

Corrigendum

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In the above thesis by Sanzenbacher, the following corrections have been made to the text:

I. Dating, missing word, organisational name error

Abstract, p i. 'International Missionary Conference' corrected to 'International Missionary Council'.

Abbreviations, p viii. 'International Christian Committee for Regufees' corrected to 'International Christian Committee for Refugees'.

Introduction, p2n3, line 2. '1938 and 1943' corrected to '1838 and 1843'.

Introduction, p3, line 5. 'World Conference on Faith and Order (1927)' corrected to 'Universal Christian Council of Faith and Order (1927)'.

Introduction, p17. line 1. '*The Churches and the Third Reich* in 1987 and 1988 (translated in 1977 and 1986) affirmed in...' corrected to '*The Churches and the Third Reich*, translated in 1987 and 1988, affirmed in...!'

II. Inconsistencies in spelling throughout

Delitsch. Should be: Delitzsch

Delitschianum. Should be: Delitzschianum

Delitizschianum. Should be: Delitzschianum

Eastermann. Should be: Easterman

Ehrenstrom. Should be: Ehrenstroem

Freundenberg. Should be: Freudenberg

Freundenberg's. Should be: Freudenberg's

Heckle. Should be: Heckel

Henroid. Should be: Henriod

Herman Kapler. Should be: Hermann

Hoffman. Should be: Hoffmann

Hoffman's. Should be: Hoffmann's

Karlsruhe. Should be: Karlsruhe

Kosmola. Should be: Kosmala

Marahens. Should be: Marahrens

Parke. Should be: Parkes

Parke's. Should be: Parkes'

Rania. Should be: Raina

Romania. Should be: Rumania (for historical consistency)

Soederblum. Should be: Soederblom

Tompkins. Should be: Tomkins

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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

**THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
ON THE CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO THE JEWS
AND ITS ROLE IN
ECUMENICAL PROTESTANT UNDERSTANDING OF
ANTISEMITISM AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM
DURING THE HITLER YEARS**

CAROLYN ROBINSON SANZENBACHER

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis describes a framework of ecumenical Protestant aspirations for world expansion of Jewish evangelization in the years before, during, and after Nazi extermination of European Jewry. It uses extensive archival documentation to reconstruct and analyze the developmental path of the International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews from inception in 1927 to its major collaboration on the World Council of Churches founding statement on Jews, antisemitism, and Jewish conversion in 1948. It examines the centrally informing role of the Jewish problem on a landscape of ideas, perceptions, and beliefs which ground organizational theories about relations between the Jewish problem, escalating antisemitism, and what was deemed to be a Christian imperative to evangelize Jews. The research unfolds around textual analysis of two categories of key texts in five chronologically structured chapters: ideas about Jews, the Jewish question, antisemitism, and Jewish missions, in the first, and protests against Nazi persecution of Jews, in the second. The study tracks and analyzes developing trends and patterns in organizational thought as well as cross-connections and cross-influence between key ecumenical leaders in order to explain why this principal rallying body for ecumenical emphasis on conversion of Jews was, by the eve of Hitler's rise, also the self-proclaimed 'responsible' body for making known to Protestant audiences the causes of discrimination, prejudice and race-hatred. The thesis examines the presences and absences of official ecumenical voices on behalf of Jews from 1933 to the end of the war, as well as the background internal dynamics of arriving at official organizational responses to the escalating persecution of Jews. It examines in detail the collaborative effort which led from a 1927 International Missionary Council in Budapest and Warsaw to the 1948 World Council of Churches statement that called attention, in the embers of the Holocaust, to the continuing existence of a people who did not acknowledge Christ.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Carolyn Robinson Sanzenbacher,

declare that the thesis entitled

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO THE JEWS
AND ITS ROLE IN ECUMENICAL PROTESTANT UNDERSTANDING OF
ANTISEMITISM AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM DURING THE HITLER YEARS

and the work presented in the thesis are both my own, and have been
generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that:

this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this university;

where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification
at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;

where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;

where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of
such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;

I have acknowledged all main sources of help;

where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly
what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;

none of this work has been published before submission.

Signed: Carolyn Sanzenbacher

Date: 10 October 2016

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ABBREVIATIONS

BICCAJ	British Sector ofICCAJ
CAJ	Christian Approach to the Jew
CC	<i>Christian Century</i>
CCJ	Council of Christians and Jews (British)
CFR	Church of England Council on Foreign Relations
CBMS	Conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland
CIJS	Christian Institute of Jewish Studies
DIJ	Delitzschianum Institutum Judaicum
DP	Displaced Persons
ECB	European Central Bureau for Inter-Church Aide
EICCAJ	European Sector ofICCAJ
ESR	European Student Relief
FCC	Federal Council of Churches
FCCGW	FCC Committee of Goodwill Between Christians and Jews
FFPC	French Federation of Protestant Churches
FMC	Foreign Missions Conference of North America
HMC	Home Missions Council
ICCAJ	International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews
ICCR	International Christian Committee for Refugees
<i>ICPIS</i>	<i>International Christian Press and Information Service</i>
ICSI	International Christian Social Institute
IMC	International Missionary Council
<i>IRM</i>	<i>International Review of Missions</i>
ISS	International Student Service
JTA	<i>Jewish Telegraphic Agency</i>
LON	League of Nations
NAICCAJ	North American Sector ofICCAJ
NCCJ	National Conference of Christians and Jews (US)
PP	James Parkes Papers
SCM	Student Christian Movement
SFPC	Swiss Federation of Protestant Churches
SVM	Student Volunteer Movement
UCCLW	Universal Christian Council on Life and Work
WA	World Alliance for Promoting Friendship Through the Churches
WCFO	World Conference on Faith and Order
WCC	World Council of Churches
WCCIF	World Council of Churches in Formation
WJC	World Jewish Congress
WSCF	World Student Christian Federation
WYMCA	World Alliance of YMCAs
WYWCA	World Alliance of YWCAs

INTRODUCTION

On Sunday, 22 August 1948, three years after the near extermination of European Jewry, some 351 ecclesiastically-attired delegates from 147 international churches in 44 countries marched in solemn procession through the stately Nieuwe Kirche of Amsterdam to celebrate founding of the World Council of Churches. It was an occasion of long anticipated development, driven through two world wars by the idea of a unified ecumenical voice in a world in need of the truths of Christianity. Over the course of fourteen days and through the reflective theme of 'Man's Disorder and God's Design' the delegates pondered what could be commonly said with spiritual authority about the universal Church and world disorder. The theme and content of the resulting official statements reflected not only concern for the plight of post-war society, of which surviving Jews were a part, but also the conviction that God's design for healing the world's disorder required its Christianization. As formulated in an assembly statement which repudiated antisemitism as 'sin against God and man' while calling attention to 'the continued existence of a...people which does not acknowledge Christ', this included Jewish acquiescence to Christianity.¹ Built into the WCC official statement by way of committee name, statement title, and opening words was the rubric 'the Christian Approach to the Jews'. Appearing first as a theme embodied in International Missionary Council conferences on Jewish missions in 1927, and then as a named subsidiary body of the IMC in 1929, the International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews (ICCAJ) had so stamped itself on ecumenical thinking by the time of the 1948 World Council founding assembly that ICCAJ views were considered to be representative of 'the official concern of the Protestant Churches [on] the Jewish Question'.² What these views were, why they came to be held, and how this international mission body achieved status as ecumenical Protestant expert on 'the Jewish question' during the Hitler years are categorical questions that have remained unasked. This study is an attempt to fill that gap by charting the developmental path of ICCAJ organizational views from 1927 to 1948.

The story that emerges is one of relations between ICCAJ's Jewish mission initiative, its developing theories on antisemitism, and its self-defined role as ecumenical disseminator of 'Christian' attitudes toward Jewish missions, escalating antisemitism, and 'the Jewish question'. In order to understand the unfolding story it is necessary to look at its four significant contexts. The first involves the artificial construct 'the Jewish question' (or 'Jewish problem'), which like the related construct 'antisemitism', is a conceptual and terminological constructed phenomena

¹Report of WCC Committee IV on the Christian Approach to the Jews, *The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches held at Amsterdam 22 August - 4 September 1948*, Ed., W.A. Visser't Hooft (SCM Press Ltd., 1949), 160-166.

²W.W. Simpson, General Secretary of the British Council of Christians and Jews and delegated observer of the Founding WCC Assembly. See W.W. Simpson and Ruth Weyl, Ed., *The Story of the International Council of Christians and Jews* (London, 1988), 16.

of late 19th century origin which had rooted in the languages of western culture by the period of this study. Both 'the Jewish question' (1843) and its perceived answer of 'antisemitism' (1879) were coined and conceptually constructed by non-Jews to describe *and* prescribe solution to what was said to be an existing societal problem with Jews.³ Although this constructed negative language was claimed by those who called themselves 'antisemitic' from 1879, the conceptual furnishings of 'the Jewish problem' had an appeal that extended beyond those willing to accept that 'antisemitism' was its solution. As such, the term and its conceptual furnishings were used simultaneously by both antisemitic adherents and those who eschewed antisemitism on varying grounds. ICCAJ was among latter countless groups who drew from an expanding cache of western ideas to describe, explain, and defend solutions to what was commonly understood to be a universal 'Jewish problem'. The use of the term without attendant encapsulating marks in scholarly discussion does not imply validation of any aspect of the artificial construction, but, rather, as in this thesis, a stylistic choice to keep as uncluttered as possible an already complex subject.⁴ The significance of the construct in this study lies in its centrality to the theoretical underpinnings of ICCAJ arguments on relations between a perceived Jewish problem, a societal need for Jewish conversion, and the Christian duty to evangelize Jews. In a broader dimension it plays a central role in this study of relations between the structural network of organizations that made up the burgeoning ecumenical movement of the early to mid 20th century, the streams of thought on the Jewish question, antisemitism, and Jewish evangelization moving through its complex of interlocking channels, and the official protests of its leadership against escalating Nazi suppression of Jews.


Secondly, it is necessary to set out what is meant here by the 'ecumenical movement' and its interlocking channels, both structurally and conceptually. The Greek word *oikoumene*, meaning 'the whole inhabited world', was used in early Christian history to refer to the universal breadth and reach of the Christian Church. In the second half of the 19th century, theological perception of *oikoumene* found root in developing ideas about concrete manifestations of the universal Church by way of unification in world missions and social relief. As illustrated on the

³ Seven publications bearing titles on 'the Jewish question' (*die Judenfrage*) first appeared in the German language between 1838 and 1843, the latter of which ignited a widely publicized debate between author Bruno Bauer and Karl Marx on how the Jewish question should be framed and argued. For titles and discussion about the transformation of the Jewish question into a common 'household word' in western languages, see Jacob Toury, 'The Jewish Question: A Semantic Approach', *Leo Baeck Institute Year Book XI* (1966), 85-106. See Rena Auerbach, Ed., *The 'Jewish Question' in German Speaking Countries, 1848- 1914* (NY: Garland, 1994), for the subsequent proliferation of German titles bearing the term. For classic etymology on the term, see Alex Bein, *The Jewish Question: Biography of a World Problem*, Trans., Harry Zohn (Herzl Press, 1990). For the two texts which marked the unveiling of the term 'antisemitism' (Antisemitismus), see Wilhelm Marr, *The Victory of Judentum over Germandum* (1979), excerpts of which are in Richard Levy, *Antisemitism in the Modern World* (C.C. Heath & Company, 1991), 74-93, and 'Statutes of the Anti-Semitic League (1879)', in Peter G.J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, Revised (John Wiley & Sons, 1988), 49.

⁴ Doris Bergen, *Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich* (University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 4.

right in Figure I below, by 1910 a vision of unified Christian evangelization of the inhabited world had spawned a World Protestant Missionary Conference at Edinburgh, from which the three main branches of the 20th century ecumenical movement emerged. 'World, 'International', and 'Universal' - International Missionary Council (1921), Universal Christian Council of Life and Work (1925), World Conference on Faith and Order (1927), World Council of Churches (1948) - signified shared vision of a unified Christian field of world outreach. The idea that evangelization and unity were inexorably linked was embedded in the development of the three branches that coalesced into the World Council of Churches by 1961. Intrinsically

Figure I. Principal Components of the Ecumenical Movement, Early to Mid-20th Century



related was the idea of supranational and supra-denominational ecumenical unity, which had a connotation far different from that of 'international' or 'interdenominational', even though the movement was in fact both. *Oikoumene*, as it was self-defined by leaders of the three lines of organizations that coalesced into the WCC, was neither incidental nor secondary to national and denominational allegiances, but something far greater in scope which transcended, while not erasing, denominational and national lines. Wherever such unified effort arose through these organizations, whether by way of missions, youth, education, relief, social justice, or doctrine and theology, it was always rooted in the aim of redeeming the world through Christianization. As shown in Figure I, however, the ecumenical movement of the period encompassed far more than the three lines of organizations that found roots in the 1910 World Missionary Conference.

As depicted upper left, a set of organizations was internationally active prior to the WMC: the two World Alliances of YMCA and YWCA (ca. 1844-1855); the Student Christian Movement (ca.1870s); the Student Volunteer Movement, missionary arm of the SCM (1886); and World Student Christian Federation (1895), which was founded as a central coordinating body for national SCMs. Each of these 'sister' organizations was also evangelistic in outlook and purpose. A third categorical component to the sprawling structure (bottom left in Figure I) was the World Alliance for Promotion of Friendship Through the Churches, founded in 1914 on the eve of WWI with the overt aim of improving international relations by way of churchmen and churches.

Within this broad-reaching yet intricately related web of organizations bound together by supranational and supra-denominational goals, crossover was such that personnel who were developed in one part of the structure took up leadership roles in another, often simultaneously or consecutively. As shown in Table I below, nowhere is this better illustrated than in the life work of John R. Mott, who was founder and *Ex Officio* of ICCAJ, and a principle organizer whose missionary influence on the ecumenical movement was unequalled. As founder and chairman of the World Student Christian Federation and the International Missionary Council, Mott was intricately involved with both the 'sister' organizations and the main lines of bodies that made up the central components of the ecumenical movement as it emerged after the 1910 World Missionary Conference. As these three branches of bodies developed in the 1920s, the

Table I. Founder and *Ex Officio*, ICCAJ

<p>John R. Mott (1865-1955)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Founder and Chairman, World Student Christian Federation (1895-1921) -Chairman, World Missionary Conference (1910) -Chairman, WMC Continuation Committee (1910-1921) -General Secretary, International Committee of YMCAs (1915-1928) -Founder and Chairman, International Missionary Council (1921-1944) -President, World Alliance of YMCAs (1926-1937) -Chairman, World Conference on the Christian Approach to Jews (1927) -Founder and <i>Ex Officio</i>, International Committee on the Christian Approach to Jews (1929-1944) -Nobel Peace Laureate for ecumenical organizational endeavours, 1946 -First Honorary President, World Council of Churches (1948-1954)

'sister' organizations were the repository from which leaders were chosen, and many made their way from left to right through prior service to John Mott. William Paton, Conrad Hoffmann, and Willem Visser't Hooft were all Mott-men in this period, and it would be they who would advance through the ranks to become heads of the centralizing components of the movement. Paton was moved from the SCM to the general secretariat of the IMC in 1927 and was *Ex Officio* of ICCAJ from its inception. Visser't Hooft was moved from the YMCA to the WSCF in 1927 and by 1933 was head of its general secretariat. In late 1927 Hoffmann was moved from

directorship of WSCF's International Student Service to WSCF proper and, in 1930, to directorship of ICCAJ. When the central ecumenical bodies of UCCLW and WCFO coalesced into the World Council of Churches in Formation (WCCIF) in 1938, Visser't Hooft was named principal general secretary and Paton was appointed joint general secretary while remaining general secretary of IMC and *Ex Officio* of ICCAJ. What these powerfully cross-linked roles meant for IMC and ICCAJ is that they were drawn more and more into WCCIF developing thought and plans for the witness of the Church in the war-torn and post-war worlds. What this meant for WCCIF was that it was never far from IMC/ICCAJ insistence upon the ecumenical duty to evangelize the war-torn and post-war worlds, including Jews who survived Nazi assault and extermination.

Third, an emerging story within this structural story is a portrait of James Parkes which is unfamiliar to academic scholarship. Although the literature is well aware that Parkes' work on antisemitism began while working with the International Student Service between 1928 and 1934, it has been no more than glossed that ISS itself was part and parcel of the ecumenical landscape.⁵ Yet both ICCAJ and Parkes originated and developed their ideas on antisemitism within the inner spaces of the burgeoning movement in precisely the same period. Both sets of views were developed in repudiatory response to Nazi antisemitism, and both disseminated specific strains of Protestant thought on antisemitism, the Jewish problem, and Jewish missions. A principle dissimilarity, and one of critical importance to this study, is that the thought of Parkes was often shunned by leaders of the central ecumenical bodies while that of ICCAJ was raised in formal status. The question 'why' is of course crucial, but there are other concerns as well. If it was the case that ICCAJ views were representative of Protestant churches gathering under the organizational banner of WCC, then Parkes' rejection and ICCAJ's acceptance force the question of how those views were understood by the ecumenical community that was rejecting and/or accepting them. The significance of this line of questioning comes into bold relief when faced with the still insufficiently explained fact that only a small handful of *official* ecumenical organizational protests against Nazi assaults on Jews are known to the scholarly literature, and that the few that do exist are marked by long silences in between. From this critical perspective, what was argued and disseminated by ICCAJ during the years of those

⁵ Scholarship is well acquainted with James Parkes' pioneering efforts to combat antisemitism. His published works dealing with antisemitism and the Jewish question offer a chronological documentation of his developing thought during the Hitler years. Between the now classic volumes of *The Jew and His Neighbour: A Study of the Causes of Anti-Semitism* (1930) and *An Enemy of the People: Antisemitism* (1945) he researched and published no less than 18 additional works in this area, 8 of which were produced in the year leading up to the war. The impact of Parkes' work on post-war research in the history of antisemitism is evidenced by claims of indebtedness and acclimation throughout the literature. Specific studies on Parkes are less common than are scholarly attributions, though by no means rare, having appeared in varied forms of general biographies, theological biographical studies, and multi-disciplinary works on aspects and periods in the history of antisemitism.

assaults, how it was understood, and how that wider understanding may (or may not) have contributed to official ecumenical responses to Nazi antisemitism become pre-eminent questions.

As this study reveals, however, any focus on official ecumenical organizational responses to Nazi suppression of Jews requires that it be placed within the context of its interwar and war-time structural development if those responses are in fact to be adequately understood. It also requires at least rudimentary understanding of the historical crisis which threatened to sever the unity of the ecumenical structure in the interwar years, for it was clearly within the context of that historical threat that leaders of the central ecumenical bodies made decisions about official voices and silences during the Hitler years. While this is not to say that it was the only context in which those decisions were made, it is to say that the history of that ecumenical crisis, which is outlined below, created a hovering fourth context that must not be ignored when evaluating official ecumenical organizational responses to escalating suppression of Jews between 1933 and 1945.

In a vein of development that did not proceed from the World Missionary Conference but nevertheless converged with UCCLW and WCCIF, an Anglo-German coalition was formed in 1910 to advance mutual understanding between nations. With aims reaching beyond borders of their respective nations, the 'Associated Councils of Churches in the British and German Empires for Fostering Friendly Relations between the Two Peoples' had by 1914 organized a conference of world churchmen in search of sustainable peace through Christian unity. The meeting of 150 delegates from 13 nations, the majority of which were British, German, and American, was planned for 3-4 August in Constance, Germany.⁶ But by the end of July Europe was mobilizing for war and little more than half of the delegates were able to reach Constance by 1 August, the day Germany declared war on Russia. A one-day meeting was convened on 2 August in which a central coordinating body was formed to facilitate cooperation between national committees of churchmen pledged to mutual understanding and world peace. Delegates armed with a message of the 'collective and inescapable duty of the churches...to bring about friendly international relationships' were escorted the following morning on 3 August 'through swarming masses of German troops' as far as the Dutch border.⁷ Germany declared war on France while the delegates were in transit. Those arriving in London on 4 August, just hours

⁶ The following account is derived from Nils Karlstroem, 'Movements of International Friendship and Life and Work, 1910-1925', 509-544, and Nils Ehrenstroem, 'Movements of International Friendship and Life and Work, 1925-1948', 545-598), *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, prev. cit.; Charles Bailey, 'The Verdict of French Protestantism against Germany in the First World War', *Church History* Vol. 58, No.1 (Mar 1989), 66-82; Charles Bailey, 'The British Protestant Theologians in the First World War: Germanophobia Unleashed', *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol.77, No.2 (April 1984), 195-221; Daniel Borg, 'German Protestants and the Ecumenical Movements: The War Guilt Imbroglio, 1919-1926', *A Journal of Church and State*, Vol.10, No.1 (Winter 1968), 51-71; Daniel Gorman, *Emergence of International Society in the 1920s* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 213-226.

⁷ Karlstroem, 512-515.

after Britain too had declared war, exercised hope in the new supranational body by naming it the World Alliance of Churches for Promoting International Friendship.⁸

Before the month was out, however, ecclesiastic charges of German aggression had provoked German Protestant leaders in world missions to issue a public 'Appeal to Protestant Christians Abroad', urging against a 'war in ecumenical relations'.⁹ Even though it made clear that an 'incurable rent' in ecumenical fellowship was imminent if efforts persisted in turning the mission field into a battlefield, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York (with the support of 40 other ecclesiastics) responded with a scathing statement on Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality on 1 October.¹⁰ German theologians hit back promptly with a more widely broadcast 'Appeal to the Civilized World', insisting that Germany's actions were pre-emptive. Churchmen from both Belgium and France followed in suit with accusations of German aggressions and civilian brutalities.¹¹ By the time Germany sank the *Lusitania* off the coast of Ireland on 7 May 1915 and England released its infamous Bryce Report in thirty languages five days later, claims and judgments about German war-guilt were pervasive throughout western ecclesiastic circles.¹²

It was not until late 1917 that appeals to Christian unity manifested in a small meeting to plan a united conference on peace at war's end. Swedish Archbishop Nathan Soederblom had attempted a larger conclave at Uppsala but churchmen from Germany, Britain, and France had refused participation. Committees of Protestant churchmen from Germany and Austria declined on grounds that German causes were defensive and just, that a formal meeting with enemies could be seen as disloyalty to Germany, and that such meetings would be possible only after Germany had secured 'honourable peace'.¹³ The Archbishops of Canterbury and York declined on grounds that England's moral principles 'had been infringed upon in the most brutal manner by German violation of Belgian neutrality'. Protestant leaders in France, who had failed to receive the meeting invitation until after the proposed date, insisted that it was illusory to speak of Christian brotherhood until German troops were out of France and German Christians had shown 'sign[s] of penitence for the crimes committed by their country'.¹⁴ The armistice of November 1918 brought no relief, and neither did the Versailles Treaty in June 1919, which assigned blame to Germany and allies for 'all loss and damage' of the war.¹⁵ In less than a month

⁸ The organization was renamed the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship Through the Churches in 1915.

⁹ Bailey, 66-70. 'Appeal to Protestant Christians Abroad' was signed by 29 theologians/scholars.

¹⁰ Bailey, 202-204.

¹¹ Bailey, 71, 202. 'Appeal to the Civilized World' 3 days later was signed by 93 theologians/scholars.

¹² *Ibid.* *The Bryce Report*, 12 May 1915, concluded that German atrocities in the first four months of the war were 'unparalleled in any war between civilized nations during the last three centuries'.

¹³ Karlstroem, 525.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, Section 1, Article 231, 'The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies'.

Prussian Protestant churches issued a 'holy protest' insisting that Protestant leaders from other western nations declare the Versailles Treaty and its 'scar' on Germany unjust.¹⁶ Churchmen from France and Belgium responded by declaring that they would not be involved ecumenically with Germany until her own churchmen had openly acknowledged Germany's wrongs.¹⁷

All of these tensions were present at the first post-war conference of the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship at Oud Wassenaar (Netherlands) in September 1919. Yet British delegates eased tensions by agreeing with German churchmen that they should not be expected to grant Germany's guilt in order to participate in an ecumenical organization.¹⁸ Contiguous with that goodwill was an emerging conference idea that nationality could possibly be superseded by condemning war itself as moral failure, and German delegates eventually declared before the conclave of 60 from 14 nations that they 'personally considered Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality an act of moral transgression'.¹⁹ In turn, Belgian and French delegates agreed to cooperate with all German Christians 'who could subscribe to this German declaration'.²⁰ Yet instead of reaping ecumenical appeasement the German declaration at Oud Wassenaar exacerbated the problem. Even though the five German delegates made clear they were not speaking on behalf of Germany or the German Church, non-delegate churchmen from Germany saw the declaration as 'national self-abasement', while non-delegate churchmen from France saw it only as a model for a stronger admission of German guilt.²¹ Spreading bitterness was such by November 1919 that the French Federation of Protestant Churches demanded 'that German churches confess their nation's war guilt publicly as pre-requisite to participation at ecumenical meetings'.²² The tension had so heightened by August 1920 that the war-guilt issue broke out at a Geneva planning conference brokered by Soederblom for the very purpose of advancing ecumenical unity. The French Protestant Federation, supported by Belgian delegates, presented a formal document to the 90 delegates from 15 countries, stressing that unity was a 'necessity' of ecumenism and that it could not be realized so long as this 'unresolved moral problem still stood as a barrier'.²³ Although simultaneously admitting the common guilt of all churches for having 'failed to imbue the nations with the spirit of the Gospel', the French and Belgian ecumenicists were reserving a 'special guilt' for the churches of the 'Central Power', arguing that there could be no ecumenical unity so long 'as they kept silence'.²⁴

By common consent, the matter of war guilt was not on the official agenda of the 1925 Stockholm Conference on Life and Work which evolved from that 1920 meeting. Yet this

¹⁶ Pastoral letter of the Prussian General Superintendents, 20 July 1919, Borg, 51.

¹⁷ Karlstroem, 531. The Oud Wassenaar conference was held 30 September -3 October 1919.

¹⁸ Ibid, 532; Bailey, 75.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Borg, 55.

²³ Karlstroem, 537.

²⁴ Ibid. See also Borg, 55-57.

historic meeting that brought together 600 delegates from 37 nations to effectively launch the first central body of the ecumenical movement became a showdown of the ecumenical issue.²⁵ The 80 German churchmen were so incensed by sermons that spoke of the League of Nations as a body to mediate God's earthly kingdom that the ecumenical issue began to spew unofficially. The more it appeared that consensus was moving toward a pacifist position that condemned all wars, the more that German delegates argued that wars of defence and patriotism should always be valid. When Hermann Kapler, head of the executive committee of the German Evangelical Churches, raised objections to any unified resolution on war, doubts were correspondingly raised about any form of moral commitment from Germany against war. Throughout remainder of the conference there was increasing concern that failure to resolve the German war-guilt issue would 'recoil heavily upon the emerging reputation' of the ecumenical movement.²⁶ By conference end the issue had materialized in the form of a German letter calling for clarification of 'the War Guilt Question' as a moral 'task of importance...[to] future ecumenical co-operative work of the Churches'.²⁷ What was being sought by Hermann Kapler was a formal distinction between the moral and political aspects of the guilt problem, one that would free the ecumenical movement of political stain, on the one hand, and exculpate German consciences, on the other. What was being required of non-German ecumenical leaders was some form of 'agreement that the war guilt confession, imposed without previous investigation and out of purely political motives, should not be recognized *res judicata*'.²⁸

Solution was not found, however, until a 1926 conference in Berne, Switzerland. The sought for statement, says historian Daniel Borg, was 'disarmingly simple' in generalities. It neither removed nor assigned German blame while staking moral and ethical claims that 'right' could not be determined by war, that no final moral judgment could be established by political instruments, and that confessions imposed by force 'in any domain whatsoever' had no 'moral value'.²⁹ Both the Continuation Committee on Life and Work (which had emerged from the Stockholm Conference) and the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship Through the Churches also jointly agreed that it was 'the duty of every Communion...to emphasize the supranational character of the Church, and...to do all in its power to cultivate international fellowship on a Christian basis'.³⁰

With all of this as historical legacy, the Continuation Committee on Life and Work established in 1928 an International Christian Social Institute in Geneva, whose aim was study

²⁵ For an overview of the historic Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work that launched the ecumenical movement, see Nathan Soederblom and Adolf Keller, 'Echoes of Stockholm', *Review of the Churches*, No. 3 (1926), 351-362.

²⁶ Borg, 59-69; Ehrenstroem, 565.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.; *res judicata*, a matter already judged that cannot be pursued further.

²⁹ Ibid., 69. The agreement was not officially approved by the German Churches and the Prussian General Synod until 1927.

³⁰ Ehrenstroem, 577.

and promotion of Christian ethics, social justice, and the supranational unity of the universal Church. In 1930 the Committee and its Institute were reorganized as a constituted Universal Christian Council for Life and Work (UCCLW). With Geneva as its administrative base, four regional sectors were established in Continental Europe, Britain, America, and Constantinople, each of which was bound to the other by way of commitment to the ecumenical supranational ideal embedded within. In December of the same year world attention was drawn to UCCLW when Archbishop Nathan Soederblom was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for orchestrating into existence this sprawling international body whose first stated aim was 'to be a mouthpiece for Christianity and...Christian conscience'.³¹ In his acceptance speech Soederblom hailed UCCLW as an 'Ecumenical Council...as magnificent an achievement as the League of Nations', and he cited among its first concrete accomplishments the 1926 Berne document that had solved the ecumenical war-guilt dilemma, which was referred to as the 'testimony about the cause of the World War'.³²

The negotiated statement to which Soederblom made reference, however, did not mark the end of ecumenical concern about the integrity of the movement. Twenty-six months later the supranational structure of UCCLW was threatened again by German withdrawal, just as it had been at the 1925 conference that had given rise to the structure. The issue reigniting the threat in March 1933 was not Germany's guilt for WWI but, rather, non-German ecumenical protest of Germany's handling of its 'Jewish problem', and the threat was being delivered, just as in 1925, by Hermann Kapler, who was by then also president of the Continental division of UCCLW.

To place ICCAJ squarely within this structural and historical development, the 1925 August conference which produced both Kapler's demand and the Continuation Committee that evolved into UCCLW *also* produced the unanimity on social concern that manifested in the International Christian Social Institute. The 600 delegates from 37 nations had jointly affirmed the need for a marshalling of Christian forces in the area of 'burning' social problems,³³ and in the wake of that focus the IMC missionary thrust so central to ecumenical aims launched plans in fall 1925 for an international conference on the Jewish problem.³⁴

Appearing first as the theme of two weeks of conferences in Budapest and Warsaw in April 1927, then as title of a widely distributed conference report that was recommended to 'all churches of Christendom',³⁵ and, last, as the name of an international body with divisions in Britain, Continental Europe, and North America, the ICCAJ was by the eve of Hitler's rise not

³¹ Nathan Soederblom Nobel Lecture, 'The Role of the Church in Promoting Peace', 11 December 1930, www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1930.html.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Karlstroem, 540-542; Bell, *The Stockholm Conference 1925 Official Report*, 17-18, 20, *prev. cit.*

³⁴ 'The Jewish Problem: Some Newer Aspects', *International Review of Missions*, Vol.14, No.4 (October 1925), 598-607.

³⁵ *The World Mission of Christianity: Messages and Recommendations of the International Missionary Council*, Jerusalem, 24 March-8 April 1928 (IMC, 1928), 73.

only the principal rallying body for ecumenical emphasis on conversion of Jews, it was also the self-proclaimed responsible body for making known the causes of race-hatred, prejudice, and discrimination.³⁶

From ICCAJ inception the Jewish problem was a centrally-informing principle of its development. That the Jewish problem existed wherever Jewish populations were dense enough to manifest undesirable 'Jewish' traits and behaviours, that Jews worsened societal conditions by refusing to assimilate and convert, and that it was in the interest of both Jews and society for Jews to be converted were all mainstay tenets that informed ICCAJ understanding. Encircling this understanding were the convictions that the Church was being called to greater tolerance and love for Jews, and that it had to openly declare such tolerance and love by proclaiming that conversion to Christianity was the only way to solve the Jewish problem, heal disintegrating society, and destroy society's enmity against the Jew. As the predominant form of that enmity, antisemitism, while having racial components, was viewed in great part as societal response to Jews. Antisemitism was thus explained as an un-Christian response to a real societal problem, on the one hand, and a compendium of racial doctrines that were inherently anti-Christian, on the other. In reference to this latter form, it was more and more said that 'wherever the grisly head of antisemitism is raised the real struggle is about Christianity'.³⁷ Antisemitism was also seen as something of potential benefit to Jewish mission efforts. While being unequivocally off-limits to Christians, it yet had the positive attribute of 'scourging' Jews toward the saving grace of Christianity.³⁸ Like tenets of understanding about the Jewish problem, these perceived un-Christian, anti-Christian, and opportunistic characteristics of antisemitism were central to both the formation of ICCAJ and the development of its aims, programs, and methodologies.

When James Parkes began working for the Student Christian Movement in 1923 ICCAJ was not in existence, but relations established there placed him in the line of exposure when it was created. The network of student ecumenical organizations, of which Parkes was a part, was the pool from which William Paton, Conrad Hoffmann, and Willem Visser't Hooft were later chosen for leadership positions, and it would be they with whom he would contend on ICCAJ issues. By the time Parkes took up work on antisemitism after moving to ISS in 1928, Mott's aim to create a central coordinating body for a new Christian approach to Jews was already in the works, and it included as legacy from the 1927 Budapest-Warsaw conferences a set of ideas that would be vastly different from those which Parkes would derive and develop. Parkes' first book on the causes of antisemitism in 1930 undermined those ideas in critical ways.³⁹ He

³⁶ *The World Mission of Christianity: Messages and Recommendations of the International Missionary Council*, Jerusalem, 24 March-8 April 1928 (IMC, 1928), 73.

³⁷ For example, Minutes from the United Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jew, 11 June 1940; WCC.261201.6.

³⁸ For example, ICCAJ executive J. van Nes, 'Anti-Semitism on the Continent of Europe', 13-14 June 1932, WCC.26120.

³⁹ James Parkes, *The Jew and His Neighbour* (London: SCM Press, 1930).

rejected any causal explanation of antisemitism that focused on Jewish actions and behaviors; dismissed explanations rooted in supernatural causes, including the argument that Jews self-caused divine punishment by crucifying Christ; and, unlike the ICCAJ tenet that antisemitism could only be solved by Jewish conversion, he insisted that it could and must be solved by human intelligence and action. Over the next years, the development of these sets of works constituted two widely divergent theories *about* antisemitism. In terms of theoretical type, ICCAJ's was based on belief in a Christian conversional cure for both antisemitism and the Jewish problem, while Parkes' was based on historical evidence which located antisemitism and the Jewish problem in Christianity's foundational teaching on Jews.

The mounting tensions between ICCAJ and Parkes is a critical story within the story of how ICCAJ views came to be seen as representative of the 'official concern of the Protestant Churches [on] the Jewish question'.⁴⁰ The other story within that story - the ecumenical quest for supranational unity - is likewise critical. The hovering history of threatened ecumenism in the interwar period pivoted around concern that division would recoil upon the integrity of the ecumenical movement. When Kapler warned about consequences of non-German ecumenical protests against Nazi treatment of German Jews in March 1933, the re-visiting of that history set off an international volley of behind-the-scenes discussions about if, when, how, and under what circumstances ecumenical bodies bound together by precepts of supranational unity could or should publicly criticize a member country. In the precise period that ICCAJ views were in the process of becoming representative of 'the Protestant Churches [on] the Jewish Question', in other words, the overarching theme of supranational unity that bound ecumenical leaders was informing ecumenical corporate decisions on what could be said about Nazi persecution of German Jews in official statements. This study is concerned with both of these parallel stories insofar as they are part of the related processes that culminated in official WCC identification with ICCAJ views on Jews, antisemitism, and Jewish missions in the early post-WWII period.

II. In order to understand where this contextually layered study fits in the scholarly literature, it is necessary to look first at the ecumenical self-perception of the term 'ecumenical' and its relation to the idea of 'ecumenical protest'. Primary source collections offering evidence of ecumenical protest against Nazism began to be issued by WCCIF in Geneva as early as 1942. A series on the militant witness of the Church was produced and distributed by the research department of WCCIF for the purpose of advancing the ecumenical ideal of the universal Church and its role as guardian of God's will in state, nation, and society. The first in the *Ecclesia Militans* series, *The Church Speaks to the World*, was meant to serve as evidence of a 'militant church' at work, one that was conscious of its 'essential unity' and 'ready to pay the price in suffering and persecution' in order to defend it. This collection of 40 church statements

⁴⁰ W.W. Simpson, *The Story of the International Council of Christians and Jews*, prev. cit.

from 10 countries who were said to be 'in open conflict' was intended to document and promote an ecumenical church standing up to whatever warred against the Church universal.⁴¹ In so doing, protests against anti-Jewish decrees and actions were intermingled (often within the same document) with protests against the anti-Christian nature of racial-national ideology, state interference with the Church, and/or attempts to usurp the Church as guardian of conscience. The resulting conflation of protests in *The Church Speaks to the World*, as well as *The Church and the Jewish Question: Attitude of the Churches and of Christian Leaders in Anglo-Saxon Countries* (published in 1944),⁴² was reinforced by post-war statements against antisemitism in a third explicitly titled collection, *The Relationship of the Church to the Jewish People: A Collection of Statements made by the World Council of Churches and Representative Bodies of Its Member Churches*, which was published in collaboration with ICCAJ after it had been subsumed by WCC as the Committee on the Church and the Jewish People in 1961.⁴³ The idea at work in all of these WCC collections was that 'ecumenical' was coterminous with WCCIF and its member churches.

A collection of primary source documents which did *not* bear a WCC imprint did not appear until the close of the 1960s and, when it did, it was made by an executive secretary of WCC from 1961 to 1967. In the same year that this first of Armin Boyens's two classic volumes on ecumenism and the *Kirchenkampf* appeared in 1969,⁴⁴ another collection of primary source documents was published by Johan Snoek who was executive secretary of the WCC Committee on the Church and the Jewish People from 1970 to 1975.⁴⁵ In a different way, and for different purpose, Snoek presented excerpted church statements with interpretive commentary in *The Grey Book: A Collection of Protests Against Anti-Semitism and the Persecution of Jews Issued by Non-Roman Catholic Churches and Church Leaders During Hitler's Rule*. Yet, however different in method and scope, the work of both widely-cited collections proceeded through the lens of traditional WCC viewing of 'ecumenical', and each worked to advance the idea of WCC as an unsilenceable entity even as it was hampered by structural limitations and conditions of war. Boyens, for example, claimed in two summary essays that 'again and again the World Council of Churches tried to be the mouthpiece of the persecuted Jewish people in Europe',⁴⁶

⁴¹ *The Church Speaks to the World*, Series Ecclesia Militans I (WCC, 1942), 1-2.

⁴² *The Church and the Jewish Question: Attitude of the Churches and of Christian Leaders in Anglo-Saxon Countries* (WCC, 1944).

⁴³ *The Relationship of the Church to the Jewish People: Collection of Statements made by the World Council of Churches and Representative Bodies of Its Member Churches* (WCC, 1962).

⁴⁴ Armin Boyens, *Kirchenkampf und Oekumene, 1933-1939: Darstellung und Dokumentation* (Kaiser, 1969); *Kirchenkampf und Oekumene, 1939-1945: Darstellung und Dokumentation* (Kaiser, 1973).

⁴⁵ Johan M. Snoek, *The Grey Book: A Collection of Protests Against Anti-Semitism and the Persecution of Jews Issued by Non-Roman Catholic Churches and Church Leaders During Hitler's Rule* (Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1969).

⁴⁶ Boyens, 'The Ecumenical Community and the Holocaust', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 450 (July, 1980), 140-152, quotation, 144; 'The World Council of Churches and Its Activities on Behalf of the Jews in the Nazi Period', *Judaism and Christianity Under the Impact of*

while Snoek set the stage for a WCCIF who, although it was said to be unable to speak because it was 'in formation', was nevertheless able to stir 'Churches in the free world...to action'.⁴⁷

Uriel Tal, the late Israeli scholar who has written masterfully about the anti-Christian aspects of antisemitism, recognized and confronted the apologetic tendency to conflate protests in *The Grey Book's* introduction, which he was invited to write.⁴⁸ After studying the contents of the volume, as well as parts of documents that had been omitted, he concluded that 'the protest of the Church against the persecution and annihilation of the Jews was an inseparable part of its general protest against the inhumane and anti-Christian character of modern anti-Semitism', and not just a protest on behalf of Jews.⁴⁹ He also argued that multiple categories of 'historical and theological questions' remained unanswered. In the case of the Church standing against the anti-Christian nature of antisemitism, Tal found that the documents in the Snoek volume were 'a clear confirmation of the Church's repudiation of Nazi doctrines, not only when directed against the Jews, but, *first and foremost*, when they threatened the very existence of the Church itself ...'.⁵⁰ In the case of relations between Christian protests and Christian beliefs, he found that even though 'the Church raised its voice against the persecution of Jews out of human motives, as well as in the hope of strengthening its own members', beliefs about Jews remained unchanged and the concept of the Jew as an 'impenitent' who had to be 'saved' continued to endure.⁵¹ In terms of the conditions of Christian protests, he found that there were multiple questions about 'the actual situation as it existed', including whether protests were raised at the right time and under the right circumstances to mitigate persecution or postpone annihilation, and whether they had any effect in strengthening Christian resistance to Nazi persecutions of Jews.⁵² Tal also made clear at the end of his critique that 'a collection of sources on the protest of the Church does not preclude the fact that there existed other positions among Christians', namely 'the position of cooperation with antisemitism, whether active or passive, direct or indirect, with knowledge or without, voluntary or through coercion'.⁵³ This was said in conjunction with his critical concern that 'by concentrating on only one aspect of the interrelationship between Christianity and Judaism during the period of the Holocaust', a collection of such sources would 'confuse the reader into thinking that protest was the prime characteristic and policy of the church regarding antisemitism, the persecution of the Jews, and their extermination'.⁵⁴

National Socialism, Otto Dov Kulka and Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, Eds, (Historical Society of Israel, 1987), 453-469, quotation, 458.

⁴⁷ Snoek, *The Grey Book*, 270.

⁴⁸ Uriel Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany: Religion, Politics, and Ideology in the Second Reich, 1870-1914*, Translated by Noah Jonathan Jacobs (Cornell University Press, 1975).

⁴⁹ Uriel Tal, 'Introduction', *The Grey Book* (I-XXVI), VII.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, I, italics added.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, XX-XXIII.

⁵² *Ibid.*, XVIII-XXV; XXIV-XXV.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, XXV-XXVI.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

A closer look at Boyens' later summaries helps to explain how the conflation which Tal warned about culminated in Boyens' generalized perception that 'again and again the World Council of Church tried to be the mouthpiece of the persecuted Jewish people in Europe'. In 'The Ecumenical Community and the Holocaust' (1980), and again in 'The World Council of Churches and Its Activities on Behalf of the Jews in the Nazi Period' (1987), Boyens stressed this point in three generalized ways:

The ecumenical fellowship of the churches became manifest in a special way in the work of the WCC and its member churches, not only for the Christian non-Aryans but for all persecuted Jews in Europe.⁵⁵

The reaction of the churches of the WCC in Europe was one of protest, in varying degrees.⁵⁶

The member churches of the WCC and the staff of the WCC raised their voices in protest against the persecution of the Jewish people. In almost all of the churches there were small minorities, brave men and women, who took up the fight for the rights of the persecuted and who tried to help the refugees. In some instances whole churches protested publicly and thereby resisted Hitler's policy of extermination by their word and deed.⁵⁷

The idea ultimately expressed - that 'ecumenical' was coterminous with WCC and WCC was coterminous with its member churches - is brought into focus as Boyens' elaboration of those generalized claims settles into a conflation of acts (and actors) ranging from refugee aid, fund raising and donations from multiple sources, pastoral letters and sermons in an array of constituent churches, cooperation with resistance movements, letters to the Red Cross, hiding and smuggling of Jews across borders by associated organizations, speeches in the House of Lords by Anglican leaders, transfer of information, and so on. While such non-critical lumping of actors and acts says much about the broad-reaching inclusiveness of 'ecumenical' as it was WCCIF-envisioned, it tells little about how 'ecumenical' is or can be distinguished from the generalized category of Church responses to Nazi persecution of Jews.

In such approaches, the abstract concept 'ecumenical' is fused with the identity of the concrete WCC organization and, included in that fusing are the constituent church bodies that make up the membership of the organization. This conflation into a single identity not only results in a confusion of actors and acts, it obscures differences and thereby invites errors of misinterpretation. Discernment is confounded when 'ecumenical' organizational responses are conflated with responses by individuals who may have been part of ecumenism but were not speaking or acting on behalf of an ecumenical organization. When this web of ecumenical blurriness is stretched and applied to include any of a number of individuals in any of a number

⁵⁵ Boyens, 'The World Council of Churches and Its Activities on Behalf of the Jews in the Nazi Period' (1987), 467; 'The Ecumenical Community and the Holocaust' (1980), 140, repeated 152.

⁵⁶ Ibid., the two essays respectively, 464; 149.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 467; 140, 151-152.

of WCCIF member churches all sight of corresponding relations between the generalized claim and the particular acts of protest as they actually happened has been lost.

Yet it is also unmistakably the case that conflation is inherent to 'ecumenical', given that every ecumenical leader (and member) of the movement wore more than one identifying hat. As Norman Goodall, general secretary of IMC and *Ex Officio* of ICCAJ explained in early 1945, he was a British Congregationalist working in the service of multiple denominational churches and 'Christian agencies of differing nations and denominations', the sum total of which was 'the Ecumenical Movement'.⁵⁸ There is thus clearly a sense in which 'ecumenical' can and should be broadly applied in scholarly discussion. Indeed, to ignore the broader application of the term where appropriate would be to fog the shared ideas of supranational unity that not only gripped leading ecumenists of the period but were central to the origin and development of the movement.

The complexities of sorting all of this out when looking at 'ecumenical' responses to Nazi persecution of Jews are enormous, and all approaches are hampered by problems of definition, range of application, and usage of terms. Generally speaking, historiography has not remained content with one dimensional litanies of Church responses, nor has it expressed much interest in exploration of WCCIF as the sole subject of ecumenical protest. In viewing scholarly treatment of 'ecumenical' chronologically most of the work falls within the historiography of the *Kirchenkampf*, into which the central ecumenical bodies were drawn by virtue of relations to the German Church. In 1974, historian John Conway paid tribute to the ongoing efforts of Franklin Littell, whose work had drawn attention to the 'essentially ecumenical character' of the German Church struggle.⁵⁹ Armin Boyens' 1969 volume, *Kirchenkampf und Oikumene: 1933-1939*, was fitted into the discussion in this respect as the 'first' to make use of the primary WCC archives. The point being made was that the *Kirchenkampf* itself was 'ecumenical', in the sense that the German Church struggle was something that 'churches of the world could ignore only at their peril'.⁶⁰ That the *Kirchenkampf* was 'of enormous significance' in both the history of the Church and 'the development of the ecumenical movement', was both previously and subsequently expressed in varying degrees and varying ways.⁶¹ Eberhard Bethge's biography of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in 1967 (translated in 1970) had already sprinkled throughout its 800 pages a substantial account of ecumenical involvement,⁶² and Klaus Scholder's standard volumes on

⁵⁸ Norman Goodall, *The Ecumenical Movement: What it is and What it does*, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 1961), 1-2.

⁵⁹ John S. Conway, 'The Present State of Research and Writing on the Church Struggle', *The German Church Struggle and the Holocaust*, Ed., Franklin Littell and Hubert Locke (Wayne State Press, 1974), 31.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Eberhard Bethge, *Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian, Christian, Contemporary* [German edition 1967], Trans., Eric Mosbacher, Peter and Betty Ross, Frank Clarke, William Glen-Doepel under editorship of Edwin Robertson (Collins, 1970).

The Churches and the Third Reich, translated in 1987 and 1988, affirmed in greater detail that such involvement was not a trivial feature of the German Church struggle.⁶³ Victoria Barnett's *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler* advanced this generally accepted understanding in 1992.⁶⁴ Wolfgang Gerlach's *And The Witnesses Were Silent*, translated in 2000, went so far as to claim that 'the events of 1933 and their effect on the Confessing Church's subsequent position toward the Jews cannot be understood without some consideration of concurrent developments in the ecumenical world'.⁶⁵ Other studies moved beyond the references threaded throughout these important volumes to look closer, both directly and indirectly, at relations between central ecumenical organizations and the German Church at various points of the ongoing struggle and its aftermath in 1945. The 1934 Barmen Declaration of the Confessing Church, the UCCLW Conference that launched WCCIF in 1937, and the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt in 1945 have all received attention as points of ecumenical input and/or influence on events related to the German Church struggle.⁶⁶

A number of diverse studies focusing otherwise have made important contributions to scholarly understanding by looking at international,⁶⁷ European,⁶⁸ American,⁶⁹ and British⁷⁰

⁶³ Klaus Scholder, *The Churches and the Third Reich, Volume One: Preliminary History and the Time of Illusions, 1918-1934; Volume Two, The Year of Disillusionment: 1934 Barmen and Rome*, Ed., Gerhard Besier, Dieter Kleinmann, Joerg Thierfelder; Trans., John Bowden (SCM Press, 1987 and 1988).

⁶⁴ Victoria Barnett, *For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler* (Oxford University Press, 1992).

⁶⁵ Wolfgang Gerlach, *And the Witnesses Were Silent: The Confessing Church and the Persecution of the Jews*, [German edition 1987], Trans., Victoria Barnett (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 49.

⁶⁶ Barmen 1934: Burton Nelson, '1934: Pivotal Year of the Church Struggle', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 4.3 (1989), 283-297; Keith Clements, 'Barmen and the Ecumenical Movement', *Ecumenical Review*, Vol. 61, No.1 March 2009, 6-16. Oxford 1937: Kenneth C. Barnes, 'The German Church Struggle and the Oxford Conference', *Holocaust and Church Struggle: Religion, Power, and the Politics of Resistance*, H.G. Locke and Marcia Sachs Littell, Ed. (University Press of America, 1996), 140-162. Stuttgart 1945: John Conway, 'How Shall the Nations Repent? The Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, October 1945', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* Vol. 18, No. 4 (October 1987), 596-622; Matthew Hockenos, *A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past* (Indiana University Press, 2004).

⁶⁷ Peter W. Ludlow, 'The International Protestant Community in the Second World War,' *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 29, No.3 (July 1978), 311-362, still stands as an invaluable study of the rise of international Protestantism through WCCIF during WWII.

⁶⁸ Klemens von Klemperer, *German Resistance Against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 1933-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

⁶⁹ William E. Nawyn, *American Protestantism's Response to Germany's Jews and Refugees, 1933-1941* (UMI Research Press, 1980); Robert Ross, *So It Was True: The American Protestant Press and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews* (University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Gerald Sittser, *A Cautious Patriotism: American Churches and the Second World War* (University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Gerhard Besier, *Religion, State and Society in the Transformations of the Twentieth Century: Modernization, Innovation and Decline* (Berlin and London, 2007), particularly "'The Friends...in America need to know the truth": The German Churches in the Opinion of the United States (1933-1941)', 81-124, and 'In Contradiction to the Grassroots?: The Stance of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ Toward the "Third Reich" ', 125-149.

⁷⁰ Andrew Chandler, 'A Question of Fundamental Principles: The Church of England and the Jews of Germany 1933-1937', *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* (1993), 221-262, and *Brethren in Adversity: George Bell, the Church of England and the Crisis of German Protestantism* (Woodbridge, 1997); Tom Lawson, 'The Anglican Understanding of Nazism 1933-1945: Placing the Church of England's Response to the

aspects of ecumenism as part of larger questions about the spread of international Protestantism during WWII, German resistance to Nazism, American Protestant response to Nazism and persecution of Jews, and Church of England attitudes toward Nazism and the plight of Jews. That 'ecumenical' can be profitably examined by looking at its parts has been made clear in all of these works. Tom Lawson's study of relations between the ecumenical idea of supranational unity adopted by Anglican leaders and the resulting attitudes toward Nazism and the German churches is particularly significant for it stands alone in isolating a denominational instantiation of an 'ecumenical impulse' that influenced attitudes and positions taken in the interwar, war, and early post-war years.⁷¹ In that singular way, Victoria Barnett, who is in the unique position of having made contributions to all of these categories of inquiry, has gone furthest in attempting to separate 'ecumenical' from the more generalized category of church protests.⁷² Since 1998 Barnett has incrementally attempted to unravel conflation of church protests on behalf of Jews by looking at statements that can be attributed to the 'ecumenical Christian movement'.⁷³ The overall trend of these studies, which are by no means plentiful, tends toward more nuanced understanding of 'ecumenical' by looking at churches, organizations, and individuals within denominations and nations who are also part of the wider ecumenical movement. Individuals are hence singled out, first, as churchmen of a particular denomination or nation and, second, as ecumenists, for ecumenism is generally employed as an incidental and secondary condition of one's national and/or denominational affiliation with world Protestant Christianity.

In this study 'ecumenical' will be treated in a specific supranational context for the precise purpose of examining the supranational nature of official ecumenical organizational protests against Nazi persecution of Jews. One of the primary tasks of this thesis is to look at the 'oneness' of official statements while taking into account the background plurality of concerns and attitudes that informed those statements. Of the lines of development converging into WCCIF, UCCLW was the central social-action arm of ecumenical development until WCCIF was brought into existence in 1938. The statements and actions of both UCCLW and WCCIF from 1933-1938 and 1938-1945, respectively, thus constitute the closest approximation to what can be cautiously inferred as official ecumenical organizational attitude. While it is indeed the case that representations of Christian organizations and churches as monolithic in

Holocaust in Context', *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol.14, No.2 (2003), 112-137, and *The Church of England and the Holocaust: Christianity, Memory and Nazism* (Boydell Press, 2006).

⁷¹ Ibid, Tom Lawson, *The Church of England and the Holocaust*, 56-57, 122-1124, 171-172.

⁷² Victoria Barnett has published two major translations of works dealing with the *Kirchenkampf* (Eberhardt Bethge's *Bonhoeffer* and Wolfgang Gerlach's *And the Witnesses Were Silent*, both in 2000), in addition to her own 1992 study on Protestant protest in Germany, as well as studies on British, American, and general ecumenical responses to Nazi persecution of Jews.

⁷³ Barnett, 'The Role of the Churches: Compliance and Confrontation', *Dimensions*, Vol.14, No.1 (1998); 'Barmen, the Ecumenical Movement, and the Jews: the Missing Thesis' *Ecumenical Review*, Vol.61 No.1, March 2009, 17-23; ; Victoria Barnett, 'Christian and Jewish Interfaith Efforts During the Holocaust: The Ecumenical Context', *American Responses to Kristallnacht*, Maria Massenga, Ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 13-29.

attitude are generally rejected by analyses of differing attitudes within those bodies, there must also be place in the scholarly discussion for the argument that official organizational statements are, in a very real sense, monolithic in nature. This does not mean an absence of plural views among those who formulated the statements, but it does mean that any existing plurality had to be put into abeyance in one way or another in order to agree upon the issued statement. In this sense, what is said by way of organizational agreement carries with it an implied 'oneness' of thought and attitude.

The analyses of statements within this study will therefore not focus on the thought of individuals per se but, rather, on the thought of individuals insofar as joined in mutual expression of official attitude and/or response. Both statements and statement-makers will be identified organizationally, and every attempt will be made to use 'ecumenical' cognates in ways that are descriptive of the self-named network of national and international organizations bound together by the shared principles, purposes, and goals of supranational unity. The combined term 'ecumenical Protestant', as it is used in this study, will also have such stipulative bearing. While the central organizations of the ecumenical movement included a small constituency of eastern Orthodox churches, it was yet the fact that the movement was predominately Protestant and that leaders of the period, including those of the Anglican Church, came to view it in that way. This specific point of focus also corresponds to the notion heralded about ICCAJ's relation to the World Council of Churches founding assembly, namely, that its view were representative of 'the official concern of the Protestant Churches on the Jewish question'.⁷⁴

III. The vast archives of the ecumenical movement, housed at the World Council of Churches Library in Geneva, includes the archives of all organizations that coalesced into the WCC as well as those of the primary 'sister' organizations of the 20th century ecumenical movement. As these archives amply illustrate, and as Norman Goodall aptly describes in *The Ecumenical Movement: What It Is and What It Does*, the 'interlocking' within this broad-reaching structure that was bound together in the quest for unity was immense.⁷⁵ Nowhere is that interconnectedness more evident than in the cross-linked nature of the extensive collections of the IMC, ICCAJ, UCCLW, WCCIF, WSCF, ESR, ISS, and CBMS, on which this study is in great part based. A first step to grasping the movement's ideas and goals as they were perceived and developed by those deep in the ecumenical trenches, however, is the 'house histories', which must be turned to as introduction to the primary source archives. These works are an invaluable aid to grasping the concepts of 'ecumenical', 'world', 'universal', and 'international' as they developed in direct relation to the web of organizations that constituted the movement, as well as the interwoven histories of relations between ecumenism, the German churches, and the

⁷⁴ W.W. Simpson, *The Story of the International Council of Christians and Jews* (1988), prev. cit.

⁷⁵ Norman Goodall, *The Ecumenical Movement: What It Is and What It Does*, prev. cit.

intra-ecumenical tensions during and after WWI.⁷⁶ The standard tome is *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, Volume I, which was co-edited in 1954 by Ruth Rouse, a member of the British sector of ICCAJ (among other roles), and Bishop Stephen Neill, who was instrumental in producing study materials that informed the 1948 WCC founding assembly statement on Jews.⁷⁷ Other works that highlight advancement of commonly-shared ecumenical goals include both essays in honour of principal ecumenical leaders⁷⁸ and studies by principal ecumenists.⁷⁹ Autobiographies, memoirs, and biographical studies of many of the same principals offer valuable details which aid in drawing a map of the comings and goings within this web of organizations and subsidiaries.⁸⁰ It must also be noted that these are the earliest works that touch upon ecumenical involvement with conflict and protest during the Hitler years. Although sparse and scattered through a range of more general works on the development of

⁷⁶ The term is borrowed from Peter Ludlow, who denigrated the 'house history' of ecumenism on grounds that the image of a developmental 'triumphant progress...along a preordained route' was too haloing. He was not criticizing accuracy of dates, events, personages, or purposes but, rather, the tendency to self-view a divine course of Church unification. See Ludlow, 'The International Protestant Community in the Second World War' (1978), prev. cit

⁷⁷ Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill, Ed., *A History of the Ecumenical Movement*, Volume I, 1517-1948 (WCC, 1954). For more on 'ecumenical', beyond general discussion throughout the 800-page volume, see W.A. Visser't Hooft, 'The Word 'Ecumenical': Its History and Use', 735-740. For chapters of particular relevance to the period of this these see, Rouse, 'Other Aspects of the Ecumenical Movement, 1910-1948', 599-644; Stephen Charles Neill, 'Places of Union and Reunion, 1910-1948', 445-496; Nils Ehrenstroem, 'Movements of International Friendship and Life and Work, 1925-1948', (545-598); W.A. Visser't Hooft, 'The Genesis of the World Council of Churches', 697-734.

⁷⁸ For example, Samuel Cavert and Henry Van Dusen, Ed., *The Church Through Half a Century: Essays in Honor of William Adams Brown*, (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936); Robert C. Mackie and Charles C. West, Ed., *The Sufficiency of God: Essays on the Ecumenical Hope in Honor of W.A. Visser't Hooft* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963); Robert Nelson, Ed., *No Man is Alien: Essays on the Unity of Mankind* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971).

⁷⁹ A few of the most important studies in this voluminous category include John R. Mott, *The World Student Christian Federation: Origin, Achievements, Forecast* (New York: WSCF, 1920); Tissington Tatlow, *The Story of the Student Christian Movement of Great Britain and Ireland* (London: SCM, 1933); Adolf Keller, *Five Minutes To Twelve: A Spiritual Interpretation of the Oxford and Edinburgh Conferences* (Cokesbury Press, 1938); Charles Macfarland, *Steps Toward the World Council: Origins of the Ecumenical Movement as Expressed in the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work* (Revell, 1938); Bell, G.K.A. , *The Kingship of Christ: The Story of the World Council of Churches* (Greenwood Press, 1954); Ruth Rouse, *The World's Student Christian Federation* (London: SCM, 1948); Norman Goodall, *The Ecumenical Movement: What It Is and What It Does* (1961), prev. cit.; John A. Macay, *Ecumenics: The Science of the Church Universal* (Prentice-Hall, 1964); Samuel McCrea Cavert, *The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement, 1900-1968* (New York: Association Press, 1968).

⁸⁰ Indispensable memoirs include William Adams Brown, *A Teacher and His Times* (London & NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940); Marc Boegner, *The Long Road to Unity: Memories and Anticipations*, Trans., Rene Hague (Collins, 1970); Kenneth Grubb, *Crypts of Power: An Autobiography* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1971); W.A. Visser't Hooft, *Memoirs* (WCC Publications, 1973). The most important biographies include Margaret Sinclair, *William Paton* (SCM Press, 1949); Ronald Jasper, *George Bell, Bishop of Chichester* (Oxford University Press, 1967); Henry Smith Leiper and Edward Daniel Staples, *S. Parkes Cadman: Great Churchman and Christian* (Congregational Christian Historical Society, 1967); William Schmidt, *Architect of Unity: A Biography of Samuel McCrea Cavert* (Friendship Press, 1978); Eleanor Jackson, *Red Tape and the Gospel: A Study of the Ecumenical Missionary Struggle of William Paton* (Published for the Paton family by Phlogistan Publishing in assoc. with Selly Oak Colleges, 1980); William J. Schmidt and Edward Quellele, *What Kind of Man?: the Life of Henry Smith Leiper* (Friendship Press, 1986); Keith Clements, *Faith on the Frontier: A Life of J.H. Oldham* (T&T Clark LTD and WCC Publications, 1999).

supranational unity before, during, and after WWII, these mostly brief accounts of various aspects of protest between 1933 and 1945 offer an important window of understanding about the self-perceptions of such protests.⁸¹

What is known by way of introduction to ICCAJ in the secondary literature is far more limited. With the exception of one PhD thesis by a former secretary of the WCC Consultation on the Church and the Jewish People, Rev. Allan Brockway, there are no specific works on the International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews.⁸² Nor does ICCAJ appear in appropriate multi-disciplinary dictionaries and encyclopaedias.⁸³ While ICCAJ's name does arise occasionally and incidentally in biographies and autobiographies,⁸⁴ histories of Christian missions to Jews,⁸⁵ and much less often in post-Holocaust studies of Church responses to the Holocaust,⁸⁶ it is, with one exception, without any mention of the representative role ascribed to ICCAJ at the time of the founding assembly of the World Council of Churches.⁸⁷ Though

⁸¹ Indispensable accounts in this regard include Charles W. Macfarland, *The New Church and The New Germany* (Macmillan Company, 1934); George Bell, *The Kingship of Christ: The Story of the World Council of Churches* (1954), prev. cit.; Ronald Jasper, *George Bell, Bishop of Chichester* (1967), prev. cit.; Samuel Cavert, *The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement, 1900-1968* (1968), prev. cit.; Marc Boegner, *The Long Road to Unity: Memories and Anticipations*, Trans., Rene Hague (London: Collins, 1970); W.A. Visser't Hooft, *Memoirs* (1973); William Schmidt, *Architect of Unity: A Biography of Samuel McCrea Cavert* (1978); Eleanor Jackson, *Red Tape and the Gospel: A Study of the Ecumenical Missionary Struggle of William Paton* (1980); William J. Schmidt and Edward Quellet, *What Kind of Man?: The Life of Henry Smith Leiper* (1986); prev. cit.

⁸² The WCC Consultation on the Church and the Jewish People was the second name change after ICCAJ was subsumed in 1961 as the Committee on the Church and the Jewish People. See Allan R. Brockway, 'For the Love of Jews: A Theological Approach to the International Missionary Council's Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews, 1927-196', PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1992.

⁸³ ICCAJ does not appear, for example, in Edward Kessler and Neil Wenborn, *Dictionary of Jewish-Christian Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), or Leon Klenicki and Geoffrey Wigoder, *Dictionary of Jewish-Christian Dialogue* (Paulist Press, 1984).

⁸⁴ Haim Chertok, *He Also Spoke as a Jew: The Life of the Reverend James Parkes* (Valentine Mitchell, 2006); Colin Richmond, *Campaigner Against Antisemitism: The Reverend James Parkes, 1896-1981* (Valentine Mitchell, 2005); Robert Everett, *Christianity Without Antisemitism: James Parkes and the Jewish-Christian Encounter* (Pergamon Press, 1993); James W. Parkes, *Voyage of Discoveries* (Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1969); Robert Allen, *Arnold Frank of Hamburg* (London: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1966). Eleanor Jackson, *Red Tape and the Gospel: A Study of the Significance of the Ecumenical Missionary Struggle of William Paton, 1880-1943* (1980), prev.cit.

⁸⁵ For example, Christopher Clark, *The Politics of Conversion: Missionary Protestantism and the Jews in Prussia, 1728-1947* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995). Yaakov Ariel's important study, *Evangelizing the Chosen People: Missions to Jews in America, 1800-2000* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000), offers a brief though valuable survey of ICCAJ relations to the Presbyterian Department of Jewish Evangelization and the Home Missions Council in America.

⁸⁶ For example, Tom Lawson, *The Church of England and the Holocaust: Christianity, Memory and Nazism* (Boydell Press, 2006); Matthew Hockenos, *A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past* (Indiana University Press, 2004); Robert Ross, 'Perverse Witness to the Holocaust: Christian Missions and Missionaries', *Holocaust Studies Annual II*, 126-139 (Penkevill Publishing Co., 1986), and *So It Was True: The American Protestant Press and the Nazi Persecution of the Jews* (University of Minnesota Press, 1980).

⁸⁷ Following William Simpson's attribution of ICCAJ as representative of 'the official concern of the Protestant Churches [on] the Jewish Question', Marcus Braybrooke pointed out in his history of the British Council of Christians and Jews that ICCAJ 'was created as a focal point for all Protestant work related to Jews'. *Children of One God: A History of the Council of Christians and Jews* (Valentine Mitchell, 1991), 4.

cursorily and scattered, these passing remarks have identifiable patterns which illustrate what is known to the scholarly literature. The first has to do with invoking the name of the only fulltime director of the ICCAJ between 1930-1951 in such a way that it is mistakenly implied that the ICCAJ was synonymous with the activities of its director. Such presumption fails to account for the breadth of executive involvement in the international organization, however, and thereby masks the multiple strains of influence that guided its development. ICCAJ Director Conrad Hoffmann is also instanced in a limited ancillary way by setting him in opposition to the views of James Parkes, or as standing in opposition to the British Council of Christians and Jews, with which Parkes was involved.⁸⁸ A third and more limited pattern of acknowledgment involves discussion of antisemitism. Church historian John Conway stands alone in cursorily suggesting that the founding of ICCAJ was related to antisemitism insofar as antisemitism was a barrier to Jewish missions.⁸⁹ Conway also quotes from an ICCAJ statement against antisemitism, which was presented to the 1937 Oxford Conference on Life and Work that laid the groundwork for the founding of the World Council of Churches, and he recognizes as well that ICCAJ was involved with the 1948 WCC statement on antisemitism and Jewish missions. Recognition of the 1937 ICCAJ statement, along with implication that ICCAJ was in some way involved with the 1948 WCC statement, is also found in collections of texts.⁹⁰ In both cases, however, ICCAJ and WCC statements are presented as evidence *against* claims of Protestant indifference to antisemitism without exploratory discussion of contexts and conditions in which they were issued.⁹¹

Allan Brockway's 'For the Love of Jews' moved a step beyond by offering an account of some ICCAJ statements against antisemitism as a developmental line of positive Protestant missionary attitudes towards Jews.⁹² While his thesis is a helpful introductory structural work on ICCAJ and its theological underpinnings from 1927 to 1961, it is not, nor was it intended to be, a systematic study of ICCAJ or its views on antisemitism. Indeed, Brockway viewed his work as 'record[ing] - but largely refraining from commentary upon, much less arguing with -

⁸⁸ Colin Richmond, Tom Lawson, Robert Everett, Haim Chertok, Marcus Braybrooke, and Eleanor Jackson, all draw upon Parkes' autobiography, letters, or personal interviews with Parkes to illustrate instances of Hoffmann's objections to Parkes..

⁸⁹ John Conway, "Protestant Missions to the Jews, 1810-1980: Ecclesiastical Imperialism or Theological Aberration," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, I:1 (1986), 127-146.

⁹⁰ For example, Johann Snoek, *The Grey Book: A Collection of Protests Against Anti-Semitism and the Persecution of Jews Issued by Non-Roman Catholic Churches and Church Leaders During Hitler's Rule* (Humanities Press, 1970), 95-97 and 298-299. When reproducing the 1937 statement Snoek does not acknowledge ICCAJ as an independent entity but, rather, as a committee of IMC; when quoting excerpts from the 1948 statement, he cites a report on 'The Christian Approach to the Jews'.

⁹¹ This is not to fault historical accounts in which such statements are cited but merely to point out that work on the context and conditions under which these statements were produced has yet to be done.

⁹² Allan Brockway, 'For the Love of Jews: A Theological Approach to the International Missionary Council's Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews, 1927-1961', prev. cit. See also *The Theology of the Churches and the Jewish People: Statements of the World Council of Churches and Its Member Churches*, with commentary by Allan Brockway, Paul van Buren, Rolf Rendtorff, Simon Schoon (Geneva: WCC, Publications, 1988), 124-140, for segments included in his thesis.

the theological history of [ICCAJ].⁹³ His intention to write that history as it was self-understood by ICCAJ leaders is reflected in the non-probing nature of his method and presentation, as well as in his choice of limited sources which limited both perspective and breadth of view.⁹⁴ To the extent that antisemitism was discussed in the two thirds of the thesis which dealt with the period between 1927-1948, there was thus no analysis (or recognition) of relations between ICCAJ's Jewish mission initiative and its developing theories on the Jewish question and antisemitism, no analysis of relations between the 1948 WCC statement and the preceding twenty years of ICCAJ argumentation on antisemitism, no mention or discussion of the concomitant and challenging work of James Parkes in the same period.

It is the argument of this thesis that all of these sets of relations come into clear view as the ecumenical landscape is broadened and the documentary base is sufficiently widened. The story emerging from a close reading of extensive documentation from an archival base that includes all aspects of ICCAJ in its international configuration is markedly different from that emerging from a limited use of ICCAJ minutes and statements from international conferences. It is within the inclusiveness of the full archival base where papers necessary for reconstruction and analysis of ICCAJ views on antisemitism are found, where trends and patterns in ICCAJ thought appear in organizational and networking activities, where one begins to grasp the cross-connections and cross-influence between key ecumenical leaders and bodies. Moreover, it is only in broadening the archival base *thereafter* to include cross-connecting ecumenical bodies that one can begin to understand the developments that led to ICCAJ's involvement with the 1948 World Council of Churches Founding Assembly statement on antisemitism and Jewish conversion.

This present study of relations between ICCAJ's developing views during the Hitler years and its perceived status as representative of 'Protestant churches [on] the Jewish Question' by 1948 is both an institutional and intellectual history, each chapter of which relies heavily on extensive documentation copied and catalogued from WCC and related repositories. Central to this work is a close reading of two categories of key texts. The first, which entails ideas about Jews, the Jewish question, antisemitism, and Jewish missions, pays special attention to concepts being developed and circulated, the language used, veiled and unveiled connotations, and the context in which the concepts appear. The second category of analysis involves statements against Nazi persecution of Jews. In keeping with Uriel Tal's critique of Christian protests, close

⁹³ Ibid., Preface, 1. Brockway, who was secretary of the WCC Consultation on the Church and the Jewish People between 1979-1988, says he began the study 'with a firm prejudice against' but 'found himself becoming more and more sympathetic'. He 'determined not to allow [his] disagreement with basic premises of...theology to overshadow the significant contribution... made...to the Church's relation to the Jewish people'.

⁹⁴ Ibid. The history of ICCAJ between 1927-1948 is largely garnered from *International Review of Missions*, *ICCAJ News Sheet*, 5 ICCAJ-related published works, and 12 sets of IMC minutes. Archival sources cited for ICCAJ per se during this period are limited to 6 sets of ICCAJ minutes, 1 ICCAJ Director's Report, 1 letter of correspondence, 1 undated report, 8 topic papers presented at conferences.

attention is paid to conditions and timing of protests, to precise explication of what was being protested, and to whether the protest was on behalf of Jews per se or part of a general protest against Nazism and/or the anti-Christian nature of antisemitism.

The research of this thesis unfolds around textual analysis in five chronologically structured chapters. Chapter one focuses solely on the landscape of ideas, perceptions and beliefs which grounded ICCA developing theories about relations between the Jewish problem and what was deemed to be a Christian imperative to evangelize Jews between 1927 and 1932. It sets out the contexts and contours of the Jewish problem and its solution as understood by ICCAJ, elucidates ICCAJ's international and broad-reaching structure, and juxtaposes James Parkes and his concurrently developing views as a persistent and thorny ecumenical presence. Ongoing analyses of these parallel views and the interplay between them provides a framework of continuity for each subsequent chapter. It also helps to make clear that these antithetical views are theories in *process* of development, evolving dynamically in interaction with common unfolding events while manifesting markedly different responses.

The lens of focus is adjusted in chapter two so that developing views of antisemitism and the Jewish problem can be examined on the shared landscape of ecumenical responses to Nazi atrocities against Jews. The exploration from 1933 to 1936 focuses on 1933 as the year that shaped the contextual furnishing of this landscape in three critical ways for the remainder of the Hitler years. First, the re-igniting of the ecumenical unity problem in March 1933 - this time in the form of the Jewish problem - lodged as a permanent feature that nagged decisions about official statements against Nazi persecution of Jews through the end of the war. Second, the introduction of Nazi Aryan legislation in April, which suppressed both Jews and Christians of Jewish origin, began to be seen as a rear attack against Christianity and the universal Church, one that pushed the perceived anti-Christian aspects of antisemitism to the forefront of concern. Third, the incursion of Aryan legislation into the German Church and the subsequent outbreak of the Confessing Church minority struggle against the majority national faction began to be viewed and promulgated as a representative struggle on behalf of the Church universal. Within these developing contexts, this chapter introduces key leaders of UCCLW and discusses in detail the conditions and attitudes of those who were involved in the earliest 1933 deliberations and statements against Nazi treatment of Jews, often through the prism of background concerns and confidential concessions. Against these backdrops, and woven throughout 1933 to 1936, are ICCAJ efforts to broaden understanding of the anti-Christian nature of antisemitism, convince of the need for a Christian cure of the Jewish problem by way of evangelization, and develop and promulgate its enlarging theory about causes of antisemitism and the Jewish problem.

Chapters three and four explore presences and absences of official voices on behalf of Jews from 1937 to the end of the war. Chapter three examines two 1937 conferences - ICCAJ and UCCLW respectively - which set into motion two ecumenical trajectories that ultimately

converged in the WCC founding statement on Jews, Jewish conversion, and antisemitism in 1948. These developments are placed within the context of the restructuring of the ecumenical movement in 1938, when WCCIF was brought into existence (by subsumption of UCCLW and WCFO) and power-brokering relations were formed between WCCIF, IMC, and ICCAJ by way of Willem Visser't Hooft, general secretary of WCCIF, and William Paton, joint general secretary of WCCIF, general secretary of IMC, and *Ex Officio* of ICCAJ. This configuration allows for exploration of the ways in which these developments were impacted by accelerating Nazi aggressions, beginning with the March 1938 annexation of Austria and its exacerbation of the refugee problem, and it allows for discussion of the development of ICCAJ involvement with WCCIF's refugee initiative for non-Aryan Christians, which arose after *Kristallnacht* in November 1938. Both chapters explore the internal dynamics of WCCIF's ongoing struggle over official statements on topics which could in any way impinge upon the integrity of the ecumenical movement, including what to say about German church silence on Nazi persecution of Jews, Nazi aggressions, and the ever-increasing mass of Jewish refugees. Examination of what was known about the worsening fate of Jews, when it was known, and the circumstances under which responses were made is one of the principal tasks of chapter four. As this chapter reveals, the period of 1940 to 1944 is marked from beginning to end by ICCAJ concerns over post-war planning of Jewish missions and WCCIF concern over the expansion of ecumenical unity. The idea that antisemitism was a symptomatic disease of a greater disordered world problem, whose only cure lay in world Christianization, remained a hallmark tenant of post-war planning, which continued without interruption as the quantity and quality of detailed reports about escalating violence against Jews poured into the ecumenical network.

The final chapter looks at post-war questions of guilt, reconciliation, and reparation and their relations to post-war reconstruction and advancement of Jewish missions and ecumenical world unity. More specifically, this chapter opens with examination of the WCCIF dilemma of how to reconcile and re-establish formal relations with the German Church while dealing with questions about German guilt and German Church silence about it. It looks in detail at the 1945 Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt issued by the newly formed German Evangelical Church Council, asking critical questions about why WCC came to be the approving body of this declaration of guilt, how the declaration was related to both post-war advancement of WCC and the 1948 WCC founding assembly statement on Jews, and why neither the German Council issuing it nor the World Council approving it spoke of antisemitism or the suffering of Jews. The remaining sections of the chapter trace and examine in detail the process of collaborative post-war effort that led to WCC identification with ICCAJ in its formal founding statement on Jews. Analyses of background materials and closed-door deliberations that informed the statement position from 1946 to its adoption in September 1948 are intended as explanation, rather than condemnation or apology, of why the electorate of a 1200-person assembly of 147 churches

from 44 countries chose, in the embers of the Holocaust, to repudiate antisemitism while calling attention to 'the continued existence of a...people which does not acknowledge Christ'.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Report of WCC Committee IV on the Christian Approach to the Jews (1948), prev. cit. **Note on variations in spelling:** The primary sources of the period, including this document, offer great variation in spelling of 'antisemitism', including 'anti-semitism', 'anti-Semitism', 'Anti-semitism', and 'Anti-Semitism'. Discussion will be limited in this study to 'antisemitism' except when quoting directly.

Chapter One
UNDERSTANDING THE JEWISH PROBLEM
1927 - 1932

In October 1925, in an essay entitled 'The Jewish Problem: Some Newer Aspects', a 'call' was made from the pages of the standard Protestant journal *The International Review of Missions* for 'experts and men of vision' to take up the study of the Jewish problem at a world conference on Jewish missions. The 'problem' as stated was the perennial 'challenge of the Jew' and the failure of Christianity to sufficiently address it.¹

Despite much antipathy among church members towards the Jews, and apathy towards the cause of their evangelization, increasing numbers of churchmen and missionary leaders throughout the world...understand that, if the Church had thought aright and applied what is her sole possession, there would have been no Jewish problem at all. It is being forced upon them that the problem has entered a new phase and presents today a special direct and urgent challenge [to] the whole Christian Church.²

This concern was introduced by pointing out that antisemitic attitudes and measures in Rumania and Russia had served as a world reminder before 1914 that 'Jews living [there] presented some particular problem', but that countries everywhere had now discovered 'that a Jewish question exist[ed]'.³ This 'universal' status of the Jewish problem, according to Dr. Macdonald Webster of the Conference of British Missionary Societies, a constituent of IMC, was one of several key changes in world Jewry which required Christian thought and action. Others included Jewish emancipation and the concurrent disintegration of Judaism; Jewish race consciousness as a unifying force of world Jewry; and an ever-increasing growth of Jewish influence in all critical domains of society. A particularized concern was that these changes would not be used to serve 'Christian ends', or 'any religious end', and that Jews who were 'adrift' from the religious bonds of Judaism would become an even greater 'disintegrating element' in western society.⁴ Response to this Christian 'call' and the subsequent development of the Jewish problem as a central issue of ecumenical Protestant concern about Jewish evangelization is the springboard of this thesis. This chapter establishes and examines the contexts and contours of relations between the Jewish problem, antisemitism, and the perceived need for Jewish conversion as understood, theorized, and delivered to a broad international Christian audience between 1925 and 1932.

As chairman of the sponsoring International Missionary Council, John R. Mott had placed Webster at the head of a committee from IMC constituent bodies to lay the groundwork

¹ J. Macdonald Webster, 'The Jewish Problem: Some Newer Aspects', *International Review of Missions*, Volume 14, Issue 4, October 1925, 598-607; 604, 606-607.

² Ibid., 598

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. 598-601, 603.

⁵ Ibid.

for an international workshop on the problems of converting modern Jewry. For what were deemed 'weighty and sufficient reasons' two weeks of back to back conferences were set for Budapest and Warsaw in April 1927.⁵ The pre-conference dossier of 'specialist' papers which had been prepared over the preceding eighteen months included analyses of the 'weakening' state of Judaism; analyses of Jewish beliefs, movements, and social conditions; intellectual, social, and moral hindrances to Jewish conversion; characteristics of Jewish types and sects; size, density, and distribution of world Jewish populations; diffusion of missionaries within geographic locations of Jews; and evangelistic opportunities among Jewish populations in eastern Europe. A 40-page analysis of responses to an extensive questionnaire sent to known Protestant missionary agencies, as well as keynote papers on the history of Christian-Jewish enmity and antisemitism were also part of the package. When the conferences convened during the early two weeks of April 1927, 175 representatives from 104 Protestant organizations in 25 countries on 4 continents were in attendance, all from established churches rooted in the life of Europe and North America.⁶

The resulting conference report, *The Christian Approach to the Jew*, was a highly synthesized and widely circulated volume which stressed consensus of delegates on 147 sub-findings in conference resolutions, and it was said to contain 'the most up-to-date material [on] the Jewish problem'.⁷ It argued throughout that the 'new' situation in world Jewry demanded missionary 'occupation' of all European and North American areas that were densely populated by Jews.⁸ The situation that elicited such urgency was said to have been brought about by break-up of the old ghettoized world and the attainment of universal political and social rights for Jews. 'Movement' in every sense of the word - intellectually, physically, and spiritually - was said to characterize this new stage of untethered Jewish freedoms. Post-WWI redistribution of six million Russian Jews by way of ceded territories to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Rumania was of particular concern, as was western immigration in large numbers from these eastern outposts. But it was the *perceived* general movement of Jews into all spheres of society that constituted the central issue of urgency.⁹ The increasing movement of Jews *away* from

⁵ Ibid., 603; Macdonald Webster to John Mott, 3 June 1927; WCC.261230.14. Implication is that the 'overflow' of Jews from the 'Eastern European fountain' had bearing on the choice of venues.

⁶ In addition to mainline church and mission society delegates, representatives were in attendance from the International Missionary Council, the World Student Christian Federation, the Student Christian Movement, and the World YMCA Committee. Some 3.8% of church organizations in attendance were agents from branches in Asia (Palestine and India) and Africa (Egypt). Neither South America nor Australia wererepresented.

⁷ Minutes of the Interim Committee, 1 February 1928, WCC.261230.21.

⁸ *The Christian Approach to the Jew: A Report of Conferences on the Subject Held at Budapest and Warsaw in 1927*, Ed., James Black (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1927), 27, 42. Conference resolutions involved 147 points - Budapest (86) and Warsaw (61) - published in both English (18-45) and German (46-77).

⁹ Ibid., 'Jews in Soviet Territories', 158-160. Redistribution studies estimated that 2 million Jews were in Soviet territory of Russia and Ukraine; 3 million in Poland; 600,000 in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; 834,000 in Rumania.

moral constraints of Judaism, increasing movement of Jews *toward* new ways of thinking in Marxism, nationalism, Zionism, and Bolshevism, and the rapidly increasing influence of Jews within commercial, intellectual, and political domains of society were all seen as potentially dangerous developments that could be 'fraught with great danger to the world, unless...directed into Christian channels.'¹⁰ Of no less concern was the idea of a disproportionate influence of Jews, and it went hand in hand with the idea that beneath widespread Jewish dispersion was an 'underlying unity' that superseded national boundaries and differences.¹¹ Failure for Christianity to respond to 'the urgency' of the situation - as stated in a plenary address to a world meeting of the International Missionary Council a year later - 'would affect the Church of 'Christ in all lands', hindering it 'by the aggressive presence of a people who deliberately rejected Christ'.¹²

These lines of thought - buffered by what was proclaimed as Christian duty to love Jews as neighbours - were unpacked in the report by way of parallel discussions on the 'old/new' Jewish situation and the 'old/new' Church attitude toward Jews. Both themes were central to conference understanding of the Jewish problem, and central to both was the theme of Christian repentance for treatment of Jews in Christendom's past. From the volume's opening essay on Christian-Jewish enmity to the closing history of antisemitism, however, repentance for what was said to be deplorable treatment of Jews in Christendom's past was buffered by claims which made clear that 'the Jew began the sorry business', that an 'orgy of aggressions against Jews' existed prior to Christianity, and that 'blame for the bitter antagonism ...rest[ed] not only on the un-forgetting and unforgiving Christian but also on the race-proud, vengeful and boastful Jews'.¹³ Jews were distinguished for 'turning gentle-minded people into angry fanatics' by their persistent calumnies and blasphemies, for ongoing hatred of Christ, and for inciting non-Jews with provoking traits and behaviours.¹⁴ This notion of causative Jewish factors was advanced by pointing out that historical 'scourging' of the Jews signalled 'the truth...that there has always been something in the character or conduct of the dispersed [Jew] that [provoked] those among whom he lived'. Provoking traits mentioned here and elsewhere in the volume included an 'uncanny power of exploit[ation]', 'acquisitiveness', 'repelling arrogance', superiority, as well as 'shrewd if not cunning, thrifty if not niggardly, self-assertive if not unscrupulous, tenacious if not obstinate, gain-seeking if not grasping' tendencies.¹⁵ Such provoking traits were explained in the closing chapter on antisemitism by way of a circle of distinctions that separated anti-Jewish

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., Findings of the Warsaw Conference, 42, 36; Black, 7-11; Questionnaire Analysis, 91-93, 94-99; 'Present Day Movements in American Jewry', 166-171; Findings of Warsaw, 36; Findings of Warsaw, 42.

¹² Memorandum to IMC Regarding Budapest-Warsaw Conferences, 9 Feb.1928; WCC.261230.21.

¹³ Ibid., Black, 1-17; Mackellar, 189-197. These claims were at times intermixed with the idea that Christian-Jewish enmity was a feud with shared accountability.

¹⁴ Ibid., Black, 3-4; Mackellar, 190; both granted that some 'deplorable' traits could be the result of harsh Christian treatment. See questionnaire analysis for 'Jewish traits' of lying, pride, boastfulness, dishonest dealings, selfishness, absence of a sense of sin, love of money, and pride; 99-100.

¹⁵ Ibid., Black 3-5; Mackellar 190-191.

and antisemitic reactions to Jews. The behavioural traits just mentioned, which were said to have been fostered by Judaism, provoked reactions that were more suitably classified as anti-Judaism. Christian anti-Judaism was not just 'opposition to the religion of the Jew', in other words, it was also opposition to a category of 'Jewish' traits that Judaism allegedly engendered. Other traits and behaviours, such as racial pride, refusal to assimilate, establishing an '*imperium in imperio* in every nation inhabited,' were said to provoke responses that were more properly characterized as antisemitic, which was defined as 'opposition to the Jewish race'.¹⁶ The overall effect of this treatment was that the carefully distinguished anti-Judaic and antisemitic responses appeared as one oppositional phenomenon with ancient, medieval, and modern faces, each of which were reflective in part of a self-causative Jewish problem, leaving Jews with an historical blame that was not undone by the good intentions of conference repentance.¹⁷

Societal response in the current world, though 'not so violent' as in the past, was said to be marked by widespread antisemitism that was 'rapidly on the rise in Central and Eastern Europe', with 'strong tendencies at work' in the US, England, South Africa, Egypt, Palestine, and Japan. One of the features which set this antisemitism apart from 'old' attitudes, however, was that 'the Christian Church [was] in no way directly connected with it...[and] the Protestant Churches especially g[a]ve it no countenance'.¹⁸ Yet, as evidenced by multiple expressions of conference concerns, giving antisemitism 'no countenance' did not mean being unsympathetic to its social, economic, and political claims. But neither did it mean being in concert with its racial claims and methods of solving the Jewish problem. Systematized bias and persecution, whether organized along religious or racial lines, had not worked to solve the Jewish problem, nor had 'segregation', 'assimilation', 'learning and civilisation', 'democracy', 'universal suffrage', 'equality ...and opportunity'.¹⁹ It was further understood that neither antisemitism nor anti-Judaism had worked: they had only served to 'knit Jews more closely together'.²⁰ Moreover, the 'old' anti-Judaic attitudes being called to repentance were simultaneously cited as hindrances to solving the Jewish problem by Jewish conversion. While 'deploring the long record of injustice and ill-usage of Jews on the part of professedly Christian people', the Warsaw findings held that the 'sins of Christendom...hindered work, fore-closed opportunities, shut doors that were ajar, and dissipated [spiritual] power'.²¹ Budapest too urged Christians 'to repentance for prejudice and persecution' while holding at the same time that 'unchristian treatment of the Jew and all race-prejudice are great stumbling-blocks to the acceptance of the Christian message'.²²

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., Black, 1-2; Mackellar, 197.

¹⁸ Ibid., Mackellar, 195.

¹⁹ Ibid., 195-196.

²⁰ Ibid. See also Questionnaire Analysis, 96.

²¹ Ibid., Findings of Warsaw I (36) and Vb(44).

²² Ibid., Findings of Budapest I (18); see also Vv (28), which is almost identical to Warsaw I.

This 'complex' Jewish problem, as it was here understood, demanded a 'new' solution wrought from Christian thought and principles, one that had the triad advantage of hindsight about past conversion failures, changed Christian attitude toward Jews, and the unified ability to withstand the 'underlying unity' of world Jewry.²³ Concern that the work of the Church would be harmed or hindered by the 'aggressive presence of a people who deliberately rejected Christ' was part of this, but it was not to be seen in terms of threat only for it was realized that a 'race numbering over 15 million' offered 'unparalleled opportunity' for the spread of the Gospel.²⁴ There was also the compelling belief, so ardently expressed, that the Church was being called to greater tolerance and love for Jews. With threat, opportunity, and Christian love now hovering, 'old' attitudes toward Jews were to be seen as both cause for an 'aroused conscience' and a 'stumbling block' that had hindered the work of the Church in the past. 'New' Christian attitudes were to be viewed and embraced as a 'more excellent way' of offering amends for the past sins of Christendom. Shouldering the burden of repentance for the past and taking a stand against the current 'forces of prejudice' were said to be necessary steps on this projected path of Protestant ecumenical reparation. But this alone - it was often stressed - was not enough to meet the full 'call' of the present urgent situation. The Church also had to willingly offer its most precious possession by openly declaring that conversion to Christianity was the only way to help the Jew, the only way to help disintegrating society, and the only way to destroy society's enmity against the Jew.²⁵

With all of this encased within the Budapest-Warsaw pleas for urgency, Protestant ecumenical response was swift and broad. Some 6700 copies of *A Christian Approach to the Jew* were circulated to Protestant ecumenical leaders by the interim committee shortly after the April conferences. By the following February a non-denominational conference had convened in London to draw attention 'to the urgency of the Jewish problem'; a commission of the Church of England had been appointed to launch a study of 'the problem'; Anglican Church Missions to Jews had resolved to use the report 'as a basis of study' for youth sessions; and mini-conferences focusing on the report had been held on the Continent. By April 1928 a resolution that appealed 'to all churches in Christendom' to study the aims of the Budapest-Warsaw conferences had been passed by the IMC at its Jerusalem meeting, and by summer 1929 executive officers were nominated for British, Continental European, and North American sectors of an organization that would orchestrate Protestant ecumenical effort for evangelization of Jews.²⁶ In summer

²³ Ibid., Findings of Budapest, 18-19, 27; Findings of Warsaw, 37, 42, 44. Memorandum to IMC, 9 February 1928; Minutes of Informal Group, 26 September 1928, WCC.261230.

²⁴ Findings of Budapest, 27.

²⁵ Findings of Budapest, 18-19, 27; Findings of Warsaw, 37, 42, 44; Memorandum to IMC, 9 February 1928; Minutes of Informal Group, 26 September 1928, WCC.261230.21.

²⁶ Minutes, 1 Feb. 1928 and 26 Sept. 1928; letter 19 April 1929, WCC.261230.21 and 261202.1.

The World Mission of Christianity: Messages and Recommendations, International Missionary Council Meeting, Jerusalem, 24 March-8 April 1928, 73.

1930, IMC chairman John Mott, who would remain *Ex Officio* of this International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews, appointed as director the veteran ecumenist Dr. Conrad Hoffmann, a 46 year old American who had served under his leadership since 1913.²⁷

What this all meant in effect was that the series of approving actions between 1927 to 1930 had placed the IMC core of mission bodies in more than 50 countries behind the centrally-organizing entity of ICCAJ.²⁸ Appointees to the executive ICCAJ was fixed at 15 (until 1932 when expanded to 25), but British, Continental European, and North American sectors were empowered to co-opt members sufficient to national need. The effect of such empowering cannot be overstated in terms of dissemination of ICCAJ purposes and ideas. By spring 1931, for example, the North American sector had expanded to 25 appointees representing what was held to be 'all of the more important Christian churches and auxiliary agencies of America'.²⁹ Between July 1931 and January 1932, a merger of the NA sector with the Home Missions Council was said to have placed the mission boards of some 27 Protestant denominations in Canada and the U.S. in support of ICCAJ. According to ICCAJ assessment, this consolidation made the NA sector a 'joint committee' of the Home Missions Council, the Federal Council of Churches, and the IMC, which would function as 'the central body for the promotion of the Christian approach to the Jews in North America'.³⁰ Early amalgamations in support of ICCAJ in Europe included a fusing of the Jewish mission committees of the United Free Church and the Church of Scotland; uniting of the four Jewish mission societies in Germany on the basis of 'fellowship'; and the consolidation of German, Dutch, Swiss and Scandinavian support for the Institutum Judaicum Delitzschianum in Leipzig, which was offered to ICCAJ as a spiritual training centre for English-speaking missionaries to Jews.

IMC purpose from the beginning was to bring ICCAJ front and centre to ecumenical efforts to evangelize Jews, and to do so by rallying and unifying Christian 'forces' within every aspect of the Church and its attendant bodies, both religious and lay. The unifying effort was to

²⁷ Conrad Hoffmann Jr. had been General Secretary of the YMCA at the University of Kansas from 1913-15; YMCA Secretary in Charge of Prisoner of War Work in Germany, 1915-1919; WSCF Director of European Student Relief, 1920-1927; and Secretary of WSCF from 1927-1930. Memorandum on Appointment of IMC Officer, date missing, WCC.261230.21.

²⁸ Minutes, Informal Group, 26 September 1928, WCC.261230.21; Conference of Officers with Members of NY Committee, 28 June, 1929, WCC.261207.1; IMC Williamstown Conference 1929, 7th Session, 15 July, WCC.261202.1. John R. Mott, 'The Purpose of the Conferences,' *Christians and Jews: A Report of the Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jew* (New York: IMC, 1931), 4.

²⁹ Organizations represented in the 25-member NAICCAJ included the Home Missions Council, Church of England in Canada, Federal Council of Churches, Protestant Episcopal Church, United Lutheran Church in America, Methodist Episcopal Church, Presbyterian Church USA, American Baptist Home Mission Society, Missionary Education Movement, Council of Women for Home Missions, Hartford Theological Seminary, International Committee of the YMCA, Student Division of the NA YMCA, and Student Volunteer Movement. Report of the Director, March 1931-June 1932, WCC.261202.5; Minutes of NAICCAJ Meeting (with attached membership list), 12 June 1931, WCC.261207.1 and 2.

³⁰ 'A Survey of the Year 1930,' *International Review of Missions*, Vol.20 (1931), 67-70; Director's Report, September 1930-March 1931 and March 1931-June 1932; NAICCAJ Minutes, 28 June, 29 September, 10 December 1931, and 19 May 1932; WCC.261207.1 and 261230.21. More will be said about subsequent problems with the ICCAJ-Home Missions Council merger in chapter five.

spread both horizontally and vertically from ICCAJ's organizational cores in America, Britain, and the Continent through consultations with local and national mission committees; lectures to divinity students at major universities; addresses to church congregations; roundtable meetings with ministerial associations; propagation of specialized literature; and innumerable programs through constituent organizations and subsidiaries of the ecumenical movement. Tying these efforts of expansion together and keeping each national sector abreast of the others was Conrad Hoffmann, who, under the eyes of Mott and his IMC general secretaries in New York and London, spent six months of each year on either side of the Atlantic, crisscrossing the European and North American continents with ambitious itineraries.³¹

Not all was rose-tinged in terms of advancing support for this international surge of effort. Even before the Budapest-Warsaw conferences convened in 1927 the Executive Committee of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, meeting in conjunction with the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, protested in a telegram to the chairman of the FCC Committee on Goodwill between Christians and Jews, reminding that their 1924 agreement was to have 'no proselytizing purpose'.³² In response to the request that no position be taken at the Budapest-Warsaw conferences that would 'jeopardize' relations between Christians and Jews, the chairman of the Goodwill committee and FCC secretary of the Commission on International Justice and Goodwill, under whose auspices that committee fell, cabled John Mott to urge that antisemitism be condemned and that initiatives which disrespected Jewish faith be negated.³³ While antisemitism was in fact condemned at the Budapest-Warsaw conferences, intentions toward evangelization of Jews were not only heralded but were made public soon afterwards in *Presbyterian Magazine*.³⁴ American Jewish response was that mutual respect had been ignored as indicated by the publicizing of post-conference plans for 'extensive missionary propaganda in countries where Jewish populations suffer[ed] most'.³⁵ The controversy increased in summer 1929 when Louis Marshall, President of the American Jewish Committee, published his

³¹ During Hoffmann's first six months he travelled from Geneva to London, New York, Pittsburgh, Chicago, St. Louis, Newark; then back to Edinburgh, Cambridge, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania. His itineraries in central and eastern Europe alone between September 1930 and March 1931 included Tuebingen, Hamburg, Leipzig, Berlin, Lodz, Warsaw, Bialystock, Cracow, Prague Vienna, Budapest; Bucarest, and, in Rumania, Cluj, Chisianau, and Galatz. Director's Report, 1 March 1930-1 March 1931, WCC.261202.5.

³² *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 20 January, 9 April, 11 April, 12 April 1927. The Committee of Goodwill Between Christians and Jews was established by the FCC in 1923 as a subcommittee of the Commission on International Justice and Goodwill; the joint agreement to have 'no proselytising purpose' was made on 30 December 1924. The cable from the Central Conference of American Rabbis that reminded Chairman Alfred Williams Anthony of the joint agreement was first reported in *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, 19 January 1927.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 10 August 1927. The August 1927 *Presbyterian Magazine* article by John S. Conning, who would become the first head of NA ICCAJ, was reprinted in *JTA*.

³⁵ Ibid. Conning' article included the claim that 40,000 Hungarian Jews had 'identified themselves with Christian Churches' since the war.

exchange of letters with Goodwill chairman Alfred Anthony, wherein Anthony had made clear that Christian missions would not be muzzled by Jewish opposition.³⁶ Objections stiffened even more in response to a December 1930 talk by John Mott to the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, where it was argued that 'continuation of Christian missions among Jews [was] a duty of the Christian Church in spite of protests raised against it'.³⁷ As Co-Chairman of the recently configured National Conference of Christians and Jew (NCCJ), an offshoot of the FCC Goodwill committee, Jewish leader Roger W. Strauss, speaking both as Jew and head of NCCJ, pointed to Christian colleagues who also objected to Jewish missions on the grounds that they were 'largely responsible' for antisemitism in America.³⁸ Strauss was particularly galled that Mott coupled his argument for Christian 'duty' to evangelize Jews with the claim that ICCAJ could at the same time further 'understanding and friendship between Christians and Jews'.³⁹ His publicized response in January 1931 was that Mott and 'those who [we]re associated with him [would instead] fan the flame of religious prejudice'.⁴⁰

ICCAJ reaction to such opposition - whether from Jews or 'goodwill' Christians - was not discouragement. While such opposition was unwelcome, it was yet seen as two categories of hindrances that had to be overcome in the development of a Christian approach to the Jew. Responses from all sides were thus to be utilized in the development of appropriate apologetic arguments and literature specific to each opposing group. Opposition from what was seen as a well-intentioned but insufficient goodwill movement was generally viewed as having been snared by a harmful liberality which was not cognizant of Church responsibility to evangelize Jews and thus denied the call of the Great Commission. Resistance from Jewry had been anticipated and planned for from the start, but some of the initial criticism about past Christian

³⁶ *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 24 and 25 June 1929. After the correspondence between Louis Marshall (AJC) and Alfred Wm. Anthony (FCC) was published in *JTA* on 24 June, an apology was issued by the secretary of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, which stated that Anthony's personal views were not meant to be interpreted as the position of Anthony's Goodwill committee.

³⁷ *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 1 January 1931. The Foreign Missions Conference of North America, a constituent of the IMC, was made up of foreign mission boards from the United States and Canada.

³⁸ *Ibid JTA*. The National Conference of Christians and Jews grew out of the FCC Goodwill Committee and was established in 1928 as an independent body of Jews and Christians. Samuel Cavert, general secretary of the FCC from 1921-1950 and member of NAICCAJ from 1930 until at least 1949, stated that the split grew out of evangelizing differences, *The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement, 1900-1968* (New York: Association Press, 1968), 123-124. For more on the NCCJ see Victoria J. Barnett, 'Fault Lines: An Analysis of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, 1933-1948', George Mason University PhD Dissertation (2012).

³⁹ *Ibid JTA*. In support of Strauss, the President of the Association of Jewish Orthodox Communities added that such conflicting claims would open the eyes of Jews 'who had been prominent in propagating mutual understanding'. British Jew Claude Montefiore had argued similarly in *The Hibbert Journal* (January 1930), that 'over and above anti-Semitism there is nothing which militates against good and friendly relations between Jews and Christians as the efforts of conversionists'. Montefiore was referring directly to the Budapest-Warsaw volume of conference demographics, studies and resolutions. Reported in John S. Conning, 'Major Problems and Issues in a Christian Approach to the Jews, 13-33, *Christians and Jews: Report of the Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews* (New York and London: ICCAJ, 1931), 13-33.

⁴⁰ *Ibid JTA*.

attitudes to Jews was in fact seen as instructive. First and foremost, however, Jewish opposition was seen as educational fodder for the development of more 'effective means of meeting Jewish defensive measures and propaganda'.⁴¹ As resistance rallied and the 'Jewish position' became more clear, there were also instances in which Jewish opposition influenced ICCAJ planning. In November 1930, for example, concern that Jewish opposition to ICCAJ could 'prove a serious danger' to the planning and convening of a May 1931 international conference in America resulted in the decision to proceed on the basis of an unpublicized and 'confidential' conference that would not be discussed publicly until after it had closed.⁴²

A related but different type of hindrance to evangelization of Jews had also been in discussion since the 1927 conferences. This particular impediment hinged on the claim that disintegration and degradation of Judaism had brought about a spiritual abyss in Jewry, which, if not filled by Christianity, would pose a danger to it. While such an abyss made the mission fields ripe, it also created difficulties for missionaries, one of which was that 'the higher moral standard of Christianity act[ed] as a deterrent to many Jews'.⁴³ In post-1927 exploration of ways to approach such alleged behavioural impediments to Christianity, study trips in both America and Europe had strongly suggested that methodology for a Christian approach to Jews could not be universal but would depend instead upon specific conditions and mentalities of the Jewish population in each country.⁴⁴

Yet by spring of 1931 it was nevertheless understood that the situation in Germany, while requiring its own nationalized methodology, could offer critical insights that would ease the difficulties of missionaries generally. To that effect, Dr. Julius Richter, a renowned missions scholar from University of Berlin, was invited to speak at the North American Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews in May 1931. Richter had a long and dedicated involvement with the ecumenical movement, having been in fact one of the signatories of the declaration of German guilt at the Oad Wassenaar ecumenical conference in 1919. He was also one of John Mott's principal organizers for the 1928 IMC conference in Jerusalem; Mott's primary European consultant on executive appointees to the ICCAJ in 1929-30; and Conrad Hoffmann's Berlin contact for briefing on the Jewish question during his first European itinerary as director of ICCAJ.

The problem facing the international effort of ICCAJ, as Richter explained to the May 1931 conference, was trying to confront Jewish mission fields without understanding the Jewish

⁴¹ NAICCAJ Minutes, 28 June 1929, WCC.261230.21. .

⁴² NAICCAJ Minutes, 8 November 1930, WCC.261207.1; Director's Report, March 1930-March 1931, WCC.261202.5

⁴³ Budapest-Warsaw Report, Questionnaire Analysis, 99-100. Jewish 'Pride and self-sufficiency' were also singled out as impediments to Jewish conversion to Christianity..

⁴⁴ The idea of 'no one method' being sufficient for a Christian evangelistic approach to Jews appeared in the 1927 Budapest-Warsaw conference Report (p.102) and was more fully developed in Hoffmann's March 1931 ICCAJ Director's Report.

mentalities and behaviours in which they were steeped.⁴⁵ Using the 'situation in Germany and Central Europe' as a learning model, he outlined categorical 'currents' of Jews and tendencies, both non-Jewish and Jewish, that had to be reckoned with, while emphasizing that 'endless variations and cross[links]' would be encountered. Even though 'categories' of Jews were to be seen as highly divergent - 'Reactionary ghetto Jews', who clung to old tradition; 'Reform Jews', most of whom were said to be assimilators; 'Zionists', impassioned with nationalism; and 'Renaissance' Jews, who appealed to Jewish heritage - 'tendencies' at work within the categories were to be seen as more or less convergent.⁴⁶ With schemata as such, Richter isolated certain tendencies that were said to lead Jews to 'become active promoters' of dangerous ideas, and monopolizers of the most paramount 'spheres of life'. In reference to the former, he pointed out that Jews were consequently 'regarded as a dangerous poison within the nation that has received them' and, to the latter, that 'Jews almost fe[lt] a predestination... to become the leaders of their host peoples'.⁴⁷ The end result, which he said should not be surprising, was that such 'imperious intrusion of Jewry' evoked strong reactions from non-Jews, most generally in the form of antisemitism.⁴⁸ As example of *why* antisemitic reaction was 'cropping up in accentuated force', Richter stated that even 'with the extensive suffering under the post-war burden of poverty and distress, Jews [were] pointed out as parading in luxury and licentiousness, filling the most expensive theatres and hotels, riding in fine autos, and seeming to riot like vampires in the blood of their host peoples'.⁴⁹ And yet, he went on, there was no trace of discernment by Jews to the relation between their behaviour and the German response to it, for in the face of antisemitic reaction the Jewish tendency was to 'feel themselves' either 'misunderstood' or 'misrepresented', and then to 'develop a strong aversion or even hatred'.⁵⁰

Although none of the elements in this causative model were new - all can be found within the papers of the Budapest-Warsaw volume - their emphasis in such strong language in a theoretical explanation of the European Jewish situation by a German churchman esteemed as an ecumenical Jewish expert bears critical witness to a broad ecumenical understanding of the Jewish problem in 1931. Not only were there no recorded objections to Richter's causative schemata by any of the 85 American and European delegates, other papers in the conference volume were replete with affirmations of the idea that antisemitism is a societal response to

⁴⁵ Julius Richter, 'The Gospel for the Modern Jew from the Standpoint of the German Churches and Missions,' *Christians and Jews: A Report of the Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews*, 12-15 May 1931, 70-78.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 70-71.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Jewish tendencies toward 'secularism', 'agnosticism', 'anti-moralistic sensualism', 'engrossing materialism', and 'organizations of freethinkers' are said to cause Jews to be 'regarded as a dangerous poison within the nation which had received them as their guests'. Jewish tendencies of 'intellectual superiority, unparalleled business activity, and ingrained will to power', on the other hand, are said to have led to the monopoly of finance, newspapers, and theatres.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 71-72.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 72.

Jews. Dr. Frank Gavin of General Theological Seminary in New York, for example, classified antisemitism as a transmitted unconscious prejudice, yet held that it was activated through 'contact with Jews'.⁵¹ Both Gavin and Dr. John Conning, head of the NAICCAJ and prolific lecturer on Jews to American seminaries, attributed such reactions to traits fostered by Jewish exclusivity and separateness. Gavin argued particularly that Jewish exclusivity engendered cultural differences and obnoxiousness, which in turn elicited resentments and hostilities. As part of that argument he claimed that, while it appeared as if antisemitism contained an element of religious intolerance, the only intolerance was on 'the Jewish side of the ledger' since it was Jews and not Christians who set themselves apart from the rest of the world.⁵² While Gavin focused more on the prejudicial mechanisms of antisemitism, Conning drew from earlier work with which all were familiar, arguing that the Jewish behaviour of 'separateness' fostered 'racial isolation', bred 'pride and aloofness', and made patriotism of Jews suspect.⁵³ Conning's conference argument for the urgency of Jewish evangelization in America was rooted in his emphasis on the un-Christian presence of 'the largest and most influential Jewry in the world'.⁵⁴

Across [the] pathway [of North America] lie 4,500,000 of the most virile and resourceful people in all the world who are not in accord with the Christian program, and who deny that these countries are or ever can be Christian.... We have now in this country not only the largest Jewry in the world, but the most influential. Jews are now at the peak of Jewish experience with respect to freedom of opportunity and achievement. Already their influence is widely felt in journalism, art, science, law, medicine, and many other spheres. They are largely under the sway of secular civilization and furnish leadership in communistic and other movements [that are] definitely irreligious in their outlook and intent.⁵⁵

Concern about ideas and behaviours emanating from contemporary Jewry was in no way confined to Conning. G.H. Gill, an executive member of ICCAJ and general secretary of Anglican Church Missions to Jews in London, delivered the message that America's current 'Jewish problem' reflected the failure of the 'whole Church to evangelize Europe's Jewry in the past'.⁵⁶ Speaking on behalf of his British colleagues, he went on to claim that, while 'we on the

⁵¹ Frank Gavin, 'The Origin and Cure of Anti-Semitism,' 45-51, *Christians and Jews: A Report of the Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jew*, 49-50. Gavin went on to say that 'since the war...this reaction has become an acute registering of distaste and repudiation'.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ John S. Conning, 'The Jewish Situation in America', *International Review of Missions*, Vol.16, 1, 1927, 64-75. See also *Our Jewish Neighbours: An Essay in Understanding* (Fleming H. Revell, 1927) from which the essay is derived.

⁵⁴ John S. Conning, 'The Local Church and Its Jewish Neighbors', *Christians and Jews*, prev. cit., 83-86.

⁵⁵ John S Conning, 'Major Problems and Issues in a Christian Approach to the Jews', *Christians and Jews*, prev. cit., 13-33, quotation 28-29. This is a milder version of ideas appearing in Conning's 1927 *IRM* essay, which made claims in answer to the question of 'why Christians are disturbed by the persistent efforts of Jewish leaders to secularize America'. His answers included Jewish denial that America was a Christian county, Jewish opposition to teaching of religion and observation of Christian holidays in public schools, and 'certain Jewish elements' that were adding to the problems of the Church by propagating blurred ideals and immorality through the arts and theatre.

⁵⁶ C.H. Gill, 'Present Day Emphases in Work for the Jews in Europe and the Near East, 34-44.

other side of the Atlantic realize your Jewish problem is no small one', there can be no solution without 'touching the source' in eastern Europe. As part of his argument about the spiritual vacuum created by modern Judaism's demise and its resulting tendencies toward dangerous modes of Jewish thought, he went so far as to warn that *unless* eastern European Jews were 'reached today while they still have religious longings, it will be too late, and your problem here will be intensified by a further influx of freethinkers'.⁵⁷ Basil Mathews, who was literature secretary for the World's Committee of the YMCA, added to this shared pattern of thought that, 'if Christianity had permeated the industrial revolution and had dealt in Christian ways with the Jews, that Jew of genius, Karl Marx, would never have given to the world the greatest rival to Christianity since the birth of Islam'.⁵⁸ The point being emphasized was that Christianity had been called - but had failed to meet the call - to save the soul of Judaism from the disintegrating effects of secularism.

There was no recognition that the ideas and statements put forth at the conference could in any way be associated with tenets of antisemitism, propagation of antisemitic attitudes, or contradictory to ICCAJ stated objectives of Christian love. Rather, the idea that 'it would be a collective crime to not come together...in the face of the new Jewish situation' was peppered in every train of thought, just as it had been since the 1927 Budapest-Warsaw conferences.⁵⁹ The 1931 North American conference was seen as concrete evidence of Christian love as well as part of the Christian duty to eliminate anti-Jewish prejudice from society. Love and duty were held to be Christian prerequisites to both Jewish missions and Christian opposition to the forces of Jewish prejudice, the two of which were said to go hand in hand. Indeed, to *not* evangelize Jews was considered to be both serious Christian failing and, in the words of John McDowell from the Board of Presbyterian National Missions, 'discrimination' against Jews. That 'every church and every denomination' was considered to be under that 'inescapable obligation' was the common understanding of conference delegates.⁶⁰ As put forth by Kenneth Macklennan, chair of the Conference of British Missionary Societies, the Budapest-Warsaw conferences were seen

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Basil Mathews, 'What is the Central Objective of the Christian Approach to the Jew?', 61-9, goes on to point out that among current ideas 'battling for ascendancy', the two most 'disintegrating forces, those at the root of modern psychology and the nature of the universe, have as their prophets two other great Jews: Freud and Einstein'. 63.

⁵⁹ James Black, editor of the Budapest-Warsaw Report and speaking now as Chairman of the Executive Committee of ICCAJ, in 'The Validity of the Christian Approach to the Jews', *Christians and Jews*, 3-12. The quotation on 'collective crime' first appeared in Mott's opening speech at the 1927 B-W Conferences and was quoted liberally thereafter. See Conning, 'Major Problems and Issues in a Christian Approach to the Jews', 13.

⁶⁰ Respectively, John McDowell, 'The Place of the Jew in the Missionary Program of the Church,' *Christians and Jew: A Report of the Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews*, 79-82; James Black, editor of the Budapest-Warsaw Report and speaking now as Chairman of the Executive Committee of ICCAJ, in 'The Validity of the Christian Approach to the Jews', *Christians and Jews*, 3-12. The quotation on 'collective crime' first appeared in John Mott's opening speech at Budapest-Warsaw, and was quoted liberally thereafter. For this instance, see Conning, 'Major Problems and Issues in a Christian Approach to the Jews', 13.

as 'the providence of God against that developing situation in Jewry which...so insistently summon[ed ICCAJ] to go forward...'.⁶¹ Conrad Hoffmann's 'Final Conclusions' of a 37-page report issued immediately before the conference convened, affirmed all of this and captured well the reason for both the North American conference and the existence of ICCAJ itself:

In many lands the Jews occupy a predominant position and exercise a directing influence in the life of society out of all proportion to their number. This being true, it matters a great deal for the cause of a Christian world community what the religious outlook on life of this dominant element in society is.⁶²

II. James Parkes came into contact with Conrad Hoffmann in 1923 when, as a recent Oxford graduate in theology, he was hired as an international study secretary for the British Student Christian Movement, a constituent of the World Student Christian Federation. As part of his work Parkes was appointed to the international committee of European Student Relief, a WSCF program under the directorship of Hoffmann. By the time he began in this ESR capacity as many as 34 nations were involved in either a 'receiving' or 'giving' role, with some 120 field workers administering aid under Hoffmann's direction.⁶³ By summer 1925 most student relief needs had been met and an ESR Commission, of which Parkes was co-secretary, recommended that the ESR reorganize and broaden its aims under the name International Student Service.⁶⁴ Hoffmann remained head of the organization until moved to a WSCF secretariat in early 1927, at which time ISS leadership was handed to Walter Kotschnig, a young political scientist from Austria. Owing in great part to Kotschnig's influence, ISS plans began to be directed toward an internationalism which sought to relieve student social problems through mutual understanding, education, and self-help. Along with this shift in emphasis, Parkes was invited to join ISS for the express purpose of establishing a program on International Cultural Cooperation. Central to this shifting emphasis of ISS were the related ideas that humanity reached fulfilment through 'the fullest possible development of its constituent nations', that mutual cooperation allowed the intrinsic values from each nation to be utilized in advancement of the whole, that 'ignorance and prejudice [were] the chief causes of misunderstanding between nations and between different sections within the nations'.⁶⁵ It was also emphasized that the banner of ISS was to be carried with 'disinterested assistance...to students of all countries, whatever their race, nationality or convictions', which meant for Parkes that the conciliatory nature of ISS principal was sewn into all work in the area of international cooperation.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Kenneth Macklennan, 'Cooperation in the Christian Approach to the Jew', *Christians and Jews*, 115-21.

⁶² Hoffmann, 'The First Six Months as Director', September 1930-March 1931, 36.

⁶³ As Chairman of WSCF John Mott had overseen the 1920 founding of ESR; his appointment of Conrad Hoffmann as ICCAJ director came on the heels of Hoffmann's service to Mott as YMCA secretary in charge of POW work in Germany between 1915-1919.

⁶⁴ Formal changes were not completed until August 1926, after which ISS functioned as a body with its own independent status, governed by a self-electing board, two thirds of which were drawn from WSCF.

⁶⁵ *International Student Service* (1928), 4-6, with Kotschnig as the unnamed author.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

According to all ISS accounts the greatest challenge to international cooperation in continental universities in 1928 was the mounting aggression of east European nationalists toward Jewish minorities. Although the redrawing of national borders at the end of WWI had been shored up by mandatory Minorities Treaties guaranteeing the rights of peoples in newly created or expanded states, avid discontent over who was and was not 'national' had soon erupted in Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. In Hungary, for example, three months after the 1920 Treaty of Trianon guaranteed equal civic and political rights without distinction of birth nationality, race, religion, or language, a Numerus Clausus law was passed which restricted university education to those who were 'known to be of absolutely unimpeachable national loyalty and morality,' and only in proportion to the percentage of that minority in the overall population.⁶⁷ For Jewish students, to whom the law was most radically applied, this meant a crippling decrease in university enrolments, even though Articles 56-58 of the Trianon Treaty guaranteed that Jews in Hungary 'were in fact and by law Hungarian nationals'.⁶⁸ Similar *de facto* exclusions were soon manifest in Poland and Rumania, even though Numerus Clausus had been warned against by the enforcing body of the Minorities Treaties. In each country forms of organized agitation and violence had prohibited Jewish students from enrolling at universities. By 1923 the question of Numerus Clausus had turned to controversy at the ESR Conference in Parad, Hungary, and, in 1925, while Parkes was chairing the WSCF Conference at Oberaegeri, Switzerland, the issue re-surfaced in a 'venomous speech' by an invited member of a central European Student Christian Movement organization.⁶⁹ European nationalism among university populations was fuelled again in 1926 when Hitler's NSDAP founded the National Socialist Student League in Germany for the purpose of integrating universities with Nazi ideology. By the time Parkes assumed his ISS post in cultural cooperation the leader of the antisemitic party in Rumania was an honoured university professor; a Jewish student had been assassinated; anti-Jewish violence had spread from Rumanian universities to the general population; and the combined effects of Numerus Clausus in Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, both by law and *de facto*, had driven as many as ten thousand Jewish students to expatriation in search of university enrolment.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 created the Charter for the League of Nations and set new European national boundaries, requiring each new or expanded nation to guarantee equal civil rights and preserve religious rights of minorities. The Minorities Treaties were signed between 1919 and 1920. The Trianon Treaty was signed in June 1920 and the Hungarian Numerus Clausus (Law XXV) was passed on 26 September of the same year. For quotation see Jules Stone, *The Numerus Clausus in the Universities of Eastern Europe* (Birmingham: Inter-University Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, October 1927).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 8-10, 17-18. Poland's Minorities Treaty was signed on 28 June 1919 but, even after being warned by the LON against enacting a Numerus Clausus in 1923, the government imposed an 'in practice' effect at universities.

⁶⁹ W.A. Visser't Hooft, *Memoirs*, (Geneva: WCC, 1973), 13. See also 'Issues to be Discussed on Race, Minorities, and Anti-Semitism' at Oberaegeri Conference, 17 February 1925; Minutes of Delegates to the WSCF Conference at Oberaegeri, Switzerland, 29 August 1925, WSCF 213.07.1.

⁷⁰ Jules Stone, *The Numerus Clausus in the Universities of Eastern Europe*, prev.cit., 3-4; 5-15; 20-26.

With no blue print, no German, Polish, Rumanian, or Hungarian language skills, and bounded on all sides by the parameters of mediation, Parkes in collaboration with Kotschnig began in March 1928 to develop an approach to the encroaching antisemitism in European universities.⁷¹ The idea was to educate where prejudice and ignorance prevailed through study groups and conferences. By August plans had been drawn and approved for four international conferences to address various student problems, the first of which was called the 'Jewish Conference' to be held in December outside of Paris (Bierville).⁷² By November it was being discussed in terms of either the 'Conference of Jews and non-Jews' or the 'Conference on the Jewish problem' and, by the close of the meeting, as the 'Conference on the Jewish Question'. The five day conference was intentionally small, private, and driven by the purpose of outlining a program of collaborative work on the Jewish question in European universities. Two types of invitations had been issued: Jewish and non-Jewish student delegates, with 20 accepting from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, Rumania, France, Great Britain, and the U.S., and Jewish and non-Jewish speakers, to which only Jews responded. Discussions nevertheless stressed the importance of looking at multiple aspects of the problem from both non-Jewish and Jewish sides. The resultant plan of action derived by the conference, as recommended by Parkes and Kotschnig to the ISS governing Assembly in January 1929, was to appoint a sub-committee of Jewish and non-Jewish students to assist in the development of informal local groups that would study and document the cultural, political, economic, and religious aspects of university antisemitism.⁷³ When the governing Assembly finalized approval of the new program in April 1929, however, it was with this exception: that it would be a mistake to include 'the religious aspect of the question' at this time, and that Parkes should 'consult with various authorities on the matter before going any further...'.⁷⁴

A month later Parkes presented a 15-page paper to the International Student Union in Geneva which clearly had religious implications.⁷⁵ It was a truncated and undeveloped version of a full length book which he would publish eighteen months later, delivered well within the context of the ISS principles of mediation.⁷⁶ Having realized that the problem in European universities could not be reduced to the 'malevolence' of Jews, as Jewish opponents charged, or to the anti-Jewish oppression of the Numerus Clausus laws, as charged by Jewish students,

⁷¹ Parkes was also working on Indo-European, Pacific-European, and American-European student issues, none of which so far as known had to do with prejudice. He was fluent in both French and Latin, and later became so in German.

⁷² Minutes of Executive Assembly of ISS, 25-27 April 1928; Minutes of Executive Assembly of ISS, 12 August 1928; Monthly News Report of ISS, December 1928, ISS.213.09.39.

⁷³ Ibid. Conference on the Jewish Question in the Universities and Memorandum to the Assembly of ISS, 2 January 1929; Memorandum to the Assembly of ISS, 5 Jan. 29, ISS.213.09.39.

⁷⁴ Minutes of Executive Assembly of ISS, Paris, 22-25 April 1929, ISS.213.09.39.

⁷⁵ James Parkes, 'Some Aspects of the Jewish Situation in Europe', May 1929, Parkes Papers MS60/9/1/1.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 14-15. The overseeing principle of mediation, as expressed by the 1928 Bierville Conference, was that ISS would not 'endanger' the overall success of multi-national work by condemning 'particular action in any country'; Memorandum, 5 Jan. 1929, prev. cit.

Parkes had turned to the historical past in order to glean light on the present situation. Based on earliest research, Parkes thus argued that the antisemitism currently encroaching European university populations could not be understood outside of its thousand year history, and, more precisely, he rooted current antisemitism in the historical aftermath of Jewish massacres during the First Crusade, which he plainly attributed to 'religious motives'.⁷⁷ Whether it was this 'going further' with the religious aspect of the Jewish question that triggered concern about Parkes is not clear, but the first known complaint about his work was registered with ISS board member Conrad Hoffmann a month later, and it had to do with Parkes' religious ideas. The objection that had been registered against him was that the programme for an upcoming WSCF conference, in which he was to play a major role, was set 'too much in the realm of ideas' and that his proposed lectures on relations between politics, religion, Church, and the Trinity were too theological.⁷⁸ Parkes went on to deliver those lectures a month later at the July 1929 WSCF Conference at Glion, Switzerland,⁷⁹ and the following week an ISS Commission at an Assembly Conference in Krems (Austria) reiterated that 'material [for 'the Jewish Work'] should be of the kinds indicated in the decisions of the Assembly...', which did not include the 'religious' element.⁸⁰

Yet, when Parkes' full-length book was published fifteen months later in October 1930, there was not only a full chapter of the 'kind' not indicated by the Assembly, the religious aspect was the centrally informing element of the study. *The Jew and His Neighbour: A Study of the Causes of Anti-Semitism*, although published by ISS, was written outside the boundaries of ISS in another way as well.⁸¹ While the study had begun within the parameters of antisemitism in European universities, the book exceeded the limits of ISS involvement by looking at the whole societal picture rather than confining it to the university milieu. It also looked at more than just present-day contexts and in so doing established documentary evidence supporting justification for incriminating historical claims. As Parkes' one presupposition, which he found 'more firmly established' by each piece of historical data acquired, he insisted that the roots of antisemitism lay in human history and nature.⁸² He thus dismissed out of hand any notion that the Jewish problem had its roots in supernatural causes, by which was meant the 'direct action of God [in] the condemnation of the [alleged] deicide race'.⁸³ He also dismissed any explanation that attributed antisemitic cause to Jews as a people set apart and 'hostile to the rest of humanity'.⁸⁴ Both theories, he argued, resulted in explanations focusing on Jewish actions and behaviours, either 'self-causing' their own divine punishment or 'self-causing' negative reactions by non-

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Letter to Conrad Hoffmann from Margaret Read, 20 June 1929, WSCF.213.09.39.

⁷⁹ WSCF Conference at Glion, Switzerland, 25-29 July 1929, Parkes Lectures, WSCF.213.09.39.

⁸⁰ Report of Commission II, ISS Conference, Krems Austria, 30 July-7 August 1929, WSCF. 213.09.39.

⁸¹ James W. Parkes, *The Jew and His Neighbour: A Study of the Causes of Anti-Semitism* (London: SCM Press, 1930. A New York edition was published the following year by Richard R. Smith Publishers.

⁸² Ibid., 11.

⁸³ Ibid., 39.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 40.

Jews. Moreover, in addition to antisemitism having *no roots* in the supernatural, there was *no solution* to be found there either, for, unlike the ICCAJ theory of solving antisemitism by way of reconciling Jew and society through Christianization, Parkes argued that the Jewish problem could only be 'unravelling by human intelligence and resolved by human action'.⁸⁵

Incriminating statements about Christianity's relationship to modern antisemitism were threaded throughout *The Jew and His Neighbour*. While Parkes looked back from present day to the middle ages, his work in antiquity was sufficient to grasp that historical knowledge about ancient Jewish dispersion was actually dependent upon ancient anti-Jewish decrees of church councils. The disposition toward Jews reflected there and elsewhere in church archives was found to be both oppressive and oppositional, imbuing a hostility that did not vary after the church came to power under Constantine. This was an attitude that held both before and after the first crusade, Parkes argued, but, owing to the events of that crusade, the eleventh century marked a violent turning point in attitude.⁸⁶ Yet 'if the crusades were the occasion' of marked change, 'they were not the real cause of the massacres'.⁸⁷ The ultimate cause rested foremost in 'the hostility of the Church', as did 'the sustained hatred which mark[ed] relation[s]...between Christians and Jews from the eleventh century onward'.⁸⁸ Further, 'the centuries which followed sowed the seeds' of modern antisemitism in two critical ways.⁸⁹ In the case of the first, 'by instilling hate into Christians', and in the second, by forcing Jews into a state of degradation that provoked and nurtured development of atypical characteristics.⁹⁰ On this latter point, Parkes was clearly arguing against tenets of Nazism which claimed that Jewish characteristics were inherent and unalterable, but he was at the same time levelling a powerful claim against the church in its ancient, medieval, and modern aspects.⁹¹ Christianity was thus being implicated in not just one but two dimensions, for not only did the hatred that sowed the seeds of modern antisemitism have its origin in religious motive, so did those alleged 'Jewish' traits which antisemites and others claimed were 'reason' for and provocation of antisemitism.

After reading the October 1930 publication announcement of Parkes' book, John Mott asked Henry Louis Henriod, who was co-secretary of WSCF and board member of ISS, to 'procure' a copy.⁹² The November response by the Mott-ICCAJ group in New York was that the book was a 'hurried piece of work and written without adequate background', 'shooting off

⁸⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 70-100.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 70. Parkes had already honed in his April 1930 speech the idea of crusaders killing Christ's Jewish enemies on their way to the Holy Land.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 76, 77, 101.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 16-17.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 17, 35-51, 76.

⁹¹ Ibid. Parkes also refuted Nazi claims which held hatred of Jews to be an instinctive reaction, but he did so while granting that antisemitism had indeed become a *learned and habitual* 'instinctive' reaction after centuries of conditioning from a common Christian inheritance.

⁹² B.R. Barber on behalf of John Mott to H.L. Henriod, 22 October 1930; Parkes Papers MS60/7/1/2.

half-cocked', and bound to bring discredit on Parkes' future work and career. These complaints, which were delivered by Conrad Hoffmann, marked the first in a 20-year unbroken line of ICCAJ criticisms that were more often than not wrapped with intentions to enlighten Parkes on the Jewish question, antisemitism, and Jewish missions.⁹³ To understand how this litany began, it is important to remember that Parkes' earlier work with SCM had placed him in relationship with Hoffmann years before he was hired by Mott to serve as ICCAJ's director. Hoffmann was twelve years senior to Parkes, as well as ten years senior in ecumenical experience, but Parkes was two years senior to Hoffmann in work related to Jews. Although Hoffmann's European work with the YMCA and ESR had brought him into contact with Jewish students, he had virtually no experience in Jewish missions, no theological training, and no knowledge of either Christian-Jewish relations or antisemitism apart from traditional Christian understanding. His attribute in this regard, when introduced by Mott as the new ICCAJ director, was that 'he had affection for the Jew' and that the Jews he had known in Europe had 'affections' for him.⁹⁴ The degree to which Hoffmann was concerned about his deficiencies is unclear, but indications suggest that Hoffmann sought in Parkes an approving, if not advisory, collaborator. When he approached Parkes in Geneva shortly before embarking upon the new directorship in September 1930, he had expressed desire to work cooperatively for the benefit of Jews. Parkes' understanding (and hope) was that Hoffmann's directorship of ICCAJ would guide the new organization along the lines of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, which sought mutual respect for both Judaism and Christianity.

Sixty days after introductory exposure to the expectations and thought of Mott and his NAICCAJ inner circle, however, Hoffmann wrote to Parkes with a clear understanding of the evangelistic purpose of his new work, and he did so in the same November 1930 letter in which he delivered the New York criticisms on Parkes' book. A few days later he sent a second letter which contained ICCAJ minutes that outlined the new organization's immediate plans, and, like the first, it was written in a tone of common purpose without hint of understanding that critical differences existed between them. Parkes responded to both letters on 9 December. He made clear that there was 'an abyss between' the work he was trying to do and that of the programme Hoffmann had sent to him.⁹⁵ The understanding at the core of his work was that he had no ulterior motive to convert Jews, while the aims outlined in the documents that Hoffmann had sent to him were more along the lines of 'how to take advantage of the present difficulties of the

⁹³ Hoffmann to Parkes, 9 November 1930, PP MS60/17/8/2. Three days after a meeting with Mott on 6 November, in which John Conning and Basil Mathews were present, Hoffmann penned his criticism to Parkes, citing Conning, Mathews, and an unnamed 'someone' who had judged the book as 'shooting-off half cocked'. On the grounds of these complaints, Hoffmann urged Parkes to postpone publication of the book. See Minutes of NAICCAJ Group Meeting on the Christian Approach to Jews, 6 November 1930, WCC.261707.1.

⁹⁴ Memorandum on Appointment of ICCAJ Director, date page missing, WCC.261230.21.

⁹⁵ Parkes to Hoffmann, 9 December, 1930, PP MS60/17/8/2.

Jews [in order] to convert them'.⁹⁶ The chasm between them, Parkes stressed, was not to be misunderstood as merely a difference in emphasis but as a difference 'of kind'.⁹⁷ He rejected the concept of 'right' Christian thinking about Jews that was laid out in the ICCAJ minutes, namely that one either 'believes in converting the individual Jew...or one does not accept responsibility for the Jews', and he did so on grounds that such thinking ignored the 'Christian responsibility to give the Jew a square deal to be a Jew'.⁹⁸ Last, in challenging the contradictory duality of the proposed ICCAJ work, he posited as wrongheaded that ICCAJ was trying to both convert Jews *and* improve relations with Jews at the same time. Either one or the other had to be chosen, he urged, 'and the slightest hint that you want to do the first will make any work you try to do on the second practically valueless'.⁹⁹ Referring back to their conversation in Geneva, Parkes went on to express the hope that Hoffmann would attempt to change the evangelistic focus of ICCAJ and concentrate instead on 'undo[ing] the work of the centuries'.¹⁰⁰

Hoffmann wrote again at the close of the May 1931 ICCAJ conference to let Parkes know that 75 'outstanding Christian leaders', including 'leading representatives from the Federal Council of Churches', had passed a set of findings that 'lift[ed] the whole [ICCAJ] enterprise... to a much higher plane'.¹⁰¹ Parkes was unpersuaded by the letter or its draft of the 36 findings that laid out ICCAJ's 'clear and compelling evangelistic purpose'.¹⁰² He rejected as unacceptable any 'official conversionist policy', and he argued that even the ICCAJ findings that touched on discrimination and repentance were 'inadequate to express the historic facts'.¹⁰³ While granting that ICCAJ had 'confessed with shame that the attitude and conduct of Christians ha[d] not been in accord with the spirit of Christ and His teachings',¹⁰⁴ he criticized that no responsibility had been taken for the 'ultimate' cause and no repudiation had been made of two thousand years of 'ignore[d] facts'.¹⁰⁵ It was one thing for the ICCAJ to urge Christians to repent for 'prejudice and unjust discriminations against the Jews', as one such 'finding' did,¹⁰⁶ but altogether another to accept and acknowledge responsibility for the anti-Jewish Christian attitudes that permeated western history.¹⁰⁷ When addressing Parkes' criticism a month later, Hoffmann responded in what would become a well-honed circular pattern, arguing that attitudes of 'discrimination,

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Hoffmann to Parkes, 26 May 1931, Parkes Papers MS60/17/8/2. The 1931 NAICCAJ Findings were published in *Christians and Jews: A Report of the Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews*, 12-15 May 1931 (IMC, 1931), 131-140.

¹⁰² NAICCAJ 1931 Findings 5.

¹⁰³ Parkes to Hoffmann, 11 June 1931, PP MS60/17/8/2.

¹⁰⁴ NAICCAJ 1931 Findings 2.

¹⁰⁵ Parkes to Hoffmann, 11 June 1931, prev. cit.

¹⁰⁶ NAICCAJ 1931 Findings 3.

¹⁰⁷ Parkes to Hoffmann, 11 June 1931.

ostracism, and persecution' would 'never' be eliminated until churches developed a 'definitely Christian attitude' to the Jews which included a commitment to their evangelisation.¹⁰⁸

III. What was not discussed in this 1930-1931 dialogue that so clearly draws lines of demarcation between Parkes and the ICCAJ was that none of the 36 NAICCAJ findings in May 1931, 7 of which contained an additional 37 parts, explicitly repudiated antisemitism. Only the terms 'prejudice' and 'discrimination' had been used, and used only sparingly. Yet this was in keeping with the findings of the Budapest-Warsaw conferences in 1927, which, although using more terms and using them more amply, also failed to speak of 'antisemitism'. 'Prejudice', 'un-Christian treatment', 'ill-usage', 'injustice', 'persecution', and 'sins of Christendom against the Jews' all found place in the 1927 findings but, just as in May 1931, 'antisemitism' was missing from its list of repudiations. While 'race discrimination' and 'race prejudice' did in fact find place in a resolution made in conjunction with the May 1931 findings, it was in the evangelizing context of resolving to petition American churches to publicly declare that racial discrimination had no place in *Christian missions*. When calling Christians 'to repentance for...prejudice and unjust discriminations against the Jews' the same 1931 findings did not make use of even the same racial category.¹⁰⁹ These were not, however, the only ICCAJ-related statements of the period. At the close of 1931 there were in fact four repudiating statements, derived from four Protestant conferences over a four year period, all bearing the influence of the first conferences at Budapest and Warsaw. Yet closer examination reveals that this was actually the case of two parallel sets of formal statements, one of which was international in scope and did not repudiate 'antisemitism' (April 1927 and May 1931), and the other of which was national in thrust and did repudiate 'antisemitism' (December 1930 and December 1931). As will become clear in the following analysis, this inconsistent inclusion and exclusion of the term was not a matter of coincidence or oversight.

The impetus for the first of the two statements that repudiated antisemitism can be seen as originating in response to James Parkes' criticism. After Parkes' censure of the deficiencies of the May 1931 NAICCAJ Findings, Hoffmann called for more specificity on antisemitism at the September North American meeting of ICCAJ.¹¹⁰ The statement resulting from this call for 'disavowal' of antisemitism was *not*, however, issued as an ICCAJ statement.¹¹¹ It was initiated

¹⁰⁸ Hoffmann to Parkes, 15 July 1931, Parkes Papers MS60/17/8/2.

¹⁰⁹ NAICCAJ 1931 Findings 3.

¹¹⁰ NAICCAJ Minutes, 29 September 1931, WCC.261207.1.

¹¹¹ The December 1931 'Christmas Message Concerning Our Relations With Our Jewish Neighbors' was issued under the combined signatures, in alphabetical order, of 30 officers from the following NA bodies: the National Council of the YWCA of Canada; General Conference of the Methodist Protestant Church; General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada; African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church; General Convention of the Christian Church for the US and Canada; Missionary Education Movement; Moravian Church North; United Lutheran Church in America; Evangelical Synod of North America; Federal Council of Churches; Home Missions Council; General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church; Southern Baptist Convention; Meeting of Friends in America; the General Conference of the

by ICCAJ, drawn up by an ICCAJ committee, and claimed as example of a NAICCAJ endeavour, but it was issued as a joint North American statement of officiating persons from 25 Protestant organizations. The only mention of ICCAJ when it appeared in December 1931, in fact, was as the affiliating organization of two of its 30 signatories, John Conning and John Mott. The second related statement of North American thrust, which was issued in December 1930, was that of the Home Missions Council (HMC) who had successfully nominated John Conning as chairman of NAICCAJ and vice-chairman of the executive ICCAJ.¹¹² Conning was later placed at the head of a sub-committee charged with drafting the HMC statement, and the sub-committee itself was placed under a commission chaired by John McDowell, who was also an NAICCAJ member. Both McDowell and Conning were subsequently appointed to the drafting committee of the December 1931 North American joint Protestant statement, with the result that the repudiation of antisemitism in *both* statements was framed in similar language.¹¹³ The HMC statement of December 1930 'call[ed] upon all churches and Christians to oppose anti-Semitism in every form', while the December 1931 joint Protestant statement disavowed 'anti-Semitism in every form'.¹¹⁴ Standing in stark contrast were the Budapest-Warsaw and NAICCAJ statements of April 1927 and May 1931 which disregarded the term 'antisemitism' altogether, opting instead for 'prejudice', 'discrimination', and 'ill-usage'. In order to cast light on why antisemitism would be repudiated in the statements of North American scope and ignored in the official statements of international ICCAJ - *when all four statements were being crafted by ICCAJ executives* - it is important to turn to a fifth statement made six months after the North American Protestant repudiation of antisemitism in December 1931.

The occasion was the first international conference of the three regional sectors of ICCAJ, and, as such, work sessions had been pre-arranged on antisemitism and the non-discriminatory grounds of missions to Jews. When convening this June 1932 meeting Hoffmann attributed the joint Protestant statement of December 1931 to NAICCAJ efforts and then called for a similar ICCAJ statement against antisemitism as 'an un-Christian, racial manifestation'.¹¹⁵ The idea in discussion was that antisemitism was 'un-Christian in every sense of the word' and

Methodist Episcopal Church South; Presbyterian Church in US; International Convention of Disciples of Christ; United Church of Canada; National Council of Congregational Churches; Reformed Episcopal Church; National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church; General Synod of the Reformed Church in US; General Synod of the Reformed Church in America; Church of England in Canada; National Council of the YMCA of Canada. See NAICCAJ Minutes, 10 December 1931, draft of 'A Christmas Message, List of Signatories, and press release urging wide circulation; WCC. 261202.5 and 261207.1.

¹¹² NAICCAJ Minutes, 38 June 1929, WCC.261230.21.

¹¹³ The drafting committee for the December 1931 joint Protestant statement was made up of Conrad Hoffmann and three NAICCAJ members: Samuel Cavert, General Secretary of the FCC, John McDowell, Administrative Committee of the HMC, and John Conning, Chairman of NAICCAJ. Hoffmann, Conning, and Cavert were all members of the NAICCAJ executive committee created in June 1931.

¹¹⁴ Respectively, HMC Findings on Jewish and Christian Relationships, December 1930, Director's Report, September 1930-March 1931, WCC.261202.5; December 1931 Protestant statement, prev. cit.

¹¹⁵ Director's Report, 1 June 1932, 11-12, WCC. 261202.5.

that ICCAJ repudiation might influence churches in Europe to 'protest against the violence and outrages of anti-Semitism in their countries'.¹¹⁶ A committee was assigned the task of drafting an ICCAJ statement on antisemitism once its members had been informed by the pre-arranged papers and discussion. Those papers on antisemitism were presented by three executives of ICCAJ, the first of which, Dr. Otto von Harling, who was director of Institutum Judaicum Delitzschianum in Leipzig, was also an appointee of the committee drafting the statement.¹¹⁷

Harling's address on 'Antisemitism in Germany' was in essence a practical condensation of Julius Richter's theoretical address on Jewish behaviours and mentalities which was given to the May 1931 NAICCAJ conference. Harling's attempt to explain why 'Germany ha[d] become the classical country of Anti-semitism' was also highly apologetic.¹¹⁸ Starting with the premise that each country had its 'point of limit' in terms of absorbing Jews, he argued that the degree of anti-Jewish feeling among natives would be stronger in countries where Jews had 'penetrate[d] into the system of the spiritual organism with the same energy as they d[id] in the economical and political regions of the people'. Where such penetration was prevalent, as it now was in Germany, 'the Jewish question [would be] more in the forefront and the Jewish element...felt more as a foreign element'.¹¹⁹ Harling's 'factual' conditions contributing to Germany's current 'struggle' were laid out in three ways. The first emphasized movement of 'unscrupulous' eastern Jews into German society in order to make 'profit [from] Germany's helplessness'. The second elaborated Jewish tendencies to leftwing interests and international loyalties. And the third emphasized increasing Jewish influence on German culture and intellectual life, with focus on the particular claim that 'many of the most destructive moral influences in art, literature, and journalism were Jewish'. In his seeking of ICCAJ understanding of the overall situation, Harling lamented the difficulties involved in trying to promote evangelistic love for Jews in a country where the Jewish question was 'so acute' and where 'antisemitism [was] the normal feeling'. He also urged, 'for the sake of justice', that ICCAJ understand why such a 'passionate struggle [had risen] in a people... otherwise rather peaceful', and to take confidence in the fact that 'we will carry on our struggle as our conditions demand and our power allows'.¹²⁰

Rev J. van Nes of the Reformed Churches of the Netherlands, who like Harling had been consistently involved with ICCAJ since the Budapest-Warsaw conferences, affirmed Harling's thesis by elaborating the degree to which Germany had 'taken the lead' in European antisemitism.¹²¹ Where van Nes differed from Harling was in his allowance that antisemitism

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ The drafting committee for the 1932 ICCAJ statement were Otto von Harling; Kenneth Macklennan, General Secretary of the British Conference of Missionary Societies, and Ruth Rouse, Secretary of the Missionary Council of the National Assembly of the Church of England.

¹¹⁸ Otto von Harling, 'Antisemitism in Germany', WCC.261202.6.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ J. van Nes, 'Anti-Semitism on the Continent of Europe', WCC.261202.6.

was a 'compound idea' made up of racial, political, economic, and religious aspects which were fanned by nationalism, and his insistence that antisemitism 'must be regarded as an anti-Christian movement'. He also emphasized that even though antisemitism was 'a scourge of the Lord to punish Jews for their sins', it had to be made clear to Christians that they would be divinely punished if they became involved with that scourging.¹²²

The third set of ideas were delivered by John Conning, who had also been present at the Budapest-Warsaw conferences and was head of the North American sector of ICCAJ. Conning's thesis, which was in line with Harling's 'limit of absorption' theory, argued that antisemitism did not appear in America until the Jewish population 'increased to millions and...influence became even more potent'.¹²³ He also acknowledged, like van Nes, that antisemitism was caused by a complex of factors, but he dismissed the idea that political, economic, and/or religious factors had bearing on its development in America.¹²⁴ Far more serious was the 'disproportionately large number of Jews entering professional life' and the 'racial peculiarities' that precipitated offensive Jewish characteristics.¹²⁵ Referring to this as the 'social' element of antisemitism, which he viewed as stemming from the Jewish predilection toward exclusivity, Conning went on to argue that it was such a potent stimulant of 'discrimination against Jews' that it even affected the religious tolerance of American churches.¹²⁶ These ideas were not being presented as something new, however, but as introduction to discussion-questions which were meant to elicit the tenets of understanding already present. The first division of questions, for example, asked if antisemitism was 'inevitable', and the second began with 'if Anti-Semitism is not inevitable, then where are we to look for the means to secure its removal?' The combined categorical questions summarized the tenets of argument that would have been implicit in any ICCAJ statement on Jews: that both antisemitism and the Jewish problem were capable of solving; that Christianity alone possessed the solution; that Christians had 'a right to expect Jews to remove whatever causes [of antisemitism] might lodge with themselves'; that the Church was duty-bound to cultivate the right attitude toward Jews; that the divine mandate to evangelize Jews could not be abandoned in order to establish good will with Jews.¹²⁷

Two things stand in bold relief in the ICCAJ statement that was crafted in the wake of these papers and discussions in June 1932. The most obvious is that, even though referred to as the 'Finding on Anti-Semitism', the term 'antisemitism' was nowhere to be found. The second was inclusion of a mutual blame clause on causation of Jewish prejudice, which is not found in earlier statements even though Jewish blame was widely discussed behind the scenes, in reports,

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ John S. Conning, 'Anti-Semitism in America,' WCC.261202.6.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Conning, 'Anti-Semitism in America', prev. cit.

and at conferences. In order to explain the exclusion of the term 'antisemitism' and the inclusion of mutual blame in the statement, it is necessary to look at both the internationalism around which ICCAJ was structured, and the ways in which ICCAJ *perceived* antisemitism and its international organizational response. The formal statements of ICCAJ, whether that of the North American sector in May 1931 or the executive ICCAJ in June 1932, were formulated as the official positions of an international body founded on the principle of ecumenical unity. As subsidiary of IMC, ICCAJ was dedicated to the IMC idea that 'spiritual unity...demand[ed] manifestation in international missionary cooperation'.¹²⁸ Yet ICCAJ was not only a subsidiary of an international body, it was itself an international body comprised of multi-national interests channelled into supra-national goals. Both of the ICCAJ statements were formulated in the light of German constituent accounts of antisemitism as backlash to Jewish ingressions, as well as concern that Germany was already being disparaged as the 'classical country' of antisemitism. It must also be taken into account that both Otto von Harling and Julius Richter, who were highly esteemed ecumenists, were present at the conferences where their expositions on antisemitism were discussed prior to statement formulations, and that Harling himself was a member of the drafting committee for the 1932 statement. All of this has to be considered not only with regard to the absence of the term 'antisemitism', but also with regard to inclusion of the mutual blame clause in 1932, for it was only after Harling's appeal for understanding of Germany's Jewish problem that ICCAJ chose to point out in an official statement that Christian 'prejudice and misunderstanding often arise from circumstances for which blame does not entirely rest on one side'.¹²⁹

ICCAJ's measured attempt to articulate opposition to prejudice, discrimination, and racial hatred, while not calling attention to the term most often associated with its German constituent, also has to be viewed in the light of ICCAJ's developing perception of antisemitism. In the same June 1932 statement ICCAJ proclaimed itself as the 'responsible' body for making known to both Church and Jews the causes of 'race-hatred', prejudice, and discrimination. The aim heralded in this claim was that ICCAJ was to 'foster study and discussion of the realities of the situation'¹³⁰ The following month those perceived 'realities' were set out in an article in the July issue of *The International Review of Missions*. What is striking is that little had changed during the seven year interim since the 1925 call to take up the study of the Jewish problem was published in the same journal.¹³¹ The July 1932 exposition was not only structured around the same points of its 1925 predecessor, it made use of generous portions of its text and listed in the

¹²⁸ *The World Mission of Christianity: Messages and Recommendations* (1928), prev. cit., 80.

¹²⁹ ICCAJ Finding on Anti-Semitism (1932), ICCAJ Minutes, 13-14 June 1932, 7-8, WCC.261202.6. The statement went on to say that, even though this was the case, 'Christian consciences should be profoundly stirred by the situation'.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ 'The Jews: The Missionary Significance, A Survey', Vol.21, No.3 (July, 1932), *International Review of Missions*, 337-348.

same order the post-1918 developments said to be most pertinent to Jewish evangelization: universal appearance of the Jewish question and rapid growth of antisemitism; 'world wide emancipation of the Jews [and] the consequent disintegration of Judaism'; 'revival of [Jewish] race consciousness' along with the unifying of world Jewry; the 'remarkable growth of Jewish influence in the world'.¹³²

What was new, relative to the seven year unchanging focus, was that 'increased racial consciousness of the Jews' was now said to 'fan the flame of anti-Semitism'.¹³³ Although such linking of Jewish racial consciousness and antisemitism was not novel to ICCAJ discussions, it had now found place as a permanent category of thought and discussion.¹³⁴ More specifically, the idea of Jewish racial consciousness was now being discussed as a troublesome outcome of Judaism's degradation and the spiritual vacuum created by it. John Conning had argued in 1927 that 'racial appeal ha[d] been substituted for the religious', that Jews identified race with religion, and that Jewish leaders 'develop[ed] racial consciousness and emphasize[d] racial claims'.¹³⁵ An attendant thought appearing in the July 1932 *IRM* article was that 'Judaism to multitudes of Jews [was] more a matter of race than religion'.¹³⁶

That this was held to have been the case was made clear a few months later when ICCAJ executives convened with a group of American rabbis for the purpose of quelling their protests against Jewish missions.¹³⁷ The meeting was unsurprisingly stalemated when rabbis remained 'irreconcilably opposed to any attempt on the part of Christians to evangelize the Jews' and ICCAJ remained 'irrevocably convinced that it must include the Jews in its missionary program'.¹³⁸ ICCAJ interpretation of the stalemate, however, was not that differences persisted, but, rather, that 'the real problem center[ed] around the question of whether Judaism was 'a race or a religion'.¹³⁹ Among ICCAJ conclusions that were passed along in the aftermath of the meeting was that 'the whole problem [was] essentially one of racial pride and not of religion', that 'the aim of Jews [was] to preserve the integrity of the Jews as a race', and that it was 'thus fundamentally a racial problem which pretend[ed] to be a religious problem'.¹⁴⁰

While this mounting ICCAJ argument about the rise of Jewish racial consciousness and its causal relationship to antisemitism will not reach fullness until after Hitler's ascension to power in 1933, the ideas were fully present going into the 1932 ICCAJ international conference and, as such, cannot be ignored when trying to understand why the conference statement did not

¹³² Ibid..

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Jewish racial pride had been cited as an elicitor of antisemitism at the Budapest-Warsaw conferences; see Mackellar, 'Anti-Semitism', 190-191, prev. cit.

¹³⁵ John S. Conning, 'The Jewish Situation in America', prev. cit., 73.

¹³⁶ 'The Jews: The Missionary Significance', 337, prev. cit.

¹³⁷ Confidential Report on the Meeting in Chicago, 13 November 1932; WCC.261207.1.

¹³⁸ NAICCAJ Minutes, 23 November 1932, WCC. 261207.1

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

explicitly repudiate antisemitism.¹⁴¹ ICCAJ's focused understanding of antisemitism in 1932 was that of an unchristian racial solution to an advancing international Jewish problem, and ICCAJ viewed itself as bearer of the anti-racial and anti-prejudicial Christian solution. Consideration of the 'anti-prejudicial' nature of this view is of critical importance, for the term 'prejudice' figured in all five ICCAJ-related statements between 1927 and 1932. With 'prejudice' as the mainstay term in all of the statements, as well as figuring into all of the background discussions informing the statements, one might assume that it was an operative word carrying a similar or equal meaning to antisemitism. At first glance, as illustrated in Table II below, there are in fact enough instances to suggest that synonymatic exchange was being made with both 'discrimination' and 'prejudice':

Table II. Terminology in Formal ICCAJ-Related Statements to Condemn Negative Attitudes Toward Jews, 1927-1932

April 1927 B-W	December 1930 NA HMC	May 1931 ICCAJ	December 1931 NA Joint Protestant	June 1932 ICCAJ
1. Prejudice (1)	Prejudice (1)	Prejudice (3)		Prejudice (3)
2. Persecution (2)	Persecution (1)			
3. Un-Christian Treatment (1)				
4. Race-Prejudice (1)		Race Prejudice (1)		
5. Injustice (4)	Injustice (2)			
6. Ill-Usage (4)	Ill-Usage (1)			
7. Sins of Christendom (1)				
8. Indifference (1)				
9.	Discrimination (1)	Discrimination (3)		
10.	<i>Anti-Semitism (1)</i>		<i>Anti-Semitism (1)</i>	
11.		Ostracism (1)		Ostracism (1)
12.		Race Discrimination (1)		Race Discrimination (1)
13.			Anti-Jewish Prejudice (1)	
14.				Hatred (1)
15.				Race Hatred (1)

A close reading of the texts in all five statements, however, belie synonymatic exchange. The repeat pattern in the statements was that of treating both 'discrimination' and 'prejudice' as forms of Christian anti-Jewishness that made up the 'sins of Christendom' being confessed, repented, and/or renounced. 'Ill-usage', 'injustice', 'indifference', and 'ostracism' were used in the same particularized vein, but clear distinction was made between the 'un-Christian' grouping that was being *renounced* and the 'racial' grouping that was being *denounced* as un-Christian. Indeed, as illustrated in Table III below, such distinctions appeared in pairs all through the series of five statements.

¹⁴¹ ICCAJ Finding on Anti-Semitism (1932), Conference Minutes, 13-14 June 1932, WCC. 261202.6.

Table III. Pairs of Distinctions in Formal ICCAJ-Related Statements to Condemn Negative Attitudes Toward Jews, 1927-1932

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Pairs of Distinctions</u>
April 1927	Un-Christian treatment of Jews <i>and</i> racial prejudice
Dec. 1930	Christian discrimination <i>and</i> every form of antisemitism
May 1931	Christian discrimination, prejudice, ostracism <i>and</i> racial prejudice and discrimination
Dec. 1931	Antisemitism in every form <i>and</i> Christian anti-Jewish prejudices
June 1932	Christian prejudice, ostracism, hatred <i>and</i> racial discrimination and hatred

ICCAJ's choice to be specific about racial prejudice, discrimination, and hatred while ignoring the specificity 'antisemitism' was informed by its developing perception of distinctions between racially-motivated prejudice and non-racially motivated prejudice, as well as its international structure. In May 1931, and again in June 1932, as expressed in conference papers, Germany was seen as the 'classical country' of antisemitism, and to such a degree, van Neys had argued, that extensive discussion about the rest of Europe was not necessary theoretically. Such ICCAJ understanding was closely aligned to both Julius Richter's May 1931 treatise on Jewish mentalities and behaviours in Germany *and* Otto von Harling's June 1932 apologetic treatise on Jewish 'penetration' of Germany, its destructive influences, and the 'passionate struggle' to deal with Germany's 'Jewish question', which he had urged fellow conferees to understand.¹⁴² It was also the case that distinction had been made earlier between antisemitism and the 'warding off of Jewish anti-Christian encroachments' in a report on German churches informing the 1927 Budapest-Warsaw conferences.¹⁴³ ICCAJ's hesitancy to repudiate antisemitism precisely at both the May 1931 and June 1932 conferences thus reflected, in part, concern about undistinguished conflation of all negative attitudes toward Jews as 'antisemitic', especially within its German constituency. With both Richter and Harling present at the conferences drafting the statements on antisemitism, and Harling himself on the 1932 drafting committee, it is not incongruous that words would be chosen which would articulate opposition to all forms of discrimination, racial hatred, and prejudice while not in any way contributing to Germany's diminishing status as 'the' country of antisemitism. It was also the case that this more imprecise condemnation of racially-motivated negative attitudes toward Jews fitted well with the general IMC aim of 'uniting the Christian forces of the world in seeking justice in international and inter-racial relations'.¹⁴⁴ In a very real sense, ICCAJ understanding of Judaism as a breeder of racial consciousness, racial pride, and other racial 'peculiarities' that provoked non-Jews to antisemitic backlash was itself a theory of troubled international and inter-racial relations. Although ICCAJ was diametrically opposed to all doctrines and solutions of racism, it was, in 1932, openly categorizing Jews as a

¹⁴² Harling, 'Antisemitism in Germany (1932)', *prev. cit.*

¹⁴³ Budapest-Warsaw Report, Questionnaire Analysis (1927), 124, *prev. cit.*

¹⁴⁴ *World Mission of Christianity, Messages and Recommendations* (1928), p.82, *prev. cit.*

race with society-troubling attributes, and, in its private and public propagation of Judaism as a vehicle of racial advancement rather than religion, it was thoughtlessly in agreement with mainline tenets of antisemitic theory.

Chapter Two

THE FACE OF NON-INTERFERENCE

1933 - 1936

In March 1933 the crisis that threatened to sever the unity of the burgeoning ecumenical movement in the interwar years was re-ignited over Germany's handling of its Jewish problem. The unfurling issue not only challenged the ecumenical ideal of being a Christian 'mouthpiece' for social justice, as had been proclaimed in Nathan Soederblom's 1930 Nobel lecture, it set key ecumenical leaders on a twelve-year course of caution wherein decisions about statements on social justice for Jews were informed by the precedence of ecumenical unity. As this path was being sedulously cut by the central ecumenical body for social action, ICCAJ's goals remained aimed at informing international Protestant understanding of the Jewish problem, its Christian solution, and the anti-Christian nature of antisemitism. The development of these concomitant paths of ecumenical response to the unfolding events in Germany between 1933 to 1936 is the focus of this chapter.

On 25 March 1933, twenty days after Adolf Hitler's ascension to German Chancellor was strengthened by German election, three Federal Council of Churches officials in America published a statement in the *New York Times*, calling reports of German persecution of Jews a matter of concern to 'all men of brotherly ideals'.¹ The statement was issued by Samuel Cavert, general secretary of FCC and executive member of NAICCAJ, along with FCC officials Parkes Cadman and Henry Leiper who were both UCCLW officers.² The statement was both a protest against 'all forms of racial and religious intolerance' and a vote of confidence that the German churches would 'repudiate and oppose' all persecutions against Jews. Three days later the new National Socialist government called for boycott of Jewish businesses, and the FCC vote of confidence became part of an international heyday of criticism about German church failure to repudiate state actions against Jews. The immediate reaction of German Protestant leaders was to send what was described as a 'barrage' of cables and letters to the FCC, urging against 'exaggerated reports coming out of Germany'.³ Hermann Kapler, President of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in Germany, who had warned at the 1925 Life and Work Conference in Stockholm that ecumenical relations would cease if imputed German war-guilt persisted, now implored those who had published the FCC statement to use their 'influence' to quell protests

¹ Statement of Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 24 March 1933, WCC 301.43.17.1, published in the *New York Times* on 25 March, p.10.

² Cavert was also one of the co-drafters of the December 1931 joint Protestant statement on antisemitism discussed in the previous chapter.

³ Two cables were received by FCC on the same day the statement was published (25 March). Burghart, president of the German World Alliance, 'warn[ed] against horror propaganda undecidably exaggerated and deceitful', while Ohlemueller, Fahrenhorst, and Luther of the German division of the International Protestant League 'declare[d] upon honour and conscience that no pogroms against Jews ha[d] happened', going on to 'ask insistently' that FCC prevent such 'erroneous propaganda of horrors'; FCC Box 9 F15.

about the 'alleged persecution of Jews'.⁴ As head of UCCLW's Continental European sector, Kapler also cautioned that more protests against Germany would 'do harm to ecclesiastical cooperation'.⁵ The first such warning was sent to Kapler's UCCLW American counterpart, Parkes Cadman, with similar admonitions to Bishop George Bell in London, who was head of the British sector and overall chairman of UCCLW. Henry Louis Henriod, general secretary of UCCLW, and Adolf Keller, director of the related European Central Bureau for Inter-Church Aid were among other ecumenical leaders who received German Protestant urgings to 'fight against untruthful and disastrous stirring up of horror' about Germany.⁶

The three principals of the FCC statement responded from New York on 30 March in three telegrams, assuring that 'the message of warning' was gratefully acknowledged and that concern over 'reported German Anti-Semitism in no sense indicates loss of esteem for German people or lessened affection for our Christian brethren'.⁷ Two follow-up letters were written by Leiper on UCCLW letterhead over the two following days to ecumenical colleagues in Europe, requesting intervention in what seen as a brewing problem.⁸ According to Leiper's assessment, recent joint protests of American Jews and Christians against German persecution of Jews had been widely misinterpreted in Germany as 'simple and unmistakable confirmation...that Jews had the power to swing whole nations into line'.⁹ The FCC statement, coming as it did between American rallies of protest, had fuelled the myth that 'there really was a worldwide organization of Jewry, capable of mobilizing public sentiment on a wide scale'.¹⁰ Of immediate concern was Kapler's warning that further 'participation...in protests could endanger friendly relations with the German Churches'.¹¹ What was 'needed', and what was being requested by Leiper, Cavert, and Cadman, was for William Adams Brown, chairman of UCCLW's administrative committee, and Willem Visser't Hooft, general secretary of WSCF, to 'go at once' to Berlin and 'reassure Dr. Kapler and others of the basic and unaltered friendliness of the American people'.¹²

⁴ Kapler to Cadman, 27 March 1933.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., and Kapler to Henriod (with list of other recipients), 30 March; Heimann to Christian Social Institute, 30 March; Kapler to Kirchenbund Geneva, 31 March; Kapler to Henriod, 3 April 1933; WCC.420041, 301.43.18.1.

⁷ Cadman, Cavert, and Leiper to Kapler, 30 March; Federal Council of Churches to Ohlemueller in Berlin, 30 March; Cadman to Kapler, 30 March 1933; WCC.301.43.17.1 and 301.43.18.1.

⁸ The American sector of the UCCLW was created in 1930, and merged with the FCC Commission on Relations with Religious Bodies in Europe (1912). The combination of the two became the FCC Commission on Relations with Churches Abroad. The Commission was an integral part of the UCCLW American sector, and vice versa, as reflected on UCCLW letterhead. Parkes Cadman was chairman of both UCCLW and the Commission, Henry Leiper was executive secretary, and Samuel Cavert was an officer of the administrative executive committee.

⁹ Leiper to Brown, with copy to Visser't Hooft, 31 March 1933; Leiper to Visser't Hooft, Geneva, 1 April 1933; WCC 301.43.17.1; Cavert and Leiper to Brown, 1 April 1933, FCC Box 9 F15.

¹⁰ Ibid., Leiper to Visser't Hooft. The FCC statement was issued after an American Jewish Congress rally in New York (12 March) and before a widely publicized protest in Madison Square Garden (27 March).

¹¹ Ibid., Leiper to Brown.

¹² Ibid.

On 1 April, the same day that Leiper wrote to Visser't Hooft in Geneva, UCCLW general secretary H.L. Henriod wrote from Geneva to Kapler in Berlin to assure that 'we will do all we can to prevent demonstrations being undertaken against Germany on false reports'.¹³ He agreed with Kapler that such protests would 'do serious harm to cooperation between the churches' and that actions 'based on unconfirmed reports [could] only endanger the situation in an irreparable manner'.¹⁴ Yet Henriod made clear, as conciliatorily as possible, that the reports about Germany were causing concerns, that calls for UCCLW action were being made by UCCLW church circles, and that he needed 'to be able to give a practical and satisfying answer' to those who were making the requests.¹⁵ In that context Henriod asked Kapler to advise him 'as quickly as possible' of the German Church attitude toward the state boycott, which was being levied against Jews as he wrote.¹⁶ Concern about how to answer constituent requests was heightened when, without a word of protest from German Protestant leaders, the German Law for Reconstruction of the Civil Service was promulgated on 7 April, and its First Ordinance defined 'non-Aryan' according to Jewish lineage four days later.

By 11 April Henriod was preparing for meetings with Kapler and other church leaders in Berlin, conferring with other ecumenical organizations in Geneva, and advising ecumenical constituencies 'to wait if possible for any public action until we have gone through Berlin and reported [back]'.¹⁷ In preparation for the meetings in Berlin, Henriod and his Geneva staff were also collecting materials that would shed light on what was feared would be a 'divisive turning point for the whole of the Ecumenical Movement'.¹⁸ Two papers prepared by colleagues in Geneva appear with Henriod's correspondence for those meetings. Both were dated 13 April 1933, both warned about the dangers of 'being lured into the poisoned atmosphere of a propaganda of lies and hatred', and both invoked the history of the German war-guilt debacle that nearly severed burgeoning ecumenism during and after WWI.¹⁹

The first was weighted by the reputation of its author, Dr. Adolf Keller, one of the most respected and well-known ecumenists in Europe and North America. Keller had retired from the directorship of UCCLW's Christian Social Institute in 1932 in order to expand the European Central Bureau for Inter-Church Aid, but he was still principally involved with the issues of the Institute.²⁰ His 'Facts and Meaning of the German Revolution as Seen from a Neutral Point of

¹³ Henriod to Kapler, 1 April 1933, with copies to Cadman, Cavert, Leiper, and others, WCC.420041.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Henriod to Bishop Ammundsen of Denmark (vice-chair of the Continental division of UCCLW), 7 April; Ammundsen to Henriod, 9 April; Henriod to Ammundsen, 11 April; Ammundsen to Henriod, 14 April 1933; WCC. 301.43.17.2, 301.43.18.1

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ For quotation, see ff. 21 below.

²⁰ The European Central Bureau for Inter-Church Aid was located at the same Geneva address as the UCCLW. It was founded in 1922 through the initiative of the FCC Commission on Relations with

View' should be viewed, in fact, from the perspective of a UCCLW research conference earlier in March, wherein it was unanimously asserted that Christians must reject the authoritarian state. In Keller's two-fold assessment, the 'controversy' between church and state in Germany over spiritual liberty was likely 'a more permanent feature than the incidental outburst of race antagonism', and the National Socialist attitude toward Jews was but one aspect of the current German revolution.²¹ He accepted as fact reports from German churchmen which claimed that atrocities against Jews had been 'distorted' and, in so stating, he summoned the Christian 'duty' to look at the 'entangled situation in the cold light of real facts before forming hasty judgments'. In his review of 'facts' he cautioned to bear in mind that 'hatred against Jews' involved more than blind racial prejudice. It could not be denied 'that the Jewish element played an important role in Russian Bolshevism as well as the growing of German communism and atheism', and, consequently, much of the 'blamed Anti-Semitism and hatred' must find explanation in what was seen as 'the destructive and moral[ly] disintegrating influence of the revolutionary Jewish mind'. German 'hatred against Jews' had to be understood not only 'as a form of blind race antagonism...but as a charge against...[the] Jewish element...responsible for the lowering of moral standards in public life...'.²² Such 'facts' and 'meaning' had to be taken into consideration when trying to understand current state policy and German Church reactions to it, even when deploring the harshness and injustice that forms of state correction had possibly taken. Instead of 'actions based on insufficient information or a propaganda of hatred', Keller advised, sister churches abroad should 'listen attentively to what the German Church [was] going to say in order to save her liberty of speech and spiritual life...'.²³

Many of the same points were made by W.A. Visser't Hooft in the second paper of the same date which was published a few weeks later in *Christian Century*. Visser't Hooft's name was familiar to the pages of this 'foremost journal of Christian opinion' as both its Geneva correspondent and general secretary of the WSCF²⁴ and, like Keller, he cautioned against the 'mob psychology' that was causing a Christian rush to judgment about Germany.²⁵ Visser't

Religious Bodies in Europe and the Swiss Federation of Protestant Churches. The aim of the Bureau was to coordinate aid to European religious bodies suffering from the effects of WWI. Organization members provided financial support, personnel, and other supportive structures, but the actual work of the Bureau was administered by a board selected from participating European churches. Offices were established in Geneva and New York with Adolf Keller as Director. As part of his liaison work between churches of Europe and North America, he published a periodic 'Confidential European Survey' to ecumenists abroad.

²¹ Adolf Keller, 'Facts and Meaning of the German Revolution as Seen from a Neutral Point of View', 13 April 1933, WCC301.43.17.6.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Samuel Cavert to Kurt Boehme on *Christian Century* influence, 31 May 1933, FCC F9B15.

²⁵ Visser't Hooft, untitled, 13 April 1933, WCC.301.43.17.2, appeared in *Christian Century* on 3 May 1933 under the title 'Christ or Caesar in Germany'. See Visser't Hooft's *CC* review of Reinhold Niebuhr's 'Why German Socialism Crashed' (22 April), where he criticized Niebuhr's critique of the German church, arguing that what was needed in 'international Christian relations [was] not...sweeping judgments...but a great deal of patient understanding and willingness to listen'.

Hooft did not deny that Jews were having 'a difficult time in Germany', but, in evaluating *why* their plight was difficult, he insisted on distinctions between actions based on 'prejudice and ignorance' and actions that were 'explicable and to some extent justifiable'. In the case of the latter, he pointed to a Jewish insistence upon 'constituting a nation within a nation,' adding that it would understandably create problems for a country 'threatened to be torn asunder by disunity and internal division'.²⁶ Like Keller, Visser't Hooft emphasized that 'the great issue at stake in Germany [was] the...spiritual freedom of the Churches'. He also held that the unfolding situation 'constitute[d] a great challenge' to the idea of Christian unity which had been so talked about at ecumenical conferences. 'Instead of judging prematurely', he argued and advised, Christians ought to practice such unity by standing with 'their German sister-Churches' while trying to understand their situation and difficulties.²⁷

Four days after the Keller and Visser't Hooft papers were written Henriod left Geneva for church discussions in Berlin, accompanied by German colleague Hans Schoenfeld, director of research at the Christian Social Institute. Three days after their own rounds of meetings with German Church leaders on 18 and 19 April, Samuel Cavert arrived in Berlin from New York for five additional days of meetings with Church leadership. On 27 April Cavert travelled from Berlin to London to confer with J.H. Oldham and William Paton, general secretaries of IMC and *Ex Officios* of ICCAJ, and, on the same day, William Adams Brown arrived in Geneva to meet with Henriod, Schoenfeld, Keller and Visser't Hooft.²⁸

From these rounds of meetings in Berlin, London, and Geneva came three reports that were decisive in cementing an ecumenical interpretation of the German Church 'situation', one that was dispensed through the web of ecumenical communication. The first, dated 25 April 1933, marked 'Strictly Confidential', and unsigned, has been attributed to Hans Schoenfeld but archival evidence suggests that it was almost certainly an early version of a report by William Adams Brown, head of the administrative committee of UCCLW.²⁹ The second was dated 28

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Samuel Cavert to Henriod, 15 March 1933; Henriod to Cavert, 22 March 1933; Henriod to Bishop Ammundsen, 11 April 1933; Cavert to Henriod, 15 April 1933; FCC Box 9 F15 and WCC.301.43.17.2

²⁹ 'The Situation in Germany', 25 April 1933, WCC.301.43.17.1, 301.43.17.4, FCC Box 9 F 15. The author of this report has been difficult to determine for two reasons, the first of which has to do with conflicting copies in WCC and FCC archives. While neither copy bears a signature, there is pencilled marking ('by H. Schoenfeld') next to the title on the first page of the FCC copy, which has led researchers working from the FCC archives to assume Schoenfeld authorship. The pencilled marking was apparently added by an FCC archivist when materials were organized, as suggested by similar markings in the same hand on other documents within the file, all of which were designated by archival box number '9'. Even though letters mention a Schoenfeld report, they are in reference to a Rengsdorf Conference report and not to the report in question. The same 25 April report in WCC archives appears in two places, both of which are in conjunction to William Adams Brown: Leiper's request for Brown's intercession and Brown's second report. Authorship of Brown on this document is thus based on those factors as well as similarity of voice, style, and content, points of discussion, unusual names mentioned, and use of a curious mix of roman and decimal numerals.

April, marked 'Private and Confidential', and signed by H.L. Henriod.³⁰ The third, which was unsigned but identified its author as William Adams Brown in a biographical note, would have been written while Brown was in Geneva with Henriod, Schoenfeld, and Visser't Hooft between 27 and 30 April.³¹ From all three emerged a sympathy for the plight of the German Church, one that had been well-plied by German ecclesiastical pleas for brotherly understanding. This is not to say that concern for the plight of German Jews was ignored, but it is to say that the reports did not have the plight of Jews at the forefront of consideration. Emphases instead were placed on the 'drastic changes imposed on the Church by the National Socialist revolution' and, this, in such a way that the silence of the German Church on state actions against Jews was relegated to a sub-category of issues resulting from the ongoing controversy between state and church.³² The overarching problem, as presented in the reports, was preservation of the 'independent unity' of the German Church from the incursion of the state, the process of which was deemed to be so complex that 'public statements of [German] Church authorities against actions such as the Jewish boycott [were] out of the question'.³³ Moreover, while none of the reports justified Nazi treatment of Jews, all three presented German state attitude as in some way explicable, each repeating a litany of claims about Jewish influence and out-of-proportion representation of Jews in universities and learned professions, as well as in the Socialist and Communist parties. In Brown's second report, for example, the German state attitude toward Jews was posited as 'a response to real grievances and dangers', with the reminder that 'it was not in Germany only, as we well know, that Jews have abused privileges that were granted to them'.³⁴ As to whom should attend to what, Brown advised that the primary responsibility of German church leaders was to 'safeguard the independence of the church against the state', while the 'most important thing' for Christians abroad was 'to leave the Germans alone to work through their national crisis'.³⁵

On 1 May 1933, with compilations of the reports in hand, Brown and Henriod set out from Geneva: Brown to London for meetings with Samuel Cavert, and Henriod to Paris for an address on the 'Church in Germany' to the Executive Committee of the French Federation of Protestant Churches. On 3 May Henriod met up with Cavert and Brown and the three travelled

³⁰ There were both French and English versions of this report. For 'Report of H.L. Henriod on the Visit to Berlin', 28 April 1933, see Boyens, *Kirchenkampf und Oekumene, 1933-1939*, prev. cit., 291-295.

³¹ 'Impressions of the Situation in Contemporary Germany with Special Reference to its Bearing upon the Future of International Cooperation in the Field of Religion', William Adams Brown (identifies himself by referring to his 1890 residency in Germany when he studied theology in Berlin), undated, WCC.301.43 17.4.

³² Henriod, for example, explained that German churchmen 'requested fellow Christians to have patience and not press them for action which might be premature', UCCLW Minutes of Executive Committee, Novi Sad, 9-12 September 1933, 5, 10.

³³ 'The Situation in Germany', 25 April 1933, prev. cit.

³⁴ 'Impressions of the Situation in Contemporary Germany with special reference to its Bearing upon the Future of International Cooperation in the Field of Religion', Brown, prev. cit.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

together to meet with Visser't Hooft, Oldham, Paton, and others at the home of William Temple, Archbishop of York, to discuss attaining greater unity in the ecumenical movement.³⁶ After two days of meetings, Henriod, Cavert, and Brown returned to London to meet on the following day with other members of the UCCLW administrative committee, including UCCLW chairman George Bell. It was at this point on 6 May that Henriod's report, which had already been widely shared and discussed, was officially presented to the administrative committee.³⁷ This was also the point at which deliberation of the report prompted action by UCCLW, one that has been cited in the scholarly literature as example of official ecumenical expression of concern for Jews.³⁸ What has been missing in this discussion is that the action taken by the Council was *not* as it seemed. While it was the case that UCCLW agreed to send a letter to the German Church president outlining its concerns, it was also the case that the German Church president was a division leader of UCCLW, and that the letter was sent to him (and other Council members) in drafted form for suggestions and pre-approval. Indeed, the 'Private Draft' from UCCLW chairman George Bell, dated 7 May 1933, included the following request for approval which was marked in red by the words 'Private and Confidential'.

The Bishop of Chichester sends the accompanying Draft of the proposed letter to Dr. Kapler, with the particular request that it may be carefully scrutinized all through and especially in the sentences about the Jews and about the Church. Is enough said? or toomuch?

With regard to the Jews, would it be wise or unwise to go a little further, implying that we realize there were special difficulties? E.g., [should we] put "undiscriminating action taken" instead of "action taken"; or add after "Jews" "whether worthy or unworthy"; or add at end of paragraph "lest a whole race should be forced to suffer for the faults of some of its members"? Or leave simply as in Draft?

With regard to Church organization, [we have] to remember the ecclesiastical composition of the Council, and to ask whether e.g. Archbishop Germanos and Dr. Cadman could equally give their signature to the sentiments expressed if either of them (instead of the Bishop of Chichester) were actually signing.

Again does the letter say enough or too much about the Nazi movement itself?³⁹

³⁶ The meeting at York, which had been in planning since January 1933, was the first in a series of meetings that led to the founding of the WCCIF in May 1938; H.L. Henriod to William Paton, 9 January; Henriod to Samuel Cavert, 21 February and 27 April 1933; WCC.261142 and FCC Box 9 F15.

³⁷ UCCLW Minutes of Executive Meeting, Novi Sad, 9-12 September 1933, prev. cit.

³⁸ See, for example, Ronald Jasper, *George Bell, Bishop of Chichester* (Oxford University Press, 1967), 101, where the unrevised 7 May draft was mistakenly represented as the 17 May letter. See also Armin Boyens, *Kirchenkampf und Oekumene, 1933-1939: Darstellung und Dokumentation* (1969), prev. cit., 52-53; Johan Snoek, *The Grey Book: A Collection of Protests Against Anti-Semitism and the Persecution of Jews*, prev. cit., 94; Kenneth C. Barnes, *Nazism, Liberalism, and Christianity: Protestant Social Thought in Germany and Great Britain, 1925-1937* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), 94; Andrew Chandler, Ed. *Brethren in Adversity: Bishop George Bell, The Church of England and the Crisis of German Protestantism, 1933-1939* (Boydell Press and Church of England Record Society, 1997), 40; Victoria J. Barnett, 'Christian and Jewish Interfaith Efforts During the Holocaust: The Ecumenical Context', *American Responses to Kristallnacht*, Maria Mazzenga, Ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 20.

³⁹ Bell, 'Private and Confidential' attachment to UCCLW administrative committee members, 7 May 1933, WCC.42.0041.

When the revised version of the official UCCLW letter to Kapler appeared ten days later there were subtle but marked changes which had altered the intention of Bell's draft. The introductory context remained the same: UCCLW wished to associate itself with the general 'substance' of Henriod's letter to Kapler on 1 April, which would have included Henriod's pledge that UCCLW would do all it could 'to prevent demonstrations being undertaken against Germany on false reports', and UCCLW wished to emphasize Henriod's reference to 'the serious and widespread concern that [was] being felt in Christian circles outside Germany'.⁴⁰ All critical revisions of the draft were made in the paragraph immediately following these affirmations. The paragraph was comprised of four units of expression: UCCLW 'realisation' of the importance of Germany's national movement; respect for national handling of political questions; hope for peace and brotherly love in Germany and in Germany's relations with others; concern about German national actions against Jews. The only one of the four points that was re-stylized in the statement was the first and, in so doing, UCCLW's 'realisation' was restated as 'we appreciate the immense importance of the national movement now proceeding amongst the German people'.⁴¹ The other changes were either *inclusions* (noted by square brackets in italics below) or, in one instance, a *deletion* of text (indicated by cross-out). The two most critical revisions were the removal of 'other races' in sentence two, and an insertion in sentence four which changed the document from an expression of concern about Jews to one of concern about Jews *and* the liberty of the German church.

We do not wish to enter into [*special*] political questions [*in which you and your fellow citizens are engaged*], nor indeed is it our business to do so.

But we believe that you will welcome an expression of the deep interest with which we and (we are sure) our colleagues in many different Churches in Europe and America follow the developments of the movement, and of our earnest hope that the forces which make for good and for peace and brotherly love, alike within the German Reich and in relation to ~~other races and~~ nations, may be in every way helped and strengthened.

