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United States biodefense, international law, and the problem of intent

United States biodefense, international law, and the problem of intent
United States biodefense, international law, and the problem of intent
Since the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United States, annual U.S. government spending on biodefense programs has increased enormously. U.S. biodefense was once exclusively the domain of military agencies and was aimed principally at protecting battlefield troops against the products of state-run biological warfare programs. Today, it is engaged in and promoted by a variety of government agencies contemplating “bioterrorism,” and it is aimed principally at protecting the American civilian population. I ask if certain U.S. biodefense policies, pointedly those funding “threat assessment” projects, make biological attacks paradoxically more likely by undermining international norms against deliberately causing disease. I conclude that they do and consider the ramifications of this answer.
0730-9384
32-42
Enemark, Christian
004b6521-f1bb-426a-a37b-686c6a8061f6
Enemark, Christian
004b6521-f1bb-426a-a37b-686c6a8061f6

Enemark, Christian (2005) United States biodefense, international law, and the problem of intent. Politics and the Life Sciences, 24 (1 and 2), 32-42. (doi:10.2990/1471-5457(2005)24[32:USBILA]2.0.CO;2).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Since the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United States, annual U.S. government spending on biodefense programs has increased enormously. U.S. biodefense was once exclusively the domain of military agencies and was aimed principally at protecting battlefield troops against the products of state-run biological warfare programs. Today, it is engaged in and promoted by a variety of government agencies contemplating “bioterrorism,” and it is aimed principally at protecting the American civilian population. I ask if certain U.S. biodefense policies, pointedly those funding “threat assessment” projects, make biological attacks paradoxically more likely by undermining international norms against deliberately causing disease. I conclude that they do and consider the ramifications of this answer.

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Published date: March 2005
Organisations: Politics & International Relations

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 400226
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/400226
ISSN: 0730-9384
PURE UUID: 16358524-585c-40d2-aad3-6462239b8247
ORCID for Christian Enemark: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0002-1833-0927

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Date deposited: 23 Sep 2016 15:15
Last modified: 08 Jan 2022 03:29

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