Wittgenstein and the “factorization model” of religious belief
Wittgenstein and the “factorization model” of religious belief
In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a 'factorization model' which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent 'factors' - the belief's content and the belief-attitude - appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a 'factorization model' severely distorts Wittgenstein's conception of religious belief.
93-110
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
2014
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
(2014)
Wittgenstein and the “factorization model” of religious belief.
European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 6 (1), Spring Issue, .
Abstract
In the contemporary literature Wittgenstein has variously been labelled a fideist, a non-cognitivist and a relativist of sorts. The underlying motivation for these attributions seems to be the thought that the content of a belief can clearly be separated from the attitude taken towards it. Such a 'factorization model' which construes religious beliefs as consisting of two independent 'factors' - the belief's content and the belief-attitude - appears to be behind the idea that one could, for example, have the religious attitude alone (fideism, non-cognitivism) or that religious content will remain broadly unaffected by a fundamental change in attitude (Kusch). In this article I will argue that such a 'factorization model' severely distorts Wittgenstein's conception of religious belief.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Published date: 2014
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 398245
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/398245
PURE UUID: e9de3309-6eaa-4be4-9fa5-6a92014adf05
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 21 Jul 2016 13:06
Last modified: 07 Jan 2022 21:51
Export record
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics