**estimating interest groups’ policy positions through content analysis: a discussion of automated and human-coding text analysis techniques applied to studies of EU lobbying**

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**Abstract**

The promises and pitfalls of automated (computer-assisted) and human-coding content analysis techniques applied to political science research have been extensively discussed in the scholarship on party politics and legislative studies. This study presents a similar comparative analysis outlining the pay-offs and trade-offs of these two methods of content analysis applied to research on EU lobbying. The empirical focus is on estimating interest groups’ positions based on their formally submitted policy position documents in the context of EU policymaking. We identify the defining characteristics of these documents and argue that the choice for a method of content analysis should be informed by a concern for addressing the specificities of the research topic covered, of the research question asked and of the data sources employed. We discuss the key analytical assumptions and methodological requirements of automated and human-coding text analysis and the degree to which they match the identified text characteristics. We critically assess the most relevant methodological challenges research designs face when these requirements need to be complied with and how these challenges might affect measurement validity. We also compare the two approaches in terms of their reliability and resource intensity. The article concludes with recommendations and issues for future research.

**Key words:** EU lobbying; policy position estimates; text analysis; automated and human-coding techniques.

**INTRODUCTION**

Content analysis is widely recognised in social sciences as a well-established ‘research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts […] to the contexts of their use’ (Krippendorff, 2004: 18). In recent years, political science has witnessed a considerable development of different automated (computer-assisted) content analysis techniques, applied mainly to the field of legislative studies and party politics research (Laver *et al,* 2003; Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Diermeier *et al,* 2012). These techniques treat words as data and infer ideological or policy positions of political actors based on words frequency in a political text. Recently, quantitative text analysis was also applied to EU lobbying research to examine interest groups’ policy positions and lobbying success (Klüver 2009, 2013) or their framing strategies (Boräng *et al,* 2014; Klüver and Mahoney, 2015; Klüver *et al,* 2015). By ‘automated text analysis’ we refer to supervised and unsupervised text-scaling algorithms conducted with the help of statistical softwares,[[1]](#endnote-1) while by ‘human-coding’ we refer to text analysis that relies on human coders for extracting, categorising and quantifying the information of interest.[[2]](#endnote-2) While both approaches use numerical values to express the variables of interest (e.g. policy positions), the process through which these numbers are generated differs: one method relies on computer codes and text-scaling algorithms, while the other employs human judgement for the interpretation of text and the assignment of relevant text-blocks to pre-established conceptual categories and coded variables that are clearly stated in a coding protocol (codebook).

The promises and pitfalls of automated and human-coding content analysis techniques applied to examine political texts have been extensively discussed in the scholarship on party politics and legislative studies (Benoit and Laver, 2007; Budge and Pennings, 2007; Lowe and Benoit, 2013). In this article, we conduct a similar comparative analysis outlining the pay-offs and trade-offs of automated and human-coding content analysis in the context of research on EU lobbying. Our article is motivated by Grimmer and Stewart’s pertinent observation that automated methods ‘are no substitute for careful thought and close reading and require extensive and problem-specific validation’ (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 267). We build on our previous research which provided a comparative assessment of the main unsupervised text-scaling algorithm used in the scholarship on EU lobbying (namely *Wordfish,* see Klüver, 2009) with the human-coding method we have employed to estimate interest groups’ positions expressed in the European Commission’s consultation on the reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars (2007) (see Bunea and Ibenskas, 2015). Our previous study presented a more elaborated methodological discussion supported by statistical evidence of automated and human-coding techniques applied to EU lobbying research. With the present article we aim to address a broader audience by providing a more general and less technical discussion of key methodological and substantive points to be considered by scholars of EU lobbying.

Our discussion fits well the context of a fast developing yet still maturing empirical literature on EU lobbying and interest groups that presents important opportunities for methodological innovation while also running the temptation to indiscriminately borrow analytical tools from across a broad spectrum of fields of research (Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014). We propose a discussion of the conditions under which such ‘methodological transfers’ can suitably take place. We limit our discussion to the issue of estimating groups’ positions based on their formally submitted position documents. The justification for this is twofold. First, EU open consultations are a relevant data source in the study of EU lobbying strategies and policy influence (Klüver, 2013; Bunea, 2014; Rasmussen and Carroll, 2014). It is therefore important to identify the most efficient and effective methods to analyse this valuable data source. Second, we decided to trade width for depth in our analysis and focus on one automated text analysis method only. We leave for future research the task of critically assessing other computer-assisted text analysis techniques that were applied to other key fields of EU lobbying research such as for example interest groups’ frames of policy issues and political debates (see Boräng *et al.-*2014).

