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Consultations with interest groups and the empowerment of executives: evidence from the European Union

Consultations with interest groups and the empowerment of executives: evidence from the European Union
Consultations with interest groups and the empowerment of executives: evidence from the European Union
We examine how an executive's consultations with interest groups during the formative stage of the policy process affect its bargaining success during the decision-making stage after it has proposed new policies to legislative actors. Our theory sets out how consultations with interest groups strengthen the executive by bolstering its formal and informal agenda-setting power. The empirical testing ground for our theory is the European Union (EU), and in particular the consultations held by the European Commission. The analysis assesses the effects of these consultations on the congruence between the Commission's legislative proposals on controversial issues and EU laws. Our analysis incorporates detailed information on the type and scope of each consultation. In line with our theory, we find that the Commission had more success during the decision-making stage after conducting open consultations with large numbers of interest groups during the policy formation stage.
0952-1895
517-531
Bunea, Adriana
35890bfe-2932-48ee-aef8-4a393a42eed1
Thomson, Robert
7e5ed66c-67df-4734-b34c-f1b1d07f635b
Bunea, Adriana
35890bfe-2932-48ee-aef8-4a393a42eed1
Thomson, Robert
7e5ed66c-67df-4734-b34c-f1b1d07f635b

Bunea, Adriana and Thomson, Robert (2015) Consultations with interest groups and the empowerment of executives: evidence from the European Union. Governance, 28 (4), 517-531. (doi:10.1111/gove.12119).

Record type: Article

Abstract

We examine how an executive's consultations with interest groups during the formative stage of the policy process affect its bargaining success during the decision-making stage after it has proposed new policies to legislative actors. Our theory sets out how consultations with interest groups strengthen the executive by bolstering its formal and informal agenda-setting power. The empirical testing ground for our theory is the European Union (EU), and in particular the consultations held by the European Commission. The analysis assesses the effects of these consultations on the congruence between the Commission's legislative proposals on controversial issues and EU laws. Our analysis incorporates detailed information on the type and scope of each consultation. In line with our theory, we find that the Commission had more success during the decision-making stage after conducting open consultations with large numbers of interest groups during the policy formation stage.

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More information

e-pub ahead of print date: 21 September 2014
Published date: October 2015
Organisations: Politics & International Relations

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 400379
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/400379
ISSN: 0952-1895
PURE UUID: e562fbf4-f69e-4ba4-98ba-96fef6976b11

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 15 Sep 2016 13:48
Last modified: 15 Jul 2019 20:07

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