measures are associated with a military security conception. Instead, she argues, 'the securitisation of non traditional issues like environmental problems is challenging and transforming existing security practices' (Trombetta, 2011: 140).

This point is of great importance for the normative debate on the implications of securitising climate change that I propose to address in this thesis. In analysing the securitisation of climate change in the EU, I aim to understand whether this has led to the adoption of extraordinary (military) measures as the Copenhagen School suggests, or if security practices are being transformed to address the climate-security problem.

With the aim of avoiding the constraints imposed by the securitisation framework, this thesis analyses the process of construction of climate change as a security issue through an alternative framework. In the following section I present the framework, and discuss how it can contribute to a better understanding of the securitisation of climate change and its effects.

3.3 An Alternative Approach: Argumentative Discourse Analysis

To enable a more comprehensive understanding of the securitisation of climate change and its consequences my analysis draws on the work of Maarten Hajer (1995, 2009), and more specifically his Argumentative Discourse Analysis (ADA), as a framework that is able to respond to the limitations imposed by the CS securitisation approach.

Studying developments in environmental politics in the 1990s, Hajer developed an approach to the analysis of discourses in political contexts that enables the understanding of how problems get defined and what political consequences these definitions have (Hajer, 1995: 2).

In constructing his theoretical apparatus, Hajer borrows concepts from Foucault's theory of discourse, namely the archaeological method of analysis, the concept of problematisation and the microphysics of power. He also applies ideas developed

in the field of social psychology, by authors such as Michael Billig and Rom Harré, which he names 'social-interactive theory'. Hajer argues that, by focusing on the interpersonal interaction level, social-interactive theory fills important gaps in Foucault's perspective, presenting 'ways in which the subject can be studied as actively involved in the production and transformation of discourse' (Hajer, 1995: 55).

Starting out with the notion that policy-making requires the redefinition of a given social phenomenon in such a way that one can also find solutions for them, Hajer (1995: 2) sees developments in environmental politics as critically depending on the specific social construction of environmental problems.

Language thus has the power to render events harmless or create political conflicts. To use Hajer's own example, if we interpret dead trees as a product of natural stress caused by draught, cold or wind, the consequence is to approach them as a natural phenomenon to which a policy solution is not required. However, if we interpret dead trees as victims of pollution, they potentially become a political problem. Framed according to the pollution narrative, dead trees are no longer 'an incident' but signify a 'structural problem' (Hajer, 2005: 299).

As a consequence, political action is better understood as an argumentative struggle in which distinct interpretations of policy problems – and corresponding solutions – compete with each for discursive hegemony. In this struggle, actors try to secure support for their definition of reality (Hajer, 2005: 59). According to this conceptualisation, using discourse analysis enables the researcher to 'understand why a particular understanding of the environmental problem at some point gains dominance and is seen as authoritative, while other understandings are discredited' (Hajer, 1995: 44).

Hajer believes that the power structures of society can be studied directly through discourse because change and permanence depend on active discursive reproduction or transformation (Hajer, 1995: 56). The rules and conventions that constitute the social order need to be constantly reproduced and reconfirmed in speech situations, whether in documents or debates (Hajer, 1995: 55).

The approach focuses on the constitutive role of discourse in political processes and allocates a central role to the discoursing subjects, although in the context of the duality of structure, which implies that social action originates in human

agency but in a context of social structures that both enable and constrain agency (Hajer, 1995: 58).

In his 1995 book, *The Politics of Environmental Discourse*: *Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*, Hajer defined discourse as 'a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities' (1995: 44).

More recently, Hajer rephrased his definition of discourse to include 'notions' as a less cognitive category he believes play a key role in discussions. Hence, in his 2009 book on *Authoritative Governance*: *Policy-making in the Age of Mediatization* he defines discourse as 'an ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts and categorizations through which meaning is ascribed to social and physical phenomena, and that is produced in and reproduces in turn an identifiable set of practices' (Hajer, 2009: 60).

In this redefinition of discourse, in addition to ideas, concepts, and categorizations, which are rational concepts, notions 'refers to less causal forms of commitments, for example things reiterated through stories, metaphors or catchphrases' (Hajer, 2009: 60). This centrality of less cognitive elements makes Hajer's framework important to this research because storylines and metaphors play a very significant role in the discourse on climate change and international security.

Hajer's ADA brings added value to the study of the climate change and international security discourse, overcoming some of the limitations imposed by the CS securitisation framework. First, while the CS assumes that those who utter security, i.e. the securitising actors, use language as a passive set of tools to advance their pre-given interests, Hajer's framework allows for much more interaction between linguistic structures and the formation of preferences: 'interests are intersubjectively constituted through discourse' (Hajer, 1995: 59).

Second, rather than focusing on a single speech act – as does the CS securitisation framework – ADA uncovers the argumentative struggles through which political (and in this case security) problems are constructed. While it still focuses on the role of language in the construction of climate change as a security issue, the argumentative approach allows for a more contextualised approach. For Hajer, the notion of discourse encompasses both the content of

statements and the context in which these are made. This means that analysis does not focus solely on the ideas, concepts, and categorisations that form the content of what is said, but also on the social practices in which discourse is produced (Hajer, 2009: 62).

In addition, because Hajer's analytical framework has been designed to investigate how political problems are defined and to what consequences, it does not make any assumption regarding the nature of security. As a result, it allows the researcher to investigate the implications of redefining climate change as a security issue, without departing from a Schmittian conception of security as exceptional politics, or an *a priori* military conception of security.

Other researchers studying climate-security discourse have applied concepts from Hajer's analytical framework to the study of climate security discourses. Matt McDonald (2013) has used Hajer's understanding of discourse to inform his mapping of the different discourses of climate change and security. Most notably, Delf Rothe has drawn upon concepts such as storylines and discourse coalitions to provide a theoretical revision of the Copenhagen securitisation framework that is 'more applicable to the complex case of climate politics' (2012: 243). However, this work only uses elements of Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis as a complement to other approaches, overlooking significant concepts that can bring added value to the study of climate change as a security issue.

3.3.1 Key Concepts of Argumentative Discourse Analysis

In developing an analytical frame for the study of political processes, Hajer seeks to define a discourse-analytical approach that is theoretically sophisticated but at the same time practically operationable (Hajer 1995: 52). To this end, Hajer devises what he terms middle range concepts that stand between Foucault's *epistèmes* and social-interactive theory's interpersonal interaction. As a result, the concepts of 'storylines', 'metaphors' and 'discourse coalitions' play central roles in the framework.

In accordance with his revised definition of discourse, which emphasises the role of less cognitive categories, Hajer identifies two central linguistic mechanisms in his analytical framework: 'metaphors' and 'storylines' (Hajer, 2009: 61).

Hajer argues '[t]he essence of a metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another' (2009: 61). A metaphor stands for something else. The example given by Hajer of the 'war on drugs' is illustrative of how a metaphor works. The expression 'invokes war to show serious commitment on the part of the political leadership' (2009: 61). We will see later how this is also the case with the 'battle against climate change'.

The metaphors used in discussions can shape the views of the world and reality. In the case of environmental discourse, it matters how the environment is discussed, whether it is 'in terms of the spaceship-ness of the Earth, the greenhouse-ness of climate change, or the disease-ness of pollution' (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005: 176). The metaphor used to discuss the environment will not only influence the discussion of the issue, but also the institutional response to it (Hajer, 2005: 303).

Using the example of acid rain, Hajer (2005: 303) demonstrates how speaking of air pollution in terms of urban smog led to a concentration of air quality monitoring in cities. This is the same in the case of discourses of climate change. Speaking of climate change through the metaphor of a disease – the planet is sick – implies that a cure is needed. While using a metaphor of war – the battle against climate change – implies that we need to fight against it.

Another central linguistic mechanism in the Argumentative Analysis framework is the concept of storyline. Hajer defines storyline as a 'generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena' (Hajer, 1995: 56); and 'a condensed statement summarizing complex narratives, used by people as 'shorthand' in discussions' (2009: 61).

Storylines function as a mechanism to create and maintain discursive order. Because the meaning of a storyline is ambiguous, it allows people with conflicting interests to join the same policy process (Hajer, 2009: 61). Actors can share a specific set of storylines but interpret the meaning of those story lines very differently and have their own particular interests (Hajer, 1995: 13). Hajer (1995: 63) argues that 'these shallow and ambiguous discursive practices are the essential discursive cement that creates communicative networks among actors with different or at best overlapping perceptions and understandings'.

The multi-interpretability of storylines, as of metaphors, is a vital aspect of their political efficacy. Hajer argues that both mechanisms

> fulfil a particularly significant role in political processes where policies have to be determined in a group of actors that do not share the same frame of reference. In such settings metaphors and storylines are the vehicles for trust and consensus. But they derive their political effect from the fact that different actors can have a (slightly) different reading of a particular statement. (Hajer, 2009: 62)

Moreover, because discussions of a problem often involve different discourses, storylines are essential to overcome fragmentation and achieve discursive closure. The key function of storylines therefore is that 'they suggest unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a problem' (Hajer, 1995: 56).

To illustrate this, Hajer gives the example of the environmental discourse as a fragmented and contradictory discourse. The author classifies this discourse as 'an astonishing collection of claims and concerns brought together by a great variety of actors' (Hajer, 1995: 1). Yet, he argues, clusters are formed around particular storylines or sets of storylines, which assist in overcoming fragmentation by combining elements from different domains. A storyline provides the narrative that allows scientists, environmentalists, politicians and other actors to develop a common understanding of environmental issues.

The concept of storylines shares a family resemblance with what other authors have termed 'empty signifiers'. Griggs and Howarth (2004: 193), drawing on Laclau, define empty signifiers as 'images or phrases which because of their lack of signification, enable the articulation of internal differences, while simultaneously showing the limits of a group's identity, and its dependence on the opposition to other groups'.

The concepts of metaphors and storylines play an important role in the study of climate security discourses. In such discourses, climate change, which is essentially a change in the statistical distribution of weather patterns, is discussed through stories and metaphors that transform climate change into an enemy.

These less cognitive elements assume a central position in ADA because they explain how actors group together in the sharing of metaphors and storylines. According to Hajer, storylines in particular have an important function as they act as the discursive cement that keeps discourse coalitions together. The notion of discourse coalition is another central concept to Hajer's framework. He argues that in the struggle for discursive hegemony, coalitions are formed among actors that, for various reasons, are attracted to a specific storyline or set of storylines (Hajer, 1995: 65). A discourse coalition is then defined as the ensemble of a set of storylines, the actors who utter these storylines, and the practices in which this discursive activity is based (Hajer, 1995: 65).

Discourse coalitions differ from traditional political coalitions or alliances because they have a linguistic basis. Hajer (1995: 66) argues that 'storylines, not interests, form the basis of the coalition, whereby storylines potentially change the previous understanding of what the actors' interests are'. This means that the unity of coalitions is dependent on discursive affinity. This affinity should not be confused with consistency, as Hajer argues the political power of a text comes from its multi-interpretability, rather than its consistency (Hajer, 1995: 61). This is evident, for example, in the debate on acid rain: whereas many actors make their own contribution to the understanding of the problem in its full complexity, there are hardly any actors who can actually understand the problem in all its details (Hajer, 1995: 61).

In a similar vein, Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 14) use the concept of 'hegemonic practices' as 'an exemplary form of political activity that involves the articulation of different identities and subjectivities into a common project' and the concept of 'hegemonic formations' as 'the outcome of these projects' endeavours to create new forms of social order from a variety of dispersed or dislocated elements'.

Understanding between different actors in a coalition is facilitated through discursive affinity. In a discussion between actors from varying backgrounds, discursive affinity means that even though arguments will vary in origin, they can share similar ways of conceptualising the world (Hajer, 2005: 304). This allows for elements of the various discourses to be combined into a more or less coherent whole (storyline) and thus conceal discursive complexity (Hajer, 2005: 304). Hajer gives an example from pollution politics, where discursive affinity is shared by the moral argument that nature should be respected, the scientific

argument that nature is to be seen as a complex ecosystem, and the economic idea that pollution prevention is the most efficient mode of production (2005: 34). He argues, that 'the arguments are different but similar: from each of the positions the other arguments "sound right".' (Hajer, 2005: 34).

If discursive affinity is particularly strong then it can be considered 'discursive contamination' (Hajer, 1995: 67). In this case, not only do discursive elements resemble one another, they flow into one another. Here, Hajer introduces Darwinism as an example of discursive contamination, as Darwin drew on sociological concepts such as competition and used them as a metaphor to understand the natural reality, and subsequently social Darwinists drew on Darwin's thought to argue that competition was the natural state of society (Hajer, 1995: 67).

The concept of discourse coalition has appeal to the study of climate change and international security because it elucidates how actors from varying backgrounds and with different interests can unite around a set of stories about how climate change impacts on security.

3.3.2 Discourse and Institutional change

Hajer argues that discourses become hegemonic when two conditions have been fulfilled. First, a new discourse starts to dominate the way a given social unit conceptualises the world (Hajer, 2005: 303). This is what he terms *discourse structuration* and it implies that the central actors in a given discursive space are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power of a new discourse (Hajer, 1993: 48).

Following structuration, a discourse should solidify in the institutional practices of that political domain. This process, which Hajer names discourse institutionalisation, means that the theoretical concepts of a given discourse are translated into concrete policies and institutional practices (Hajer, 1995: 61) or become traditional ways of reasoning (Hajer, 1993: 46).

For Hajer then, language has an impact on institutions and policy-making (Hajer, 2006: 67). The relationship between discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation is illustrated by an example of Hajer's research on acid rain.

The fact that in the 1950s and 1960s air pollution was discussed and conceived of in terms of 'urban smog' meant that the monitoring of air quality was concentrated in cities. This institutionalised urban definition meant that for a long time there was no 'data' available to prove that air pollution affected the countryside and lakes, which made it difficult to get acid rain on the agenda (Hajer, 2005: 303).

This conception of how discourses become dominant allows the researcher to analyse the effect of discourses in a two-step procedure. Adopting an approach that focuses on the analysing of both structuration and institutionalisation brings added value to the analysis of the climate change and security discourses. While it allows for a better understanding of how security discourses transform how actors conceptualise climate change (and how climate discourses transform how actors conceptualise security), it also enables the understanding of the institutional effects of such reconceptualisation.

Following this premise, the main research questions in this thesis mirror the two-step procedure proposed by Hajer. First, I ask to what degree has the climate change and international security discourse (CCIS) been structured in the EU. And second, whether it has been institutionalised in the EU.

To measure discourse structuration, I will look at whether and how CCIS metaphors and storylines, initially proposed by a small group of conflict prevention actors, have diffused to other spheres of EU policy-making, mainly the climate change and the security spheres. The extent to which CCIS metaphors and storylines have spread into EU official documents, such as reports and speeches, is indicative of the broadening of the discourse coalition and, therefore, of the extent to which the CCIS discourse dominates the way EU actors conceptualises climate change.

While metaphors, storylines and discourse coalitions are indicative of discourse structuration, discourse institutionalisation is more difficult to trace. Hajer's framework is less explicit on how to go about measuring discourse institutionalisation. However, a few notions can be extracted from his work on ecological modernisation. For Hajer, the discourse of ecological modernisation would become institutionalised when its main theoretical premises inform new policies, for example shifting investment in mobility from road to rail, or new institutional arrangements, such as the restructuring of departmental divisions (Hajer, 1995: 61).

Given the normative debate that I seek to address in this thesis, analysing policy change resulting from the climate change and international security discourse is of great importance. Consequently, to answer the second main research question, I will examine whether the metaphors and storylines employed in the CCIS discourse originate new policy principles and policy instruments to deal with climate change.

In addition, I will analyse the effects of the new discourse in terms of institutional practices and institutional re-ordering. The creation of new positions or groups, or changes in competences, due to the reframing of climate change as a security issue is significant because, as Connelly et al (2012: 173) argue, the way in which political units organise their response to environmental issues can have a profound effect on policy.

In essence, this thesis is concerned with how the (re)definition of political problems can have an impact in policy solutions. While I use a discursive approach to address this issue, other approaches have been widely used to explain why policy change occurs. One such approach is agenda-setting theory, which is concerned with the processes through which issues become the focus of attention in an actor's agenda (Soroka, 2007: 185).

As B. Guy Peters (1994: 9) puts it, '[b]y definition, no policy can be made if the issue underlying it cannot first be placed on to the active agenda of a governmental institution'. Hence, setting the agenda is a crucial stage in the policy process for any political unit.

Authors studying agenda-setting dynamics in the EU (Princen and Rhinard, 2006) have identified two paths through which issues come to the agenda: the 'high politics' route where issues are placed on the agenda 'from above' by political leaders; and the 'low politics' route, where they are placed on the agenda 'from below' by experts working together. This is a valuable insight since it shows how issues do not only arise as a result of the actions of high-ranking political figures, but can also 'arise as a result of professional concerns among people working in the same issue area' (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1121).

Whichever route issues follow, agenda-setting theory proposes three stages for issues entering the agenda (Princen and Rhinard, 2006). First, issue specification means that a general issue is further elaborated into a set of specific demands. Second, issue expansion occurs when issues are moved beyond the initial actors

in specific venues to a wider set of actors. Finally, issue entrance takes place when an issue gains access to the formal agenda of EU decision-makers.

In the first stage, the concept of policy framing has been given considerable attention. Policy framing 'addresses the role of political issue definitions in the policy-making process' (Daviter, 2007: 654). Framing, according to Falk Daviter (2007: 654), refers to the 'process of selecting, emphasizing and organizing aspects of complex issues according to an overriding evaluative or analytical criterion'. As every policy issue can be subject to divergent and often conflicting perceptions, which definition of the problem prevails and which dimension of the issue dominates policy debates can substantially influence political choices (Daviter, 2007: 654).

By focusing on how issues are defined and then expand to other venues until they enter the formal agenda of decision-makers – thus enabling the adoption of new policies – enables parallels to be drawn with Hajer's ADA. First, in the same way that agenda-setting sees the framing of issues as substantially influencing policy choices, for ADA policy solutions are also critically dependant on the specific discursive construction of problems. Second, just as agenda-setting is concerned with the expansion of issues beyond initial actors that promote the issue, ADA is concerned with the diffusion of specific metaphors and storylines, which enables a discourse to become structured in a given policy unit. Lastly, in agenda-setting the final stage of the trajectory of an issue is when it gains access to the formal agenda of decision-makers and leads to the subsequent adoption of new policies/legislation. Similarly, for ADA, discourse institutionalisation would be the last step in the career of a discourse, in which the theoretical concepts used to frame a given political problem are translated into policies and institutional practices.

To conclude, while both approaches can be effective in analysing how new definitions of political problems progress (or do not progress) to become policy solutions, the approach chosen for this study is one that pays particular attention to the discursive construction of politics, seeking to highlight how political problems (and solutions) are defined and disseminated through stories and narratives.

3.3.3 Applying ADA Critically

Hajer's framework brings added value to the study of climate security discourses because it enables the understanding of how such discourses play out in policy-making and institutional re-ordering. As such, ADA is an essential tool for this research, as the aim is to understand the evolution and consequences of the discourse on climate change and security in the European Union.

However, in order to better address the central questions in this thesis there is a need to clarify conceptual issues within the framework. First, the relationship between discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation is not always clearly articulated in Hajer's work. The author is not clear on whether discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation are strictly sequential, although he seems to suggest that institutionalisation depends on the success of structuration (see Hajer, 1995: 263).

Although I agree that a degree of discourse structuration is necessary to initiate discourse institutionalisation, I argue that structuration and institutionalisation can occur almost simultaneously, rather than sequentially. The research in this thesis seems to suggest that some degree of institutionalisation is possible, even if a discourse has not succeeded in dominating the way a given social unit conceptualises the world (see Chapter 6). In other words, the 'second step' can begin before the 'first step' is concluded.

In fact, there seems to be a degree of reciprocity between the two steps. As the dominance of a storyline can affect institutional practices, so can changes in institutional practices contribute to the reproduction of storylines. For example, the creation of a new committee as a consequence of a new discourse can, in turn, contribute to the diffusion of the said discourse, thus supporting its structuration. As such, one can argue that there exists some overlap between the two steps identified in ADA. Hence, while dividing the assessment of the influence of a discourse into two distinct steps is useful for analytical clarity, in the empirical field the relationship between these two steps is often more complex.

Another important issue is the relationship between an emerging discourse and more established discourses. In Hajer's analysis of acid rain in the UK and the Netherlands, he investigates the antagonistic relationship between the traditional pragmatist discourse and the emergent ecological modernisation (Hajer, 1995).

More recently, he has used ADA to analyse four competing discourses on the future of Ground Zero following the September 2011 terrorist attack that destroyed the New York World Trade Center (Hajer, 2009). Hajer thus understands political action as an argumentative struggle in which distinct interpretations of policy problems compete with each for discursive hegemony (Hajer, 2005: 59).

The question that follows is whether different interpretations of policy problems are always antagonistic or whether they can be complementary. The findings in this study suggest that although the discourse of ecological modernisation and the climate change and international security discourse interpret the climate problem distinctively, these discourses can complement one another. It can be argued that instead of generating different policy solutions to a problem, different but complementary discourses can support similar solutions. This suggests that we should not only be looking for antagonisms but also complementarities in our understanding of the nature and impact of discourses.

Finally, to complement Hajers's ADA I introduce the concept of discourse entrepreneurs. Discourse entrepreneurs can be defined as actors who build and promote discourses containing new definitions for policy problems. Later in the thesis, I describe how a small group of actors joined efforts to place the issue of climate security on the EU agenda for the first time (see Chapter 4). As such, they operated as discourse entrepreneurs, actively constructing and disseminating narratives that depicted climate change as a security issue.

With the introduction of the concept of discourse entrepreneurs, I seek to highlight the role of agency in the emergence of new discourses. Hajer focuses on the concept of discourse coalitions, which is defined as the ensemble of a set of storylines, the actors who utter these storylines, and the practices in which their discursive activity is based (Hajer, 1995: 65). While this concept is useful to explain how actors with different interests can subscribe to the same set of storyline in specific contexts, it does not capture the fundamental role of specific actors in the emergence of a new discourse.

The concept of discourse entrepreneurs is thus the discursive equivalent of what Finnemore and Sikkink termed 'norm entrepreneurs'. According to their seminal 1998 article in *International Organization*, norm entrepreneurs are crucial to the emergence of new norms because 'they call attention to issues or even "create" issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them'

(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 897). Hence, the concept helps explain how norms 'do not appear out of thin air' but instead are actively built by agents who have strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their communities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 896).

The concept of discourse entrepreneurs also shares similarities with the notion of policy entrepreneurs from the agenda-setting literature. In this literature, the concept of policy entrepreneurship is factored into agenda-setting processes to reveal the role of agency in explaining policy innovation (Iusmen, 2012: 513). Policy entrepreneurs are defined 'as people who seek to initiate dynamic policy change' (Mintrom, 1997: 739). In essence, policy entrepreneurs are '[p]olitical actors who promote policy ideas' (Mintrom, 1997: 739).

While agreeing that certain actors are vital to the promotion of policy ideas, the position in this thesis is that these ideas are spread through discourses. For this reason, the concept of discourse entrepreneurs is used to illustrate the pivotal role of these actors in promoting new definitions for policy problems and, consequently, new policy solutions. Based on the empirical findings of this thesis – where a small group of actors sought to promote a redefinition of climate change as a security problem in the EU – I believe the concept also brings added value to Hajer's ADA because it captures the fundamental role of specific actors in the emergence of new discourses.

3.4 Research Methods

The main aim of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the implications of addressing climate change through a security perspective in the EU. Looking at the specific case study of the EU, it seeks to answer two central questions. First, has the CCIS discourse become dominant in the way climate change is conceptualised in the EU? Second, has this discourse solidified in particular institutional arrangements?

Having presented above the theoretical approach that informs the thesis, as well as its main concepts, this chapter now turns to the methods used to answer the research questions.

In applying discourse theory to empirical studies, discourse analysis draws on a variety of methods. However, analysts working within this tradition usually adopt a problem-driven orientation which makes the selection of methods dependent on how research questions are constructed (Glynos, et al., 2009: 24). In keeping with this approach, I used qualitative methods for generating data and analysing data that were, in my view, best suited to address the research questions set out for this thesis.

Below, I present and discuss the methods used for accessing and generating data as well as for analysing that data. First, however, I briefly discuss the research design.

3.4.1 Research Design

This thesis analyses a single case study: the EU discourse on climate change and international security. A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context (Yin, 2009: 18). By focusing on the EU case, this research aims to conduct an in-depth contextualised analysis of the emerging climate-security discourse.

The EU climate security case can be defined as a revelatory case study. The EU was one of the first political entities to identify climate change as a security threat and a pioneer in adopting policies aimed at addressing the security implications of climate change. As such, analysing the emergence and consequences of this discourse presents an opportunity to 'observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to social science enquiry' (Yin, 2009: 48).

To be sure, other authors have analysed cases of securitisation of climate change. However, as I have argued previously, analysis has focused on the macro level. By grouping together climate-security narratives from a range of political actors, researchers have derived broad generalisations about climate change and security discourses. Focusing on the macro level, although very useful to map the different climate-security discourses, is not as suitable to analyse the political consequences of said discourses. Concentrating the analysis on a single (although multidimensional) actor, alternatively, allows an in-depth examination of the structuring concepts, ideas, and categorisations through which climate change is being constructed as a security issue, as well as the analysis of processes of institutionalisation of that discourse.

In prioritising in-depth, contextual analysis, the aim of this research is not to derive general propositions and theories. Indeed, I agree with the view that generalisation is not an accurate way of depicting and explaining social reality (Howarth, 2005: 331; Flyvbjerg 2001: 67). However, by analysing a revelatory case study, I believe that this study can contribute to the on-going normative debate on the implications of securitising climate change. More specifically, by analysing a concrete case of securitisation of climate change, I aim to shed some light on the consequences of securitising climate change.

3.4.2 Methods for accessing and generating data

The choice of methods was driven by the two central research questions in this project, namely whether the climate change and international security discourse has been structured in the EU and whether the main premises of this discourse have become institutionalised in the EU.

Given the focus on discourse, official EU documents – as well as unofficial documents such as meeting minutes and agendas – were a key source of data. The analysis of official documents was essential to understand the structuring concepts and ideas of the climate change and international security discourse, as well as to find evidence of the structuration of the said discourse in the EU climate change and security discursive spaces.

Adopting a question-driven orientation, the sample of documents for analysis was selected according to relevance. Accordingly, I focused on key documents for understanding the emergence, structuration and institutionalisation of the EU climate change and international security discourse. I started by analysing the 2008 Report on *Climate Change and International Security* – the first official EU document on the issue – and the two reports released on follow-up. The study of these core documents in the CCIS process provided a basic notion of the process of events and allowed for a preliminary mapping of the main actors involved.

This initial analysis allowed the identification of additional documents for analysis. Documents were selected on the basis of their discursive richness, rather than on their binding power. As such, the research focused mainly on Communications and working documents from the Commission, Council Conclusions, European Council Conclusions and European Parliament reports and

resolutions. While these are not binding documents, they enable us to extract argumentative structures that allow an understanding of how the climate change and international security metaphors and storylines spread and whether or not they became structured in EU discourse. In addition, I analysed speeches from relevant EU actors in both internal and external settings, which are also very relevant to understand how key actors define climate problems and whether they subscribe to CCIS storylines

Analysis of official documents was complemented by interviews. As I aimed to understand the context in which the CCIS discourse emerged, as well as the potential solidification of the main concepts of the discourse in institutional arrangements, I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with central actors in the process to generate primary texts for analysis. In-depth interviews are acknowledged as a relevant method to pursue questions that are difficult to locate in documentary sources and to explore such questions in intricate detail (Soss, 2006: 141). In this research, interviews provided an essential complement to official documents because they allowed for a better understanding of how the 'reframing' of climate change came about.

Prior to the start of interviews, a list of essential open interview questions was drafted. From this list, individual semi-structured interview schedules were composed according to the specific particularities of each interviewee. Based on these tailored schedules, interviews flowed as a conversation, providing opportunity for probes and follow up questions that arose from the responses.

The flexibility in semi-structured interviews, by allowing interviewees to talk about what they viewed as important in the CCIS process, was crucial to understand dynamics that would have not been brought up in a structured interview, where we would move from one item to the next in the list of questions.

The selection of interviewees was done by snow ball sampling. The number of interviews was not selected beforehand and evolved with knowledge of the issue. In a first moment I identified a number of actors involved in the drafting of the core CCIS documents. From these interviews I continually added new interviewees based on information that emerged as important to the understanding of the process and its implications.

This allowed for adjustments to be made in light of new questions that originated from data analysis. For example, it was not until I had conducted the first two rounds of interviews – and analysed the data generated in those interviews – that it became evident that development cooperation and civil protection were two important angles of analysis. As such, I broadened the scope of research, not only regarding the relevant official documents to look at, but also in terms of new interviewees to select.

In total I interviewed twenty-one people, between EU and Member state officials, NGO and think tank members. Two of these people I interviewed on more than one occasion. Interviews were conducted between November 2012 and November 2014. Most interviews were conducted face to face in Brussels, although five were telephone interviews. Where interviewees consented, interviews were recorded and later transcribed.

It should be mentioned that official documents and interviews were used in a symbiotic way. Documents were essential in the identification of relevant interviewees and interviews were crucial in the identification of seminal documents. The analysis of documents and the undertaking of interviews were complementary and allowed for a better understanding of how the discourse of climate change and security developed and to what consequences.

I have also participated in a few events on climate change and security in Brussels, which was very important in terms of building networks and identifying interviewees. [2] These events, which brought together key actors in the CCIS process, also provided a crucial opportunity to observe and register relevant discursive interactions between different stakeholders.

3.4.3 Methods for analysing data

Having given an overview of the methods used for accessing and generating data, I now turn to the methods used to analyse that data. Both official documents and

[2] Events included: a seminar on "Climate & Security Envoys – New Developments in Climate Change and Security" in the European Parliament on 6 November 2012; A panel on climate change at the European Defense Agency's Military Green Conference held on 6 June 2013; and a seminar of the Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change (GMACCC) held at the European Climate Foundation on 23 September 2013.

semi-structured interviews provide text that needs to be analysed to answer the research questions at hand.

Following Hajer's ADA, I used qualitative textual analysis to uncover argumentative structures in official documents and interviews. First, I focused on the pivotal documents that propose the issue of climate change and international security in order to reveal the main features of the discourse. As a result, I read through the text of the various documents, identifying the main metaphors and storylines through which climate change was discussed. I coded metaphors and storylines using a computer software program to help characterising and comparing the language. I then considered how these metaphors and storylines related to conceptions of security, as well as to policy solutions. Identifying the structuring concepts and ideas was fundamental to expose the distinctive features of the CCIS discourse.

To examine the structuration of the discourse, I read through official documents and speeches from the climate change and the security policy arenas looking for the diffusion of CCIS metaphors and storylines. The aim was to measure the dissemination of the climate change and international security discourse to other spaces of the EU, through the prevalence of the CCIS storylines and metaphors in these documents.

Also reading through the interviews, I examined how EU officials interpreted and framed climate change through stories and metaphors that link climate change to security. Hence, while the analysis of official documents and speeches was essential to identify storylines, the analysis of interviews was essential to uncover the different ways in which actors interpret those storylines.

To examine the institutionalisation of the discourse, I analysed documents from the relevant EU institutions looking to see whether central concepts of the CCIS discourse have informed new policies or institutional arrangements. However, it should be mentioned that directly linking institutional change with a specific discourse is challenging. While some discourses contain identifiable principles to guide policy-making, others are less clear regarding the policy solutions to the problems they identify. In this study, policy change brought about by the EU climate change and international security discourse was identified in two ways: in some instances, climate change and international security storylines were found in proposals for new policies/instruments; in other cases, interviews were

essential to identify specific policies that interviewees perceived as resulting from the structuration of the CCIS discourse.

3.4.4 Strengths and Limitations of the methods used

The methods used in this research were chosen specifically because they were found most suitable to address the research questions. The use of semi-structured research interviews allowed for a greater level of detail in the data generated, than documentary analysis alone would have done.

Regarding the methods for analysing the data, my method of analysing narratives, metaphors and storylines enabled me to answer the research questions about the nature of the policy discourse. Other authors have used quantitative text analysis with the aim of extracting from texts quantitatively measured features such as word counts. However, rather than focusing on the frequency with which certain words appear in certain discussions, the aim of the qualitative approach taken in this thesis, is to understand more fully how language is used in context and how different linguistic concepts interrelate.

However, while qualitative methods for data analysis in general, and for discourse analysis in particular, have increasingly gained prominence in the social sciences due to their ability to enable an in-depth, comprehensive understanding of phenomena, as any other methods they also have limitations that the researcher needs to be aware of.

Regarding the methods for generating and accessing data used in this thesis, two main issues should be mentioned. First, while making the choice of relevant documents for analysis question driven is fruitful in terms of providing a tailored and in-depth answer to the research questions, the representativeness of the sample is not subject to the checks quantitative research can offer.

Using elite interviews as a means to generate data also raises issues regarding the difficulty of relying on interviews as credible data sources (Dexter, 2006: 25). The data generated by interviews is subjective. However, in my research I was not concerned with whether the interviewees were reporting the facts objectively, but rather I was interested in what their statements revealed about their perceptions of the CCIS process.

In addition, while I have done my best effort to interview people with diverse views and positions regarding the issue at hand, ultimately the completion of interviews was subject to the willingness and availability of the people I have approached. This also poses questions of representativeness.

Regarding the methods used to analyse data, a qualitative approach raises issues regarding subjectivity. As Meyer (2001: 30) has argued, objectivity cannot be achieved by means of discourse analysis because research is embedded in the beliefs and ideologies of the analyst and therefore prejudicing the analysis towards the analyst's preconceptions. Although this remains true, an effort was made to triangulate findings – my understandings of documents were checked against actors' perceptions retrieved from interviews.

3.4.5 Ethics considerations

Interviews complied with the University guidelines for Research Ethics, according to the ethics application submitted to the Faculty's Ethics Committee. Interviewees were approached via email, at which point they were sent a Participant Information Sheet containing a brief description of the research, as well as information about what the interview would involve. At the start of every interview, participants were briefed on what was expected of their participation and asked to sign a consent form as part of the consent process.

Interviews were only recorded when the consent of the interviewee was given. This consent was given in writing by ticking the appropriate box in the consent form. In cases where participants opted not to be recorded, I only took notes as the interview proceeded.

In compliance with the Data Protection Act and University policy, all efforts were made to maintain the confidentiality of interviews. Information collected, including a list of interviewees and interview transcripts was stored on a password protected computer. Notes taken during interviews were digitalised and paper versions destroyed.

In the writing up of interview findings, all efforts were made to safeguard the anonymity of interviewees, so that no quotations can be attributed to particular individuals. When referring to interview findings, these will be identified by the

general position the interviewee held at the time of their involvement in the CCIS process (e.g. Commission official; NGO Representative). A list of interviews can be found in Appendix.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have proposed Maarten Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis as the main theoretical framework for my analysis of the EU climate security discourse and its implications. Following from the arguments raised in the literature about the problematic fixity of the CS securitisation theory, the dominant approach to the study of climate change and security, I argued that ADA can make a significant contribution to the study of the effects of defining the climate problem through a security narrative.

The emphasis Hajer's discourse analytical framework gives to how language has an impact on institutions and policy-making is of great importance for addressing the normative debate on the implications of climate change. Working within this framework, this thesis will assess the impact of the EU climate change and international discourse in two phases. First, it will analyse the degree to which central EU actors were persuaded by the rhetorical power of the climate security discourse. Subsequently it examines if the discourse has solidifies in concrete policies or institutional practices.

To answer these two central questions in the thesis, the research combines the analysis of official and unofficial documents with in-depth interviews as means to access and generate data. To analyse the data, I used qualitative textual analysis to uncover argumentative structures such as the narratives, metaphors and storylines through which the climate problem and the solutions to it are discussed.

Chapter 4: The Emergence of CCIS Discourse in the EU

In the previous chapters I have identified the shortcomings in existing analysis of the climate-security link and proposed an alternative framework to study the implications of framing climate change as a security issue. More specifically, I argued that academic research has to date focused almost exclusively on a normative debate over the benefits versus the disadvantages of securitising climate change. In such research, analysts' individual conceptions of security prescribe their assumptions regarding the outcome of addressing climate change through a security framework.

In this thesis, I seek to take research beyond the normative debate. The aim is to analyse the implications of linking climate change and security in a more systematic way by focusing on a specific case study. As such, the thesis focuses on the European Union (EU), where climate change has been formally acknowledged as a security threat. The EU claims to be taking the lead in shaping the response to the security implications of climate change. As such, the framing of climate change as a security issue in the EU provides a unique case study opportunity.

To enable a more systematic analysis of the EU discourse on climate change and security, I use Maarten Hajer's framework for argumentative discourse analysis. Using this approach, I assess the influence of the EU climate-security discourse in two steps. First, I look at whether the discourse has become dominant in the way climate change is conceptualised in the EU, i.e. whether discourse structuration has occurred. Subsequently, I seek to understand whether the discourse has solidified in particular institutional arrangements, i.e. discourse institutionalisation.

However, before looking at structuration and institutionalisation, this first empirical chapter looks at the emergence of the climate change and international security (CCIS) discourse in the EU. The chapter focuses on the

period between 2006, when the discourse began to develop in the EU, and the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference in December 2009. The aim is to contextualise the emergence of this new discourse, as well as to analyse its mains characteristics.

To this end, the chapter is divided in two main parts. The first part is descriptive and seeks to give an account of the main events that led to the appearance and development of a discourse linking climate change and security. I start by providing a brief background for the emergence of concerns with the security implications of climate change in the EU and proceed to present an overview of the main events related to the construction of the EU CCIS discourse.

The second part of the chapter engages in the analysis of the emerging discourse. In line with the theoretical framework, I identify the main metaphors and storylines employed by the proponents of the climate-security link. The aim is to understand the narratives and storylines that discourse entrepreneurs used to construct climate change as a security problem. As different constructions of a problem yield different policy solutions, understanding the way in which actors constructed climate change as a problem is important to understand the type of policy solutions they were envisaging.

The last section of the chapter discusses the emergence of a discourse coalition on climate change and international security in the EU, looking in more detail into the main actors in this coalition as well as the practices through which they promote the new discourse.

4.1 Background for the emergence of CCIS

We have seen in the literature review chapter how concerns about environmental security emerged in the waning years of the Cold War. The link between the environment and security was first visible in the US where a number of scholars argued for a redefinition of national security to include environmental issues. In the late 1980's, policymakers put environment and security concerns on the international agenda, with the authors of the

'Brundtland Report' and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev introducing the topic at the UN (Dalby et al., 2009: 781).

From the early 2000s, climate change gradually became the main focus of the environment and security nexus as it came to be increasingly perceived as the most pressing environmental issue facing the world. Already in 2003, a report commissioned by the US Department of Defense argued that climate change should be elevated to the status of national security concern as it could destabilise the geopolitical environment. Should adverse weather conditions develop relatively abruptly, the authors argued, climate change could potentially lead to violent conflict over limited resources, such as food, water and energy supplies (Schwartz and Randall, 2003).

Despite this pioneering report, it is not until 2007 that the potential security consequences of climate change start to be systematically considered. A series of events around that time contributed to giving climate change a higher profile. In November the IPCC released its Fourth Assessment Report which reflected a major increase in scientific consensus about the reality of climate change and its man-made causes. In December, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the IPCC and Al Gore 'for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change' (Nobel Prize, 2007).

The unprecedented public and political attention generated by these events coincided with an increasing prominence of scientific, political and public discourses portraying climate change as a threat to security (Rothe, 2012: 243). In April 2007, the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter referred to as 'the Security Council') held its first-ever meeting to debate the potential impact of climate change. While some delegates raised doubts over the appropriateness of the Security Council to hold a discussion on climate change, many speakers praised the initiative (United Nations, 2007). Although no statement or resolution was adopted, this was a symbolic first-step towards the acknowledgement of climate change as a security issue, since the Security Council has the primary responsibility, under the UN Charter, for maintaining international peace and security

In June 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon claimed the conflict in Darfur was the world's first climate change conflict. He argued that '[a]mid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change' (Ki-moon, 2007). This view was corroborated by a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2007: 9) report on Sudan released a week later, according to which there was 'mounting evidence that […] regional climate change has […] contributed to conflict'.

Around this time, a number of academic studies on the climate-security link had been published. Although these studies did not provide robust evidence of a correlation between climate change and security concerns, the climate-security argument became increasingly influential in political discourses (Rothe, 2012: 243).

The year of 2007 also saw the proliferation of non-governmental organisations reports on climate change and security. From defence and security think tanks (e.g. the Center for Strategic and International Studies; the CNA corporation) to international charities (e.g. Christian Aid, International Alert), these organisations warned that climate change would have important security consequences that need to be addressed.

To conclude, by 2007 the notion that climate change could lead to insecurity had found a place in scientific, political and public discourses. For this reason, analysts acknowledged the year of 2007 as a turning point in the process of securitisation of climate change (Brauch, 2009: 6; Rothe, 2012: 243).

4.2 Climate Change and security in the EU: A chronology of events

In the European Union, concerns about the potential links between the environment and security date back to a report prepared by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy of the European Parliament on *Environment, Security and Foreign Policy*. This document, which became known as the Theorin Report underlined the connections between global

environmental problems, resource scarcity, security and potential conflicts (European Parliament, 1999).

Around 2006 both the Council of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as 'the Council') and the European Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commission') were already undertaking work on issues such as water security and energy security. According to an interviewee from the Council, in the context of this research it became increasingly evident that climate change acted as an additional pressure (Council Official, 28 February 2013). This awareness, in conjunction with an increasing prominence of external discourses portraying climate change as a threat to security, started to influence EU institutional actors.

Interviews suggest that the many studies and reports on the potential security impacts of climate change produced at that time were very influential with EU officials. Interviewees highlighted the role of reports such as *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change* by the CNA Corporation (2007) and *World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk* by WBGU (2007). The work of geopolitical expert Cleo Paskal on the potential of climate change to redraw maritime boundaries and increase border-related hostilities was also mentioned as being very influential with interviewees (Commission Official, 4 October 2012; Council Official, 6 November 2012; Council Official, 28 February 2013).

Additionally, in the period of 2006-2007 there were significant opportunities for exchange of ideas between EU officials and experts working on the issue of climate-security. The role of think tanks is very relevant here. For example, the Institute for Environmental Security (IES)[3], which had been pushing for the environmental security agenda in the EU since the early 2000s, convened a series of events on climate change and security in this period. In these events, academics, researchers from other think tanks, NGO representatives, EU national government representatives and EU officials came together to discuss the potential impacts of climate change on security. An interviewee of the IES recalls that

[3] The IES is an international non-profit non-governmental organisation established in 2002 in The Hague, with the goal of increasing political attention to environmental security.

> there was a series of IES conferences [...] in which we were responsible for spreading the ideas: through the European Parliament, through the groups, through the Commission, through the Council, and so on. Because the IES is very small but it does have convening power (IES Representative, 29 May 2013).

Initiatives from Member State governments were also important in promoting the debate on the link between climate change and security. In June 2007, for example, the Danish government invited the Council for a small informal meeting to discuss the impacts of climate change on foreign policy (Council Official, 20 September 2013). The meeting followed the release of a report on the issue funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and co-authored by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and the Chatham House. The report explores ways in which an integrated climate change-foreign policy approach might improve prospects for a more effective global climate change regime (Drexhage et al., 2007).

These events contributed to incite interest in a selected group of EU officials from the Council and the Commission. In the Council, the issue was picked up by officials from the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, a unit responsible for monitoring international developments, as well as analysing emerging threats and crises. In the Commission, officials from the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG Relex, now extinct), also took interest in the issue of climate security.

Also in the EU Joint Situation Centre[4], the EU's intelligence unit under the supervision of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereinafter referred to as 'the High Representative'), analysts started to realise that climate change and international security should be included in their analysis. In order to introduce the topic to the unit, they invited Anders Wijkman, at the time European Parliament Rapporteur on Climate Change, to make a presentation on climate change and its international security implications. An interviewee from the Situation Centre explained the rationale for introducing the topic:

[4] Since 2012 the Joint Situation Centre is named EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN).

> we need a comprehensive attitude to security. You have to look at all aspects that are closely or remotely linked to security to see how they interact and generate general security situations or situations of insecurity [...] So with this enlarged definition of security, with this realisation that climate change is a burning issue and probably the most important existential issue that we are fighting, I convinced my director – who was not difficult to convince – to hold this presentation. (INTCEN Analyst, 5 June 2013)

Swiftly, an informal network of officials interested in climate security was established. These actors set in motion a process that aimed to give more visibility to the climate security link in the EU and which culminated in the release of a joint paper by the High Representative and the European Commission on Climate Change and International Security. The Joint Paper marks the official acknowledgement of a link between climate change and security in the EU and has become the cornerstone of the EU CCIS discourse. In the next section the paper is discussed in some detail.

4.2.1 The Joint Paper on Climate Change and International Security

Having identified climate change as an emerging threat the EU should address, the above mentioned EU officials set in motion a process with the goal of making climate security more visible in the EU context.

The growing interest in climate security by EU officials coincided with the German Presidency of the Council in the first semester of 2007. The programme of the German Presidency had a significant focus on climate change and culminated with the establishment of the '20-20-20' targets by EU leaders in March 2007.

It was the June 2007 European Council, under the German presidency of the Council of the EU,[5] that gave a mandate for the High Representative and the Commission to produce a report on Climate change and international security. The Presidency conclusions read:

[5] Before the Lisbon Treaty, European Council meetings were hosted by the member state holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

> It is becoming increasingly evident that climate change will have a considerable impact on international security issues. The European Council invites the High Representative and the European Commission to work closely together on this important issue and to present a joint report to the European Council in Spring 2008 (European Council, 2007: 119).

Despite the formal mandate coming from the European Council in June 2007, interviews suggest that the contours of the report were already being discussed by an informal network of actors prior to this date. From the Council, officials from the Policy Unit and Solana's advisors took the lead in the drafting. For the Commission, officials from DG Relex were very involved (Council Official, 28 February 2013; Commission Official, 4 October 2012).

These actors worked to influence the German Presidency of the Council of the European Union, which at the time hosted the European Council meetings, in order to get the mandate for the report (Council Official, 27 February 2013). Following the formal invitation from the European Council, the report was released in March 2008 as a joint report by the High Representative and the Commission.

The joint paper builds mainly from existing literature, in particular the above mentioned reports by German Advisory Council on Global Change and the Military Advisory Board (Council Official, 28 February 2013). It was mainly drafted by the above mentioned actors from the Policy Unit, Solana's cabinet and DG Relex, but officials from other departments contributed to specific parts of the report according to their fields of expertise. For example, officials from the EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO) contributed to the assessment of the impacts of climate change on EU civil protection mechanisms (Commission Official, 6 June 2013). Moreover, the EU Joint Situation Centre provided analytical documents whose findings were incorporated in the draft (INTCEN Analyst, 5 June 2013).

In addition to institutional actors, think tanks also contributed to the discussions on the Solana paper. As other authors have noted, two organisations were particularly active in these discussions, namely E3G and the IES (Zwolski and Kaunert, 2011: 30).

E3G[6], whose founders have done considerable work on climate security, contributed to discussions on the joint paper. As an interviewee from this organisation recalls,

> there was a bunch of consultations, both informal and formal that went into that paper and then to the next stage [...] we had quite a lot of interaction with [DG] RELEX at the time and inputted our ideas into the various versions of the Solana paper [...] So a lot of input into those consultation processes by ourselves and other people. (E3G Representative, 7 October 2013)

Also an interviewee from the IES described the organisation's involvement with the paper arguing that they 'followed it very closely' (IES Representative, 29 June 2013).

Born of the collaboration of these actors, the report 'on Climate Change and International Security' was presented in April 2008 as a Joint Paper by the High Representative and the European Commission. The paper, frequently referred to by EU officials as 'the Solana Paper', examines the impact of climate change on international security and the subsequent consequences for Europe's own security. It identifies climate change as a multiplier of existing threats and considers the appropriate responses the EU should adopt to address the security impacts of climate change.

The paper starts with the premise that climate change is factual. In the very first line of the document the authors argue that '[t]he risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are already taking place' (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 1).

In the document, the High Representative and the Commission highlight the 2ºC target which has been formulated as a political benchmark by the EU (Rothe, 2011: 340). As such, the potential security consequences of an increase in global temperature beyond the 2ºC threshold are emphasised. According to the paper,

[6] E3G – Third Generation Environmentalism is an European independent, non-profit organisation. It was founded in 2004 with the goal to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development. We leverage outcomes on climate, economics, resources and security.

> unmitigated climate change beyond 2ºC will lead to unprecedented security scenarios as it is likely to trigger a number of tipping points that would lead to further accelerated, irreversible and largely unpredictable climate changes. (High Representative and European Commission 2008: 1)

By representing a 'point of no return', the 2ºC limit functions as a symbolic marker which separates manageable from irreversible climate change (Rothe, 2011: 339). However, the argument in the paper is that even if the 2ºC is met, climate change will still pose security risks. For this reason, it calls attention to the findings of the IPCC which demonstrate that

> even if by 2050 emissions would be reduced to below half of 1990 levels, a temperature rise of up to 2ºC above pre-industrial levels will be difficult to avoid. Such a temperature increase will pose serious security risks that would increase if warming continues. (High Representative and European Commission 2008: 1)

According to the Joint Paper then, there are unavoidable security risks resulting from climate change. Hence, while the magnitude of the threat depends on whether or not the 2º goal is achieved, in both scenarios climate change will act as a 'threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability' (High Representative and European Commission 2008).

Concretely, the paper identifies seven key interconnected threats posed by climate change: conflict over resources; economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure; loss of territory and border disputes; environmentally-induced migration; situations of fragility and radicalization; tension over energy supply; and pressure on international governance. In the document, the High Representative and the Commission also identify some of the regions most vulnerable to these threats, namely Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Arctic.

The paper contains a number of recommendations for EU response. Being the first report the EU produced on climate change and international security, it acknowledges the need to conduct further studies. Hence, 'first step to address the impact of climate change on international security should be to build up knowledge and assess the EU's own capacities' (High Representative and European Commission 2008: 9). Following assessment, the paper argues

for the enhancement of EU internal capabilities, namely in terms of prevention of and preparedness for disasters and conflicts.

A strong emphasis is placed on the global dimension of the problem and the consequent need to address it through a multilateral response. In this context, the strengthening of the international climate change regime is deemed essential. The paper argues that

> the EU needs to continue and strengthen its leadership towards an ambitious post-2012 agreement in 2009, including both mitigation and adaptation action by all countries as a key contribution to addressing climate security (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 10).

Following from this, international cooperation with both relevant international organisations as well as with third countries occupies a prominent position in the recommendations of the joint paper. It argues that 'climate change calls for revisiting and reinforcing EU cooperation and political dialogue instruments, giving more attention to the impact of climate change on security' (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 11).

The Joint paper on Climate Change and International Security marked the official recognition of climate security as an issue in the EU. Following its release, a Steering Group was formed with the aim of implementing the Joint Paper. Within less than two years two follow-up reports were produced.

In December 2008 the High Representative presented a follow-up report, containing recommendations for EU action on climate change and international security, based on regional and thematic analysis done by the Commission, Member States, along with expertise from civil society and think tanks (High Representative, 2008: 2). The report contains three main recommendations, the first of which refers to the need for more detailed analysis of the regional security implications of climate change. The report summarises analysis done for three initial case studies (Africa, Middle East and North Africa, and Central Asia) and recommends that 'as a next step, studies should be undertaken on areas such as Afghanistan and its neighbourhood; South and East Asia; the Arctic; the Pacific; the Caribbean; and Latin America' (High Representative, 2008:2).

The second main recommendation in the report concerns the integration of analyses into EU early warning mechanisms. The report argues that

> The current EU early warning instruments must focus more on climate change and environmental degradation, alongside other relevant variables such as governance, demographic pressures or regional conflicts. We should incorporate a wider range of climate-related data, to assist in identifying potential dangers and areas at particular risk. (High Representative, 2008:6)

Accordingly, the report suggests the reinforcement of 'co-ordination with the relevant EU crisis management structures, to ensure that the impact of climate change is taken into account for strategic planning and capability development' (High Representative, 2008: 6).

The final recommendation in the report refers to the intensification of dialogues with third countries and organisations. The High Representative highlights that engaging partners is vital because 'neither reducing emissions nor addressing the security dimension can be done by the EU alone' (High Representative, 2008: 6). As a result, the report recommends that the EU works closely with key global partners and organisations, as well as with the regions that face the most risk from climate change (High Representative, 2008:7).

The Follow up report by the High Representative indicated that the implementation of recommendations should be reviewed by the Council in the second half of 2009. The review came in November 2009, in the form of a Joint Progress Report drafted by the General Secretariat of the Council, the Swedish Presidency of the Council and the Commission Staff.

The report evaluates the progress made by the EU institutions and Member States in addressing the security implications of climate change. Overall, it reviews positively the evolution of the climate change and international security process, arguing that EU activities on CCIS 'highlighted the role of the EU as a global leader on CCIS' (Council, 2009a: 5).

This leadership role, the report argues, comes with the responsibility to take action to address the security implications of climate change. According to the report,

> The EU has a critical role to play in the emerging global response to the security implications of climate change. In order to improve its ability to play a role commensurate with its commitment, more actions are suggested based on the insights gained in the past year. (European Commission et al, 2009: 8)

As a result, while the previous two reports placed great emphasis on the need to increase the knowledge base, the Joint Progress Report stresses the urgency to act. It states:

> Both knowledge and action are needed. As we explore the inter-relationship between climate change and security, we can better target our policies. But, while we should continue to build up our knowledge, we cannot afford to wait from taking action. This should be a combination of prevention, mitigation, adaptation, and response to crisis where it occurs. (Council, 2009a: 3)

Recommendations are divided in two main sections, the first of which focuses on the external promotion of the climate-security link. The report recommends that the EU drives the global debate on CCIS forward, seeking to keep the topic on the agenda of relevant UN bodies, in particular the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) and the Security Council (Council, 2009a: 9).

The second part of the recommendations addresses EU action, namely the reinforcement of the EU's institutional capacity to work on CCIS. The report offers suggestions for making the functioning of the Steering Group more effective, such as including more actors and developing an EU wide strategy for action on CCIS (Council, 2009a: 10). The integration of climate change into EU development cooperation is also endorsed as an essential tool for EU action on CCIS (Council, 2009a: 11) Finally, the reinforcement of crisis management capabilities is also suggested as a key measure to address the security consequences of climate change (Council, 2009a: 12).

Overall, the joint progress report offers more detail on what the EU should do to address the security implications of climate change than the previous reports had done. It also gives more concrete suggestions about which instruments should be used in the response to climate change and security. However, the report leaves out important information, especially on how action

on CCIS is to be funded. The report only briefly mentions that the budgetary implications of 'linking mitigation, adaptation and crisis prevention in a conflict-sensitive way' (Council, 2009a:11) should be properly assessed.

Overall, the two follow up reports did not attain as much visibility as the Solana report. For example, the French Presidency referred the November 2008 follow-up report to the Agriculture and Fisheries Council which merely 'took note of a report containing recommendations from the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy concerning climate change and international security' (Council, 2008a: 49)

However, these documents are important as the first documentation of an EU discourse on climate change and international security. As such, their analysis allows us to understand the metaphors and storylines used to construct the EU CCIS discourse.

4.3 Climate Change and International Security Storylines

The previous section gave a brief overview of the main events that led to the emergence of an EU discourse on CCIS. However, in order to gain a deeper understanding of this discourse, it is also necessary to examine its main arguments. In this section, I identify the main metaphors and storylines employed by the proponents of the CCIS discourse in order to better understand how climate change was constructed as a security problem in the EU context.

In addition to the CCIS reports mentioned above, the analysis here considered also encompasses speeches from key proponents of CCIS, as well as knowledge gained in interviews with key actors.

The first step of the analysis is to uncover the metaphors through which climate change is presented. A metaphor is defined as understanding and experiencing something in terms of another (Hajer, 2009: 64).

In the text analysed, climate change is depicted as a 'threat' or as 'threatening' something. This discursive representation articulates an antagonism between

humanity and climate change, which is featured as an external enemy (Methmann and Rothe, 2012: 327). Hence, the representation of climate change through a threat metaphor suggests that this environmental phenomenon is being understood and experienced in terms of a struggle between humankind and a changing climate that threatens livelihoods.

Using this metaphor, a narrative is developed where climate change is claimed to act as a 'threat multiplier'. Throughout the text analysed the notion that climate change is a 'threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability' (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 2) appears consistently.

The phrase 'threat multiplier', which first appeared in the 2007 Military Advisory Board report, was incorporated into the Joint Report because it captured the complexity of the threat (Council Official, 6 November 2012). In fact, the idea of a 'threat multiplier' illustrates how climate change is perceived as a 'cross-cutting and multi-dimensional threat' (Council, 2009a: 6). In this sense, the threat posed by climate change implies an agglomeration of various negative impacts across all sections of society and the economy. As a Council official put it,

> the interaction [between the impacts of climate change] is the significant thing. How migration and, for instance, land issues reinforce governance problems, which then reinforces ethnic problems, etc. So it is this complexity and the mutual interactions that you need to look at if you want to understand [the threat posed by climate change]. (Council Official, 6 November 2012)

Moreover, the idea of a threat multiplier focuses on the potential of climate change to intensify existing threats. Rather than creating a new and direct threat to security, climate change is expected to exacerbate already existing risks, tensions and insecurities. According to the interviews undertaken, this emphasis on the intensification of existing threats matches the dominant view among EU officials. As a Commission official explained, 'climate change has stronger impacts when other issues already exist in societies. It increases tensions' (Commission Official, 4 October 2012).

While it highlights the urgency of the problem, the idea that climate change will multiply existing threats across all sectors of society is somewhat ambiguous. Although several examples of threats deriving from climate change are discussed throughout the texts analysed, the notion of a 'threat multiplier' is an all-encompassing notion – any negative impact of climate change can potentially create a security threat, even if only by its interaction with other impacts.

The phrase 'threat multiplier' then functions as a storyline. The ambiguity of the phrase allows it to function as a 'discursive cement that creates communicative networks among actors with different or at best overlapping perceptions and understandings' (Hajer, 1995: 63). In this sense, actors with different perceptions about the threats posed by climate change – and different interests in the climate *problematique* – are able to subscribe to the idea that climate change is a threat multiplier.

The key role of this specific storyline in building consensus is acknowledged by some of the discourse proponents. In the opinion of a Council official involved in the drafting of the Joint Report:

> I think, in politics (…) if you want to do something and you want to move the consensus, if you want to move this organisation which is so complicated and so slow moving and so painful, you have to sometimes galvanise […] and a phrase like that can help you do that. (Council Official, 6 November 2012)

A storyline refers to a condensed form of narrative. Hajer claims that although a story has a beginning, middle, and an end, people usually use short cues because they assume others will know what is meant (Hajer, 2005:302). The 'threat multiplier' storyline is an example of this: the complete story about the causal relationship between the mechanisms and processes that cause changes in the earth's climate (beginning), the physical impacts of such changes (middle) and the intensification of existing security threats (end) is replaced by the phrase 'threat multiplier'. Actors use this phrase because they assume their interlocutors understand the processes and effects implied.

Each person, however, has their own versions of the 'climate change as a threat multiplier' story. In the specific case of the EU, although most

interviewees referred to climate change explicitly or implicitly as a threat multiplier, what each identified as the main threats varied slightly. While some interviewees stressed the increase in frequency and severity of natural disasters as a threat, others highlighted the proliferation of border and resource disputes.

Hence, by depicting it as a threat multiplier, the discourse entrepreneurs made clear they perceived climate change as a potential threat on a broad range of levels, or as Methmann and Rothe (2012: 328) have named it, a 'master-threat'.

Nevertheless, one specific threat appears to be given a prominent place. A predominant concern with the impact of climate change on conflict is apparent in all text analysed. In line with the threat multiplier storyline, the argument is that the effects of climate change have the potential to exacerbate existing drivers of conflict. Overall, there is fear that climate change will aggravate resource scarcity – such as water, arable land and food stocks – triggering violent conflict over resources.

Discourse entrepreneurs are however cautious not to depict climate change as a direct cause of conflict, but rather as an additional pressure for states/regions where conflict is already occurring or latent. Hence, as the High Representative and the Commission argue, '[t]he core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone' (High Representative and European Commission 2008: 2).

Therefore, while the concept of 'threat multiplier' allows for a causal chain between the effects of climate change and conflict to be established, it also accommodates the view that conflict is complex and dynamic. Rather than creating conflict directly, the idea is that the effects of climate change will have an impact on, and interact with, other drivers of conflict such as economic, social and political factors.

In addition, there is an apparent concern in the text with increased migration caused by the effects of climate change. The argument is that climate change could create added stress were populations are already vulnerable, thus amplifying or triggering migration within and between countries. An intensification of migration creates two forms of concerns for the EU. First, since the EU's neighbours include some of the most vulnerable regions to

climate change, migratory pressures at the EU border is expected to increase in the future (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 4).

In addition to increased migratory pressure for Europe, climate-induced migration also links with conflict. A common argument made in the text analysed is that massive migration flows are likely to increase conflicts in transit and destination areas. As a Council official involved in the drafting of the CCIS papers explained, 'when we talk about migration, we're not only talking about migration to the EU. We're also talking about migration outside the EU. The EU might be called to intervene in these areas' (Council Official, 28 February 2013).

Ultimately then, it can be argued that conflict is the predominant threat that climate change will intensify. However, as we have discussed above, the threat multiplier storyline encapsulates a wider range of concerns regarding the impact of climate change, including economic damage, risks to development and energy insecurity. By accommodating these different concerns, the threat multiplier storyline becomes appealing across a broader range of actors, for example between EU officials working on conflict prevention and environmental organisations.

Having tried to demonstrate how the phenomenon of climate change was constructed as a problem by CCIS discourse entrepreneurs, the analysis now turns to the solutions proposed to deal with the said problem.

If climate is understood through a threat metaphor, then the solution to the climate problem is understood in terms of a response to a threat. Entrepreneurs argue that '[t]he EU has a critical role to play in the emerging global response to the security implications of climate change' (Council, 2009a: 8). There are two important claims here. The first is the need for effective multilateralism in the response to the security implications of climate change because 'the EU cannot act alone' (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 9). Climate change is a global problem and therefore 'the EU is advocating a multilateral response' (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 10).

The second claim is that, in the context of multilateralism, the EU has a pivotal role in the response to the security implications of climate change. In fact, a

predominant narrative in the text analysed is that of the EU as a global leader on climate change and international security. Raising awareness of the security implications of climate change, as well as shaping the global response to those implications, is seen as part of the EU's leadership role.

The discourse entrepreneurs highlight how the EU is well suited to lead on the global response to the climate threat. According to the Joint paper,

> The EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security, given its leading role in development, global climate policy and the wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal. Moreover, the security challenge plays to Europe's strengths, with its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, and as a key proponent of effective multilateralism. (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 2)

Hence, as High Representative Solana (2008a) has argued, 'it is up to Europe to lead the international response' to the security consequences of climate change.

The focus on multilateralism on one hand, and EU leadership on the other, is made compatible through the idea of 'EU multilateral leadership'. Entrepreneurs argue the EU should deliver 'multilateral leadership [...] to promote global climate security' (Council, 2009a: 3).

But what exactly is the EU proposing to lead on? If we look at the concrete measures proposed as response to the threat of climate change, we find 'a combination of prevention, mitigation, adaptation, and response to crisis where it occurs' (Council, 2009a: 3).

Mitigation is advocated as a fundamental measure to deal with the security implications of climate change. Mitigation efforts aim at preventing an increase in average global temperatures above 2° C, which would trigger a number of tipping points that would lead to irreversible climate change. The argument has an internal and an external dimension. First, the link between climate change and security is framed as an incentive to strengthen EU's efforts to reduce emissions.

Second, the EU stresses its role to raise support for an ambitious global climate agreement under the UN framework. Hence, throughout the CCIS reports cooperation with key global partners (US, China, India, and Russia) is identified as an essential instrument for EU action on climate change and security.

Even if mitigation efforts can limit temperature increases to below a threshold of 2° C, it is argued that some impacts of climate change are unavoidable. Consequently, adaptation is seen as essential to deal with these impacts. The focus here are the most vulnerable developing nations. The EU proposes to intensify international cooperation to assist these nations in their institutional and capacity building efforts.

Mitigation and adaptation then continue to be the central pillars of EU climate action. They are invested with urgency due to the fact they become preventive security policies. According to the Joint Report, 'investment in mitigation to avoid such scenarios, as well as ways to adapt to the unavoidable should go hand in hand with addressing the international security threats created by climate change; both should be viewed as part of preventive security policy' (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 1).

Response to crisis is also important given the stress on conflict but also natural disasters. In addition to mitigation and adaptation, the CCIS documents also advocate for the strengthening of EU's capacities for crisis response. The documents advocate further building up civil and military capabilities, including civil protection and the use of crisis management and disaster response instruments to contribute to the response to the security risks posed by climate change (High Representative and European Commission, 2008).