We first identify the defining characteristics of interest groups’ position documents in the EU policymaking. We contend that the choice for a method of content analysis should be informed by a concern for addressing the specificities of the research topic covered, of the research question asked and of the data sources employed (in line with Roberts, 2000). We then discuss the key analytical assumptions and methodological requirements of automated and human-coding text analysis and the degree to which they match these text characteristics. We critically assess the most relevant methodological challenges research designs face when these requirements need to be complied with and how these challenges might affect measurement validity (see also Eising 2016). We also compare the two approaches in terms of their reliability and resource intensity. We conclude with recommendations and issues for future research. We place a greater analytical focus on discussing the automated text analysis because of its novelty in the literature and because its complex methodological assumptions make it less intuitive and easy to grasp for non-methodologists.

**INTEREST GROUPS’ POLICY POSITION DOCUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF EU POLICYMAKING**

Interest groups’ policy positions documents represent a valuable data source. These texts were used for example to research lobbying in the context of US federal bureaucratic rule-making (Nelson and Yackee, 2012), and judicial and legislative politics (Caldeira and Wright, 1990; Evans, 1996). In the literature on European lobbying, they were employed to study interest mobilisation, lobbying strategies and lobbying success at the national (Rasmussen, 2014) and EU level (Klüver, 2013; Bunea, 2013; Rasmussen and Alexandrovna, 2013). In most studies, researchers employed human-coding content analysis to estimate groups’ positions and levels of lobbying success (see Eising *et al,* 2015), although automated approaches were also applied (Klüver, 2009).

In the context of the EU system of governance, interest groups’ position documents present a set of salient characteristics that differentiates them in some fundamental ways from ideological texts such as party manifestos or legislative speeches. We consider these characteristics to be key in informing a researcher’s decision on what content analysis technique best fits his/her research design. We observe thus the following characteristics:

1. The *substantive content* *of texts* is technical in nature: these documents usually communicate technical and factual information, corresponding to what the literature describes as a technocratic policymaking system in which expert knowledge and policy specific information are key when private actors interact with policymakers and express their opinions on concrete policy matters. The level of technicality varies across texts, according to the degree of expert knowledge and specialisation an organisation possesses. Two relevant observable implications follow from this. First, these texts refer to complex policy realities and provide information that usually corresponds to *several issues* and *policy dimensions*. Second, the information conveyed with the help of *numerical values* can have an important substantive meaning, and it sometimes represents the key instrument for discerning between policy positions.
2. *The structure* of documents allows a relatively easy and straightforward identification of *policy issues* in relation to which organisations express positions. Generally, these documents follow closely the structure of the Commission’s consultation call that clearly identifies the policy issues on which stakeholders’ positions are requested. This differs from ideological texts, especially party manifestos, whose authors are less constrained with regard to the issues they address in texts.
3. The *intended purpose of communication* can vary across texts, although all documents are formally addressed to the European Commission. Whereas some texts are used by organisations to affect policy outcomes by formulating specific demands and transmitting technical, specific, policy-relevant information, other texts do not express a specific position but consist instead of more general statements about a policy area or aspects of EU decision-making.
4. Their *authorship* varies greatly in terms of types of organisational actors formulating them (i.e. business, environmental NGOs, local authorities, Euro-federations, national associations, individual organisations). This also implies that the level of texts’ technicality varies according to the degree of expert knowledge and specialisation that an organisation possesses in a policy area.
5. Their *text format* is not uniform and it can vary in terms of length, terminology, writing-style and language. Some documents are longer than others, some use more technical terms while others adopt a laymen vocabulary.
6. Policy documents are often written in several *different languages* in accordance with the legal framework allowing the use of any of the EU twenty-four official languages when participating in the policymaking process.

7) The relevant *unit of analysis* for these texts varies across documents and can range from one sentence to several paragraphs. A qualitative inspection of these documents reveals that organisations use anything in between one or several sentences to one or several text paragraphs to express their position on one policy issue.

Having identified these defining characteristics of policy position documents, we now turn and discuss how they affect the applicability of automated and human-based content analysis.

**CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW**

***AUTOMATED TEXT ANALYSIS***

Content analysis techniques are classified into two broad approaches: automated and human-based. Automated content analysis uses computers to either classify the content of texts into specific topics or scale them to extract actors’ positions. In contrast, the human-coding approach is based entirely on ‘the use of people as coders, with each using a standard codebook and coding form to read, view, or otherwise decode the target content and recode his or her objective and careful observations on pre-established variables’ (Neuendorf, 2002: 52). Both classes of content analysis are applied to address various research questions and imply the use of different analytical techniques. One of their most prominent use concerns the measurement of political actors’ positions, a fundamental quest for the study of politics (Laver and Benoit, 2006: 14).

While we recognise that there is a wide range of both supervised and unsupervised text-scaling algorithms that are employed for conducting automated text analysis (Slapin and Proksch, 2014: 129-130; Skalski, 2002; Alexa and Zuell, 2000), we review only one particular method, namely *Wordfish*, for reasons outlined in the introduction. Before we show how its methodological rigours match the characteristics of groups’ position documents, we briefly introduce this method.

*Wordfish* is a text-scaling algorithm that uses word frequencies to place documents within a unidimensional policy space (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). The method assumes that word frequencies follow a Poisson distribution, which has a single parameter () representing both the mean and the variance. The functional form of the model is:

Where: is the frequency of word *j* in the document of the actor *i*, is a set of document fixed effects, is a set of word fixed effects, is the estimate of a word-specific weight that captures the importance of the word *j* in discriminating between actors’ positions, and is an estimate of the position of the actor *i*. By having fixed effects for actors and words, the method accounts for the possibility that some actors have longer documents and some words are used more often than others by all actors. The model is estimated using an expectation maximisation algorithm.

*Wordfish* provides essential *methodological opportunities* that hold across fields of research: high measurement reliability, time efficiency, compatibility with conducting large-n research and comparatively lower levels of intensity of data collection efforts relative to approaches relying on human-coding.[[3]](#endnote-3) Relative to other text-scaling algorithms (e.g. *Wordscores*), *Wordfish* has more straightforward underlying assumptions and it does not require any rescaling method or raw scores. It is therefore a relatively user-friendly and transparent algorithm. Most importantly, *Wordfish* does not require the existence of two reference texts expressing and marking the most extreme positions in relation to the analysed dimension (as required by *Wordscores*). This is particularly relevant in the field of EU lobbying because such reference texts that ‘can be estimated with confidence from independent sources or assumed uncontroversially’ (Laver *et al,* 2003: 313) are not available. Whereas for party manifestos, the external validation of the reference texts was done with the help of expert surveys, no such data sources are currently available on interest groups’ policy position documents.

These are all noteworthy opportunities. Yet, the empirical application of this method also raises a set of research design challenges that we discuss in the next section. We consider each challenge to be of equal importance. Assessing empirically the relative impact of each methodological trade-off on the measurement validity of position estimates is a complex task that goes beyond the purpose of the present article.

***HUMAN-CODING***

Several human-coding techniques have been applied to the measurement of political actors’ policy positions, with the Comparative Manifestos Project being perhaps the best-known project. In the literature on lobbying no such massive data-coding project exists but several human-coding techniques were used (see Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Eising *et al,* 2015; Vannoni 2016). The methodological assumptions of human-coding text analysis are less strict and elaborate. They consist mainly of three fundamental principles: (1) the coding of text needs to be based on a codebook detailing all steps of the coding process, the content of interest, the unit of analysis, the coding format, and the categories of variables to be coded based on the analysed texts; (2) the training of coders on how to systematically apply this codebook; (3) conducting and reporting an inter-coder reliability test to evaluate the reliability of the coding scheme (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007). This approach has no specific strict requirements regarding the quality of analysed texts in terms of their comparability, authorship, format, informative content, or the use of numerical values to convey a message (see also Voltolini, 2016). These aspects are all taken into account before the codebook is developed and then addressed in the content of the coding protocol as the researcher finds necessary.

In this study we build on the human-coding we applied in our previous research (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2015). To code groups’ positions, we first examined the EU official documents associated with the examined consultation to identify the policy issues on which organisations adopted positions. We then identified the positions of organisations on each issue based on their position documents by first reading the text sections/paragraphs providing the relevant information, and then by coding the position based on one (or two) key sentences that explicitly expressed it. Each position was coded in the dataset. Our approach thus differs from the classical approach that usually implies a systematic coding of all sentences in a paragraph/sub-section followed by their distribution into positive and negative categories and the analysis of the aggregate distribution of these positive and negative values (see the Comparative Manifestos Project).

**MEASUREMENT VALIDITY: METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND CHALLENGES**

While it is generally agreed that automated content analysis outperforms human-coding in terms of reliability and resource intensity, the scholarship still debates about how the two approaches perform in terms of their validity (Slapin and Proksch, 2014: 138). Automated content analysis is based on a number of assumptions, whose violation may affect the validity of its results. Slapin and Proksch identify the following methodological assumptions that need to be satisfied when applying automated content analysis:

1. The method assumes that the employed algorithm captures the *dimensionality of the policy space* analysed appropriately. Since text-scaling is applied to capture an underlying, latent variable that cannot be directly observed or measured (i.e. ideology, policy position), having a well defined prior knowledge and clear definition/identification of what dimension(s) is/are estimated with the applied algorithm is a strong methodological imperative.
2. The method assumes that the analysed texts *provide information* that is directly linked to and relevant for the underlying policy dimension(s) that is examined with the text-scaling algorithm.
3. An automated approach requires that all analysed texts are similar (and thus comparable) in terms of their authorship, text generation process, targeted audience and communication purpose (e.g. convey a political ideology to the electorate, state a position in a political debate). The texts should use a similar terminology and be generated within similar institutional/organisational settings by similar types of actors (e.g. political parties, MPs). The documents must be written in the *same language*. This is a crucial assumption since the estimates of computerised content analysis are based on the relative frequencies with which different words are used across texts. Word frequencies have a substantive meaning and allow distinguishing the substantive differences between texts in relation to the underlying, latent variable that is researched.
4. *Only words are data* and their frequency in a text provides substantive information about the latent variable analysed. The observable implication of this assumption is that substantive information conveyed with the help of numerical values, graphs or figures is usually removed from the analysed text, or if kept, it is not given appropriate weight in the estimation algorithm because usually such information is not frequently repeated in the text.

Below, we discuss the extent to which the specific characteristics of interest groups’ policy documents match these methodological assumptions and how this could create several methodological challenges. We also discuss the extent to which human-coding can address these potential challenges.

***CAPTURING APPROPRIATELY THE DIMENSIONALITY OF THE EU POLICY SPACE***

A key aspect that may affect the validity of the results of automated text analysis is whether the number of dimensions identified to describe the political/policy space is appropriate and does not discard relevant information (Laver and Benoit, 2012: 199). Text scaling methods extract the positions of actors in a low (usually single) dimensional space, although the existing methods differ with regard to how many dimensions they derive. The *Wordfish* method places actors in a single-dimensional space. The creators of *Wordfish* make a very explicit argument in this respect: ‘first define the dimensions ex ante and, second, use only documents that contain information relevant to that dimension. Defining the dimension implies being transparent about what information is being used.’ (Slapin and Proksch, 2008: 712). Current applications of *Wordfish* to analyse groups’ position documents follow this methodological requirement by assuming that the entire text of a position document provides information about one policy dimension only: ‘[s]ince all documents discuss only the Commission initiative for reducing CO2 emissions from cars, one can assume uni-dimensionality and, thus, the complete texts were used for the analysis’ (Klüver, 2009: 541).

We argue that generally the requirement for a uni-dimensional space can raise a serious methodological challenge when analysing interest groups’ position documents because these texts usually provide information about a policy space that can have (and usually does have) more than a single dimension. These texts provide information about *a large number of issues* and they are *authored by diverse organisations.* While a large number of issues does not necessarily imply a multi-dimensional space, the differences between stakeholders in terms of their interest type, organisational form and national origin usually result in a complex ‘bundling’ of policy issues which then translates into a multi-dimensional policy space. In addition, the practical realities of EU policymaking suggest that policy events revolve around several issues that are treated by decision-makers individually and not collapsed into one policy dimension. A brief reading of different Commission’s calls for consultations reveals that in their policy practice, the European bureaucrats design detailed consultation documents in which they formulate specific questions aimed at asking for stakeholders’ policy feedback on several, specific and distinct issues.