[*We are not yet perhaps fully informed of all the circumstances of the case and we should be thankful for further information.*]

But at the same time it would not be fair to disguise from our friends in Germany that certain recent events, especially the action taken against the Jews [*and the serious restrictions placed upon freedom of thought and expression*], have caused and continue to cause us anxiety and distress; and we feel that we ought to share our concern with you here.⁴²

All racial implications were removed from the document with the deletion of 'other races', and that, along with the specification of 'special' political questions in sentence two,

⁴⁰ 'Private Draft', UCCLW Chairman George Bell to Hermann Kapler, 7 May 1933, WCC.42.0041.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² For the full text of the revised letter of 17 May 1933 see Boyens, *Kirchenkampf und Oekumene, 1933-1939*, prev. cit., 308-309.

worked to suggest that 'the action taken against the Jews' was *politically* rather than racially motivated. This was of course precisely what Bell was getting at when he asked Kapler and other UCCLW reviewers whether the statement should distinguish 'undiscriminating actions', imply that there were 'special difficulties', or suggest by the insertion of 'whether worthy or unworthy' that at least some state actions against Jews could be valid. Further, by making clear that the Church and its 'fellow citizens' were also engaged in those 'special political questions', the impression was given that there was at least some agreement between state and church as to what constituted those 'special' questions. Moreover, by inserting into the last sentence of the paragraph '*and the serious restrictions placed upon freedom of thought and expression*' the issue of the spiritual liberty of the German church was written-in as a matter of UCCLW concern and the document was no longer a matter of sole concern about the plight of German Jews. While it is by no means clear which of these changes Kapler initiated, it is clear that he was involved not only in the revision but in the disposition of the revision as well. The revised version was in fact circulated just to principal ecumenical leaders on 17 May, with the labelled understanding that it was 'not to be published in any way at present, by request of Dr. Kapler'.⁴³ Significantly more important than the identities of the initiators of these changes, however, is that the revised letter unequivocally reflected UCCLW assent to the interpretative line emanating from Kapler and other German church officials.

When Samuel Cavert returned to America after attending the UCCLW London meeting which set this letter-writing into action, he later told his ecumenical colleagues in both Geneva and Germany that it was his intention to 'interpret the situation in German Protestantism as sympathetically as possible'.⁴⁴ This ambition was revealed in reference to discussion of an essay he had written on the German Church for *Christian Century*, which was published the week after UCCLW revised its letter to Kapler.⁴⁵ Cavert's report is significant for it offers a window of understanding between UCCLW's May acquiescence to German church leaders and its second decision on the same issue in September 1933. Perhaps even more critically, the report appeared *exactly* 60 days after Cavert, Cadman, and Leiper had issued their 24 March letter of protest against anti-Jewish actions in Germany, and in this sense it offers a comparative account of the turn-around in emphasis that had taken place. While the documents were of two distinct types, both addressed relations between Nazi persecution of Jews, German church response, and the corresponding attitude of the rest of the Christian world. In the March statement published

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Cavert stated this objective to Kurt Boehme on 31 May and Visser't Hooft on 13 July 1933 ; FCC B9 F15 and 16.

⁴⁵ Samuel Cavert, 'Hitler and the German Churches', *Christian Century*, 24 May 1933, 683-685. Cavert's reliance on accounts by Brown is conspicuous not only in (unacknowledged) quotations from his reports but in his heavily marked copy of Brown's 25 April 1933 report; FCC B9F15. For European ecumenical praise of the article, see Cavert to Keller, 22 May; Keller to Cavert, 9 June 1933, FCC B9F15-16.

in the *New York Times* all forms of racial and religious intolerance were protested against; the expectation was set forth that German churches would repudiate antisemitism in Germany; and all Christians were urged to 're-examine their own racial attitudes and relationships'.⁴⁶ In the May essay in *Christian Century*, however, 'cruel discriminations against the Jews' were pointed to but not protested against; apologetic explanation was given as to why the German churches had not 'made any public protest against the injustice done to the Jews'; and appeal was made for Christians 'to avoid rash judgment and strive instead for an attitude of patient understanding and sympathy'.⁴⁷ Cavert's essay was aptly entitled 'Hitler and the Churches', for the predominant issue was no longer persecution of Jews but survival of the churches under Hitler's advance of usurping control. As a 'final word of one who ha[d] been in contact with German church leaders during recent weeks', Cavert urged that fellow Christians sustain 'unbroken fellowship' with the suffering German churches as witness to the 'international unity...growing among the churches since the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work at Stockholm in 1925'.⁴⁸

According to UCCLW secretary Henry Leiper, preservation of that ecumenical unity was the central dilemma that UCCLW faced at its September 1933 meeting.⁴⁹ The event re-triggering the issue was the Prussian Synod's adoption of the Aryan Paragraph just a few days before UCCLW convened at Novi Sad, Yugoslavia on 9 September.⁵⁰ In Leiper's account, the overarching dilemma at Novi Sad was preservation of Christian unity at the cost of conscience, or, stated another way, censure of the German Church at the price of 'another historic division ...in [an] already divided Christendom'.⁵¹ Of eleven separate documents drawn by various members, none were thought to be satisfactory and any which 'implied a joint action amounting to censure [were deemed as] unfit instruments for what the [UCCLW] wanted to accomplish'.⁵² The diplomatic solution proposed by George Bell and adopted by UCCLW was to enter an official 'Minute' which acknowledged differing opinions about the church situation in Germany while emphasizing agreement about the importance of maintaining Church unity. The 'Minute'

⁴⁶ FCC statement in *NY Times*, 25 March 1933, WCC 301.43.17.1.

⁴⁷ Cavert, 'Hitler and the German Churches', *Christian Century*, prev. cit.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ UCCLW Minutes of the Executive Committee, Novi Sad, 9-12 September 1933.

⁵⁰ Telegram to UCCLW Geneva from Berlin at the end of the General Assembly (unsigned), 5 September 1933, WCC.301.43.17.2. The Prussian Decree was dated 6 September 1933.

⁵¹ Henry Smith Leiper, 'Personal View of the German Churches Under the Revolution: A Confidential Report Based on Intimate Personal Contact with the Leaders on Both sides of the Church and State Controversy in the Third Reich', November 1933, 18-20, Duke University, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and MSS Collections. See Jasper, *George Bell*, prev. cit., who relies heavily on Leiper's report, 100-108. See also George Bell, *The Kingship of Christ*, In Bell's *Kingship of Christ: The Story of the World Council of Churches* (Greenwood Press, 1954), 30, who marks the September 1933 Novi Sad resolution as the point at which UCCLW executive committee 'felt obliged to record grave anxieties, in particular with regard to the severe action taken against persons of Jewish origin, and the serious restrictions placed upon freedom of thought and expression in Germany'. Bell makes this attribution without any mention of the 7 May draft, its behind the scene machinations, and the resulting 'not to be published in any way at present' letter of 17 May.

⁵² Ibid.

was to be followed by a formal letter to the German Reich Bishop outlining the Council's concerns. As this intention played out on paper, the sentence pertaining to UCCLW concern about Jews was similar to the one used in UCCLW's revised letter to Kapler on 17 May, but with one critically significant difference. Instead of UCCLW concern about 'action taken against the Jews', 'grave anxieties' were now expressed about 'action taken against persons of Jewish origin...'⁵³

This measured change in emphasis from 'Jews' to 'persons of Jewish origins' was subtle but critical, as becomes clear in the official UCCLW letter to Reich Bishop Ludwig Mueller the following month. Bell singled out 'two matters gravely disturbing to the Christian conscience' and neither had to do with the general plight of Jews per se.⁵⁴ Bell's expressed 'shock' over German Church synodal adoption of the Aryan paragraph was two-fold: 'shock' that German Christians 'should be deprived of their posts in the Church or made to feel as...inferior...simply because they [were] Jews by birth or Jewish descent,' *and* 'shock...[that] the [German] Church ...makes race a determining factor in the status of the Christian'.⁵⁵ 'Shock' was also expressed about the element that was added to the May revised letter to Kapler, repeated at Novi Sad in September, and stated to Mueller as 'the suppression or forcible silencing of those [German churchmen] holding views to which the controlling group objects'.⁵⁶ Yet in all of this UCCLW 'shock', there was no mention about the general Nazi persecution of Jews.

What had begun in March as ecumenical concern over German Church silence about state persecution of Jews had by May become more focused on Nazi incursion into German Church liberty, a concern all the more accentuated by September when German Church synods agreed with Nazi legislative measures against Jews. What UCCLW had wanted 'to accomplish' at Novi Sad, as Leiper framed it, was avoidance of ecumenical division while making peace with demands of conscience about racial injustice.⁵⁷ Such ecumenical peace of conscience was being sought, however, within the parameters of *not* rushing to judgment on 'insufficient information' about German persecution of Jews while trying to distinguish what was just and unjust about the Aryan legislation. While no doubts are to be found among ecumenical leaders about the unmitigated injustice of the Aryan paragraph's application to non-Aryan members of the Christian Church, it is far from clear that the same was held about its application to the general population of German Jews. Even though there was clearly no absence of concern about

⁵³ UCCLW Minutes of the Executive Committee, Novi Sad, 9-12 September 1933, prev. cit.38. See also Bell's Letter to the Editor of *The Times*, 4 October 1933, wherein the full paragraph of the 'Minute' was reproduced as example of the work of social justice stemming from the UCCLW, WCC.301.43.17.2.

⁵⁴ George Bell to Reich Bishop Mueller, 23 October 1933, in Novi Sad Minutes, 39-41. The letter was distributed as a press release by the American Sector of UCCLW on 29 November 1933; FCC B9F17.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* Nor was it such in his follow-up letter to the Reich Bishop on 18 January 1934, where he again expressed concern about 'application of the Aryan Paragraph to Church officers'. See George Bell to Reich Bishop Mueller, 18 January 1934, WCC.301.4306.14.

⁵⁷ Leiper, 'Personal View of the German Churches Under the Revolution', prev. cit.

the general plight of Jews, there were far too many instances of sympathy with the notion that some suppression of Jews was needed to attribute an equal claim of unmitigated injustice.

II. On another level, at the end of May 1933, Samuel Cavert's fellow ICCAJ enthusiast John Mott made known his own view on protests against German suppression of Jews as 'unavailing and provocative'.⁵⁸ Mott had been one of many ecumenical and church leaders in discussion with the Archbishop of Canterbury during April and May and, according to the Archbishop's notes of their 31 May meeting, Mott had stated that he 'could not have but at least some understanding of the reasons that had made the Jews so unpopular...in Germany'.⁵⁹ While Mott's had been just one in a train of opinions moving through Lambeth Palace, there had been enough agreement by 7 June that Archbishop Cosmo Lang doubted that he could speak as 'Jews might expect' at an upcoming event in London. Lang penned that concern to Tissington Tatlow, general secretary of the British SCM and chairman of the ISS Assembly, after receiving a report by ISS Director Walter Kotschnig which dissuaded criticism of Germany.⁶⁰ James Parkes was with Tatlow when the Archbishop's letter arrived, and after extensive discussion of the issue Tatlow commended Parkes to Lang in a 9 June letter as 'one of the most reliable sources...about Jewish affairs on the Continent'.⁶¹ Parkes in turn followed by letter and meeting with Lang's secretary, urging not only that the event in London be used 'for a declaration of fundamental Christian principles, but also that the Archbishop appeal directly to 'German Christianity to dissociate itself from the lie [of racism]'.⁶² Parkes also opined, in opposition to the prevailing apologetic, that the National Socialist threat to the church in no way justified church silence on this issue.

Parkes' action with the Archbishop is all the more significant when seen in the broader context of having been publicly silenced by Kotschnig just a few months earlier. In December 1932 Parkes had gone beyond the ISS principle of avoiding particular condemnation by stating in print that the 'National Socialists of Germany, National Democrats of Poland, and the Iron Guard of Rumania seem to think there is something fine in violence itself'. The uproar from Germany's National Union of Students for having been singled out by such 'misrepresentation'

⁵⁸ Andrew Chandler, 'A Question of Fundamental Principles: The Church of England and the Jews of Germany, 1933-1937', *Leo Baeck Yearbook* (1993), pp. 221-261.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Walter Kotschnig, 'Reflections on a visit to Germany', 15 May 1933; WCC.301.43.17.7. Koschnig's report did not mention the problem of the German churches and was in no way an apologetic, even though it reached a similar conclusion of non-interference. It was written from a political point of view as a personal rather than ISS official opinion, but within the framework of ISS conciliatory principals. His concern was that German national sensitivities were so heightened by the imputation of sole war-guilt in the Versailles Treaty that further 'wholesale condemnation' of Germany would 'bring the spectre of war dangerously near' again. He went on to say that even criticism of 'German acts directed against more primitive individual rights ought to take forms other than they do at present'. Copies were sent to Mott, Cavert, Keller, Henriod, J.H. Oldham, William Temple, and 20 other international ecumenists.

⁶¹ James Parkes, *Voyage of Discoveries*, prev. cit., 106; Chandler, prev. cit., 231-233.

⁶² *Ibid.*

and 'prejudice' was so laden with tension that Kotschnig had published an official apology for Parkes in early March, promising to avoid future actions that might 'injure the basis of [ISS] work and fellowship'.⁶³ That Parkes would go on to counter Kotschnig's report by intervening with the Archbishop was only one aspect of the developing picture, however, for the following month he drafted an essay that castigated Germany again as 'the disgrace of a supposedly Christian country'. 'The Nature of Antisemitism', written for *The Church Overseas, An Anglican Review of Missionary Thought and Work*, not only repudiated the 'nonsensical laws' being promulgated as answer to Germany's Jewish problem, it contextualized his related argument that the Jewish problem had been created by Christian history and that the only way Jews had survived that history as a people was through their 'refusal to be converted'.⁶⁴ Moreover, it refuted the implication of ICCAJ's question - 'what is Judaism: a race or a religion?' - by stating almost verbatim the same question and then arguing that 'the problem of the Jews is due neither to race...nor to their religion', but to 'their history in Christian Europe'.⁶⁵

Parkes' condemnation of German acts to legalize suppression of Jews in a July 1933 mission periodical was clearly in counter to more than one argument and addressed to more than one audience. Parkes was also taking aim at the recent surge of ICCAJ activity in Europe. Beginning with three separate addresses at the January 1933 SCM Quadrennial conference of 2000 delegates, where for the first time in its history the 'Jewish Problem and Jewish Missions' were on the SCM programme, Conrad Hoffmann had been crisscrossing Europe in a five-month lecture series on the Christian approach to the Jew. Inherent to those lectures was explication of relations between the Jewish problem and the need for Jewish missions, and within that analysis was argumentation about causal relations to escalating antisemitism.⁶⁶ By early May this line of

⁶³ Parkes' editorial appeared in the December 1932 issue of the ISS *Vox Studentium*, distributed monthly to all national student unions. The article was reprinted in part in *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, December 20 and 22, with subsequent reports on 1 and 3 March 1933. One of the headlines, 'International Student Service climbs down when German Nazi students protest against objection to anti-Jewish university violence', captured the emphasis of the reports, wherein Kotschnig was charged with 'withdrawal before German antisemitism'. Related articles appeared in *JTA* on May 13, 24, and 31.

⁶⁴ James Parkes, 'The Nature of Antisemitism', July draft for *The Church Overseas, An Anglican Review of Missionary Thought and Work*, subsequently published in Vol.6, No.24 (October 1933), 302-310; Parkes Papers MS60/9/1/9.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* Parkes became aware of ICCAJ's November 1932 meeting with Chicago rabbi, the purpose of which was to quell Jewish protests against Christian missions to Jews, and there is reason to think that he may have been aware of ICCAJ's conclusion after the meeting, namely that Jewish aim was to preserve the integrity of the race, and that refusal to acquiesce to Christianity was 'fundamentally a racial problem which pretends to be a religious problem'. 'Confidential Report', 13 November 1932, *prev. cit.*

⁶⁶ Hoffmann's European tour of lectures during the first five months of 1933 began with England, Scotland, Ireland, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, with second visits to Germany, Scotland, and England before returning to America in early June. Documents contributing to the lectures and events of this tour include Minutes of British ICCAJ, 3 January 1933, WCC.261207.8; *News Sheet*, Vol.2 No.6 (June 1933); Hoffmann to Members of ICCAJ, 15 September 1933, WCC.261207.2. 'Private and Confidential' Report of a United Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jew, London, 11 January 1934, WCC.261201.2; Minutes of British ICCAJ, 7 March 1934, and 6 June 1934, WCC.261207.8.

argumentation derived from seven years of discussion since the Budapest-Warsaw conferences had been packaged in a 24-page pamphlet that was being distributed in the wake of Hoffman's 1933 European tour.⁶⁷ The booklet, *A New Approach to an Old Problem: Modern Jewry and the International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews*, was in fact a title-play on 'The Jewish Problem: Some Newer Aspects', which appeared in the 1925 *IRM* article that announced the 1927 Budapest-Warsaw conferences.⁶⁸ It was the first of three efforts disseminated over the course of eleven months, all of which essentially carried the same set of arguments. 'Modern Jewry and Christian Responsibility' followed as a confidential ICCAJ report in September 1933, and 'Modern Jewry and the Christian Church', which was almost identical in its elements of argument on antisemitism, was published in the April 1934 issue of *IRM*, with 2400 reprints distributed internationally.

Assayed together, the series constituted an encompassing argumentation of *increases*: increasing Jewish influence, increasing antisemitism, increasing disintegration of Judaism, increasing Jewish interest in Christianity, each of which was said to increase the urgency of Christianity's call to the Jewish problem. Differences in the three pieces lay only in degree of focus, tone, detail, presentation, and audience. Emphases in the May 1933 booklet were spread equally over these areas of increase, with aim toward justifying an international Christian body to address the challenges those increases posed. Readers were told that 'the Church, concerned as she is and should be with a Christian world order, [ought] to realize the increasing influence of Jews in all fields of human endeavour'; that Jews 'exercise[ed] influence out of all proportion to his numbers'; that 'every world movement, most of all the Christian Church, must reckon with the Jew who is such a dominant element and force in human society today'.⁶⁹ It was also the case that ICCAJ time-worn arguments about Christianity's need for awareness of the other areas of increase were revisited.⁷⁰ What was new to the explication was the way in which arguments about increasing antisemitism had pushed claims about Jewish racial consciousness front and centre. Like the July 1932 *IRM* essay discussed in the previous chapter, but to a much greater degree, Jewish 'racial and national consciousness' was described as a principle inflamer of antisemitic persecution.⁷¹ As this alleged causative circle was sketched by Hoffmann in the *New Approach to an Old Problem*:

⁶⁷ Hoffmann arrived in London on 1 January 1933 with untitled draft of the booklet, which was reviewed by Paton and other executives of the British sector. The manuscript was later updated to reflect events in Germany.

⁶⁸ In reference to *IRM*, Vo. 14. No. 4 (October 1925), 598-607.

⁶⁹ Conrad Hoffmann, *A New Approach to an Old Problem: Modern Jewry and the International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews* (London and New York: IMC, May 1933).

⁷⁰ Ibid. Increasing disintegration of Judaism, for example, was said to provide recruits for communism, atheism, cults, etc. Increasing Jewish interest in Christianity, 'essentially along humanistic lines', was said to be 'both a challenge and a menace to the Church's claim of and faith in the divinity of Christ', on the one hand, while offering the possibility of converts, on the other; 4, 9.

⁷¹ Ibid.

the more Jew-conscious Zionism and persecution make the Jew, the more bitter anti-Semitism becomes; but the stronger anti-Semitism becomes the more Jew conscious the Jew becomes.⁷²

These claims were more fully drawn in the September 1933 confidential report issued after Hoffmann's five-month European tour.⁷³ Here as elsewhere 'modern Jewry' was discussed comparatively to Jewish life in pre-WWI Europe. Rather than speaking as he had earlier of before and after the war, however, argumentation was divided into before and after 'the rise of Hitler's anti-Semitism, and the periods were specified according to assessed waxing and waning of Jewish racial consciousness. On this altered landscape of explication time periods were marked by distinctions between what was termed as traditional Jewish racial consciousness in the ghetto *and* a new racial consciousness which was said to have flourished under 'Hitler's wave of anti-Semitism'.⁷⁴ Essential to this line of thought was Hoffmann's claim that traditional Jewish racial consciousness had an inherently strong religious element but that the 'new' racial consciousness was predominantly distinguished by a-religious and anti-religious elements. Accordingly, a decline in the 'seclusion and segregation' that was found previously in the ghetto was said to have caused both 'breakdown' in traditional religious racial consciousness and 'surrender of religious interest'.⁷⁵ Such 'weakening and loosening' of the religiously based racial consciousness that had 'b[ound] Jews to Jewry and Judaism' was thus held to have been typical of the world trend until 'the time of Hitler's wave of anti-Semitism'.⁷⁶ The waning trend reversed with the rise in antisemitism, in other words, because persecution 'revived in world Jewry a new sense of racial solidarity' and 'provok[ed] a veritable renaissance of Jewishness'.⁷⁷ A critical difference between the two types of Jewish racial consciousness, Hoffmann stressed, was that the current 'renaissance of Jewishness' was one in which cultural, racial, and national elements were predominant rather than the religious.⁷⁸

As illustrated in Figure II below, Hoffmann saw in this assessment strong evidence for causative relations between Jewishness and antisemitism, which, he argued, created a two-horned dilemma for Jews, preservation or assimilation:

⁷² Ibid.,5. Jewish failure 'to see that one cannot both have and eat his loaf of bread' was said to add to the 'whole problem'. The claim was made in reference to Jews demanding equality and recognition while insisting upon preservation of 'Jewish characteristics and loyalties'.

⁷³ Conrad Hoffmann, 'Modern Jewry and Christian Responsibility', 'Confidential' Director's Report , 1 September 1933; WCC.261207.2 Hoffmann's analysis of antisemitism made up roughly half of the 21-page report.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 2.


⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.,2-4.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 4. Hoffmann went on to ask, 'with so much emphasis on the racial and national aspects of Jews, is there not grave danger of the creation of a Jewish state within the body politic of the respective nations, where the Jews promote such emphasis? And would not restriction of the present Jewish renaissance to the field of religion, rather than that of race and nation, greatly mitigate against the danger of such a political result?'

Figure II. ICCAJ Diagram of the Jewish Problem/ Jewish Dilemma, September 1933⁷⁹



The point being laboured in Hoffmann's diagram and text was that preservation of Jewishness guaranteed the preservation of antisemitism but that antisemitism disappeared when did Jewishness. That 'the Jew' must choose between preservation and disappearance was cast as a dilemma between the 'conflicting forces of innate character' *and* the forces and prejudices of 'environment'.⁸⁰ As Hoffmann claimed, both secularization and toleration led to disappearance of the Jew while Jewish emphasis on preservation of either the religious or non-religious aspects of Jewishness led to discrimination and persecution. If 'the Jew' should choose preservation, the choice was between preservation of religious elements, preservation of racial-national elements, or the futility of trying to preserve both. In most parts of the world, Hoffmann argued, choosing to preserve racial-national elements or both would 'lead to difficulties if not to actual oppression and persecution'. But this was not only a dilemma which Jews had to face, for *all* who were 'engaged in the Christian approach to Jews' also had to reckon with and develop 'convictions on the answer to the issue'. Moreover, concerns about the current 'renaissance of Jewishness' was not limited to its causal relation to antisemitism. The preservation of Jewishness in its current emphasized form also had critical implications for the world. As posited in his remarks on 'challenges to be faced', to which there were no recorded objections:⁸¹

Unless Christianity can Christianize Jewry, Jewry will Judaize the world - and in modern Jewry today the anti-religious, atheistic and unscrupulous Jew is gaining the ascendancy.⁸²

In his analysis of relations between the 'new' Jewish racial consciousness and 'Hitler's wave of anti-Semitism', Hoffmann also repudiated the racially discriminating aspects of

⁷⁹ Ibid., 5, reproduction of the diagram as it appeared in the poor quality microfilm report.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 4-5. He cites as warrant an unnamed author who says 'Anti-Semitism alone preserves the Jews'.

⁸¹ Ibid. Letters requesting 'careful reading' of 'facts and arguments presented' were sent to members of all three international sectors of ICCAJ on 15 September and 4 October; WCC.261207.2.

⁸² Ibid., 20.

'German anti-Semitism'.⁸³ While condemning Nazi antisemitism and praising international protests of both Christians and Jews against it, however, the report expostulated that 'in all of the protests and denunciation by world Jewry' there had been 'little or no admission by Jews of any possible blame on the part of...themselves'. Hoffmann's judgment was clearly intended to fault, based as it was on the argument that any who had given 'serious thought and study to the problem as it ha[d] manifested in Germany must recognize that certain types of Jews...have been at least contributing factors in arousing hatred of the Jew in Germany'. Here, Hoffmann invoked again as a prevailing contributory factor the 'new' racial consciousness of Jews, going so far as to claim that 'the racial emphasis of Hitler and his followers is...more or less identical with the racial emphasis on Jewishness'.⁸⁴ The confidential report also drew attention *away* from Nazi antisemitism by arguing that there were 'larger issues' and 'greater menace in Hitlerism than its repercussions on Jewry'. Citing the danger of war, as well as political, religious, and economic freedoms, Hoffmann went on to reprove 'our Jewish friends [who] seem to overlook these entirely in the frenzy and preoccupation of protests against the anti-Semitic manifestation of Hitlerism'.⁸⁵

All of the main elements of this argumentation, many repeated verbatim, were present when aspects of the confidential report were published in rewritten form for the April 1934 *IRM*.⁸⁶ There were, however, notable amendments. While the narrative remained the same, incendiary points and statements like the two just quoted had been edited out; the tone of argument softened; and the causal claims treated more subtlety. The overall vein in which arguments now appeared was clearly that of presenting the case for Jewish missions to a general Christian audience and, as such, they were spread over the first ten pages of the sixteen-page essay as the 'situation' that called for Jewish missions. Equally clear was that 'the situation' as it existed was distinguished by its relationship to the rise of antisemitism. That relation, however, had also been altered. There was now a significant stretching of emphasis on 'Hitler's wave of anti-Semitism', making it sound as if Jewish racial consciousness had not taken rise until Hitler 'came into power in March 1933'.⁸⁷ While this was inconsistent with the sequence of arguments that had been developing since 1925, including Hoffmann's own, it was yet an expedient way to harness the opportunity afforded by the notoriety of Nazi persecution of Jews. Hoffmann had in fact already argued that 'so far as getting the eye and ear of the world...no better publicity

⁸³ Ibid., 7.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 6-8; quotations, 7. It should be noted that these positional comments were stated and argued in the context of the question: 'are gentiles alone responsible or guilty, or are the Jews themselves also to blame for much of the persecution and discrimination...?'

⁸⁶ Conrad Hoffmann, 'Modern Jewry and the Christian Church', *International Review of Missions*, Vol.23 (April 1934), 189-204.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 193. The point was made in conjunction with the claim that opportunity had never been 'so ripe as now for an aggressive constructive program involving a Christian approach to the Jews'.

agency could have been found than Hitler's anti-Semitism'.⁸⁸ In that same way the *IRM* article placed greater stress on Hitler's victimization of Jews, as well as increased need for Christian ministrations to Jews through both missions and the combating of antisemitism. One significant addition was recognition of the general failure of Christian church circles in Germany to 'protest against anti-Semitism *per se*', one which in fact admitted that protests against the Aryan clause had been almost exclusively limited to the ways in which it violated the liberty of the German Church.⁸⁹ Another included two primary reasons that Christians should 'unite in a world alliance to combat anti-Semitism'. The first, seen as altruistic, was that antisemitism, as a type of racial discrimination, was 'a violation of human personality held sacred by Christ and...a direct denial of [his] teaching and spirit'. The second, which was understood *not* to be of selfless motive, was that antisemitism 'endanger[ed] the very existence of Christianity'. Accordingly, Hoffmann argued, it followed to conclusion that antisemitism 'must eliminate the Christian faith whose foundations are so largely Jewish'.⁹⁰ Much of the same discourse about a 'rebirth' of Jewishness was also included in the exposition, but the pointed statement about Jews 'Judaizing' the world if they were not 'Christianized' did not appear. It was instead replaced with the more abstract question:

Shall Jewry become a nation with a national home somewhere, or shall Jewry disappear in humanity, like salt in a solution, no longer existent as Jewry, but permeating all mankind with Jewish spirit and influence?⁹¹

III. Three months before this exposition appeared in the April 1934 *IRM* an 'influential conference' of ICCAJ, IMC, and British missionary leaders had met in London to discuss antisemitism and the challenges it posed to the Christian approach to Jews.⁹² Hoffmann had by that time returned to Europe for another series of lectures so his analyses and reports were of key importance. But so were the reports of Ruth Rouse, a recently appointed executive member of the ICCAJ, who among other titles was secretary for the Church of England's Missionary Council and a member of its Council on Foreign Relations.⁹³ In those capacities Rouse had conducted onsite evaluation of the situation in Germany in October 1933, which had included some 45 meetings with leaders and clergy of both state and confessing churches, missionary

⁸⁸ Hoffmann, 'Modern Jewry and Christian Responsibility', Confidential Report of the Director, 1 September 1933, *prev. cit.*, 5, 8.

⁸⁹ Hoffmann, 'Modern Jewry and the Christian Church', *IRM*, Vol.23 (April 1934), 189-204.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 197.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 194.

⁹² Quotation from William Paton to Henriod, 6 February 1934, WCC.261142. In addition to IMC and ICCAJ executives, conferees included representatives from the Conference of British Missionary Societies; Church Missions to the Jews; British Jews Society; Church of Scotland Jewish Missions Committee; Jerusalem and the East Mission; East London Fund for the Jews; International Hebrew Christian Alliance; Barbican Mission; Presbyterian Church of England; British and Foreign Bible Society; Missionary Council of the Church Assembly; Baptist Union; Congregational Union; Methodist Missionary Society; Student Christian Movement.

⁹³ Ruth Rouse, who was a delegate to the Budapest conference in 1927, was appointed to ICCAJ in late 1932 after having participated in BICCAJ.

societies, Christian student bodies, members of the Nazi Party, including the Reich Bishop, members of his cabinet, delegates to the 1933 Disarmament Conference, and secretaries of Home and Foreign Offices.⁹⁴ In a report of those meetings to the January 1934 conference of mission leaders Rouse included a list of the 'intolerable' Jewish elements which churchmen, statesmen, and youth organizations alike had said they were 'determined at all costs to do away with'.⁹⁵ As summarized in the confidential minutes of the mission conference, the four main 'elements' included well-worn claims about 'domination of Jews in certain professions'; 'Jewish influence and control of cinema and theatre'; 'spread of Communism', for which Jews were held 'responsible'; and 'the bad influence exercised by Jews from Poland and Russia'.⁹⁶ Rouse also explained to conferees that even though the German state attempts to eliminate those 'elements' had inflicted 'tremendous suffering' on Jews, it was also the case that 'the Hitler regime had done much to improve the moral situation' in Germany.⁹⁷ There were both positive and negative effects to be considered, in other words, when trying to 'determine a right course of [Christian] action' and response.⁹⁸

To discuss the improved moral situation in Germany, however, was not to approve the antisemitic measures that had been taken to quell the alleged Jewish source of moral corruption. But neither was concern over suffering of Jews to discount the value of 'opportunities' afforded by the notoriety of antisemitic measures against Jews. Both afternoon and evening sessions of the day-conference were taken up with reports and discussion on how to take 'full advantage of the new interest in Jewish problems, mainly due to Hitler's campaign of anti-Semitism'.⁹⁹ It was Hoffmann who took lead there, speaking of projects already in various stages, as well as those lacking or in need of revision. Pre-eminent among these was development of printed material which would provide facts and 'advise on the attitude...Christians should take' about the German situation, and launching of a campaign to educate Christians on antisemitism.¹⁰⁰ In the case of

⁹⁴ Rouse also interviewed American, English, and Swedish clergy stationed in Germany. Her reports appear in three versions: 'Confidential Report on Missionary Situation in Germany', 24 October 1933; 'Strictly Private and Confidential Report to Conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland', 24 October 1933; 'Strictly Confidential Report to the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations', 31 October 1933; WCC.301.4317.4 and 7 and 301.4318.1.

⁹⁵ 'Private and Confidential Report of a United conference on the Christian Approach to the Jew, 11 January 1934; WCC.261201.2.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2-3. In discussion on the right course of Christian response, it was noted by J.H. Oldham that no such thing as a guiding universal Christian attitude toward race relations existed, and, by other conferees, that 'violent agitation against the existing state of things [in Germany] could do no good'.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-8.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 6-7. Plans included targeting of university SCMs and other youth organizations, theological colleges, parish churches, business and women's groups. Increased efforts were to be made to insure that the Jewish question was included in the programmes of annual church conferences, and that a stream of material was harvested for the religious press and radio broadcasts. Other projects included updated literature which argued the case of Jewish mission from both Christian and Jewish perspectives, and a pamphlet urging Christian prayer for Jews. See Memorandum of Suggested Projects, June 1934, WCC.

literature advising on the situation in Germany, Hoffmann's April 1934 *IRM* essay (and its 2400 reprints) was apparently aimed at bridging that gap.¹⁰¹ As for Hoffmann's itinerary itself, while not diminishing the worth of what was referred to as ICCAJ printed 'propaganda', the spoken word and face-to-face contact with Christian and church organizations of all types were deemed of inestimable value.¹⁰² Indeed, over the two months following the January 1934 conference in London Hoffmann delivered no less than 65 lectures before embarking on a three month tour of the Near East and south eastern Europe, as well as 250 lectures between the summers of 1934 and 1935, all of which would have been reflective of the same theoretical lines of argument.¹⁰³

To place this in its broader context, at the time of the January 1934 mission conference, wherein those plans were formulated, Rouse's confidential reports agreed in essence with the sentiment reflected in the earlier reports of Henriod, Brown, and Cavert: namely, as phrased by Rouse, that 'butt[ing] in or giv[ing] advice openly' would merely inflame German sensitivities and cause yet more misunderstanding and rupture.¹⁰⁴ Approaches to the German Church about state persecution of Jews had to be tempered, in other words, so not to appear as if trying to intervene in Germany's business. Rouse's report made plain that a trusted German source had 'laid great stress on the need for heads of churches in other lands...to take counsel together about the attitude...towards the German Church on certain questions'.¹⁰⁵ It is critical to note that this was precisely the same course of action being promoted by UCCLW General Secretary H.L. Henriod. As set out in a letter to UCCLW chairman George Bell in mid-October 1934, his hope was that no outside church would act independently in adopting an attitude toward the German Church 'without having consulted with the leaders of the other Churches'.¹⁰⁶ To do anything other than this, he cautioned, would run counter to the 'crucial importance of the ecumenical movement', which he described as being 'at stake' here.¹⁰⁷

To widen this lens even further, both Rouse's report and Henriod's letter were written in the wake of the September 1933 UCCLW administrative meeting at Novi Sad, where it was agreed that censure of the German Church would be held in abeyance.¹⁰⁸ Rouse in fact reported on the praise coming *from* German Church leaders for the 'moderate' action taken at Novi Sad in

261201.2; BICCAJ Minutes, 6 June 1934, WCC.261207.8; and NAICCAJ Minutes, 9 November 1934, WCC.261207.2.

¹⁰¹ BICCAJ Minutes, 7 March 1934, 2, WCC.261207.8.

¹⁰² 'Private and Confidential Report of a United conference', 11 January 1934, prev. cit.

¹⁰³ BICCAJ Minutes, 7 March 1934, prev. cit.; Hoffmann to William Paton, 8 April 1935, WCC.261203.1.

¹⁰⁴ Rouse, 'Strictly Private and Confidential Report to Conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland', 24 October 1933, 7, WCC.301.43.18.1.

¹⁰⁵ Rouse, 'Strictly Confidential Report to the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations', 31 October 1933, 11, WCC.301.43.17.7.

¹⁰⁶ Henry Louis Henriod to George Bell, 19 October 1933, 4, WCC.301.43.17.2. The idea being expressed was that indiscriminate actions and responses would reap both despair and division rather than a unified attitude that would 'help the Christians in Germany'.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ UCCLW Minutes of the Executive Committee, Novi Sad, 9-12 September 1933.

lieu of the 'public condemnation' that had been called for by some members. A few weeks after the German-approved solution at Novi Sad, A.W. Schreiber, head of ecumenical relations for the German Protestant Church, sent an invitation to Charles Macfarland to make a new onsite study of the 'new German church'.¹⁰⁹ Macfarland was a seasoned advocate of ecumenical unity and, at the time of this German invitation, he was on a two-month consultation at the UCCLW Institute in Geneva.¹¹⁰ The invitation had been issued with government approval, which helps to explain his access to some 60 church leaders and state officials, including Reich Bishop Mueller, Alfred Rosenberg, and Adolf Hitler. At 209 pages, his published volume about that visit was the fullest ecumenical report to date.¹¹¹ *The New Church and the New Germany, A Study of Church and State* was dedicated to German colleagues who worked to bring 'the Evangelical Church of Germany into enduring relations with Ecumenical Christianity', and it directed attention to what was deemed the 'providential' coexistence of supranational ecumenism and the current national struggle of the German Church.¹¹²

Landscaped as such Macfarland relied on his assessment of unfolding circumstances in Germany while drawing heavily from Leiper's firsthand analysis of the ecumenical body that was evaluating those circumstances. Beginning and ending with sympathy for and confidence in Christians in Germany, the German Protestant Church was drawn as steeped in oppositions and split into two unequal parts: minority opposition against state efforts to nationalize the Church, on the one hand, and majority opposition to the minority that sought to preserve the autonomy of the Church, on the other. Depicted as standing alongside this national Church struggle was the supranational UCCLW, the primary ecumenical agency in Protestant Christendom which was both surveyor and communicator between the German Church and the rest of the Protestant Christian world. The report that followed, once fitted into this ecumenical context, was an in-depth apologetic for the decision made by UCCLW at Novi Sad in September 1933.

Macfarland's general line of explanation was that there were ample grounds for German concern about its Jewish problem; that the problem had been addressed with strong legislative action; that the legislation had made its way into the German Church; that the German Church was hence faced with the choice of disavowing the supra-racial and supranational qualities of the Church universal, *or* disavowing the encroachment of the Nazi state. When considering the

¹⁰⁹ Macfarland was general secretary of FCC from 1912-1930 and secretary of its Commission on Relations with Religious Bodies in Europe from 1920-1930, and in those capacities he had secured the appointments of Henry Leiper and Samuel Cavert, the latter of whom was his associate general secretary from 1920-1930. A.W. Schreiber was one of the key German churchmen who had sent opposition cables in response to the FCC statement in the *New York Times* on 25 March 1933.

¹¹⁰ Charles Macfarland to Dr. Beth, 29 August 1933, FCC Box 9 F17.

¹¹¹ Ecumenical leaders outside of Germany arranged for materials to be collected for Macfarland, whose meetings overlapped with those of Ruth Rouse. See Winterhager to Henriod, 17 October 1933, for discussion of documents 'which Bonhoeffer asked us to hand on to Macfarland'; WCC.301.43.17.2.

¹¹² Charles W. Macfarland, *The New Church and the New Germany: A Study of Church and State* (NY: Macmillan Company, 1934), 7.

Jewish problem and its corrective, Macfarland pointed to 'extenuating circumstances' that had to be taken into account: namely, that there was 'altogether too much truth in [the] identification of certain members of the Jewish race with wrongdoing in particular spheres of human life'; that 'the presence of Jews...cause [d] a real economic, cultural, social, and institutional problem in Germany'; that Hitler's 'hatred and horror of atheistic Marxism and communism...concentrated on Jews because...many of that race [were identified] with those economic and social theories in Germany'.¹¹³ Consequently, so Macfarland concluded, 'Adolf Hitler faced a problem of the State that had to be met...'.¹¹⁴ At the same time Macfarland was equally clear that Hitler's corrective was wrong in 'spirit, method, and practices', abounding in 'discriminating ruthless process' and 'fanatical intolerance', while lacking in that which was 'essential to any reasonable regulation of the problem'.¹¹⁵ This Macfarland said he was sure of, but he went on to report that opinions of fellow Christians in Germany were mixed. To some the Aryan legislation was a state necessity that should not apply to the church. To others it was a state necessity that should be adopted by the church. To others yet, which he cast as a 'divisional position', it was held that the church should leave the Aryan laws to the state and the state in turn should leave the church to itself.¹¹⁶ Many from these various groups held, however, that 'the situation was grave enough to warrant' at least temporary legislation, and by 5 September such opinion had prevailed enough for the Prussian Synod, encompassing roughly half of German Protestantism, to *voluntarily* adopt legislation that limited church membership and clergy to those of 'Aryan descent'.¹¹⁷

The implication of this action, as presented in Macfarland's report, was that universal 'Christian brotherhood' was being determined by 'race and nation'.¹¹⁸ The question facing the UCCLW a few days later at Novi Sad was thus posited as an equal concern to 'all Christian bodies...particularly those [interested in] Christian unity'.¹¹⁹ On this Macfarland spoke in the

¹¹³ Ibid., 63-67.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 67.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 65-68

¹¹⁶ Dietrich Bonhoeffer's 'The Church and the Jewish Question', written just after the April enactment of the Aryan clause, offers example of that 'divisional position'. Bonhoeffer invoked two sets of distinctions - Jews and Jewish Christians *and* state and church - and then paired the distinctions to highlight a Jewish problem of the state which could not be interfered with by the church, and a Jewish issue of the Church which could not be interfered with by the state. In the case of the former, the Jewish problem was said to be 'one of the historical problems which our state must deal with' and the state was 'justified in adopting new methods'. Justification for not interfering with the state was based on belief that those 'who nailed the redeemer of the world to the cross must bear the curse for its action through a long history of suffering'. 'The Christian church sees th[is] history', he said, 'as God's own free and fearful way with his people'. It was understood, in other words, that God used the state and other means to penalize Jews, and that Jews would remain part of the historical problem for the State until they transferred their allegiance to Chris by conversion. Once converted both the penal suffering of Jews and responsibility of the state was reversed and it became the duty of the Church to 'not allow actions towards its members to be prescribed by the state'. Essay appears in *No Rusty Swords: Letters, Lectures, and Notes 1928-1936*, Volume 1, *The Collected Works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer*, Ed. Edwin Robertson (Harper & Row, 1967), 223-227.

¹¹⁷ Macfarland, 78-79, e.g., warranted because of the 'danger of Bolshevism' and the 'economic situation'.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 69

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 170.

voice of Henry Leiper, whom he invoked as having had 'a large share of responsibility in the matter', quoting pages of passages from his reports to elaborate the main points of UCCLW deliberation. The 'grave' problem before UCCLW was that of two complicating and halting dilemmas. In adopting Aryan laws the German Church had in effect abandoned its supra-racial and supranational attributes, *but* if the UCCLW denounced the German Church and severed it from the universal Church body Germany would be left without the 'spiritual and moral force' of fellow world Christians. In the case of the second dilemma, German Church endorsement of official racial discrimination within the body of Christ could not be overlooked, *but* neither could the past Christian history of 'splitting up the Church every time there [was] disagreement'. The reason that this latter horn of the dilemma won out when UCCLW chose to remain in fellowship with the German Church, Macfarland/Leiper explained, was that UCCLW *chose* to make an official ecumenical attempt at breaking the centuries-long habit of Christian division, even though the choice was made 'at the risk of being thought willing to acquiesce to immoral and un-Christian actions'.¹²⁰

Here was the crux of the matter as it had been playing out since Kapler's warning in March 1933 that further ecumenical protests against Germany's alleged persecution of Jews would 'do harm to ecclesiastical cooperation'.¹²¹ The circulating idea that 'something had to be done' about Germany's Jewish problem was indeed being transmitted in Macfarland's account of the Prussian Synod adoption of the Aryan clause and UCCLW's response to it, but, even though that can be seen as an informing factor of ecumenical understanding, its invocation was *not* an expressed feature of the process that led to UCCLW formal decisions. UCCLW deliberations were guided far more by organizational aims related to Christian domain than by sentiments about Jews, whether negative, indifferent, or positive. Official UCCLW responses were purpose driven by pre-established organizational goals that operated like the well-hewn needle of a compass. The most magnetizing, and the one around which the others pivoted, was preservation of the hard-won unity of ecumenical world churches embodied within the structure of UCCLW. It was never to be 'unity' at the cost of conscience but neither was it to be 'disunity' at the cost of 'casting the first stone', a principal that was often invoked by members of the German Church when rebuking non-German Christian criticism of German treatment of Jews. One outcome of such chastisement was that compassion, forgiveness, and 'judg[ing] *not* that ye be not judged' was formulaically invoked in non-German ecumenical explanations of German Church silence about the plight of German Jews. Varying degrees of 'back-room' assuaging of German sensitivities were also plentiful, as seen in the responses to Kapler's March 1933 threat about the impending harm of protests to ecumenism. Moreover, as seen in the revised letter to Kapler in

¹²⁰ Ibid., 174.

¹²¹ Kapler to Cadman, 27 March 1933, prev. cit.

May, that assuaging also included behind-the-scenes German approval of what could and could not be said publicly *to* the German Church in official letters. There was also a much propagated effort to present the German Church in sympathetic light, which, consciously or unconsciously, turned attention *away* from German Church silence on Nazi persecution of Jews. Even though that silence was often admitted by ecumenical leaders - formulaically admitted as a 'weakness' - it was effectively pushed into the background by a leitmotif which depicted the German Church as standing courageously against Nazism on behalf of Christendom and the Church universal.

The most striking feature in all of the reports emanating from these various ecumenical leaders involved with UCCLW is the way in which emphasis was transformed. The Aryan legislation affecting Jews was transmogrified into a universal question that was said to affect all of mankind because it limited the truths of the Christian gospel 'to the salvation...of a racial group'.¹²² That this was perceived as a frontal attack on Christianity rather than Jews bore not only on ecumenical decisions about German Church responses to Nazi treatment of Jews, but also on reports *about* those decisions as they were handed down the lines of ecumenical communication. Yet without the unraveling of documents, letters, and reports that furnished the backdrop to those reports and official decisions, the memory-in-making portrayal of the UCCL position as 'unalterable opposition to racial discrimination' remained equivocal, and, as such, could be pointed to as evidence of the resolute stand that ecumenism was taking on behalf of Jews - with no hint of its partiality.¹²³

IV. Not all would read UCCLW actions as being free of partiality, however. James Parkes was quick to see a one-sidedness in UCCLW intentions to aid non-Aryan German refugees and expressed so in a letter to UCCLW general secretary Henriod shortly after Novi Sad's decision to assist 'Christians of Jewish descent'.¹²⁴ Parkes had been installed as head of an ISS committee to deal with student refugees fleeing from Germany,¹²⁵ and he was consulting on a part-time basis with the new League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, James McDonald.¹²⁶ In those capacities, while taking care to say that he was speaking 'without official

¹²² Ibid., 177: 69, 70.

¹²³ Macfarland, 174.

¹²⁴ Novi Sad Minutes, prev. cit., 37.

¹²⁵ The ISS Executive Committee for Refugee Students, of which Parkes was head, was comprised of representatives from the United States, France, and England, as well as the World Union of Jewish Students, and it included both Walter Kotschnig, director of ISS, and Tissington Tatlow, chairman of the ISS governing Assembly. Parkes' appointment was made at the Twelfth Annual ISS Conference held in late July 1933.

¹²⁶ Parkes was recommended to McDonald on the same day that he was installed as High Commissioner for Refugees, 26 October 1933. ISS was soon recognized by the High Commission as the 'body dealing with student questions', *Report of Second Meeting of the Governing Body of the High Commission for Refugees Coming From Germany*, 2-4 May, 1934, 16. For more on Parkes and McDonald association see *Advocate for the Doomed: Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald, 1932-1935*, Richard Breitman, Barbara McDonald Stewart, and Severin Hochberg, Ed. (Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2007), 134, 143, 146-47, 198, 213, 215.

authority', Parkes addressed the offer of UCCLW assistance in procuring aid for Christian non-Aryan refugees by saying that churches needed to be involved in raising refugee funds but 'not exclusively for Christian victims'.¹²⁷ He also pointed out that such 'emphasized discrimination' was contrary to that which was being offered by Jewish organizations, who were 'treating on an equal basis all who came to them'.¹²⁸ Parkes' disagreement with UCCLW partiality is important for reasons beyond illustration of his own non-partiality, for, like his action against Kotschnig's dissuasion of German criticism, it signals the more oppositional role to which he was adapting, and it makes clear that his dissent was not limited to disagreement with Conrad Hoffmann. Yet, at the same time, it was also the case that Parkes' outspokenness to ecumenical leaders between 1933 and 1936 was concomitant with his increasing controversy with Hoffmann. While he had expressed reserve in taking 'open attitude against' Hoffmann's early work with ICCAJ - hoping instead that Hoffmann would give Jews 'a square deal to be a Jew' - that hope and reserve was vanishing by 1934. The bombarding effects of Hoffmann's efforts to tie ICCAJ conversionist intent to the Jewish question were being made known to him at every turn, but he was opposed to anything resembling a public dual of persuasion with Hoffmann. That much had been clear when he refused to appear on the same bill at the January 1933 SCM Quadrennial conference. Even though his refusal was partially due to overburdened circumstances it was also evident that turning into popular debate the serious and critically misunderstood 'Jewish question' was not of his liking. Parkes was far more concerned with the rigours of research and reasoned argument than with methods of group persuasion and public debate. He was not averse to making his criticisms known, however, as he did during the period when Hoffmann unfurled some 65 lectures on the Jewish question in Britain between January and March of 1934.

Closely related to that series of lectures was the launching of ICCAJ plans for educating two specific 'markets': British Jewish leaders, who were to be approached by way of a joint conference (like that between ICCAJ and American rabbis in late 1932), and the Student Christian Movement, which was to be approached through circuits of lectures. Parkes was inadvertently drawn into this mix by both targeted 'markets'. In February 1934 Herbert Loewe, a Jewish scholar of Semitic languages and Jewish culture at Oxford and Cambridge, had written Parkes to inform that he had been asked to join in an ICCAJ conference of Christian and Jewish leaders.¹²⁹ Having been previously enlightened by Parkes on the conversionist aims of ICCAJ,

¹²⁷ Parkes to Henriod, 16 November 1933, with copy to High Commissioner, WCC.420064.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* Henriod forwarded Parkes' letter to UCCLW chairman George Bell on 18 November and by December a joint representative of UCCLW and European Church Aide had been appointed to the High Commission Advisory Council. UCCLW intentions remained the same, according to Henriod two months later. The UCCLW plan was to 'stimulate' church contributions that would be distributed through existing agencies approved by the High Commissioner, 'with special interest for Hebrew Christians'; Henriod to William Paton, 8 February 1934, WCC.261142.

¹²⁹ Herbert Loewe to Parkes, 9 February 1934, PP MS60/17/8/1. Loewe had sought advice from Parkes in late 1932 when asked to speak on the Jewish question at the SCM Quadrennial in January 1933.

he said that he was going to refuse unless advised otherwise.¹³⁰ Parkes not only advised Loewe to stand his ground on refusal, he told Hoffmann that he had advised him as such. He also made clear to Hoffmann that he was 'more and more convinced that right relations between Jews and Christians' would never be obtained by conversionist methods.¹³¹ The problem was not that of finding a more suitable mission 'formula', as ICCAJ continued to claim, but of finding a 'right relationship' based on equality. And this, Parkes adjoined, could never be achieved by a group whose publications and works were 'designed to show that Christianity possesse[d] something lacking in Judaism'.¹³² This did not deter ICCAJ's conference or Hoffmann's insistence that those who had 'sound religious convictions [had] the right or duty to...propagate' them'.¹³³ Nor did Parkes' mounting criticism slow ICCAJ efforts to 'educate' British university sectors of the SCM. Parkes' objections were becoming widely known, however, for when an SCM request for help was sent to Parkes in late April 1934 it was headed by the upper case words 'TO BE READ NOT DAMNED'.¹³⁴ The help being sought from the missionary secretary of the SCM of Great Britain was to provide some 'balancing' relief from the 'pressure' being placed to officially adopt ICCAJ mission policies.¹³⁵ The SCM concern was that it had compromised itself when allowing the Jewish question and Jewish missions to become part of its Quadrennial programme, thereby creating an atmosphere in which official SCM policy was expected. 'Friend Conrad', the plea urged, was 'pushing us hard'.¹³⁶

The resulting series of lectures on Jewish-Christian relations in British theological colleges in the early months of 1935 were not delivered by James Parkes of the ISS, but Dr. James Parkes who had resigned from ISS in lieu of independent scholarship. Parkes' resignation coincided with ISS suspension of relations with student bodies that were associated with the Nazi government, as well as with publication of his doctoral study on causal relations between foundational teachings of the Church and modern antisemitism. A notable point about the title of that work - *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Antisemitism* - is that it did not carry the hyphenated form of its topic as did his earlier book, *The Jew and His Neighbour: A Study of the Causes of Anti-Semitism*.¹³⁷ Parkes' removal of the hyphen was inconsistent with contemporary Christian usage but, like the mounting differences

¹³⁰ Ibid. See also Loewe to Parkes, 26 November 1932 and Parkes to Loewe, 2 Dec. 1932; PP MS60/17/8/1.

¹³¹ Parkes to Hoffmann, 13 February; Parkes to Loewe, 14 February; Parkes to Mattuck, 14 February 1934; PPMS60/17/8/1.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Hoffmann to Parkes, 20 February 1934, PP MS60/17/8/1. See also BICCAJ Minutes, 7 March 1934, where update was given on the upcoming conference with Jewish leaders; WCC. 261207.8.

¹³⁴ Sally Coey to Parkes, 26 April 1934, PP MS60/17/8/1.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Parkes, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Antisemitism* (London: Soncino Press, 1934). Parkes usage of the non-hyphenated term began in 1932 and remained consistent even though published versions of manuscripts were at times subjected to editorial changes.

between he and Christian colleagues, it was grounded in his research-driven belief that the *phenomena* of antisemitism was something greater and more far reaching than the *phenomenon* of current 'anti-Semitism' in Germany and elsewhere. The chapter-by-chapter analysis that lay behind the non-hyphenated title argued cogently that the roots of modern antisemitism lay in the Christian development of the story of its historical past rather than in the actual events of that past.

Reasoning from a broad range of primary source documents preserved by the Church as its spiritual and historical legacy, Parkes argued first that the conceptual portrait of Jews and Judaism drawn by church fathers in the first three centuries of Christian history was one of interpretative theological necessity rather than reality. Second, he argued that claims derived from that conceptual portrait were interpretatively used out of historical and situational context to define a 'theological position of Jews' as God-betraying and God-abandoned enemies of the Church and Christianity who were both negligible and contemptible.¹³⁸ Central to interpretation was an unyielding belief that the 'old' Hebrew scriptures contained divine revelations of truth that had been hidden and preserved until the coming of Christ. Early Christian claims of divine entitlement to the Hebrew texts were hence staked by Christian apologists who believed that the 'old' scriptures and 'new' revelations of Christ were but one category of unerring Christian truth which could only be understood by the light of the 'new'. The Hebrew scriptures, Parkes argued, thus became 'a mine from which proof texts could be extracted' to prove the divinity of Christ, the predominance of Christianity, and the theological portrait of Jews as Christianity's enemy.

Central to the theological formulations derived from those 'proofs' was the wielding of universalized claims from the 'new' testament of apostolic writings: 'the Jews' killed Christ, 'the Jews' were rejected by God, 'the Jews' were the enemy of God. It was also a matter of evidence, Parkes argued, that those claims became more hostile in order of historical appearance. By the time the fourth gospel was written the designation 'the Jews' was an all-inclusive reference to those who were 'considered equally [as] enemies' of Christianity. The sobering result was that the more particularized terms 'a Jew' and 'some Jews' were almost unknown to later patristic literature, having been replaced by a stream of universalized designations that were repeatedly attended by negative theological claims and explications.¹³⁹ The resulting theological picture drawn by church fathers and validated as spiritual and historical legacy was hence one that portrayed Jews as everywhere and always 'a perpetual and present danger'. The sum result, Parkes concluded, was a perdurable foundation of beliefs, teachings, and legislative oppression that held through the centuries, one on which modern antisemitism 'reared a structure of racial and economic propaganda'.¹⁴⁰ Although he charged modern antisemites with culpability, Parkes

¹³⁸ Ibid., for example, 42-43, 95, 160-161

¹³⁹ Ibid., 33, 160.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 95, 375.

yet claimed that the 'final responsibility still rests with those who prepared the soil, created the deformation of the people, and so made these ineptitudes credible'.¹⁴¹

The inroads made by Parkes' book into the milieu of ICCAJ thought between 1934 and 1936 were significant in at least one way. Parkes' mountain of primary source evidence which documented the development of fixed negative teachings on Jews in the ancient church could not be ignored, but his emphasis on causative relations between ancient theological attitudes and current antisemitism did not fit with ICCAJ understanding that negative Christian attitudes were aberrations of foundational Christian teachings. Awareness of the degree to which negative anti-Judaic teachings existed in the early church was heightened, in other words, but ICCAJ's fixed insistence upon modern causes of antisemitism was strengthened. Yet, it was also the case in the same period that some change emerged in ICCAJ realisation of the degree to which antisemitic attitudes existed within present day churches. Although it had been pointed out (in 1931) that anti-Jewish sentiment within some churches constituted 'the most embarrassing problem' ICCAJ had to face,¹⁴² and the point itself had been both preceded and followed by piecemeal gathering of what were seen as measured deviations from a general Protestant norm,¹⁴³ it was not until after the publication of Parkes' book that Hoffmann began to draw attention to the harsh reality of antisemitic attitudes *within* Christianity. His awareness had been raised while on a spring tour in southeastern Europe and the Near East through chance meetings with antisemitic Protestant churchmen and Protestant missionaries faced with antisemitic attitudes of indigenous Christian populations. But the realization drawn from those spring and summer encounters in 1934 - that there was 'no hope of evangelizing the Jews without first Christianizing the Christians' - was not expressed until the following November.¹⁴⁴

This was less-despairingly stated seven months later in July 1935 as part of a five-year reflection on the aims and accomplishments of ICCAJ, one in which Hoffmann admitted of 'sobering disappointments', 'naive enthusiasm', and 'high hopes [that had] been moderated to less ambitious objectives'.¹⁴⁵ This same report that held admittance of the need for Christianizing Christians, however, also held shorthand formulations of existing ICCAJ argumentation which alleged or implied causative relations between Jews and antisemitism. Hoffmann's buffered tone of discourse about multi-causes of antisemitism, which was exclusive of direct condemnatory

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 376.

¹⁴² John Conning, 'Major Problems and Issues in a Christian Approach to the Jews', 1931, 14-15, prev. cit.

¹⁴³ See, for example, Budapest-Warsaw Report (1927) where prejudice was 'identified' with some Christian organizations in some countries, and where among German churches only Lutherans were said to be affected, 18, 124, prev. cit; ICCAJ Director's Report, 1 March 1931, where 'antisemitic response' was said to be coming from German church leaders and the Orthodox Church of Rumania was said to be 'on the whole anti-Semitic', WCC. 261202; Report of United Conference, 11 Jan. 1934, where some anti-Jewish feeling in some churches was seen as a difficulty to be overcome in Christian missions to Jews, 7.

¹⁴⁴ NAICCAJ Minutes, 9 November 1934, prev. cit.

¹⁴⁵ Conrad Hoffmann, 'Survey, Report and Forecast', 1 September 1930 to 1 September 1935, was presented to British and European sectors on 10-13 July and to the NA sector on 25-26 September.

statements about Jews while stating that 'major causes lie elsewhere', did not hesitate to remind that 'not a few [were] contributed by the Jews'.¹⁴⁶ Even though there was pronounced effort to de-generalize claims by placing emphasis on 'certain Jews' or 'some Jews' when explaining the content of those claims - which was clearly in response to Parkes' work - the greater part of the causal discussion still curved around causes allegedly contributed by Jews. In each cause of antisemitism said to lie elsewhere - intense nationalism, economic hardship, rising secularized and anti-religious movements - Hoffmann's explanations pivoted around the societal role played by 'certain Jews' or 'some Jews' in each of those arenas. Moreover, and critically so, Hoffmann reissued claims put forth in earlier analyses about modern Jewry's *threat to Christianity*: the dangers associated with Jewish involvement in anti-religious movements; the 'renaissance' of Jewishness stressing racial and national aspects of Jewry'; increasing disintegration of Judaism which steadily increased the number of atheistically-inclined Jews throughout Christendom.¹⁴⁷ Though stated variously, the formulaic repetition of these familiar argumentative elements gathered toward the conclusion that each was a challenging aspect of what was an 'undeniable entrenchment of Jewry in opposition to Christianity'.¹⁴⁸ 'How are we leavening this type of modern Jewry?' was the question being put forth here, by which was meant how successful were ICCAJ efforts to propagate arguments about need for and duty of the Church to evangelize opposing Jewry.¹⁴⁹

The answer, after nearly seven pages of discussion about limitations and failures was that, in spite of successes, the objectives of the Budapest-Warsaw conferences were far from realized.¹⁵⁰ Chief among the factors delimiting ICCAJ success was the world's 'rising tide of anti-Jewish feeling', which Hoffmann described as the 'most outstanding event in our field of activity'.¹⁵¹ As much as antisemitism was hindering ICCAJ efforts to 'leaven' modern Jewry, however, it was also broadcasting need for ICCAJ, for 'if any good ha[d] come from Hitler's anti-Semitism...it ha[d] been to make the world Jew conscious as never before'.¹⁵² As moderator of discussion at the conference where this report was presented in July 1935, IMC chairman John Mott was well in accord with this assessment.¹⁵³ He was also of the mind that 'much more

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., for example, 10-12, where racial and 'a-religious if not actually anti-religious' Zionism in Palestine was said to be advancing as Jewish emigration increased. The concern was that atheistic Jews would control Palestine by 1945 and missionary activity would be negatively affected 'in a land largely controlled by Jews'. See also 12-14.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 14, where argued that 'the spiritual leader of Israel...presents a direct challenge to the doctrines on which Christendom is so largely based'.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 14, italics added. See 11, 25, 27, for further instances of 'leavening the mass of Jewry'.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 31.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 3, for quotation; see 24-30 for discussion of other problems and difficulties to be overcome.

¹⁵² ICCAJ Minutes, 10-12 July 1935, WCC.261206; esp .8, 9, 15, 30-31.

¹⁵³ The ICCAJ conference, held in London, 10-13 July 1935, included representatives from Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Hungary, Sweden, Ireland, Scotland, England, and America. Reports in absentia were presented from Austria, Denmark, Belgium, France, Rumania, Poland, and Palestine.

thinking on the Jewish problem' was needed, as were the conferees from nine countries in their urging of new research on the background and causes of antisemitism.¹⁵⁴ While this increasing concern about increasing antisemitism did not in any way alter ICCAJ conversionist motive, it was seen as extending the limits of ICCAJ motive to include a 'challenge to the conscience of the Church' that was separate and apart from Christian 'duty' to evangelize Jews'.¹⁵⁵ Yet while this was clearly a stated intention it was also made clear that conversionist outreach efforts were to be strengthened and expanded in ICCAJ's overall stance against antisemitism.¹⁵⁶ Assessed as such, and with admission of its ever-deepening complexity, the combating of antisemitism was seen by the conference as the primary ICCAJ activity of the future, and more thorough research on antisemitism was ordered.

As part of the called-for research on antisemitism the conference ordered a thorough study on non-Aryans, with emphasis on 'Christian non-Aryans'.¹⁵⁷ This was begun immediately by Hoffmann but distribution was preceded by a preliminary paper written by Parkes Cadman, who was chairman of both the American sector of UCCLW and the Christian Committee for German Refugees.¹⁵⁸ Although Cadman's paper was wrapped in sincerity meant to stir Christian conscience on behalf of non-Aryans, it clearly encouraged Christian partiality. 'Germany's Christian Non-Aryans' opened in fact with the claim that 7 April 1933, the date that the first Aryan law was enacted, 'promise[d] to be a famous date in the *history of Christianity*'.¹⁵⁹ The significance of the suppressing Aryan legislation, in other words, was not the suppression of Jews but, rather, that it was 'the first time a government...challenged the validity of baptism'.¹⁶⁰ Cadman went on to claim that, beyond 'precipitat[ing] a serious crisis in Church history', the arbitrary distinction 'non-Aryan' created a 'desperate' plight for non-Aryan Christians, which was different than that of Jews.¹⁶¹ While this analysis was not intended as lack of concern for Jews who were suffering under Aryan legislation, he yet quoted in agreement with a German Protestant periodical that 'conditions of Jews [we]re essentially more favourable than those of non-Aryan Christians'.¹⁶² Arguing from 'numbers' and 'aid', Cadman elaborated that the number of Christian non-Aryans was far greater than that of Jews, but that the aid to Christian non-Aryans was next to nothing compared with that being sought for Jews by world Jewry.¹⁶³ Both of these he argued from shared ecumenical interpretation, but his third line of reasoning about

¹⁵⁴ 'Summary of Discussion', 10-12 July 1935, WCC.261203.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Minutes of ICCAJ Conference of British and European Sector, 9, 15, 30-31.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵⁸ Parkes S. Cadman, 'Germany's Christian Non-Aryans', was attached as addendum 7d to the Minutes of the ICCAJ July 1935 conference of British and Central European sectors, WCC.261203.2.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, italics added.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 2. Hoffmann's July 1935 Director's Report argued the same less vigorously, 5 and 28, *prev. cit.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 2-4.

the greater burden of non-Aryan Christians was based on theological speculation about a 'threat' which made Christian non-Aryans '*more suspect [to Nazis] than the Jew*':¹⁶⁴

the racial propaganda that has been exploited in Germany tends to react more harshly upon non-Aryan Christians than upon the Jews, for they are a living refutation of the preposterous nonsense about race, religion, and Germanism so fiercely promoted by National Socialist leaders.¹⁶⁵

When Hoffmann's 'confidential' report on non-Aryans followed shortly thereafter in September 1935, twice in size and more broadly focused than Cadman's paper on 'Germany's Christian Non-Aryans', it too advanced the notion that antisemitism harboured special threat to Christianity. While the report was an indubitably sincere lament about the widespread suffering of all who were classified as non-Aryan, it yet followed in the same vein of focus on 'numbers' and 'aid' while bolstering multiple claims about the greater suffering of Christian non-Aryans and Christendom's failure to relieve it.¹⁶⁶ In contrast to Cadman's estimate of one to three million Christian non-Aryans, Hoffmann stressed that there were only 500,000 Jews among a total population of two to three million non-Aryans in Germany.¹⁶⁷ Although confused about terminology and inconsistent with how it was applied - 'Jew and partial Jew', 'Christian and partial Jew', 'non-Aryan and Hebrew Christian', 'Jews and non-Aryans' - he was unmistakably clear that the antisemitism manifested in persecution of non-Aryans was evidence that Nazism 'c[ould] not tolerate the Christian religion...against which it must therefore fight'.¹⁶⁸ This was of course in keeping with his earlier argument that 'anti-Semitism endangered the very existence of Christianity itself', but it should not be seen as an argument exclusive to ICCAJ.¹⁶⁹ It was, rather, a gathering ecumenical argument that was being developed and affirmed incrementally by those most involved with these issues. As expounded by Henry Leiper in a speech reported in the *Boston Herald* in February 1936, for example, 'what [was] happening in Germany' was said to be 'directed not only at Jews but at Christians as well, because their belief in God as the father of all mankind [was] opposed to the Nazi ideology of a God incarnate in a race'.¹⁷⁰ That the fate of non-Aryan Christians was 'even more tragic than that of the Jews', which was repeatedly stated within this circle, was reported again by UCCLW general secretary Henriod in June.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., italics added.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Hoffmann, Confidential Report Concerning the Condition of Non-Aryans in Germany, 1 September 1935, was circulated to ICCAJ members (including FCC general secretary Samuel Caver) and UCCLW general secretary Henriod just days before the September 1935 Nuremberg Laws; WCC.420038.1.

¹⁶⁷ In comparison, an estimation made by Nazi Rudolf Hess was that there were 400,000-500,000 who fit the legal concept of 'Jew', and 300,000 who fit the concept 'Jewish *Mischling*' after the September 1935 Nuremberg Laws and their 'First Supplementary Decree' on 14 November. See Karl Schleunes, *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews* (University of Illinois Press, 1970, 1990), 128-129.

¹⁶⁸ Hoffmann, Confidential Report Concerning the Condition of Non-Aryans, prev. cit., 5.

¹⁶⁹ Hoffmann, 'Modern Jewry and the Christian Church' (April 1934), prev. cit.

¹⁷⁰ *Boston Herald*, 26 February 1936; FCC HSL Papers, Box2.

¹⁷¹ Henriod's June 1936 report for UCCLW can be found in Boyens, 1933-1939, 366-368, prev.cit.

Hoffmann's take the following month, in the context of the non-Aryan plight, was that of an 'anti-Christian movement coming in [the] wake' of the 'bitter anti-Jewish campaign'.¹⁷² The point he was making in his Director's Report was that Nazism recognized 'the blood relationship of the Christian faith to Judaism' and 'must therefore eliminate [Christianity] if [it] would free Germany of all Jewishness'.¹⁷³

The new ICCAJ study on antisemitism that had been called for by the 1935 conference would build on these developing ideas. The most important aspect of that call in terms of future ecumenical development was that involvement in the study was to be extended to UCCLW. Increasing awareness of antisemitism in the Church prompted ICCAJ to seek collaboration with UCCLW, which was researching social and moral issues to be presented at its 1937 conference of world churches. IMC General Secretary J.H. Oldham, who had lamented that Christianity lacked a universal guideline on race relations in 1934, had been tapped as principal organizer of the conference and was presently orchestrating the tenor of research that would appear. When approached about the possibility of including antisemitism among issues to be presented, his response was positive. The ICCAJ plan from July 1935 to September 1936 was thus that *two* separate studies on antisemitism - one by ICCAJ and one by UCCLW - would surface at their respective conferences in summer 1937. As planning unfolded toward that end, a commission was formed around IMC General Secretary William Paton to oversee production of the ICCAJ study and ensure that antisemitism was addressed at the UCCLW conference. Hoffmann, of course, was included, as was Dr. Willem Ten Boom, secretary of the Central Bureau of Jewish Missionary Societies in Holland, and Professor Phillip Kohnstamm, a Dutch Hebrew Christian scholar recommended by IMC.¹⁷⁴ By summer 1936, through the efforts of this commission, it was widely understood in the ecumenical community that ICCAJ would highlight 'Anti-Semitism and the Church' at its 1937 international conference in Vienna immediately before the UCCLW Oxford conference.¹⁷⁵

ICCAJ intentions were unexpectedly altered in mid-September, however, when Oldham informed that he would not be able to produce UCCLW's study on antisemitism in time for the conference. What was most surprising to Hoffmann was not that the mammoth undertaking for the Oxford conference had interfered with the UCCLW study - but that the work that had been done thus far for UCCLW had been done by James Parkes. After discussing the possibility of

¹⁷² Hoffmann, Director's Report, July 1936, 3; WCC.261202.6.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Willem Ten Boom, who was brother to Corrie Ten Boom of post-Holocaust Christian distinction, earned his doctorate with a thesis on modern racial antisemitism (*Die Entstehung des modernen Rassen-Antisemitismus*, Leipzig, 1928).

¹⁷⁵ Account is based on correspondences between Hoffmann, Van Nes, Pernow, and Sloan from January to April 1936, WCC.261203; Hoffmann to ICCAJ Committee, 19 Feb. 1936, WCC.261202.6; ICCAJ Minutes of British and European Sectors, 28-29 April 1936, WCC.261203.3; Hoffmann to ICCAJ Committee, 15 July 1936, WCC.261204.5.

including antisemitism on the UCCLW agenda, Oldham had contacted Parkes to request a study on the causes of present-day antisemitism, and Parkes had produced a 21-page manuscript on 'The Nature of Antisemitism', which Oldham had assessed as 'historical' rather than what he had called for.¹⁷⁶ Although Hoffmann had been unaware that Oldham had commissioned Parkes, he had not been unaware of the study itself, for Parkes had circulated the paper without mention of Oldham in May 1936. Hoffmann in turn had penned criticism of Parkes' assessment of causes. Parkes had set as his task to dispel commonly encountered causal explanations of antisemitism, one of which was embraced by ICCAJ, namely, that Jewish exclusiveness was the result of racial pride. In refutation, Parkes had argued that any Jewish exclusivity which differed in kind from Christian exclusivity was a direct result of external pressures, and not inherent predilection to racial exclusiveness, and, in support, he had elaborated the positive sustaining attributes of a people committed to the preservation of God-given Judaism in a Christendom bent on negating it.¹⁷⁷ While admitting 'profit' from Parkes' study, which Hoffmann said was 'basic and essential' if any progress was to be made toward 'solution of the age-old problem', he yet maintained that knowledge of the past was useful only where it reaped specificities with which to combat the antisemitism of the day.¹⁷⁸ What knowledge and acceptance Hoffmann had about Christianity's historical role in antisemitism, in other words, it was not held to be a relative cause of current antisemitism, nor was it given place as a major causal factor of the anti-Jewish attitudes that he himself now recognized must be eliminated from the Church. Yet the historical 'beginnings of anti-Jewish persecution', such as that meant to Hoffmann, were in fact viewed as a 'necessary background' to the understanding of current antisemitism.¹⁷⁹ More precisely, those beginnings, which were held to have been in play before inception of Christianity, figured prominently in his theory of Jewish persecution: e.g., that preservation of Judaism and Jewishness guaranteed antisemitism but persecution vanished when did Jewishness and Judaism. And it was this to which he returned in his criticism of Parkes' assertions about Jewish persistence to preserve an intact Judaism. Hoffmann contended, as he had previously, that constant Jewish persecution rather than 'inherent staying qualities' had preserved Judaism historically, adding as a provoking cause of the persecution Jewish 'clannishness' and stiff-necked opposition to conversion efforts.¹⁸⁰

With this dispute in the background, and in no way settled when he learned in fall 1936 that there would be no UCCLW study on antisemitism, Hoffmann asked Oldham to inform him

¹⁷⁶Ten Boom to Oldham, 5 September 1936; Oldham to Hoffmann, 17 September 1936; Oldham to Ten Boom, 18 September 1936; Hoffmann to Oldham, 28 September 1936; WCC.261201.3. Also Hoffmann to Bishop Graham-Brown, 29 August, 1936, WCC.261201; NA ICCAJ Minutes, 29 Sept. 1936, 3, WCC.261207.2; Hoffmann to ICCAJ, 17 November 1936, WCC.261204.5.

¹⁷⁷ Parkes, 'The Nature of Antisemitism', March 1936, PP MS60/9/2/5.

¹⁷⁸ Hoffmann to Parkes, 5 May 1936, PP MS60/17/8/2.

¹⁷⁹ See, for example, Hoffmann to Committee Members, 19 February 1936, WCC.261202.6.

¹⁸⁰ Hoffmann to Parkes, 5 May 1936, prev.cit.

if it was later decided that Parkes would 'undertake something' for the UCCLW conference, adding that he thought 'Parkes ha[d] a vital contribution to make'.¹⁸¹ Yet at the same time Hoffmann began a course of action that made no room for Parkes' historical focus on causal relations between foundational Christian teachings on Jews and modern antisemitism. Indeed, over the nine-month period between learning about UCCLW's withdrawal from the study and the two 1937 summer conferences, every stage of planning reflected a reminder that the lens of ICCAJ focus was to be set upon the current and not historical landscape of antisemitism.¹⁸² There was to be one notable exception, however, and it was clearly in contradiction to Parkes' argument that Jewish hostility and hatred toward early Christianity was neither universal nor constant. Although claimed as Christian history, that belief, according to Parkes, was not based on historical events but on 'interpretative' theological exegesis that *required* Jewish hostility.¹⁸³ Such assertions rubbed against ICCAJ claims about the provoking role of Jewish hostility in ancient Christian responses to Jews, so Hoffmann went in search of a study that would deal specifically with that 'problem of the early Church'.¹⁸⁴ What he had in mind, as explained to potential expositors, was 'Jewish opposition to the growth of the early Church', for it was there, he believed, that 'at least some of the roots of present-day Anti-Semitism' were 'lodged'.¹⁸⁵ With that one 'historical' exception - which so clearly sought some level of *Jewish* cause - the new ICCAJ study on antisemitism was to focus on the immediate causes of current persecution of Jews, for 'the more important question [was] not the anti-Semitism of the past, but what the churches c[ould] do in the face of the present'.¹⁸⁶

To summarize briefly how the persecution to which Hoffmann referred had developed since 1933, one week after FCC protested against Germany's persecution of Jews in the *New York Times*, the German state had called for a boycott of all Jewish businesses on 1 April. The first Aryan legislation which categorized Jews and began purging non-Aryans from influential spheres of German society was enacted on 7, 22, and 25 April, followed with attendant laws in July, September, October, March 1934, and May 1935.¹⁸⁷ As part of the 1933 laws, cultural ministries had been established in September for fine arts, film, literature, broadcasting, press, theatre, and music under Joseph Goebbels, who urged the necessity of removing every vestige

¹⁸¹ Hoffmann to Oldham, 28 September 1936, prev. cit.

¹⁸² Correspondence between members of ICCAJ study commission (Hoffmann, Paton, Ten Boom, and Kohnstamm), October 1936-May 1937, are found in WCC.261203.4; 261203.14; 261204.5; 261201.3; 261206.9.

¹⁸³ Parkes, *Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Antisemitism*, 121-150.

¹⁸⁴ Hoffmann to Ten Boom, 13 November 1936, WCC.261203.14.

¹⁸⁵ Hoffmann to Canon Danby, 1 December 1936, WCC.261203.14.

¹⁸⁶ Hoffmann to Danby, 30 December, WCC.261201.3; Hoffmann to Ten Boom, 4 December 1936, WCC.261203.14.

¹⁸⁷ Karl A. Schleunes, *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews 1933-1939* (University of Illinois Press, 1970, 1990), 92-132; *Legislating the Holocaust: The Bernard Loesener Memoirs and Supporting Documents* (Westview Press, Perseus Books Group, 2001), 153-180.

of Jewishness from German society, and this was but one area in which Jewishness was being purged. Eradication of Jewish influence was being urged across the disciplines. Within weeks of the first 1933 laws, for example, a German Nobel Laureate in Physics was praising the Aryan laws as a tool by which disciplinary realms of knowledge could be rescued from the 'damaging influence by Jews'.¹⁸⁸ The enactment of the 1935 Nuremberg laws and their first Supplementary Decree had then set out precise definitions of 'Jew' according to one's degree of 'Jewishness', as illustrated in Table IV, which was to clarify earlier (and later) laws that were systematically depriving Jews of livelihood and participation in society.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, as critical studies have

Table IV. Definitions of 'Jew' Determined by Degrees of Jewishness in the 1935 Nuremberg Laws

Jew	Anyone with 3 or 4 Jewish grandparents
Jew	2 Jewish grandparents belonging to Jewish congregation on 15 September 1935
Jew	2 Jewish grandparents + being married to a Jew on 15 September or later
Jew	1st degree <i>Mischling</i> (half breed) + being married to a Jew
Jew	1st degree <i>Mischling</i> + spouse is member of a Jewish religious congregation
Jew	Aryan converted to Judaism
1st degree <i>Mischling</i>	2 Jewish grandparents who have no connection to Jewish religion
2nd degree <i>Mischling</i>	1 Jewish grandparent with no connection to Jewish religion

since demonstrated, research on the Jewish problem and eradication of Jewish influence became common goals of major state institutions established as early as 1935, the results of which were widely broadcast throughout Germany (and elsewhere) by way of public talks, press, and radio in the ideological language of 'Judaization' and the necessity for 'de-Judaization'.¹⁹⁰

This particular ideological aspect of Nazi legalized persecution of Jews is particularly significant, for it was precisely around the same issues of 'Jewishness', 'Judaization', and the racial/national implications of Judaism that Hoffmann was arguing *on behalf of* ICCAJ in the same period. These were key to Hoffmann's racial identity theory, revealed in September 1933, which stressed that persecution had provoked a 'renaissance of Jewishness' within world Jewry, one that was rooted in racial and national aspirations rather than religious. These claims went hand in hand with earlier arguments on the dangers of increasing Jewish influence in all spheres of society, increasing disintegration of Judaism, and increasing Jewish involvement in anti-religious movements. His explicitness on the combined effect of these 'problems' in 1933 and 1934 bears repeating:

¹⁸⁸ 1905 Nobel Laureate Philipp Lenard, *Voelkischer Beobachter*, 13 May 1933, appears in Klaus Hentschel's important documentation of efforts to de-Judaize science, *Physics and National Socialism, An Anthology of Primary Sources* (Birkhaeuser Verlag, 1996).

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.* *Legislating the Holocaust*, 21.

¹⁹⁰ Max Weinreich, *Hitler's Professors: The Part of Scholarship in Germany's Crimes Against the Jewish People* (Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1946); Patricia von Papen-Bodek, 'Scholarly Antisemitism During the Third Reich: The Reichinstitut's Research on the Jewish question, 1935-1945', PhD. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1999; Alan E. Steinweis, *Studying the Jew: Scholarly Antisemitism in Nazi Germany* (Harvard University Press, 2006). See also Susannah Heschel, *The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany* (Princeton University Press, 2008), for the early efforts of the German Christian movement, whose beliefs about Jewish influence in Christianity led to the founding of the Institute for the Study and Eradication of Jewish influence on German Church Life in 1939.

Unless Christianity can Christianize Jewry, Jewry will Judaize the world - and in modern Jewry today the anti-religious, atheistic and unscrupulous Jew is gaining the ascendancy.¹⁹¹

Shall Jewry become a nation with a national home somewhere, or shall Jewry disappear in humanity, like salt in a solution, no longer existent as Jewry, but permeating all mankind with Jewish spirit and influence?¹⁹²

Between 1933 and 1936 there was unmistakable consistency in this line of argument, one which included, it will be recalled, comparison of Jewry's 'racial emphasis on Jewishness' to that of the 'racial emphasis of Hitler and his followers'. In Hoffmann's 1933 assessment the two were 'more or less identical'.¹⁹³ By summer 1935 these combined units of argument were being used to make the point that each was a challenging aspect of what was termed to be 'undeniable entrenchment of Jewry in opposition to Christianity'.¹⁹⁴ At the same time it was argued that Nazi persecution of Jews was evidence that Nazism *was* contention against Christianity.¹⁹⁵ By mid 1936 the combined point of emphasis was that the Nazi 'fight on Jewishness' would ultimately lead to the elimination of Christianity. That 'you c[ould] not de-Judaize a country without de-Christianizing it' was most clear to Hoffmann, and he consistently passed this on as a warning to the churches.¹⁹⁶ That some or all of this would be carried over in the new study on antisemitism that was to be unveiled at the upcoming Vienna conference was clearly indicated by early 1937, when Hoffmann advised the ICCAJ committee member in charge of drafting the study to keep in mind that:¹⁹⁷

...owing to the constant insistence of the Jew regarding his racial and national identity, he becomes a suspicious minority against whom anti-Semitism is inflicted whenever an economic crisis or other national crisis arises in the land.¹⁹⁸

Hoffmann's emphasis on causative relations between Jews and antisemitism had remained a hallmark feature of ICCAJ explication throughout the years of legislative attempts by the Nazi state to find a solution to its alleged Jewish problem, with no hint of recognition that such arguments had explicit commonalities with the antisemitism that the organization claimed, and believed, it was 'called' to combat.

¹⁹¹ Hoffmann, Director's Report, September 1933, 20, WCC.261207.2.

¹⁹² Hoffmann, 'Modern Jewry and the Christian Church', *IRM* Vol.23 (April 1934), 189-204; 194.

¹⁹³ Hoffmann, Director's Report, September 1933, 7.

¹⁹⁴ Hoffmann, Director's Report, September 1935 (delivered in London on 10-13 July), WCC.261203.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Hoffmann, Director's Report, July 1936, 3; WCC.261202.6.

¹⁹⁷ Hoffmann to Kohnstamm, 23 February 1937, WCC.261203.14. After citing Theodor Herzl's belief that 'anti-Semitism is a national question', Hoffmann advised that the claim be addressed in 'reverse order'.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Chapter Three

PRESENCES AND ABSENCES OF VOICES

1937-1939

What had begun in 1935 as a collaboration in which the Universal Christian Council on Life and Work would serve as consultant to ICCAJ on antisemitism had become instead a fortuitous opportunity for ICCAJ to consult the 1937 Oxford conference that would usher in the World Council of Churches. The concurrent launching of its new study on antisemitism at the 1937 Vienna conference, deliberation of that study by 67 Christian delegates from 18 countries, and the resulting statements delivered to Oxford ten days later bore significantly on ICCAJ's place within the changing structure of the ecumenical movement. The critical development of those changes between the Vienna conference in July 1937 and the outbreak of World War II in 1939 is the focus of discussion in this chapter.

To understand the Vienna Conference it is important to look first at the data-gathering methods which informed the understanding of antisemitism presented in the new study. As opposed to the systematic and analytic historical research methods used by James Parkes, data for the ICCAJ study was opinion-driven, solicited from a broad range of international Christian sources, and focused on the social/psychological conditions which those sources contributed to development of antisemitism within their national boundaries. This 'country' data, in turn, was assessed by an ICCAJ commission (Kohnstamm, Ten Boom, Hoffmann, and Paton) and then worked into an analysis that was to be presented and discussed at the conference. The analysis was initially intended to be a joint authorship of Kohnstamm and Ten Boom, one subject to the oversight and approval of Paton and Hoffmann. As the work progressed the manuscripts were circulated to at least seven delegates from the United States, England, Rumania, and Poland for commentary, and the final revised manuscript was acknowledged to be a general resolution of the 'divergences of opinion' that had surfaced during the process of collaboration.¹

Assessment of the 'country' data did not appear per se in any of the manuscript drafts but it was used as interpretative support for the study.² The significance of these reports, as well as their inclusion in pre-conference materials sent to delegates, thus requires some assessment of content prior to discussion of the completed study on antisemitism that was presented to the Vienna Conference. Using the language of missions, all of the reports were compiled by those concerned or directly involved with 'occupation' of specific mission fields.

¹ Kohnstamm to Paton and Kohnstamm to Hoffmann, 19 October 1936; Hoffmann to Ten Boom, 20 October 1936; Paton to Kohnstamm, 23 October 1936; Ten Boom to Hoffmann, 29 October 1936; Hoffmann to Ten Boom with copy to Kohnstamm, 13 November 1936; Hoffmann to Ten Boom, 4 December 1936; Ten Boom to Paton with copy to Hoffmann, 24 December 1936; Kohnstamm to Paton with copies to Hoffmann, Parsons, H.L. Ellison, Coulter, Isaac Feinstein, John Conning, Schneiderman, and W.W. Simpson, 26 January 1937; WCC.261203, 261203.4, 261203.8, 261203.14; 261204.

² Minutes, Enlarged Meeting of ICCAJ, Vienna, 28 June-2 July 1937, WCC.261206.8.

Of twenty-five reports submitted, some 123 pages in full, the overwhelming majority addressed conditions of Jews in European countries.³ Nineteen dealt with Europe, three with the Middle East, and one each with South Africa, South America, and the United States.⁴ Of the nineteen European reports, seventeen addressed the issue of antisemitism, and fifty-nine percent of those were compiled by current members of the international committee of ICCAJ. Of the seventeen addressing European antisemitism, only three said that it was 'practically non-existent' or 'hardly a public question' (Finland, Italy, and Norway). The remaining fourteen reported rise in varying degrees. With exception of Sweden, Greece, and Great Britain (the northern, southern, and western points of that group), reports were issued from countries encircling Germany: Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Thirty-six percent of the fourteen acknowledged the presence of antisemitism in its churches; seven percent claimed its churches were openly opposed to antisemitism; seven percent said its churches assumed no responsibility in combating antisemitism.⁵ In terms of cause, some sixty-four percent attributed the antisemitism within its nation to multiple factors which included the spread of national socialist ideology and/or other political, economic, social, and/or cultural conditions.⁶ *None* of the fourteen reports hinted that cause might lay within the Church, but twenty-one percent did make clear that antisemitism was 'merely a minor aspect of a larger problem', a 'phase of modern attack on religion in general', and that 'if Christendom fail[ed] to combat anti-Semitism', its very existence would be 'endangered'.⁷

Beyond the 123 pages of 'country' reports, conference materials included the new study on antisemitism (97pp) and other related papers (108pp), the total of which constituted some 328 pages of a pre-conference package. When the conference convened in Vienna between 28 June and 2 July 1937, the sixty-seven Christian leaders evaluating, discussing, and judging these materials included fifty-six delegates from Europe (England, Ireland, Scotland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland); four from the Middle East (Palestine, Syria); and seven from North America (both

³ Area reports included Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Palestine, Poland (2), Portugal, Rumania, South Africa, South America, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, United States. A different type of report on Birobidjan, which was among conference materials, is not included in this survey. All of the reports under discussion here are located within the files of WCC.261203.

⁴ Of the nineteen reports on European countries, nine were issued by representatives of British mission concerns, four by Swedish, two each by Dutch and American, and one each by Swiss and German mission affiliates.

⁵ Respectively, 1) Austria, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland, Rumania; 2) Netherlands; 3) Switzerland.

⁶ Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland (2), Rumania.

⁷ Quotations respectively, Poland (p.6), Czechoslovakia (p.4), Germany (p.5). The claim that 'the danger of antisemitism to Church and Christianity as a whole [was] not yet sufficiently realized' also appeared in the report on South Africa (p.3).

United States and Canada).⁸ The sub-committee of nine appointed to draft the ICCAJ statement on 'Anti-Semitism and the Church' included delegates from Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Austria, Palestine, Holland, the United States, and England.⁹

The keynote address on the second day of the conference was the finale of collaborative process that advanced the new study on antisemitism through its various stages, but Dr. Philip Kohnstamm of Holland acknowledged sole responsibility for expression of its written content. 'The Church of Jesus Christ and Antisemitism in the Age of Secularisation', which included a thirty-one page paper and sixty-six pages of appended material, led into the topic by way of causal analysis.¹⁰ In laying the groundwork, Kohnstamm presumed the existence of a general 'instinctive' enmity between *unlike* peoples while focusing on instinctive enmity between non-Jews and Jews. In terms of the latter, he explained that such 'natural' instinctive enmity would not exist if Jews did not manifest such obvious differences. 'The full-blooded Jew, and to some extent his mixed offspring', were presented as 'in many respects different' from non-Jewish Europeans and Americans in 'taste', 'speech', 'manner of expression', 'temperate', 'colour of skin', 'physical build', 'rhythm', 'humour', and even 'diseases' and 'crimes', and to these differences he added undifferentiated Jewish 'peculiarities' that were not inherent but developed over 'centuries of oppression'.¹¹ With such 'differences' in tow, and 'natural enmity' as a common condition of man, Kohnstamm broadened his lens to a cultural level of Jewish and non-Jewish coexistence while trying to explain the development of modern antisemitism since emancipation.

By comparing cultural attributes of Germany with countries such as Holland, England, and Scotland, where antisemitism existed in only slight proportion, he postulated that where 'solider stock and more rational nature' had developed, more conditioned respect for others, more 'inner' confidence, and greater peaceful co-existence among cultures would be found. Having acknowledged possibility of peaceful co-existence, Kohnstamm called attention to cultural conditions that created a far different 'Jewish problem', and he did so by invoking a paper by Conrad Hoffmann that was appended to his study. Referring to Hoffmann's frequently posed question about the Jewish co-existence 'situation' - can there exist within common culture a group that preserves its 'peculiarity' without those differences eliciting hostility? - Kohnstamm

⁸ Data has been extracted from attendance records. Of six original delegates from Germany, five were prevented from attending by the Nazi government. Minutes, Enlarged Meeting of ICCAJ, Vienna, 28 June-2 July 1937, WCC.261206.8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 7. The Subcommittee on Anti-Semitism and the Church included Professor W.M. Horton (USA); Professor Philip Kohnstamm (Holland); Rev. B. Vancura (Czechoslovakia); Dr. F. Neumann (Austria); Rev. Isaac Feinstein (Rumania); Rev. George L.B. Sloan (Palestine); E.I.M. Boyd (Rumania); Rev. J.W.C. Dougall (England); Rev. William Paton (England), General Secretary of IMC.

¹⁰ Philip Kohnstamm, 'The Church of Jesus Christ and Antisemitism in the Age of Secularisation', Vienna Conference, 28 June-July 2 1937, WCC. 261203.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

reasoned that, yes, to a degree, it was possible under the right conditions. However, according to his assessment of Hoffmann's 'Facts Regarding American Jewry and Anti-Semitism', such right conditions were not reflected in America because the preservation of cultural identity that was insisted upon by Jews had nothing in common with the reality of Jewish cultural heritage. In America, according to Hoffmann's appended paper, 'the Jew...builds a wall of partition...to prevent the assimilative process'; the 'Jew demands [both] full equality [and] the right to remain different'; 'Jewish insistence on remaining different...[was] no longer based on religion but increasingly on race and nation; and 'anti-Semitism [was] sure to develop...if the Jew persists in emphasizing his racial and national...identity'.¹² In Kohnstamm's assessment, American Jews had ceased to be a religious community, and the situation was 'not so very different in West and Central Europe'.¹³

It is important to understand that this was not just a case of invoking Hoffmann's 'facts' into Kohnstamm's argument: it was the case of Hoffmann's racial identity thesis making its way into the new ICCAJ study on antisemitism. A main point being disseminated was that the nature of present modern antisemitism was radically different from persecution arising from earlier struggles between Jewish and Christian faiths precisely because there was little if any religion left in modern Jewry. With references to de-religionized modern Jewry, as well as to Israel's 'fall from God', Kohnstamm returned to his natural enmity argument to discuss its 'deeper' causal significance. Speaking alternately of antisemitism as 'struggle against the true Israel', as 'the bitter life and death struggle against everything that first took visible form in Israel', as 'hatred of those who serve idols against all who serve God', he went on to argue that it was only 'natural that Anti-semitism must be directed not only against the true Israel, but also against the Israel which has fallen from God'.¹⁴

The construction of this claim, its theological focus on Christianity (the true Israel) as the root target of antisemitism, and its relegation of Jewry to a secondary, though seemingly frontal, object of antisemitism is a matter of great concern here. Moreover, it is a far reaching concern for even though Kohnstamm acknowledged responsibility for opinions expressed in the study, the core of this thought found its way into the ICCAJ statement that was presented to the Oxford conference. Before discussing that statement, however, a return to Kohnstamm's paper and its appendices will help to clarify relations between the ideas being transmitted there. Of first importance is the theological way in which the Christian duty to combat antisemitism is

¹² Conrad Hoffmann, 'Appendix I: A Few Facts Regarding American Jewry and Anti-Semitism', Vienna Conference (1937), 2-4; see also Hoffmann's letter to Kohnstamm, 23 February 1937, suggesting this approach of explanation; WCC.261203.

¹³ Kohnstamm, 'The Church of Jesus Christ and Antisemitism in the Age of Secularisation', 5-6; 7-9; 13.

¹⁴ Ibid., 9, 12, 19. For references to de-religionized Jewry, 9, 10, 14, 22, 29.

'inextricably linked' with the divine call to Jewish missions.¹⁵ That they were linked by way of a Roman Catholic document entitled 'The Church of Christ and the Jewish Question' is highly significant for it brings into bold relief mutually-shared Protestant and Catholic theological attitudes toward Jews in this same period.¹⁶ By far the weightiest of Kohnstamm's appendices - in both size (31pp) and claim of treating 'the whole subject of Anti-Semitism from exactly the same standpoint'¹⁷ - the Catholic treatise had made its way to ICCAJ through the *Judaicum Delitzschianum*, which had been transferred from Leipzig to Vienna under the directorship of ICCAJ Hans Kosmala.¹⁸ John Oesterreicher,¹⁹ a Catholic priest who published the journal in which the treatise appeared, had come to Kosmala for instruction in Hebrew in summer 1936.²⁰ This was the period in which Kohnstamm had been referred to Kosmala by Hoffmann for assistance with the ICCAJ study on antisemitism, and according to recent scholarship it was also the period in which Oesterreicher and his colleagues conceived their idea for this work on the Jewish question.²¹ When the resulting treatise appeared in February 1937 in the Catholic journal *Die Fuellung*, it carried names of fourteen esteemed signatories from eight European countries, as well as reported support of 'outstanding religious and noted Catholic political leaders' who chose for reasons of safety to remain anonymous.²² By appending and invoking this treatise in the new ICCAJ study on antisemitism, Kohnstamm and all of those who had

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 24-25.

¹⁶ After appearing in *Die Fuellung* the treatise was published as *The Church and The Jews* (with 'The Church of Christ and the Jewish Question relegated to subtitle), Trans., Gregory Feige, Committee on National Attitudes of the Catholic Association for International Peace (Paulist Press, 1937).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁸ The Institutum Judaicum Delitzschianum, which was previously under the direction of ICCAJ executive Dr. Otto von Harling in Leipzig, was a training center for English-speaking missionaries to Jews. It was relocated to Vienna under the directorship of Hans Kosmala in December 1935. Kosmala was appointed to the international board of ICCAJ in April 1936. See *News Sheet*, December 1935 and February 1936; Hoffmann to ICCAJ, 19 February 1936; ICCAJ Minutes, 28-29 April, 1936; Director's Report, 1 July 1936; WCC.261202.6 and 261203.3.

¹⁹ Johannes Oesterreicher was a converted Jew (1923) who was ordained as priest in 1927. In 1934 he co-founded the Viennese Pauluswerke, a Jewish mission dedicated to the work of improving relations between Christians and Jews. He was also publisher of the organization's bimonthly journal, *Die Fuellung* (Fulfillment). He later became a key figure in Catholic renewal of Jewish attitudes, playing a key role in *Nostra Aetate* at Vatican II. For ICCAJ reporting on Oesterreicher soon after the Pauluswerke founding in September 1934, see *News Sheet*, October 1934, 4.

²⁰ *News Sheet*, July-August 1936, Item 3; ICCAJ Director's Report, July 1937, WCC.261203, 8.

²¹ Recent English scholarship on this Catholic document include important studies by Elias Fuellenbach (2007) and John Connelly (2012), both of whom see it as early but flawed development in the renewal of Catholic attitudes leading to *Nostra Aetate* at Vatican II. Neither is aware of the document's role in the ICCAJ study. Connelly is aware of Oesterreicher's student relationship to Kosmala but unaware of Kosmala's association with the ICCAJ or ICCAJ's association with the document. See Elias Fuellenbach, 'Shock, Renewal, Crisis: Catholic Reflections on the Shoah', *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust*, Ed. Kevin P. Spicer (Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2007); John Connelly *From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews, 1933-1965* (Harvard University Press, 2012).

²² *The Church and The Jews*, Preface, prev. cit.

approved and advanced the study were in effect calling upon the weight of this concurrence. Equally important is that the appended treatise was being invoked as a 'model [of] the Gospel of the Church' in its defense of 'God-given' human rights.²³

On this landscape, and against the backdrop of viewing antisemitism as struggle against the *true* Israel, Kohnstamm argued the 'inextricable' link between the Christian duty of Jewish missions *and* the Christian duty of combating antisemitism. Drawing on the Catholic appendix, he quoted liberally to ground antisemitism as a heresy which was 'the deadly enemy of the Gospel and the Church', one that 'threaten[ed]...to rend in pieces the mystic body of Christ'. In contradistinction to the race theory, which was said to seek destruction of the individual, deny 'humanity as a created unity', and negate human redemption, the Gospel and the Church were said to seek advancement of the God-given rights of man, the unity of all humanity, as well as the inviolable election of Israel.²⁴ Pointing to that election and 'the expectation that it...would settle the fate of the world', he went on to invoke the Catholic appendix again to argue that 'the Church in its confession, if not always in practice, ha[d] maintained its belief in the final and indissoluble election of Israel'.²⁵ The section invoked, however, was fully dependent upon the preceding section which, although not quoted, was assumed as background argument for Israel's inviolable election. Here, in answer to the question 'has not Israel forfeited its original divine election by rejecting its Redeemer?', the case was made that 'even though terrible tribulations must come over Israel...these trials in no way mean that [God] has rejected His people'. Far from any idea of rejection, and in clear refutation that Jews are eternally cursed, the Catholic treatise argued that 'the tribulations signify only [that] God pleads to win His people'.

For this reason one may see in the terrible events in Central Europe since 1933 not only a warning of God to His people, without, however, trying to condone them in the least, but a warning, too, to a Christendom grown indifferent.²⁶

²³ Kohnstamm, 'The Church of Jesus Christ and Antisemitism in the Age of Secularization', 20. The European signatories of 'The Church of Christ and the Jewish Question', later translated as *The Church and The Jews*, included Rev Dr Silverster Braitto, editor of Czech translation of Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*; Very Rev Fr. Superior Charles Devaux, Superior General of Fathers of Our Lady of Zion and editor of *La Question d'Israel*; Rev Cyril Fisher, Austrian priest and author; Stanislaw Fumet, author and president of a French Catholic publishing firm; Very Rev Charles Journet, Rector and Professor of Theological Seminary in Fribourg and later Cardinal; Rev Johannes Kors, Professor of Dogma and Speculative Morals at Catholic University of Nymwegen; Rev Basilium Lang, youth and liturgical leader in Czechoslovakia; Rev Benoit Lavoud, Professor of Moral Theology at University of Fribourg; Dietrich von Hildebrand, Philosopher and Professor of Ethics at University of Munich and then University of Vienna; Jacques Maritain, Professor of Philosophy at Institut Catholique; Eduard Pant, publisher and leader of German Catholics in Poland; Rev Francis Stratmann, author and leader of Catholic peace movement; Rt. Rev Dr Alois Wildenauer, Provost and Canon of St Stephen's Cathedral in

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 18-19, 20, 23 (quoting from 'The Church of Christ and the Jewish Question', 15-16).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 20, 21.

²⁶ 'The Church of Christ and the Jewish Question', 12-13, quoted from English edition.

This argument went on to say that:

No one can approach the Jewish question of our day without disappointment and sorrow that, by and large, Judaism did not see in the persecutions of recent years...a reason for self-examination and conversion to God *and* His anointed.... Unfortunately most of them see in the happenings since 1933 nothing more than a materialistic, nationalistic self-determination. They persist in clinging to a God-forgetting humanitarianism. This, indeed has been encouraged by the attitude of many Christians who have kept silent in the face of injustice; all of this is, humanly speaking, regrettable.²⁷

Such conversionist regret, as well as the context in which it was here packaged, was by no means just a Catholic argument. As evidenced by its appearance at the 1932 constituting assembly of the ICCAJ in London, where Rev J. van Nes explained antisemitism as an anti-Christian phenomenon that was *both* a 'scourge of the Lord to punish [Jews]' and God's promise of punishment to Christians who became involved, such thought was of ecumenical Protestant heritage as well.²⁸ Moreover, although the 'scourge' aspect of this argument was not regularly featured as an explicit showpiece of ICCAJ emphases, such backdrop assumption was never far below the surface and often assumed. Beyond Kohnstamm's implicit agreement by way of stating that antisemitism was being viewed from 'the same exact standpoint' as the Catholic treatise, there were no recorded objections in the conference-wide discussion that followed.²⁹ If there were, in other words, ecumenical Protestant exceptions to the idea that 'the tribulations [of Israel] signify only [that] God pleads to win His people', they were not expressed by some 67 delegates at the Vienna conference during summer 1937.³⁰

What *was* recorded in the conference minutes, however, was Kohnstamm's 'especial attention' to the Roman Catholic 'Memorandum', and his subsequent emphasis that Christians

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 14, italics in original text.

²⁸ J. Van Nes, 'Anti-Semitism on the Continent of Europe', 13-14 June 1932, *prev. cit.*, Chapter II.iii. It should also be noted that not all forms of this argument agreed. Other Catholic and Protestant versions held closer to the ancient form that Jews were under God's curse for the crucifixion. A highly significant version of this argument was published in the U.S. and Great Britain in the same period as the Vienna conference. The volume in which it appeared, *Here Stand I!* by Martin Niemoeller of the Confessing Church, was heralded in *Christian Century* ads as containing sermons that were 'destined to [stand] with the Theses of Martin Luther'. The argument in question was preached in 1935 on the day dedicated 'to the memory of the destruction of Jerusalem and the fate of the Jewish people'. Niemoeller found in Nazi 'Positive Christianity' the same pride and race-consciousness that had caused the Jewish people to become bearers of God's 'curse', alternately described as 'punishment which ha[d] lasted for thousands of years' and 'the unforgiven blood-guilt of its fathers'. The volume was issued as companion to Niemoeller's autobiography, *From U-Boat to Pulpit*, which carried a full length laudatory chapter by Henry Leiper, and both volumes were published in November 1937 after having been widely publicized. See, for example, *Christian Century*, 21 July, 10 November, 16 November 1937. For analysis of the myth of Niemoeller and his widely heralded status as Christian martyr both during and after the war, see Tom Lawson, *The Church of England and the Holocaust: Christianity, Memory and Nazism*, *prev. cit.*, esp. 31-54.

²⁹ The stated purpose of the Catholic appendix, 'The Church of Christ and the Jewish Question', was to 'bring back to mind the teaching of the Church' on the Jewish question, 5.

³⁰ 'The Church of Christ and the Jewish Question', 13.

should seek God-sourced mercy for Jews rather than stressing the consequences of 'His blood be on us and on our children'.³¹ This was a summary way of refuting that Jews were eternally cursed because of their role in the crucifixion, while affirming the infrangible election of Israel on the grounds of God's mercy.³² God's merciful intention for Israel, of course, was viewed as the other bonded side of his missionary command that the Church 'not stop at the boundaries of any people, least of all...that people to which her Lord sends her first of all'.³³ To deny Jews the compound riches of the Church was not only to deny God-given fulfillment to fallen Israel, but to fall prey to the racial 'heresy' that threatened 'to rend in pieces the mystic body of Christ'.³⁴ Efforts to combat that 'heresy' - which were robustly urged in both Kohnstamm's paper and its attendant Catholic appendix - were thus viewed and presented as efforts to defend the Church and Gospel.

While there is no question that both Kohnstamm's study and its appendix were vigorous protests against antisemitism, or that the Catholic treatise was invoked with such assumption and intent, there is also no question that the duty of combating antisemitism, as presented in the ICCAJ study, was bound up with defense, preservation, and advancement of Christianity. This was made transparently clear in the main points of the adopted Vienna conference statement, revealingly entitled 'Anti-Semitism and the Church':

We desire to record our conviction that in contemporary anti-Semitism we face an extraordinary menace against which all Christians must be warned. All forms of hatred and persecution must be deplored by Christians, and their victims must be succoured; but there exists today a type of racial anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic propaganda inspired by hatred of everything springing from Jewish sources; and this creates more crucial issues for Christianity than ordinary outbursts of race feeling. Christian churches must be warned that they cannot be silent in the presence of this propaganda, still less connive at or participate in the extension of its errors and falsehoods, without betraying Christ, undermining the basis of the Church, and incurring the most severe judgment of God.

The Christian Church must let no doubt about its attitude prevail in the eyes of the world. Realizing that enmity to the Jews has now become a cloak for the forces of anti-Christ, and conceals hatred for Christ and His Gospel, the Christian Church must reject anti-Semitism with complete conviction. To realize its true nature and to vindicate its right to the title of the "Body of Christ", the Church must preach the Gospel and open its fellowship to men of all races, including the Jews. Our mission to the Jews cannot consistently be carried on without at the same time combating anti-Semitism among Christians,

³¹ Minutes of Vienna Conference, 12, refers to words attributed to Jews in *Matthew 27:25* and discussed in the Catholic appendix, 12-13.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Kohnstamm, 21-22.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

and giving more tangible evidence than has yet been given of our sympathy with Jews and Hebrew Christians in their present distress.³⁵

This statement was unmistakably claiming that, among forms of persecution and hatred, the one being protested against was the one that created the most crucial issues for *Christianity*. Gathering the threads of what can be viewed as a stipulative definition of antisemitism within the statement is instructive. Cast as it was in the form of a warning, Christians were informed that antisemitism was no ordinary form of racism: it was one 'inspired by hatred of everything springing from Jewish sources'. Antisemitism thus cloaked the anti-Christ, concealed hatred for Christ and the Gospel, and warred against the Church's right to the title 'The Body of Christ'. Reasons given for alerting potential Christian combatants to its dangers were complementary to this understanding, for both silence about and participation in antisemitism were viewed as acts of personal agency in undermining the Church, and both carried the penalty of God's severe judgment. It was also the case that refutation and rejection of antisemitism were seen as acts of preservation and defense of the Church. That vindication against such antisemitic attack on the Church could only be made by 'preach[ing] the Gospel...to men of all races, including the Jews', was a critical part of this refutation.³⁶ But so was the realization that missions to Jews could only be carried out while concurrently combating antisemitism 'among Christians' and 'giving more tangible evidence' of Christian sympathy for the current plight of Jews.

All of this was clear enough, but it was precisely the transparency of this understanding shared by 67 church delegates from 18 countries that is of vital importance here. That this was no behind-doors understanding of antisemitism is highly relevant when viewed through the lens of lingering post-Holocaust questions about the dearth of official Church protests on behalf of Jews during the Hitler years. For here is a clear refutation of antisemitism, but it was made by way of a widely held self-focus on preserving, defending, and advancing the Christian Church. This was not just a matter of racial antisemitism being seen as contrary to Christian faith, but as 'constitut[ing] one of the principal denials in modern life of the Christian doctrine of man'. Nazi antisemitism was thus seen as a fully-felt threat to Christianity per se, and it was fully-felt all the more *the more* it was realized that antisemitism nested 'within the Church, and 'not only in one country'. As set forth in a letter accompanying the Vienna statement to Oxford, the Church was thus faced with the 'appalling situation' that some Christian Churches '[we]re reluctant, or frankly refuse[d], to receive a Jewish convert'. What that meant to ICCAJ was that where such conditions existed, 'the Christian religion had ceased to exist except in vain form'.³⁷

³⁵ Vienna Minutes, Conference Statement on 'Anti-Semitism and the Church' (1937), Paragraphs I and II.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Vienna Conference Letter to the Oxford Conference (1937).

Such emphasis on the dangers of antisemitism *to* the Church rather than to the Jewish world, however, should not be confused with the idea that self-interest was the only interest being expressed at Vienna. The ICCAJ statement went on to say that the 'false teaching' of antisemitism was 'full of potential danger for all mankind'.³⁸ Concerns about antisemitism as expressed in the statement, in other words, were either particularized as concern for Christianity or universalized as concern for the whole of humanity, while concern for Jews, the unequivocal object of antisemitism, was marginalized to that of being a part of humanity. It is also important to clarify the assumed relation between ICCAJ concern for humanity and ICCAJ concern for the Church, for it was uncompromisingly believed that solution to the ills of humanity could only be found in the Christianization of the world. While it may seem incongruent to simultaneously hold that Christianity was endangered by antisemitism, on the one hand, and that it was the only hope for the 'cure' of antisemitism, on the other, it was not. For antisemitism was held to be 'false teaching' that had found its way into the Church from without, existing as an evil *within the Church but not of it*. Within this accepted and promulgated framework of reference, the overriding concern was that antisemitism was striking at the roots of the Church's foundation, and not, as James Parkes argued, that the roots of antisemitism were part of the foundations of the Church.

As an evil from without, the ICCAJ letter from Vienna to the Oxford Conference made clear that 'Anti-Semitism predate[d] Christianity', and that it should not be looked upon as 'a purely Christian phenomenon', even though it was 'aided by false Christian teaching'.³⁹ Such understanding was of course reflective of ICCAJ continuing insistence that current and not historical causes of antisemitism should be the point of focus. A case in point about such emphasis and how it influenced wording of official statements is found within the archives of the Vienna conference. Among those documents are both original and revised statements on antisemitism in Poland and Eastern Europe, both of which contain seven recommendations for Christian response. Two of the recommendations contain revisions, however, which bear significantly on what was being transmitted. For sake of efficiency both versions are shown below by italicizing and placing within square brackets the text that was *removed* from the adopted statement.

[We confer in all humility the failings of our own Churches in the matter of anti-Semitism.] We would stress that an immediate duty rests upon all the

³⁸ Vienna Conference Statement on 'Anti-Semitism and the Church', in regard to the false teachings of racial antisemitism, which were said to 'deny and abrogate various humans rights and privileges with far-reaching repercussions in the relationships between individuals, peoples, and nations', and to 'distort completely all prevailing ethical concepts and principles'.

³⁹ Vienna Conference Letter to Oxford, prev. cit.

religious forces of [*these*] all countries, including auxiliary Church agencies, to allay the present suspicions; to correct the psychological and divisive forces of evil which are now abroad; to unite all in the bonds of the Christian principle "in love serve one another", and to utilize religious education wherever possible towards this end. This duty, while incumbent upon all, rests, we believe, in a special degree upon the State Churches [*of these lands*] concerned with communities that claim the name of being Christian'.⁴⁰

[*While we humbly confess that the chief blame for Anti-Semitism down the ages rests on the Christian Church, yet we cannot close our eyes to the fact that a portion of the blame lies on the Jews.*] In all humility we would urge Jewry to cooperate with us in our effort to combat anti-Semitism by doing its share in removing causes of offense and by working together for conciliation'.⁴¹

Without belabouring the implications of removal of all text that referred to either Christian blame or repentance for Christian failings in the long history of antisemitism, it is of utmost concern that the Vienna conference retained inference (if not claim) that some portion of causal blame for antisemitism belonged to Jews. While this did not make its way into the ICCAJ statement on antisemitism delivered to Oxford, it was entered into the minutes of the conference as an officially adopted statement, and, in that way, was widely circulated to the ecumenical community. It should also be noted that such inference appeared elsewhere in the minutes as well, namely in two separate discussions on antisemitism in Poland where 'Jewish nationalism as opposed to Polish nationalism' was seen as 'a further cause of anti-Semitism'. In the second instance, it was duly recorded that the antisemitic 'situation would be eased if Polish Jews were openly to express their loyalty to Poland as the country of their adoption'.⁴²

While not in any way rescuing the negative patterns of thought being transmitted here, it must not be ignored that conference proceedings were conducted within the general context of advancing Christian love for Jews, and that, within this context, strong calls for Christian action were made. Beyond calls to antisemitic combat in the ICCAJ statement and letter to Oxford, it was made clear that Christian mercy and love must be exercised in dealings with Jews, and that promotion of reconciliation and understanding between Jews and Christians must become a priority on both individual and corporate levels. The ICCAJ study and the adopted conference Statement on Refugees also 'endorse[d] the principle that its first duty [was] towards so-called non-Aryan Christian[s]', and the statement itself called upon churches 'in all lands to share the

⁴⁰ ICCAJ Subcommittee Report on Poland and Eastern Europe, Article 4, written in the context of the first article: 'We believe the Jewish situation in Poland in particular and Eastern Europe in general...raises problems which are a challenge to modern civilization and Christendom such as only international cooperation based upon the principles of Christ can solve.' Whether the revisions took place at the subcommittee or broader conference level is not known. For the full adopted version, see Vienna Conference Minutes, 20-21, WCC.261206.8. For the original version with penciled striking of text, see 'Report of Committee on Poland', WCC.261204.4.

⁴¹ Ibid, Article 5.

⁴² Vienna Conference Minutes, 8-9.

common responsibility' of raising funds for their relief.⁴³ To this was added a Church-wide call to prayer, and tacked onto it were ICCAJ adopted plans to launch a literature campaign against both antisemitic propaganda and antisemitic attitudes within the church.⁴⁴

It is far from clear, however, that protests/calls on behalf of Jews and protests/calls on behalf of the Church are even separable here - which throws us back to Kohnstamm's insistence that the Christian duty of combating antisemitism is *inextricably* linked to the Christian call to Jewish missions. Indeed, it throws us beyond this insistence for according to argumentation, discussion, and statements of this conference, that inextricable link was itself unmistakably connected to defense, preservation, and advancement of the Church. Such conflation of self-interest and benevolence, whether deliberate or not, not only confuses benevolence and self-interest, it masks dissemination of negative ideas with the face of good intention, and it does so to such a degree that even those disseminating such conflation failed to see that what was being transmitted was negative or harmful.

It is thus in no way trivial that all of this was being worked out within the environs of daily opening and closing prayer, nor is it trivial that negative elements of thought about Jews were being transmitted under the auspices of Christian love. Such widespread failure to grasp the transmissible effect that love and good intentions might have on affirming and advancing negative ideas about Jews had marked the ten year trail of ICCAJ resolutions and statements on antisemitism since Budapest and Warsaw. From that head-gate in 1927 to the 1937 conference in Vienna, the moral suasion of such ecumenical concern for Jews had not only worked to self-persuade ICCAJ that its tenets of argumentation about Jews were neither harmful nor negative, the inseparable conflation had worked to convince that its self-interest aspects were uniformly in line with Christian benevolence for Jews. In this penetrating light, it is thus *less* surprising that the Vienna conference 'invite[d] the Oxford Conference to do two things', and two things only:

realizing that the [Oxford] Conference can make its voice heard widely among the churches of all lands, [ICCAJ] begs the Conference to speak out clearly on *the dangers of anti-Semitism to the Church itself* and to recognize openly the total impossibility of a Church tainted with this form of racial absolutism bearing any valid witness to the word of God in the world.⁴⁵

ICCAJ's second request to Oxford had partly to do with protecting the turf that it had so arduously groomed over the ten years of international expatriation on antisemitism since the Budapest-Warsaw conferences. When requesting that the Conference include 'the problem of

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid. For example, Minutes of Vienna Conference, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 23. See also Kohnstamm, 'The Church of Jesus Christ and Antisemitism in the Age of Secularization', 26.

⁴⁵ Vienna Conference Letter to Oxford, prev. cit., italics added.

anti-Semitism' in any post-conference study of 'the great problems that confront[ed] the Church in the modern world', ICCAJ offered its expertise while reiterating that it was already in possession of 'ample material' on antisemitism.⁴⁶ This would have been in no way unexpected, for what had begun in 1935 as ecumenical collaboration in which UCCLW would serve as consultant to ICCAJ had become by 1937 an ecumenical consultation in which ICCAJ was the sole voice on antisemitism to the UCCLW world conference of churches. What this meant in terms of immediate exposure was that the ICCAJ statement on 'Anti-Semitism and the Church', along with its official accompanying letter, would be presented and argued before 425 delegates from 40 countries, as well as a listening audience of 400 associate delegates and 100 delegates from international youth organizations.⁴⁷

II. As a final matter before the ICCAJ statement and letter were delivered to Oxford, two publicity reports about the conference were compiled and circulated in the ten days between adjournment in Vienna and assemblage at Oxford. Both were directed toward the public, both were honed products of ICCAJ's self-professed image, and both emphasized select points on which ICCAJ banked its projected harvest of support. It was also the case that in one area in particular the reporting ran astray from, if not counter to, actual conference proceedings:

...the evidence gathered by the Committee showed that nothing in the spiritual realm was more necessary in the Church today than a great act of solemn contrition for its *past* attitude to the Jews.⁴⁸

Though few in number these words require attention for they suggest a conference emphasis that is not found in a close reading of proceedings and presented papers. While this is not to say that all traces of contrition were missing from the conference, it is to say that the statement was in discrepancy with the recorded proceedings of the conference, and that it ran contrary to the conference's orchestrated focus on present causes rather than on Christian anti-Jewish attitudes of the past. Yet it would be too simple to assume that this statement was the result of intentional falsification. A much more sobering explanation consistent with long-held presumption is that it was not even thought about, much less consciously considered, and that it was a case of reading into the Vienna conference the same self-perception that had been in the making since 1927 when Christian contrition *was* a focus of ICCAJ argumentation.

What *can* be said about intention, however, is that the publicity reports were deliberate in their attempt to sharpen an ICCAJ image, that they were written by a delegate who was

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ J.H. Oldham, *The Oxford Conference Official Report* (Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark & Company, 1937), 3.

⁴⁸ 'The Vienna Conference: The International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jew', WCC.261203, italics added.

assigned that task on the first day of the conference, and that they were constructed as much to persuade as to remit factual information. Kenneth Grubb, an ecumenist who would be named to the Religious Division of the British Ministry of Information in 1939 and serve as Controller of Overseas Propaganda from 1941-1946, was the artificer of the publicity reports.⁴⁹ As a lay principal in the World Dominion Movement, Grubb had been co-opted to ICCAJ committees for its 1935 conference, one of which had set in motion the mandate for the new ICCAJ study on antisemitism.⁵⁰ His co-opting in fact had come on the heels of ICCAJ realization that the written word could be the most effective means to target audiences and dispense its views on antisemitism and the Jewish question. The path of those means, as understood by the time of the Vienna conference, was that 'every cause require[d]...effective propaganda of its interests', but that the propaganda had to aim at presenting 'the cause as a whole'.⁵¹ What Grubb and ICCAJ were aiming for in post-conference publicity was thus advancement of organizational name and purpose through the projected images of conviction, knowledge, capability, and experience in bearing the banner of Church missions to Jews in the face of societal challenges.

In so aiming, however, there were other instances of misleading use of information. Beyond the example given about the statement on contrition, which appeared in the second publicity report, one third of the text in the first report was set off in a manner that implied quotations, and thereby confused interpretative narrative with statements of the conference.⁵² This confusion created by offset text that was proceeded by attributions such as 'the conference says in part' set up not only the potential for, but the actuation of, misleading attributions.⁵³ The second more polished report did away with offset text and concentrated instead on interpretative reporting that painted a picture of the conference as a gathering of men 'whose day-to-day lives were spent in wrestling with human distress and destitution in their bitterest form'.⁵⁴ Much was also made about alleged 'Jewish Christian Collaboration', citing 'outspokenly critical' papers by Jews as evidence of Jewish and Christian cooperation 'in the face of great common menaces'.⁵⁵ But, again, just as the claim about contrition, this was highly misleading because it failed to clarify that the two papers - which were neither presented nor discussed at the conference - had appeared only in pre-conference materials.