4.4 Discourse entrepreneurs and the promotion of storylines

Having presented the main storylines in the emerging EU climate change and international security discourse, this section now discusses the actors who initiated the discourse as well as the practices through which they sought to promote the new discourse.

Earlier in this chapter, I have argued that the actors responsible for initiating the EU CCIS discourse were officials from the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the Council and the Commission's DG RELEX. The fact that CCIS was 'born' from these two actors is relevant to understand the dominant concern with the external impacts of climate change in the discourse. DG Relex was responsible for the external policy of the Union and the Policy Unit had the responsibility to monitor and assess emerging international threats and crises (Dover, 2010: 252).

Other actors became quickly involved in the CCIS process. According to interviews, inside DG RELEX, the Policy Coordinator on Climate Change Issues took an interest in the issue. In the Council Secretariat, climate change and international security was taken up by one of Solana's Personal Advisors. Analysts from the EU Joint Situation Centre also contributed to debates on the issue although keeping a distance from policy. In addition to institutional actors, think tanks also contributed to the discussions leading to the publication of the Solana paper, participating in formal and informal consultations and inputting their ideas into the CCIS papers.

At the top level, High Representative Solana also took an interest in the climate-security link issue from very early. Already in March 2007, the head of EU diplomacy was arguing that climate change is one of the 'complex security challenges that defy traditional ways of operating' (Solana, 2007). Furthermore, calling attention to the impact of climate change on conflict, Solana argued that Darfur was 'the first time we are aware that a war is caused by climate change - and it will not be the last' (Solana, 2007).

These actors constructed and promoted a discourse containing a new definition for the problem of climate change. I have introduced the concept of discourse entrepreneur in Chapter 3 as a complement to Hajer's ADA, to highlight the fundamental role of specific actors in the emergence of new discourses. The above mentioned actors were key in the emergence of the climate change and international security discourse because – in a discursive space dominated by discourses of climate change as an economic issue – they actively constructed and disseminated narratives and storylines that depicted climate change as a security issue.

Saying that these entrepreneurs created an EU discourse on climate change and international security does not mean they invented the climate security narratives and storylines out of thin air To be sure, entrepreneurs drew on existing narratives from NGOs and think tank reports. In a way then, it can be said that entrepreneurs are also constructed by the discourse. What they read in those reports convinced them that this was a serious and important issue. However, CCIS entrepreneurs combined these pre-existing storylines in a way that made sense for the EU context. As such, they were critical for the emergence of the EU CCIS discourse. In a discursive context where climate change was predominantly understood as an economic challenge, the EU CCIS discourse entrepreneurs reconstructed the problem by 'creating' a discourse that frames climate change as a security challenge.

Interviews were key for understanding these actor's motivations to develop a discourse linking climate change and security in the EU. First of all, the identification of climate change as a threat to security was seen as a natural development in a context of increasing importance attributed to non-traditional security threats. In the words of a Council official involved in the onset of the process,

> we were thinking about how to position the European Union in the so called new security issues, issues that don't fall under the traditional scheme of military conflict or peacekeeping or terrorism. Because we felt that these issues are growing in importance on the international agenda, this is an area where the EU (…) should be able to play a growing role (Council Official, 6 November 2012).

Hence, while the entrepreneurs recognised the innovative character of the CCIS discourse in the EU context, at the same time they viewed it as an obvious development because identifying emerging risks and addressing their security consequences was 'their job'. As an official from DG RELEX explained, 'it is the role of a diplomatic department to analyse the threats ahead. The world is changing and the department needed to explore what was going to happen tomorrow' (Commission Official, 4 October 2012).

Something that became evident in interviews with EU CCIS discourse entrepreneurs is that they were genuinely convinced of the impacts of climate

change on international security and, therefore, in their areas of work. In the words of an Official from the Council Secretariat: 'I took it personally. For me it became an issue because I felt this was more important [than other issues in the portfolio]. I put in personal effort because I believed in it' (Council Official, 28 February 2013)

The construction of climate change as a security problem was also seen as instrumental in raising the profile of climate change. An official from the Commission claimed the report aimed to show that 'climate issues are not soft issues. They have important impacts' (Commission Official, 4 October 2012). By raising awareness of the security impacts of climate change, CCIS entrepreneurs sought to make climate change a priority for policymakers. According to a Council Secretariat official, the aim was to put climate change 'at a somewhat higher level of the EU's agenda and the broader international agenda' (Council Official, 6 November 2012).

In this context, engaging the US is given a prominent place in the rationale for speaking of climate change in terms of security. As a Commission official argued, at the time of emergence of this discourse, the 'US administration was in strong denial of climate change'. CCIS thus allowed to 'bring an important angle of climate change to their attention' (Commission Official, 4 October 2012).

Hence, entrepreneurs hoped that calling attention to the security consequences of climate change would reinforce internal and external mitigation ambitions. As a Council official put it,

> if you think [climate change] has all these horrible security implications that are going to get worse and that it is a threat multiplier and all these things […] it also strengthens the case for Europe or whoever to be ambitious on climate change (Council Official, 6 November 2012).

Also High Representative Solana has argued that, 'saying that climate change poses security risks reinforces the need to stick to our [the EU's] commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' (Solana, 2008a).

The efforts to reinforce ambitions in climate change mitigation must be understood in the context of the preparations for the 2009 United Nations

Climate Change Conference. In this context, CCIS emerged as an attempt to raise the profile of climate change, inside the EU and externally, as a preparation for the negotiations. In the words of a Council official, 'it was the run up to Copenhagen and there was a need to make the environment more political' (Council Official, 28 February 2013).

Overall, entrepreneurs believed that framing climate change as a security issue would enable a better response to this problem. Given that different construction of a problem yield different policy solutions, discourse entrepreneurs redefine social phenomena in ways they believe will bring about the best solution for them. Framing climate change as a security issue was therefore seen as an opportunity to bring together actors working in diverse fields, such as development, security, foreign affairs, and environment under a common project. By bringing different types of expertise together, CCIS entrepreneurs hoped to foster the development of a more comprehensive and effective policy response to climate change (Council Official, 6 November 2012; Council Official, 28 February 2013)

Overall, we can identify a discourse coalition on climate change and international security. According to Hajer, 'a discourse-coalition refers to a group of actors that, *in the context of an identifiable set of practices* [sic], shares the usage of a particular set of story lines over a particular period of time' (Hajer, 2005: 302). In the CCIS discourse coalition, actors with varying backgrounds unite around the 'climate change as a threat multiplier' story-line.

Having established that the link between climate change and security was an important area the EU should address, actors in the CCIS discourse coalition needed to get their message across to other EU actors. In other words, entrepreneurs sought to promote the emerging CCIS discourse inside the EU.

However, it should be mentioned that, despite the acknowledgement that discourse entrepreneurs have an interest in the dissemination of certain discourses, one should not see discourses as 'utilitarian tools' that entrepreneurs use for their own purpose. Discourses can be used as part of a political strategy, but any strategy is also shaped by its discursive environment. As I have argued earlier, it was the increasing prominence of discourses portraying climate change as a threat to security that motivated

entrepreneurs to develop an EU narrative on CCIS. Therefore, it can be argued, that discourse and interests are mutually constitutive.

One of the ways in which the entrepreneurs disseminated the discourse was through the release of reports on climate change and international security, particularly the 2008 Joint Paper by the High Representative and the Commission which was widely circulated in EU institutions.

Another way in which entrepreneurs propagated the CCIS discourse was through the meetings of the Steering Group. Following the publication of the Joint Paper, the Council set up a Steering Group on Climate Change and Security. The Steering Group provided an important platform to disseminate the CCIS discourse as entrepreneurs invited actors from varying backgrounds to participate in the meetings.

An interviewee with responsibilities for organising the meetings described how the Steering Group increasingly brought together people from different areas, 'people that never talked before' (Council Official, 28 February 2013). Hence, the meetings increasingly started to include individuals from Member States with an interest in climate change and security. According to the interviewee the member States most active in the Steering Group were Germany, the UK and Sweden (Council Official, 28 February 2013). Other actors also participated occasionally in the meetings, for example elements from the European Defence Agency and the EU Military Staff.

Despite being an informal group, the Steering Group provided a space to bring together actors who shared an interest in the issue of climate security, as well as to allow actors to coordinate strategies for driving the process forward. As an interviewee argued, 'one should not underestimate the importance of informal networks, especially informal networks that cross institutions' (IES Representative, 29 June 2013).

However, entrepreneurs also sought to spread the new discourse among EU institutions, Member States and the civil society through other practices. More specifically, they organised a number of conferences, workshops and meetings for policymakers. These events aimed to call attention to CCIS as an emerging area of concern, as well as to bring together climate actors and security actors, thus enabling networking (Council Official, 6 November 2012).

In addition to these events, EU bodies commissioned several reports on the impacts of climate change on international security. In addition to the regional studies done the Policy Unit and DG Relex, the European Commission funded studies on CCIS by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Institute for Sustainable Development and Adelphi Consult. As well as increasing the knowledge base, these studies contribute to disseminating the CCIS discourse.

The fact that a top official took interest in CCIS was also very relevant to the promotion of the discourse. High Representative Solana promoted the CCIS narrative in various settings. On a number of addresses to the European Parliament, Solana highlighted the effects of climate change on international security. For instance, addressing the Committee on Foreign Affairs in April 2008, the High Representative argued that the security implications of climate change were 'a very important issue' on which he hoped to 'continue to work in close contact with the Parliament' (Solana, 2008b: 5). In February 2009, addressing the European Parliament on the EU Common, Security and Defence Policy, Solana referred to climate change as one of the 'threats and challenges that we face in today's world"'(Solana, 2009: 2).

The High Representative also promoted the discourse among the European civil society, by publishing on the 13th of March 2008 an article on the security implications of climate change. The article, translated in four languages and published simultaneously in four reputable newspapers[7], presented the main conclusions in the Joint Report on Climate Change and International Security. In the article, Solana addressed European citizens, arguing that '[t]he most appropriate way of viewing climate change is as a threat multiplier' (Solana, 2008a).

[7] The Guardian in the UK, Le Soir in France, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Germany and La Vanguardia in Spain.

4.4.1 Challenges to the promotion of the discourse

The discourse coalition was not as successful in promoting the discourse internally as some actors may have wished. Interviewees suggest a number of contributing factors for the limited success of the discourse.

First, although several activities were promoted to disseminate the discourse, the fact that the Steering group on CCIS was not a permanent group made it difficult to keep the issue on top of the agenda more lastingly. A Council Secretariat official explained that it was not possible to create a more permanent group due to the heavily bureaucratic nature of the institution. Consequently, it was only possible to create an informal group based on the interest of participants. As a result, the official regretted, 'not being a formal group, after Copenhagen [COP 15] interest started thinning out' (Council Official, 28 February 2013).

Second, interviewees claim that from the outset inter-institutional frictions between the Council and the Commission regarding competence hindered the process. In the words of a Council official,

> there was, as always, some institutional positioning, because some people saw it more as Solana's report and people in the Commission said 'well we have been doing this already so what is he coming for now?' and this is sort of typical Brussels story (Council Official, 6 November 2012).

As a result of this friction, the High Representative follow up report was submitted to the Agriculture and Fisheries Council which resulted in a low visibility for the issue (Council Official, 28 February 2013).

Third, restructuration in the EU institutions in the period between December 2009 and January 2011 contributed to the decline in the priority of climate change within the EU.

The end of Solana's mandate as High Representative and the appointment of Baroness Catherine Ashton as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP)

had a significant impact on the continuity of CCIS.[8] Solana, which I already identified as a CCIS discourse entrepreneur, had demonstrated to have a personal commitment to the issue. Ashton, on the other hand, not only lacked in foreign policy experience, but also was absorbed by the task of setting up the European External Action Service (EEAS) (INTCEN Analyst, 5 June 2013).

The restructuring of the services in preparation for the establishment of the EEAS also contributed for the decline in the promotion of the CCIS narratives. The dissolution of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the Council and of DG RELEX, significant promoters of CCIS led to a dispersion of the issue (Council Official, 28 February 2013).

Moreover, the establishment of the EEAS, which incorporated the diplomatic departments of both the Council and the Commission, was a complex process. The 'difficult birth of the EEAS' (E3G Representative, 7 November 2012), as one interviewee put it, or the 'infancy problems of the EEAS' (INTCEN Analyst, 5 June 2013) as referred to by another interviewee, meant that inter-institutional struggles over the shape and competences of the new department overshadowed other issues.

These factors hindered the release of a follow-up on the CCIS reports in 2010. The December 2009 Council Conclusions stressed that the implementation of CCIS should be followed up 'through a report to the Council during the latter part of 2010' (Council, 2009a: 2). According to a Council official, the report was drafted by the Council but the Commission insisted on postponing its release until the establishment of the EEAS. However, the report was never released because, the same official argued, the report 'had no support from Asthon. Everything was ready, but there was never a decision from Ashton' (Council Official, 1 March 2013).

Finally, the decline in the interest on climate change more generally also reflected on the CCIS discourse. While the CCIS discourse built up until the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, the disappointment with the outcome of the summit pushed the whole of the EU into a period of

[8] Under the Lisbon Treaty the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was replaced by the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission.

introspection. Pavese and Torney (2012: 138) have argued that the EU's marginalisation in the final negotiations at Copenhagen 'came as a blow to the EU's self-image as an international leader on climate change'. The EU failure, as it was perceived by many, pushed the EU into 'a period of reflection concerning the EU approach to the international climate change negotiations' (Pavese and Torney, 2012: 138). Hence, between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2011, the issue of climate change did not figure high in the EU agenda.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the phase of emergence of a discourse on climate change and international security in the EU. It started by providing a background for the emergence of CCIS on the international level, namely with the proliferation of non-governmental organisations reports on climate change and security around the year of 2007.

The chapter then presented a brief overview of the main events that led to the development of a CCIS discourse in the EU. It followed developments from 2006 when EU actors working on conflict prevention first considered that climate change may act as an additional pressure, through to the establishment of an informal network of officials interested in climate security. The chapter also presented the main arguments in the 2008 Joint paper by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission on *Climate Change and International Security*, which has become the cornerstone of the EU climate change and international security discourse.

By presenting the main events that led to the emergence of an EU discourse on CCIS, the first part of the chapter aimed to provide context for the analysis of the said discourse. In the second part of the chapter, the discourse was analysed in more detail, uncovering the main metaphors and storylines through which climate change was constructed as a problem.

I have argued that climate change is depicted as a 'threat' or as 'threatening' something, a discursive representation which articulates an antagonism between humanity and climate change. The representation of climate change through a threat metaphor, I argued, suggests that this environmental phenomenon is being understood and experienced in terms of a struggle between humankind and a changing climate.

Most importantly, I have identified the central storyline in the EU CCIS discourse as that of climate change acting as a 'threat multiplier'. This narrative focuses on the potential of climate change to intensify existing threats, rather than on the production of new and direct threats to security. The phrase 'threat multiplier' captures the complexity of the threat because it highlights the fact that climate change can potentially have an impact in virtually all spheres.

The notion of a 'threat multiplier' encompasses both direct and indirect threats to Europe. However, a predominant concern with the external impacts of climate change, especially with how climate change will impact on conflict drivers, is clear in the text analysed. The fact that CCIS was 'born' from DG Relex and the Policy Unit, both with a responsibility in monitoring emerging international threats, is relevant to understand this dominant concern with the external impacts of climate change in the discourse.

Corresponding to the definition of the problem as a threat, the solution to this problem is understood in terms of a threat response. However, the main responses envisaged are mitigation and adaptation, although in a context of reinforced urgency due to the fact that they acquire preventive security status. Given the prominent concern with conflict, and also the predicted increase in frequency and severity of natural disasters, enhancement of EU capabilities for crisis response is also highlighted as an essential measure in addressing the security impacts of climate change.

In the context of the response to the threat of climate change, the EU is understood as a leader with the responsibility to shape the global response to the security implications of climate change. However, as the EU cannot address the problem alone, the idea of multilateral leadership is advanced. Both the 'EU

leadership on CCIS' and the idea of a 'multilateral leadership on CCIS' are important story-line in the CCIS discourse.

Finally, the chapter discussed the role of the actors who initiated the CCIS discourse. I argued these actors should be seen as 'discourse entrepreneurs', because they actively built narratives and storylines that link climate change to security. Because they had strong beliefs about the appropriateness and importance of the climate-security link, CCIS discourse entrepreneurs drew on existing reports to actively construct a discourse that frames climate change as a security challenge.

Moreover, I sought to demonstrate how these actors promoted climate change and international security discourse, through a number of activities including seminars, workshops and meetings. In so doing, entrepreneurs aimed to call attention to the climate-security link, as well as gain support for action on climate security.

Overall, this chapter has sought to describe the emergence of a discourse coalition on climate change and international security on the EU. In this coalition, actors from the environmental sphere, and more specifically climate change, as well as actors from the security sphere, were brought together under a common discourse on climate change and international security. In connecting these previously independent areas of policy a discourse coalition has formed around the EU CCIS storylines, most notably the storyline of 'climate change as a threat multiplier'.

The next chapter will measure the success of entrepreneurs in disseminating the CCIS storylines. In doing so, I will analyse the structuration and institutionalisation of the climate change and international security discourse in the EU climate change sphere.

Chapter 5: CCIS in the EU climate change sphere

The previous chapter addressed the emergence of an EU discourse on climate change and international security (CCIS), focusing on the role of the discourse entrepreneurs in constructing and disseminating that discourse.

Following the publication of Joint Paper on CCIS in 2008, discourse entrepreneurs organised as the informal Steering Group on Climate Change and International Security, promoted a number of activities that aimed to 'anchor' the new discourse in the EU. These included the organisation of conferences, workshops and meetings for EU policymakers, as well as the commissioning of several reports on the impacts of climate change on international security.

In this chapter, I measure the influence of the CCIS discourse in the EU climate realm. Following Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis, I start by analysing discourse structuration. Looking at EU climate change documents and speeches, I seek to understand whether CCIS metaphors and storylines have been incorporated into EU climate change discourse and whether central EU actors now conceive of climate change as a security issue.

Following the analysis of structuration, the second part of the chapter addresses the institutionalisation of the climate change and international security discourse. The aim is to understand whether the CCIS discourse has been translated into climate policy principles and instruments in the EU.

5.1 CCIS in the EU climate change discursive space

Climate change was for the first time on the agenda of the European Council in June 1990, following developments at the international level (Oberthür and Pallemaerts, 2010: 29). Since then, preventing climate change has increasingly become a priority for the EU, with EU leaders recently endorsing the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% compared to 1990 levels.

From the onset, EU climate change discourse has been dominated by principles of ecological modernisation (EM). EM emerged in the 1980s as a policy-oriented discourse in environmental politics that sought to reconcile the, until then, 'opposing goals of economic growth and environmental protection' (Carter, 2007: 227). As such, EM depicts environmental protection as a positive-sum game, where rather than being an obstacle to capital accumulation, it becomes a potential source of further accumulation (Pepper, 1999: 3).

By combining monetary units with discursive elements derived from the natural sciences, EM provides a common denominator through which the costs and benefits of environmental damage can be considered (Hajer, 1995: 26). Hence, in an eco-modernist discourse, the rationale for environmental action is presented through the argument that the 'benefits' outweigh the 'costs'.

By the end of the 1980s, EM had become an important part of the belief system of the EU (Barnes, 2011: 51). The Fourth Environmental Action Programme launched in 1987 already drew upon and promoted ecological modernisation (Baker, 2007: 304). Today EM 'underpins all aspects of EU environmental policy' (Benson and Jordan, 2013: 330).

The specific issue of climate change is no exception. Commission discourse has increasingly emphasised the link between job creation and the introduction of climate-friendly technologies. The Council and the European Council have also increasingly highlighted the political and economic opportunities of effective climate policies, especially from the 2000s (Oberthür and Dupont, 2011: 85). The European Parliament, despite being more sceptical about the use of some new environmental policy instruments, has consistently supported the principles of ecological modernisation (Burns and Carter, 2011: 67-70).

EM has also become central in some Member States' conceptualisation of climate change. In Germany, for example, ecological modernisation has been central for the governments since the late 1990s and the success of German technology-based innovation strategy for climate policy is, according to Jänicke (2011: 140) a result of this thinking. Also in the UK ecological modernisation storylines have been invoked to win support for more ambitious climate change mitigation policies (Rayner and Jordan, 2011: 102).

Ecological modernisation has thus become the dominant way of conceptualising climate change in the EU. It is against this background of EU discourses

populated by eco-modernist storylines that the EU climate change and international security discourse emerges around 2007-8.

In this section, I analyse the evolution of EU discourse on climate change between 2003 and 2014, with the aim of understanding how the CCIS discourse developed in a discursive space dominated by ecological modernisation. Focusing on documents and speeches produced by the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, I ask whether the CCIS metaphors and storylines have been incorporated into EU climate change discourse and whether central EU actors now conceive of climate change as a security issue.

5.1.1 The European Commission

The European Commission is the executive body of the European Union and has a wide range of functions within the EU system. These functions include policy initiation, monitoring of policy implementation, management of European programmes, as well as an important external relations role (Egeberg, 2013: 130).

In a similar way to governments, the Commission is composed of a political executive wing and an administrative wing (Egeberg, 2013: 130). The political wing is composed by a 'College' of 28 Commissioners, one from each EU country, which provides political leadership. The Commission President, whose role has been strengthened since the 1980s, gives political guidance to the Commission.

The administrative wing is composed of various departments and services. One of the key departments of the Commission's administration are the Directorates-General (DGs) which cover similar policy areas to national ministries (Egeberg, 2013: 135). The Commission services deal with more general administrative issues.

The Commission plays a central role within the EU climate change policy-making process. It is the institution with the right of formal initiation of policy and the responsibility of overseeing its implementation (Barnes, 2011: 41). According to the Community method of decision-making, it is the Commission that leads the formulation of new climate legislation within the EU by making a proposal, and then the Council and European Parliament co-decide.

The Commission's Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) also has an important role in EU climate policies. Through the work of its four units, DG CLIMA develops domestic and international climate policies, implements the EU Emissions Trading System and promotes low carbon and adaptation technologies.

As argued above, EM became a significant feature of the Commission thinking in the 1980s. This can be demonstrated by the inclusion of principles of ecological modernisation in the Fourth Environmental Action Programme. On climate policy, eco-modernist principles underpinned the launch of the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) in 2005.

An analysis of Commission climate related documents between 2003 and 2008 evidences a discourse dominated by eco-modernist storylines. Cost-benefit analysis is used to legitimise the argument for emission reductions. In 2005, the Commission established the foundations of EU climate change strategy '[o]n the basis of an analysis of the effects of climate change and the costs and benefits of action in this area' (European Union, 2005). The Commission strategy is summarised in the Communication 'Winning the Battle against Global Climate Change', whose overall argument is that the benefits of limiting the global average temperature increase to 2˚C outweigh the costs of mitigation policies (European Commission, 2005a).

In addition to the benefits of a more stable climate, climate action is believed to bring additional benefits in the form of economic growth and the creation of jobs. According to the Commission, '[t]here is a real potential to make climate-friendly policies a major driver for growth and jobs in Europe' (European Commission, 2008: 3).

Hence, while the Commission recognises that adopting the necessary measures to mitigate climate change requires economic effort, it also argued that 'the climate change challenge can be transformed into an opportunity for European industry' (European Commission, 2008: 4). The opportunity is presented through the storylines of 'a competitive edge in a low carbon future' (European Commission, 2005a: 7). The idea is that 'the EU can gain a first mover advantage by focusing on resource-efficient climate friendly technologies that other countries will need to adopt in the future' (European Commission, 2005a: 7).

The urgency of acting on climate change becomes justified from an economic point of view, because it makes economic sense to be the first mover. According to the Commission,

> the longer Europe waits, the higher the cost of adaptation. The earlier Europe moves, the greater the opportunity to use its skills and technology to boost innovation and growth through exploiting first mover advantage (European Commission, 2008: 3).

Hence, in line with ecological modernisation, through the first mover advantage climate protection and economic growth are made as compatible. Making the transition to a low-carbon economy is seen as a positive development for the EU economy, transforming the climate challenge into a win-win situation.

The release of the Stern Report in 2006 added another dimension to the cost-benefit analysis because it put a price on the effects of unmitigated climate change. The review made clear that besides weighing the benefits of limiting climate change against the cost of mitigation policies, the costs of inaction also needed to be considered. The conclusion that the economic costs of inaction in the face of climate change would be 'very severe' (Stern et al., 2006: xxvii) reinforced eco-modernist arguments in the Commission. The findings of the Stern Review were used to give scientific grounding to the Commission's claims regarding emissions reductions and the 'costs of inaction' became a frequently used storyline.

In the 2007 Communication 'Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius', the Commission highlights that the Stern Review estimated the costs of inaction at 5 to 20% of global GDP, thus demonstrating 'the enormous costs of failure to act' (European Commission, 2007: 3). Also in the 2008 communication '20 20 by 2020: Europe's climate change opportunity', referring to the findings of the Stern Report, the Commission argues that '[t]here is compelling evidence now available that the costs of inaction would be crippling for the world economy' (European Commission, 2008: 2).

Overall, the eco-modernist climate change discourse seems to be directed to the European audience. As Commission President Barroso has argued, the EU needed to 'reassure [its] citizens that there are benefits as well as major challenges ahead. A low carbon economy will be a stimulus to [...] prosperity, not a brake on growth' (Barroso, 2007). In addition to EU citizens, the eco-modernist climate change discourse also seeks to speak to European business actors. For example,

in a speech at the Lehman Brothers in early 2008, Barroso called on 'the European business community, to seize [the climate change] opportunity with both hands' (Barroso, 2008).

Nevertheless, by setting an example of success in reconciling ambitious climate goals with economic growth, the Commission expects to reinforce the EU's leadership role in international climate change politics. With the adoption of ambitious emission reduction targets the EU claims to have shown itself 'ready to give global leadership: to tackle climate change, to face up to the challenge of secure, sustainable and competitive energy, and to make the European economy a model for sustainable development in the 21st century' (European Commission, 2008: 2).

Overall, in the period analysed, the European Commission reconciles the EU's commitment to the climate cause – and its aspiration to a global leadership role on climate change – with the goal of maintaining the prosperity of the European economy through the adoption of an eco-modernist discourse. Thus, when a discourse on climate change and international security emerged in the EU, storylines of ecological modernisation dominated the climate change discourse in the EU.

In the above mentioned period, climate security storylines were not found in the Commission discourse with the exception of two documents. In its 2005 Communication entitled 'Winning the Battle on Climate Change' the Commission already made reference to the risk of conflict in connection to the effects of climate change. According to the document, '[t]he combination of stresses from climate change [...] may converge on a number of vulnerable areas, for example in Africa, leading to potential regional conflict [...]' (European Commission, 2005a: 3).

Also the January 2007 Communication on 'Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius' briefly mentions the potential security consequences of climate change. According to the Communication, the 'failure to act [on climate change] will have serious local and global security implications' (European Commission, 2007: 3).

After the release of the CCIS reports, and the previously mentioned activities to promote the CCIS discourse among EU officials, there are only a few instances where CCIS storylines can be found in Commission communications on climate

change. The April 2013 Commission working document entitled 'Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration' that accompanied the 'EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change' draws clearly on CCIS storylines. While the Communication itself does not address the climate security link, given that it focuses on the impacts of climate change in European territory, the staff working document acknowledges climate change will act as a threat multiplier with potential impacts on migration.

Despite recognising the difficulty of establishing a straightforward link between migration and environmental degradation, the paper makes a connection between environmental degradation, amplified by climate change, and migration. According to the document,

> though debate between researchers and within the policy world is continuing, there is growing evidence that climate change, climate-induced events and environmental disruptions are likely to assume greater importance in influencing migration, particularly within the developing world (European Commission, 2013a: 3).

As climate change is predicted to act as a threat multiplier, the Commission working group anticipates that climate change can exacerbate migration drivers. Recalling the 2008 joint paper on 'Climate Change and International Security', the working paper draws attention to the fact that 'climate change could act as a "threat-multiplier", exacerbating trends, tensions and instabilities which would already have an influence on migration patterns' (European Commission, 2013a: 6).

Although it makes reference to the joint paper and the threat multiplier nature of climate change, the document does not establish a straightforward link between migration and conflict. The paper merely makes reference to conflict in the context of the forthcoming IPCC assessment report which will include an examination of the ability of States to address climate change, conflict and migration and regarding conflict prevention in the Horn and East Africa. The fact that migration is not directly connected to conflict is intriguing because the link is one of the main arguments in the threat multiplier storyline found in the CCIS documents. Hence, although the document incorporates some elements from the CCIS, it does not subscribe fully to that discourse.

Climate Change and International security storylines can also be found in the speeches of Commission actors of that period. Commission President Barroso has

argued that in addition to an environmental issue, climate change also has a security dimension. In a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, Barroso argued:

> climate is also of course a foreign policy and security issue as well. Climate change is likely to trigger and exacerbate. It risks undermining our efforts to bring development to the poor parts of the world. And we will see potentially dangerous disputes: about water, about maritime resources, about population migration. (Barroso, 2009)

Stavros Dimas, the Commissioner for the Environment[9], has also drawn on CCIS storylines in his speeches. For example, in a talk at the University of Cambridge, Dimas argued that climate change would act as a 'threat multiplier', 'threaten[ing] both our prosperity and also our security' (Dimas, 2008).

On a couple of occasions, the Environment Commissioner has used the example of Darfur to illustrate how the impacts of climate change were already contributing to security crises. For example, in a talk at the Humboldt University, Dimas argued:

> Climate change is not only a problem for our children and grandchildren to worry about in decades to come. It is already happening, and its effects already need to be addressed now (…) The world is already seeing shifts in patterns of agriculture, and water shortages are a growing cause of security crises in various regions. Darfur is an example of that. (Dimas, 2009)

With the creation of the post of Commissioner for Climate Change and the establishment of the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) in 2010, climate change moves out of the remit of DG Environment. Connie Hedegaard was the first ever appointed Climate Commissioner. The Climate Commissioner's discourse has only occasionally drawn on CCIS storylines. For instance, addressing members of the Junior Chamber International, Hedegaard argued that young people

> will live [their] lives in a world where climate change will become increasingly severe and will have direct impacts on the world around us. Climate change is

[9] Before the creation of the post of Commissioner for Climate Action in 2010 climate change was included in the portfolio of the Commissioner for Environment.

> not only a threat in itself; it is also a threat multiplier, making other crises worse. (Hedegaard, 2011)

Also in 2012, speaking at the 12th Delhi Sustainable Development Summit, Commissioner Hedegaard argued that 'Climate change is a threat multiplier' (Hedegaard, 2012). However, the Climate Commissioner's discourse usually draws on eco-modernist storylines, highlighting the economic opportunity of sustainable growth.

CCIS storylines were most visibly integrated in the Commission´s discourse on climate diplomacy. In July 2011 the European Commission, together with the European External Action Service, released a Joint Paper proposing an EU strategy for a renewed climate diplomacy. In the paper, the problem of climate change is conceptualised according to the threat multiplier storyline. The first paragraph of the document reads

> Climate change is a global environmental and development challenge, with important security implications given that it acts as a 'threat multiplier', exacerbating tensions over land, water, food and energy prices, thus creating migratory pressures. It serves as a potential catalyst for igniting conflict. (EEAS, 2011: 1)

In line with the threat multiplier storyline, concerns with migration and conflict are constant throughout the document, although it is stressed that climate change alone does not cause conflict.

The EU leadership role is also highlighted by recalling that the EU has been at the forefront of the debate on the international security implications of climate change since 2007. The paper argues that the EU should now work to 'raise global awareness of the security risks, and threat-multiplier nature, of climate change, particularly in vulnerable regions' (EEAS, 2011: 4).

In 2013 the EEAS and the Commission released a second reflection paper, entitled 'EU climate diplomacy for 2015 and beyond', where climate change is again identified as 'a risk-multiplying threat with a broad strategic dimension' (EEAS, 2013).

By giving such a prominent role to the security implications of climate change in the two climate diplomacy papers the Commission, together with the EEAS, demonstrated the centrality of CCIS narratives for its climate change discourse. Moreover, as it will be discussed in the second part of this chapter, in addition to

recognising the security dimension of climate change as part of the definition of the problem, the Climate Diplomacy papers also identify it as part of the solution. The documents set that climate change and international security should be one of the three strands of action the EU should pursue in its climate diplomacy strategy.

Overall, the analysis of Commission documents and speeches indicates that, even though Commission discourse on climate change is still dominated by concepts of ecological modernisation, from 2008 the threat multiplier storyline is used by Commission actors.

5.1.2 The Council of the European Union

If the Commission has a central role in policy initiation – by proposing legislation – the Council is at the core of the EU's legislative process, because it has to approve all EU proposals before they can become EU law (Lewis, 2013: 143). As such, the Council's assumes a central function in climate policy decision-making.

The Council brings together the government representatives of all EU Member States, meeting under different formations according to the issues discussed (Lewis, 2013: 143). The rotating Council Presidency also gives a significant input to EU policy-making through its role in the planning, scheduling and chairing of meetings at every level in the Council.

The influence of the Council in EU climate policies differs between the internal and external settings. Internally, the Council is not able to move domestic EU climate policy forward on its own as it shares its powers with the European Parliament and the European Commission. However, in shaping EU external climate policy the Council is the single most important actor (Oberthür and Dupont, 2011: 75). Assisted by the input of the Commission, the Council defines the position of the Union in international negotiations. The Presidency of the Council also plays a significant external role, as it 'acts as the main contact point and spokesperson for the EU' (Oberthür and Dupont, 2011: 75).

In the previous chapter I have argued that the High Representative for CFSP, and Secretary-General of the Council, Javier Solana was a CCIS discourse entrepreneur. Here, I examine the discourse of other Council actors to see whether they subscribe to the climate change and international security storylines. Specifically,

I look at the Council of Environment Ministers, which has most of the competence in climate policy. Even though other Council formations can sporadically discuss the issue when relevant, 'climate change is the prerogative of the Environment Ministers' (Van Schaik, 2010: 261).

An analysis of the Conclusions of the Environment Council between 2003 and 2013 reveals that climate change was discussed in every single meeting of the Ministers of Environment. Moreover, in nearly all the meetings the Environment Council adopted conclusions concerning to the climate issue. This section analyses those Conclusions, looking for the main storylines in the Council discourse.

The Council was slower than the Commission in adopting eco-modernist principles in the framing of the climate problem. In the March 2005 Council Conclusions on 'Medium and longer term emission reduction strategies' the Council does not yet argue strongly for the economic benefits of climate policy, but rather

> INVITES [sic] the European Commission to continue its analysis of benefits and costs, focusing *inter alia* on the costs of adaptation to climate change, the benefits of climate change policies, the costs of inaction and an economic evaluation of the damages caused by climate change [...] (Council, 2005: 3, italics in original).

Eco-modernist arguments become more visible in the period between 2006 and 2008. As with the Commission, the Stern Review exerted a big influence in Council discourse. Following its release, Council conclusions consistently refer to the findings of the review, highlighting the costs of inaction as well as the potential economic opportunities of climate action. For example, in the December 2006 Environment Council Conclusions, in follow-up to COP12 in Nairobi, the Council stresses that

> the report of Sir Nicholas Stern on the economics of climate change [...] shows that climate change is a serious threat, that the benefits of strong, early global action on climate change considerably outweigh the costs of inaction, that globally tackling climate change is a pro-growth strategy for the longer term and that it can be done in a way that does not constrain the sustainable growth of any Parties and that the earlier effective action is taken, the less costly it will be (Council, 2006a: 3).

In February 2007 the Environment Council adopted conclusions on 'EU objectives for the further development of the international climate regime'. Again, the Council acknowledged the findings of the Stern Review, specifically the notion that the benefits of timely global action on climate change far outweigh its economic costs (Council, 2007: 2). Moreover, the Council expressed the view that strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will 'improve Europe's competitiveness' (Council, 2007: 5).

The March 2008 Council Conclusions on Environment, in preparation for the Spring European Council, argue that the resolve to deeply transform EU economies 'should deliver new opportunities to underpin European competitiveness, growth and jobs across the EU pulling new and energy-efficient technologies into the market' (Council, 2008b: 8).

After 2008, references to EM become less explicit in the conclusions of the Environment Council. Other analysts have observed that the Council began to focus on the political opportunity for the EU to show leadership in the international climate change negotiations (Oberthür and Dupont, 2011: 86). Even so, despite less obvious eco-modernist principles are still underlying in the Council's discourse. For instance, in its October 2013 conclusions in preparation for COP19 the Council highlighted that 'enhancing global pre-2020 mitigation ambition […] will deliver significant benefits in terms of sustainable development, economic growth, energy security and health benefits' (Council, 2013a: 5).

References to security made their way into the Environment Council discourse on climate change in late 2006. In October the Environment Council expressed its concern with the adverse security impacts of climate change (Council, 2006b: 2). In December of the same year, Council conclusions argued that

> the effects of climate change may have major implications for national and world security in the form of problems such as growing intensity and frequency of natural disasters, water scarcity and drought, famine and land degradation which increase the risk of national and international conflicts, including an increase in environmental refugees (Council, 2006c: 3).

However, subsequent Environment Council conclusions do not mention the link between climate change and security. Only in October 2011, the Council recalled the 2010 United Nations Security Council meeting on climate change and the concern that 'climate change may aggravate existing threats to international peace and security' (Council, 2011a: 2).

The limited incorporation of the climate change as a threat multiplier storyline in Environment Council conclusions is perhaps not surprising given that security issues are outside the remit of this Council formation. Security issues are dealt with by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), which brings together Foreign Ministers of the Member States.[10]

In December 2009 the FAC adopted conclusions on Climate change and Security, where it endorsed the 2009 Joint Progress Report on Climate Change and International Security and supported its recommendations. Furthermore, the Council declared that 'climate change and its international security implications are part of EU's wider agenda for climate, energy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and therefore central to the endeavours of the EU' (Council, 2009a: 1). Hence, the Council asked for a follow-up on the implementation of recommendations through a report in the following year.

In addition to these conclusions, the Foreign Affairs Council has discussed CCIS in the context of climate diplomacy. On July 2011 the FAC adopted conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, where the Foreign Ministers acknowledge climate change and international security as an important area for EU external action. According to the document

> The Council recognises the need to build on the work already undertaken on climate change and international security. The EU will continue to raise global awareness of the security risks to, and threat multiplier nature, of climate change, particularly in vulnerable regions. The Council recognises the need to drive the global debate on climate change and international security forwards. (Council, 2011b: 2)

In 2013, following the second Climate Diplomacy paper, Council Conclusions reconfirm the importance of the security element in climate diplomacy. In the paper, the Foreign Affairs Council

> welcomes the continued activities to build awareness and capacities to tackle the strategic and security dimensions of climate change, including at the level of the UN Security Council, and takes note of the increasing engagement of Member States and partner countries in those efforts. (Council, 2013b: 2)

[10] Before the Lisbon Treaty, Foreign Ministers met under the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).

Moreover, according to the Council, tackling climate change 'is not only an environmental imperative but also, fundamentally, a necessary condition for peace and security' (Council, 2013b: 3). Overall, by including climate security in Climate Diplomacy EU Foreign Ministers accept the rhetorical power of the climate change and security narrative.

It is also important to look at the Presidencies of the Council because they are responsible for setting the agenda of the Council. In order to understand whether the CCIS storylines were picked up by the Member States, I analysed the Presidencies' work programmes which were elaborated between 2005 and 2013.

In all work programmes analysed, climate change is among the priorities for the Presidency of the EU. Of the seventeen work programmes analysed, only two contained a reference to climate change and security. In 2008 the Slovenian Presidency's work programme made reference to the Joint Report. More concretely it stated:

> The Presidency looks forward to the report of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission on the impact of climate change on international security, which will be presented at the Spring European Council and will serve as a basis for proposing concrete policy measures at the EU level (Slovenian Presidency of the Council, 2008: 12).

More recently, the Greek Presidency referred to climate change in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Climate change is framed as a factor that may affect 'Sustainability in Defense', a term used to address the concern with the environmental sustainability of EU military activities (Greek Presidency of the Council, 2014: 17).

Despite these two references, it is clear that ecological modernisation is dominant in the Presidencies' discourse on climate change. The main climate storylines found consistently across the documents analysed are 'the opportunities of climate change', 'energy security' and 'EU leadership on climate change'.

5.1.3 The European Parliament

The European Parliament is the only directly-elected European Union institution, presently bringing together 751 Members. Members of the European Parliament

(MEPs) are elected once every five years by voters from the 28 Member States and, once elected, organise along political lines.

Although the EP has achieved a reputation of EU environmental champion, historically it has had limited scope to shape climate policy (Burns and Carter, 2011: 58). The introduction of the codecision procedure by the Maastricht Treaty expanded the powers of the Parliament. While the Commission continues to have the lead in developing proposals, the Parliament was given codecision authority with the Council in amending proposals and determining whether they become law (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007: 27).

The EP has actively sought to influence climate policy through its debates and non-legislative resolutions (Burns and Carter, 2011: 58). In this section, I analyse EP resolutions on climate change approved between 2005 and 2013 to understand whether the CCIS metaphors and storylines have been incorporated into parliamentary discourse.

Throughout the documents analysed eco-modernist narratives are present. The EP was swift to introduce a narrative on the costs of inaction in its climate change discourse. In the November 2005 resolution on *Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change* the EP argues that calculating cost-effectiveness of climate measures 'must include the costs of inaction and the expected economic benefits from early action and innovation as well as from technological learning' (European Parliament, 2005a).

In addition to the challenges, the EP discourse highlights the opportunities created by climate change. For example, the February 2009 resolution on '2050: The future begins today – Recommendations for the EU's future integrated policy on climate change', the EP argues that 'the climate policy goals agreed at the European Council of March 2007 are technically and economically feasible and offer unique business opportunities for thousands of EU undertakings' (European Parliament, 2009a).

However, the Parliament also has called attention to the fact that not all climate policy should be based on cost-benefit analysis. In its April 2008 resolution on adaptation, the EP argues that

> an approach towards adaptation mechanisms which is based solely on a cost-benefit analysis does not seem appropriate, as it is foreseeable that in Europe too the poorest will be hardest hit, because they generally lack sufficient

> insurance, information and mobility to respond to a changing environment. (European Parliament, 2008a)

Despite its cautious approach, it can be argued that EP discourse on climate change subscribes to eco-modernist storylines. Other authors have noted how '[t]he EP has long supported the use of new environmental policy instruments and the development of other principles of ecological modernisation as a way of getting business to support the environmental policy agenda' (Burns and Carter, 2011: 68).

The explicit link between climate change and security does not appear in EP resolutions until the end of 2007. Earlier in 2005, an Opinion of the Committee on Development on the 'Report on Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change' suggested the incorporation of a paragraph on the adoption of 'conflict prevention and disaster reduction strategies with a special regard to developing countries to reduce political destabilisation, as the consequence of a changing climate/ecosystem' (European Parliament, 2005b: 16). However, the paragraph was not included in the final resolution approved by the European Parliament (2005a).

It should be also mentioned that in the Parliamentary debate on the resolution, Anders Wijkman, the Rapporteur, argued that climate change was a security threat. According to the Swedish MEP,

> Climate change is one of the most serious threats we face. I wish to emphasise that it can no longer be seen as an environmental problem. A warmer climate is a less stable climate, entailing a threat to just about every sector of our society, a threat that must be designated as one of our security problems. It is a security threat not only to the EU and its Member States but also, of course, to many poor countries in the tropics. (European Parliament, 2005c: 16)

Despite this conviction, the resolution on 'Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change', which followed the report, did not contain any mention to security or conflict (European Parliament, 2005a).

It is only in November 2007 that an EP resolution links climate change and security. Making reference to the United Nations Security Council's debate on the impact of climate change on peace and security, the resolution acknowledges that climate change 'might also threaten international peace and security' (European Parliament, 2007).

After the release of the Joint Paper on Climate Change and International Security in March 2008, EP resolutions on climate change start including CCIS narratives. For example, in the October 2008 resolution on 'Building a Global Climate Change Alliance' the EP

> [r]eiterates the alarming conclusions of the [...] Paper entitled 'Climate Change and International Security', which warned that climate change is intensifying security risks for the EU, threatening to overburden states and regions of the world which are already fragile and prone to conflict [...] (European Parliament, 2008b)

Climate Change and security also figures in the final report of the Temporary Committee on Climate Change (CLIM), set up by the European Parliament decision of 25 April 2007 for a period of twelve months. In the CLIM report, the Parliament endorses the recommendations set out in the Joint Report by the High Representative and the Commission on 'Climate Change and International Security' and 'stresses the need to construct an appropriate multilateral preventive EU climate diplomacy to that end' (European Parliament, 2009a: 17). As such, the EP

> [c]alls on the EU and its Member States, in the context of the European Security Strategy and the European Security and Defence Policy, to prevent, monitor, and take action to tackle the effects of climate change and resultant natural disasters on civil protection and human safety as well as possible conflicts caused by changes in water and land supply resulting from climate change. (European Parliament, 2009a: 17)

During its short existence, the Temporary Committee held an initiative on climate change and security. As part of the CLIM thematic sessions, the EP held on March 2008 a session entitled 'How to engage other main actors - climate change, adaptation in third countries and global security'. The session brought to Parliament a high profile key-note speaker, Dr. Rajendra K. Pachauri, Chairman of the IPCCC.

In the working document on the thematic session MEP Justas Vincas Paleckis, the Theme Leader, concluded that climate change is 'the biggest security threat of today's world' and argued that '[f]or this reason it should be central to Europe's preventive security policy' (CLIM, 2008: 4).

Hence, the European Parliament, as the European Commission and the Council, has included CCIS storylines in its discourse on climate change.

5.1.4 Challenges in the structuration of CCIS

Overall, the analysis presented above indicates that, although climate change and security discourse has not become dominant, CCIS storylines have become an integral part of the way climate change is conceptualised in the EU.

While EU actors continue to speak of climate change mainly in eco-modernist terms, CCIS storylines are used to highlight another dimension of the problem. In fact, although the two discourses frame the climate problem according to two sets of distinct storylines, the analysis suggests the CCIS discourse did not emerge as a challenge to the established eco-modernist discourse. Rather, in the documents analysed, climate security and the economic benefit of addressing climate change are presented as complementing one another.

First of all, economic costs and security implications are two dimensions of the climate problem that the EU wants to tackle. This is evident in the 2007 Communication on Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius where the Commission states:

> Strong scientific evidence shows that urgent action to tackle climate change is imperative. Recent studies, such as the Stern review, reaffirm the enormous costs of failure to act. These costs are economic, but also social and environmental and will especially fall on the poor, in both developing and developed countries. A failure to act will have serious local and global security implications (European Commission, 2007: 3).

Economic and security concerns are thus two sides of the same coin. EU climate discourse emphasises that a good management of climate change will lead to positive outcome (new jobs, etc.), whereas an ineffective management of the problem will lead to security consequences. As it is argued in the Joint Progress Report,

> if our response is properly managed, it could provide opportunities for increased multilateral cooperation. A low-carbon and resource efficient economy will create new jobs and industries and will contribute to a more energy secure future. But, if poorly managed, it may exacerbate tensions which already exist, act as a threat multiplier and leave the most vulnerable to fend for themselves. (Council, 2009a:2)

Among EU actors, the economic argument is frequently used to legitimate action on climate security. The Joint Report cites the findings of the Stern, which is to date the most authoritative expression of ecologically modern framing of climate change, as a rationale for making climate change a security issue. An EU Official involved closely in the drafting of the Joint Paper argued that, by making the high price of climate change clear, the Stern Review contributed to the idea that it was necessary to think more seriously about the climate change and place it at a higher level in the agenda (Council Official, 28 February 2013).

Moreover, the analysis shows similarities between the two discourses. The discourse of ecological modernisation assumes that existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalise the care for the environment (Hajer 1995: 25). This is also the underlying assumption found in the CCIS discourse. This means that in both conceptualisations, climate change can be resolved without resorting to major structural change.

Both discourses contain strong arguments for EU action on climate change. However, they seem to emphasise action on different levels. By highlighting the opportunities created by climate policies in terms of European competitiveness, growth and jobs, EM makes a strong case for investment in internal climate policies. On the other hand, CCIS highlights the need to work with the states and regions of the world that face the most risk from climate change. As such, CCIS discourse is likely to have more impact on EU external relations.

In fact, it can be argued that there is no tension between CCIS and EM. The 2013 Climate Diplomacy paper exemplifies how both storylines are well integrated in the EU climate change discourse. According to the paper,

> Core European interests are at stake in the climate field, be it in security terms as recognised by the European Security Strategy or in economic terms to ensure a level playing field and long-term growth prospects for EU business. (EEAS, 2013)

The links between economics and security become even more intricate, when the document argues that some of the security impacts of climate change will follow from the economic impacts. In the words of the paper: '[c]limate change is a strategic threat which will have security impacts, many of which will flow from economic impacts' (EEAS, 2013).

Hence, both the economy and security are legitimising storylines for climate action. For both the Commission and the EEAS, 'keeping global warming within the agreed below 2°C limit is still achievable, economically advantageous and a security imperative […]' (EEAS, 2013).

Hence, eco-modernist discourse is not antagonistic of CCIS. Resistance to the structuration of the climate security discourse came from discourses that oppose the securitisation of issues in the EU. Interviews suggest that a few voices raised concerns about the use of narratives that link climate change to security. Some EU actors, especially environmental actors, were concerned that establishing a link between climate change and security would be a negative development (Commission Official, 4 October 2012).

In the words of a Council official: '[t]here was a concern that by securitising climate change issues we would make it worse. Or we would somehow divert attention away from the need to conduct an ambitious climate change deal in Copenhagen and beyond' (Council Official, 6 November 2012).

There were also some concerns raised regarding the militarisation of climate change. An MEP, who strongly opposed the link, argued that the security focus was not the right angle to address the problem. In the words of the interviewee,

> I think we have to consider everything in the context. And the context is that we have the strategy of the securitisation and militarisation of the EU. And we have the context and all the external policy of the EU is going more and more militarised. And we oppose this. (MEP, 27 February 2013)

Instead of focusing on security issues, the same interviewee argued, climate change should be addressed through the angle of climate justice.

Discourse entrepreneurs were conscious that the CCIS discourse could generate concerns regarding militarisation because the involvement of the military in a non-traditional domain is a sensitive topic. But from the point of view of the entrepreneurs, risk of militarisation of climate change was non-existent because the EU military themselves do not want to take competences away from other spheres (EEAS Official, 6 November 2012).

However, interviewees stress, opposition to the climate security link was not particularly strong. According to one interviewee, opposition 'was very marginal.

People generally understood it. They never really made a problem of it' (Commission Official, 4 October 2012).

Other competing discourses are also identified by CCIS entrepreneurs as contributing to the decline in visibility of CCIS. Some newer member states, led by Poland, became increasingly assertive in expressing their opposition to strengthening EU climate policy (Pavese and Torney, 2012: 138). As one interviewee argued, 'Poland for example, because it has a high production of coal, was not interested in raising the profile of climate change' (Council Official, 27 February 2013).

Moreover, by the end of 2009, the EU was immersed in the European debt crisis and EU discourses were dominated by 'the crisis'. One interviewee explained that the 'Eurozone crisis takes precedence because there is only place for one item in the agenda' (E3G Representative, 7 November 2012). Another interviewee from DG RELEX said 'climate change has fallen to the bottom of the agenda because of the crisis' (Commission Official, 4 October 2012).

As I have argued in the previous chapter, the year of 2010 was not auspicious for strong climate discourses. This fact, combined with the dispersion of CCIS actors due to the dissolution of the Policy Unit and of DG Relex, made it difficult to give continuity to the issue. At the same time, with the leaving of Solana, there was no high profile Official supporting climate change and security. Interviewees pointed out the appointment of Mrs Ashton as a drawback in the CCIS process. The new High Representative, they argue, did not have the same kind of personal commitment to CCIS. A Council official involved in the drafting of the first reports said their 'biggest regret [was] that Ashton has not talked about the issue [of climate change and international security' (Council Official, 28 February 2013).

Despite not having the impact that entrepreneurs had wished, one can point to some degree of structuration of the CCIS discourse. EU institutional actors acknowledge that climate change can have an impact on security and the 'threat-multiplier' storyline has become an integral part of EU discourse on climate change.

In the next section, I ask whether this acceptance of the CCIS discourse has an impact in EU climate policies, by analysing the institutionalisation of the discourse.

5.2 The Institutionalisation of CCIS in EU Climate Change Policies

In the first part of this chapter I have argued that the EU climate change discourse has been dominated by principles of ecological modernisation (EM) since the 1980s. Although EM 'assumes that existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalise the care for the environment' (Hajer, 1995: 25), it prescribes reforms to those institutions in order to make them more 'environmentally friendly' (Carter, 2007: 227).

Consequently, the eco-modernist discourse brings with it new principles to guide environmental policy-making. These principles include the shift to preventive policies, the integration of environmental concerns into other policy areas and the integration of environment into cost-risk calculations (Pepper, 1999: 3).

EM is characterised by a discursive shift towards economic policy instruments (Connelly et al., 2012: 178). It suggests a transition away from traditional forms of intervention and towards more 'de-centred forms of governance that include a greater emphasis on markets as key delivery mechanisms for environmental governance' (Bailey et al., 2010: 5). The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), the cornerstone of EU emissions reduction efforts, is a paradigmatic example of a policy instrument promoted by an eco-modernist framework.

Principles of ecological modernisation have supported EU climate policies from their onset in the 1990s. Already in 1991, they informed the Commission's proposal for a carbon/energy tax, its first proposal for a market-based environmental policy instrument (Barnes, 2011: 51).

Although EU actors still think and talk about climate change mainly through eco-modernist concepts, I have argued that the storyline of climate change as a threat multiplier has become embedded in the EU climate change discursive space. CCIS security frames the problem of climate change distinctly from EM: while the eco-modernist discourse frames climate change as an economic challenge, the CCIS discourse frames climate change as a fundamental threat to the security of the EU.

In this part of the chapter, devoted to the institutionalisation of CCIS in EU climate policies, I ask whether this distinct definition of the climate problem results in the choice of a distinct solution for it. I aim to understand whether framing climate

change as an international security problem has led to the institutionalisation of new environmental policy instruments.

I will start by addressing the impact of CCIS discourse on internal climate policies, namely mitigation and adaptation. I then proceed to analyse the institutionalisation of CCIS in the EU external policies regarding climate change, namely climate diplomacy.

5.2.1 Internal Climate Policies: Mitigation and Adaptation

Although in 1992 the EU already played a significant role in the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), EU internal climate policies remained largely symbolic throughout the 1990s. Climate change is an issue of 'shared competence' between the Union and the Member States. For a significant period of time there was substantial disagreement between the Commission and the Council on the need for EU-wide measures to implement the Community's emission stabilisation commitment (Oberthür and Pallemaerts, 2010: 31). As a consequence of this divergence, the Council systematically emptied the Commission's climate proposals of substantive content (Jordan et al., 2012: 48).

It was not until after the 2001 Bonn/Marrakesh accords and the entry into force of the Kyoto protocol in 2005, that the reluctance of Member States to adopt common measures to cut GHG emissions was gradually overcome (Oberthür and Pallemaerts, 2010: 42). The EU then entered a more active and dynamic period in which many more of the Commission's proposals were adopted (Jordan et al., 2012: 48).

The acceleration of EU climate policy-making was driven, some authors suggest, by the intensification in the public interest and the increase in scientific evidence regarding the severity of climate change, especially from the IPCC (Jordan et al., 2012: 48).

This more active period of EU climate policy-making also coincided with the strengthening of EM discourse in the Commission and the emergence of this discourse in the Council. By introducing storylines that highlight the belief that climate goals and economic goals can be successfully combined the eco-modernist discourse on climate change endorsed new policy-making principles.

As a result, climate policy-making became guided by cost benefit analysis. Already in 2004 the European Council requested the Commission to undertake 'a cost benefit analysis which takes account both of environmental and competitiveness considerations', as preparation for a discussion on 'medium and longer term emission reduction strategies, including targets' (European Commission, 2005a: 3).

In an EM framework, prevention rather than reaction, one of the central themes of the precautionary principle (Connelly et al., 2012: 176), becomes a central principle for EU climate policy-making. The need to take early action on climate change is highlighted by the storyline of 'the costs of inaction', identified in the previous chapter as central to the EU eco-modernist discourse on climate change, especially since the release of the Stern Report in 2006.

The strengthening of an eco-modernist discourse on climate change in EU institutions also gradually reinforces the principle that climate policy goals should be integrated into all policy areas. Although the goal of environmental policy integration was already recognised by the Maastricht treaty, since 2008 there has been a concerted effort to integrate climate change into other policy areas. In EU language this is often referred to as climate policy mainstreaming, which means that actors whose main tasks are not directly concerned with climate change also work to attain mitigation and adaptation goals (Commission Official, 27 February 2013).

At the strategic level, climate policy mainstreaming was initiated in 2008 with the agreement of the European Council to place climate change and energy as one of the five EU 2020 headline targets. For EU climate actors mainstreaming climate concerns into other policies is 'the most effective way to spend the main bulk of the climate finance needed' (DG CLIMA, 2015).

In terms of policy instruments, EM clearly privileges economic instruments over the traditional regulatory approaches. The discursive shift towards economic instruments is in fact a central theme in the dominant conception of ecological modernisation (Connelly et al., 2012: 178).

Ecological modernisation legitimises the institutionalisation of market-based approaches to climate change. This is well visible in the case of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the 'undoubted flagship' (Bailey et al., 2010: 6) of EU carbon governance. In line with ecological modernisation, the EU ETS is framed as a device that promotes 'effective and cost-efficient action to reduce carbon

emissions without jeopardising the competitiveness of European industry' (Bailey et al., 2010: 7).

The EU ETS, the European Union's key tool for reducing industrial greenhouse gas emissions which became operational in 2005, is a market-based trading instrument. The EU ETS works on the 'cap and trade' principle, where a limit is set on the overall volume of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by large energy and industrial installations. Companies covered by the system then receive or buy emission allowances which they can trade (DG CLIMA, 2015).

Emissions trading represent a shift away from 'traditional regulatory command-and-control approaches of earlier EU environmental policy' (Connelly et al., 2012: 311). As the Commission frames it, '[i]n contrast to traditional 'command and control' regulation, emissions trading harnesses market forces to find the cheapest ways of reducing emissions' (European Commission, 2013b).

Despite this high profile example of instrument change, 'the most common instrument of EU climate policy (at least in terms of the number of adopted measures) is still regulation' (Jordan et al., 2011: 544). The 2020 climate and energy package, the key internal policy development in the period here considered, comprises four pieces of complementary legislation covering CO2 emissions, renewable energy and carbon capture and storage.

Hence, as Neil Carter has argued, although the growing influence of ecological modernisation has strengthened the support for alternatives to regulatory measures,

> currently, ecological modernisation is most apparent as a discourse rather than as an activity. Regulations are, and will continue to be, widely used everywhere, not least because they satisfy administrative convenience, retain public legitimacy and suit industry. (Carter, 2007: 349)

But, even though EM has not become fully institutionalised in the EU, it brought to the EU climate policy arena a set of principles that now inform policy-making.

5.2.1.1 CCIS policy principles and policy instruments

When analysing policy change derived from the CCIS discourse the first question that comes to mind is whether this discourse also brings its own identifiable set of environmental policy-making principles.

CCIS establishes a relationship between climate change – an environmental issue – and the security of Europe and its citizens. Two types of responses follow from this formulation: tackling climate change (therefore nullifying its security consequences) or tackling the security consequences.

The analysis of EU CCIS discourse makes it clear that EU actors view both types of response as essential. While security responses are seen as necessary to manage the consequences of unavoidable changes in the climate, mitigating climate change is the priority for EU action.[11] As High Representative Solana explained, 'saying that climate change poses security risks reinforces the need to stick to our [the EU's] commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' (Solana, 2008a).

The question that follows is what type of climate policy-making principles does CCIS support? First and foremost, CCIS emphasises the role of preventive policies. By highlighting the severity of the risks posed by climate change, the CCIS discourse reinforces the need to prevent climate change through investing in ambitious mitigation policies. The CCIS discourse adds another dimension to the preventive nature of climate policies by constructing them as preventive security policy. As the Solana report argues,

> Unmitigated climate change beyond 2ºC will lead to unprecedented security scenarios as it is likely to trigger a number of tipping points that would lead to further accelerated, irreversible and largely unpredictable climate changes. Investment in mitigation to avoid such scenarios [...] should be viewed as part of preventive security policy. (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 1)

In addition to mitigation, adaptation is also an integral part of preventive climate policies because, in dealing with the unavoidable effects of climate change, adaptation reduces the security threats posed by climate change. By helping communities to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, adaptation policies can prevent or minimise the damage caused by changes in the climate,

[11] In the next chapter I will address the institutionalisation of CCIS in EU security policies.

thus preventing conflict and other security consequences. Hence, while mitigation is the most fundamental climate strategy for the EU, 'adaptation is a necessary and unavoidable complement to mitigation' (Council, 2013c: 2).

The CCIS discourse also reinforces the idea that climate policies should be mainstreamed into all other policy areas. Due to its focus on climate change as a security challenge, CCIS specifically pushes for the integration of climate concerns in EU foreign and security policies and institutions (High Representative (2008, 2008: 2).

When asked whether they could point to any institutional change derived from CCIS, three EU officials interviewed argued that the recent effort to mainstream climate change into all EU policies was a consequence of an acknowledgement of its link to security (Commission Official, 4 October 2012; Commission Official, 27 February 2013; Council Official, 6 November 2012). Even if establishing a causal link between the structuration of the CCIS discourse and the Commission's effort to mainstream climate concerns into other policies is difficult, the fact that some officials perceive it to be connected is a sign of the impact of this discourse.

Overall, it can be argued that CCIS does not bring new principles to the EU internal climate policy-making sphere but rather reinforces existing principles. Both the focus on prevention and the integration of climate concerns into all policy areas are also a feature of ecological modernisation. CCIS adds to the arguments for the need to commit to these principles.

However, regarding climate policy instruments, it is not clear what follows institutionally from the climate security discourse. While EM emphasis on a positive relationship between the environment and the economy endorses markets as key delivery mechanisms for environmental governance, CCIS does not make assumptions about the instruments through which ambitious mitigation and adaptation policies should be achieved.

It could be argued that, by linking climate change to security, CCIS would endorse ambitious mandatory regulation instruments. This is certainly the argument of those who see securitised issues as calling for emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal boundaries of political practice (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). According to this logic, the climate security link would endorse the imposition of tough regulations on emissions. However, while the character of urgency of curbing emissions is highlighted in the CCIS discourse this simply

'adds an incentive to strengthen EU's comprehensive efforts to reduce emissions' (Council, 2009b: 1).

Despite this incentive, and the EU's 'rhetorical commitment to climate policy' (Jordan et al., 2012: 49), commentators argue that mitigation policies adopted are 'still far from compatible with the EU objective to limit global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius' (Oberthür and Pallemaerts, 2010: 52). As Jordan et al. (2012: 52) have noted, the EU 'exhibits a well-known mismatch between ambitious policy intentions and weak implementing capacities'.

This mismatch between rhetoric and action can be, at least partially, explained by the fact the climate policies are an area of shared competences between the Union and the Member states. Being an issue of shared competences means that EU climate policy is a result of complex negotiations and consensus building between actors with differing interests (Barnes, 2011: 55). Therefore, the EU is rather constrained in its choice of policy instruments.

In the case of adaptation policies, the mismatch is even greater as the EU lacks legal competence in land-use planning (Rayner and Jordan, 2013: 82). Furthermore, civil protection is an area where the Union merely has the competence to support the action of the member states. Hence, while there is a conviction that the climate-security link reinforces the urgency of adaptation, the development of common adaptation policies has been significantly slow.

As an interviewee from DG Clima argued, 'the link to security (…) pushes for climate adaptation policies' (Commission Official, 7 November 2012). As such, the EU is encouraging Member States to adopt national adaptation strategies but this is a voluntary process and not part of EU legislation (Commission Official, 6 June 2013). Rather than using regulatory or economic instruments, as in the case of mitigation, the EU is seeking to influence Member States' behaviour through the provision of information and through persuasion. The voluntary nature of adaptation policies is contradictory to a character of urgency attributed to them.

In addition to the lack of EU competence, early research on adaptation has generally presumed that 'the greatest vulnerabilities would be in the developing world, rather than in Western industrialized countries' (Berkhout, 2005: 383). In effect, the role of adaptation in preventing the security impacts of climate change is acknowledged to be of more relevance for the external relations dimension. As I argued in the previous chapter, the security impacts of climate change are not as much a concern within Europe's borders as they are for developing countries.

In CCIS discourse, adaptation as a minimizer of security threats is recurrently connected to development policies. I will discuss the integration of climate change adaptation in development cooperation in the next chapter.

To sum up, the dissemination of CCIS storylines in the EU climate change discursive space did not bring new internal climate policy-making principles or instruments. Like the EM discourse, CCIS highlights the role of prevention and mainstreaming as central policy principles: for EM prevention and mainstreaming make good economic sense as compared to the costs of inaction; for CCIS they are measures to safeguard European security.

CCIS discourse pushes for more ambitious mitigation targets as well as for adaptation policies to deal with the unavoidable. However, the discourse does not favour a particular policy instrument to achieve the desired targets. By reframing climate policies as security imperatives, CCIS reinforces the urgency of existing policy instruments, calling for more ambitious targets. Therefore we can identify a mismatch between the rhetoric of urgency due to the security imperative and EU climate action.