The scholarship has recently developed multi-dimensional text-scaling algorithms (Diermier *et al,* 2012), and one such approach was applied in the scholarship on interest groups to examine policy frames (Klüver and Mahoney, 2015). Nevertheless, prior knowledge about the number and substantive meaning of policy dimensions is important when interpreting the results of these analyses (cf. Benoit and Laver, 2012). For example, since one prominent characteristic of interest groups’ position documents is that they provide *information with the help of technical terminology*, one cannot assume that the underlying space that structures groups’ positions is based on the classic dimensions of ‘left-right’, ‘liberal-conservative’, or ‘pro- vs. anti-EU’. Instead, a good knowledge of the dimensions specific to the examined legislative proposal is required.

Human-coding is more flexible in this respect since it allows identifying the positions of stakeholders on specific issues, which can then be used to examine and interpret the dimensionality of the policy space using multi-dimensional data analysis techniques. For example, we identified ten policy issues corresponding to the consultation on the reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars based on the questions asked by the Commission in the consultation document and groups’ position documents. With the help of Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis we found that these issues correspond to two policy dimensions, each describing a different regulatory regime aimed at improving environmental standards by regulating car producers or consumers’ behaviours (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2015).

***INFORMATION CONTENT***

A second challenge in applying automated content analysis to interest groups’ position documents is that these may include information that is not directly linked to and relevant for the underlying policy dimension(s). This results from two characteristics of these documents: their *technical terminology* and the *variation in the intended purpose of communication*.

First, the use of technical terminology, numbers and figures in interest groups’ policy documents means that, different from ideological texts such as party manifestos or legislative speeches, the frequency with which a word is used does not differentiate between actors’ positions on the latent policy dimension(s). These differences are instead marked by using key technical terms or numerical values, which are not given appropriate weight in the estimation algorithm because usually such information is not frequently repeated in the text. The automated content analysis of such technical documents is therefore unlikely to uncover the substantive policy differences between positions, and would instead capture differences based on other grounds such as different styles of writing. Moreover, applying automated content analysis usually requires the removal of all numeric values even if they play a key role in differentiating between interest groups’ positions.

Second, the variation in the purpose of communication is also problematic because it means that some documents (or parts of them) do not provide information related to specific issues and are therefore uninformative for uncovering policy positions. This observation supports the argument that a successful application of automated text analysis needs to be embedded in a thorough reading of texts: ‘[i]ndeed a deep understanding of the texts is one of the key advantages of the social scientist in applying automated methods’ (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 270).

In contrast, human-coding can effectively deal with both challenges. First, human coders are able to differentiate between actors’ positions on the basis of both key words and numerical values. In the consultation on CO2 emissions, one key issue was the time frame for reaching the emissions reduction target. Two substantially different positions were expressed: pro-environment organisations asked for 2012 to be the deadline for reaching the target, while car producers advocated for this deadline to be 2015. Numerical values were key in identifying the positions differentiating between them. The removal of numbers from texts (that is usually required in automated text analysis) would have prevented in this case an accurate identification of positions.

Second, human-coders are also able to discard irrelevant information or uninformative documents when coding interest groups’ positions. For example, several organisations that participated in the consultation on CO2 emissions did not express any specific positions in their documents. Thus, one could reasonably argue that their position documents were not informative with respect to the underlying policy dimension(s) analysed (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2015).

***THE TEXT GENERATING PROCESS***

Another challenge in applying automated content analysis to study interest groups’ policy documents arises because the process through which their content is generated varies substantially. These differences result from the variation in the *authorship* and the *intended purpose of communication* of these documents. As already mentioned, a very diverse set of organisations are involved in EU policymaking. They differ in terms of organisational settings and lobbying capabilities, and benefit to different degrees from the presence of staff members specialised in the formulation of policy position documents. This instead affects the level of technicality of their documents. Differences in the text generating processes also imply that these texts are not comparable units of analysis amenable to text-scaling algorithms. An additional challenge arises when trying to integrate in one analysis documents generated by private and public actors that have substantially different organisational environments. This can constitute a relevant challenge when attempting to estimate lobbying success by looking at which positions (expressed in position documents) are translated into policy outcomes (stated in the legislative proposals or final legislative acts). By their very nature, groups’ position documents and EU official texts are not comparable texts generated within similar institutional settings, which implies that they cannot be included in the same automated text analysis.

