The Liability Rule, proprietary remedies and body parts

Abstract

Sometimes courts and commentators disavow a proprietary approach to excised body parts in the belief that non-proprietary remedies are adequate to the task. A belief of this sort, this type of conceptual resistance to the application of property law to body parts, is allegedly captured in the compendious expression known as the liability rule. Moore v Regents of the University of California clearly illustrates this type of opposition. Some recent scholarship has also tried to ground this sort of exclusive non-proprietary approach to body parts in the liability rule component of the analytical framework developed by Calabresi and Melamed. This piece interrogates the idea that nonproprietary causes of action should exclusively furnish the applicable theory of liability in relation to body parts; it suggests an understanding of the theoretical framework of Calabresi and Melamed which facilitates a proprietary approach to body parts along with current non-proprietary approaches. I argue that property, liability and inalienability rules basically serve the same purpose (protection of an entitlement in the nature of a property interest) and that the difference amongst them is one of degree rather than nature; also, none of the triad applies separately and independently of one another. Thus, I suggest that the liability rule is not essentially non-proprietary and could be used to protect a proprietary entitlement. I tested my understanding of Calabresi and Melamed’s framework against a case that involved damaged kidney in order to show the difference the framework, as conceived by me, could make to the remedial fortunes of a claimant in body parts’ litigation.

More information

Identifiers

ORCID for Remigius Nwabueze: orcid.org/0000-0002-3100-6427

Catalogue record

Export record

Altmetrics