When analysing the institutionalisation of the acid rain discourse in the UK and the Netherlands, Hajer found a similar paradox. While acid rain became generally accepted as a programmatic issue that called for a change in policy strategies, the 'selected remedial measures failed to give material form to that new reality' (Hajer, 1995: 265). Instead of eco-modernist policies, acid rain was met with pragmatic solutions. One of the reasons for this mismatch between rhetoric and action, he argues, is that the eco-modernist acid rain storyline had to compete with existing figures of speech that were combined with existing institutional commitments. Storylines such as 'Britain has a proud record in air pollution' or 'Britain has the best scientists working on the issue' helped legitimise given regulatory institutions (Hajer, 1995: 268).

In the CCIS case, the 'climate change as a threat multiplier' storyline has to compete with existing storylines that place 'the EU at the forefront of international action against climate change'. These storylines certify the efficacy of already existing policies to address climate change. If the EU has a 'proud record' in emissions reductions, there is no necessity for the creation of new policies and instruments.

5.2.2 CCIS and EU Climate Diplomacy

Environmental issues have been formally integrated in EU external policies since 2002 when the General Affairs Council adopted a strategy to integrate the environment in the drawing up and implementation of EU external policies (Council, 2002). Since the adoption of the strategy, the Commission and the Member States have intensified their efforts in the area, including through the creation of the EU Green Diplomacy Network (GDN), an informal tool composed of officials dealing with international environment and sustainable development issues in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and their diplomatic missions.

In this context, climate change has increasingly become a priority in EU relations with third countries, as an effective diplomatic effort is seen as vital to ensure that the impacts of climate change are 'addressed at the highest political level throughout the world' (EEAS, 2014a).

In the previous sections I sought to demonstrate how the climate change and international security storylines emphasise the external dimension of the climate problem. Concerns about conflict and migration, encapsulated in the 'threat-multiplier' storyline, together with an emphasis on an international leadership role for the EU, construct climate change a foreign policy issue.

As such, it is necessary to investigate the impact of this discourse in EU external action on climate change. In the next paragraphs, I seek to understand whether the structuration of the CCIS discourse in the EU climate change arena has had an impact on instruments for climate foreign policy.

As climate change is an issue of shared competences between the Union and the member states, 'external representation is taken care of jointly' (Van Schaik, 2010: 256). Typically, Member states have preferred to appoint the rotating Council presidency as lead negotiator. However, the Union – represented by the European Commission – has also been regularly represented in international climate negotiations (Oberthür and Roche Kely, 2008: 38).

Although the existing distribution of competences in the area of climate change remained essentially untouched with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, article 191 of the Treaty established that Union policy on the environment should contribute to the promotion of 'measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change' (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union, art. 191, 2008, OJ C326/47). As Benson and Jordan (2010: 470) noted, although this provision does not provide a new legal power as such, it appears to give the Commission a clearer mandate to participate in international climate change discussions alongside Member States.

A significant part of the EU's external representation in climate change refers to its participation in the United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC) negotiations. The EU is a Party to both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, as are all EU Member States individually.

Climate change and international security documents highlight the role of UNFCCC negotiations in reducing the threats of climate change and suggest the EU should 'emphasize in negotiations that the threats of climate change need to be reduced and stress the importance of adaptation strategies in the most vulnerable regions and countries in this context' (Council, 2009a: 9). However, a survey of EU discursive contributions to the annual Conference of the Parties shows that climate change and international security storylines are not employed in this forum.

A Council official involved in the preparation of international climate negotiations argued that the security narrative is being strategically left out of EU discourse is the UNFCCC. Although 'climate change is a threat multiplier with consequences to national and human security', the official argued, framing climate change as security 'creates a firewall between developing and developed countries' (Council Official, 27 February 2013). It is understood that the security argument raises questions about who is responsible for creating these security problems. Hence, according to the same official, 'it would be counterproductive for the EU to use this argument in UNFCCC negotiations. The EU has to be very careful and sensitive' (Council Official, 27 February 2013).

Hence, while the main goal of promoting a narrative on the links between climate change and security is to help mobilise support for UNFCCC conferences (EEAS, 2013), the narrative is not used in the UNFCCC meetings. Instead, what is emphasised in these meetings is the urgency of reaching an ambitious deal that delivers on the 2ºC target and the EU's proud record in emission reductions.

However, the UNFCCC negotiations are not the only forum where the EU exercises its external relations in the area of climate change. The EU also seeks to advance its international climate change agenda through its complimentary foreign policy instruments, including policy dialogues and financial instruments.

Since the emergence of the climate change and international security discourse, the security dimension of climate change has become part of the issues the EU seeks to promote in the international arena.

The United Nations (UN) has been the primary target of EU's efforts to foster an international response to the security implications of climate change. To this end, the EU has launched in 2009 a consultation with the UN System to share views and information on the security implications of climate change and to identify opportunities for cooperation on CCIS (Council, 2009a: 4).

Also in 2009, the EU strongly supported the UNGA resolution A/RES/63/281 entitled 'Climate change and its possible security implications', which invites the relevant organs of the United Nations to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications (UNGA, 2009).

Although the initiative for the resolution came from the Pacific Small Island Developing States, the EU supported it from the onset. At the June 2009 General Assembly meeting which voted on the resolution, Eduard Metela of the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the UN, speaking on behalf of the EU, welcomed the adoption of the resolution and stated:

> the European Union believes that, by adopting the resolution on climate change and its possible security implications, the United Nations membership has made a first important step towards considering and addressing security risks related to climate change (Metela, 2009).

Moreover, the EU representative communicated that the EU looked 'forward to the Secretary-General's comprehensive report [...] and to the attention that the relevant organs of the United Nations will devote to climate change and its security implications' (Metela, 2009).

The General Assembly resolution requested the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) to submit a comprehensive report on the security implications of climate change, to be based on the views of the Member States and relevant regional and international organisations (UNGA, 2009). The report, which was presented by the Secretary General in September 2009, identifies several 'threat minimisers' that could help to lower the security risks posed by climate change.

The EU claims an active involvement in the discussions related to the UNSG report, providing through the Steering Group and the Swedish Presidency of the

Council substantial input to the report (Council, 2009a: 4). A former Council official confirmed that the EU gave a significant contribution to the report through the work of officials from the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and DG RELEX (Council Official, 28 February 2013). These officials were identified as discourse entrepreneurs in the previous chapter.

Raising the issue in other multilateral fora that deal directly or indirectly with climate change is also a priority for the EU. In this context, during its 2013 presidency of the Group of 8 (G8) the UK raised the issue with leading industrialised countries by hosting a two-day meeting on climate change and security at Wilton Park. In this meeting, which benefited from the presence of the EU's HR/VP Catherine Ashton, policymakers from interested G8 countries discussed possible actions to respond to the impacts of climate change. The result, was the recognition of the 'consequences of climate change and associated environmental and resource stresses as a contributing factor to increased security risks globally' in a joint declaration by the G8 Ministers and the HR/VP (G8, 2013).

Climate change and international security is also now part of the portfolio of issues the EU raises in bilateral political dialogues (EEAS, 2010). According to the High Representative's Joint Progress report, since March 2008, the EU has continued to raise the issue of climate change and security in its dialogue with third countries, including key players and countries which are particularly vulnerable to climate change (High Representative, 2008: 6).

An example of the engagement of the EU with vulnerable countries and regions on the issue of climate change and security is the Pacific Islands states. In November 2008, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and the EU issued a joint declaration where they 'recognised the urgency and human security dimension of climate change' (PIFS and EU, 2008: 3) and committed to cooperate closely to address the challenges posed by climate change.

The commitment to work with the Pacific Islands states on climate change and security was reconfirmed in 2012 by the Joint Communication 'Towards a renewed EU-Pacific Development Partnership' where the Commission and the High Representative argued that

> the EU will also develop a comprehensive climate diplomacy strategy in the Pacific, for EU actors, Member States and their national diplomatic services to address climate change at all political levels, to promote and support the

> implementation of climate action as well as to address linkages between climate change and international security in the Pacific. (European Commission and High Representative, 2012: 10).

In addition to the regular European Development Funds allocations, the EU has committed a substantial amount of additional climate change funding. This funding – managed by the Global Climate Change Alliance – has been allocated to develop and strengthen the Pacific countries' capacity to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change.

With the creation of the EEAS in 2010, EU efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy for climate diplomacy have been given a renewed impetus. These efforts were clearly articulated in the two previously mentioned papers by the EEAS and the European Commission on Climate Diplomacy. While UNFCCC negotiations is an area of shared competences between the Union and the Member States, in the area of climate change and international security, the EEAS and the EU Delegations - both established by the Treaty of Lisbon - 'have a particular role to play' (EEAS, 2011: 4).

The climate diplomacy papers attribute a key role to climate change and international security in the EU's strategy to enhance climate diplomacy, by including action on climate security as one of the three strands of action for EU climate diplomacy.[12] According to the papers, the EU will build on the work done on climate change and international security and work to 'raise global awareness of the security risks, and threat-multiplier nature, of climate change' (EEAS, 2011: 4). Thus, EEAS and the Commission argue that EU external action should further strengthen dialogue and co-operation with third countries and international organisations.

In addition to working with the most vulnerable countries, in order to prevent conflict and promote adaptation to climate change, the EU should also raise climate change and international security issues in bilateral political dialogues with the largest emitters. An example of this is the work of the EU Delegation to Washington, which is doing considerable outreach work on climate change and security.

[12] The other two strands of action refer to: 1) the promotion of climate change action at various levels, including the UNFCCC negotiations, bilateral relations and relations with international organisations; 2) support for developing countries' institutional and capacity building efforts to address climate change

According to one Member of the Delegation interviewed, the Delegation has partnered with the Center for Naval Analysis and the American Security Project, two American think tanks with considerable work on climate security, specifically to work on outreach on the issue. According to the interviewee,

> We discovered that by framing issues in certain ways we would be able to reach other people. By framing it as security issue, we would be able to reach republican constituencies [...] we don't need to reach out to the constituencies that already believe in climate change. We need to reach out to the ones who do not. And for that we need to speak their language. (EU Diplomat, 4 December 2014)

An interviewee from the EEAS also confirmed that the climate security argument is very important in the EU's climate change dialogue with the US because the 'military are very important in internal debates' (Interview EEAS).

What becomes apparent from this is that, in addition to an issue to which the EU wants to raise awareness, climate change and international security is also a narrative that the EU uses strategically to persuade international partners to act on climate change.

The 2013 Climate Diplomacy Paper explicitly acknowledges the instrumentality of employing a security narrative on climate change. In the document, the EEAS and the Commission argue that intensified diplomacy efforts should include

> sharpening an EU narrative on the intricate links between climate change, international and human security and natural resource scarcity and on how these links shape future prosperity, stability and development. (EEAS, 2013)

This indicates the EEAS and the Commission perceive the link between climate change and security as a compelling argument to galvanise support for climate action on a global scale. However, as the citation above makes evident, CCIS is not the only narrative to be strategically used. The paper acknowledges that different narratives appeal to different actors, and therefore argues there is a need to adapt the discourse to the interlocutor. Accordingly, the paper argues that 'EU advocacy must be based on a deep understanding of partner countries' positions, constraints and stakeholder interests' and as such, 'EU narratives will be [...] adapted and tailored to specific and local circumstances' (EEAS, 2013).

An interviewee from the EEAS supported the view that climate security is only one of the narratives to be used in Climate Diplomacy. In the EEAS understanding,

arguments need to speaks to national debates. Therefore, one of the priorities for climate diplomacy was to develop new arguments that could be transferable into the political level (EEAS Official, 6 November 2012).

A similar point was made by the EU Delegation to Washington interviewee who argued that, while this specific Delegation had been successful in using the CCIS narrative, in other contexts it would not have been as much. For example, with China, the interviewee argued, 'the climate security discourse does not click' (EU Diplomat, 4 December 2014). Hence, while the EU delegation is pursuing this route, the interviewee highlighted that 'the EU's perspective is that we have to be cautious with this. The official position is that ok, climate change can have security implications but it is also a broader issue' (EU Diplomat, 4 December 2014).

Overall, the EU strategy is to develop a toolbox for EU climate diplomacy with partner-specific messages, including 'climate change and international security', 'climate science', 'the nexus between climate change and sustainable development', and 'the costs of inaction' (EEAS, 2013).

The focus on the utility of the climate security narrative is seen as disappointing by some CCIS discourse entrepreneurs who feel that EU climate diplomacy reports do not show a strong enough commitment to climate security (Council Official, 28 February 2013). As one interviewee explained, climate security is about the understanding of interests and how climate change affects them, but in climate diplomacy it has been framed merely as 'getting a better outcome at the UNFCCC' (E3G Representative, 7 October 2013).

Nevertheless, what is evident is that the Climate Diplomacy papers, together with the Council Conclusions on climate diplomacy, formally integrate climate change and international security in the EU foreign policy strategy for climate change. Previous strategies for EU outreach on climate change did not include a security dimension.

5.2.2.1 Actors

In the previous paragraphs I have argued that climate change and international security has become part of the EU strategy for climate diplomacy, with climate security issues now being raised with partners. The discussion now turns to how CCIS endorses a change in the actors who deal with climate change.

Climate change has been the prerogative of the Environment Ministers since the onset of climate policies and other Council formations have only discussed certain aspects of climate change that fell under their competence. The framing of climate change as an economic problem, characteristic of EM, evidently calls for the participation Ministers of Economy and Trade. In the EU this has been increasingly visible with the participation of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) in discussions about climate change, namely on the financial aspects of international negotiations (Afionis, 2010: 346).

The framing of climate change as an international security issue, by externalising the climate problem and focusing on issues of conflict and migration, places climate change in the remit of Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) defines and implements the EU's foreign and security policy and therefore is the Council formation that deals with international security issues.

Before the 2008 Joint Paper on Climate Change and International Security, Foreign Affairs Ministers only addressed climate change in connection to energy security or development cooperation. However, as I have argued earlier in this chapter, following the release of the CCIS reports, the FAC adopted conclusions on Climate change and security where Foreign Ministers stated that 'climate change and its international security implications are part of EU's wider agenda for climate, energy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy' (Council, 2009a: 1).

The recent papers on Climate Diplomacy seem to epitomise an attempt from both the Commission and the EEAS to anchor climate change in foreign policy. This is not to say that the paper is attempting to take climate change away from the remit of Environmental Ministers, but that it is clear that in the EU there is a sense that Foreign Affairs ministers must be involved as part of a comprehensive approach to climate change. Setting up the role of EU climate diplomacy, the latest climate diplomacy document argues that

> [r]enewed political momentum on climate change at the highest levels needs to be built including to deal with the security dimension. Success in 2015 will necessarily require the support of the highest political level, and the regular involvement of not only Environment Ministers, but also of Foreign Affairs and Development Ministers [...] (EEAS, 2013)

Besides Foreign Affairs Ministers, the CCIS discourse calls for the intervention of other foreign policy actors. Redefining climate change as a Foreign Affairs issue also implies a bigger role for the newly established EEAS, as well as for the High

Representative. The importance attributed to these two actors is evident in the recommendations of the first Climate Diplomacy Paper, where it was argued that the EU should

> [r]ecognise the important role that the High Representative, the European Commission and the EEAS can play in working collaboratively with Member States, in particular Environment and Foreign Affairs Ministers, on climate diplomacy. (EEAS, 2011: 4)

Hence, by highlighting the peace and security dimension of climate change, the CCIS discourse makes a strong case for climate change to be dealt with by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The inclusion of climate security storylines in the Climate Diplomacy means that external action actors acknowledge climate security as an important dimension of external relations. The drafting of the climate diplomacy papers by the EEAS, which supports the EU foreign affairs chief, and its endorsement by the Foreign Affairs Council, composed by the Foreign Ministers of Member States, means that EU foreign policy actors accept the rhetorical power of the climate change and security discourse.

It has been suggested that the link to security has been important in steering climate change towards external relations actors. Louise Van Schaik (2010: 267), who has done considerable analysis on EU climate diplomacy, has argued that the interest of EU foreign policy actors in climate change increased precisely because of the establishment of a link between climate change and security in the EU.

Conversely, it can be argued that the link to security has been established precisely because foreign policy actors have an interest in dealing with climate change. Such interest can be explained, as Van Schaik (2010: 267) also notes, by the assumption that diplomats are better skilled in international negotiations than environment officials. In this case, the CCIS discourse would be instrumental in bringing climate change to the foreign policy domain.

Interviews suggest that these considerations were crucial in the onset of the CCIS process in the EU. In the words of one interviewee from the Council,

> People said also ‘why can’t this High Representative that we have do something in support of our climate change objectives?’ And he always said ‘yes but only in the margins because the climate change negotiations as such are being run by climate negotiators, by Environmental Ministers. My main interlocutors are

> Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers. So that's not really my role. My job is to look after political and security issues'. (Council Official, 6 November 2012)

Linking climate change and international security thus enables the High Representative, as well as Foreign and Defence Ministers, to deal with climate change.

Another interviewee from the Commission also argued that one of the aims of linking climate change and security was to 'gain access to decision makers that are not only Environment Ministers' because 'climate change is not only an environmental issue' (Commission Official, 4 October 2012).

Discussing a scenario where the High Representative and the EEAS would take the lead in climate negotiations, Van Schaik (2010: 272) argues that '[t]he advantage of the HR/VP and EEAS take-over would be a more permanent structure for the coordination and external representation of the EU. It may also lead to the EU becoming a more diplomatic and strategic climate negotiator'. Moreover, placing climate change at the Foreign Affairs level makes it more high-profile. The Foreign Affairs Council meets every month while the Environment Council meets only twice a year.

However, while CCIS enables climate change to be dealt with by the aforementioned CFSP actors, therefore enabling a transformation in institutional practices, presently climate change is still mostly dealt with by the Environment Council. There is opposition to taking climate change away from Environment Ministers because, it is argued, they have bigger knowledge on the substance of climate change negotiations. If on the one hand there is expectation that foreign policy actors would make the issue more strategic, on the other hand there is a concern that the 'real commitments to tackling climate change may be less guaranteed than if Environment Ministers remain in the lead' (Van Schaik, 2010: 273).

5.3 Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter I analysed the structuration of the CCIS discourse in the EU climate change discursive space. Having examined the climate-related discourse of the European Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament, I have argued that although CCIS has not become the dominant way

of conceptualising climate change, these central actors now conceive of climate change as a security issue.

In other words, while EU actors continue to speak of climate change mainly in eco-modernist terms, CCIS metaphors and storylines have been incorporated into EU climate change discourse, highlighting another dimension of the problem.

The second part of the chapter has addressed the institutionalisation of the CCIS discourse in the EU, examining whether the 'climate change as a threat multiplier' storyline has been translated into concrete climate policy principles and instruments.

In the case of internal climate policy-making, I have argued that the dissemination of CCIS story-lines in the EU climate change discursive space did not bring new internal principles or instruments. Like ecological modernisation – the dominant discourse on climate change in the EU – CCIS highlights the role of prevention and of mainstreaming as central policy principles. By reframing climate policies as security imperatives, CCIS reinforces the urgency of existing policy instruments, calling for more ambitious mitigation and adaptation targets.

Changes in policy instruments due to the CCIS discourse are more visible in the context of EU external climate policies. Significantly, climate change and international security is now part of the portfolio of issues the EU promotes in the international arena. EU foreign policy actors have acknowledged the instrumentality of employing a security narrative on climate change as a way to galvanise support for the international climate change regime. Hence CCIS discourse is acknowledged as a powerful tool in engaging external partners.

In addition, the CCIS narrative has broadened the range of actors who deal with climate change. Climate change which, as an environmental problem, had traditionally been the prerogative of Environment Ministers is increasingly becoming an issue for the Foreign Affairs Council as well. The EEAS is also seeking a more prominent role in climate diplomacy. The climate change and international security discourse, by highlighting impacts on external conflict and migration, has intensified the interest of foreign affairs actors in the issue.

While EM provides a strong incentive for the EU to adopt internal policies to mitigate climate change, CCIS highlights the need to address climate change in EU external relations. Therefore, the discourse of climate change and

international security has been most evidently integrated in EU climate diplomacy. Foreign policy thus becomes a 'natural' home for climate security discourse.

Reflecting on how these findings speak to the normative debate on the securitisation of climate change, an important point can be made. Some analysts anticipated that linking climate change to security would make climate change a priority for policymakers, due to the exceptional nature of security. However, the analysis of CCIS discourse indicates that while discursively climate change has acquired a level of urgency compatible with security issues, mitigation and adaptation policies do not correspond to the level of ambition necessary to counter the security effects of climate change.

Chapter 6: CCIS in the EU security realm

In the previous chapter I addressed the structuration and institutionalisation of the climate change and international security (CCIS) discourse in the EU climate change sphere. I have argued that while CCIS storylines have been incorporated in the EU broader discourse on climate change, policy change derived from CCIS has been limited to EU foreign action on climate change.

In this chapter, I analyse the impact of the CCIS discourse in the EU security sphere. Climate change and international security storylines combine elements from both the climate change and the security discourses. In addition, discourse entrepreneurs have sought to disseminate CCIS storylines to both climate change actors and security actors, in an effort to bring together these two previously independent policy areas. As a consequence, it is also relevant to understand the influence of the CCIS discourse among EU security actors.

Mirroring the approach of the previous chapter, this chapter is divided in two main parts. In the first part of the chapter I analyse the structuration of CCIS in EU security discourses. Looking at EU security documents, I seek to understand whether CCIS metaphors and storylines have been incorporated into EU security discourse and whether central EU security actors now conceive of climate change as a security issue.

In the second part of the chapter I address the institutionalisation of the CCIS discourse. The aim is to understand whether and how the CCIS discourse has been translated into security practices and instruments.

6.1 CCIS in the EU security discursive space

Security has been a central aim of the EU since its original conception in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community (Bretherton and Vogler, 2010: 189). A desire for peace and stability motivated the founding Member States to combine security and economic goals and these motivations have remained constant in the evolution of the EU (Kirchner, 2006: 951).

Even though security is an area over which Member States have sought to retain their sovereignty, thus delaying EU security integration, EU Member States have committed themselves to a Common Foreign Security Policy. As an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) covers defence and military aspects, as well as civilian crisis management. The CSDP is composed of three main elements, namely military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and conflict prevention. Under the CSDP, the EU has launched about 30 civilian and military missions and operations.

However, the security role of the EU cannot be confined to the CSDP. From the onset of EU security integration, the EU has assumed a comprehensive approach to security.

Building on its own integration project as the perfect example of conflict prevention, the EU has sought to establish itself as an experienced actor in the field of conflict prevention (Barnutz, 2012: 47). This meant that EU actors have pushed for a comprehensive approach to security where, in addition to military means, a range of civilian means are employed. According to the Presidency Conclusions of the 2001 Göteborg European Council,

> The European Union is committed to developing and refining its capabilities, structures and procedures in order to improve its ability to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks, making use of military and civilian means. (European Council, 2001: 11)

The EU has increasingly developed a discourse of 'comprehensive approach' to security. Central to the EU's comprehensive approach is the idea that security and development are closely interlinked. According to Barnutz, who studied EU security discourse between the European Council in Helsinki 1999[13] and August 2001,

> the EU established a security logic that poverty and under-development was likely to lead into conflict and that, accordingly, a security policy was needed including long-term approached of development policies and short-term approaches of civilian and military action (Barnutz, 2012: 55)

[13] Where the Headline Goal for the common European Security and Defence Policy was established

The comprehensive approach, and the importance of the development-security link in EU security discourse, was confirmed by the publication of the ESS in 2003.

The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council in December 2003, provides the conceptual framework for the CFSP, including the CSDP. The 2003 ESS is the first official and comprehensive security strategy of the European Union. Drafted under the auspices of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR), the document identifies key security challenges facing the EU and the resulting political implications.

The ESS confirms that the EU's comprehensive approach entails not only a broadened view of security threats but also a widening of the range of measures to respond to contemporary security problems. According to the document, 'in contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments' (Council, 2003: 7).

Hence, under the comprehensive approach, the EU recognises that an effective and sustainable response to security threats can only be achieved by using the full range of instruments at the EU's disposal (Barry, 2012: 1).

The central importance of the development-security nexus is also confirmed by the ESS. Not only has the document stated that 'security is a precondition of development' (Council, 2003: 2), it also argues that development policies are part of EU security policy. According to the document, the EU should make use of 'the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention' at its disposal, 'including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities' (Council, 2003: 11).

As Zwolski (2012a: 994) has argued, '[t]he discourse that emphasizes a holistic approach to security, incorporating military as well as civilian and development policy instruments has become dominant in the EU and remains largely uncontested'.

In the following paragraphs I analyse the structuration of the CCIS narrative in EU security discourse, looking for the diffusion of CCIS metaphors and storylines into EU security-related official documents and speeches. The EU's comprehensive approach to security, making use of a broad range of instruments to pursue security goals, means that the list of actors who speak security in the EU is vast.

My analysis focuses on the Council and the European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the EU Military.

6.1.1 The Council of the European Union and the European Council

The most important actors within the CSDP are the foreign and defence ministers of the EU member states, because they formulate policy initiatives and reach agreements on common positions and joint actions (Dover, 2010: 251). Foreign and defence ministers, meeting within the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), define and implement the EU's foreign and security policy, which is based on the guidelines set by the European Council. Hence, the European Council, composed by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, is also a relevant actor in CSDP because it defines the political direction and priorities of the EU.

In the previous chapter, we have seen how the FAC has adopted conclusions on Climate change and Security in 2009, where it 'underlined the possible international security implications of climate change, and the potential risk for increased natural disasters and conflicts over scarcer resources, its effect on migration and state and regional instability […]' (Council, 2009a: 1).

In the conclusions, the FAC endorsed the recommendations in the Progress Report, including to 'hone and sharpen the EU´s crisis management capabilities relevant to dealing with CCIS' (Council, 2009b: 2). This indicates that the FAC not only subscribes to the CCIS storylines but also agrees with the use of CSDP instruments to address the security implications of climate change. However, further analysis of the FAC conclusions show that climate change is not mentioned in the context of CSDP again.

The European Council has also welcomed the reports on climate change and international security. In its Presidency Conclusions, the March 2008 Brussels European Council

> underline[d] the importance of this issue, and invite[d] the Council to examine the paper and to submit recommendations on appropriate follow-up action, in particular on how to intensify cooperation with third countries and regions regarding the impact of climate change on international security. (European Council, 2008a: 14)

By inviting the Council to follow-up on climate change and international security, this paragraph indicates that Member States, represented at the highest level, subscribe to the climate change and international security narrative.

Arguably the strongest indicator that both the Council and the European Council subscribe to the CCIS storylines is the inclusion of climate concerns in the ESS. The 2003 ESS contained only a brief mention to climate change in the context of resource scarcity, arguing that the '[c]ompetition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions' (European Union, 2003: 3).

Four years later, the December 2007 European Council tasked the High Representative to examine the implementation of the ESS and to draft a proposal for improving the implementation, as well as to complement it. Thus, in December 2008, HR Solana presented a Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy which effectively confirmed the long-term validity of the 2003 strategy and contained recommendations to improve implementation.

The Implementation Report identifies climate change as one of the global challenges and key threats to European security interests, arguing that five years after the publication of the ESS, the security implications of climate change have 'taken on a new urgency' (Council, 2008c: 5).

Recalling the joint paper on 'Climate Change and International Security', the Report stresses how climate change can act as a 'threat multiplier', stressing specifically the potential of climate change to exacerbate conflict. According to the document,

> Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible. (Council, 2008c: 5)

To address these potential security implications of climate change, the report claims that the EU has enhanced its conflict prevention and crisis management, but argues it still needs to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. Furthermore, it argues the EU cannot address this issue alone, which makes

international co-operation with the UN and regional organisations essential (Council, 2008c: 6).

With the publication of the Implementation Report, which reinforces the ESS – the core document of European security and defence policy which defines the EU's strategic objectives – now includes climate change as one of the threats to be addressed by the Common Security and Defence Policy.

As the ESS was drafted by HR Solana, which I identified as a CCIS discourse entrepreneur earlier, it is not surprising that it draws on CCIS storylines. However, the endorsement of the Implementation Report by the European Council in December 2008 indicates that EU Member States accept climate change as a threat that EU security should address. In its December 2008 Conclusions the European Council,

> endorses the analysis presented by the Secretary-General/High Representative, in consultation with the Commission, in the document reviewing the implementation of the 2003 security strategy so as to improve it and add new elements to it. This document reveals the continuing existence of the threats identified in 2003 as well as the emergence of fresh risks likely to threaten the security of the EU, directly or indirectly, which it has to tackle globally. (European Council, 2008b: 15)

Hence, the European Council gives its agreement to the inclusion of climate change as a new threat the EU needs to tackle.

6.1.2 The European Commission

Although the Commission has a limited role in the CSDP, it plays a central part in development policies, which are increasingly connected to security in the EU. Development issues are governed by the ordinary legislative procedure, which means the European Commission has the right of initiative. Furthermore, within the Commission, the Directorate-General Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) is responsible for designing and delivering EU development policies.

The Commission is a strong promoter of the notion that security and development are fundamentally intertwined. In its 2005 communication on 'Policy

Coherence for Development' the Commission argued the EU should 'treat security and development as complementary agendas' (European Commission, 2005b: 5).

The analysis of Commission discourse indicates that climate change has increasingly become a central element in the link between development and security. Already in 2003, the Commission Communication on 'Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation' had identified climate change as 'a development problem since its adverse effects will disproportionately affect poorer countries with economies' (European Commission, 2003: 3). However, the document only briefly mentions the potential security implications of climate change in connection to conflict over diminishing water resources or mass migration (European Commission, 2003: 11).

In October 2009 the Swedish Presidency of the Council and the European Commission produced a joint paper on 'Climate Change and Development' which provides guidance on how the EU can best respond to the challenges of mitigation and adaptation in the developing countries most vulnerable to climate change. These are mainly the Least Developed Countries, the Small Island Developing States and the African countries at risk of drought, desertification and floods.

In the paper, the Swedish Presidency and the Commission make reference to the potential impact of climate change on the security of developing countries, arguing that climate change 'affects democratic governance, political stability and security' (European Commission, 2009a: 4). The core concern here is with the impact of climate change on resources because, the document argues, 'when resources – water, arable land, forests – become scarcer, the threat to stability and security increases' (European Commission, 2009a: 4).

An interviewee from DG DEVCO confirmed that the European Commission sees climate change as one of the main factors of shocks and stresses that could cause instability in the developing countries (Commission Official, 27 February 2013).

The Commission's thinking is that there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and that without development there will be no sustainable peace (DG DEVCO, 2015). In this mutually reinforcing relationship, climate change assumes a potentially dangerous role because, being a threat multiplier, it can have an impact on both elements of the nexus. On the one hand,

climate change is predicted to intensify conflict drivers. On the other hand, climate change has the potential to intensify conditions of under-development.

Overall, it can be argued that climate change is being increasingly integrated in the development-security discourse of the European Commission. Therefore, for the Commission, 'future work on security and development should include the security and development implications of climate change' (European Commission, (2011: 9).

6.1.3 The European Parliament

Although it has no formal role in CSDP decision-making, the European Parliament is consulted on CSDP issues and on the general direction of the policy. The Parliament holds debates on progress in implementing the CSDP every year and adopts resolutions on the issue. Furthermore, being the only-directly elected European institution, a European Parliament resolution sends a powerful political message which makes it an important institution to look at in terms of its discourse.

An analysis of the successive Parliament resolutions on CSDP indicates that from 2008 climate change is increasingly acknowledged as an issue EU security should address. In its 2005 resolution on the European Security Strategy the Parliament welcomed the comprehensive understanding of security expressed by the ESS. In the context of this comprehensive understanding, the Parliament considered environmental factors such as scarcity of natural resources and environmental degradation, as contributing to existing regional conflicts (European Parliament, 2005d).

Also the 2006 resolution on the ESDP 'emphasises that the increasing worldwide competition for sources of water and energy, as well as natural disasters and the security of the Union's external borders, must be included as a strategic objective in the further development of the ESS' (European Parliament, 2006: 2). However, these resolutions do not mention specifically the effects of climate change.

In May 2008, in its resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP, the European Parliament '[i]nvites the High Representative to assess in a White Paper the progress made, and any shortcomings, in the implementation of the ESS since 2003, including [...] the consequences of climate

change and natural disasters for civil protection and human security' (EP, 2008: 3). It further calls on Member States to increase their exchange of intelligence through the EU Joint Situation Centre, arguing that 'special measures need to be taken into account concerning new threats not covered in the ESS, such as the security of energy supply and the security consequences of climate change' (European Parliament, 2008c: 8).