Also, organisations use policy documents for different communication purposes. Some employ them to transmit expert knowledge and specialised information as part of their attempts to exert policy influence. Others use them to indicate their stakeholder status, to contest the legitimacy of the initiated policy initiative or to show their constituency that they are performing their EU representational mandate. Therefore, interest organisations differ from each other in more fundamental ways than parties or MPs which represent among themselves a more homogenous group of political actors, that generate political texts in more similar institutional environments and are subjected to similar ‘institutional constraints’ (Proksch and Slapin, 2012).

Human-coding content analysis does not have any specific requirements regarding the text generating process and is thus better equipped to deal with documents that were generated by different types of actors in different organisational settings.

***VARIATION IN THE LINGUISTIC REGIME***

A further challenge to applications of automated text analysis is posed by the assumption that the analysed texts are comparable. This aspect is key in the context of EU policymaking because in this system of governance policy position documents are written in different languages. The observable implication of this is that text-scaling algorithms are applied to texts written in one language only (most often English). Texts written in any other languages must be excluded from the analysis since text-scaling algorithms require a unique linguistic regime.[[4]](#endnote-4) This implies a trade-off between discarding some texts and implicitly reducing the number of observations, and not conducting the text-scaling analysis at all. Discarding data points can however potentially bias estimates of the population of organisations lobbying within a certain policy/consultation event, estimates of the size of lobbying sides and coalitions, and affect subsequent causal inferences made about the aggregate levels of lobbying success estimated for both individual organisations and lobbying sides within an event or lobbying venue. In contrast, human-coding can address the issue of documents’ diverse linguistic regime by allowing the development of codebooks in different languages.

***WORDS AS UNIT OF ANALYSIS***

Lastly, the very basic assumption that words are the most appropriate unit of analysis for investigating the content of position documents is challenging. The scholarship theorising content analysis recommends that in a research design the relevant unit of analysis should be decided based on the context of research: ‘[t]he key in selecting a unit of analysis is not to assume that one’s population of text is comprised a priori of clearly-distinguishable text-blocks. On the contrary, it is the researcher’s responsibility to divide this population into blocks – blocks that can be uniquely identified according to the contextual variables required for addressing the research question at hand’ (Roberts, 2000: 268). To pay attention to the context of research focusing on EU policy documents means to take into account their technical nature. For such technical documents, the frequency of words is less informative in terms of estimating a policy position since this frequency does not have an ideological meaning. Instead, considering that the relevant unit of analysis can range between one or several key sentences that express the policy positions to one/several paragraphs that convey this position constitutes a more reasonable approach. Some organisations express their position in a very succinct manner with the help of one or two clauses, while others employed one or two full paragraphs to specify their preference. Deciding the most appropriate unit of analysis in this context emphasises again the absolute importance for an in-depth knowledge of the texts.

**RELIABILITY AND RESOURCE INTENSITY**

Automated content analysis performs well in terms of assuring high measurement reliability. Based on the same sample of documents and applying the same scaling algorithm, one usually gets the same estimates of interest groups’ positions across several different measurements. There is one caveat though: these estimates depend on the words used in the text-scaling analysis. What counts as an ‘informative’ word and what is deleted because is considered ‘uninformative’[[5]](#endnote-5) is decided by the researcher, and therefore it is potentially subject to change and can vary across research designs. This could potentially affect the reliability measure of positions estimates.

In contrast, human-coding is more prone to systematic coding error (Mikhaylov *et al,* 2012). Its successful application depends to a large extent on the quality and intensity of the training received by human coders (Neuendorf, 2002). This aspect is particularly relevant and potentially challenging in the context of research on EU lobbying and policymaking, which, as already mentioned, is rather technical and therefore requires a solid and thorough knowledge on behalf of coders of the analysed policy events. At the same time, the reliability of human-coding may be improved since policy issues are relatively well defined in the consultation documents of the European Commission.