⁴⁹ Kenneth Grubb, was president of the Church Missionary Society from 1944-1969, and chairman of the WCC/IMC Commission of the Churches on International Affairs for 23 years, beginning in 1946.

⁵⁰ Minutes of ICCAJ Conference of British and European Sectors, 10-12 July 1935, prev. cit.

⁵¹ Conrad Hoffmann, 'What Shall We Do About Literature?', Vienna Conference, WCC.261203.

⁵² 'Enlarged Committee Meeting of the [ICCAJ]', Vienna, 6 July 1937'.

⁵³ For example, Allan Brockway, 'For the Love of Jews', 41-42, 45, mistakenly identified the publicity reports as one set of 'informal minutes' and, as such, quoted from them as direct assertions by 'Vienna conference members'.

⁵⁴ 'The Vienna Conference: The International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jew', prev. cit.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

The ICCAJ publicity reports also failed to mention highly critical papers by two non-conference Christians, one of which had been submitted by James Parkes.⁵⁶ Although not an invited participant Parkes had been asked to contribute a paper after it had become clear that Oldham had previously requested his input. The solution sought, which was in line with efforts to avoid any focus on the historical causes of antisemitism, was to solicit a paper from Parkes on 'Modern Judaism's Challenge to Christian Theology'. In response, Parkes changed the title to the question 'Where Does Modern Judaism Challenge Christian Theology?', placed the term 'challenge' within double quotes in his opening sentences, and then challenged the idea that conversion of Jews to Christian theology was God's will.⁵⁷ Counter to Hoffmann's efforts to de-emphasize the Christian past, Parkes rooted his argument in the troubled history of Christian-Jewish relations by reminding that Jews had been 'victims of the...Christian majority' since the fourth century and that 'the initiative for the persecution they had suffered had been primarily ...Christian'. Secondly, counter to the traditional notion that Christianity was the completion and fulfillment of Judaism, Parkes argued that Christianity and Judaism were 'in fact complementary historical developments of...common essential truths', and that the 'real relation between the two' was that of 'balancing' their strengths and weaknesses. Last, in answer to the question 'why does Judaism so consistently refuse to accept Jesus as Christ?', Parkes gave the theological answer that 'it has not been the will of God that they should be led to a conversion [based] on abandonment of that half of the truth which is theirs already...'.⁵⁸

ICCAJ's choice to not mention such forceful arguments against its aims and basis, while eagerly alleging that openly expressed differences between Jews and Christians were part of the Vienna conference, is an important illustration of the ICCAJ image that was being projected in these publicity statements. That the latter claim was seen as having great publicity value becomes clear in the publicist's proclamation that the alleged open dialogue between Jews and Christians 'marked a new way forward in the Christian approach to Jewry'. ICCAJ's image of itself, and the one it most wished to imprint upon ecumenical Protestantism, was that it was something distinct from centuries of failed attempts to Christianize Jews and that it possessed the wherewithal to advance both evangelization of Jews and improved Christian-Jewish relations while tackling the international problem of antisemitism. The fact that ICCAJ

⁵⁶ The other Christian paper cast blame on Christianity was a copied essay from an American magazine. In referring to its author, Kohnstamm pointed out that, 'although calling himself a Christian', he described the New Testament as the basis of antisemitism. Kohnstamm went on to say that he hoped to prove him wrong for 'the purging of the New Testament would...be too high a price to pay even for the ultimate overcoming of Antisemitism'. See 'The Church of Jesus Christ and Antisemitism...'. 16.

⁵⁷ Parkes, 'Where Does Modern Judaism Challenge Christian Theology?', WCC.261203. Hoffmann later commissioned a rebuttal to Parkes by ICCAJ member Rev Clephane Macanna on 'The Jewish Challenge to Christian Theology'.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 1, 3, 9; see 7-9 for Parkes's 'historical' answers to why Jews refused to convert.

acknowledged Jewish comments and arguments on these matters by appending their papers to the conference materials was much more important to ICCAJ than the unmentioned fact that those Jews were not present at the conference.⁵⁹ In this same vein of projecting self-image, and as a way of fortifying its request to the Oxford conference that ICCAJ not be overlooked in any post-conference considerations about antisemitism, the same publicity report pointed out that, 'unlike many conferences', ICCAJ had 'its own permanent secretaries and regional groups who [we]re able to take up the matters raised and carry them through to the stage of action'. The report made clear that ICCAJ was capable of locating itself in the centre of problems to be dealt with, just as it had located its conference in Vienna where 'it was in closer touch, so to speak, with the Jewish problems of Poland, Germany and the eastern countries of Europe'.⁶⁰

III. When the UCCLW conference convened ten days after the Vienna conference on 12 July 1937 the official ICCAJ statement and letter were presented by Dr. Walter Horton, a member of the North American sector of ICCAJ. The actual case was argued, however, and by all accounts argued well, by ICCAJ *Ex Officio* William Paton. Before looking at the argument it is important to ground the conference as the successor of the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work held at Stockholm in 1925 under direction of Nathan Soederblom, who received the 1930 Noble Peace Prize for efforts in forging its church-unifying outcome. The first goal of Oxford was thus to demonstrate and advance the ecumenical unification that had already been achieved, and, as such, Oxford was hailed for bringing together delegates from 'all principal [non-Roman Catholic] churches' in Continental Europe, Great Britain, and the United States, as well as South America, Africa, India, China, and Japan.⁶¹ The next stage of unity to be sought was ascertainment of what could realistically be achieved through Soederblom's conception of UCCLW as 'a mouthpiece for Christianity and...the Christian conscience'.⁶²

This did not mean that the Oxford conference was seeking officially adopted reports that could be read as 'unified declarations or decisions', for that was neither the aim nor the outcome of the joint effort. As explained by Henry Leiper and J.H. Oldham, the end reports of the conference were products of collective thinking that had been 'debated at length' before the

⁵⁹ The two papers by Jewish authors that were appended to conference materials were by Charles Singer, 'A Memorandum', and Hans Joachim Schoeps, 'Basic Realities in Judaism', WCC.261203. Singer's 'Memorandum', which was foremost a Jewish plea for Christian help in the refugee crisis, was requested by William Paton. It was later published in an expanded form by the British Christian Council for International Friendship, Life and Work, with a foreword by George Bell, as *The Christian Approach to Jews* (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937).

⁶⁰ 'A Vienna Conference: The International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews', prev. cit.

⁶¹ J.H. Oldham, *The Oxford Conference Official Report*, 2-3. Apart from two abstentions, the Roman Catholic Church and the German Evangelical Church, the Conference was said to be 'representative of present-day Christianity throughout the world'.

⁶² Soederblom, 'The Role of the Church in Promoting Peace', Nobel Lecture, 11 December 1930, prev.cit.

full conference, but no attempt had been made to gain 'unanimous agreement with regard to every word'.⁶³ Delegate votes of adoption meant 'general agreement' with content and form. The significance was not that every dot and tittle were agreed upon but that the reports represented 'what a large body of [diverse] Christians ...were prepared...to say *together*' about societal issues that bore crucially on 'Christian understanding of life'.⁶⁴ What was being agreed upon was thus seen as a firm grasp of Christian truth on basic societal issues 'by the main bodies of disciples', for the purpose of 'defin[ing] the right Christian attitude on th[o]se issues'.⁶⁵

The shaping of what could be said *together* began with identification of issues in plenary sessions of the full conference, followed by daily deliberations at the committee level, where reports were drafted before being debated by the 425 delegates in final plenary sessions. It should be noted, however, that some three years of planning, research, and writing under Oldham's direction had already isolated the contexts in which issues were to be discussed, and it was within those parameters of Church, Community, State, and Nation that issues were isolated, committees assigned, and reports drafted. It should also be recognized that when, on the third day of the conference, Paton presented the ICCAJ issue of antisemitism, the full body of nearly a thousand participants had already heard a 'burning and searching' presentation on the presence of racial discrimination against 'the colored peoples' within Christian churches.⁶⁶ Paton enjoined this issue of general racial discrimination in the churches by drawing attention to 'the terrible relevance of the Jewish problem in the world' and emphasizing that Jewish converts were also objects of the same racial discrimination.⁶⁷ The point being made in both addresses had to do with racial barriers between Christians *and* Christians within the churches, rather than with people of colour or Jewish descent outside the body of Christ. Discrimination within the body of Christ not only eclipsed Christianity's claims of universal acceptance, it emptied them to the point of extinguishing Christianity. Moreover, as Paton argued, it was not only the case that Christianity would be invalidated by an absence of the universalism on which it was founded, it was precisely because of Christianity's divine commission to universalism that the Church was placed on the frontline of battle wherever race or nation were raised as the 'ultimate authority over human life'.⁶⁸

Viewed in this light, and this was indeed the light in which it was viewed at Oxford, antisemitism was weighed and measured as a form of the broader category 'racism', which, as a

⁶³ Henry Leiper, 'Preface to the American Edition', *The Oxford Conference Official Report*, J.H. Oldham (Chicago & New York: Willett, Clark & Company, 1937), x-xi.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Oldham, *The Oxford Conference Official Report*, 16-17, italics in original text, and x- xii.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 22-24, 26.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

whole, was seen as an inherent and destructive enemy of Christianity.⁶⁹ What was deliberated and agreed upon at Oxford constituted a strong ecumenical Protestant refutation of racism in every form, and it is significant that the message emanated from four of the six committee sections as well as from the adopted 'Message from the Oxford Conference to the Christian Churches'. While it was infused throughout the *Official Report* instead of appearing in just one designated statement, there was yet synthesis of thought and principle in what was defined as 'Christian truth concerning race'.⁷⁰ The four points of emphasis can be read as insistence upon the divine gift of race and nations,⁷¹ the Christian commission of universality,⁷² the sins of racial and national pride,⁷³ and Christian duty to be 'the leaven by which Christ transforms society and nations'.⁷⁴ In brief, this entailed that racial distinctions were part of God's plan for enrichment of the world, that all shared alike in God's love, concern, and compassion, and that all were created with the intention of becoming part of the supra-racial fellowship of the Christian church. That there could be no racial barriers, no dividing walls, and no racial limitations *within* churches was at the heart of this message, for not only did such barriers deny the gospel proclamation that was Christianity's 'task and commission', the racial hatred at the root was rebellion against 'the Creator of all peoples and races'.⁷⁵

In terms of Christian responsibility for both the existence of racial problems and the work to be done in repairing them, the list was long. As citizens of society and members of the body of Christ, each Christian was said to bear 'twofold responsibility' for applying Christian principles to racial solutions. In the civic realm, Christians were urged to insure that public policies recognized and protected the value of each human by way of rights to the essential conditions of life, including education, opportunity, and involvement in society. In the spiritual realm, Christians were urged as individuals to cultivate the mind of Christ toward other races,

⁶⁹ Conference statements on racism appear in five sections of *The Oxford Conference Official Report*. 1). 'Message from the Oxford Conference to the Christian Churches' (45-52), 46, hereafter cited as Message. 2). 'Report of Section on Church and Community' (55-66), 'The Church and Race', 60-61, hereafter Report CC. 3). 'Report of Section on Church, Community and State in Relation to Education' (113-150), 'The Church a Supra-racial Fellowship', 116-117, hereafter Report CCSE. 4). 'Report of the Section on the Universal Church and the World of Nations' (151-171), 'The Church and War', 167, and 'The Church's Witness: Removal of Racial Barriers', 167-168, hereafter Report UCN. 5) 'Additional Report of Section on Church and Community' (172-233), 'The Church and Race', 213-218, hereafter Report ACC. This last addendum report was not submitted to the conference but settled at the committee level before becoming part of the *Official Report*. See also 'Report of Section on Church and State' (65-74), 74, and 'Additional Report of Section on Church and State (224-255), 255, both of which renounce 'all forms of persecution, whether by Christians against other Christians or by Christians against adherents of other religions'.

⁷⁰ Report ACC, 213.

⁷¹ Message, 46; Report CC, 60; Report ACC, 214.

⁷² Message, 46; Report CC, 60-61; Report CCSE, 116-117; Report ACC, 213-214.

⁷³ Message, 46; Report CC, 60; Report ACC, 214-215.

⁷⁴ Report CC, 60; Report CCSE, 116-117, 144; Report UCN, 166 and 167; Report ACC, 215-217.

⁷⁵ Respectively, Report CC, 60-61; Message, 46.

while joining with the church corporately to 'set its face implacably [against racism]'. Weighing heavily on these principles for shaping mind and action was the need for the church to call its members to confession. Pointing out not once but multiple times that guilt had to be addressed, it was made clear that Christians must 1) 'confess their share in the common guilt of mankind' for any pride of race or nation that created or embittered past wars, and 2) recognize that 'individual Christians and their churches bear a heavy guilt' for their part in the racial situations of the present.⁷⁶

It is significant that it was here, within the proximal context of this specific type of guilt, that the only two references to antisemitism per se appeared in the reports. That is not to say that guilt for the present situation was the only context in which antisemitism was discussed, for whenever speaking of past or present racial problems in *The Official Report* it was always within the broader context of racism's challenge to the Church Universal.⁷⁷ As such, the explicit statements on antisemitism, like the broader statements on racism, were related to doctrinal issues bearing upon the witness of the church. The first was placed within the subheading 'Removal of Racial Barriers':

The church dishonors its claim to ecumenical reality if it allows, even under the pressure of situations of great and genuine difficulty, the presence of racial barriers within it. We call attention here to the acceptance of the color bar in certain churches and to the more widely diffused and less acknowledged evil of anti-Semitism, whereby not only have terrible sufferings been imposed upon the Jews by states historically Christian, but membership within the church denied or made difficult to those of the race to which our Lord belonged after the flesh.⁷⁸

The second mention of antisemitism, though less explicit about racism's harm to Christianity's claims, followed in intent after attention had been paid to the Church commission 'to call all men into...a divine society that transcend[ed] all national and racial limitations and divisions'. It should also be noted that this particular statement appeared in an addendum report that had been resolved at the committee level rather than being discussed and debated in the full plenary session, which means that it had limited exposure until the *Official Report* was issued. The statement appeared in the 'Additional Report of the Section on Church and Community' as item four in an inter-related list of areas in which Christians had 'greatest obligation and opportunity', and it directed attention to the duty of being divinely called, *as the church, to stand and speak*:

⁷⁶ Report UCN, 166; Report ACC, 215-216.

⁷⁷ Report UCN, 167.

⁷⁸ Report UCN, 167-168. Paton, Visser't Hooft, Cavert, Henriod, Leiper, Basil Mathews, Adolf Keller, and Walter Horton were among delegates who formulated this report.

...against racial pride, racial hatreds and persecutions and exploitation of other races in all their forms', the church is called by God to set its face implacably and to utter its word unequivocally both within and without its own borders. There is special need at this time that the church throughout the world bring every resource at its command against the sin of anti-Semitism.⁷⁹

It is necessary to grasp what was being said here, for the sum of this thought as it appeared in the *Official Report* would be called upon by ecumenical leaders throughout the remainder of the Hitler years. A first point of note is that there was no discernible word or thought in any of the statements which suggested that antisemitism had relation to Christianity other than being a species of racism. Antisemitism was seen solely as a form of racism which maligned Christian truth, and not, as James Parkes argued, a set of anti-Jewish ideas rooted in Christian doctrine on to which tenets of Nazi racism were later attached. Antisemitism, as a form of racism, was thus held to be simultaneously destructive to both its racial object and the Church. While this is not to demean in any way stated concerns about antisemitism's obvious object, it is to point out that in a very real sense lines were blurred between stated concerns about racial objects and stated concerns about racism's danger to the universal commission of Christianity. The principle being defended was not that all men and all races were part of a common humanity, or that all were created as equal parts of a common humanity, but that all men and all races were created as equal parts of a common humanity that was called to come together in universal Christianity. The difference is subtle but critical. Even though there was no direct reference to evangelization of Jews per se in the Oxford materials, there was no refutation of it either in the overarching theme that racism denied God's commission to evangelize all men of all races. To hate, persecute, or exclude on the basis of race was rebellion against both God and God's divine commission, and, as such, it heaped damage on not only the Church witness to the gospel but to the gathering of its fruit as well. Moreover, as made clear in the statement on antisemitism by the Committee on the Universal Church and World Nations, antisemitism, as a form of racism, decried the very 'ecumenical reality' of the universal commission of the church for which the Oxford Conference had convened to advance.⁸⁰ It must also be pointed out that in all adopted findings delivered to the churches as a grasp of Christian truth on antisemitism, the Oxford Conference had done exactly what the ICCAJ had 'begged' it to do: namely, 'to speak out clearly on the dangers of anti-Semitism to the Church itself and recognize openly the total impossibility of a Church tainted with this form of racial absolutism bearing any valid witness to the world of God in the world.'⁸¹

⁷⁹ Report ACC, 217-218.

⁸⁰ Report UCN, 167-168.

⁸¹ ICCAJ Vienna Conference Letter to UCCLW Conference at Oxford, prev. cit.

IV. Perhaps even more critical to future ICCAJ advancement were the new cross-linked relations which resulted from the restructuring of the ecumenical movement at Oxford. It was unanimously agreed there that the two major ecumenical bodies representative of Christendom's non-Roman Catholic churches - the Universal Christian Council of Life and Work (UCCLW) and the World Conference on Faith and Order (WCFO) - would be joined into one body to 'facilitate more effective action of the Christian church in the modern world'.⁸² Nine days after the Oxford conference, WCFO gave its own official seal at its Edinburgh conference. The subsequent constitutional drafting of the new ecumenical body in May 1938 at Utrecht created the Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches in Formation (WCCIF) which was to be based in Geneva.⁸³ To put this restructuring in practical terms, there was a moving of the same ecumenical leaders into more complex and cross-linked roles with a significant shift in general secretariat power. Prior to Oxford, Henry Louis Henriod had been general secretary of both UCCLW and the World Alliance, Willem Visser't Hooft had been general secretary of WSCF, and William Paton had been general secretary of IMC and key *Ex Officio* of ICCAJ. After reorganization, Henriod was left with the World Alliance; Visser't Hooft was in charge of the general secretariat of the new WCCIF; and Paton was part-time general secretary of WCCIF as well as general secretary of IMC and *Ex Officio* of ICCAJ. The link between Paton and Visser't Hooft was extended in December 1938 when IMC and WCCIF took a first step toward establishing closer relations in matters of mutual concern. The following month Paton was appointed secretary of a new Joint Committee of WCCIF and IMC under the chairmanship of John Mott, who was also one of three vice-chairmen of WCCIF as well as chair of IMC and *Ex Officio* of ICCAJ.⁸⁴ Although Paton remained based in London, and Visser't Hooft in Geneva, this set of cross-linked roles resulted in a mutually dependent, and powerful, relationship involving constant communication

⁸² The move toward ecumenical unification had begun under initiative of William Adams Brown in January 1933, the plans of which culminated in a May 1933 meeting at York with key ecumenists Temple, Paton, Cavert, Oldham, Visser't Hooft, Henriod, and Bishop Ammundsen. A series of small but pivotal international meetings followed and by fall 1936 the Committee of Thirty-Five had been formed to assess both the progress of the ecumenical movement and its future. At the 1937 Oxford conference the Committee of Thirty-Five recommended and the conference accepted the adoption of a proposal to join into one body the two ecumenical organizations principally representative of the churches. Members of that group who were directly involved with ICCAJ were Mott, Paton, Oldham, and Cavert (who coined the name for the new WCC). Other members included Henriod, Brown, Bell, and Visser't Hooft. See 'Report of the Committee of Thirty-Five', Appendix B, *The Oxford Conference Official Report*, 261-267.

⁸³ After the Oxford and Edinburgh conferences, appointees from UCCLW and WCFO constituted a Committee of Fourteen under the chairmanship of Temple; Mott, Oldham, and Brown were among the seven representing Oxford. In May 1938 the group and its solicited advisors met at Utrecht to formalize plans and draft the WCCIF constitution, which received final approval by WCFO in September 1938.

⁸⁴ William Temple, Archbishop of York, was installed as Chairman of WCCIF, with John Mott, Marc Boegner (President of the French Protestant Federation of Churches) and Greek Orthodox Archbishop Germanos as Vice-Chairmen. Henry Leiper was appointed as an associate secretary to Visser't Hooft and Paton, whose main responsibilities lay in America. Both Samuel Cavert and Wm. Adams Brown were made members of the WCCIF Provisional Committee.

between the two offices until Paton's death in 1943. What this meant for WCCIF was that it was never far from Paton's emphasis on the Christian duty to evangelize the world, and what it meant for IMC and ICCAJ was that it was drawn more and more into Visser't Hooft's concerns and decisions about advancement of WCCIF as the ecumenical reality of the universal Church.

Beyond Paton's central positioning in this new structure of the ecumenical movement, he had by May 1938 inadvertently become central to the operations of ICCAJ itself. In fall 1936 Hoffmann had received an invitation to head the Department of Jewish Evangelization under the Board of National Missions for the Presbyterian Church USA. The plan entailed that he would, after September 1937, retain title as director of ICCAJ but spend only three months a year on ICCAJ business in Europe. Paton had subsequently nominated Dr. Erwin Reisner, an Austrian-German member of the Confessing Church, to bridge the nine-month gap as associate director, and the Vienna Conference had approved him for a one year term while re-electing Hoffmann as executive director. This was not to be just the sharing of one office, however, for Reisner's work in part was to launch a major change within ICCAJ structure. Concomitant with his appointment was the creation of an International Committee on Jewish Missions Literature, whose main centre was to be in Vienna, with field offices in New York, London, and Palestine. The aim of the expansion was for Vienna to become the centre of European work, and to do so in cooperation with Hans Kosmala's Vienna-based Institutum Delitzschianum. As part of the initiative it was agreed at the Vienna Conference that ICCAJ would officially commend the Delitzschianum as an 'institution suited for advanced and specialized training' of missionaries to Jews. To ensure continuity, Kosmala was appointed to serve under Reisner on the new international literature committee, as was (by December 1937) Kenneth Grubb, whose work was based in London. In turn, Kosmala, Paton, and Hoffmann were appointed to Grubb's advisory committee for his 'World Survey on Jewry and the Church', which was to be published in 1939.⁸⁵

All of these plans began to unravel in March 1938 when Hitler annexed Austria into the German Reich and Jews were rapidly and systematically excluded under a *Judenfrei* policy. As early as May the relocation of the Delitzschianum from Vienna to London was being considered and by September it was clear that Kosmala would indeed transfer the Institute. It had also become clear that Reisner would not be able to continue the ICCAJ work in Vienna, having

⁸⁵ NAICCAJ Minutes, 29 September 1936, WCC.261207.2; Paton to Kohnstamm, 23 October 1936, WCC.261203.8; Minutes of the Vienna Conference (July 1937), 11, 14, WCC.261206; BICCAJ Minutes, 16 September 1937, WCC.261229; Literature Committee Minutes, 3 August 1938, WCC.261207.4; Preliminary Report by Conrad Hoffmann, 21 September 1938, WCC.261201.4; BICCAJ Minutes, 6 February 1939, WCC.261207.7; Minutes of ICCAJ British and European Sectors, 21 September 1938, WCC.261203.

been arrested by the Gestapo and ordered to cease all activities.⁸⁶ What this meant by fall of 1938 was not only that Vienna would not be the centre of ICCAJ European efforts but, also, that ICCAJ had no associate director. What it meant for Paton in London, given that Hoffmann would only be working for ICCAJ three months of the year, was that he had been fortuitously moved front and centre of ICCAJ's European planning and development.⁸⁷

The other major sea change that shaped the roles both Paton and ICCAJ would play in the new ecumenical structure had begun to form in the wake of the Evian Conference called by President Roosevelt after the German *Anschluss*. While delegates from thirty-two nations were gathering in France in July to address government concerns about the mounting refugee problem, Hoffmann had been making his way through what he described as a nightmare of non-Aryan 'woe and torture of soul' in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. His series of six well-circulated ecumenical reports between early August and late October made clear that what he had seen had nullified 'the marvellous achievements of the Hitler regime', and he now defied anyone to witness what he had seen 'and not come away haunted'.⁸⁸ The swelling problem for the Church, in Hoffmann's assessment, was twofold: non-Aryans, 'whether Jewish or Christian in faith', [were] slowly but surely and inexorably being annihilated', on the one hand, and, 'everywhere', meaning Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, 'the Church [was] involved in anti-Semitism', on the other.⁸⁹ The primary burden bearing on the Church to fight antisemitism while aiding and caring for its own refugees was, according to Hoffmann, outside the burden bound up in the hopes of Evian. 'Unless the Church s[poke] out boldly and act[ed] accordingly with reference to th[is] whole problem of the Jew, it w[ould] seriously weaken its witness of Christ to the world, as well as its Christian calling'.⁹⁰ The denouement of these obviously grieved reports, which were yet marked by ICCAJ conversionist thinking, was Hoffmann's pressing sense that he was being called to hands-on work in the

⁸⁶ Both Reisner and Kosmala were Germans, but not of Jewish origin. Kosmala's cause was taken up by missionary concerns in London, and Reisner continued to be supported by ICCAJ through March 1939.

⁸⁷ BICCAJ Minutes, 2 May 1938, WCC.271207.5; Minutes of ICCAJ British and European Sectors, 21 September 1938, WCC.261203; Circular letter to ICCAJ with 'Statement on Dr. Reisner's Situation Since 21 September 1938', WCC.261207.7.

⁸⁸ Conrad Hoffmann, 'Strictly Private and Confidential' Report, 5 August 1938 and ICCAJ Report, 15 October 1938, WCC.261201.4 for quotations. See also 'Preliminary Report', 21 September 1938, WCC.261201.4; recorded report in ICCAJ Minutes, British and European Sections, 21 September 1938, 261203; 'A Plan for German Refugee Relief', 15 October 1938, 261207.6; 'Homeward bound' letter to ICCAJ, 23 October 1938, 261207.5

⁸⁹ Hoffmann, 5 August 1938, 1; 15 October 1938, 10; prev. cit.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 15 October, 10-11. For other examples of the conversionist thinking associated with plans to aid refugees, see, for instance, Hoffmann to ICCAJ, 23 October 1938: 'Our opportunities are limitless. A Christian witness to distressed Jewry now, in the manner of the Good Samaritan may be used of God for a convincing revelation to Jewry of the redeeming love of Christ'. See also ICCAJ Subcommittee Statement, 16 Dec 1938: 'Unless the Christian Church responds to Jewish need at this hour its mission to the Jew is in peril of failure'. Both can be found at WCC.261207.5.

European refugee fields to implement the centralized agency for non-Aryan Christian refugees that he was urging Christendom to establish.

In order to grasp the organizational changes that ensued thereafter it is necessary to turn back to April 1933 when Adolf Keller posed suggestions which initiated the earliest ecumenical efforts on behalf of refugees.⁹¹ It will be remembered that his Central Bureau for Inter-Church Aide shared offices and worked in conjunction with the UCCLW in Geneva. By fall 1933 the UCCLW had empowered a task-driven committee to be formed on behalf of refugee 'Christians of Jewish descent', of which Keller was a part.⁹² From its formation in 1934 the intent of the International Christian Committee for Refugees (ICCR) was to 'stimulate' church contributions that would be distributed through agencies approved by the High Commission on Refugees, 'with special interest for Hebrew Christians'.⁹³ By the time UCCLW was subsumed by WCCIF in May 1938, the ICCR, chaired by George Bell and known as the 'London Committee', had four joint presidents from England, Yugoslavia, France, and Sweden, of which Bell was one, as well as thirteen national appeal or cooperating committees from nine western nations.⁹⁴ ICCAJ was well-represented within this structure, with one member serving on its executive committee and three others on the cooperating committees of Sweden, Scotland, and England. Moreover, Hoffmann had made himself known within these circles as a willing and able ecumenical authority on the Christian non-Aryan refugee situation.

Responses to Hoffmann's series of widely circulated 1938 reports, as fitted into this history, developed along two separate lines. On 21 September in London the British and European sections of ICCAJ unanimously resolved to urge the Presbyterian Board of National Missions in America to release Hoffmann for what was yet an undefined work in Europe on behalf of non-Aryan Christian refugees.⁹⁵ The following day in Geneva an informal committee made up of Keller, Henriod, and Visser't Hooft was created as a working subcommittee of the ICCR for the specific purpose of aiding non-Aryan Christian refugee pastors and theology students, with the idea that 'assistance and advice' should be obtained from Hoffmann'.⁹⁶ Six weeks later Visser't Hooft witnessed firsthand the violence against Jews that would come to be

⁹¹ Adolf Keller to Henry Leiper, 20 April 1933, WCC.301.4317.2.

⁹² UCCLW Minutes of Executive Committee, 9-12 September 1933, Novi Sad, 37, *prev.cit.*

⁹³ H.L. Henriod to William Paton, 8 February 1934, WCC.261142.

⁹⁴ International Committee for German Refugees, with addresses, n.d., WCC.301.4329.4. The other three presidents of ICCR were Most Rev Archbishop Eidem, Sweden; Rt. Rev Bishop Iriney, Novi Sad, Yugoslavia; and Pasteur Marc Boegner, French Protestant Federation of Churches. Executive committee members included Kenneth Grubb, Henry Louis Henriod, and Adolf Keller. Cooperating Committee chairmen who were members of ICCAJ were Rev Birger Pernow, Sweden; Rev W.W. Simpson, England; and Rev Clephane Macanna, Scotland.

⁹⁵ Joint ICCAJ Minutes of British and European Sections, 21 September 1938 WCC.261203. 4; Conrad Hoffmann to ICCAJ, 23 October 1938, and ICCAJ Subcommittee Statement, 16 Dec 1938, 261207.5.

⁹⁶ Aide Memoire on Non-Aryan Pastors and Theology Students, 22 September 1938, WCC.301.4330.

known as *Kristallnacht*, and, in response, members of the Geneva committee issued a statement that called upon but did not elaborate the ecumenical position on antisemitism arrived at in earlier statements. While more will be said about this in the concluding section of the chapter, the point to be made here is that the *Kristallnacht* violence was viewed as a climaxing event to persecutions ensuing since the Aryan laws were enacted, and it would be viewed thereafter as the key event that had turned ecumenical concerns into WCCIF action. By early December the informal committee was referring to itself as the Geneva Ecumenical Committee on Aid to Non-Aryan Christians, and, by January 1939 increasing numbers and needs of non-Aryan Christians had made it clear that its work could not be limited to non-Aryan Christian clergy. Decision and plans were made by the Provisional Committee of the WCCIF to establish a coordinating office to deal specifically 'with Christian refugee work on behalf of the ecumenical movement', and before April's end a letter outlining its functions, location, and auspices had been issued to ecumenical organizations and churches.⁹⁷ It was to be directed by both Paton and Visser't Hooft under auspices of WCCIF, located in London at Bloomsbury House,⁹⁸ and it was to work in close association with the ICCR, which had also been brought under auspices of the WCCIF for 'sake of unity of action and authority with the respective Churches'.⁹⁹

Hoffmann's name as chief officer of the new WCCIF refugee enterprise did not become a matter of emphasis until mid-April 1939, and, indeed, the idea of a chief officer was not raised until discussions with the High Commissioner for Refugees revealed a flaw in WCCIF plans. The original idea involved only a secretary to carry out the day to day work, and the man who had been chosen by virtue of availability and talents was Adolf Freudenberg, a 45-year-old German doctor of law and former official in the German Foreign Office, who later became a pastor in the Confessing Church.¹⁰⁰ High Commissioner Sir Herbert Emerson and his Deputy,

⁹⁷ Aide Memoire from Geneva Ecumenical Committee on Aid to Non-Aryan Christians, 6-8 December 1938; Confidential Aide Memoire from Geneva Ecumenical Committee on Aid to on Aid to Non-Aryan Christians, 11 January 1939; Confidential Aide Memoire on Geneva Ecumenical Committee on Help to Churches in Czechoslovakia, WCC.301.4330.1.

⁹⁸ Bloomsbury House in London had been the central headquarters of refugee relief organizations since January 1939, including the Jewish Refugee Committee (1933), the Central Council for Jewish Refugees (1933), the Germany Emergency Committee of the Society of Friends (1933), the Church of England Committee for Non-Aryan Christians (1937), the Christian Council for Refugees from Germany and Central Europe (1938), as well as the Central Committee for Refugees, headed by the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

⁹⁹ Aide Memoire from Geneva Ecumenical Committee on Aid to Non-Aryan Christians, 20 March 1939, WCC.301.4330.1; Paton to Under Secretary of State, Home Office, 3 April 1939, WCC.261244; Adolf Freudenberg to Paton, 3 April 1939; Freudenberg to Paton, with final draft of circular letter to ecumenical organizations, 18 April 1939; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 18 April 1939; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 19 April, 1939, WCC.261142.

¹⁰⁰ Dr. Adolf Freudenberg had been hired to work with British refugee organizations by the Swiss Committee for Evangelical Non-Aryan Refugees, of which Keller was part, and the initial idea in January 1939 was for him to also represent the WCCIF Provisional Committee and the World Alliance.

Dr. Gustave Kullmann, however, urged that a German should not be sole representative of international ecumenical work. In the process of arguing that a German could be used if the ecumenical office was headed by an acceptable non-German, Emerson urged the appointment of the former Secretary of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, who had a history of diplomatic service and was currently dealing with refugee questions at the Home Office in London. Bell was convinced that the candidate was sound and Paton was impressed by his credentials but, for reasons discussed only in conversation and not in writing, the candidate's name was withdrawn shortly before Hoffmann's was raised. It was George Bell, in fact, who put forth Hoffmann's name but, once done, Paton took the lead even before Hoffmann was informed he was being considered.¹⁰¹ Paton made plain that he knew 'very well the defects of Hoffmann', which he described as 'defects of his qualities'. He had enthusiasm, energy, and passion, and 'sometimes plunge[d]...when a more discreet man would take a different line', but he was 'red-hot about the Jewish question' and had been 'deep in this refugee business since the beginning of the Hitler regime'.¹⁰² When Kullmann urged that Hoffmann's 'missionary cause among the Jews would make his relationship with Jewish organizations impossible', Paton was undeterred in his insistence that Hoffmann would work mainly in the interests of Christian non-Aryans, arguing additionally that he had a unique ability to 'hold the affection of Jews while making no secret of his evangelistic position'.¹⁰³ When Hoffmann returned to London in early May 1939 with news that Americans were still not warming to his release for refugee work in Europe, Paton still persisted. On 1 June, by which time invitation from WCCIF in Geneva had been issued to Hoffmann, Paton gained a second unanimous backing of the British and European sectors of ICCAJ, on the grounds that Hoffmann would not only guard 'interests of Christian non-Aryans from the refugee angle, but would be active in planning for the[ir] spiritual and religious life' as well.¹⁰⁴

The broader next step was a collaborative meeting wherein the WCCIF, the ICCAJ, and associated ecumenical and refugee figures were called to openly exchange views about the proposed appointment. By 12 June invitations were being issued for a meeting in London on 3 August but, at the request of Visser't Hooft in Geneva, Paton was overseeing compilation of the

¹⁰¹ Aide Memoire from Geneva Ecumenical Committee on Aid to Non-Aryan Christians, 18 February 1939, WCC. 301.4330.1; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 27 February 1939, WCC.261142.8; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 3 March 1939, WCC.261142; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 11 March 1939; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 13 March 1939, WCC.261142.1.

Bell to Paton, 13 April 1939; Paton to Visser't Hooft via D.H.Standley, with copy of Bell's letter, 14 April 1939, 261142.

¹⁰² Paton to Visser't Hooft, 18 April 1939, WCC.261142.

¹⁰³ Paton to Bell, 9 May 1939, WCC.261142.

¹⁰⁴ 'Private Circulation' Minutes of the ICCAJ, British and European Sections, 1-2 June 1939, WCC. 261213.3.

list so that the 'right people' were invited. When the meeting convened Paton presided over a group of twenty-two from Switzerland, Germany, Scotland, England, Ireland, Canada and the U.S., which included Bell, Henriod, and Leiper - all members of the Provisional Committee of WCCIF.¹⁰⁵ Leiper was there to protect American as well as WCCIF interests, however, and he cautioned his European colleagues to *not* 'take too much of Dr Hoffmann's time from work in [America]'.¹⁰⁶ A matter of concern, known and respected going into the August 1938 meeting, was that America's role in the overall Jewish refugee problem was crucial and that Hoffmann was needed there. The U.S. was not only one of the largest refugee-receiving countries, it also bordered on Central and South America which constituted another large refugee-absorption centre. Given that North America assumed full mission responsibility for itself as well as for its southern neighbours, the fact that there were only two Protestant missionaries to Jews on the South American continent presented problems associated with missionary following of refugees into areas of emigration. There was also a problem of permanent *versus* transient refugees, the former of which were thought to be the type in North America as opposed to the more transient refugees on the Continent, and that was creating long-term refugee and mission problems for the U.S. Finally, there was the related problem of increasing antisemitism in America which, by virtue of being a pre-eminent aspect of Christian missions to Jews, had to be combated as well.¹⁰⁷

With expressed understanding and sympathy for American concerns, Bell yet reasoned that 'the major point was that Christian non-Aryans were in need of a whole time ambassador'. Paton seconded Bell by arguing that a full address of the refugee situation by WCCIF would by necessity include 'the American side of the problem'.¹⁰⁸ He also made clear that approval and financial backing had already been obtained from IMC for the annual quarter of Hoffmann's salary, and that waiting in the wings were 'organisations in Great Britain and Europe [who] would be willing to pay for his salary and expenses' if America should release him for work on the continent.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, by way of sealing the WCCIF invitation to Hoffmann, Paton had obtained what was seen as most 'essential' to the whole effort, namely that Hoffmann would be

¹⁰⁵ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 12 June 1939; Paton to Bell, 28 July 1939, WCC.261142 and 310008. Other members of the consultative group included Adolph Freudenberg, Hans Kosmala, Kenneth Grubb, Heinrich Grueber, Bertha Bracey (Germany Emergency Committee), Canon Cross from Dublin, and a range of ICCAJ members and associates.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., Minutes, Special Meeting of ICCAJ, 3 August 1939, 2.

¹⁰⁷ Paton to Bell, 9 May 1939, WCC.261142; Minutes ICCAJ British and European Sections, 1-2 June 1939, 3-4, WCC.261213.3;

¹⁰⁸ Minutes, Special Meeting of ICCAJ, 3 August 1939; Memorandum on Invitation of Dr Conrad Hoffmann to Give Wider Help in Connection with Christian non-Aryan Refugees, 3 August 1938, WCC.261207; Minute of ICCAJ Resolution, 3 August 1939, and Paton to Visser't Hooft, 9 August 1939, WCC.261143.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

'known' as having the support of church leaders, which Paton assured could 'certainly be secured by World Council officers'. The collaborative consensus of the group was thus to request that American interests release Hoffmann to WCCIF for a 'minimum of six months', and to do so by way of joint appeal from WCCIF and ICCAJ, the letters for which had been issued by 9 August 1939.¹¹⁰

The whole arduously-devised plan was turned upside on 1 September when Hitler invaded Poland from the west and sixteen days later Stalin invaded from the east. 'Who could have conceived', Hoffmann asked from America on 19 September, 'of the German-Russian alliance, the Russian-Japanese appeasement, the carving up of Poland between Germany and Russia?'¹¹¹ By the time he had written it had become clear to all concerned in London, Geneva, and New York that the refugee plan as devised was now unworkable. When England and France declared war on Germany on 3 September, Freudenberg, who was in Switzerland, was unable to return to London and, as a German, it was not expected that he would be allowed to re-enter Britain. The forming plan was that Freudenberg would work from Geneva, Paton would do what was needed in London, and Hoffmann would remain at his present work in America to facilitate help in critical ways. Both Paton and Visser't Hooft believed that America's role in the refugee problem was more 'necessary than ever', and Hoffmann was being asked to orchestrate efforts that would relieve the burden of European neutral countries in both the numbers of refugees being absorbed and the costs to absorb them. The request, in other words, was for him to raise American dollars and to do what he could to influence an increase in allotted numbers of refugees to America.

By early October, Hoffmann was also being asked by Visser't Hooft to act as consultant to Freudenberg, who was by this time working from the WCCIF Geneva office. Both Paton and Visser't Hooft remained joint directors of refugee efforts for the present even though daily oversight had been transferred to Visser't Hooft in Geneva.¹¹² An emergency committee had been formed by Visser't Hooft, Keller, Henriod, and other Swiss ecumenists, and it in turn had been merged with the existing WCCIF Subcommittee on Refugees, under which the WCCIF Office for Refugee Work would function. General Secretaries of the WCCIF (Visser't Hooft),

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Hoffmann to Paton, 19 September 1939, WCC.261143.

¹¹² Paton to Visser't Hooft, 4 September 1939; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 6 September 1939, WCC.261143; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 7 September, Paton to Visser't Hooft, 13 September, Paton to Visser't Hooft, 15 September 1939, WCC.261142.9. Paton to Hoffmann, 18 September; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 19 September; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 25 September; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 2 October 1939, WCC.261143. Visser't Hooft to Hoffmann, 8 October 1939, WCC. 420038.1; Freudenberg to Paton, 3 November 1939, WCC.261144.7; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 24 November 1939, and Freudenberg to Hoffmann, 4 November 1939, WCC.261143; Hoffmann to Visser't Hooft, 10 November 1939, WCC.420038.1.

World Alliance (Henriod), the Central Bureau for Inter-Church Aide (Keller), World Student Christian Federation (Robert Mackie), and World's Alliance of YMCA's (Tracy Strong) had also come together to form an Emergency Committee of Christian Organizations (ECCO) to coordinate ecumenical bodies involved in emergency war needs. From this point forward the ecumenical emphasis on Christian non-Aryan refugees that had occupied ICCAJ and WCCIF since fall 1938 would be shared by concern for prisoners of war and interned civilians. Indeed, as early as 12 September Paton was speaking of POWs and internees in terms of being 'the biggest business' of war-time activities, and five days later, in a letter to Leiper which outlined WCCIF's war-plans, POWs dominated Visser't Hooft's text to such an extent that there was no mention of refugees at all. By late November, soon after the World YMCA had been granted permission from British, French, and German governments to organize ecumenical POW work, Visser't Hooft, in consultation with the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, had formulated plans for a WCCIF Commission for Chaplaincy Service to Prisoners of War. What this meant for WCCIF Christian non-Aryan refugee work - which had just been up and running for five months when war broke out - was that it would not be the sole focus of relief concerns, and that it would be in constant competition for Christian funding, the majority of which, it was agreed by all, would have to come from America.¹¹³

V. Between 1937 and 1939 the ecumenical movement had undergone striking changes. The restructuring of its central bodies into the WCCIF, the restructuring of aims and leadership of ICCAJ, and WCCIF's centralization of joint ecumenical efforts on behalf of non-Aryan Christian refugees had all coincided as concomitant developments that were affected by the accelerating aggressions of Nazi Germany. Efforts and planning in all three areas had moved through rapidly changing stages, each of which had been spurred by one Nazi aggression after another, starting with the March 1938 annexation of Austria and its exacerbation of the refugee problem. One of the most significant developments resulting from this interplay was the internal background tension surrounding WCCIF attempts to manifest as Christian witness in the face of the antisemitic aggressions creating the refugee problem. Indeed, the question articulated as principle concern of the Oxford conference that launched the WCCIF - what can the churches say *together?* - resonated throughout the first year of WCCIF existence, and running parallel to it were the questions of what to say officially and when to say it. The first opportunity presented

¹¹³ Confidential 'Policy of the Provisional Committee in Time of War', 4 September 1939, WCC. 261142.9; Tracy Strong to John R. Mott, 6 September, WCC.420077; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 12 September, WCC.261142; Bell to Visser't Hooft, 16 September, WCC.420077; Visser't Hooft to Leiper, 17 September, WCC.301008.4; Tracy Strong to John R. Mott, 18 October, WCC.420057; Mott to Visser't Hooft, 23 October, WCC.420057; Visser't Hooft to Officers of WCCIF, 23 November, WCC.420077; Temple to Visser't Hooft, 4 December 1939, WCC. 420077.

itself just weeks after the September 1938 ratification of the WCCIF constitution, when in Germany on 9-10 November thousands of Jewish businesses were destroyed or damaged in Germany, synagogues were desecrated and burned, and tens of thousands of Jewish men were incarcerated in concentration camps. Visser't Hooft was in Germany at the time and, as noted previously, he witnessed the violence. Six days later on 16 November Visser't Hooft, as general secretary of WCCIF, Keller, as director of Central Office for Inter-Church Aid, and Henriod, as general secretary of the World Alliance, issued a joint ecumenical statement by way of a published letter in the *International Christian Press and Information Service*. It was written in the form of a letter which began with 'Dear Sir':

At the moment when the terrible persecution of the Jewish population in Germany and in other Central European countries has come to a violent climax, it is our duty to remind ourselves of the stand which we have taken as an oecumenical movement against anti-semitism in all its forms.¹¹⁴

It is important to note that there was no mention of the persecution being a state-sanctioned pogrom which occurred against a background of German church silence. There was no direct criticism, in other words, of either perpetrator state-agents or church-bystanders, even though all were aware of the problem of German church silence.¹¹⁵ This joint letter followed a measured line of remaining non-political, non-explicit, and non-condemnatory, while referring to other channels to condemn the racial policies of the Nazi state. More precisely, it referred to three earlier ecumenical statements - one of which had emanated from Oxford - which were said to 'have unequivocally expressed the Christian attitude'.¹¹⁶ The statements that were *not* pointed to are as revealing as those that were, however, for there was no mention of the compromised resolutions by UCCLW in May and September of 1933 which elected for ecumenical unity rather than condemnation in any form. The statement of 1933 that *was* referred to was that of the executive committee of the World Alliance, which had convened just three days after the UCCLW meeting at Novi Sad, with Henriod (general secretary of both organizations) and many of the same ecumenical figures in attendance. The prevailing difference between the statement-making aims of UCCLW and the World Alliance, as gleaned from Leiper's reports, was that the WA, as a peace organization, had already been shorn of its aspirational ties to official church

¹¹⁴ Joint Geneva Statement, 16 November 1938, WCC. 301.4330.1, appeared in *International Christian Press and Information Service*, No.49 (1938). The remainder of the statement urged: 1) corporate prayers of intercession; 2) appeal to governments to allow larger numbers of non-Aryan refugees; 3) to undertake church responsibility for non-Aryan Christian families and non-Aryan pastors or theological students.

¹¹⁵ See Visser't Hooft, *Memoirs*, 90-91, where he explained why the German church remained silent.

¹¹⁶ The statements on antisemitism referenced in the Joint Geneva *Kristalnacht* letter included two by the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches (1933 and 1938) and the adopted statements of the 1937 Oxford conference. See Snoek's *Grey Book*, prev. cit., 93, 99, for World Alliance statements.

government in Germany.¹¹⁷ To say this another way, with most of its German members in opposition to state church government, the World Alliance was not trying to walk a tightrope of unity with the German Reich Church, in contrast to UCCLW, and could therefore say officially in 1933 what the UCCLW could not:

We especially deplore the fact that the State measures against the Jews in Germany have had such an effect on public opinion that in some circles the Jewish race is considered a race of inferior status. We protest against the resolution of the Prussian General Synod and other Synods which apply the Aryan paragraph of the State to the Church...¹¹⁸

The situation in 1938 after *Kristallnacht* was no different. Explicit condemnation of German state policy and German church silence was not in the purview of the WCCIF. As recent heir to UCCLW, but not the World Alliance, its position was still very much that of trying to balance on a tensely-strung line of unity with German Christianity, which included maintenance of relations with the Reich Church. The non-specific *Kristallnacht* letter, which referred to earlier statements without repeating them, was a calculated solution issued from key representatives of key ecumenical bodies, but not an official issuance of WCCIF itself. It is also important to note that Paton, who was under German Christian criticism for condemning at Oxford any national attempt to exclude Jews from the universal Church, did not appear as one of the letter's signatories.¹¹⁹

The significance of all of this measuredness, however, is not only its frame of context for the *Kristallnacht* letter, but as signaler of a pattern that dominated WCCIF internal discourse throughout 1939. The general struggle over official statements - what to say, when to say it, to whom it should be addressed, and whether it should be said openly or covertly - was a gathering concern throughout the year. More specifically, what to say about refugees, what to say about Nazi aggressions and impending war, and what to say in response to statements that impinged upon the theological basis of ecumenism's role were questions that had merged into *one* inter-related deliberation. On 25 March 1939 German Christian leaders of eleven regional churches had issued in Godesberg a declaration which repudiated supranational or international bodies of churches, whether Catholic or Protestant, calling them a debasement of Christianity. This was

¹¹⁷ Henry Smith Leiper, *The Church-State Struggle in Germany* (London: Friends of Europe, 1935), 19.

¹¹⁸ Statement of the Executive Committee of the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches at Sophia, 15-20 September 1933; Snoek, *Grey Book*, 93. The 1938 WA statement was less explicit in that it neither singled out Germany nor made direct reference to the support or inaction of the German church. It was molded instead along the lines of the Oxford Conference, citing 'weakness, hesitancy, and failure of Christians' and stating appall for 'racial and religious intolerance'. Christians were urged to counter persecution 'now being directed against the Jewish race and against thousands of Christians who have kinship with the Jews'. No persecutory agent was named; Snoek, 99.

¹¹⁹ See Wilhelm Brachmann's 1938 memorandum, 'The World Oecumenical Movement Between the Fronts', WCC.26143.3.

the first of four theses published in the official Gazette of the German Evangelical Church between 4-6 April, followed by claims that Christianity 'is the unbridgeable religious opposition to Jewry', and that the National Socialist fight against church attempts to gain political power was a logical and necessary continuation of work begun by Martin Luther.¹²⁰ Visser't Hooft was in Berlin when the declaration was published and a confidential report from Berlin appears in his administrative files, but there is no recorded discussion until Karl Barth urged ecumenical response on 13 April.¹²¹ Writing to Paton and Temple two days later, Visser't Hooft described the theses as 'an aggressive statement against both the Confessional Church and the ecumenical movement', arguing that it was of such 'utterly anti-Christian character' that silence was not an option.¹²² He was undecided about whether official response should come from the Provisional Committee, a selection of larger churches, or a group of individual 'ecumenical personalities'. In the discussion that followed, Bell, Temple, Paton, Boegner, and Visser't Hooft all agreed that official response was necessary and that it should be signed by the chairman of the Provisional Committee, the chairman of the Administrative Committee, and the two general secretaries.¹²³

Whether to speak officially about Nazi aggressions and impending war was altogether a different matter. At the same time Barth urged ecumenical response to the Godesberg statement, he had also proposed that in the event of war the churches of nations in opposition to Germany jointly declare that it was not a war against the German people.¹²⁴ A different proposal from the Ecumenical Council of Sweden urged ecumenical repudiation of Germany's aggressions 'against small nations'.¹²⁵ While neither of these came to fruition, WCCIF deliberations for and against official statements in these instances were part of the ongoing debate and therefore critical to understanding the reasoning behind statements that were made.

As lead man, Visser't Hooft agreed with Barth's proposal for a joint war statement, with three stipulations. It would have to be 'very carefully worded', should 'not be made by the Ecumenical Movement as such', and should include elements which made clear that: 1) other nations were 'not without responsibility'; 2) Christians had no choice 'but to resist a regime which would dominate...nations and spread its anti-Christian methods'; 3) that it was 'our desire to maintain Christian fellowship with all those in Germany who believe in the Lord Jesus

¹²⁰ Declaration by German Christian Church Leaders, drafted in Godesberg on 25 March and signed in Berlin on 4 April 1939, WCC.301008. For a critical study, See Susannah Heschel, *The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany* (Princeton University Press, 2008).

¹²¹ 'The German Church Struggle Report, January-March 1939 by a Resident of Berlin', WCC. 301008.

¹²² Visser't Hooft to Temple, 15 April 1939, with copy to Paton, WCC.420077.

¹²³ Paton to Visser't Hooft, 18 April, WCC. 261142. Temple to Visser't Hooft, 21 April; Visser't Hooft to Temple, 26 April; WCC.420077. Paton to Visser't Hooft, 26 April; Temple to Visser't Hooft, 27 April 1939, WCC.301008.

¹²⁴ Visser't Hooft to Temple, 15 April 1939, prev. cit.

¹²⁵ Ecumenical Council of Sweden to WCCIF Geneva Office, 21 April 1939, WCC. 310008.

Christ.¹²⁶ In the case of the Swedish proposal to protest against German aggressions, however, Visser't Hooft gave four reasons 'for a *negative* decision': 1), 'a declaration of this kind would almost certainly mean...that all our relations with leaders of the German Churches would be broken off'; 2) 'coming as it would just after our answer to [Godesberg], it would seem that we had started...an anti-German campaign...'; 3) 'our authority as a Provisional Committee...is not sufficient to make a statement concerning things...not so immediately connected with our central purpose'; 4) 'if we made such a statement...we would be playing right into the hands of those who look upon the WCC as a semi-political institution'.¹²⁷

In the ensuing discussion, Paton responded to Visser't Hooft's stipulations on Barth's proposal by contacting the general director of BBC and asking confidentially if a broadcast could be arranged if church leaders were willing 'to take responsibility' for such a statement.¹²⁸ Temple, in contrast, was doubtful that such a statement could be made without coming off 'as hypocritical', but he agreed with Visser't Hooft that a statement expressing the 'judgment' being called for by the Swedish Council could not be made.¹²⁹ Paton was equally convinced that a statement of that sort could not come from the Provisional Committee, but he was 'increasingly doubtful' about whether the Committee was right in not making an effort to secure a united statement that would be helpful to Christians. He realized that 'the Provisional Committee and its officers c[ould] only be concerned, if at all...from the background, and ought not to appear as agents'.¹³⁰ Yet he still held that there had to be something that could be said 'together *before* war should break out'.¹³¹ Visser't Hooft granted that, ideally, it was the case that 'the churches ought to speak and ought to speak together', but he yet insisted that, in the present situation, neither church statements written along similar lines nor a common joint statement would work.¹³² In the case of the former, 'it would not make a strong impression', and, in the latter, it would 'seem to form a block of democratic churches'.¹³³ Moreover, Visser't Hooft was opposed to the term 'aggressions' in any statement, on the grounds that it was the terminology of democratic nations and 'very much resented not only in Germany but in Italy, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria'.¹³⁴ The *only* united declaration that Visser't Hooft could envision, which he doubted would be 'worthwhile', was one in which it would be said openly that 'we have no common mind on the rights and wrongs of the international situation, but that we believe nevertheless in

¹²⁶ Visser't Hooft to Temple, 15 April 1939, prev. cit.

¹²⁷ Visser't Hooft to Temple, 26 April 1939, prev. cit., italics added.

¹²⁸ Paton to F.W. Ogilvie, General Director of BBC, 18 April 1939, WCC.261143.

¹²⁹ Temple to Visser't Hooft, 21 April 1939; Temple to Visser't Hooft, 1 May 1939, WCC.420077.

¹³⁰ Paton to Temple, 28 April 1939, and Paton to Visser't Hooft, 2 May 1939, WCC.301008.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Visser't Hooft to Temple, 1 May 1939, WCC.420077; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 6 May 1939, 301008.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

the absolute duty of Christians to maintain their unity in Christ and take a stand for peace and justice'.¹³⁵

In order to broaden the context, this behind-the-scenes deliberation was going on at precisely the same time in which efforts were being made to finalize the new WCCIF refugee initiative. One result of this parallel development was that two official WCCIF documents were being simultaneously deliberated and drafted. The first, which had to do with church-wide announcement of WCCIF's launching of the refugee office, was being handled by Paton in London, and the second, which had to do with the Godesberg statement, was being orchestrated by Visser't Hooft in Geneva. As both were being finalized near the end of April 1939, Visser't Hooft suggested a third official document which would call attention to the ecumenical task 'implicit' in the WCCIF refugee initiative. He based this suggestion on the grounds that 1) it was safe to do so since WCCIF's response to Godesberg did not entail a specific question of Non-Aryan refugees, and 2) that 'the refugee question [wa]s precisely one in which we can show... that the Church is an ecumenical reality'.¹³⁶ Paton was at first receptive but upon reflection argued that he was 'increasingly unwilling that the WCCIF should make...a strong appeal about refugees, important as the refugee question is, when the world wants to hear something even more important...'¹³⁷ This was of course a return to Paton's debate with Visser't Hooft over the importance of a united church statement that would bring hope to Christians before war broke out. In this context, Paton found it inconceivable that the Provisional Committee would even think of 'putting the refugee business not only high up in the list of things that have got to be done, but absolutely first of all'.¹³⁸ His concern was that it would make 'a very ambiguous impression on the Churches of the world if, at a time when people are desperately seeking for the Word of God about war and peace, we come out with a very strong call about refugees'.¹³⁹

This slice of the ongoing and inter-connected internal debate took place in the brief interim period between finalization of WCCIF's official response to the Godesberg declaration *and* the eruption of the German Church Foreign Office to that official response. When the four Godesberg theses first became part of the discussion Visser't Hooft had proposed that refutation be drafted in four similar theses. When the refutation was agreed upon those same four points appeared in extended form as a published statement to 'Christian Churches of all countries' in *International Christian Press and Information Service*, with copies of the statement mailed to

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 26 April, 1 May, 6 May 1939, WCC.261142 and 301008.

¹³⁷ Paton to Visser't Hooft, 29 April 1939, WCC.261142; Paton to Temple, 3 May 1939, WCC.301008.

¹³⁸ Paton to Visser't Hooft, 4 May 1939, WCC.261142.

¹³⁹ Ibid. See also Paton to Temple, 3 May 1939, WCC.301008, where 'exceedingly injurious impression' was used. Paton said he yielded to no one in his 'consciousness of the importance of the refugee question, but [thought] that such action, if no more is done on the other issue, might be actively criticised'.

the religious and secular press. The WCCIF decision to publicly address all churches rather than issue a statement directly to churches in Germany, was, like all other related decisions, bound up with the general struggle of what to say, when to say it, and to whom it should be addressed. This hovering constant, as well as the strong conviction that the Godesberg theses constituted an 'aggressive statement' against ecumenism and WCCIF were primary moving factors but not the only ones. The decision to defend WCCIF publicly was made at a time when churches were deciding about joining the WCCIF and some were casting doubt about the legitimacy of its true world status. 'By far the biggest question' of concern, as stated in February 1939, was its lagging membership. Not even the Church of England had decided to commit by the time the Godesberg declaration was issued.¹⁴⁰ Only two of eight Orthodox churches had joined WCCIF, and not a single Methodist or Baptist church in the world had officially accepted the WCCIF invitation. Visser't Hooft's plan immediately before the Godesberg theses appeared had been to quell misapprehensions about WCCIF by countering ideas that rubbed against the idea of churches coming together in one world body, while focusing on the *Una Sancta* implicit in Christianity, and to do so by making use of the *International Christian Press and Information Service* as a valued 'instrument of ecumenical education and propaganda'.¹⁴¹ Once the Godesberg theses were issued, the dilemma was how to counter the aggressive German Christian statement against world ecumenism, while making clear to world churches that WCCIF was capable of protecting and advancing the causes of ecumenical Christianity.

The WCCIF decision to publicly direct its refutation of the Godesberg declaration to all world churches and to publicly circulate the statement to both religious and secular press, however, was far more incendiary than had been bargained.¹⁴² One hour after receiving word of the WCCIF statement on 6 May 1939, Bishop Heckel of the German Evangelical Church

¹⁴⁰ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 24 February 1939; Paton to VH, 27 February; Canon J.A. Douglas to Paton, 4 March; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 8 March 1939, WCC.261142.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., Visser't Hooft to Paton, 24 February 1939. The *International Christian Press and Information Service* (ICPIS) evolved from the UCCLW International Christian Press Commission as a weekly news source published from Geneva in November 1933. In late February 1939 the service was brought under the auspices of WCCIF, and by November of the same year the letterhead carried the lines: 'under the auspices' of the Provisional Committee of WCCIF and the WA, and 'supported by' the World Alliances of the YMCAs and YWCAs. In 1940 IMC also began to be listed as a supporting ecumenical organization. For the 1933 transformation of *ICPIS*, which occurred in response to and as part of the unfolding situation in Germany, see Cavert to Henriod, 15 April 1933, FCC B9 F15; Leiper to Cavert, 18 April 1933, and Cavert to Leiper, 24 May, FCC B12 F17; Cavert to Prof. D. Hinderer, 31 May, FCC B9 F15; Cavert to Hinderer, 14 September, and Schoenfield to Cavert, 2 December 1939, FCC B9 F17.

