Monastic governance: forgotten prospects for public institutions
Monastic governance: forgotten prospects for public institutions
To overcome agency problems, public sector reforms started to introduce businesslike incentive structures to motivate public officials. By neglecting internal behavioral incentives, however, these reforms often do not reach their stated goals. This research analyzes the governance structure of Benedictine monasteries to gain new insights into solving agency problems in public institutions. A comparison is useful because members of both organizational forms, public organizations and monasteries, see themselves as responsible participants in their community and claim to serve the public good. This research studies monastic governance from an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, and German-speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost 500 years, and only a quarter of them broke up because of agency problems. The authors argue that they were able to survive for centuries because of an appropriate governance structure, relying strongly on the intrinsic motivation of the members and internal control mechanisms. This governance approach differs in several aspects from current public sector reforms.
631-653
Inauen, E.
4716be5e-4eaa-4266-bcff-62095d8605a8
Rost, K.
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Frey, B.S.
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Homberg, Fabian
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Osterloh, M.
83aa045b-2074-4936-80c3-07df09456c37
November 2010
Inauen, E.
4716be5e-4eaa-4266-bcff-62095d8605a8
Rost, K.
06a9f410-b714-4cf1-a199-08ffe30e979e
Frey, B.S.
46e2a933-714b-4f89-8b44-de4f3e6bbcb2
Homberg, Fabian
31042a5c-cd37-46a1-bdde-53abb55f1072
Osterloh, M.
83aa045b-2074-4936-80c3-07df09456c37
Inauen, E., Rost, K., Frey, B.S., Homberg, Fabian and Osterloh, M.
(2010)
Monastic governance: forgotten prospects for public institutions.
The American Review of Public Administration, 40 (6), .
(doi:10.1177/0275074009360372).
Abstract
To overcome agency problems, public sector reforms started to introduce businesslike incentive structures to motivate public officials. By neglecting internal behavioral incentives, however, these reforms often do not reach their stated goals. This research analyzes the governance structure of Benedictine monasteries to gain new insights into solving agency problems in public institutions. A comparison is useful because members of both organizational forms, public organizations and monasteries, see themselves as responsible participants in their community and claim to serve the public good. This research studies monastic governance from an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, and German-speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost 500 years, and only a quarter of them broke up because of agency problems. The authors argue that they were able to survive for centuries because of an appropriate governance structure, relying strongly on the intrinsic motivation of the members and internal control mechanisms. This governance approach differs in several aspects from current public sector reforms.
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e-pub ahead of print date: 18 May 2010
Published date: November 2010
Organisations:
HRM and Organisational Behaviour, Southampton Business School
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 398713
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/398713
ISSN: 0275-0740
PURE UUID: 7fa03a3b-640e-422b-b875-bd8388f39830
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Date deposited: 01 Aug 2016 10:30
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 01:39
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Author:
E. Inauen
Author:
K. Rost
Author:
B.S. Frey
Author:
Fabian Homberg
Author:
M. Osterloh
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