Automated content analysis also performs better in terms of resource intensity. While the preparation of documents for analysis and mastering the methods of computerised content analysis may be quite labour intensive, content analysis based on human coders requires the deployment of much more substantial human and financial resources. The methodological implication of this is that human-based text analysis can be less compatible with conducting large-n research designs. The analysis of only a selected number of cases from the entire universe of possible cases means that the reliability of human-based content analysis may be lower. This makes case selection a key element in any research design relying on human-coding and requires a clear and well crafted case selection criteria, alongside an open discussion and recognition of the limits to generalisability of research findings.

**CONCLUSION**

A solid content analysis research design requires a good match between the assumptions of the analytical method and the characteristics of the texts that constitute its object of analysis (Roberts, 2000). In the EU context, interest groups’ policy position documents present a set of text characteristics that challenge the ability of the existing methods of automated text analysis to uncover valid policy positions of interest groups expressed in these texts. These documents tend to use technical language; they refer to multiple issues; they are authored by diverse organisations that use these documents for different communication purposes; and they are often written in several languages. Human-based content analysis is better equipped to account for these text characteristics, and therefore it represents a recommended method for studying these documents even if it requires more resources and its results can be less reliable. We consider that this explains perhaps why European Commission’s policymakers’ themselves adopt this approach when examining and analyzing interest groups’ contributions to public consultations instead of opting for automated analyses.

Our discussion suggests several recommendations for the substantive and methodological research on lobbying in the EU. First, scholars who consider using automated content analysis should examine the extent to which the aforementioned characteristics are present in the particular sample of texts they want to examine. We argue that the use of automated content analysis techniques should be considered as a feasible methodological option only when the analysed policy documents are less technical in their substantive content and terminology used, the number of policy issues is low, the organisations authoring them are relatively homogenous in their organisational characteristics and they use their documents for the same goals (e.g. to express their policy positions on the issues related to a legislative proposal), and only when all (or almost all) documents are written in the same language.

More systematic research is needed to establish the variation of these text characteristics and conditions under which automated techniques can be applied across different policy areas and consultation events. The present analysis drew extensively on the consultation on one environmental consultation to identify the characteristics of interest groups’ position documents. A systematic analysis of a large and representative number of consultations may find that some of these methodological issues are more present than others. Second, future research should also examine how much each of the aforementioned text characteristics affect the validity of position estimates derived from automated content analysis. Finally, building on the insights about which of these document features are most present and provide the most important challenges to the validity of the estimates of interest groups’ positions, the scholars should upgrade the existing techniques and develop new methods of automated content analysis to account for these characteristics. Nevertheless, even when such methods are developed, human-based content analysis will remain an important tool in the study of open consultations in the European Union. As Grimmer and Stewart (2013: 270) suggest, ‘[r]ather than replace humans, computers amplify human abilities. The most productive line of inquiry, therefore, is not in identifying how automated methods can obviate the need for researchers to read their text. Rather, the most productive line of inquiry is to identify the best way to use both humans and automated methods for analyzing texts.’

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**Notes**

1. See Grimmer and Stewart (2013: 268) for an excellent overview of automated content analysis methods for political texts. Supervised and unsupervised text-scaling algorithms are the two main approaches used for ideological scaling. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. This distinction differs thus from the classical dichotomy of qualitative versus quantitative content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004: 87-98). Our analysis is based on the fundamental assumption that ‘[a] content analysis has as its goal a numerically based summary of a chosen message set. It is neither a gestalt impression not a fully detailed description of a message or a message set.’ (Neuendorf, 2004: 87-89). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. We note though that the application of automated content analysis techniques usually requires a careful preparation of analysed texts in terms of removing uninformative words, numbers, figures, and punctuation marks. This step can also be labour intensive and relies exclusively on the efforts of researchers. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. See however the very recent attempts made to develop ‘automated multilingual content analysis techniques by Proksch et al, 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Slapin and Proksch (2014: 137) refer to these as ‘stopwords’, i.e. words that have no ideological content such as prepositions and conjunctions’.

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   **Note to authors: can you please provide 3-5 key quotes for the publisher**

   **Key Quotes** [↑](#endnote-ref-5)