¹⁴² Visser't Hooft to Temple, 1 May 1939, WCC.42007, where hope was expressed that publishing in *ICPIS* would defray German accusations that the statement was political. Two days later, however, he requested that the statement be circulated to the secular press, Visser't Hooft to Paton, 3 May 1939, WCC.301008. It appeared in *ICPIS* (No.19, 6 May 1939), and Paton sent copies to secular and other religious press on 8 May. The WCCIF statement was printed in *The Times* on 10 May under the title 'Church Unity', with subtitle 'Christianity and the Jews'. See WCC. 301008 and 30143.31.7 for press letters and clippings.

Foreign Office issued a telegram demanding immediate retraction, on the grounds that it was 'intolerable interference in internal German affairs', that it exceeded WCCIF 'competence', and threatened future ecumenical relations.¹⁴³ The cable was followed by some 21 pages of communication between WCCIF and the German Church - a letter on 8 May in which German grievances were set out; two WCCIF letters to Heckel on 8 and 11 May; two WCCIF reports of a meeting with Heckel on 15 June - and, in all of this, there was not a single mention of Jews, the Jewish question, or WCCIF's refutation of the Godesberg's thesis that 'Christian faith is unbridgeable opposition to Judaism'.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, as this series illustrates, and as stated in a July report of the June meeting with Heckel, German grievances were 'principally directed against the *form* that the [WCCIF] statement had taken', and were 'in no way directed in *substance* to any of the expressions of opinion put forward in the [WCCIF] statement'.¹⁴⁵ German complaints from start to finish focused on WCCIF's decision to step outside the arena of theological discussion and enter into public debate, to present its position as a declaration of Christian truth rather than opinion, and to suggest that 'Christian Churches of all countries' adopt that position.¹⁴⁶ WCCIF's response was equally fixed. The signatories of the Provisional Committee

¹⁴³ Telegram from German Evangelical Church Office for Foreign Affairs, 6 May 1939, WCC.301008.

¹⁴⁴ German Evangelical Church Office for Foreign Affairs to Visser't Hooft, 8 May 1939, WCC.261143. The WCCIF Provisional Committee letter to Heckel was submitted by Visser't Hooft to Temple, Paton, and Bell on 8 May, and, with subsequent approval, was mailed to Heckel on 11 May with an attendant letter by Visser't Hooft, WCC.301008. For the two detailed reports, see Visser't Hooft, 'Private and Very Confidential Memorandum Concerning Relations Between the Provisional Committee and the German Evangelical Church, 20 June 1939; Hans Schoenfeld, 'Personal and Strictly Confidential Supplementary Remarks on Relations Between the Provisional Committee and the German Evangelical Church', written at the end of June and distributed on 7 July 1939, WCC.301008.

¹⁴⁵ Hans Schoenfeld, 'Personal and Strictly Confidential Supplementary Remarks on Relations Between the Provisional Committee and the German Evangelical Church', *prev. cit.*, 1-2. The four points in the official WCCIF Statement in Response to the Godesberg Declaration (WCC.301008):

1. We believe in the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church. The national organization of the Christian Church is not an essential element of its life. It has its blessings, but also its dangers. But the recognition of the spiritual unity of all those who are in Christ, irrespective of race, nation, or sex (Gal.iii.28; Col.iii.11) belongs to the essence of the Church. The Church is called to give clear and visible expression to this unity.
2. The Christian Faith is the practice of obedience to Jesus Christ, who is the Messiah of Israel. "Salvation is of the Jews" (John iv.22). The Gospel of Jesus Christ is the fulfilment of the Jewish hope. The Christian Church owes it, therefore, to the Jewish people to proclaim to it the fulfilment of the promises which had been made to it. And it rejoices in maintaining fellowship with those of the Jewish race who have accepted that Gospel.
3. The Church of Christ owes its allegiance to Jesus Christ alone and the right distinction and relationship between politics and ideology on the one hand and the Christian faith on the other hand is, therefore, one which serves to make clear that to Jesus Christ is given, not merely some, but all authority in Heaven and Earth, and that the Church is bound to proclaim His Lordship over all areas of life, including politics and ideology.
4. The only form of order and tolerance which can be accepted by the Christian Church must be based on the acknowledgement of the unique revelation offered to the world in Jesus Christ and the full freedom to proclaim His Gospel.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Schoenfeld, 1-2.

held firm to the belief that the first thesis of Godesberg could only be read as directed against ecumenism, and that the remaining theses were 'no less contrary' to underlying ecumenical principles.¹⁴⁷ The Godesberg theses 'went to the heart of the ecumenical question', in other words, and WCCIF's response was held to be a matter over and above internal German affairs.¹⁴⁸ The purpose for bringing the issue before the world churches as members of the *Una Sancta*, it was repeatedly argued, must not be misinterpreted as national or political interference. It was a 'proper occasion for the officers of the Provisional Committee to act' precisely because it 'specifically deni[ed] the legitimacy of any kind of ecumenical or international Christian action'.¹⁴⁹

That WCCIF's refutation should carry with it the threatening possibility of *German withdrawal* from the World Council was not only unexpected but far removed from WCCIF intentions to maintain and present a united front. The ensuing deliberations with Heckel on 15 June were thus looked upon as 'negotiations', and always with an eye toward resolution that would protect and advance ecumenical unity. Heckel's demands which would circumvent German withdrawal from WCCIF, if granted, were four: a place for himself on the Provisional and Administrative Committees; a place on the Provisional Committee for one of his juridical collaborators; the creation of a German associate secretary comparable to Henry Leiper's American position; and his approval of 'all documents of general significance...before they should in any way be made public'.¹⁵⁰ The general terms of negotiation that Visser't Hooft posed to the Provisional Committee were also four: that WCCIF not allow itself to be 'forced' into a situation in which it would be looked upon as '*responsible* for the breaking off of all ecumenical relations with the German Church'; that it 'not give a purely negative response; that it ensure that Heckel's office had no monopoly on WCCIF relations with Germany'; and 4) that it do everything possible to maintain ties with the rest of the German Church.¹⁵¹

WCCIF tension about how to respond to German demands was compounded on 21 June 1939 when Visser't Hooft received yet another 'sad document of compromise' emanating from the German Church. This time, however, the document carried the signature of a Provisional Committee member, Bishop August Marahrens of Hanover, who had been the first head of the Confessing Church Provisional Government and was later appointed by the Oxford Conference as the only German member on the WCCIF Council. The document in question, which was

¹⁴⁷ WCCIF Provision Committee to Heckel, 11 May 1939, WCC.301008.

¹⁴⁸ Visser't Hooft, 'Private and Very Confidential Memorandum, 20 June 1939, prev. cit., 2.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid; Paton to Leiper, 30 May 1939, WCC.301008.

¹⁵⁰ German Evangelical Church Office for Foreign Affairs to Visser't Hooft, 8 May, p.3, and Visser't Hooft, 'Private and Very Confidential Memorandum, 20 June 1939, pp. 2-4, prev. cit.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., Visser't Hooft, 6-7, italics added.

forwarded to Bell and WCCIF officers, was unequivocal in its position, as was Visser't Hooft's understanding of it, which was attached in a handwritten note: 'statement by Lutheran bishops attacking ecumenical universalism and supporting race policy'.¹⁵² Where the Godesberg declaration had refuted Judaism as 'unbridgeable' opposition to Christianity, and WCCIF had argued in return that Christianity fulfilled Judaism, this statement had moved the debate to a new level by proclaiming that a 'responsible race policy [was] necessary for maintenance of the purity of [German] nationality'.¹⁵³

This was public agreement with Nationalist Socialist racial policy by a member of WCCIF's Provisional Committee, and there is no way to get around the fact that WCCIF's response to it was fitted into *extant* deliberations, without outrage, and with no discussion of dismissing Marahrens. There was indeed deep concern over what to do, but there was not a single word about the impact that such a statement would have on either Jews or the moral suasion of Christian attitudes toward Jews. The statement was seen as a 'kind of counter-statement' to WCCIF's refutation of Godesberg, one that was 'terribly serious' and 'distressing', but it was not seen as one that was to be responded to by the WCCIF.¹⁵⁴ Attention remained focused on the 'ultimatum' that had been issued from Heckel, one that had to be deliberated prudently, wisely, and courageously so 'as not to spoil our last chance of keeping in touch with all groups of the Church in Germany'.¹⁵⁵ All were agreed that Heckel's appointment was key to the solution, and that it would be 'foolish' to return a negative answer.¹⁵⁶ The resolution passed after 'long and anxious thought', one month before outbreak of war, was that two additional places would be given to the German Church and that each of the two sectors of the Provisional Committee would be responsible for the appointment of one. The conciliatory idea was that Heckel would be appointed by one sector, a member of the Confessing Church appointed by the other, and that Bishop Marahrens' established position on the WCCIF Provisional Committee would satisfy the remaining German church group.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² Visser't Hooft to Bell, 21 June 1939, includes handwritten note and statement, WCC.301008.3. The document was signed in Berlin on 31 May and carried considerably more signatures than the Godesberg declaration. Visser't Hooft and WCCIF officers were fully aware that in addition to Marahrens it had been signed by other Lutheran bishops of the Confessing Church, including Bishop Wurm of Wurtemberg, Bishop Meiser of Bavaria, and Bishop Kuehlewein of Baden. See Visser't Hooft's *Memoirs*, 92-98, for his account of the two documents and their aftermath.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ Ehrenstroem to Paton, 22 June 1939; Paton to Ehrenstroem, 26 June; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 26 June; WCC.301008. The prevailing opinion here was that Lutheran bishops who signed the document should be approached by Lutheran theologians outside of Germany rather than being confronted by WCCIF.

¹⁵⁵ Visser't Hooft to Bell, 21 June 1939, WCC.301008.

¹⁵⁶ Paton to Visser't Hooft, 26 June 1939, WCC.301008; Temple to Visser't Hooft, 27 June, WCC.420077; Schoenfeld Memorandum, 6 July, WCC.301008. See also Bell to Visser't Hooft, 18 July, and Bell to Visser't Hooft, 15 August, where he called the found solution 'very wise'; WCC.301008.

¹⁵⁷ Paton to Bell, 28 July 1939, WCC.301008.

WCCIF officers were not 'prepared to do anything that would be seen as hostile by other German church groups' but they were prepared to pass up confrontation on the German church statement that was hostile to Jews. The tension between speaking out as an official body and keeping silence in order to advance ecumenism had been a complex feature of ecumenical involvement with German churches since 1933, but it was becoming more and more difficult to balance the tightrope of unity that WCCIF was trying to walk. Provisional Committee officers had been able to see that the Marahrens' document was a German church 'compromise' but they had been unable to view their own silence about the document in the same light. Moreover, that compromise received formal expression when WCCIF retained Marahrens on the Provisional Committee and allowed his name to appear on WCCIF letterhead until 1943. Indeed, Bishop Marahrens remained a member of the Provisional Committee until he was replaced in October 1945 by Bishop Wurm of Wuertenberg, who was himself a signatory of the same document. While the outbreak of war effectively stopped the intended appointment of Heckel, Marahrens lived on in his Provisional Committee capacity even though he was also signatory to a statement in September 1939 which heralded the German Church for 'supply[ing] the weapons of steel with the invincible forces out of God's Word'.¹⁵⁸ If WCCIF consciences were uneasy about these decisions, including that of keeping silence about the Lutheran document, they were lulled by an overriding concern for advancing the *Una Sancta* in the name of WCCIF. At the outbreak of war, the defence of unity was invoked as the primary task around which all other issues were to be approached, and undergirding that task was agreement that the reality of ecumenical unity 'must at all cost remain unbroken'.¹⁵⁹ In no area was this to be more strongly focused than in decisions about public statements which might be construed as 'political views'. It was well understood that no one 'c[ould] be really neutral in this war', *but* it [was] a question [of] how far ecumenical leaders c[ould] go without endangering the position of the Ecumenical Movement ...¹⁶⁰

The momentarily changing conditions of the world between 1937 and 1939 had not elicited corresponding changes in policies about either public statements of WCCIF protest or promulgation of ICCAJ mission initiatives. Policies were derived from aims believed to be rooted in the precedence of divine mandates - advancement of the *Una Sancta* and advancement of God's call to Israel - and both mandates were held to be unchanging in the face of changing conditions. The diligence with which leadership of WCCIF pursued its aspired mandate during this period is remarkable, and all the more so when viewed in the context of the *known* changing

¹⁵⁸ Bethke, *prev. cit.*, 568.

¹⁵⁹ Visser't Hooft to Temple, Mott, Boegner, Oldham, Archbishop Eidem, Bishop of Novi Sad, Bishops Berggrav and Damgaard, 20 September 1939, WCC.420077.

¹⁶⁰ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 5 October 1939, italics added, WCC.261143.

conditions of Jews. Between March 1938 and July 1939, eight Supplementary Nuremberg Decrees had been imposed within the German Reich, which, together with innumerable other laws, were systematically disenfranchising Jews through deprivation of rights to citizenship, professions, wages, financial reserves, ownership of property, freedom of movement, social access, housing, transportation, and personal possessions, including one's own name. The German Regulation of Name Changes Law in August 1938 required that all Jews within the Reich were to add the 'names 'Sarah' or 'Israel' according to gender. By the time of *Kristallnacht* in November 1938 all remaining Jewish enterprises carried identifying marks, and all Jewish passports were stamped with the letter 'J'. In the months leading up to the war in 1939 - while WCCIF was moving back and forth between Geneva and Berlin in 'negotiations' with Reich Bishop Heckel over his position on the Provisional Committee - further decrees were issued on confiscation of Jewish valuables, reduction of pensions, and appropriation for forced labour.¹⁶¹ It was in this same precise period, and with knowledge of these gathering manifestations of German racial policy, that WCCIF *chose* to abstain from protesting against the 'sad document of compromise' in which German Lutheran bishops proclaimed that a 'reasonable race policy [was] necessary for maintenance of the purity of [German] nationality'.¹⁶²

As illustrated in detail, WCCIF did not manifest the full moral voice that Soederblom had envisioned in 1925 and that Oxford had hoped to facilitate in 1937. WCCIF protested forcefully in 1939 when ecumenical authority and integrity was overtly challenged by German Christians at Godesberg, but leaders abstained in silence when challenged by racial alignment of Lutheran bishops with whom they were ecumenically involved. In that same vein of disposition, whatever concerns were held about accelerating Nazi aggressions against Jews, they were held in abeyance and not in official public oppositions. WCCIF's knowledge *about* mounting Nazi aggressions against Jews after the outbreak of war, however, was made known to the churches at the end of 1939 - in the form of an appeal for aid to non-Aryan Christian refugees. But it was James Parkes, and not WCCIF, who voiced the first public report to Christendom about Nazi war-atrocities against Jews, even though the same information was mutually in hand. What was known by Parkes in late fall of 1939 was known by WCCIF European principals, and that was equally true of what was known by the principals of ICCAJ. All were being informed by reports flowing into and through existing refugee and mission networks, the earliest of which was

¹⁶¹ As these negotiations proceeded it was even suggested by George Bell that the next Provisional Committee meeting be held in Berlin in order to seal the new German appointments; Bell to Visser't Hooft, 15 August 1935, WCC.301008.

¹⁶² Visser't Hooft to Bell, 21 June 1939, with statement carrying signatures of WCCIF Provisional Committee member Bishop Marahrens and Bishop Wurm, who would become Marahrens' replacement in 1945, among others; WCC.301008.3.

circulating no later than 15 days after Hitler invaded Poland. Yet the nature in which Parkes' responded to the more or less common cache of information stands in stark contrast to the responses of WCCIF and ICCAJ. Parkes' response was to publish in *Christian News Letter* on 6 December 1939 a report about the war's devastating effect on the Jewish people, with emphasis on the Nazi Jewish Reserve in (Lublin) Poland, which was 'not intended to lead to anything but...extermination'.¹⁶³ WCCIF's public response later that month was to report on the Lublin Reserve in a Christmas appeal for funds that would 'at least save our fellow Christians in Central Europe from being sent to th[at] hell'.¹⁶⁴ ICCAJ's response was to launch investigation into the effects of war on European Jewish missions and begin immediate post-war planning for mission reconstruction on the Continent and throughout the world.

Yet, in pointing out this sharp contrast between Parkes' focus on Jews as *Jews per se*, WCCIF's focus on non-Aryan Christians who were being classified as Jews, and ICCAJ's focus on Jews as the mission object of its perceived divine mandate, it should not be assumed that those points were the only WCCIF and ICCAJ concerns. Attitudes of both sets of leaders were anything but indifferent to the increasing plight of Jews. But it was precisely their expressed concerns about increasing Jewish devastation that makes their fixed course of aims all the more remarkable. Like the 1933 UCCLW deliberations examined in the last chapter, the points of refugee focus were guided by specific aims driven by perceived mandates rather than by sentiments about the unfolding and rapidly changing picture of Jewish devastation. As with earlier WCCIF statements of protest, WCCIF refugee focus after war ensued was powered by advancement of the beliefs inherent in the *Una Sancta*, with the additional corresponding belief that 'the refugee question' was one in which it could be shown 'that the Church is an ecumenical reality'.¹⁶⁵ ICCAJ's concentrated focus on post-war planning of Jewish missions, while aiding WCCIF refugee efforts, was likewise driven by its perceived mandate to advance God's call to Israel. In the case of each organization, decisions about response to unfolding conditions were never intended to be made on the sole basis of humanitarian needs, but, rather, on the basis of humanitarian need according to the precedence of the divine mandates directing organizational aims and purposes. At the close of 1939 in the early months of the second world war it was not just a matter of responding, in other words, but of responding in a way that would advance the organizational mandate without losing sight of where it was headed.

¹⁶³ James Parkes, 'The Fate of the Jews', *The Christian News Letter*, 6 December 1939, Supplement No.6. ¹⁶⁴ 'The Jewish Reservation Near Lublin and the Situation of the Jews and Non-Aryans in Germany and in the Territories under German Control, WCC.261201, was sent out by the WCCIF Refugee Office from late December and early 1940 under a cover letter entitled 'Appeal to Churches from WCCIF Office for Refugee Work'. WCC.301.4330.1 includes a 15 December 1939 draft.

¹⁶⁵ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 26 April, 1 May, 6 May 1939, WCC.261142 and 301008.

Chapter Four

PRESENCES AND ABSENCES OF VOICES

1940-1944

The years of 1940 to 1944 were inlaid with ecumenical developments driven by the central preoccupations of preservation and advancement of ICCAJ and WCCIF mandates, both of which had remained unchanged throughout the years of Nazi aggressions leading up to the war. The constitutional formation of WCCIF in 1938 as the core body of the ecumenical structure had resulted in intensifying relations between WCCIF, IMC, and ICCAJ through overlapping roles in leadership as well as collaboration on common ecumenical goals. The main focus of collaboration between ICCAJ and WCCIF after *Kristallnacht* in November 1938 was WCCIF's centralization of joint efforts on behalf of non-Aryan Christian refugees. Collaborative effort in launching a WCCIF Refugee Office in London in April 1939 and Hoffmann's appointment as chief officer in August had been abruptly altered by accelerating German aggressions, the onset of war, exacerbation of the refugee problem, and, by the end of 1939, 'extermination' of Jews in Poland. The subsequent development of ICCAJ and WCCIF responses to worsening conditions of Jews as Nazi aggression spread across Europe is the focus of this chapter. That development is traced and examined in the context of guiding organizational mandates that bore consistently on internal dynamics of official patterns of response. For ICCAJ's advancement of God's call to Israel, that entailed intensive post-war planning for the reconstruction of Jewish missions while defending the validity of Jewish evangelization against what was seen as an encroaching goodwill toleration movement. For WCCIF's advancement of ecumenical unity, that involved a shaping of policy on what could be said officially while orchestrating collaboration on refugee relief as manifestation of the spiritual reality of ecumenism. Those patterns of organizational responses are examined in the light of what was known about the escalating atrocities that will become the Nazi 'finalsolution'.

As early as January 1940 ICCAJ discussions on the reconstruction of post-war Jewish missions were already in progress.¹ War conditions had made clear that post-war evangelization of Jews would be dependent upon informed war-time planning, and that 'disorganization' of European missions and changing geographic distribution of Jews would demand reassessment of both mission fields and missionary efforts. Within the range of problems under consideration was what was deemed a Christian imperative to provide aid to refugees that were said to be moving in great 'crowds' to the United States, France, Britain, overseas Dominions, South

¹ Minutes, British ICCAJ, 12 January 1940, WCC.261207.7; Robert Smith, Memorandum on Missionary Problems Resulting from Wartime Conditions, February 1940, WCC.261229.2. See also copy of letter from the Foreign Office, 9 January 1940; A. Gerhardt to Paton, 12 January 1940; Standley to Gill, 19 January; Gill to Standley, 20 January 1940, WCC.261201.7.

America, and the Far East.² Refugee relief was seen as a major war-time task of Jewish work but from more than one perspective: beyond the Christian duty to provide material and spiritual aid, refugees were seen as 'a ready-to-hand cross section of Jewish life', affording incomparable 'opportunity for study of the Jewish problem'. The 'poverty' of refugee circumstances was said to be rendering Jews 'especially responsive to acts of Christian kindness', and further study was needed on the 'incalculable effect of the catastrophe in transforming Judaism from within'.³

When the first of two conferences convened in London on 11 June 1940 to formally deliberate these and war-related problems, sixty-seven representatives from fifteen British missionary and refugee agencies were in attendance. The intention was that it be of a 'severely practical' nature, and time would not be spent on 'passing resolutions of sympathy with suffering Jewry, right as such resolutions [we]re on appropriate occasions'.⁴ Two addresses set the theological and theoretical tones of discussion. The first was in absentia by Conrad Hoffmann, who outlined the three tasks of war-time Jewish mission work as 'Samaritan service to refugees', 'combating of anti-Semitism', and the 'cure of anti-Semitism, which could only be found in Jesus Christ'.⁵ William Paton followed with a series of three linking arguments which claimed that antisemitism was at root an attack against 'revealed religion', the epitome of which was Christianity; that Christianity's mission to Jews was the litmus test for the 'whole mission enterprise'; and that wherever 'the grisly head of Anti-Semitism [was] raised, the real struggle [was] about Christianity'.⁶

Robert Smith, newly appointed assistant director of ICCAJ, provided the backdrop of practical considerations by surveying damages to Jewish missions and refugee populations since the 1937 Vienna conference.⁷ Antisemitism and 'anti-Christian tendencies' had spread through

² Robert Smith, 'Memorandum of Missionary Problems Resulting from Wartime Conditions', February 1940, WCC.261229.2.

³ Ibid.

⁴ The conference was a collaboration between the BICCAJ and the CBMS Committee for Work among Jews. For pre-conference planning, see Minutes, Arrangements Committee for United Conference on Christian Approach to the Jews, 7 March 1940, WCC.261201.7; Conrad Hoffmann to Baker, 11 March 1940, WCC. 261201.7; Minutes, CBMS Discussion Group, 4 April 1940, WCC.261229.2; Report of Conference between Dr. Conrad Hoffmann and Mr. McLeish, New York, May 1940, WCC.261201.1. For quotation, see Report of a United Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews, 11 June 1940, WCC. 261201.6.

⁵ Ibid. Hoffmann's paper was based on his confidential report of July 1939, 'In Germany', where he elaborated these points as ICCAJ's response to 'the present crisis and emergency to world Jewry', 16; WCC.261201.1

⁶ William Paton, Extracts from Address at United Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews, 11 June 1940, WCC.261229.2.

⁷ Robert Smith, 'Summary of Wartime Difficulties' and 'Effect of the War on Jewish Mission Work', 11 June 1940, WCC.261229.1-2 and 261201.6-7. Both were circulated in advance of their review at the conference, and both relied upon data from the WCCIF Refugee Office as well as individual reports from mission societies. The combined reports summarized refugee and/or mission conditions in occupied countries as well as Italy, Great Britain, the British Dominions, Balkans, Palestine, Egypt, Abyssinia,

Germany, and the double menace was said to be advancing with the advance of German armies. Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium, all of which were key missionary fields, had been occupied by German troops and 'driven before them' had been streams of Jewish refugees, missionary workers, and converts. Mission work in Germany had been 'liquidated', little was possible in Rumania, Hungary, and Balkans, and work in Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, and Poland had been suspended.⁸ The effects on Jews had been equally disastrous. Nazi atrocities against Jews no longer required proof, Smith said, for missionary reports that had 'seemed incredible' were now common and it was understood that 'something amounting to extermination [was] going on' in Poland.⁹ Smith also pointed out as matter of fact that increasing knowledge of Nazi atrocities had generated greater callousness toward Jewish suffering, and to many 'the fate of the Jews' seemed small in 'comparison with the agonies of other nations who are our allies...'.¹⁰

From these perspectives, discussion throughout the conference was carried on in the language of 'dislocated' missions, 'altered' mission fields, and projected post-war reorganization and reconstruction. Deliberations moved along three lines: the need to imprint upon churches that Jewish missions were integral to all mission efforts; the need to harness full cooperation between world mission societies; and the need for ICCAJ's international expertise in the whole range of problems.¹¹ 'Occupation' of re-drawn Jewish mission fields in the post-war world was set as the ultimate goal, and it was unanimously agreed that success was dependent upon sound knowledge of refugee demographics and integrated planning of mutually agreed geographic allocations which avoided overlapping.¹² In terms of post-conference tracking of redistributed Jewish refugee populations, William Paton took the lead and by mid-August 1940 he was requesting information from the High Commissioner of Refugees about 'where the Jews [we]re and how much the numbers in different countries ha[d] been affected by emigration and forcible removal...'.¹³

Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Iran, and America. Hoffmann also reported on the situation in the United States, noting that 'quota immigration from European countries in the next decade would [likely] be Jewish in character' and 'it was feared this might intensify anti-Semitism in America', 'Report', 2.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Smith, 'Effect of the War on Jewish Mission Work', prev. cit., 2-3 .See also 'Summary of Wartime Difficulties', 4, where noted that persecutions seemed 'to have broken down Jewish prejudices against Christianity' and in numerous cases had led to baptisms.

¹⁰ Smith, 'Effect of the War on Jewish Mission Work', prev. cit., 2.

¹¹ Report of a United Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews, 11 June 1940, prev. cit. See also C.H.Gill, 'Points for Possible Action', 26 June 1940; Smith to Paton, 3 July 1940; 'Notes of Sub-Committee on Jews Conference', 11 July 1940; WCC.261229.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Paton to Kullman, 21 August 1940, WCC.261229.2. Information about relocated Jewish refugees had the added value of providing their 'whereabouts' to areas in which missions were still operative. See CBMS Minutes, Committee on Work among Jews, 9 October 1940, WCC.261229. For more on Paton's

The unfolding of such search and planning had its own set of problems, however, and the need for formal guidelines which provisionally allocated the mission fields that would eventually be redrawn was seen more and more as a necessity.¹⁴ By early February 1941 Robert Smith had put into circulation a provisional draft of mediating principles to guide geographical allocations.¹⁵ The primary concern was how to go about allocating post-war spheres of Jewish populations without infringing the *rights* of individual mission societies. There were already 'claims' to areas in which missions had long been established, but regulations which 'delimit[ed]' geographic Jewish mission fields had never been attempted. There was also no mechanism in place for adjustment of missionary outreach to 'shifting centres of Jewish populations' in the post-war world. Smith's provisions were thus aimed toward mission society cooperation in respecting the 'rights' of those who had already established mission territorial claims as well as the development of principles for division of geographical areas in which claims had not been firmly staked.¹⁶ Geographical spheres not previously occupied, spheres abandoned during the war, and spheres where work was still in experimental stages were looked upon as being more or less trouble-free in terms of 'infringement' problems, and the aim was to keep them that way through allocations that were subject to mutual agreement and peer review.¹⁷

With these provisional guidelines as basis for discussion, a second London conference was convened on 29 April 1941, the primary theme of which was cooperation between Jewish mission societies. Again, delegates of the conference referred findings and data to ICCAJ for further analysis, along with a request for retrospective study of the world Jewish mission field prior to outbreak of war.¹⁸ In the course of that survey three types of geographical errors were isolated as problems that had to be worked through in post-war reconstruction of missions: over distribution of resources, such as in Palestine; 'overlapping' of resources, as in Central Europe and Poland; and unoccupied or inadequately-occupied fields, as in South America and the British Dominions. By September 1941, as illustrated in Table V below, eight geographical

tracking efforts through official and semi-official channels, see Emerson to Paton, 25 June 1941, FCC B9F19; Harold Beeley (Royal Institute of International Affairs) to Paton, 27 November 1941, and Paton to Beeley, 28 November 1941, WCC.301.4331.10.

¹⁴ Smith to Paton, 3 July 1940, WCC.261229; CBMS Committee on Work among Jews, 9 October 1940; WCC.261229. BICCAJ Minutes, 10 October 1940, WCC.261207.

¹⁵ Robert Smith, 'Memorandum on Jewish Missionary Cooperation After the War', 3 February 1941, WCC. 261229.

¹⁶ Ibid. See also CBMS Minutes, Committee on Work among Jews, 5 February 1941; Gill, 'Memorandum on Proposed Conference on Closer Cooperation', February 1941, WCC.261229.

¹⁷ Ibid., Smith.

¹⁸ Standley to Hoffmann, 5 May 1941, WCC.261201.8. Minutes of the April conference did not survive but pre and post-conference documents provide adequate detail as to proceedings and outcome. Standley to Hoffmann, 5 May 1941; Hoffmann to Standley, 9 July 1941; WCC. 261201.8. BICCAJ Minutes, 10 September 1941; William Paton, Memorandum for Meeting of Group on the Christian Approach to the Jews, 20 November 1941, WCC.261207.

spheres had been placed under evaluation for post-war allocations. Those projections dealt only with geographical areas that were not self-contained by existing home missions to Jews, and therefore did not include Great Britain, Scandinavia, and North America, nor did they include South America, which was generally considered to be a mission-responsibility of the United States.¹⁹

Table V. Geographical Spheres of Jewish Mission Fields Under ICCAJ Evaluation for Post-War Allocation, September 1941²⁰

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Abyssinia 2. North Africa, Algeria, Tunis, Morocco 3. Southern Poland, Transylvania, Slovakia, Ruthenia 4. Central Europe and all other areas of Poland 5. Russia 6. South Africa 7. Australia 8. British Dominions
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Running parallel to ICCAJ post-war planning was a series of events gathering into what would be seen as a looming threat to the viability of post-war missions to Jews. In March 1940 James Parkes received a commission from Conrad Hoffmann to write a pamphlet on the topic 'Was Jesus an Enemy of the Jews?'.²¹ To make sense of this, it is important to understand that the pamphlet was not of Hoffmann's initiative and that Parkes was brought into the project only when his attempt to secure another author had failed. As part of ICCAJ effort to produce evidence that it could improve Christian-Jewish relations even while heralding Jewish missions, Hoffmann's dialogue with an American rabbi had led to the rabbi's suggestion for a 10,000 word pamphlet that would enlighten both Jews and Christians on Jesus' attitude toward first century Jews.²² Parkes was keen from the outset when the commission was presented as a joint offer from the reform rabbi and ICCAJ. While it is impossible to know what Hoffmann was thinking when he agreed to commission Parkes, it is abundantly clear that when Parkes accepted it was with the same intention that he had preached an honorary sermon at Oxford a few months earlier. The tradition for the annual sermon, which had been set since 1848, was to confute Jewish arguments and promote 'conversion...of the ancient people of God'.²³ Parkes' early 1940

¹⁹ BICCAJ Minutes, 10 September 1941, WCC.261207.

²⁰ Table V is compiled from BICCAJ Minutes, 10 September 1941, prev. cit.

²¹ Hoffmann to Parkes, 25 March 1940, MS60/17/8/2. The initial discussion between Hoffmann and Parkes involved additional letters on 9, 23, 30 April, 8 May, 1 October 1940; PP MS60/17/8/2.

²² Reform Rabbi Mendelsohn of Chicago may have suggested Parkes as author. Hoffmann wanted the title to be reversed to 'Were Not the Jews the Enemies of Jesus?', but Mendelsohn insisted that the essay address the question 'Was Jesus an Enemy of the Jews?'; and, with just this stipulation, he agreed to share expenses for the pamphlet and Parkes' honorarium.

²³ Oxford honorary sermon guidelines established in 1848, MS60/17/10/1.

sermon, in contradiction to the expected tradition, was a developed version of the paper he had submitted to the 1937 ICCAJ Vienna conference, one which clearly argued that attempts to confute Jewish arguments and promote Jewish conversion to Christianity had failed, and would continue to fail precisely because it was not God's will that Jews should be converted.²⁴ The commissioned pamphlet, which was based on arguments in Parkes' *Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue* (1934) and *Jesus, Paul and the Jews* (1936), continued in this vein, arguing that Jesus was not in opposition to first century Judaism but steeped in it, and that his attitude toward Judaism and Jews was that of 'reform' rather than 'rejection'. The notion that first-century Jews hated Jesus was clearly refuted by Parkes, as was the idea that Paul had abandoned the truth of Judaism for the truth of Christianity. Both Jesus and Paul were shown to be Pharisees, the latter of which was converted from 'being an unhappy to a happy Pharisee' by making Jesus the centre of his Judaism.²⁵ The manuscript was mailed to Hoffmann through the London ICCAJ office in late January 1941, but Parkes received no word until six months later in July and, when he did, there was no mention of the American rabbi's involvement.²⁶ Hoffmann explained instead that he had circulated the manuscript to 'various friends' in America and Britain, and all had agreed that it was 'not the type of material that we of the [ICCAJ] should publish'.²⁷

During this period when Parkes was sharpening his theological position on Jewish missions, he became involved in another matter which would soon cause far more concern for ICCAJ than did his pamphlet. The background is important for it not only reflects another side of Parkes' challenging presence but also the unrelenting nature of ICCAJ's self-understanding of the Christian imperative to evangelize Jews. During the summer of 1940, which was the period of the ICCAJ conference on post-war mission planning, a Mrs. Freemann, who was a delegate to that conference from the Church of England Committee for Non-Aryan Christians, was referred to Parkes by Rabbi Dr. Mattuck, Chairman of the Society of Jews and Christians and a friend of Parkes since his early days at ISS. An important result of the suggested discussion between Parkes and Freemann was the idea of a collaboration between Christians and Jews in combating antisemitism. By early August, Freeman's organizational efforts had cleared the path for a meeting in October, invitations to which were being issued by the Dean of St. Paul's for a meeting to discuss 'the causes for anti-Semitism and the means for combating it in this

²⁴ Parkes, 'Christianity and the Conversion of the Jews', Oxford University Sermon, January 1941, PP MS60 17/10/1. For Parkes' later reflection on the sermon, see *Voyage of Discoveries*, 154-155.

²⁵ Parkes, 'Was Jesus and Enemy of the Jews?', PPMS60/9/4.

²⁶ After the initial round of letters between Hoffmann and Parkes, Parkes corresponded with the IMC- ICCAJ London secretary on 21, 28, 30 January 1941; 4, 5, 19 February; 5 May; 24 and 26 June 1941; PP MS60/17/8/1, 8/2, and WCC.261229.2.

²⁷ Hoffmann to Parkes, 22 July 1941, PP MS60/17/8/2. Parkes wrote back on 14 August, holding Hoffmann to his word on the fee. Hoffmann did not respond until a year later on 4 August 1942, saying that he would pay \$60 on condition that the money be reimbursed if the manuscript was sold elsewhere.

country'.²⁸ Persistent German bombings that began in September caused the meeting to be postponed, however, and it was not until early May 1941 that new invitations were issued for a 10 July meeting at Grosvenor House in London.²⁹

Parkes was among the six initial Christians in attendance and so was William Paton. A second meeting was held on 27 October, of which Paton was unaware, and a third followed on 19 November. Having wind of his exclusion but making no mention of it, Paton wrote to Parkes the following day, asking if 'anything concrete' had come from the Grosvenor meeting. Being aware of Parkes' other involvements, he also inquired as to whether 'definite plans' were being made for discussions on 'the place of Jewry in a world settlement'.³⁰ Over the course of the next few days Parkes learned from Paton that he was secretary of a 'strong group' working on 'the general problem of post-war settlement from the standpoint of the Christian Church', and that he was using his influence to make sure that 'something clear and definite on the future of the Jewish population' was included.³¹ Paton, in turn, learned from Parkes that the general question of Jewry in post-war settlement was being covered by Chatham House, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and the World Jewish Congress in Britain, with all of whom he was working. He also heard from Parkes that Henry Carter, general secretary of Methodist Social Welfare and chairman of the Christian Council for Refugees, had brought other key figures to Grosvenor House meetings, and that the most recent had 'launch[ed] the first concrete step of a Christian-Jewish Council'.³² But this Paton already knew, for in the meantime he had received Carter's own account of what had led to a unanimous vote for a joint council on Jewish-Christian relations, and, in response, he had set out an excoriating letter of indignation about his exclusion from the meetings, charging that it was based on his identification with Jewish missions.

If the answer is yes, then...I must deal very plainly with you... I hold perhaps the most representative inter-church post in the country and I have yet to learn that it is the considered view of the Christian churches that the universal redemption of mankind wrought in Christ is not intended by our Lord to apply to the Jews. I am as eager as any to try to rectify some of the evils which have followed from wrong methods used in the past, and because I have taken the trouble to identify myself in fundamental principle with these missions I have some influence with them. I should, however,

²⁸ Dean of St. Paul to select list of six Jews and six Christians, 12 August 1940, WCC.301.4331.10.

²⁹ A series of six letters about Paton's invitation for the 10 October 1940 meeting took place between the Dean of St. Paul's, Paton, and Freeman on 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21 August and 25, 30 September 1940. Six letters on the 10 July 1941 meeting took place between the Dean of St. Paul's, Paton, and Freeman on 17, 19, 27 May; 5, 6 June; and 8 July; WCC.301.4331.10.

³⁰ Paton to Parkes, 20 November 1941, PP MS60/17/8/2.

³¹ Paton to Parkes, 26 November 1941, PP MS60/17/8/2. For more on the post-war settlement group related to WCCIF see Paton to Visser't Hooft, 14 January and 27 February 1941, and Henry van Dusen to Paton, 26 November 1941, WCC.301.009 and 261142.14.

³² Parkes to Paton, ca. 22 November 1941, PP MS60/17/8/2.

regard any attempt to eliminate the evangelistic witness from Jewish-Christian contacts not only as unfaithful to our Lord but as quite certain...to gain no fundamental respect from Jews. No intelligent Jew who reads the New Testament can be in any doubt as to what Christians ought to think.³³

Paton went on to fume that it 'would be calamitous' if only Jews handled the 'question of the Jews' in post-war settlements, but 'no less calamitous if the only Christians...allowed to handle the matter [we]re those who accept[ed] the Jewish view of the rights and wrongs of [Jewish] evangelization'. And he made explicitly clear that if it was the case that those who held his views on Jewish missions were to be excluded that he would 'deal with the matter openly and publicly'.³⁴ Carter struck back with denial that Paton's exclusion was on the grounds so charged, making equally clear that he too was ready to deal with the matter 'publicly'. In so stating he reminded Paton that such a controversy would not advantage 'the cause we both seek to serve'. It might clarify the issue, Carter warned, but it might also 'damage the Christian cause by dividing those' who had found common ground.³⁵ Paton smoothed the surface, as he often did, and continued his attack in the background three days later.³⁶ Writing to E.N. Cooper at the Aliens Department of the Home Office, he stressed scepticism about situations in which 'anxiety' over antisemitism resulted in a 'tendency to suggest, tacitly if not definitely, that in all that matters devout Jews and devout Christians [we]re identical'.³⁷ While careful to say that no one could be 'but pleased' with efforts that brought Jews and Christians together, he went on to caution that such collaboration 'always involve[d] on the side of the Christian a receding' from the biblical position on missions to Jews. What was needed, he urged, was 'utmost...desire for cooperation' in practical matters while preserving 'insistence' that 'the Gospel ha[d] no bounds'.³⁸ To ICCAJ Assistant Director Robert Smith the following week, Paton counselled to stand firm against any attempt to hold similar joint meetings in Scotland which did not preserve that 'insistence'.³⁹ He saw no objection so long as a joint meeting was conditional, but meetings between Jews and Christians had to be along lines of defined points, such as post-war settlement for Jews or combating antisemitism, and there had to be clear-cut recognition of differences on both sides. Indeed, Paton said there was 'a lot to be gained by Jewish-Christian collaboration on

³³ Paton to Carter, 26 November 1941, WCC.301.4331.10. See also Carter to Paton, 21 November 1941.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Carter to Paton, 4 December 1941, WCC.301.4331.10.

³⁶ Paton to Carter, 7 December 1941, WCC.301.4331.10.

³⁷ Paton to E.N. Cooper, 10 December 1941, WCC.310.4331.10.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Paton to Smith, 22 December 1941, WCC.310.4331.10. See also Smith to Paton, 17 December 1941, where it was explained that Rabbi Salis Daiches of Edinburgh, one of the delegates at the third Grosvenor House meeting, was attempting to hold a 'similar meeting in Scotland'. Even though Smith had already 'warned' colleagues about the inherent danger, he was seeking Paton's counsel on the possibility of a joint meeting that would not 'compromise on missionary questions'.

defined themes', so long as Jews understood that 'the Christian church remain[ed] a Christian Church, committed to the universal revelation of God in Christ. What Paton 'deplored' was any 'suggestion, open or tacit, that Christians c[ould] only cooperate with Jews [on] the public questions of the day by giving up the Christian claim of a universal evangelistic imperative'. What he urged of Smith and the Church of Scotland was to 'stand quite firm on this matter', which he termed a Christian 'imperative'.⁴⁰

All you have to do is to remain faithful to your fundamental position, to collaborate frankly on the basis of it...but to eschew as morally futile any kind of co-operation which tacitly annuls a part of the Christian witness.⁴¹

A month later, on 28 January 1942, Robert Smith applied this principle to the problem of post-war justice for Jews at a Jewish mission conference in Edinburgh. The purpose of the gathering, which had been in the planning since February 1941, was to consider 'what approach, if any, should be made to the Government to ensure [both] equal rights for Jews and freedom of opportunity for missionary work among them'.⁴² The topic was an unmistakable offshoot of the broader post-war planning for Jewish missions that had been launched with the June 1940 conference, and, as such, it was dominated by ICCAJ perspectives. All three of the keynote speakers were ICCAJ leaders who articulated long-held organizational views on the history of Jewish-Christian hatred, antisemitism, the Jewish problem, and Jewish missions. The issue before the conference was laid out in three overlapping parts: the problem of restoring political rights for Jews, the problem of restoring religious freedom for Jews, and the problem of doing so while preserving the Christian freedom to evangelize Jews. The goal, in other words, was not to convince of the need for restoration of human rights that were now denied Jews, but rather to distinguish 'rights' and 'freedom' so the same was not denied to those wanting to convert Jews. It was thus given without exception that all human rights must be secured for Jews in any post-war settlement, and this was made strikingly clear in the first part of the resolution adopted by the conference:

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² The planning for this 'Conference on Post-War Situation of Jewry' (28 January 1942) had been launched by the Church of Scotland General Assembly in February 1941. The conference report is a 25-page document which includes carefully recorded texts of three keynote speakers and a report on world Jewish missions of Presbyterian churches, as well as history and proceedings of the conference. All of the speakers had been delegates to the June 1940 United Conference on the Christian Approach to Jews. The introductory 'General Survey of the Jewish Problem', 2-10, was an extensive re-visitation and updating of views on antisemitism and the Jewish question that had appeared at the Budapest-Warsaw conferences. The 'Problem of Securing Political Rights for Jews', by Clephane Macanna, 10-14, was an elaborated version of Hoffmann's 1933 theory about the dilemma of the Jewish problem, namely, preservation of Judaism and Jewishness *or* assimilation of Jewry and Jewishness, and it broached the question of whether it was even possible to secure national/political rights while preserving a racial/national religion within a nation. Robert Smith's, 'Problem of Securing Religious Freedom for the Jews', 20-23, is discussed below. PP MS60 17/10/2.

...this Conference of representatives of the Presbyterian Churches of Great Britain and Ireland...having considered the position of Jews in the problem of post-war reconstruction, deploras any denial to persons of Jewish descent of the right of equal treatment before the law and of other rights due to their status as ordinary citizens, and urges that all governments shall take...steps to restore to the full status of human dignity such as Jewish people have been deprived...and, in particular, that all legislation unjustly diminishing the rights of Jews, as such, shall be repealed at an early date:

Yet it was also given without exception that the right to propagate the Christian faith to Jews must in no way be infringed upon by any liberty granted to Jews, but this was *not* overtly stated on the other side of the grammatical colon. The resolution continued:

recognizing also that liberty of consciences is a necessary condition of all understanding between races and nations, the Conference urges on all Governments the recognition of the unfettered right of every individual to free choice in religious faith and to the public profession and preaching of it so long as these rights do not run counter to public law and order.⁴³

It is only when looking behind the words of this second part of the resolution that one is able to see that it was as much *if not more* about preservation of the evangelizing rights of Christians than about the rights of Jews themselves. Smith had emphasised this point immediately prior to the deliberations leading to the resolution, arguing that religious liberty had to be viewed from the two critical aspects of 'freedom of worship' and 'freedom of missionary propaganda'.⁴⁴ The 'freedom of worship depended upon the freedom to follow the leading of a higher revelation of truth', so he argued, and that freedom was derived from the freedom of preaching that preceded it. There were thus *two* freedoms under consideration in all discussions, and the second could not be abandoned in lieu of the first, as was the case in 'goodwill movements [that] embrac[ed] both Jews and Christians'.⁴⁵ If 'human dignity' was to be secured for Jews, the Christian belief in a 'final and universal truth which reconciled all human differences' could not be silenced in 'appeasement'. Rather, it had to be vigorously expressed as 'something more solid than the rights of man, equal citizenship, or any of the other slogans of the emancipation'.⁴⁶ The problem was not how to get justice' or how to get cooperation, Smith insisted, 'but how to rescue the Jews from a spiritual ghetto...'.⁴⁷ Although the adopted resolution - which was later distributed to all Presbyterian churches - revealed nothing of the arguments lying at its heart, it did in fact shore up an unequivocal ICCAJ position which would not delimit post-war Jewish missions. In its urging and adoption of the 'unfettered right of every individual' to publicly profess and preach religious faith, it safeguarded on what were said to be strong theological grounds the right to

⁴³ Ibid., 'Conference on Post-War Situation of Jewry', 28 January 1942, 25.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Robert Smith, 'Problem of Securing Religious Freedom for the Jews', 20.

⁴⁵ Ibid., see also 15.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 20-22.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 22.

evangelize Jews while promulgating the benevolent notion that restoration of rights to Jews was a matter of great Christian concern.⁴⁸

II. As these deeply entrenched ICCAJ positional lines were being drawn on Jewish missions and post-war mission rights, ecumenical lines of a different sort were also being drawn. In early May 1940, before German aggressions spread into Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, and France, Visser't Hooft had issued a memorandum to WCCIF's Administrative Committee and other key ecumenical leaders which would result in an informal policy on official WCCIF statements. It had been eight months since outbreak of war and 'many Christian circles' were 'severely' criticizing WCCIF's silence. There was 'widespread conviction' that the ecumenical movement would fail if silence prevailed in the face of world 'struggles' and Visser't Hooft was now arguing that what had been said in the past was inadequate to the present 'tragic situation'.⁴⁹ In his opinion, an attempt to draft a WCCIF statement in January 1940 had been of no avail because the Provisional Committee had failed to see that the war was but one aspect of 'the great spiritual conflict' engulfing the world.⁵⁰ The intent of this May memorandum was to refocus thinking and bring home the 'reality' of the 'war behind the war'. His thesis was divided into two parts: a seven-page argument about the 'anti-Christian forces' that were moving the world toward 'spiritual and moral nihilism', and a five-page warrant for the spiritual and moral necessity of the Church to be neither silent nor neutral. The conflict was portrayed as 'a war in which great spiritual powers struggle[d] for possession of the human soul', and the portrayal was steeped in language which equated 'aggressively anti-Christian elements' with the 'powers of darkness'.⁵¹ The challenge being dealt to the Church in the face of 'forces' desiring 'de-Christianization of the world', Visser't Hooft argued, was to 'confess' itself wherever planted.⁵² The challenge being dealt to WCCIF, as ecumenical representative of churches, was to 'confess' the Church universal, and to do so in four ways. It had to speak out against 'anti-Christian forces' so that silence did not turn into 'compromise'; speak clearly about the supranational unity of the Church; speak warning about the dangers threatening that unity; and speak order to the nations of the world.⁵³ Moreover, it had to move from the realm of the political to the spiritual

⁴⁸ Ibid.; 'Conference of Post-War Situation of Jewry', 25. For distribution of resolution to Presbyterian churches, see BICCAJ minutes, 12 May 1942, WCC.261207. More will be said about this in Conclusions.

⁴⁹ W.A. Visser't Hooft, 'The Ecumenical Church and the International Situation', written in late April and issued in early May 1940, WCC. 301008. See also Visser't Hooft to Paton, 6 May 1940, WCC.261142.12.

⁵⁰ Ibid. For more of Visser't Hooft's views on the WCCIF meeting in January 1940 at Apeldoorn, Holland, see W.A. Visser't Hooft, 'The Genesis of the World Council of Churches' (1954), 708-710, prev. cit., and *Memoirs* (1973), 119-120, 133.

⁵¹ Ibid., 'The Ecumenical Church and the International Situation', 1-2. This language of metaphysical war was used some 17 times in the first four pages alone.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

and speak as one transcending Church body that shared mutual responsibility for failure to make its presence a living reality in the world.⁵⁴

Responses were of two types. The first was expressed solely by Robert Mackie, general secretary of WSCF, who declaimed the memorandum's emotive language on grounds that it was 'very dangerous to think, or write' in terms of 'spiritual warfare'.⁵⁵ Mackie did not object to the idea that there was 'a spiritual war in which no Christian c[ould] remain neutral', but, rather, to the use of indeterminate language which failed to distinguish human agency and, hence, implied that spirits of darkness controlled anti-Christian ideologies and movements. He was ultimately concerned that such language confused issues of spiritual deterioration with the 'actual warfare' that was taking place and, by so doing, confused ideas of societal justice by relegating them to the spiritual realm.⁵⁶

William Paton and William Temple expressed no such concern about language or its implications but focused instead on the suitability and feasibility of WCCIF speaking with a common mind. Paton's position was much the same as in the fall of 1939. He was 'doubtful about...a pronouncement by the officers of the World Council' and could see no point in it, for even if the Committee could find agreement it would merely reflect what had 'already [been] thought and said'.⁵⁷ There was also the problem of who would say it, being cut off as they all were by war, and, to Paton, it seemed of little worth for just 'a few to say, in the World Council capacity, what we have already been saying in other capacities'.⁵⁸ Temple's response was much weightier. The issues that had rendered stalemate at the January 1940 administrative meeting had yielded three distinct positions: that a statement should be made against aggressions and the suppression of freedoms; that any statement about the issues would jeopardize peace; that the ecumenical role should be mediation rather than confrontation of issues. In sorting out which was most suitable, Temple agreed with Visser't Hooft that 'a purely spiritual word' that focused on the overall failing of the whole Church rather than pointing a finger at any particular church or nation could indeed solve the dilemma.⁵⁹ But he could see no way in which such a statement could be made without the ecclesiastical authority to do so. WCCIF was still 'in formation' and would remain so until an assembly of world churches ratified its constitution and declared it

⁵⁴ Ibid., 5, 8-9, 10-12.

⁵⁵ Robert Mackie to Visser't Hooft, May 1940, 2, WCC.301009. For positions of Marc Boegner and William Adams Brown, see Visser't Hooft to Paton, 18 May 1940, and Visser't Hooft to Temple, 6 June 1940, WCC. 261143 and 420077.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Paton to Visser't Hooft, 3 June 1940, WCC.261143.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Temple to Visser't Hooft, 20 May 1940, is missing from WCC.42007, but appears in part in Visser't Hooft's *Memoirs*, 123, prev.cit.

complete. Even an unofficial or quasi-official statement was not possible unless the whole Administrative Committee could be brought together, the prospects of which were dimmed by escalation of the war.

Temple's concerns within this framework were two, and with explication of them came his WCCIF chairmanship authority about how the question of public proclamations would be handled.⁶⁰ The first had to do with the practical and contingent issue of ecclesiastical authority, as already discussed, but the second, which had been central since WCCIF inception, had to do with the overarching and essential issue of ecumenical unity. If WCCIF spoke 'corporately' it might erect 'fresh barriers', Temple warned, but, if WCCIF was 'silent because [it had] no authority to speak', the churches could come together after the war to rebuild unified 'Christian fellowship'.⁶¹ It would not only be difficult, he said, but 'almost impossible' for Christians from warring nations to come together in an organization which had either 'corporately taken sides' or 'officially condemned, directly or by implication'.⁶² Temple's solution, rather than attempting quasi-corporate statements that might exacerbate already existing problems, was 'to prophesy individually', and to do so by way of contact through the Geneva office, so that 'the same message w[ould] be given ecumenically...with a variety of emphasis'.⁶³ The official voice of WCCIF, in other words, would remain silent while its constituent parts would be directed and encouraged to speak by way of a unified ecumenical message being orchestrated from Geneva.

By the time Visser't Hooft responded to Temple on 6 June, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland had fallen, Germany had almost penetrated the last lines of French defence, and earlier concerns had gelled to a despair about whether an ecumenical movement could even exist in a world in which the Church was fighting 'a life and death struggle'.⁶⁴ It was an anxious response of conceptual 'buts' and 'howevers' which in the end reconciled with Temple's solution. Visser't Hooft acknowledged the problems of making corporate statements while believing that some attempt should be made, but he realized both the necessity and the war-time difficulties of coming together as a group to do so. He was also aware of the impossibility of *not* speaking-out if WCCIF principals were brought together at a time when the 'very foundations...of the whole of civilization [we]re shaking'. If that happened, he pointed out, it would be very difficult for 'people to feel that our Movement ha[d] any relation to the realities of the world'.⁶⁵ Yet - and this is a very critical yet - when Temple, Paton, Bell, Oldham, Leiper, Brown, and Visser't

⁶⁰ Temple to Visser't Hooft, 20 May 1940, is missing from WCC.42007, but appears in part in Visser't Hooft's *Memoirs*, 123, prev. cit.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Visser't Hooft to Temple, 6 June 1940, WCC.420077.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Hooft *were* brought together in London in April 1942, no such attempt was made to find even a quasi-official word. The occasion was Temple's inauguration as Archbishop of Canterbury, which could be argued as inappropriate or inconvenient for convening, but, given the world situation and the previously stated ecumenical concerns and urgings, such argument does not hold. Nor does it size with Visser't Hooft's own 1973 explanation about Temple's directive on WCCIF statements: 'if only one could have talked this out with Temple!'⁶⁶ It must also be said that at no time leading up to the 1942 gathering of WCCIF principals in London was there any discussion about the possibility of attempting a joint statement in lieu of joint meeting, even though all remained in close contact not only by mail but by way of hand-carried documents to and from Geneva, Great Britain, and America. Instead, the whole issue flagged from exhaustion as acceptance set in that the safest and most unity-preserving position was that WCCIF did not have the ecclesiastical power to make official pronouncements.

Indeed, this was articulated so *ad nauseum* that by December 1942 Karl Barth burst forth in an excoriating criticism at the end of a 49-page letter to American churches, entitled 'The Churches of Europe in the Face of the War'.⁶⁷ Barth 'deplore[d] the fact' that while studies, memoranda, conferences, visitations, and correspondences occupied those in Geneva, 'at no time was...the Ecumenical Movement *heard* in this decisive moment', not from 1933 to 1938 when embodied in UCCLW nor from 1938 to the present day when embodied in the WCCIF.⁶⁸ Whenever Barth questioned he 'was always told that the Ecumenical Council...had no authority, no commission, and no power to speak publicly and authoritatively ...'. He had heard over and over that the institution was just 'in process of formation' and thus 'incapable of taking action', and he found it not only 'deplorable' but 'tragi-comic' that a 'discernible form' of ecumenism had finally been attained but that was unable to act because it was 'engaged in some endless process of development'.⁶⁹ He rejected the idea that a 'publicly binding utterance of a real Council of the Churches...must... have the character of a papal encyclical', and thus refused as invalid any explanation of silence based on the argument that WCCIF did not have ecclesiastic power to speak. Instead of waiting for the churches of the world to give such power by a formal vote of confidence, the WCCIF 'should long ago, without asking leave, have given proof of spirit and

⁶⁶ Visser't Hooft's exclamation, as recorded in his 1973 *Memoirs*, 123, must be compared to his account of the same in 'The Genesis of the World Council of Churches' (1954), 710-711, *prev. cit.*, where no such concern was expressed. Temple's instructions were noted as a matter of fact that was not in need of explanation. By 1973, however, Temple's letter and surrounding events were clearly being explained apologetically.

⁶⁷ Karl Barth, 'The Churches of Europe in the Face of the War', 12 December 1942, was the first chapter of a three-part book, *The Church and the War*, trans. by Antonia H. Froendt, with Introduction by Samuel Cavert, published by Council on Foreign Relations (1942) and Macmillan (1944); see 46-49.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

strength even at the risk of being blamed for it...'. If WCCIF remained incapable of such action, Barth summed, it 'will be viewed in history as a friendly but impotent game like the League of Nations...which likewise became morally bankrupt because nobody felt inclined to accept the responsibility for endowing it with *power*'.⁷⁰

In spite of Barth's criticism, which was indeed seen as scathing in 1942, Visser't Hooft's position was unmoved and remained so with rare exception through the war, even though by his own account questions about what was being *unsaid* from Geneva persisted.⁷¹ Measured silence on aggravating issues that might thicken ecumenical barriers, however, did not mean silence on others. WCCIF spoke clearly on matters having to do with attitudes toward ecumenism at work in the war-torn world. WCCIF leaders were one in that respect, and all were fully agreed that the first line of action was standing in 'defence' of ecumenical principles.⁷² What was to be done within the parameters of Temple's solution was to use every means available to advance Church unity by advancing the *idea* of ecumenism, while providing evidence that ecumenical unity was emanating from the WCCIF centre at Geneva. Neutrality in a liaison capacity was viewed as the key to Geneva's role in maintaining relations between the churches of Europe and the rest of the world. The more that Europe was cut off by aggressions of war, it was held, the more incumbent it was for WCCIF to 'reiterate emphatically that the Ecumenical Movement is a fellowship of Churches which cuts across all geographical, political, or racial divisions...'.⁷³

A primary tool to herald that message was the ecumenical press service. By this time *ICPIS* was fully under the auspices of WCCIF and it was being published weekly from Geneva in three language editions. It was an invaluable information organ through which the Geneva centre maintained contact with its constituent world churches, which Visser't Hooft said might 'otherwise too easily forget...[its] existence'.⁷⁴ It was also being used as a means for saying what could not be said officially. As early as May 1939 Visser't Hooft had realized that there was no mechanism in place for planting statements that could not be said straightforwardly, and he had introduced the practice of using *ICPIS* to distribute press statements that were preceded by the

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ For initial response to this criticism, see Visser't Hooft to Cavert, 27 November 1942, FCC B9F19, where he charged Barth with an 'unhistoric and unrealistic conception of what the Ecumenical Movement is and what it is not'. See also 'The Genesis of the World Council of Churches' (1954), prev. cit., 710-711, where he admitted matter-of-factly that 'friends and critics often asked why the World Council did not speak out concerning the great issues which were at stake'. For a 1973 version, see *Memoirs*, 134-135, where he 'did not take that challenge lightly', 'agreed with Barth that the ecumenical movement should have been able to fulfil this 'watchman's office' but 'could not disregard the conviction of our most responsible leaders (especially William Temple)...'.

⁷² Visser't Hooft to Paton, 18 July; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 18 September; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 1 November 1940; WCC.261142.

⁷³ Visser't Hooft, 'Strictly Confidential: The Future of Ecumenical Work in Europe', July 1940, WCC. 301009.