Following the release of the High Representative's ESS implementation report, the EP 'welcomes innovative aspects of the revision [of the ESS] such as its focus on climate change' (European Parliament, 2009b).

Subsequent yearly resolutions include references to climate change which, the European Parliament argues, 'is widely recognised as being an essential driver and threat multiplier for global security, peace and stability' (European Parliament, 2012a: 2).

In preparation for the European Council discussion on security and defence at the December 2013 Summit, the European Parliament puts forward its own recommendations in its resolution of November 2013. In the context of those recommendations, the EP makes two proposals on climate change as part of a strategy to increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP. First, in the context of discussions regarding the relevance of EU battlegroups, the EP 'stresses that they constitute an important tool for timely force generation, training and rapid reaction; [...] [and] underlines the fact that EU battlegroups should be deployable for all types of crises, including climate-driven humanitarian crisis' (European Parliament, 2013: 7). Second, the EP points out that the EU should further engage with international organisations in order to 'share analysis and cooperate in addressing the challenges of environmental policy and climate change, including their security implications' (European Parliament, 2013: 9).

When analysing the structuration of CCIS in the security-related discourse of the European Parliament, it is necessary to analyse one parliamentary initiative that focused specifically on the issue: 'The Resolution on the role of the CSDP in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters', approved by the European Parliament on November 2012. The EP resolution stems from a report submitted by Estonian Member of European Parliament (MEP) Indrek Tarand to the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, where the use of CSDP tools for climate-related crisis is proposed.

Given the specific focus on climate driven crisis and natural disasters, the report focuses on global security with emphasis on the most vulnerable states or regions as the main referent object of security. Evidently, in the concern about the security of the countries and regions more vulnerable to the effects of climate change, there is an underlying concern with the security of the European Union because it is acknowledged that natural disasters and climate-driven crisis occurring outside the Union have direct or indirect security implications on the Union, namely trough climate driven migration.

An analysis of the narratives in the report makes evident that climate change is defined through the metaphor of threat. The report defines 'the issue of climate change as the biggest threat to global security' (Tarand, 2012). The threat is presented in the form of crisis and disasters caused by climate change.

As with other EU documents, the main concern regards the potential impact of climate change on conflict drivers. Although the report acknowledges that so far no case of conflict can be exclusively attributed to climate change, it seeks to demonstrate that there is a link between these two phenomena. According to the document, the consequences of natural catastrophes on access to freshwater and foodstuffs can force people to migrate, which in turn can overstretch the economic, social and administrative capabilities of fragile regions and failing states, thereby creating conflict. Hence, although the phrase 'threat multiplier' was not inserted in the document, the arguments are very similar to those made by CCIS entrepreneurs.

Defining climate change through a threat metaphor implies the need for a defence against climate change. This is in fact the rationale for the report, which advocates conflict prevention and crisis management as the main responses to climate driven crises. Since the document is advocating a role for CSDP in climate change, the key agents of security are evidently CSDP actors, both military and civilian, although the resolution recognises the need for a comprehensive approach that includes other actors. Hence it argues that addressing climate change through a security nexus 'is but one component of EU action on climate change, which attempts to use political and economic tools to mitigate and adapt to climate change' (Tarand, 2012). Hence, the nature of the threat, the responses suggested to deal with the issue and the key agents of security are defined in a similar way to that of the core CCIS documents.

The adoption of this resolution by the European Parliament, with 474 votes in favour, indicates an acceptance of the CCIS discourse by the majority of MEPs.

The Parliamentary debate generated by the proposal for resolution allows for a deeper analysis of the discourse, highlighting how storylines are used. The explanations of the vote indicate that most Parliamentarians believe that climate change can exacerbate conflict drivers. For example, Lithuanian MEP Radvilė Morkūnaitė-Mikulėnienė, of the European People's Party (EPP) group, was convinced that

> Climate change definitely has an impact on security and, although we have not yet identified a conflict which broke out because of climate change alone, we need to take account of the consequences of natural disasters and climate change for international security. I therefore agree that the negative impact of climate change and natural disasters on peace, security and stability should be included in the CFSP and CSDP […] (European Parliament, 2012b)

Also Michał Tomasz Kamiński, Polish MEP from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) political group, argued that climate related evented were already 'overstretching the economic, social and administrative capabilities of already fragile regions or failing states and creating conflict' (European Parliament, 2012b).

MEPs also acknowledged a potential impact of climate change on security, through its effects on migration. Italian MEP Giovanni La Via (PPE) considered 'essential to develop contingency plans for the EU's response to the effects of natural disasters and climate-driven crises occurring outside the Union that have direct or indirect security implications on the Union, including climate-driven migration' (European Parliament, 2012b).

However, it is important to note, that the resolution did find some opposition in the Parliament, as shown by the 80 votes against. A number of MEPs feared that the report sought to justify the further militarisation of the EU. In his explanation of vote, Portuguese MEP João Ferreira from the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), who voted against the report, argued that the report

> starts off by manipulating justified fears about crises caused by more or less extreme climate phenomena and natural disasters in order to claim that these are 'the biggest threat to global security'. In this way it seeks to justify the further militarisation of the EU, the development of military capabilities by the

> European Defence Agency, and enhanced coordination between NATO and the EU […] (European Parliament, 2012b)

Sharing this opinion, a group of MEPs from the GUE/NGL group tabled a minority report where they justified their objection to the Tarand report arguing it 'wrongly focuses on repressive and military counter-measures whilst advocating further EU militarisation' (GUE/NGL MEPs, 2012).

However, these MEPs did not oppose the conceptual link between climate change and security. According to the minority opinion, 'the report is based on the correct assumption that climate change can exacerbate existing conflicts' (GUE/NGL MEPs, 2012). What they opposed was the measures proposed to deal with the security consequences of climate change.

An MEP, who I interviewed, confirmed this point of view conceding that 'of course climate change is the roots for conflicts, as poverty is the root for conflicts' (MEP, 27 February 2013). However, the said MEP continued, 'if we only say that it is a problem for the security of European people and not for the security of the people in the so called third world or the people that are suffering, that is a point of view I do not want to follow' (MEP, 27 February 2013).

This indicates that although these MEPs oppose what they believe to be militarised measures to address the issue and a shift away from addressing the underlying root causes of global distributive inequity, they subscribe to the 'threat multiplier' storyline. According to these actors, climate change exacerbates drivers of conflict but this can only be effectively tackled by addressing the root causes of the problem.

6.1.4 EU Military Actors

This section addresses the structuration of the CCIS discourse among EU military, by looking at the discourse of the two permanent military structures of the EU: the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

The EUMC, composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, is the highest military body set up within the Council. It directs all EU military activities and provides advice and recommendations on military matters.

The EUMS has the basic mandate to provide military expertise and support ESDP. Within the External Action Service, the EUMS is directly attached to the High Representative and works under the military direction of the EUMC. The EUMS currently includes around 200 seconded military officers and has two main sets of tasks, namely to perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for ESDP military operations, and to contribute to the process of elaboration, assessment and review of the military capability goals, in cooperation with the EDA (Grevi, 2009: 31).

As CCIS entrepreneurs envisaged a significant role for EU military actors in climate change and international security – entailing the use of military assets and capabilities in conflict management and climate-related disaster relief as well as the greening of military capabilities (Council Official, 1 March 2013) – they sought to disseminate the CCIS narrative to these actors. As a result, European military actors were invited to participate in the CCIS events organised by entrepreneurs. Interviews suggest that members of the EUMS started taking part in the meetings of the CCIS Steering Group towards the end of 2009 (Council Official, 28 February 2013).

In 2012, the EUMS drafted a Military Concept on Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency for EU-led military operations. In order to take account of the new challenges acknowledged in the ESS, and the interdependence between security and development, the concept establishes the principles and the responsibilities necessary to meet the requirements of environmental protection during EU-led military operations (EUMS, 2012). In the concept, climate change resilience is identified as an important factor for lasting stability once a conflict has been solved (EUMS, 2012: 19).

More recently, the EU Military produced a document on climate security. On July 2013 the EUMS produced a food for thought paper entitled 'Climate Change – A Military perspective'. The paper, which discusses the 'need and scope for a Climate Change related concept' (EUMS, 2013: 1) argues that climate change should be included 'in future security assessment and military planning' (EUMS, 2013: 3).

The paper identifies the consequences of climate change for the military. First, it predicts that climate change 'will influence the roles and tasks which the military has to perform in the future', including an even wider 'involvement in humanitarian aid, disaster relief, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace

enforcing' (EUMS, 2013: 10). Furthermore, it argues that climate change is affecting the operational environment of the military, including by facilitating the access to austere geographic areas such as the Arctic Ocean.

The paper also acknowledges that the military is a major energy consumer and CO2 producer and argues it also needs to contribute to the reduction of the human impact on climate change. As such, it acknowledges the need to reduce the 'military environmental footprint during Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations' (EUMS, 2013: 11).

The Food for Thought paper reproduces the storylines found in the CCIS documents. Looking at how the nature of the threat is defined, the paper identifies climate change as a threat multiplier. The document recognises that climate impacts are hardly ever the sole cause of conflict, but that they can 'act as a threat multiplier which may overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone' (EUMS, 2013: 6).

Having been produced by the EU Military Staff, the paper evidently focuses on the role of the EU military as key agents of security. Notwithstanding, it acknowledges the need for a comprehensive approach, in collaboration with other relevant actors, where adaptation and mitigation play a central role. Moreover, although EU leadership on climate change and security is emphasised, the document stresses the need for a multilateral response. According to the document,

> The EU will continue to promote a better understanding of adaptation and mitigation to address the security risks of climate change as part of a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict reconstruction, as a key proponent of effective multilateralism. (EUMS, 2013: 3)

Regarding the responses proposed for dealing with that threat, the document separates them into two categories. The first one concerns generic challenges and the second one military specific challenges. In the first category the measures proposed are environmental intelligence for early warning and situational awareness; comprehensive risk assessment; and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction (EUMS, 2013: 15-16).

In the second category, the paper identifies five military specific challenges: the further growth in importance of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; the

need to adapt to meet the challenges of the new environment; the greening of the military; the development of capabilities to understand, predict, prevent and mitigate the adverse effects to international security (EUMS, 2013: 16).

More traditional security concerns are also present in the paper. The effects of climate change on access to resources and the consequent potential for competition over those resources are discussed. In particular, the opening of maritime areas in the Arctic is mentioned (EUMS, 2013: 16).

The drafting of the food for thought paper indicates that EU Military Staff have accepted the climate change and international security narrative sponsored by the discourse entrepreneurs.

After reviewing the Food For Thought paper on climate change, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) decided in its meeting on 25 September 2013 that the issue should continue to be monitored. According to the proceedings of the meeting,

> The EUMC agreed to invite the EUMS to continue to monitor the on-going situation with respect to Climate Change and its security implications, in concert with work within the EU institutions, the EDA and other organisations, and revert to the EUMC with proposals for specific workstrands that are of direct relevance to the military in due time (EUMS, personal communication, 26 November 2013).

This indicates that also the EUMC subscribe to the CCIS storylines. However, further developments are necessary to determine whether this discourse becomes structured among EU military, since at this point the issue has only started to be debated in the EU military institutions.

6.1.5 Broadening the Discourse Coalition

The analysis of EU security discourses indicates the CCIS discourse has been accepted by EU security actors, and a language of security in connection to climate change has become routinised. Climate change has become an important element in the EU's conceptualisation of security. In fact, climate change fits well with the EU's comprehensive approach to security in which non-military threats are added to the range of security threats the EU should address.

Understandably, climate change does not dominate the way EU actors conceptualise security. In a complex and interdependent international security environment, climate change is one threat among others. However, it has become an integral part of how EU actors conceptualise security. As a Council Official put it, 'we cannot be talking about security in the 21st century without climate change' (Council Official, 27 February 2013). Along the same lines, a UK military officer involved with the issue at the EU level argued that 'it is quite clear now that you cannot do a security strategy without climate' (MOD Official, 6 October 2014). This indicates that central actors in the EU security discursive space have been persuaded by the rhetorical power of the new discourse.

As actors from varying backgrounds increasingly accept the new discourse, the discourse coalition broadens significantly. In addition to bridging two previously distinct areas of EU policies, climate change policies and security policies, CCIS connects actors from other backgrounds who have an input in the link between these two policies. As an illustrative example, the above mentioned Report on the role of the CSDP in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters, submitted by MEP Tarand to the European Parliament, was built on the work of different stakeholders, including the EEAS, the Commission DGs CLIMA, ECHO and DEVCO, the EU military staff, the EDA and people from various other institutions, including environmental think tanks and NGOs (EP Assistant, 23 September 2013; GLOBE EU Representative, 22 September 2013).

By accommodating the different concerns of these actors, the threat multiplier storyline becomes appealing across a broader range of actors, providing a common ground between different specialised discourses, for example between EU military and EU development workers.

6.2 The Institutionalisation of CCIS in EU Security Policies

In the first part of this chapter I analysed the diffusion of CCIS metaphors and storylines into EU security discourse. In this second part I ask whether and how this diffusion has had an impact on security policy instruments in the EU.

As I have highlighted earlier, the EU has long adopted a comprehensive approach to security, broadening the scope of security responses and making use of the full range of instruments at the EU's disposal. By adding non-traditional issues to

the list of security threats, the EU extends the scope of response to such threats. This implies that 'some security threats can be responded to with non-military means' (Kirchner, 2006: 952). Hence, the EU's comprehensive approach to security means that EU security policy is multi-dimensional, with a broad range of instruments and policies being used to respond to security problems (Zwolski, 2012b: 69).

Following the emphasis of the CCIS discourse on the external impact of climate change, the analysis presented here focuses on the external dimension of EU security policies. Given the predominant concern in CCIS discourse that climate change will act as a threat multiplier exacerbating conflict and crisis in vulnerable regions of the world, the analysis focuses on how this discourse affects the EU's approach to external security threats.

This is not to say, however, that the EU's own territory is not vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. This vulnerability is acknowledged in the EU Internal Security Strategy (ISS) which recognizes that '[t]he EU is exposed to an array of potential crises and disasters, such as those associated with climate change' (European Commission, 2010: 13). To address these risks and increase Europe's resilience to crises and disasters the Commission is currently working closely with Member States to develop national risk assessment covering natural and man-made risks (Commission Official, 6 June 2013).

But despite some degree of concern about the direct impacts of climate change on European territory, it is predicted that Europe is going to be most affected through the repercussions of climate change effects in vulnerable regions of the world.

The Union uses a wide array of foreign policies, tools and instruments to respond to external conflicts and crises. In the words of the Commission:

> [t]he list of EU instruments directly or indirectly relevant to the prevention of conflict is long: development co-operation and external assistance, economic co-operation and trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation, as well as economic or other sanctions, and ultimately the new instruments of ESDP.[14] (European Commission, 2001: 6).

[14] Now CSDP

This illustrates what authors such as Zwolski have argued: that 'there is more to the EU's international security profile than the relatively recent CSDP framework and capacities' (Zwolski, 2012b: 69). As a result, the analysis of the CCIS impact on security policy needs to look at both CSDP instrument and other EU instruments and policies which are seen as contributing to security.

In the next paragraphs I will analyse the impact of CCIS in CSDP instruments, focusing on its military dimension. I then analyse the impact of the discourse in non-CSDP instruments with a relevance to security.

6.2.1 CCIS and the Common Security and Defence Policy

CSDP is the element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy covering matters of defence. It has two main components, to be precise a military component, and a non-military component covering civilian crisis management.

Under the CSDP, the EU seeks to pursue a role in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. In 2003 the EU made its first deployment of forces under the ESDP, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since then, the European Union has launched about 30 civilian and military missions and operations under this framework.

In this section I analyse the effect of the CCIS discourse on the instruments of CSDP, focusing on the influence of the discourse in military instruments. Although the civilian component of CSDP is equally as important, instruments of civilian crisis management with potential relevance to addressing the security implications of climate change would be those of civil protection. As this is an area where CSDP relies on the assets and capabilities of the Commission, I will discuss it in more detail in the next section.

The analysis of whether and how CCIS discourse has been translated into military instruments of CSDP has to be made in the context of a broader transformation in military roles. Since the end of the Cold War, military roles have evolved from a focus on territorial defence to the crisis management and peacekeeping tasks of today (Howorth, 2014: 73). In this context, climate change, as a multiplier of existing threats, is predicted to influence the tasks European military will have to perform in external crises and conflicts.

Many analysts and policymakers recognize that military structures have capabilities and assets that can be valuable to an effective response to the consequences of climate change (Brzoska, 2013: 172). Specifically, these actors point to the fact that the military have skills in environmental intelligence, risk assessment, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

This was also the belief of CCIS entrepreneurs, who saw an important role for the EU military in addressing the security consequences of climate change. As a Council official argued,

> In our interpretation, the military could be used in disaster and contingency planning. They have the methodology. We have a lot to learn from them. No one ever talked about intervention. If we take it from the point of view of prevention what we can take from the military is contingency planning. (Council Official, 1 March 2013)

In the previous section we have also seen that the EU military themselves acknowledge that the military community should contribute to the construction of robust policy responses to climate change that avoid the risks of future instability (EUMS, 2013: 17). As part of this response, additional roles for the EU military are anticipated, which has 'implications with respect to training, equipment and capability development' (EUMS, 2013: 17).

With regard to training, climate change and international security is now featured in the curriculum of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), a training and education instrument established in 2005 with the aim of providing strategic-level education in the Common Security and Defence Policy (Council, 2009a: 7). An integral version of the Solana paper is included in the Handbook on CSDP, the reference book for course participants at the ESDC (Rehrl and Weisserth, 2013). This means that EU military personnel – but also civil servants, diplomats and police officers – are aware of the potential implications of climate change in international security, as well as their potential role in dealing with those consequences.

However, despite the acknowledgement that climate change will transform the operational environment and bring new roles and tasks for the military (EUMS, 2013: 17), at present the EU military are focusing on reducing their contribution to climate change itself by focusing on energy efficiency. According to a EUMS official, from a military point of view the main concern at the moment is lowering military dependency on fossil fuels (EUMS Official, 9 September 2013).

Certainly climate change is not the only concern behind this focus. Lowering military dependency on fossil fuels also aims to lower the logistical burden for EU military forces in theatre, even reducing casualties occurred during the escort of fuel. However, an interviewee was keen on emphasising the double benefit of the measure: it not only contributes to reducing emissions, but also saves lives (EUMS Official, 9 September 2013).

In its work to lower dependence on fossil fuels, the EUMS is working in close collaboration with the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA is an organisation set up by the Council to support Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP.

Since 2012 the EDA is developing 'Military Green', a 'strategic tool supporting the mitigation of adverse effects to the climate and ecology while strengthening defence and crisis management capabilities' (EDA, 2012: 2). The aim of the EDA is to use Military Green as an umbrella for promoting environmentally responsible and more effective capabilities, in support of environmental values in the Defence and Crisis Management Community (EDA, 2012: 2).

While first conceived to address environmental issues more generally – in support of the European Union Military Concept on Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency drafted by the EUMS – climate change soon assumed a central position in Military Green. As an interviewee recalled, during the first discussions between the EDA and EUMC on whether Military Green should include climate change, the EDA team was reluctant due to the dimension of the topic and the fact that other EU actors were already working on it (EDA Official, 9 October 2013). However, the interviewee argued, the EDA team soon came into contact with CCIS discourse entrepreneurs in seminars and, later, were invited to the meetings of the Steering Group on CCIS. Following these contacts, EDA officials became interested in the topic and climate change became 'a late addition to Military Green' (EDA Official, 9 October 2013).

The EDA has also since March 2012 the GO GREEN project which enables participating Armed Forces to produce the electricity they need from renewable sources. With Germany as lead nation it has the participation of six other EDA Member States, namely Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Luxembourg and Romania. The project aims to help the EU to reach its '20-20-20 energy targets' through the action of the European Armed Forces, relevant land owners

and energy consumers, and, at the same time, contribute to gaining independence from fossil fuels.

While the GO GREEN is not framed as a project to address climate change, an interviewee from the EDA argued the project 'opened the door' for the EDA to gain support for climate-related projects. Showing the numbers of the project and the prediction of the savings Member States can achieve by using renewable energy technologies has attracted the attention of the Commission, the interview argued (EDA Official, 9 October 2013).

6.2.1.1 A concrete proposal to institutionalise CCIS in the CSDP: the Tarand Report

The chapter now analyses a concrete proposal to institutionalise CCIS in the Common Security and Defence Policy: the November 2012 European Parliament resolution on the 'Role of the CSDP in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters'. In the previous section I have discussed the resolution focusing on its discursive features. In this section, I focus on the instruments it proposes to address climate change and security.

Although non-binding, an EP resolution suggests a political desire to act in a given area. The analysis of this resolution is particularly relevant because it contains specific proposals to translate the CCIS discourse into CSDP policy instruments. Moreover, it has opened a precedent as subsequent parliamentary initiatives mention this specific resolution.

While the need for a comprehensive approach which includes the entire range of EU policies is recognised, the resolution focuses on the role of the CSDP in preventing and responding to climate-driven crises. According to the EP, an effective response to crises such as natural disasters needs to 'draw on both civilian and military capabilities, and require closer cooperation between these two assets' (European Parliament, 2012c: 7).

Consequently, the resolution urges the EU to develop civilian and military capabilities to allow their deployment in response to natural disasters and climate-driven crises. It calls on the EDA and the EU Military Committees to ensure that 'procurement programmes and capability development programmes devote adequate financial means and other resources to the specific needs of responding to climate change and natural disasters' (European Parliament, 2012c: 8).

The resolution also stresses the need to create 'joint capabilities that are relevant for operations which respond to the impact of climate change or natural disasters' (European Parliament, 2012c: 9). To enable the creation of such joint capabilities, the resolution proposes implementing the start-up envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty.

In addition, acknowledging that Member States armed forces are big energy consumers, the resolution stresses the need to improve energy efficiency and environmental management within European armed forces. Therefore, it '[c]alls on the military to shoulder its responsibilities in the domain of environmental sustainability" (European Parliament, 2012c: 8).

The adoption of this resolution by the European Parliament, with 474 votes in favour, indicates that the majority of MEPs supports an adjustment of CSDP instruments to address the security implications of climate change. However, the analysis of the Parliamentary debates originated by the motion for resolution illustrates some of the challenges in the institutionalisation of the CCIS discourse. In the previous section I have discussed a degree of opposition to the EP resolution due to fears of militarisation of climate change. However, the biggest reasons for disagreement did not have as much to do with normative issues, as with concerns about duplication of instruments and the resulting financial implications.

A number of proposals contained in the motion for resolution submitted by MEP Tarand were rejected in the Parliament. Tarand and his supporters wanted to create the post of EU Special Representative (EUSR) on Climate Security. A few months earlier, the EU had appointed its first thematic Special Representative, the EUSR for Human Rights with the role to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of EU human rights policy. The Tarand report envisaged a similar role for the EUSR for Climate Security, with a 'mandate to promote and mainstream the main principles of the already existing EU Climate Diplomacy and the future EU Climate Security Policy into all EU external actions' (European Parliament, 2012d: 77).

The idea of a EUSR on climate security was inspired by the UK experience with the appointment of a Climate & Energy Security Envoy in 2010, a cross-government post created to assist the UK Ministry of Defence, The Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the Department of Energy & Climate Change to convey a message on the security implications of climate change (MOD Official, 6 October 2014).

The idea however was rejected in Parliament. Interviews suggest that MEPs were quite resistant to the idea of creating another post because it implied additional costs (EP Assistant, 23 September 2013).

The Parliament also vetoed the creation of a formal group on climate change and security. The original motion for resolution invited

> the HR/VP to establish a formal working group within the Council/EEAS structure to consider the entire range of interrelated issues connected with climate change and energy-related security and defence concerns, as the absence of such a working group has so far hindered the development of a comprehensive and consistent EU approach. (European Parliament, 2012d: 49)

However, both the EEAS and the Council manifested their opposition to this idea. According to interviewees in the Parliament, they insisted that the existing informal steering group on CCIS functioned very well and, therefore, there was no need to create a formal group (GLOBE EU Representative, 22 September 2013; EP Assistant, 23 September 2013).

Another proposal that did not get through Parliament was the creation of a European Engineer Corps. Similarly to the EU Battle groups, this group of military engineers would provide rapid response in situations of climate driven crisis, performing tasks such as road and bridge repair, fountain drilling, and reconstruction of houses (EP Assistant, 23 September 2013). However, this idea was removed from the final resolution.

A core point of opposition to the proposal was the idea that it would unnecessarily duplicate ECHO's efforts in disaster response. One of the mandate priorities of the Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response Dr. Kristalina Georgieva was the creation of a disaster response capacity, which was accomplished in 2013 with the launch of the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). With the creation of the ERCC underway, the Commission wanted to avoid duplication in disaster response capabilities, as well as diversion of funding (EP Assistant, 23 September 2013).

This concern was echoed by MEPs in the parliamentary debate. Bulgarian MEP Nadezhda Neynsky, for example, argued that

> considering the restricted budget available, it is not the increase of administration and the creation of new policies but the enhancement of the already existing instruments which will lead to a more efficient reaction in the

> event of such crises. […] The Common Security and Defence Policy may complement but not replace these well functioning Union instruments (European Parliament, 2012b)

The concern expressed by MEPs was reflected in the final EP resolution, with the introduction of a paragraph where the Parliament 'recalls the need to avoid any duplication with well established instruments for humanitarian aid and civil protection which are outside the remit of the CSDP' (European Parliament, 2012c).

Friction between different actors with responsibilities in crisis management is not new in the EU. Other researchers have documented long going interinstitutional turf wars between the Commission, which oversees mechanisms for humanitarian aid/civil protection, and the Council which recently embraced civil protection tasks as a part of the CSDP civilian crisis management (Howorth, 2014; Terchovich, 2014). Interviewees suggest that in the case of the Tarand Report, DG ECHO perceived the Tarand report as stepping into their territory which contributed to their strong opposition (EP Assistant, 23 September 2013).

Overall, while conceptually the main premises of the report were accepted by the majority of MEPs, concerns about funding and interinstitutional struggles have hindered the adoption of concrete measures to address climate-driven crises. In general, MEPs believed that existing EU policy instruments were able to address the security implications of climate change. The explanation of the vote of Romanian MEP Monica Luisa Macovei illustrates this view:

> [C]limate change and natural disasters have an impact on global security, peace and stability […] Therefore, we – as the European Union – should take the effects of natural disasters and climate change into consideration in our external action strategies, policies and instruments. However, do we need a special representative for climate security, or do we need a Council working group on climate security, for this purpose? I do not think so. This would create, above all, additional bureaucracy. I believe that climate security can and must be addressed with existing European policies. (European Parliament, 2012b)

As a result, although the resolution was adopted by a large majority in the Parliament,[15] after going through all the Amendments the resolution became devoid from any new significant measures to address climate-driven crises. As one interviewee regretted, 'in the end, with all the amendments, it all became just

[15] The result of votes in Parliament were 474 votes in favor, 80 votes against and 18 abstentions.

EU language' (EP Assistant, 23 September 2013). This demonstrates the difficulties of institutionalising a discourse, even when its main theoretical concepts have been accepted.

6.2.2 CCIS and non-CSDP instruments: the comprehensive approach

Over the past decade, the EU developed an increasingly all-encompassing comprehensive approach to security. Howorth notes that while initially the notion of a comprehensive approach was intended to promote coordination between the military and civilian aspects of the EU security and defence policy, the concept has now been extended in all sorts of directions (Howorth, 2014: 105). As a result, the EU's comprehensive approach to security goes beyond the CSDP, making use of the full range of foreign policy instruments at its disposal.

Recently, the Commission and the HRVP produced a Joint Communication setting out the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, where they confirm the need for a joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, covering all stages of the cycle of conflicts and crises (European Commission and High Representative, 2013: 3). Climate change, as a global challenge with an increasing security dimension, has been acknowledged by the Commission and the HRVP as an issue that the EU's approach to conflicts and other crisis should address (European Commission and High Representative, 2013: 10).

Diplomatic Instruments

In the previous chapter we have seen how the EU has launched dialogues on CCIS with partners, including countries which are particularly vulnerable to the security risks posed by climate change. In the context of Climate Diplomacy, the EEAS is investing in preventative diplomacy to address the rising vulnerabilities resulting from climate change (Council, 2014: 154). As part of this effort, the EEAS has been closely involved in a series of high-level international conferences on climate security, the last of which was held in Seoul in March 2013.

Significantly, as part of its efforts to address the nexus between climate change and international security through preventive diplomacy, the EU has sought to promote the issue within the UN Security Council. Although not a Member of the

Security Council itself, the EU has raised the issue through the initiative of its Member States.

Already in 2007, even before the EU had developed a strategy for climate diplomacy, the United Kingdom had called for the Security Council's first-ever meeting on the impact of climate change. The EU was represented in the meeting by the German Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ms. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, who argued there was 'a clear link between climate change and the need for conflict prevention' (Wieczorek-Zeul, 2007).

In July 2011, a second meeting on the impact of climate change was held, this time under the German Presidency of the Security Council. In a concept note prepared for the meeting, Germany claimed it was now again 'time to bring the security implications of climate change to the attention of the Council' because awareness of the potential security implications of climate change had increased (Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN, 2011: 3). Moreover, the note argued that the effects of climate change went beyond the mandate of the UNFCCC and asserted that a debate on this topic was consistent with the Council's mandate to maintain international peace and security.

The EU was represented in the meeting by Ambassador Pedro Serrano, acting Head of the EU Delegation to the United Nations. In his statement on behalf of the Union, Serrano claimed that '[t]he European Union and its member States believe that climate change has important security implications, since it acts as a threat multiplier' and emphasised that 'the EU remains committed to broadening its understanding and mainstreaming climate change and its security implications in its foreign and security policies' (Serrano, 2011).

More recently, in February 2013 the Security Council held an informal meeting on the Security Dimensions of Climate Change. The meeting, held under the 'Arria Formula', was convened by the United Kingdom together with Pakistan. Thomas Harting, Head of the EU Delegation to the UN, highlighted that climate change acts 'as a "threat multiplier", exacerbating tensions over land, water, food and energy prices, and creating migratory pressures and desertification' (Harting, 2013). Furthermore, Harting assured the EU and its Member States would remain a reliable and engaged partner in further international climate risk assessment and management.

These Security Council meetings, despite stemming from Member States initiatives, demonstrate a commitment by the EU to promote an international

response to the security threats posed by climate change. Through its role as an observer within the UN, and through the action of its Member States, the EU has promoted the discussion of climate change in the UN organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. In addition, the climate diplomacy strategy drawn up by the EEAS foresees the promotion of further discussions in the UN Security Council (EEAS, 2013).

In the remainder of this section, I analyse the institutionalisation of the climate change and international security discourse in the EU's approach to external conflicts and crises, focusing on non-CSDP instruments. I focus on early warning mechanisms, humanitarian aid and civil protection, development cooperation and the instrument for stability. Although instruments are complementary, each focuses on a different stage of the crisis cycle.

Early warning

Early warning systems are part of EU conflict-prevention efforts, inasmuch as they help predict crises and conflicts, enabling preparedness. The importance of early action was recognised by CCIS entrepreneurs who proposed the development of analysis, monitoring and early warning capacities as one of the main steps to address the impact of climate change on international security. CCIS reports argued that 'EU early warning instruments must focus more on climate change and environmental degradation, alongside other relevant variables such as governance, demographic pressures or regional conflicts' (High Representative, 2008: 6).

The EU Joint Research Centre (JCR), the European Commission's in-house science service, is acknowledged a role in improving the knowledge base of the impacts of climate change (Council, 2009a: 7). The JCR works on monitoring climate change and on predicting extreme weather events. In addition, it develops climate risk management practices to cope with present and future risks.

The EU has developed an Earth Observation Programme consisting of a complex system of data collection, including earth observation satellites, that aims to understand changes in the planet and its climate. Copernicus, previously known as GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security), will collect information in relation to the environment and security. Climate change is one of the services to be provided by the programme. Still in a pre-operational phase, the Copernicus

Climate Change service, will give access to information for monitoring and predicting climate change, therefore supporting adaptation and mitigation.

EU Intelligence services are also monitoring the security impacts of climate change, with climate change being integrated as a factor into the 'EU Watch List' (Council, 2009a: 8). An interview in the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) – the centre that provides intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness in the fields of the CFSP and the CSDP – confirmed that climate change is considered as a factor in intelligence analysis. According to the interviewee, the INTCEN started to consider the pertinence of taking climate change into account in intelligence analysis already in 2006, having provided analysis for the Solana paper on climate change and international security. The INTCEN has since then created a specific section on global issues with the mandate to look at issues that are not addressed in the other sections which deals with climate change, along with other environmental issues (INTCEN Analyst, 5 June 2013).



Figure 1. The crisis cycle and examples of EU response (Source: European External Action Service).

However, critics argue that the problem of climate change was not integrated into intelligence assessment and analysis very efficiently. When compared to the US, where the Central Intelligence Agency created a climate change analysis unit, the EU is 'still way off the pace', an interviewee argued (E3G Representative, 7 October 2013).

As an example, the Joint 2009 Joint Progress Report on CCIS indicates the creation of a Global Atlas on Natural Resources and Conflicts by the Joint Research Centre as capacity building on CCIS. However, at the moment, climate change is not included in the modelling of the Global Atlas which focuses on the link between armed conflict events and the existence of natural and mineral resources.

Overall, although the EU has sought to enhance its early warning and analysis capacities, climate-related factors are not incorporated into the monitoring of potential conflicts and crises in a systematic way as CCIS entrepreneurs had wished.

Development Cooperation

Another important instrument in the EU's approach to external conflicts and crises is development policy. Development cooperation is a long term economic instrument which aims to reduce poverty in partner countries, as well as to ensure sustainable development and to promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance and the respect of human rights.

In the EU, development policy is considered one of the most important tools for preventing conflict. In effect, for the Commission, '[d]evelopment policy and other co-operation programmes provide, without doubt, the most powerful instruments at the [Union's] disposal for treating the root causes of conflict' (European Commission, 2001: 9). Hence, although development policy aims go beyond conflict prevention, their importance for preventing conflict is well recognised in the EU.

In the first part of this chapter, I argued that climate change is being increasingly integrated in the development-security discourse of the European Commission.

Increasingly, the Commission is also integrating climate concerns into development cooperation policies.

According to the Joint Progress Report, as a result of the CCIS process, 'CCIS is [now] included in formal training sessions for COM staff members on mainstreaming climate change into development cooperation' (Council, 2009a: 7).

Although in 2003 the European Commission had already developed an action plan to incorporate environmental aspects into EU development policy, in 2009 there was still a 'sizeable gap' between the proclaimed goals and actual results. Acknowledging the need to take the climate dimension fully into account, in November 2009 the European Commission updated its environmental integration guidelines to increase emphasis on climate change.

With the support of external consultants, the Commission prepared a set of guidelines on the Integration of Environment and Climate Change in Development Cooperation which 'define a comprehensive reference framework for integrating the environment and climate change into the different stages of the cycle of operations for EC development cooperation […]' (European Commission, 2009b: ii) Hence, climate change, which 'represents a new development challenge, but […] also means that most existing environmental issues take on a new urgency' (European Commission, 2009b: 5), now occupies a central position in the Commission's environment mainstreaming.

The link between climate change and security is advanced as one of the arguments in the rationale for mainstreaming climate change, and the environment, in development cooperation. According to the Commission guidelines,

> Increasingly, environmental conditions are also linked to security and potential conflict in particular regarding access to and the management of natural resources. Climate change is already considered one driver in the creation of 'environmental refugees' with the related social and political challenges. (European Commission, 2009b: ii)

In effect, interviews suggest that the mainstreaming of climate change in development policies has been intensified by the framing of climate change as security. An interviewee from DG DEVCO argued that one of the aims of mainstreaming climate change in development was to prevent insecurity in

developing countries. Given the potential of climate change to cause instability in these countries, tackling climate change is increasingly seen as a priority for the Commission as a way to provide security (Commission Official, 27 February 2013).

An official from DG CLIMA also argued that, in addition to raising awareness for climate risks, the CCIS process was significant because it enabled the mainstreaming of climate change in development policies. As an example, the official argued that the security argument influences recipient countries to select climate change as a priority in development projects (Commission Official, 7 November 2012).

The recent commitment to spend 20% of the whole EU budget on climate related action is likely to have a big impact on the mainstreaming of climate change in development policies. The EU has agreed that 20% of its €960 billion budget for the 2014-2020 period should be spent on climate change-related action. This represents a significant increase compared to the 6-8% share in 2007-2013. EU development policy is expected to make a significant contribution towards achieving this goal, with 'an estimated €1.7bn for climate spending in developing countries in 2014-2015 alone' (European Commission, 2013: 1c).

Some EU officials believe that the commitment for 20% of the 2014-2020 EU budget to be spent on climate-related projects and policies is connected to the framing of climate change as a security issue (EEAS Official, 6 November 2012; Commission Official, 7 November 2012; Commission Official, 27 February 2013). However, interviewees also mention a significant degree of internal opposition to an increase in the allocation of funds to climate related initiatives in detriment of other development areas. In the words of a DEVCO official:

> It's a sensitive topic actually because not everyone recognises this importance of mainstreaming [...] especially those that are dealing with the ODA [Official development assistance] [...] say that instead it [the funding] should be devoted to more traditional development fields like education, and health, women protection. So it shouldn't be about climate change. (Commission Official, 27 February 2013)

The 2009 Conclusions on Climate Change and Development acknowledge this concern, and recommend that climate financing should 'not undermine or jeopardize the fight against poverty and continued progress towards the MDGs' (Council, 2009c: 2).

Overall, although climate change has been given a higher profile in development policy, it is very difficult to establish a causal link between climate mainstreaming and security imperatives. Climate change is understood as a risk to development itself, threatening 'to undo decades of development efforts towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals' (European Commission, 2009a: 4). Therefore, some actors frame climate change as a development problem (Gupta and Van Der Grijp, 2010: 8).

However, it is significant that integrating climate change in development policy is seen as a strategy to prevent conflict. Moreover, the fact the EU officials perceive the mainstreaming of climate change into development policies as a consequence of framing climate change as a security risk is noteworthy.

Humanitarian aid and civil protection

Crisis response deals with emerging and acute crises that require immediate responses, whether natural or man-made. The European Commission's Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) ensures rapid and effective delivery of EU relief assistance through its two main instruments: humanitarian aid and civil protection.

Through the humanitarian aid instrument, the EU provides needs-based humanitarian assistance covering areas such as food, shelter, healthcare, and water and sanitation. The civil protection instrument enables the deployment of in-kind assistance, such as teams, experts and equipment, to countries requesting international assistance in major emergencies. Both instruments are seen as complementary in building a robust and effective European mechanism for disaster response.

According to the Commission, the potential of climate change to increase the frequency, intensity and severity of natural disasters, calls for a more efficient humanitarian action and civil protection responses (COM, Annual rep 2014: 19).

In the context of humanitarian action, DG ECHO uses Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) as its main approach contributing to climate change adaptation. The concept of DRR refers to the

> practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to

> hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events (ECHO, 2013: 2)

With the increase in the reported number of climate-related events since 1980, DRR became a key strategy in the adaptation of vulnerable communities to climate change.

An official from ECHO explained the importance of the concept of resilience in this context. In responding to a humanitarian crisis, a conflict, or natural a disaster, the concept of resilience means that humanitarian actors not only give an immediate response by giving funding or by sending a civil protection team but also have a more medium term and long term perspective, making sure that this crisis will not happen again. In this sense, the official argued, building resilience can be considered one of the responses to the security threats posed by climate change (Commission Official, 6 June 2013).

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

Often used as complement to humanitarian action, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is one of the key EU instruments for external assistance, dedicated to fund urgent assistance to countries in situations of crisis or emerging crisis. Managed by the Commission's service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), in close collaboration with the EEAS, the IcSP plays a crucial role in the EU's political commitment to pursue conflict prevention (FPI, 2015).

In the context of its role in addressing global threats to security, the IcSP foresees assistance to third countries to address the destabilising effects of climate change on peace and security (European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 230/2014).

Climate change was not contemplated as an issue in the 2006 regulation that established the IcSP's predecessor, the Instrument for Stability (Ifs). However, even during the term of the IfS, climate change became increasingly perceived as an issue the instrument should address. In 2012, the Multi-annual Indicative Programme for 2012-2013 suggested climate change and security as a relevant theme to be taken into consideration (European Commission, 2012: 17).

Also in 2012, the IfS has funded activities on climate change and security. More specifically, the pre-and post-crisis capacity building programme of the IfS long-term component, also known as the Peace-building Partnership (PbP), allocated 2.5 million euros to projects on 'Climate Change, Natural Resources and International Security'. Of this sum, 1.5 million were spent in a 'Climate Change and Security in Eastern Europe and Central Asia' action carried out by the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC). The Commission implementing decision lays out the aims of the action as follows:

> Considering the security implications of climate change and the Council conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy adopted on 18 July 2011, it is proposed to concentrate support on crisis preparedness in the context of climate change by preparing governments and policy makers of Eastern Europe and Central Asia to better understand and deal with the security and regional implications of climate change and their expected impacts on trans-boundary regions and their societies (EEAS, 2012: 3-4).

With the 2006 regulation expiring by the end of 2013, on December 2011 the Commission presented a proposal for a new Instrument for Stability. Acknowledging that climate change was a risk to world stability and security, the Commission gave climate change a prominent place in the rationale for revising the Instrument. It reads,

> This Regulation aims at introducing a revised Instrument, building on the experience of the previous one, in order to increase the efficiency and coherence of the Union's actions in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis response, crisis preparedness and peace-building and in addressing security threats, including climate security (European Commission, 2011: 8).

The CCIS narrative is evident in the proposal. Climate change is framed according to the 'threat multiplier' storyline, with the Commission arguing that '[t]he increasing challenge of climate change is a multiplier of existing threats that add a new dimension of man-made natural hazards and security risks' (European Commission, 2011: 2).

Interviewees from the Commission argued that the integration of climate change in the proposal of a new IfS is a consequence of the link between climate and security (Commission Official, 7 November 2012; Commission Official, 27 February 2013).

In March 2014 the Council and the Parliament approved a new Instrument succeeding the IfS, called the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. The regulation establishing the new IcSP instrument is clearer about climate change and security, stating that 'future work on security and development should include the security and development implications of climate change' (IcSP regulation, 2014: 1). Climate change is acknowledged as cross-cutting issue to be included in programming. As such, the regulation states that the EU shall provide technical and financial assistance for 'addressing global and trans-regional effects of climate change having a potentially destabilising impact on peace and security' (European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 230/2014).

The IcSP has a non-programmable component in response to crises or emerging crises, as well as a programmable component. For the programmable component, a Thematic Strategy Paper, accompanied by a Multi-annual Indicative Programme for the period of 2014-2020, has been drawn up. In the document climate change is identified as 'a threat multiplier that exacerbates existing trends and tensions' (EEAS, 2014b: 32),

Because of its potential to fuel existing conflicts, the need to mainstream climate change into EU external action, including its external cooperation instruments, is advocated. According to the Thematic Strategy Paper, while mitigation of climate change risks can be more effectively supported under the main geographic cooperation instruments, the IcSP is 'particularly well-suited to address the security impacts and threats of climate change at the global and trans-regional levels' (EEAS, 2014b: 33).

The document defines three aims for assistance under the IcSP in the area of climate change. First, to strengthen policies, institutions and capacities to address the security risks posed by climate change and develop adaptation strategies. Second, providing support to international dialogue and cooperation in this area. Finally, enhancing the knowledge base of climate change impacts and their interrelation with security and facilitating risk communication and awareness raising on security impacts of climate change (EEAS, 2014b: 33).

The fact that climate change has been given more visibility in the 'new Instrument for Stability' indicates that the link between climate change and security is becoming institutionalised in the EU's approach to external conflicts and crises.

Overall, while one can find examples of CCIS storylines in the security discourses of a number of EU actors, CCIS related policies are more prevalent in the

Commission's work on development and security. One factor contributing to this may be the fact that development policy is an area of shared competences between the Union and the Member States, where the Commission's initiatives have had considerable influence (Smith, 2013: 218). By contrast, Member States have managed to retain their sovereignty over other foreign, security and defence policies. However, this is a point where inferences have to be limited given the scope of the data gathered for this study. Nevertheless, it remains an important line for future research to understand how differences in legal mandate influences the structuration of the climate-security discourse.

6.3 Institutionalisation and the normative debate on securitisation

In the previous section I have sought to show how the CCIS discourse has had an impact, albeit modest, in EU security practices. In the context of CSDP, EU military have started to reflect on how climate change affects their role. In the context of non-CSDP instruments that contribute to the EU security role, climate change has been integrated in existing instruments. Significantly, it is now one of the issues to be addressed by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

Although no single dedicated instrument to deal with the security impacts of climate change was created, it can be argued that CCIS has become part of EU practice. Since 2009, climate change and security is an item in the annual report of the HR/VP, where she summarises the activities promoted to advance climate security in the EU.

Given the on-going normative debate on the implications of addressing climate change through a security framework, and the underlying concerns about militarisation in that debate, examining how the CCIS discourse impacts on EU security policy-instruments assumes great importance. In the previous chapter, where I analysed the impact of CCIS in EU climate change discourse and policies, I have argued that linking climate change to security did not lead to the level of ambition in mitigation policies that some analysts anticipated. Regarding the impact of CCIS in security policy, an important point to make is that it has also not led to the militarisation that many analysts feared.

The idea that the securitisation of climate change could lead to a militarisation of the response to the climate problem follows from the Copenhagen School's focus on extraordinary measures, which traditionally have been associated with a military security conception. However, what we have seen is that climate change has been integrated in the EU's approach to conflicts and crisis where the whole range of foreign policy instruments is used in a complementary way to provide security. Militarisation is therefore not compatible with the EU's comprehensive approach.

Military instruments are, of course, an integral part of the comprehensive approach and it is widely recognised that military structures have important capabilities and tools that are appropriate to deal with some of the security impacts of climate change. CCIS entrepreneurs envisaged a role for the military mostly in terms of civil-military cooperation for crisis management and disaster response (High Representative and European Commission, 2008: 10). In the words of a Council official: 'in our interpretation, the military could be used in disaster relief and contingency planning because they have the methodology. We have a lot to learn from them' (Council Official, 1 March 2013).

However, climate-security concerns have been integrated in a variety of instruments covering the whole of the crisis cycle, but with an emphasis on preventive instruments such as development cooperation and the IcSP. This finding challenges the fixity of the Copenhagen framework in relation to the security practices that securitisation is seen as bringing about.

Another important point that follows from the analysis of the institutionalisation of CCIS discourse in the EU refers to the Schmittian understanding of security of the Copenhagen School (CS). The CS sees securitisation as taking issues 'outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). According to this conceptualisation, when an issue is successfully moved to the security sphere the securitising actor claims a special right to use whatever means he/she deems necessary to respond to it.

The CCIS case study, however, illustrates how security issues in the EU are subject to a process of political and institutional struggles, in which security policies and instruments are negotiated between actors with responsibilities in providing security. The discussions around the Tarand report, for example, show how struggles between actors from the Commission and the Council hinder the adoption of security measures.

Rather than giving securitising actors the power to adopt security measures, once climate change was securitised in the EU, the means to address the issue were still subject to negotiation between different actors. The institutionalisation of security policies therefore faces many constraints in a multilevel governance actor such as the EU.

Notably, Didier Bigo, one of the leading academics within the Paris School of Security Studies, has argued that the narrow conceptualisation of securitisation as a speech act that creates exceptionalisation overlooks the bureaucratic routines 'that are necessary to understand how discourses work in practice' (Bigo, 2002: 73). In Bigo's alternative conceptualisation,

> [s]ecuritization works through everyday technologies, through the effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional, through political struggles, and especially, through institutional competition within the professional security field (Bigo, 2002: 73)

Accordingly, the researcher cannot focus exclusively on the role of political discourse in the securitisation process, but has also to look at the role and practices of bureaucrats and security professionals.

If one follows Bigo's conceptualisation, and sees the institutionalisation of security practices as resulting from the everyday practices of actors involved in implementing these policies, then the limited institutionalisation of policies deriving from CCIS can be, at least partially, explained by the high degree of rotation of staff in the EU institutions.

From various interviewees I have heard that the continuity of new issues is affected by the constant job rotation in the EU institutions (Council Official, 6 November 2012; Council Official, 1 March 2013; EDA Official, 9 October 2013). For example, speaking of the prospects for continuity of climate change as an important topic for the EDA, one of the interviewees explained:

> The problem with the EDA is that it is dependent on the individuals that are there and their areas of interest [...] When I left I tried to make sure things stayed afloat. The problem was that everyone who was working with green issues left at the same time. We all left. (EDA Official, 9 October 2013)

With the dissolution of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the Council and of DG RELEX, officials who worked for these divisions were either reabsorbed

by different EEAS departments or out of the job. Also, some officials were seconded from their national offices, which meant they returned to their national bases. This was highly detrimental not only for the structuration of the CCIS discourse, as I have argued before, but also to the institutionalisation of policies that translate the main concepts of such discourse.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the structuration and institutionalisation of the climate change and international security discourse in the EU security field. It started by examining EU security discourse to understand whether CCIS story lines have become structured. I have argued that CCIS has been incorporated into EU security discourse. Although only one of the many threats the EU has to address, climate change has become an integral part of how EU actors conceptualise security.

Since the issue emerged in the EU around 2006, the climate change and international security discourse coalition has broadened significantly. While at the onset the discourse coalition was made up of a few actors with roles in conflict prevention, it now encompasses a considerably more significant number of actors from differing backgrounds. This includes actors working in the areas of climate change, security, foreign policy, development, and civil protection.

The second part of the chapter has asked whether the EU climate change and international security discourse has been translated into concrete security policies and institutional practices. In accordance with the EU's comprehensive approach to security, where the EU uses the whole range of instruments available, I analysed the impact of CCIS discourse both in CSDP instruments and non-CSDP instruments with a role in providing security.

Regarding CSDP, we have seen how EU military have started to consider how climate change will transform the operational environment and bring new roles and tasks, and are considering the drafting of an EU Military concept on climate change. However, I have argued that presently EU military are focusing on reducing their contribution to climate change itself by lowering military dependency on fossil fuels.

Regarding the impact of CCIS in non-CSDP instruments, I have argued that considerations about the impacts of climate change have been included in the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises. In this context, the mainstreaming of climate change into development cooperation policies is increasingly becoming an integral part of the EU's effort to prevent conflict. Notably, climate change has been identified as one of the threats to be addressed in the Instrument contributing for Stability and Peace, one of the main instruments to fund urgent assistance to countries in situations of crisis or emerging crisis.

These empirical findings can contribute to the normative debate over the securitisation of climate change. Importantly, accepting that climate change is also a security issue did not lead to the militarisation of the issue. Rather, climate change is becoming increasingly important in the context of the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and other crisis, which uses a wide array of policies, tools and instruments.

However, concerns about funding and inter-institutional struggles are hindering the adoption of concrete measures to address climate-driven crises. Although EU security actors acknowledge that climate change exacerbates conflicts and crises around the world, they believe it can be addressed by existing policies. The creation of more specific climate-security initiatives, such as the creation of a EUSR on Climate Security, is seen by many EU actors as unnecessary duplication of funds and instruments.

Hence, the CCIS case study challenges the assumption of the Copenhagen School that securitisation takes issues beyond regular practices of policy-making. Rather it shows how security policies in the EU are subject to negotiation between different actors with responsibilities in providing security.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Climate change has been considered one of the defining challenges of the 21st century because it touches on all aspects of human life, creating a planetary emergency. Among the many metaphors through which people have tried to make sense of the impacts of climate change, is the notion of climate change as the equivalent of war. Climate change, understood through a metaphor of war is seen as a security threat to the survival of people, communities and nations.

This thesis set out to explore the consequences of using security narratives to speak about climate change. As such, it has sought to contribute to the on-going normative debate over the securitisation of climate change, by empirically examining the process of construction of climate change as a security issue in the EU and the resulting policy and institutional consequences.

In the thesis I have aimed to answer two main questions. First, whether the climate change and international security discourse has become dominant in the way climate change is conceptualised in the EU. Second, whether this discourse has solidified in concrete policies or institutional arrangements. To this end, I have used Maarten Hajer's framework for argumentative discourse analysis, which allows the uncovering of narratives, metaphors and storylines through which environmental issues are constructed as problems for policy-making, but also of the institutional consequences of using those discursive concepts.

Combining the analysis of official and unofficial EU documents with semi-structured interviews, I sought to address the impact of the CCIS discourse on a discursive level – i.e. discourse structuration – as well as the impact of the discourse in terms of policies – i.e. discourse institutionalisation. Given that the CCIS storyline brought together two previously independent policy areas, the research has analysed the impact of the CCIS discourse in EU climate change discourse and policies, and in EU security discourse and policies.

In this concluding chapter I discuss the empirical findings in the thesis. The chapter starts by presenting the main findings in the empirical chapters and discussing how these relate to the research questions. It then turns to a discussion of the main theoretical implications of the research. Finally, the last

section discusses some of the limitations of this research and advances possible avenues for further research.

7.1 Empirical Findings

In the first empirical chapter, I sought to illustrate the emergence of a discourse coalition on climate change and international security in the EU. I have argued that around 2006 a group of EU actors connected to conflict prevention started to speak about climate change in terms of a security threat. These actors, which I have identified as the CCIS discourse entrepreneurs, have sought to promote the idea that climate change acts as a 'threat-multiplier', a storyline that depicts how climate change will increase existing threats across all sectors of society.

Unpacking the all-encompassing notion of climate change as a threat multiplier, I have argued that, although several examples of threats deriving from climate change are discussed throughout the texts analysed, ultimately the main concern is that climate change will exacerbate existing conflict drivers. As a result, in addition to mitigation and adaptation policies, the measures proposed by entrepreneurs to respond to the security implications of climate change are strengthening crisis response capacities.

Identifying these features of the CCIS discourse provided the tools with which to answer the two main research questions in the thesis. First, addressing whether CCIS discourse has become dominant in the way climate change is conceptualised in the EU, I have looked at whether CCIS metaphors and storylines have been incorporated in the EU climate change discourse. I have argued that while EU actors continue to speak of climate change mainly in eco-modernist terms, CCIS metaphors and storylines have been incorporated into EU climate change discourse. Hence, although CCIS has not become the dominant way of conceptualising climate change, EU climate change actors now conceive of climate change as a security issue.

Regarding whether CCIS has been incorporated into EU security discourse, the prevalence of the climate change as a threat multiplier storyline in EU security documents indicates that CCIS has become an integral part of EU security discourse. Although one of the many threats the EU has to address, climate change has become one of the issues EU actors see as threatening security.

Vouching for the structuration of CCIS discourse is the significant broadening of the CCIS discourse coalition. While at the onset the discourse coalition was made up of a few actors with roles in conflict prevention, it now encompasses a considerably more significant number of actors from differing backgrounds, including climate change, security, foreign policy, development, and civil protection. This means that central actors in the EU have accepted the rhetorical power of the new discourse.

To answer the second central question in the thesis, I have analysed EU policies in order to understand whether these had been transformed by the CCIS discourse. Regarding internal climate policies, I have argued that the dissemination of CCIS storylines did not bring new internal principles or instruments because CCIS, like ecological modernisation, highlights the role of prevention and of mainstreaming as central policy principles. Changes in policy instruments due to the CCIS discourse, I argued, are more visible in the context of EU external climate policies, as CCIS is now part of the portfolio of issues the EU promotes in the international arena.

Looking at the impact of CCIS discourse in EU security policies, I have argued that the discourse had a limited impact on CSDP. Although the EU military have started to consider how climate change will transform the operational environment and bring new roles and tasks, CCIS has not led to significant changes in defence planning.

Regarding the impact of CCIS in non-CSDP instruments that contribute to security, I have argued that climate change has been included in the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises. In this context, climate change is being increasingly mainstreamed into development cooperation policies as an integral part of the EU's conflict prevention efforts. Notably, climate change has been identified as one of the threats to be addressed in the Instrument contributing for Stability and Peace, one of the main EU instruments to assist countries in situations of crisis or emerging crisis.

In addition, I have argued that the CCIS narrative has resulted in a broadening of the range of actors who deal with climate change. Climate change, which as an environmental problem had traditionally been an issue for the Environment Ministers, is increasingly moving under the remit of the Foreign Affairs Council as well. The EEAS, the diplomatic service of the EU, has also an increasingly prominent role in climate change, through its efforts in climate diplomacy. The

CCIS discourse, by highlighting the external impacts of climate change, has intensified the interest of foreign affairs actors in the issue.

Despite these institutional developments, there remains an important mismatch between rhetoric and action. Supporters of a reframing of climate change as a security issue expected that the link to security would attribute a sense of urgency to climate change, speeding up action to address the threat. However, although the urgency of climate change is recognised in the discourse through the threat metaphor employed, institutional change does not mirror this urgency.

Hajer (1995: 267) identified a similar paradox in his study of acid rain. While acid rain became generally accepted as an issue that should be dealt with eco-modernist principle of anticipation, it was met with remedial measures akin to the traditional pragmatist discourse. One of the reasons for this mismatch between rhetoric and action, he argues, is that the eco-modernist acid rain storyline had to compete with existing figures of speech that were combined with institutional commitments. Storylines such as 'Britain has a proud record in air pollution' or 'Britain has the best scientists working on the issue' helped legitimise given regulatory institutions (Hajer, 1995: 268).

In the CCIS case, the 'climate change as a threat multiplier' storyline had to compete with existing storylines about 'the EU at the forefront of international action against climate change' or 'the EU's comprehensive approach to security'. These storylines certify the efficacy of already existing policies to address both climate change and its security implications. These storylines, combined with concerns about duplication of funding, generate resistance to the creation of new policies and instruments.

7.2 Theoretical Implications

This thesis intends to speak to the literature related to climate change and security and aims specifically to contribute to the normative debate on the implication of securitising climate change. The empirical findings in this thesis, I believe, can inform discussions on the normative assumptions about the securitisation of climate change.

The EU case study suggests that framing climate change as a security threat does not necessarily result in the adoption of military measures to address the issue.

As I argued above, policy change due to the climate-security link is limited. In terms of security policy, I argued that CCIS had the most significant impact in non-CSDP instruments, namely in the EU's approach to conflict and crisis.

Rather than on military instruments, the comprehensive approach relies on the entire range of EU policies and instruments to address the different cycles of a crisis. These include financial instruments, such as the Instrument contributing for Stability and Peace, which I argued, has been significantly refurbished to address the security impacts of climate change. It also includes development cooperation, a substantial part of the EU's conflict prevention efforts. Regarding specifically the military, rather than on attempts to secure energy resources by force, for example, EU military are focusing on strategies to lower their dependency on fossil fuels, namely through the use of renewable resources.

As I have argued earlier in the chapter, the assumption that security discourses lead to the adoption of military measures to deal with climate change, follows from the Copenhagen School's roots in traditionalist security debates. The empirical findings in this thesis seem to support what authors such as Trombetta (2011: 136) have argued: rather than promoting emergency and extraordinary measures, the securitisation of environmental issues contributes to transforming security practices, legitimising new actors and instruments. Adding climate change to the list of issues that contribute to conflicts and crises highlights the importance of supporting mitigation and adaptation strategies in conflict-prone areas, thus broadening the range of instruments the EU mobilises to promote security.

In addition, a couple of other theoretical arguments can be drawn from the EU case study. First, as other researchers have noted, securitisation is best seen as an argumentative process, rather than a single speech act (Rothe, 2012: 243). For the Copenhagen School, there is a securitising actor that utters security and an audience who accepts (or rejects) the security argument. What the EU case reveals is that security discourses have to compete with other discourses, namely, discourses that oppose securitisation.

Second, the empirical findings in this thesis challenge the Schmittian understanding of security as exceptional politics that underpins securitisation theory. The framing of climate change as a security issue did not give way to executive decision-making. Instead, the response to the issue was subject to

negotiation between different actors with responsibilities in providing security policies in the EU.

The response of the Copenhagen School would be to label CCIS as failed securitisation. However, speaking in Copenhagen terms, one cannot dismiss this as a case of failed securitisation because the audience (EU officials) has agreed with the securitising actors (CCIS entrepreneurs) as to the 'securityness' of climate change (Roe, 2008: 616) What becomes evident is that although the audience accepted the securitising move, it has not given securitising actors the authority to adopt emergency measures.

On this point, the empirical findings seem to agree with Bigo (2002: 73) who argues that rather than through exceptionality, securitisation works through political struggles and institutional competition within the professional security field. We would add that, in the case of climate change, the institutional competition relevant to securitisation goes beyond the security sphere. Responses to the security implications of climate change are negotiated between actors from different backgrounds, including climate policies, security policies, but also development for example.

Overall, I argue that addressing the securitisation of climate change through the lens of the Copenhagen School is misleading. Limiting the analysis to failed vs. successful securitisation, based on the adoption of extraordinary measures, leads researchers to discard interesting and important processes whereby environmental issues are gradually being conceptualised as security issues.

Beyond these implications for the Copenhagen School, the research also has implications for the application of Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis. First, while Hajer seems to suggest a sequential relationship between discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation – two central concepts in his analytical framework – the empirical findings in this thesis suggest that this does not necessarily happen in a strict sense. Although a degree of structuration is necessary to initiate discourse institutionalisation, some degree of institutionalisation is possible even if a discourse has not succeeded in becoming dominant.

In the EU case, one can point to some policy development in EU external policies, even if the climate change and international security discourse has not become fully dominant. Hence, while dividing the assessment of the influence of a

discourse into two distinct steps is useful for analytical clarity, the empirical findings on this thesis suggest that the relationship between these two steps is more complex.

Second, the findings in this study suggest that although the discourse of ecological modernisation and the climate change and international security discourse interpret the climate problem distinctively, both discourses can be complementary. This challenges Hajer's understanding of political action as an argumentative struggle in which distinct interpretations of policy problems compete for discursive hegemony. This suggests that we should not only be looking for antagonisms but also complementarities in our understanding of the nature and impact of discourses.

Finally, empirical evidence in the thesis suggests a fundamental role for specific actors in the emergence and promotion of discourses. While climate-security narratives were becoming increasingly prominent in the discourse of IGOs and think tanks around 2006, a small group of EU actors moulded these narratives into a story that was coherent for the EU context and then sought to promote this story across EU institutions.

In a discursive context where climate change was predominantly understood as an economic challenge, these actors were critical for the emergence – and promotion – of the EU climate change and international security discourse. As such, I have introduced the concept of discourse entrepreneurs to highlight the role of agency in the emergence, structuration and institutionalisation of new discourses. Discourse entrepreneurs can be defined as actors who build and promote discourses containing new definitions for policy problems.

7.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

This thesis has sought to contribute to the normative debate on the securitisation of climate change by empirically examining the process of securitisation of climate change in the EU. Although the research conducted has shown that CCIS has conquered the EU climate change discursive space and provided some instances of policy change resulting from this, at this point in time the CCIS process is still at an early stage. Future developments in the CCIS process will

determine the policies and institutional changes which will solidify as an outcome of speaking climate change through a security language.

As Hajer has argued, measuring the structuration and institutionalisation of discourses is something that suits research extending over longer periods, between ten to fifteen years (Hajer, 2009: 64). Among EU officials, there is hope that the recent release of the fifth IPCC report, which for the first time includes a section on climate change and security, will give a new impetus to the process (Interview 21).

Moreover, while this study was concerned with the broader picture of EU climate-security discourse, future research should provide more granularity of analysis to account for differences in in the degree of structuration between different institutions and within those institutions. An interesting question for further research is whether there are differences in the degree of structuration of the discourse between Commission DGs. Given that different DGs deal with different policy areas, it would be interesting to understand how this is reflected in their acceptance of the climate-security discourse. Another important, related, question regards the extent to which differences in the EU legal mandate to deal with different issues influences the structuration of the climate-security discourse.

In addition, the empirical findings of the EU case cannot be seen as representative for other cases. As such, it is important that future research empirically examines the effects of securitising climate change in other political contexts. In the US, for example, climate change is increasingly being framed as a security threat. Future research on the US case could elucidate the institutional outcomes of climate security discourses in that specific context, further contributing to the normative debate on securitisation.

Further research is also needed to address discourses that are closely related to CCIS. The issue of whether and how the securitisation of climate change affects EU migration policies was out of the scope of this thesis. While CCIS narratives identify environmentally triggered migratory stress as one of the threats arising from climate impacts, policy recommendations do not address EU migration policies. In addition, migration is already undergoing a securitisation process in the EU. As a result, although the climate-security link can potentially reinforce the securitisation of migration, it is necessary to analytically separate the analysis of

the securitisation of environmentally induced migration and the securitisation of migration in general as each has different dynamics.[16]

Finally, there is scope to explore the links between the climate change and international security discourse and more specialised discourses such as water security, food security and energy security. Especially energy security has gained significant prominence in the EU as a main policy area.

The reason why energy security is not explored here is that while this issue is being increasingly discussed in the context of climate change in the EU, concerns with securing energy resources are driven by considerations other than curbing emissions. The EU Energy security strategy was developed as a response to concerns over disruptions caused by the effects of Russia-Ukraine gas disputes. Further research is needed on the impact of CCIS on energy security policies – and vice versa – because, as Bazilian et al. (2011: 3750) argue, 'while there are many potential synergies between the two issues, they can also result in conflicting recommendations'.

While the future research outlined above will bring a richer and deeper understanding of the effects of climate and security discourses, this study has offered some insight of the policy and institutional consequences that followed from framing climate change as a security threat in the EU case. Even though at present the securitisation of climate change is much more visible at the discursive level than on the policy level, empirical evidence indicates that CCIS has been successful in the broadening of the range of actors that work on climate change. And while the involvement of some actors is seen as problematic, should the EU response to the security impacts of climate change remain focused on mitigating its own emissions, raising the urgency of climate change on a global level and mainstreaming climate concerns into its comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises, addressing climate change through a security frame – in addition to other frames – could be a positive development.

[16] For a good discussion of how framing climate change as a security threat can contribute to efforts to further securitise migration in the EU see Geddes and Somerville (2012).

Appendix: List of Interviews

Commission Official, DG DEVCO. European Commission. Interview: Brussels, 27 February 2013.

Commission Official, DG CLIMA. European Commission. Interview: Brussels, 7 November 2012.

Commission Official, DG ECHO. European Commission. Interview: Brussels, 6 June 2013.

Commission Official, DG RELEX. European Commission. Telephone interview: 4 October 2012.

Council Official, Cabinet of High Representative Solana. Council of the European Union. Interview: Brussels, 6 November 2012.

Council Official, Council Secretariat. Council of the European Union. Interview: Brussels, 27 February 2013.

Council Official, Council Secretariat. Council of the European Union. Interview: Brussels, 28 February 2013; Interview: Brussels, 20 September 2013.

Council Official, Council Secretariat. Council of the European Union. Interview: Brussels, 1 March 2013.

E3G Representative, Environmental NGO. Interview: Brussels, 7 November 2012.

E3G Representative, Environmental NGO. Telephone interview: 7 October 2013.

EDA Official, Research and Technology. European Defence Agency. Telephone interview: 9 October 2013.

EEAS Official, Global Issues Division. European External Action Service. Interview: Brussels, 6 November 2012.

GLOBE EU Representative, cross-party group of European Parliament legislators (part of GLOBE International). Interview: Brussels, 22 September 2013.

EP Assistant. European Parliament. Interview: Brussels, 23 September 2013

EUMS Official, Concepts & Capabilities. European External Action Services. Interview: Brussels, 9 September 2013.

EU Diplomat, Delegation of the European Union to the United States (Washington, DC). Telephone interview: 4 December 2014

IES Representative, Environmental NGO. Interview: London, 29 May 2013; London 29 June 2013.

INTCEN Analyst. European External Action Service. Interview : Brussels, 5 June 2013.

MEP. European Parliament. Interview: Brussels, 27 February 2013.

MOD Official. UK Ministry of Defence. Interview: London, 6 October 2014.

NATO Officer, Emerging Security Challenges Division. Telephone interview, 26 June 2013.

List of References

Adger, W. Neil (2010) 'Climate Change, Human Well-Being and Insecurity'. *New Political Economy*, 15(2), 275-292.

Afionis, Stavros (2010) 'The European Union as a negotiator in the international climate change regime'. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, 11(4), 341–360.

Bailey, Ian et al. (2010) *Ecological modernisation and the governance of carbon: a critical analysis*. Norwich, University of East Anglia. Available at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/GCD_WorkingPaper009.pdf [Accessed 15 April 2014].

Baker, Susan (2007) 'Sustainable development as symbolic commitment: Declaratory politics and the seductive appeal of ecological modernisation in the European Union'. *Environmental Politics*, 16(2), 297-317.

Barnett, Jon (2003) *Security and Climate Change*. Norwich: Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. Available at http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wp7.pdf [Accessed 10 April 2014].

Barnes, Pamela M. (2011) 'The role of the Commission of the European Union: Creating external coherence from internal diversity'. In Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly (eds.) *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics*. Oxon: Routledge, 41–57.

Barnett, Jon and Adger, W. Neil (2007) 'Climate Change, human security and violent conflict'. *Political Geography*, 26(6), 639-655.

Barnutz, Sebastien (2012) 'The EU's logic of security: politics through institutionalised discourses'. In George Christou and Stuart Croft (eds.) *European 'Security' Governance*. Oxon: Routlege, 41–58.

Barroso, José Manuel (2007) *Statement to UN High Level event on Climate Change*. 24 September, United Nations High Level event on Climate Change, New York.

Barroso, José Manuel (2008) *Europe's Climate Change Opportunity*. 21 January, Lehamn Brothers, London.

Barroso, José Manuel (2009) *Achieving a deal on climate change: an EU view on Copenhagen*. 21 September, Council of Foreign Relations, New York.

Barry, Linda (2012) *European Security in the 21st century: The EU's Comprehensive Approach.* Dublin: The Institute of International and European Affairs. Available at http://www.iiea.com/publications [Accessed 08 November 2014].

Bazilian, Morgat et al. (2011) 'Interactions between energy security and climate change: A focus on developing'. *Energy Policy*, 39(6), 3750-3756.

Benson, David and Jordan, Andrew (2010) European Union environmental policy after the Lisbon Treaty: plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose? *Environmental Politics*, 19(3), 468–474.

Benson, David and Jordan, Andrew (2013) 'Environmental Policy'. In Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (eds.) *European Union Politics*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 325-337.

Berkhout, Frans (2005) 'Rationales for adaptation in EU climate change policies'. *Climate Policy*, 5(3), 377–391.

Bigo, Didier (2002) 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease'. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27, 63-92.

Brauch, Hans Günter (2009) 'Securitizing Global Environmental Change'. In Hans Günter Brauch et al. (eds.) *Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts*. Berlin: Springer, 65-102.

Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John (2006) *The European Union as a Global Actor*, 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Brock, Lothar (1991) 'Peace through Parks: The Environment on the Peace Research Agenda'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(4), 407-423.

Brown, Lester (1977) *Worldwatch Paper 14: Redefining National Security*. Washington DC: Worldwatch.

Brown, Oli et al. (2007) 'Climate Change as the "New" Security Threat: Implications for Africa'. *International Affairs*, 83(6), 1141-54.

Brzoska, Michael (2012) 'Climate Change as a Driver of Security Policy'. In Jürgen Scheffran et al. (eds.) *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability*. Berlin: Springer, 165-184.

Burnham, Peter et al. (2008) *Research Methods in Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Burns, Charlotte and Carter, Neil (2011) 'The European Parliament and climate change: From symbolism to heroism and back again'. In Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly (eds.) *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics*. Oxon: Routledge, 58–73.

Busby, Joshua (2007) *Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action*. New York: Council on Foreign relations. Available at http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/climate-change-national-security/p14862 [Accessed 9 May 2015].

Busby, Joshua (2008), 'Who Cares about the Weather?: Climate Change and US National Security'. *Security Studies*, 17, 468-504.

Buzan, Barry et al. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene (2009) *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Campbell, Kurt M. and Parthemore, Christine (2008) 'National Security and Climate Change in Perspective'. In Kurt M. Campbell (ed.) *Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate Change*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1-25.

Carter, Neil (2007) *The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

CLIM (2008) *Working document no. 6: 'How to engage other main actors - climate change, adaptation in third countries and global security'*. Brussels, 6 May.

CNA Corporation (2007) *National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.* Available at https://www.cna.org/reports/climate [Accessed 8 March 2009].

Connelly, James et al. (2012) *Politics and the Environment*. London: Routledge.

Council (2002) *European strategy on environmental integration in external relations*. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment [Accessed 10 May 2014]

Council (2003) *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*. Brussels, 12 December.

Council (2005) *Climate Change: Medium and longer term emission reduction strategies, including targets – Council conclusions*, 7242/05. Brussels, 11 March.

Council (2006a) *Follow-up to the Twelfth Conference of the Parties (COP 12) – Council conclusions*, 16941/06. Brussels, 19 December.

Council (2006b) *2757th Council Meeting – Environment* [Press Release]. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid [Accessed 9 September 2013].

Council (2006c) *2773rd Council Meeting – Environment* [Press Release]. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid [Accessed 9 September 2013].

Council (2007) *EU objectives for the further development of the international climate regime beyond 2012 – Council conclusions*, 6621/07. Brussels, 21 February.

Council (2008a) *2917th Council Meeting – Agriculture and Fisheries* [Press Release]. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid [Accessed 9 September 2013].

Council (2008b) *2856th Council Meeting – Environment* [Press Release]. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid [Accessed 9 September 2013].

Council (2008c) *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*, S407/08. Brussels, 11 December.

Council (2009a) *Joint progress report and follow-up recommendations on climate change and international security (CCIS) to the Council*. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

Council (2009b) *Council conclusions on Climate change and security* [Press Release]. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu [Accessed 9 September 2013].

Council (2009c) *Council Conclusions on Climate Change and Development,* 16071/09. Brussels, 17 November.

Council (2011a) *3118th Council meeting – Environment* [Press Release]. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu [Accessed 9 September 2013].

Council (2011b) *Council conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy* [Press Release]. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu [Accessed 29 January 2013].

Council (2013a) *Preparations for the 19th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 19) – Council conclusions*, 14856/13. Brussels, 15 October.

Council (2013b) *Council conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy* [Press Release]. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu [Accessed 29 January 2013].

Council (2013c) *An EU strategy on adaptation to climate change – Council Conclusions*, 11151/13. Brussels, 18 June.

Council (2014) *Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament*, 12094/14. Brussels, 23 July.

Dabelko, Geoffrey D. (2009) 'Planning for climate change: the security community's precautionary principle'. *Climatic Change*, 96, 13-21.

Dalby, Simon et al. (2009) 'Environmental Security Concepts Revisited During the First Three Phases (1983-2006)'. In Hans Günter Brauch et al. (eds.) *Facing Global Environmental Change: Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts*. Berlin: Springer, 781-790.

Daviter, Falk (2007) 'Policy Framing in the European Union'. *Journal of European Public Policy,* 14(4), 654–666.

Detraz, Nicole (2011) 'Threats or Vulnerabilities? Assessing the Link between Climate Change and Security'. *Global Environmental Politics*, 11(3), 104–20.

Deudney, Daniel (1990) 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security'. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 19(3), 461-476.

Dexter, Lewis Anthony (2006) *Elite and Specialized Interviewing*. Colchester: ECPR Press.

DG CLIMA (2015) *Climate policy mainstreaming*. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/mainstreaming/index_en.htm [Accessed 15 February 2015].

DG DEVCO (2015) *Security and development, conflict prevention and the comprehensive approach*. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ [Accessed 14 April 2015].

Dimas, Stavros (2008) *Winning the Fight against Climate Change: an EU Perspective*. 13 June, Cambridge University, Cambridge UK.

Dimas, Stavros (2009) *Climate Change in times of economic crisis - the path to a successful climate conference in Copenhagen*. 6 July, Humboldt University, Berlin.

Dover, Robert (2010) 'From CFSP to ESDP: the EU's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies'. In Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (eds.) *European Union Politics*, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Drexhage, John et al. (2007) *Climate Change and Foreign Policy: An exploration of options for greater integration*. Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development. Available at https://www.iisd.org [Accessed 7 March 2009].

Dryzek, John S. (2013) *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ECHO (2013) *Thematic Policy Document n° 5: Disaster Risk Reduction – Increasing resilience by reducing disaster risk in humanitarian action*. Brussels: Publications Office.

EDA (2012) *Military Green – Energy & Environment at the European Defence Agency.* Brussels: EU Publications Office.

EEAS (2011) *Towards a renewed and strengthened EU climate diplomacy – Joint reflection paper prepared by the EEAS and the services of the Commission*. Brussels, 9 July.

EEAS (2012) *Instrument for Stability Crisis Preparedness Component – Annual Action Programme 2012*. Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/ [Accessed 24 October 2014].

EEAS (2013) *EU climate diplomacy for 2015 and beyond – Joint paper prepared by the EEAS and the services of the Commission*. Brussels, [no date].

EEAS (2014) *Climate Change Diplomacy*. Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/index_en.htm [Accessed 15 November 2014].

EEAS (2014b) *Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2020 and accompanying 2014-2017 multi-annual indicative programme of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace*. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid [Accessed 24 October 2014].

Egeberg, Morten (2013) 'The European Commission'. In Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (eds.) *European Union Politics*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 129-141.

Elliott, Lorraine (2004) *The Global Politics of the Environment*, 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

European Commission (2001) *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, COM(2001)211 final. Brussels, 11 April.

European Commission (2003) *Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation*, COM(2003) 85 final. Brussels, 11 March.

European Commission (2005a) *Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change,* COM(2005) 35 final. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2005b) *Policy Coherence for Development – Accelerating progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals*, COM(2005) 134 final. Brussels, 12 April.

European Commission (2007) *Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius: The way ahead for 2020 and beyond*, COM(2007) 2 final. Brussels, 10 January.

European Commission (2008) *20 20 by 2020: Europe's climate change opportunity*, COM(2008) 30 final. Brussels, 23 January.

European Commission (2009a) *Climate Change and Development – Joint Paper of the Presidency and the Commission Services*, SEC(2009) 1426 final. Brussels, 20 October.

European Commission (2009b) *Guidelines on the Integration of Environment and Climate Change in Development Cooperation*. Brussels: EU Publications Office.

European Commission (2010) *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe*, COM(2010) 673 final. Brussels, 22 November.

European Commission (2011) *Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability*, COM(2011) 845 final. Brussels, 7 December.

European Commission (2012) *Adopting the Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2012-2013 for assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation under the Instrument for Stability*, C(2012) 5584 final. Brussels, 20 August.

European Commission (2013a) *Commission Staff Working Document on Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration*, SWD(2013) 138 final. Brussels, 16 April.

European Commission (2013b) *The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Factsheet*. Brussels, EU Publications Office.

European Commission (2013c) *An EU budget for low-carbon growth* [Press Release]. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/budget [Accessed 15 May 2015].

European Commission (2014) *Annual Report on the European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2013*, COM(2014) 537 final. Brussels, 28 August.

European Commission and High Representative (2012) *Towards a renewed EU-Pacific development Partnership*, JOIN(2012) 6 final.

European Commission and High Representative (2013) *The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises*, JOIN(2013) 30 final. Brussels, 11 December.

European Council (2001) *Presidency Conclusions – Göteborg European Council,* 15-16 June 2001, SN 200/1/01 REV 1. Brussels, [no date].

European Council (2007) *Presidency Conclusions – Brussels European Council,* 21-22 June 2007, 11177/1/07 REV 1. Brussels, 20 July.

European Council (2008a) *Presidency Conclusions – Brussels European Council,* 13-14 March 2008, 7652/1/08REV 1. Brussels, 20 May.

European Council (2008b) *Presidency conclusions – Brussels European Council*, 11-12 December 2008, 17271/1/08REV 1. Brussels, 13 February.

European Council (2011) *Conclusions – Brussels European Council*, 4 February 2011, EUCO 2/1/11 REV 1. Brussels, 8 March.

European Parliament (1999*) Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Foreign Policy Report on the environment, security and foreign policy*. Brussels, 14 January.

European Parliament (2005a) *Beating global climate change: European Parliament resolution on 'Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change'*, P6_TA(2005)0433. Brussels, 16 November.

European Parliament (2005b) *Report on Winning the Battle Against Global Climate Change, A6-0312/2005 final*. Brussels, 20 October.

European Parliament (2005c) *Climate change – Beating global climate change* [debate]. Strasbourg, 16 November.

European Parliament (2005d) *Resolution on the European Security Strategy,* P6_TA(2005)0133. Strasbourg, 14 April.

European Parliament (2006) *Resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy in the context of the ESDP*, P6_TA(2006)0495. Strasbourg, 16 November.

European Parliament (2007) *Resolution on limiting global climate change to 2 degrees Celsius – the way ahead for the Bali Conference on Climate Change and beyond,* P6_TA(2007)0537. Strasbourg, 15 November.

European Parliament (2008a) *Resolution on the Commission Green Paper on 'Adapting to climate change in Europe - options for EU action'*, P6_TA(2008)0125. Brussels, 10 April.

European Parliament (2008b) *Resolution on building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to climate change*, P6_TA(2008)0491. Strasbourg, 21 October.

European Parliament (2008c) *Resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy and ESDP*, P6_TA(2008)0255. Brussels, 5 June.

European Parliament (2009a) *Resolution on '2050: The future begins today – Recommendations for the EU's future integrated policy on climate change'*, P6_TA(2009)0042. Brussels, 4 February.

European Parliament (2009b) *Resolution on the European Security Strategy and ESDP*, P6_TA(2009)0075. Brussels, 19 February

European Parliament (2012a) *Resolution on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy.* Strasbourg, 22 November.

European Parliament (2012b) *Role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters* [debate], Strasbourg, 21 November.

European Parliament (2012c) *Resolution on the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters*, P7_TA(2012)0458. Brussels, 22 November.

European Parliament (2012d) *Amendments to the draft on the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters.* Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ [Accessed 20 October 2014].

European Parliament (2013) *Resolution on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy*, P7_TA-PROV(2013)0513. Strasbourg, 21 November.

European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 230/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace.

European Union (2005) *Strategy on climate change: foundations of the strategy*. Available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment [Accessed 12 March 2012].

EUMS (2012) *European Union Military Concept on Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency for EU-led military operations*, EEAS 01574/12. Brussels, 13 September.

EUMS (2013) *Food For Thought paper on Climate Change – a Military Perspective*, EEAS 01284/13. Brussels, 26 July.

Falk, Richard A. (1971) *This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival.* New York: Random House.

Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998) 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change'. *International Organization*, 52(4), 887-917.

Fischer, Frank and Forester, John (eds.) (1993) *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. London: UCL Press.

Floyd, Rita (2008) 'The Environmental Security Debate and its Significance for Climate Change'. *The International Spectator*, 43(3), 51-65.

Flyvbjerg, Bent (2001) *Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FPI (2015) 'Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, preventing conflict around the world'. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace_en.htm [Accessed 23 March 2015].

G8 (2013) *G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement*. Available at https://www.gov.uk/ [Accessed 23 June 2014].

Geddes, Andrew and Somerville, William (2012) 'Migration and environmental change in international governance: the case of the European Union'. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 30(6), 1015–1028.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter (1998) 'Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(3), 381-400.

Glynos, Jason, et al. (2009) *Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods*. Southampton: ESRC National Centre for Research Methods.

Græger, Nina (1996) 'Environmental Security?'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(1), 109-116.

Greek Presidency of the Council (2014) *Programme of the Hellenic Presidency of the Council of the European Union*. Available at http://www.gr2014.eu/Programme-Greek-Presidency-EU [Accessed 3 June 2014].

Grevi, Giovanni (2009) 'ESDP Institutions'. In Giovanni Grevi et al. (eds.) *European Security and Defence Policy: The first 10 years (1999-2009)*. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. Available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdfb [Accessed 1 March 2010].

Griggs, Steven and Howarth, David (2004) 'A transformative political campaign? The new rhetoric of protest against airport expansion in the UK'. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(2), 181-201.

GUE/NGL MEPs (2012) *Minority opinion – report on the role of CSDP in case of climate-driven crises and natural disasters*, European Parliament. Available from http://www.europarl.europa.eu [Accessed 2 December 2014].

Gupta, Joyeeta & Van Der Grijp, Nicolien (eds.) (2010) *Mainstreaming Climate Change in Development Cooperation: Theory, Practice and Implications for the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hajer, Maarten A. (1993) 'Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalisation of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Britain'. In Frank Fischer and John Forester (eds.) *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*. London: UCL Press, 43-76.

Hajer, Maarten A. (1995) *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hajer, Maarten A. (2005) 'Coalitions, Practices, and Meaning in Environmental Politics: From Acid Rain to BSE'. In David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds.) *Discourse theory in European politics: identity, policy and governance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 297-315.

Hajer, Maarten A. (2009) *Authoritative Governance: Policy-making in the Age of Mediatization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hajer, Maarten A. and Versteeg, Wytske (2005) 'A decade of discourse analysis of environmental politics: achievements, challenges, perspectives'. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 7(3), 175-184.

Hartmann, Betsy (2010), 'Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and the Politics of Policy Discourse'. *Journal of International Development*, 22(2), 233-246.

Hedegaard, Connie (2011) *Think of all the money we could save if Europe made the transition to a low-carbon society!.* 7 November, JCI World Congress, Brussels.

Hedegaard, Connie (2012) *Getting more for less*. 3 February, 12th Delhi Sustainable Development Summit, New Delhi.

Harting, Thomas Mayr (2013) *EU Statement - Arria Formula Meeting on Security Dimensions of Climate Chang*e. 15 February, United Nations, New York.

Hendrix, Cullen S. and Glaser, Sarah M. (2007) 'Trends and Triggers: Climate, Climate Change and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *Political Geography*, 26(6), 695– 715.

High Representative (2008) *Climate Change and Security: Recommendations on follow-up to the report on Climate Change and International Security*, 16994/08. Brussels, December 10.

High Representative and European Commission (2008) *Climate change and international security*, S113/08. Brussels, March 14.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1991) 'On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict'. *International Security*, 16(2), 76-116.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1994) 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases'. *International Security*, 19(1), 5-40.

Howarth, David (2000) *Discourse*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Howarth, David (2005) 'Applying discourse theory: the method of articulation'. In David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds.) *Discourse theory in European Politics: identity, policy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 316-348.

Howarth, David, et al. (2000) *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis - Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Howarth, David and Stavrakakis, Yannis (2000) 'Introducing discourse theory and political analysis'. In David Howarth et al. (eds.) *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1-23.

Howorth, Jolyon (2014) *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Huysmans, Jeff (2006*) The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. Oxon: Routledge.

IPCCC (2013) *Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).* Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/ [Accessed 25 January 2015].

Iusmen, Ingi (2012) Policy entrepreneurship and Eastern enlargement: The case of EU children's rights policy. *Comparative European Politics*, 11(4), 511-529.

Jänicke, Martin (2011) 'German climate change policy: political and economic leadership'. In Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly (eds.) *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics.* Oxon: Routledge: 129–146.

Jordan, Andrew et al. (2011) 'Policy Instruments in Practice'. In John S. Dryzek et al. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society*. Oxford: OUP, 536-549.

Jordan, Andrew et al. (2012) 'Understanding the Paradoxes of Multilevel Governing: Climate Change Policy in the European Union'. *Global Environmental Politics*, 12(2), 43–66.

Ki-moon, Ban (2007) 'A Climate Culprit in Darfur'. *The Washington Post* [Online], June 16. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com [Accessed 12 May 2015]

Kirchner, Emil J. (2006) 'The Challenge of European Union Security Governance'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(5), 947–968.

Levy, Marc A. (1995) 'Is the Environment a National Security Issue?'. *International Security*, 20(2), 35-62.

Lewis, Jeffrey (2013) 'The Council of the European Union and the European Council'. In Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (eds.) *European Union Politics*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 142-158.

Litfin, Karen T. (1994) *Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation*. New York, Columbia University Press.

Mathews, Jessica Tuchman (1989) 'Redifining Security'. *Foreign Affairs*, 68(2), 162–177.

Matthew, Richard A. (1995) 'Environmental Security: Demystifying the Concept, Clarifying the Stakes'. In *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, Washington DC: Wilson Centre,14–23.

Matthew, Richard A. (1999a), 'Introduction: Mapping Contested Grounds'. In Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew (eds.), *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics*. Albany: State University of New York, 1-22.

Matthew, Richard A. (1999b), 'Conclusion: Settling Contested Grounds'. In Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew (eds.), *Contested Grounds: Security and*

Conflict in the New Environmental Politics. Albany: State University of New York, 291-301.

Mazo, Jeffrey (2009) *Climate Conflict: How Global Warming Threatens Security and What to Do about It*. Oxon: Routledge.

McDonald, Matt (2013) 'Discourses of climate security'. *Political Geography*, 33, 42-51.

McDonald, Matt (2008), 'Securitisation and the Construction of Security'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(4), 563-87.

Metela, Eduard (2009) *Speech on Behalf of the EU*. 3 June, United Nations General Assembly, New York.

Methmann, Chris and Rothe, Delf (2012) 'Politics for the day after tomorrow: The logic of apocalypse in global climate politics'. *Security Dialogue*, 43(4), 323-344.

Meyer, Michael (2001) 'Between theory, method, and politcs: positioning of the approaches to CDA'. In Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage, 14-32.

Mintrom, Michael (1997) 'Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation'. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3), 738–770.

Moran, Daniel (2011) *Climate Change and National Security: A Country-Level Analysis*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Myers, Norman (1989) 'Environment and Security'. *Foreign Policy*, 74, 23-41.

Nobel Prize (2007) *The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007* [Press release]. Available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/press.html [Accessed 12 May 2015].

Nordås, Ragnhild and Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2007) 'Climate change and conflict'. *Political Geography*, 26(6), 627–638.

Oberthür, Sebastien and Dupont, Claire (2011) 'The Council, the European Council and international climate policy: From symbolic leadership to leadership by example'. In Rüdiger, K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly (eds.) *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics*. Oxon: Routledge, 74–91.

Oberthür, Sebastien and Pallemaerts, Marc (2010) 'The EU's Internal and External Climate Policies: an Historical Overview'. In Sebastien Oberthür and Marc Pallemaerts (eds.) *The New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy*. Brussels: VUB Press.

Oberthür, Sebastien and Roche Kelly, Claire (2008) 'EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges'. *The International Spectator*, 43(3), 35-50.

O'Brien, Karen et al. (2010) *Climate Change, Ethics and Human Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PIFS and EU (2008) *Declaration by the Pacific Islands Forum States and European Union on Climate Change.* Available from: http://www.gcca.eu [Accessed 17 March 2013].

Parker, Charles F. and Karlsson, Christer (2010) 'Climate Change and the European Union's Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth?'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48(4), 923-943.

Pavese, Carolina B. and Torney, Diarmuid (2012) 'The contribution of the European Union to global climate change governance: explaining the conditions for EU actorness'. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 55, 125-143.

Pepper, David (1999) 'Ecological modernisation or the 'ideal model' of sustainable development? Questions prompted at Europe's periphery'. *Environmental Politics*, 8(4), 1–34.

Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN (2011) *Maintenance of international peace and security: the impact of climate change – Concept note*. New York, 1 July.

Peters, B. Guy (1994) 'Agenda-setting in the European community'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1(1), 9–26.

Princen, Sebastiaan, and Rhinard, Mark (2006) 'Crashing and creeping: agenda-setting dynamics in the European Union'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(7), 1119–1132.

Raleigh, Clionadh and Urdal, Henrik (2007) 'Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflict'. *Political Geography*, 26(6), 674–94.

Rayner, Tim and Jordan, Andrew (2011) 'The United Kingdom: a paradoxical leader?'. In Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel and James Connelly (eds.) *The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics*. Oxon: Routledge, 95–111.

Rayner, Tim and Jordan, Andrew (2013) 'The European Union: the polycentric climate policy leader?'. *WIRE's Climate Change*, 4, 75–90.

Rehrl, Jochen and Weisserth, Hans-Bernhard (2013) *Handbook on CSDP – The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*, 2nd ed. Vienna: Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria.

Roe, Paul (2008) 'Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitisation and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq'. *Security Dialogue*, 39(6), 615–635.

Rønnfeldt, Carsten F. (1997) 'Three Generations of Environment and Security Research'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(4), 473-482.

Rothe, Delf (2011) 'Managing Climate Risks or Risking a Managerial Climate: State, Security and Governance in the International Climate Regime'. *International Relations*, 25(3), 330-345.

Rothe, Delf (2012) 'Security as a Weapon: How Cataclysm Discourses Frame International Climate Negotiations'. In Jürgen Scheffran et al. (eds) *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability*. Berlin: Springer, 243-258.

Salehyan, Idean (2008) 'From Climate Change to Conflict? Not Consensus Yet'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(3), 315-326.

Scheffran, Jürgen and Battaglini, Antonella (2010) 'Climate and conflicts: the security risks of global warming'. *Regional Environmental Change*, 11 (Suppl. 1), 27-39

Schiffrin, Deborah (1994) *Approaches to discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Schreurs, Miranda A. and Tiberghien, Yves (2007) 'Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining European Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation'. *Global Environmental Politics*, 7(4), 19-46.

Schwart, Peter and Randall, Doug (2003) *An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security*. Washington, DC. Available at http://www.climate.org/PDF/clim_change_scenario.pdf [Accessed 19 October 2010].

Serrano, Pedro (2011) *Speech by the European Union*. 20 July, Security Council, New York.

Slovenian Presidency of the Council (2008*) Slovenian Presidency Programme: Si.nergy for Europe*. Available at http://www.eu2008.si/en/indexd41d.html [Accessed 2 June 2014].

Smith, Dan and Vivekananda, Janani (2007) *A Climate of Conflict: the links between climate change, peace and war*. London: International Alert. Available at http://www.international-alert.org/resources/publications/climate-conflict [Accessed 8 February 2009].

Smith, Michael (2013) 'EU External Relations'. In Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan (eds.) *European Union Politics*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 213-225.

Solana, Javier (2007) *Managing Global Insecurity*. 21 March, Washington DC, Brookings Institute.

Solana, Javier (2008a) 'Before the flood', *The Guardian*, 10 March. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/mar/10/beforetheflood [Accessed 7 April 2014].

Solana, Javier (2008b) *Address to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament*. 8 April, European Parliament, Brussels.

Solana, Javier (2009) *Address to the European Parliament on the EU common, security and defence policy*. 18 February, European Parliament, Brussels.

Soroka, Stuart N (2007) Agenda Setting and Issue Definition. In Michael Orsini and Miriam Smith (eds.) *Reconfiguring Policy Analysis: Contemporary Canadian Approaches*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 185–210.

Soss, Joe (2006) 'Talking Our Way to meaningful explanation: A Practice-Centered View of Interviewing for Interpretive Research'. In Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (eds.) *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 127-149.

Stern, Nicholas, et al. (2006) *Stern review: the economics of climate change*. Norwich: The Stationery Office.

Stritzel, Holger (2007), 'Towards a Theory of Securitisation: Copenhagen and Beyond'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3), 357-83.

Tarand, Indrek (2012) *Report on the role of the Common Security and Defence Policy in case of climate- driven crises and natural disasters*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2012/2095(INI). Brussels, 5 June.

Tercovich, Giulia (2014) 'The EEAS Crisis Response System'. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management,* 22 (3), 150-157.

Tol, Richard S. J. and Wagner, Sebastian (2010) 'Climate change and violent conflict in Europe over the last millennium'. *Climatic Change*, 99, 65-79.

Torfing, Jacob (2005), 'Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges'. In Howarth, David and Torfing, Jacob (eds.) *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1-32.

Trombetta, Maria Julia (2008) 'Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse'. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 21(4), 585-602.

Trombetta, Maria Julia (2011) 'Rethinking the securitisation of the environment: old beliefs, new insights'. In Thierry Balzacq (ed.) *Securitisation theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve*. Oxon: Routledge, 135-49.

Ullman, Richard H. (1983) 'Redifining Security', *International Security*, 8(1), 129-153.

United Nations (2007) *Security Council holds first-ever debate on impact of climate change on peace, security, hearing over 50 speakers* [Press release]. Available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm [Accessed 8 March 2009].

UNEP (2007) *Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*. Available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/sudan/00_fwd.pdf [Accessed 12 May 2015].

UNGA (2009) *Resolution 63/281: Climate change and its possible security implications* (3 June 2009), A/RES/63/281. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/63/281 [Accessed 15 May 2015].

Van Schaik, Louise (2010) 'The Sustainability of the EU's Model for Climate Diplomacy'. In Sebastian Oberthür and Marc Pallemaerts (eds.) *The New Climate*

Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy. Brussels: VUB Press, 251–280.

Wæver, Ole (1995) 'Securitisation and Desecuritisation'. In Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 46-86.

Westing, Arthur H. (1989) 'The Environmental Component of Comprehensive Security'. *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 20(2), 129-134.

WBGU (2007) *World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk*. Berlin: German Advisory Council on Global Change. Available at http://www.wbgu.de [Accessed 10 October 2012].

Webersik, Christian (2010) *Climate Change and Security*: *A Gathering Storm of Global Challenges*. Santa Barbara: Praeger.

Wieczorek-Zeul, Heidemarie (2007) *Statement on behalf of the European Union.* 17 April, UN Security Council, New York.

Yin, Robert K. (2009) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Youngs, Richard (2009) *Energy Security: Europe's new foreign policy challenge*. Oxon: Routledge.

Zwolski, Kamil (2012a) 'The EU and a holistic security approach after Lisbon: competing norms and the power of the dominant discourse'. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1–18.

Zwolski, Kamil (2012b) 'The EU as an international security actor after Lisbon: Finally a green light for a holistic approach?'. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(1), 68 –87.

Zwolski, Kamil and Kaunert, Christian (2011) 'The EU and climate security: a case of successful norm entrepreneurship?'. *European Security*, 20(1), 21-43.