The “default view” of perceptual reasons and closure-based sceptical arguments
The “default view” of perceptual reasons and closure-based sceptical arguments
It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.
1-22
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
(2016)
The “default view” of perceptual reasons and closure-based sceptical arguments.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, .
(doi:10.1163/22105700-006011221).
Abstract
It is a commonly accepted assumption in contemporary epistemology that we need to find a solution to ‘closure-based’ sceptical arguments and, hence, to the ‘scepticism or closure’ dilemma. In the present paper I argue that this is mistaken, since the closure principle does not, in fact, do real sceptical work. Rather, the decisive, scepticism-friendly moves are made before the closure principle is even brought into play. If we cannot avoid the sceptical conclusion, this is not due to closure’s holding it in place, but because we’ve already been persuaded to accept a certain conception of perceptual reasons, which both issues a standing invitation to radical scepticism and is endemic in the contemporary literature. Once the real villain of the piece is exposed, it will become clear that the closure principle has been cast in the role of scapegoat in this debate.
Text
The Default View of Perceptual Reasons.pdf
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 5 March 2015
e-pub ahead of print date: May 2016
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 398241
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/398241
ISSN: 2210-5697
PURE UUID: 7977ad5b-3c3c-4399-9d5a-43fc86e494c8
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 21 Jul 2016 11:12
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 05:45
Export record
Altmetrics
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics