The invalidity of the argument from illusion
The invalidity of the argument from illusion
The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that can be used to make the argument valid. But we argue that the obvious fixes are problematic. If our arguments are successful, we show that the argument from illusion is even more difficult to defend than is commonly acknowledged.
357-364
Walters, Lee
6588848d-16fa-41f1-a94b-c339c3428c13
French, Craig
7b485ca7-569b-4185-9d06-d6076ce2c1aa
October 2018
Walters, Lee
6588848d-16fa-41f1-a94b-c339c3428c13
French, Craig
7b485ca7-569b-4185-9d06-d6076ce2c1aa
Walters, Lee and French, Craig
(2018)
The invalidity of the argument from illusion.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (4), .
Abstract
The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that can be used to make the argument valid. But we argue that the obvious fixes are problematic. If our arguments are successful, we show that the argument from illusion is even more difficult to defend than is commonly acknowledged.
Text
Illusion Short.pdf
- Accepted Manuscript
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Accepted/In Press date: 17 September 2016
Published date: October 2018
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 400614
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/400614
ISSN: 2152-1123
PURE UUID: 4f792462-67df-4fb6-ad57-23b2dcc64177
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Date deposited: 20 Sep 2016 10:33
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 05:54
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Author:
Craig French
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