⁷⁴ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 24 Feb 1939, WCC.261142.

words, 'we have received the following from ecumenical sources'.⁷⁵ One of the earliest 1939 planted drafts was in fact an article on the reasons that ecumenical statements on international issues could not be officially made.⁷⁶ The press service was also used extensively as a tool of 'ecumenical education and propaganda', and was thus integral to dissemination of ecumenical principles emanating from studies conducted in the WCCIF research department. By the close of 1940, for example, 'The Ethical Reality and Function of the Church' was underway as the primary war-time study of the department, and soon to be launched was a related study on 'The Preaching of the Church in This War'.⁷⁷ An attendant *Ecclesia Militans* Series followed in early 1941 with the specific aim of teaching constituent churches how to be transformed into militant confessing bodies, while strengthening those who were already involved in struggles against 'formidable adversaries'.⁷⁸ Church statements which could be read as standing in defence of Church integrity were collected as protest-witness to both war-torn and supporting churches, and by early 1942 some forty of these from ten countries were being distributed under the title *The Church Speaks to the World* as illustration of *Ecclesia Militans* in action. The idea at work, as in all war-time messages from Geneva, was that ecumenical unity and solidarity necessarily preceded a *Una Sancta* that could withstand anti-Christian forces.

An essential part of the WCCIF message was preparation for re-Christianization of the post-war world. Although Robert Mackie had been opposed to Visser't Hooft's language describing the spiritual 'war behind the war' in May 1940, he and others were united on what had to be done to win the spiritual war. Instead of waiting for the post-war world to begin, however, Mackie had argued forcefully that the 'ecumenical movement' must begin immediately to herald the message that 'the Church holds the secret of the world's salvation'.⁷⁹ Whether by such urging or conditions created by the war, WCCIF became involved in missions to a much greater degree than would have been the case had there not been widespread war. Visser't Hooft had recognized as early as mid-September 1939 that relations with Christians in Germany could be influenced by ecumenical concern for German missionaries and missions during the war, and had offered WCCIF to IMC as its continental liaison to German missions.⁸⁰ By the following

⁷⁵ Visser't Hooft to Temple, 1 May 1940, WCC.420077.

⁷⁶ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 24 February 1939, prev.cit. For drafts of planted stories on both the impasses of making a common declaration and the Godesberg Declaration, ca. May 1939, see WCC.301008.

⁷⁷ WCCIF Provisional Committee Report, July-December 1940, FCC B23F1; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 18 July, 18 September 1940; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 1 November 1940, WCC.261142.

⁷⁸ *The Church Speaks to the World* (Geneva: WCCIF, 1942) consists of statements between 1931-1941. For the *Ecclesia Militans* series and discussion, see WCC.213.1187; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 15 January and 24 November 1941, WCC. 261142.16; van Dusen to Visser't Hooft, 27 November 1941, WCC. 301009.

⁷⁹ Mackie to Visser't Hooft, May 1940, prev.cit.

⁸⁰ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 13 September 1939, WCC.261142.9

July WCCIF was also acting as intermediary to Dutch missions and by September work in the same capacity had been extended to French missionary societies.⁸¹ Within months Geneva was producing surveys of what was being done on behalf of European missions, with the idea that the documentation would 'counteract...anti-ecumenical tendencies' which questioned the validity and efficacy of WCCIF.⁸² By December 1940 a section on 'Missions' which illuminated WCCIF involvement had been added as a regular feature of the Provisional Committee Report.⁸³

In the same period Visser't Hooft was vigorously championing the work and emphasis of Hendrik Kraemer, who, in association with Conrad Hoffmann, would head the first post-war WCC conference on official Church attitude toward Jewish missions.⁸⁴ Kraemer was recognized by IMC as a leader in the work of bonding churches with missions, and, when asked to produce a signature volume on the topic in 1938, he had clarified in three ways that Church 'obligation' to evangelize Jews was not only 'as stringent' but 'even more stringent' than it was for the 'rest of the non-Christian world'.⁸⁵

In the first place...the Jewish people and its history is more intimately related to the divine economy of revelation in Christ than any other people. In the second place...the Jews are living in millions in the area of the Christian Church, and are therefore the most obvious objects of its apostolic calling. In the third place, the empirical church owes to the Jews, especially in the present time, a clear demonstration of what Christianity really means.⁸⁶

Like other WCCIF efforts during the years of war, Visser't Hooft's heralding of Kraemer's emphasis was an attempt to promote ecumenical integration of all aspects of the Church. As Paton had argued at the June 1940 mission conference, in concert with Kraemer, missions to Jews were the 'acid test' of church missions to the rest of the world and, hence, indicator of the efficacy of Christianity's call to evangelize the world. WCCIF promotion of Jewish missions was thus seen as a necessary part of the ecumenical movement's evangelical purpose. Moreover, as mission efforts were taken on by WCCIF as part of its concrete work during the war, IMC and ICCAJ were drawn more and more into the WCCIF post-war vision that was being disseminated from Geneva. Indeed, Visser't Hooft's initiatives to harness and promote war-

⁸¹ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 18 July and 18 September 1940, WCC. 261142.

⁸² Paton to Visser't Hooft, 1 Nov 1940; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 29 November 1940; WCC.261142.

⁸³ WCCIF Report on the Work of the Provisional Committee, July-December 1940, FCC B23F1.

⁸⁴ Hendrik Kraemer, Professor of Religions at University of Leiden, was later appointed Director of the WCC Ecumenical Institute in 1946. For Visser't Hooft's heralding of Kraemer, see for example Visser't Hooft to Hoffmann, 4 February 1941, WCC.420038; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 4 February 1941 and 27 March 1941, WCC.261142.14; Visser't Hooft to Mott, 10 April 1941, WCC. 420057. ⁸⁴ Ibid., 227-228. For Conrad Hoffmann's heralding of Kraemer's reasons for Jewish missions as validity for ecumenical missions to Jews, see 'The Responsibility of the Church to the Jews in the Present World Crisis', 12 December 1941, WCC.261201.7.

⁸⁵ Hendrik Kraemer, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1938), 227.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

driven collaboration on missions as manifestation of ecumenism marked a critical signpost on the road toward a post-war collaboration that would bring ICCAJ more and more under the wings of WCCIF.

III. The other major area of war-driven ecumenical collaboration was refugee relief. As mentioned in the previous chapter, even before outbreak of war Visser't Hooft wanted to call church-wide attention to the ecumenical task 'implicit' in WCCIF's refugee office.⁸⁷ It was to be another concrete way in which WCCIF could demonstrate its efficacy to advance ecumenical reality. That Conrad Hoffmann had been named as chief officer of the WCCIF refugee initiative in August 1939 is significant - even though outbreak of war prevented his appointment - for it signals that refugee relief was rooted in the mission imperative, even though aid to the suffering was to take immediate precedence. From ICCAJ perspective in early 1940 refugee work was a major task of Jewish mission work for four primary reasons: first, as aid and support of non-Aryan Christians; second, as evidence of Christian love for Jews; third, as an advance toward improved Christian-Jewish relations; and fourth, as a learning laboratory from which new and improved mission strategies and plans could be deduced for post-war planning. From WCCIF perspective in October 1944 all of that was being accomplished by an 'approach' which did not emphasize missionary motives but had significant 'missionary importance'.⁸⁸ Even though the WCCIF announcement of its refugee initiative in April 1939 had made clear that efforts would be directed toward non-Aryan Christians, the complex mix of refugee populations in internment camps after the outbreak of war had stretched WCCIF intention incrementally to include aid to Jews as conditions and urgency demanded. European Jews 'from all classes of society and of all shades of belief' were thus helped by Christian relief funded by WCCIF, and, consequently, they were becoming 'acquainted with the Christian Church through its loving witness'.⁸⁹ Such interaction through relief - which was referred to as 'living contact between the ecumenical movement and the Jews' - was self-analyzed by October 1944 to have 'produced' the result of breaking down 'ancient enmity and deep rooted mistrust' so that 'a freer hearing of the message of Christ' was possible.⁹⁰ By providing the 'connection and dialectic between relief work and Jewish missions', WCCIF's refugee office was thus self-viewed as paving the way for a 'class' cooperation with ICCAJ in the areas of post-war refugee relief and Jewish missions.⁹¹

The aid emanating from the WCCIF refugee office during the war years is a laudable story of ecumenical collaboration to relieve the physical and spiritual suffering of refugees, but

⁸⁷ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 26 April, 1 May, 6 May 1939, WCC.261142 and 301008.

⁸⁸ Freudenberg to Birger Pernow (vice-chairman of ICCAJ), 4 October 1944, WCC.301.4331.9.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

it also a story of what was known about the antisemitic atrocities against those refugees *and* what was being said privately and publicly about it. The many-dimensional role of information plays throughout both stories, for what was known determined the practical relief work that needed to be done, on the one hand, and it constituted the basis for humanitarian and moral judgments about protests, on the other. Information was also a determinant of the financial aid doled out by WCCIF, for its operations were dependent upon donations, and donations were dependent upon the information used to solicit them. The main determinant was of course the spread of German aggressions creating additional refugee populations and locations. But it was also the case that information being parcelled out about those refugee populations influenced donations, and that funding, often stipulated by donors, played a critical role in determining the refugee locations that would receive WCCIF aid.

Collaborative sharing of refugee information within the ecumenical network was robust from the onset of the war, and much of what was known in the early years came from existing mission sources.⁹² Details in WCCIF's 1939 Christmas report on 'The Jewish Reservation Near Lublin' that was used to solicit funds for non-Aryan Christians, for example, were supplemented by mission reports on conditions in Berlin, Hamburg, Prague, Vienna, Warsaw, Cracow, Lwow, Lodz, Bialystok, and Wilno which had been transmitted by ICCAJ members involved in refugee work. Robert Smith, in turn, incorporated the Lublin report into his own reporting on 'The Effect of the War on Jewish Mission Work' at the ICCAJ post-war planning conference in June 1940. When Visser't Hooft met with Smith in March 1940 as part of WCCIF effort to strengthen collaboration, he in turn then carried to Geneva the latest report on refugees who had fled to the havens of England and Scotland.⁹³

On that same trip Visser't Hooft carried information from the High Commission for Refugees in London which signalled a change in WCCIF representation of the Jewish reserve in Poland.⁹⁴ At the time he had learned from the High Commission that transports to Lublin had been halted, WCCIF appeals were built around requests for emigration funding that would prevent German non-Aryan Christians from being placed on those transfers. This corrective made clear that change in refugee appeal was necessary, but there were other reasons for shift of refugee emphasis. Even with the WCCIF Lublin report and its harrowing use of the term

⁹² For examples of early 1940 reports coming to ICCAJ from Jewish mission fields, see Gerhardt to Paton, 12 January 1940; Standley to Gill, 19 January 1940; Gill to Standley, 20 January 1940, WCC. 261201.7.

⁹³ Visser't Hooft to Freudenberg, 15 March 1940, WCC.261244.7.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* The High Commissioner was concerned that ongoing reports about transfers to Poland would reduce the amount of aid given to central European countries. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee had already reduced allocations for refugee aid in Switzerland, Belgium, and France in order to increase relief efforts in eastern Europe. A related concern was that withdrawal of Jewish funds would lead to increased antisemitism in the central European countries bearing the brunt of the refugee burden.

'extermination', refugee donations had only trickled in, and did not do so substantially until after Germany's May 1940 aggressions on Luxembourg, Belgium, Holland, and France.⁹⁵ By September, with refugee populations fleeing to unoccupied France and rumours that 'a radical solution of the whole problem [wa]s being envisaged' there, the WCCIF refugee office was more and more focused on Christian non-Aryans in southern France, and very few cases of 'emigration from Germany [were] being dealt with'.⁹⁶ The transfer of 7500 German non-Aryans to internment camps in unoccupied France in October was an even stronger determining factor, for the plight of those refugees stirred the 'giving' of Swiss Christians on an allocated basis.⁹⁷ By December 1940 Visser't Hooft was thus reporting that the concrete reality of ecumenism was at work in the internment camp at Gurs where relief was being coordinated for 800 non-Aryan Protestant Christians by a Protestant French pastor working on behalf of WCCIF.⁹⁸

This relief work in the internment camps of unoccupied France allowed WCCIF access to first-hand reliable information on refugee conditions and increasing Nazi atrocities. Donald Lowrie, a 1927 delegate at the Budapest-Warsaw Conferences on Jewish missions and present head of the Coordination Committee for Relief Work in Internment Camps in France, was the principal source of information during the 1942 summer deportations of Jews to Poland.⁹⁹ As agent of the YMCA World Committee Donald Lowrie reported directly to Tracy Strong in Geneva and John Mott in America. Strong, who also made trips to the camps, was in turn a key source of information to ecumenical leaders in London and the Geneva Emergency Committee of Christian Organizations (ECCO), of which Visser't Hooft was an integral part.

Visser't Hooft too made trips to unoccupied France, reporting in a 'confidential' series on the European church situation which was issued by the WCCIF Research Department. He

⁹⁵ In contrast, and reflective of the way in which refugee aid flowed through WCCIF in the early years of war, appeals for POW work had reaped two and a half times as much funding. Refugee funds in early May 1940 amounted to 4000 SF as compared to 10,000 in POW funds. A year later funds for non-Aryan Christian refugees and POWs were still being recorded respectively as having 'great financial difficulties' and having 'no financial difficulties' at all. Funds spent on refugees in 1941 was 80,000 SF compared to the same for the first six months of 1942. That spent in 1943 was 350,000 SF as compared to 250,00 for the first six months of 1944. See Visser't Hooft to Paton, 18 May 1940, WCC. 261142.12, and Visser't Hooft to Mott, 10 April 1941, WCC. 420057; Confidential Minutes of Provisional Committee Meeting, 13-14 July 1942, and WCCIF Report on Activities During July 1943-July 1944, FCC B23F1.

⁹⁶ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 18 July 1940; Visser't Hooft to Paton, 18 September 1940, WCC.261142.

⁹⁷ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 29 November and 6 December 1940; Paton to Visser't Hooft, 1 November 1940, WCC.261142. See also Visser't Hooft to Hoffmann, 2 October 1940, WCC.420038.1; Report of the Work of the Provisional Committee, July-December 1940, FCC.B23F1. The Swiss fund were stipulated for German non-Aryan Christian refugees of non-French nationality in the Gurs Internment Camp.

⁹⁸ Charles Toureille, the coordinating pastor appointed by WCCIF in fall 1940, was previously an officer of the World Alliance for Friendship Between the Churches. For Toureille's relations with the WCCIF Refugee Office, see Tela Zasloff, *A Rescuer's Story: Pastor Pierre-Charles Toureille in Vichy* (University of Wisconsin Press, 2003).

⁹⁹ The Coordination Committee for Relief Work in Internment Camps, involving 25 relief organizations, was founded by Lowrie in November 1940. The group came to be known as the Nimes Committee.

was there in both April and September 1941 and each report reflects aspects of his attitude on public pronouncements. In the April report, which reveals expectations about public protests, he levelled complaints about both the French Protestant Reformed Church and Marc Boegner who was head of that Church.¹⁰⁰ He criticized the French Church for not having taken a public stand on the 'main national issues', and he criticized Boegner for taking a stand that was 'personal and confidential' rather than public.¹⁰¹ While he indeed granted that Boegner had 'intervened again and again at Vichy' on issues of racial legislation, he yet regretted that there had been no *public* statement which made clear the overall position of the French Protestant Church on 'moral and spiritual issues', going so far as to express 'demand for a clear affirmation by the Church of its convictions'.¹⁰² That Visser't Hooft criticized Boegner, who was chairman of the administrative committee of the WCCIF, is an important illustration of how he was embracing his own role as orchestrator of a common ecumenical message. Although WCCIF itself was not in the business of public statements, as stipulated by Temple's directive in May 1940, Visser't Hooft clearly expected WCCIF constituents to speak publicly on issues affecting the integrity of the Church as evidence of the ecumenical spirit emanating from WCCIF.

The report of Visser't Hooft's trip to unoccupied France in September brings into bold relief his attitudes about suppression and transmission of information. The 'Strictly Confidential' report was organized according to sections that were not to be published 'in any shape or form' and sections that could be published without 'mention of origin'.¹⁰³ His summation of refugee conditions in the portion of the report which could be quoted was described as 'tragic', but all of the more content-laden statements were those which could not be published in any form.¹⁰⁴ The general facts of the camps - 'very bad' overall conditions, 'cases of real cruelty', 'terrible things' happening during requisitions for labour, inhumane treatment by guards - could not be made known publicly because 'publication would make it impossible to continue the work'.¹⁰⁵ A boundary was drawn, in other words, between information that was being transmitted only to ecumenical leaders and that which could be passed along more publicly. Among information that could be transmitted was the ecumenical nature of the work being conducted in the camps,

¹⁰⁰ 'Not for Publication: Notes on the Situation in France', April 1941, WCC.301.0113.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. For details on Boegner's interventions, see Marc Boegner, *The Long Road to Unity* (London: Collins, 1970); Richard I. Cohen, 'Jews and Christians in France During World War II: A Methodological Essay', Otto Dov Kulka and Paul R. Mendes-Flohr, *Judaism and Christianity Under National Socialism Impact of National Socialism* (Jerusalem: Historical Society of Israel, 1987), 327-340. For his 'Strictly Confidential' letter to the Grand Rabbi of France, 26 March 1941, expressing pain for the 'innumerable trials and injustices' imposed by the October 1940 French racial legislation, see WCC. 301.4319.3.

¹⁰² Ibid, 'Not for Publication: Notes on the Situation in France', April 1941.

¹⁰³ 'Strictly Confidential: Notes on the Situation of the Church in Europe, No. 3, Autumn 1941, WCC. 301.43.29.3.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

where 'non-Aryan Christians [were] speak[ing] of the 'ecumenical' meals, 'ecumenical' shoes, and 'ecumenical' literature which they were receiving through WCCIF.¹⁰⁶

Also within Visser't Hooft's 'Strictly Confidential' September 1941 report, sent out in early November, was notification that 15,000 Jews from Berlin and 10,000 from elsewhere in Greater Germany had been forcibly deported to Poland in October. There was more information available to him at the time, however, and his handling of it is important not only in itself but because it was used in the same non-public way for which he had criticized Boegner six months earlier. Instead of public protest or public informing, Visser't Hooft had written on 29 October to Carl Burckhardt, chairman of the Mixed Relief Committee of the International Red Cross. In terms of information about deportations from Berlin, he relayed that transports from Vienna to Poland had been moving for some time; that Jews from the Rhineland were 'already there or en route'; and that 2000 more were to be transported from Prague. His speculation was that this 'wave' was the 'beginning of the complete deportation of Jews and Christians of Jewish origin from the Reich and the Protectorate'. He also informed of conditions on the receiving end in Poland, particularly those in the Warsaw ghetto, where famine, typhus, and a mortality rate of 26% in children under three were spreading. This December 1941 letter to Burckhardt was a request for the IRC to investigate the 'urgent needs' of Polish and Jewish populations in the Warthegau (which included the Lodz ghetto) and the General Government (which included the Lublin Reserve as well as the Warsaw ghetto). Visser't Hooft's stated reason for the request was that 'the Jewish question touch[ed] the centre of the Christian message' and 'neglect of the Church to raise its warning and protective voice' would constitute disobedience to God.¹⁰⁷

By summer of 1942 the WCCIF refugee office had received more reports on conditions in the ghettos of Lublin, Warsaw, Lodz, Riga, and Wilna, and these too were passed on to the Mixed Relief Commission by Adolf Freudenberg, who, without mentioning Visser't Hooft's earlier letter, urged that the IRC 'relieve the fate of these unfortunate people in every possible way'.¹⁰⁸ Neither IRC response nor WCCIF public protest was forthcoming, however, and no effort was made by Visser't Hooft to approach Burckhardt in writing again until the end of the year, by which time the situation in Poland was widely known to be that of extermination.

In the interim, Donald Lowrie's reports about deportations from non-occupied France to the ghettos of Poland were a key source of WCCIF information. Detailed memoranda from Lowrie began immediately after the first trains evacuated the first non-French Jews in the first

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Visser't Hooft to Burckhardt, 'Memorandum Zur Lage in Polen', 29 October 1941, with copy to Dr. Max Huber (president of IRC) WCC.301.4331.7; see Snoek, *The Grey Book*, 270-272, for English translation.

¹⁰⁸ Freudenberg to Mixed Relief Commission of the International Red Cross, 3 June 1942, Snoek, 272.

days of August 1942.¹⁰⁹ As chairman of the Nimes Committee, he had learned on 30 July that 10,000 Jews were to be deported within the month, 3600 of which would be taken in four shipments on 6, 8, 10, and 12 August. The destination was 'uniformly reported' as the Jewish reservation in Poland, Lowrie said, but since 'epileptics, palsied, insane, and even bedridden' were being taken, a 'need for labour' did not explain the deportations.¹¹⁰ The best that he and his colleagues had been able to 'imagine' was that 'the general German plan for a new Europe include[d] 'purification' of undesirable elements'.¹¹¹ Two weeks after the first trains he reported that numbers had been increased and that 15,000 more were to be deported by 29 September.¹¹² As the net continued to widen, according to his 17 September report, exemptions were reduced, 'categories' were 'altered almost daily to include more Jews', and there was no indication of abatement.¹¹³ Estimated deportations to date were 10,495 and the 'revolting' conditions under which they had been carried out were clearly illustrated by Lowrie's graphic details of the 'bestial violation of all principles of human dignity and respect'.¹¹⁴

In addition to Lowrie's memoranda about transports *from* internment camps, WCCIF was also receiving various reports about arrival of trains and 'measures of extermination being applied on a large scale' on the other end.¹¹⁵ One of the September 1942 informants, a 'reliable German source with close relations to certain military and industrial circles', relayed details of the arrival of trains from France, Holland, and Belgium, partially filled with corpses that were being used in the 'manufacture of soap, glue, and train oil'. That report also stated that Nazis had ordered scientific studies of 'methods of extermination and utilization of corpses'.¹¹⁶ Another report, written in code that had been unravelled, explained that Jews used in heavy industry 'seem[ed] to be' the only ones exempt out of 600,000 in Warsaw and that Jews were being removed from the city to a rural location to carry out the killings.¹¹⁷ WCCIF had also learned of the existence of gas chambers and killing centres through the Swedish diplomat Baron von Otter, who had received details of the killing programs at Treblinka, Belzec, and Sobibor on 19-20 August from Kurt Gerstein, a 'Confessing Churchmen who [had] entered the SS in order to

¹⁰⁹ Donald Lowrie, 'Confidential Memorandum to Tracy Strong', 10 August 1942, WCC.301.4329.3.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Lowrie to Tracy Strong, 'Third Memorandum re Measures Applied to Foreign Jews in Non-occupied France', 25 August 1942, FCC B9F19.

¹¹³ Lowrie to Strong, 'Fourth Memorandum re Measures Applied to Foreign Jews in Non-occupied France', 17 September 1942, WCC.301.4329.3.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. See also 'Fifth Memorandum re Measures applied to Foreign Jews in non-occupied France', 7 October 1942, Donald and Helen Lowrie Papers, University of Illinois Special Collections.

¹¹⁵ The reports appear in a document entitled 'Note', 22 September 1942, which is actually a collection of notes beginning 12 September, WCC.301.4331.6.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

find out the truth'.¹¹⁸ According to Visser't Hooft's later statements, he himself was made aware of Gerstein's 'story of the gas chambers' by the end of August or early September 1942.¹¹⁹

The other line of information feeding into WCCIF in the same period came through Gerhart Riegner, Secretary of the World Jewish Congress in Geneva, who had been in touch with the refugee office since November 1940. On 10 August 1942, the same day that Lowrie issued his report on the first transports from non-occupied France, Howard Elting, U.S. Vice Consul in Geneva, had forwarded a memorandum on his 8 August meeting with Riegner, which contained firsthand information about exterminations from a prominent German with 'excellent political and military connections'.¹²⁰ That transmission, later known as the Riegner telegram, is a well-known story of suppression based on disbelief, but it is also a story of suppression based on the *belief* that the information being relayed bore 'earmarks of war rumor inspired by fear...'¹²¹ As such, the telegram lay buried until Stephen Wise, president of the World Jewish Congress, received a copy of Riegner's report on 28 August. His subsequent contacts with the U.S. Undersecretary of State resulted in the request that information not be made public until verified. Wise, in turn, waited, and on 24 November announced at a widely publicized press conference in New York that the State Department had confirmed that two million European Jews had already been killed in Hitler's plan of total extermination.¹²² The British section of the WJC followed with a circular letter on 27 November - which also found its way to WCCIF's pool of information - to the President of the Methodist Conference, Moderator of the Church of Scotland Assembly, the Archbishops of Canterbury, York, Wales, and Cardinal Hinsley.¹²³ The

¹¹⁸ Visser't Hooft, 'WCC Action at the Time of the Extermination of Jewish People', 3 March 1965, WCC.301.4331.6.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. For Gerstein's full report made in May 1945 shortly before his suicide, see 'The Gerstein Report', Aktion Reinhard Camps at Holocaust Research Project. See Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, 1030, prev. cit., who says Baron von Otter 'reported existence of the killing centers to Stockholm, but the Swedish government did not disseminate the information'.

¹²⁰ Gerhart Riegner to Visser't Hooft, 14 April 1965, WCC.301.4331.6. Riegner's letter was in response to Visser't Hooft's March 1965 inquiry about his documentation of any WCC action taken during 'the extermination of the European Jews'. See also Howard Elting Jr. to United States Secretary of State, 10 August 1942, 'Conversation with Mr. Gerhart M. Riegner', <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/newsusdept.html>.

¹²¹ Harrison to US Secretary of State, 11 August 1942, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/newsusdept.html>. For more on the Riegner telegram see Walter Laqueur and Richard Breitman, *Breaking the Silence* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Christopher Browning, 'A Final Hitler Decision for the "Final Solution"? The Riegner Telegram Reconsidered', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, V10 N1(1996), 3-10.

¹²² See Deborah E. Lipstadt, *Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-1945* (Touchstone, 1986), 184-185, who reports that *Christian Century* described those claims as echoes of 'propaganda triumphs of the First World War', asking if 'any good purpose was served by making such announcements', and claiming that the US State Department did not agree with the claims of WJC.

¹²³ A.L.Easterman and N. Barou to President of Methodist Conference, Rt. Rev. Moderator of the Church of Scotland Assembly, Cardinal Hinsley, Archbishop of Wales, Archbishop of Canterbury, Archbishop of York, 27 November 1942.

letter called solemn attention to the campaign of 'exterminating the entire Jewish population' in occupied countries, urging that church bodies lend their voices and aid 'to save the remnants of the Jewish people of occupied Europe'.¹²⁴

Versed as he was in this inpouring information Visser't Hooft's was one of those voices raised. But, as in fall of 1941, it was in a request to Burckhardt at the International Red Cross rather than in a public statement. While referring to his earlier letter, Visser't Hooft reported to Burckhardt that the situation in Poland 'had deteriorated in an alarming way' and that it now included 'mass executions' of both Polish Jews and Jews deported to Poland.¹²⁵ A 'distinguished German', whose reliability he said could be guaranteed, had informed WCCIF 'that at one place in Poland, 6000 Jews - men, women and children - [we]re being shot every day', that 'executions [were being] made in three groups, each of 2000 persons', and that it had 'been going on for weeks'.¹²⁶ Repeating again his purpose for writing the letter, Visser't Hooft said that the 'Jewish question touch[ed] the centre of the Christian message' and that he was therefore 'compelled to raise our voice anew on behalf of these people who are being threatened with extermination'. His request to Burckhardt on this occasion was the same as in fall 1941: that IRC 'take urgent steps to send delegates to the areas in question'.¹²⁷

It was not until March 1943 that a more public request was made by WCCIF, and, when it was, it was not without backroom controversy over what should and should not be officially said. It was, in fact, the second of two such controversies in the first three months of 1943 and Visser't Hooft was at the heart of both. The first involved a statement by Archbishop Temple, chairman of WCCIF and artificer of the May 1940 directive on official WCCIF statements. Temple had preached a sermon in mid-January that mildly criticised the Confessing Church in Germany for 'making no specific protest against the treatment of Jews and Poles' and, to the dismay of many, including his own, *The Times* had singled out his quotation and it was picked up by the world press.¹²⁸ Visser't Hooft was chief among those objecting to Temple's criticism, and he did so on grounds that statements implying that the Confessing Church 'had not taken a clear attitude and had even failed miserably' could have a 'real bearing on future relationships' with German churches.¹²⁹ He also criticised that Temple had preached an earlier sermon which warned of a 'penal element' at the end of the war, arguing that the 'nations concerned w[ould]

¹²⁴ Ibid. See also 'Private and Confidential' circular letter, which detailed 14 'measures taken' by the British section of WJC in response to reports of mass extermination; WCC.301.4331.6.

¹²⁵ Visser't Hooft to Carl Burckhardt, 3 December 1942, translated from French, Snoek, 272-73. *GreyBook*, prev. cit.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid. Freudenberg repeated the report about executions in a confidential letter to Cavert, 9 December 1942; FCC B9F19.

¹²⁸ Temple to Paton, 22 January 1943; Paton to Temple, 25 January 1943, WCC.301.4331.7.

¹²⁹ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 27 January 1943, WCC.261142.17.

need no other punishment than that which [wa]s implied in the course of historical events...'.¹³⁰ With mind unchanged Visser't Hooft returned to those criticisms in early April, urging Paton that 'clarifications' were 'badly needed'.¹³¹ What was 'needed' on the penal issue was clarity on whether Temple was inclined toward punishment for all who were directly responsible, or 'punishment of whole nations'. What was 'needed' to correct the impression that the Confessing Church 'had not protested at all' was to acknowledge that at least some protests had been made. While it was understood that the Confessing Church had not 'spoken out as clearly as it should', Visser't Hooft argued, there had been cases in which stands were made 'in relation to euthanasia and the persecution of Jews' and the 'chief thing' was that they had had been made, even if they had not been made publicly.¹³²

It was at this point of Visser't Hooft's criticism of Temple that his own statements came under fire. William Paton learned from High Commissioner Sir Herbert Emerson on 8 April that Visser't Hooft had issued a joint Aide Memoire with the World Jewish Congress in late March, and that he had done so in the name of the World Council of Churches. That Visser't Hooft would 'take action in the name of the whole Secretariat without consultation' was an incendiary matter for Paton, and after reviewing the document it was also a matter of avid dissent.¹³³ 'Being somewhat an expert in the matter', it seemed to him as if Visser't Hooft 'had to some extent swallowed the Zionist proposals', and he made clear in backroom criticism to colleagues and the High Commission that he deeply regretted his co-secretary of WCCIF had 'gone in so definitely with the World Jewish Congress', which he viewed as 'Zionist'.¹³⁴ After deliberating the issue at the Office of the High Commissioner, his specific objections coincided with those of Emerson. The document hinged on the claim of its first point - that the most acute and urgent refugee problem was the 'deliberate extermination of the Jews' - and it was this that was so ardently rejected by both Emerson and Paton.¹³⁵ Emerson, who assumed that the Memoire was drafted by the WJC, held that 'Jews made a great mistake in speaking only of Jews and in systematically

¹³⁰ Ibid. Visser't Hooft deigned it wrong 'to give the impression that...punishment...w[ould] be imposed by any group of men or nations'.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Visser't Hooft to Johansson, 6 April 1943, which was a coded way of sending letters to Paton in London and Cavert in America, WCC.301.4331. See also Paton to Cavert, 6 May 1943, FCC.B9F20.

¹³³ Emerson to Paton, 7 April 1943; Paton to Emerson, 9 April; Paton to Emerson, 16 April 1943; WCC.301.4331.7.

¹³⁴ Ibid.; Paton to Carter, 16 April 1943; Carter to Paton, 19 April; Paton, 'Note of Conversation with Sir Herbert Emerson', 20 April; Paton to Carter, 20 April; Paton to Temple, with copy to Bell, 14 May 1943; WCC.301.4331.7.

¹³⁵ Aide Memoire by the Secretariats of the World Council of Churches and the World Jewish Congress, 22-24 March 1943. The Aide Memoire appears in four forms: notes dated 9 March 1943; a second draft, with editing in the handwriting of both Visser't Hooft and Freudenberg; the form submitted to designees by letter on 22 March; a telegraph summary, 24 March; WCC.301.4331.7. See C. Norton to Gerhardt Riegner, 24 March 1943; Riegner to Norton, 24 March 1943.

disregarding the fact that a very large number of refugees of all kinds [we]re not Jews at all'.¹³⁶ According to Paton, he considered such singular 'attitude of the Jews [to be] a fostering cause of anti-Semitism'.¹³⁷ While Paton did not extend that charge to Visser't Hooft, the implication was that his participation in the broadcasting of the document gave credence to 'excessive Jewish propaganda'.¹³⁸ Emerson held, and Paton agreed, that the Memoire plan for 'immediate rescue' - exchange of Jews for German civilians and *en bloc* admission of Jews into Allied countries - would increase antisemitism in Britain if German civilians were exchanged for Jews in lieu of British prisoners'.¹³⁹ The attendant idea of 'abrogating' security measures by admitting Jews *en bloc* was equally disdained as 'wild-cat thinking' of an impossible nature.¹⁴⁰

To view these objections in perspective it is necessary to recognise that talk of Jewish extermination and the need for urgent action was widespread and public in March 1943. By the time the Aide Memoire surfaced unequivocal acknowledgement and condemnation of Jewish extermination had been issued by mass rallies in New York; the International Federation of Trade Unions; the governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United States in a joint United Nations statement; and all had called for immediate rescue of Jews.¹⁴¹ Yet there was a strong undercurrent of claims moving below the public surface which held that Jews should not have preference in either refugee relief or rescue. As set out in memoranda between the diplomats arranging the upcoming April Bermuda Conference on the refugee problem, the British Embassy had stated on 20 January 1943 that 'the refugee problem c[ould] not be treated as though it were a wholly Jewish problem', and the American Secretary of State had affirmed on 25 February that 'the refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race or faith'.¹⁴² Even though the Aide Memoire did not overtly challenge the presuppositions of those planning the Bermuda Conference, by affixing the World Council name to it Visser't Hooft was

¹³⁶ 'Notes on Conversation with Sir Herbert Emerson', 20 April 1943. See also Paton to Carter, 20 April 1943, with copies to both Temple and Bell on 14 May 1943; WCC.301.4331.7.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Paton to Temple, 14 May 1943, with copy to Bell; Paton to Bell, 24 May 1943; WCC.301.4331.7.

¹³⁹ 'Notes on Conversation with Sir Herbert Emerson', 20 April 1943, prev. cit.

¹⁴⁰ Paton to Carter, 20 April 1943, prev. cit.

¹⁴¹ United Nations Statement on the Murder of European Jews, 17 December 1942; www.jewish virtual library.org/jsource/UN/un19421.html; International Federation of Trade Unions, 'Extermination of Jews by the Nazis', 11 December 1942, WCC.301.4331.6. See Lipstadt, *Beyond Belief*, 190-205, for echo of protests in the international press. See Lawson, *The Church of England and the Holocaust*, 82-86, for protests by the Anglican hierarchy in the same period.

¹⁴² British Embassy to the Department of State, 'Aide Memoire: Refugees from Nazi-Occupied Territory', 20 January 1943, U.S. Department of State *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1943, Volume 1, 134-137. See also U.S. Secretary of State to British Ambassador, in response to British Aide Memoire of 20 January 1943, WCC.301.4331.7. Gerhardt Riegner to Visser't Hooft, 14 April 1965, WCC.301.4331.6.

seen as arguing in the name of constituent world churches *against* those presuppositions, which were shared by Emerson and Paton.

Although it is not fully apparent as to why Visser't Hooft joined the WCCIF name to the Memoire without consultation with Paton, it appears as if he believed he was acting within the parameters of what could be said, on the one hand, and that he felt an enlarging sense of his role in orchestrating what should be said, on the other. His efforts to reorganize refugee work under a proposed department of post-war reconstruction of Christian institutions had already received nods of approval from both America and Britain, including Paton's, and the weight of those preparations had been resting in his hands since late September 1942. As a result of that sense of enlarging capacity, his understanding that 'the Jewish question touche[d] the centre of the Christian message' had spilled over from efforts of relief to efforts of research on the Jewish question, and the WCCIF refugee office was in the process of collecting 'documents on the churches and the Jewish question' for publication.¹⁴³ His heralding of the idea that the Church must act on the belief that 'the word of salvation [is] for the whole of humanity and for all realms of life', including that of world order, was also an informing factor.¹⁴⁴ That he aspired for WCCIF to contribute to international decisions that would bear on post-war issues affecting world order is clear, as is his increasing awareness of the 'ecumenical value' of interventional acts that demonstrated WCCIF efficacy.¹⁴⁵ There was also the hovering problem of silence and the gauntlet thrown down by Barth in December 1942.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, just days before engaging with the March 1943 Aide Memoire, he had written to Paton that Barth was 'on the warpath' again over the silence issue.¹⁴⁷ Yet, although Visser't Hooft was concerned about Barth's challenge that WCCIF would be viewed as 'impotent' in its continuing silence, it would be a mistake to view that concern in isolation of its evolving context.¹⁴⁸ As confided to Paton in the same March letter, Visser't Hooft had also begun to realize that WCCIF principals had too readily accepted their difficulties as 'reasons for silence', and that not enough effort had been made to speak 'as a Council'.¹⁴⁹ While it is possibly the case that this emerging awareness figured into his decision to act without consulting Paton, however, it did not affect the way in which Visser't Hooft acted. The Aide Memoire was a carefully measured proposal for a plan of rescue based on an *already* widely-publicized claim that the most urgent refugee problem stemmed from the Nazi campaign

¹⁴³ WCCIF Report on Activities During the Period July 1943-July 1944, FCC B23F1.

¹⁴⁴ Visser't Hooft, 'The Church and International Reconstruction', FCC B9F20.

¹⁴⁵ Visser't Hooft to Cavert, 16 October 1942, where the 'ecumenical value' of relief action for the Church of Greece is weighed, FCC B9F19.

¹⁴⁶ Barth, 'The Churches of Europe in the Face of the War' (December 1942), prev. cit.

¹⁴⁷ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 6 March 1943, WCC.261142.17.

¹⁴⁸ Barth, 'The Churches of Europe in the Face of the War', prev. cit.

¹⁴⁹ Visser't Hooft to Paton, 6 March 1943, prev. cit.

of Jewish extermination. The document was not a protest per se and it stayed well within the WCCIF pattern of measured approaches that would not threaten ecumenical unity.

As far as can be determined there was only one instance in the course of the war when WCCIF stepped outside of those self-imposed boundaries to publicly protest extermination of Jews. The statement was issued some fifteen months later and it is significant not only in its strong urging, but also because it was prefaced by an unequivocal clarification of the WCCIF non-protest policy that had guided refugee work:

The Ecumenical [Committee] for Refugees exists in order to give material and spiritual aid to refugees of all faiths. Its main task is therefore to relieve the suffering of the refugees rather than to protest against the treatment meted out to them. But there are situations in which the only aid we can give is in the form of a solemn and public protest. To-day this is the case.¹⁵⁰

The situation sparking this exception to WCCIF non-protest policy in late June 1944 was accumulating information on rapid Nazi extermination of Hungarian Jews at Auschwitz. Before looking at the rest of the statement, however, it is important to look at the information that preceded it. The day after Nazi occupation of Hungary on 20 March, Gerhart Riegner had called for 'chiefs' of Protestant and Catholic churches, among others, to launch a 'world wide appeal' to Hungarians, urging them 'not to admit application of policy of extermination of Jews'.¹⁵¹ Visser't Hooft and Freudenberg responded immediately by cabling George Bell in London to support Riegner's request, pointing out that 'numerous Christians' were among the 800,000 Jews whose destiny was in danger, but WCCIF itself did not make public appeal.¹⁵² In the interim between Riegner's cable and the eventual WCCIF protest in late June, there were three reports comprising 107 densely packed pages of 'hard and fast facts' on rapidly changing conditions of Hungarian Jewry, dated 30 April, 19 May, and 5 June, all of which were datelined Geneva.¹⁵³ The precise detail about enactment of innumerable antisemitic decrees, newspaper quotations about 'the Jewish question in Hungary [being] liquidated once and for all', and official statements about 'ghetto resettlement' and transports 'into the interior of the country' is stunning in its compound nature. Yet the accumulation of these reports did not tip the scale enough for WCCIF to step outside its self imposed boundaries until two highly detailed reports about actual methods of extermination and numbers of Jews being systematically exterminated

¹⁵⁰ Ecumenical Committee for Refugees Statement, *ICPIS*, No. 26 (June 1944); appears also in Snoek, *The Grey Book*, 281, prev. cit.

¹⁵¹ Riegner cable to S.S. Silverman, with copy to WCCIF, 21 March 1944, WCC.301.4331.7.

¹⁵² Visser't Hooft and Freudenberg to Bell, 23 and 30 March 1944, WCC.301.4331.7.

¹⁵³ Quotation, 'A Concise Summary of the Situation of Hungarian Jews' (22pp), 30 April 1944. 'Recapitulation and the Second Report on the Situation of Hungarian Jews' (50pp), 19 May 1944. 'Third Report on the Situation of Hungarian Jews' (35pp), 5 June 1944. WCC.301.4329.6.

at Auschwitz fell into hand. The first was an abridged version of a 32 page report written by Jewish escapees about the full extermination process, later known as the Auschwitz Protocols, and, the second, an attendant report on the present accelerated extermination of Hungarian Jews.¹⁵⁴ The subsequent WCCIF protest, without either signatories or the WCCIF name, appeared shortly thereafter in *International Christian Press and Information Service* during the last week of June, some three months after Riegner's initial cable requesting public protest by Protestant and Catholic churches.

Trustworthy reports state that so far some four hundred thousand Hungarian Jews are deported in inhuman conditions and, in so far as they have not died on the way, brought to the camp of Auschwitz in Upper Silesia where, during the past two years, many hundreds of thousands of Jews have been systematically put to death. Christians cannot remain silent before this crime. We appeal to our Hungarian Christian brethren to raise their voice with us to do all they can to stop this horrible sin. We appeal to Christians of all countries to unite in prayer that God may have mercy on the people of Israel.¹⁵⁵

While this was indeed a laudable statement of protest, and a much needed voice, it was not exceptional in the broader picture of protests being made. As made clear on 26-27 June by the U.S. Legate in Bern, 'individuals, groups and organizations, private and public, officials of all kind, ha[d] been vainly protesting and seeking to express their indignation at this outrageous and unspeakable conduct...'.¹⁵⁶ Yet the statement of protest was exceptional when viewed in the unbroken line of WCCIF non-public protest between 1940 and 1944 - and it was exceptional in essence as well. Both of the WCCIF letters to the IRC, October 1941 and December 1942, had been based on the understanding that 'the Jewish question touch[ed] the centre of the Christian message' and that an unraised voice would be disobedience to God and neglect of Christian duty. The June 1944 statement, which had obviously been touched by something more deeply human than a 'question' and a 'message', was shorn of all such justification even though it was still framed within a Christian context. There was no attempt at all to justify the strong claim that 'Christians cannot remain silent before this crime' *except* for the urgency of ongoing and rapid systematic extermination of Jews. As Visser't Hooft revealed to William Temple and Samuel Cavert the following month, 'the revelations about the fate of the Jews deported from

¹⁵⁴ The abridged version of the Auschwitz Protocols and its attendant report on extermination of Hungarian Jews are in German, untitled, undated, and marked 'not mention source of report', WCC. 301.4329. Randolph Braham, *Politics of Genocide*, says 'evidence is overwhelming' that both documents were forwarded to Switzerland on 19 June by a leader of Hungarian Jewry (Krausz), creating a 'locus' of diplomatic activity in summer 1944, 978-979, 1021.

¹⁵⁵ *ICPIS*, No. 26 (June 1944). Snoek, 281, says the statement was picked up by *Basler Nachrichten* on 29 June and *Jewish News* (London) on 18 July.

¹⁵⁶ The U.S. Legate was quoting Secretary of State Cordell Hall, 'Secretary's Press Conference', No. 153, 26/27 June 1944, appeared in *Basler Nachrichten* 27 June; WCC. 301.4330.6.

Hungary [had] made a deep impression...', one which, it must be emphasized again, prompted WCCIF to step outside its guarded boundaries on public protest.¹⁵⁷ It must also be mentioned, although it was not an exclusively WCCIF action and most likely initiated by Karl Barth, that copies of the two harrowing documents which had precipitated this public response were mailed to ecumenical leaders under a 4 July cover letter signed by Barth, Emil Brunner, Visser't Hooft, and Paul Vogt, without any corresponding request of confidentiality.¹⁵⁸

Two further points must be taken into consideration. At roughly the same time in which WCCIF was making this significant exception in its non-protest policy, Visser't Hooft was reiterating the importance of WCCIF's non-protest policy. In the same confidential letter to Temple and Cavert wherein his 'deep impression' about the fate of Jews had been expressed, he related that demands were being made for the 'ecumenical movement [to] raise its voice' on the issue of Allied systematic bombing of whole cities as well. In so doing - even though he had stated confidentially in late 1943 that Allied bombardment of German cities was the main moral concern of the war - he praised WCCIF Administrative Committee Chairman Marc Boegner for handling this issue of Allied bombing 'in the truly ecumenical fashion', namely, by 'refus[ing] to make any public protests on the question, though there ha[d] been much pressure'.¹⁵⁹ WCCIF overarching concern about post-war ecumenical relations, in other words, influenced decisions about speaking out on issues *other* than persecution of Jews as well, and it applied to all WCC constituent nations. The Aide Memoire jointly issued by the WJC and Visser't Hooft in March 1943 had stated that the most urgent refugee problem was the 'deliberate extermination of the Jews', *but* Visser't Hooft had argued to Temple some nine months later that if the bombardments of German cities continued, 'it will be the Allies who have killed far more civilians than the Nazis ever succeeded in killing'.¹⁶⁰ An inverted shift in this thinking occurred in June 1944, after receiving over a three month period 107 pages of documentation, topped off by the Auschwitz Protocols and its attendant report, all of which detailed evidence of a particularized Nazi animus for Jews. In terms of the second point that must be considered, while WCCIF stepped outside its own self-imposed boundaries to make 'solemn and public protest' against

¹⁵⁷ Visser't Hooft, Confidential Memorandum to William Temple and Samuel Cavert, end of July 1944, WCC.301.4330.6.

¹⁵⁸ Untitled letter in German, 4 July 1944, WCC.301.4331.7. Translation in Snoek, 223: 'We send to you...two [documents]...and a covering letter dated June 19, 1944, which came from reliable sources and reached Switzerland through diplomatic channels. The [documents] have shocked us deeply. Out of a sense of responsibility we feel it our duty to convey these [documents] to you. We do not doubt that you will read them and let them circulate within your own group'.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Visser't Hooft explained to Temple and Cavert that he had responded to requests for WCCIF statements on Allied bombing by saying that 'we cannot begin to speak on this issue at this late date', while promising that he would again 'underline [the] gravity' of the matter to Temple.

¹⁶⁰ Visser't Hooft to Temple, 15 December 1943, WCC.420077.

Nazi extermination of Jews, it was also the case that the powerful sentence 'Christians cannot remain silent before this crime' was removed from the statement in the German edition of *ICPIS*.¹⁶¹ This of course was in keeping with WCCIF's pattern of not drawing attention to German Church silence in order to advance ecumenical unity.

IV. Although Visser't Hooft and Paton were at complete odds on what could be said about Jewish refugees in March 1943, they were in full agreement about the necessity of Jewish evangelization. In the same period in which Visser't Hooft was orchestrating European refugee efforts from Geneva, Paton was the undeterred London force behind initiatives to advance the Jewish mission agenda and bring ICCAJ into closer association with the post-war structure of the WCC. Indeed, Paton's central role in advancing ICCAJ and WCCIF collaboration in this period cannot be overstated. As a result of the ongoing work of tracking redistributed Jewish populations and analyzing post-war allocations of Jewish mission fields, Paton and the BICCAJ had determined that post-war European missions had to be closely linked to both refugee relief and mission rehabilitation, as well as reconstruction of churches and mission-related boards. The WCCIF plan for reconstruction of European Christian institutions, which had been drafted in September 1942 with the aid of Samuel Cavert, called for the creation of a Department of Reconstruction, and by December Paton was stressing the importance of integrating ICCAJ into those plans. By mid 1943 he was eyeing the possibility of an ICCAJ deputation to inquire about reconstruction of Jewish work in Europe, and by early 1944 consultations were in progress for an ICCAJ office under auspices of the post-war Reconstruction Department, one that would be responsible for 'practical study of the Jewish question' and 'coordination of Christian work on behalf of Jews and Jewish Christians'.¹⁶²

At the same time Paton was orchestrating ICCAJ's post-war alignment with WCC he was also pushing war-time initiatives that would ensure church support for Jewish missions in the post-war period. From late fall 1940 through February 1941 he was engaged in discussion with theological colleges at Cambridge, Edinburgh, Manchester, and Oxford in order to secure a university lectureship for Hans Kosmala, who was being championed as 'one of the ablest

¹⁶¹ Hartmut Ludwig, 'Christians Cannot Remain Silent About This Crime: On the Centenary of the Birth of Adolf Freudenberg', *Ecumenical Review* Vol.46 No.4 (1994), 475-485, 476. When Ludwig queried in 1974, Freudenberg 'could not remember why the phrase was left out of the German edition'.

¹⁶²For ICCAJ discussions and plans for association with WCC Reconstruction, see BICCAJ Minutes, 4 December 1942, WCC.261207; CBMS Minutes, 7 June 1943, WCC.261229.2; BICCAJ Minutes, 30 September 1943, WCC.26213.3; BICCAJ Minutes, 8 February 1944, WCC.261207. For WCCIF reconstruction plans and approvals, see 'Confidential: Reconstruction of Christian Institutions in Europe', WCCIF Provisional Committee, 15 September 1942; Cavert to Paton, 24 November, FCC B9F20; Strong to Visser't Hooft, 24 November, FCC. B9F19; Paton to Cavert, 18 February 1943; Cavert to Visser't Hooft, 12 March 1943, FCC B9F20.

Continental Christian students of the modern Jewish question'.¹⁶³ Kosmala had been in London since late 1938 when the Institutum Judaicum Delitzschianum was moved from Vienna, but after war ensued he had been interned as a German national until Paton secured his release in fall 1940. Paton's championing of Kosmala is significant, for his work focused on historic aspects of Christian-Jewish relations by exposing alleged 'causes on the Jewish side which led to present misunderstanding[s] between Jews and Christian'.¹⁶⁴ The lectureship he sought for Kosmala was the first of three projects involving such emphasis, each of which explicated modern Jewish problems as related to the fundamentals of Christian faith.¹⁶⁵ Kosmala's subsequent lectures on antisemitism and the Jewish question to University of Cambridge faculty and theology students in early 1941 served as the basis for *The Jew in the Christian World*, published by the Religious Book Club in March 1942, and that in turn served as the theological foundation for a Christian Institute for Jewish Studies, organized along the lines of the war-folded Delitzschianum in October 1943.¹⁶⁶ Paton's intention behind all of this was to bring the credibility of scholarship to Jewish missions, to hone and promote arguments for the theological validity of missions to Jews, and to counter any tendency toward a 'goodwill' attitude that hindered Jewish mission efforts.

Concurrent with these initiatives was a retreat from the ranks of ICCAJ which would have significant bearing on the developing ICCAJ issue with Jewish-Christian collaboration. W.W. Simpson's resignation from ICCAJ in November 1941 is important not only in that respect, but also because his eight-year involvement with ICCAJ reflects a much different view than is current in scholarship.¹⁶⁷ Contrary to the understanding that he was a pioneer advocate of Christian-Jewish relations *sans* evangelization of Jews, Simpson's appearance on the missionary landscape in 1933 marked the first instance of British Methodist Church involvement in Jewish missions. He was hired in April 1933 by the Methodist Church Missionary Society to work under supervision of the British Society for Propagation of the Gospel Among the Jews, and he was hired specifically to develop a 'Christian apologetic' for modern educated Jews.¹⁶⁸ After introducing himself to James Parkes, announcing his conversionist 'convictions', and asking to no avail for assistance with Jewish contacts in London, Simpson moved into the realm of

¹⁶³ Paton to Flew, 15 November 1940, WCC.261213.7.

¹⁶⁴ Kosmala to Paton, 11 November 1940, WCC. 261213.7.

¹⁶⁵ Paton to Flew, Cambridge, 15 November 1940, was one of 58 letters between November 1940-April 1941 which detailed Paton's promotion of Kosmala to theological colleges; WCC. 261213.7-9.

¹⁶⁶ *The Jew in the Christian World*, co-authored by Kosmala and Robert Smith (London: SCM Press, 1942). Extensive correspondence on both book and institute is located at WCC.261213.

¹⁶⁷ Simpson's involvement with ICCAJ is drawn from extensive documents in WCC.261207, 261219.31; WSP MS66 1/3/4; PP MS60 17/8/1; as well as 8 years of BICCAJ and ICCAJ minutes and reports.

¹⁶⁸ E.W. Thompson (Methodist Missionary Society) to Frank J. Exley (British Society for Propagation of the Gospel Among the Jews), 22 April 1933; Thompson to Simpson, 22 April 1933, WSP MS66/1/3/4.

ICCAJ by way of his immediate supervisor, Rev Frank Exley, who was an executive member of BICCAJ.¹⁶⁹ From July 1934 to November 1941 he worked uninterruptedly with ICCAJ, first as an appointed member of BICCAJ, and, beginning in April 1936, as a British appointee to the executive ICCAJ. In the early years of Simpson's involvement he was instrumental in founding a youth council with conversionist intentions which he sought unsuccessfully to bring under the ICCAJ banner,¹⁷⁰ affirming on multiple occasions that the youth council's 'aim [wa]s definitely the evangelisation of the Jews'.¹⁷¹ Parkes sensed that Simpson was 'slowly coming round' to a revised position on conversionist organizations in June 1936, but that was also the period in which Simpson was appointed to the executive ICCAJ.¹⁷² That he would go ahead and remain in that appointment for the next five and a half years suggests more questions than are possible to address here, but evidence suggests that it is perhaps more an illustration of the way in which Simpson sought benefit from each side of the Jewish evangelisation issue than it is of any

¹⁶⁹ Simpson to Parkes, 15 November 1933. Parkes made clear in a letter on the same day that he stood 'on the other side of the hedge' and would not advise 'how to make contacts...for a purpose which [he] deeply regret[ted]'; Parkes to Simpson, 15 November 1933, PP MS60 17/8/1.

¹⁷⁰ Documentation which challenges the historiographic belief that Simpson and the youth council were 'not missionary in intention' includes some 51 letters, organizational drafts, and reports between June 1934 and October 1936. From the youth council's inception in summer 1934, Simpson sought ICCAJ approval and official recognition. He had in fact assumed that it would be called the 'Youth Section' of the ICCAJ, but he was not forthcoming to ICCAJ about some members pressing for Jews to be included. After being informed by BICCAJ leaders, Paton laid out the condition that neither ICCAJ, IMC, nor the British Conference of Missionary Societies could recognize the youth council so long as its status about evangelisation vs. goodwill was uncertain. Simpson's response in fall 1934 was unequivocally that 'our aim is definitely the evangelisation of the Jews'. This, he had no problem affirming in letters, but such clarity failed to translate to his submitted draft of council aims a few months later. Paton requested again that reference be made 'to missionary work among Jews', and Simpson responded that there was 'no was no hesitation in the mind of any member' that their goal was to 'educate...young folk so that they will be driven to face up to the missionary implications of Christianity in its relation to Judaism'. Yet his revised statement of aims was still equivocal and made no specific mention of missionary work among Jews, even though, according to an accompanying letter, he felt that the 'force' of that conviction was apparent. Simpson revealed more about this evasiveness three months later, hoping that it would clarify his position so that the statement would meet the approval of ICCAJ. He had written 'informally' to the youth council secretary, pointing out that the council would 'almost inevitably...compromise [itself]' by inviting Jews to join as members...because they would...impose certain conditions to which it would be very difficult for us to agree', but he did not want to discuss the matter openly, for the less publicly said about 'efforts of an "official" character the more likely we are to succeed'. Simpson did not want the youth council to 'typed' 'in any way, but he did want the support of ICCAJ, IMC, and BCMS 'in the background'. BICCAJ was not convinced by his shuffling nor did it believe that the issue was settled. It was unanimously agreed that 'a group in which Jews were actually members... could not do what [you say] is in your mind, namely to afford a...meeting place for [youth] who are profoundly concerned with the Christian approach to the Jews, including the whole question of evangelism'. Although 'sympathetic' with the concept of a youth council on Christian-Jewish relations, the decision in February 1935 was that 'the best and happiest arrangement' with ICCAJ would be more informal than had been promoted. ICCAJ continued its financial and secretarial support, and Simpson continued seeking approval for plans, but youth council stationary did not, as Simpson had earlier envisaged, carry an ICCAJ associated title. For claim of Simpson's non-missionary intentions, see Braybrooke, *A History of the Council of Christians and Jews*, 7; see WCC. 261216.31 for documentation to the contrary.

¹⁷¹ Simpson to Paton, 26 July 1934, WCC.261219.31.

¹⁷² Parkes to Rev. Parbrook (Methodist Church of Durham), 16 June 1936, PP MS60/17/8/1.

struggling conviction.¹⁷³ Both before and after Simpson's appointment to the executive ICCAJ in 1936, he served on major committees of ICCAJ conferences, presented papers, participated in multiple recorded discussions, and nowhere in the documentation is there any indication of his dissent from ICCAJ views on Jewish missions, the Jewish question, or antisemitism. Yet, while not dissenting from ICCAJ, it is also the case that he was being incrementally influenced by Parkes' theology on the perdurability of the covenant at Sinai; that he was growing weary of restrictions placed on advancement of Christian-Jewish relations by overt declaration of mission intention; that he (like other more progressive ICCAJ members) was displeased with traditional missionary society methods of evangelizing Jews. When Simpson resigned from ICCAJ in November 1941, Paton thus tried to reason with what he judged to be his 'wobbly' theological position, but he did not attempt to dissuade his resignation. Paton later learned that Simpson was resigning in preparation for the general secretaryship of the emerging British 'goodwill' Council of Christians and Jews.¹⁷⁴

By the time word of these developments reached America and Hoffmann's reaction made its way back, it was spring 1942. Having determined that 'goodwill' councils of Christians and Jews 'undercut' evangelistic efforts, Hoffmann ordered a counter 'educational' programme to be launched in British churches which would forewarn of the attendant danger to the Jewish evangelization enterprise.¹⁷⁵ Simpson learned of Hoffmann's call to action on 15 April and immediately forwarded extracts of the letter to Parkes.¹⁷⁶

Up to this point James Parkes had not publicly attacked the ICCAJ or the ecumenical movement in name, but this act of initiating sabotage of efforts between Jews and Christians to combat antisemitism constituted, in his words, a time of 'showdown'.¹⁷⁷ He began with William Temple, who was not only Provisional Committee chairman of WCCIF but chairman of the emerging Council of Christians and Jews as well. Temple was also the recently-installed

¹⁷³ In the same period that Parkes wrote about his 'coming round', for example, Simpson acquiesced to Hoffmann's judgment about the possibility of Parkes being appointed as chairman of the youth council. Hoffmann's argument was that his involvement would negatively affect the 'Jewish missionary societies and agencies' that were currently cooperating with ICCAJ, that it would possibly 'cause a stampede from our ranks, and probably...jeopardize your own position in relation to Exley's Committee, if not to your Methodist Church Board'. No indication can be found that Parkes was ever aware of Simpson's discussion with Hoffmann. Hoffmann to Simpson, 9 June 1936, WCC.261219.31.

¹⁷⁴ Standley to Hoffmann, 4 December 1941, WCC.261201.8. As will become clear in the next chapter Simpson's resignation did not affect his conviction about Jewish missions, nor did it negatively affect his desire to maintain relations with ICCAJ. Six months after resigning from ICCAJ he was 'disturbed that members of the Committee might think he wanted to separate and break off contacts'; Kosmala to Paton 2 January and 21 May 1942, WCC.261213.6.

¹⁷⁵ Hoffmann to Macanna, 5 March 1942, PPMS60/17/2.

¹⁷⁶ Simpson to Parkes, 15 April 1942, PP MS60/17/10/2, along with extracts of Hoffmann to Macanna, 5 March 1942.

¹⁷⁷ Parkes to Temple, 16 April 1942, PP MS60/17/10/2; Parkes to Walter Kotschnig, 2 June 1942, PP MS60/16/449.

Archbishop of Canterbury and, in that capacity, Parkes asked him to 'stand [against] adoption of an official missionary attitude to Judaism' by refusing his patronage to the Church Mission to Jews.¹⁷⁸ While Temple had not yet been approached for Jewish mission patronage, he made clear to Parkes that his interest in 'Christian-Jewish friendship' did not preclude 'equal interest in attempting to convert Jews', and that, if he had to choose, the latter would 'take precedence'. His understanding, like that of Hoffmann, Paton, Visser't Hooft and others, was that missions to Jews were 'a Christian obligation'.¹⁷⁹

Ten days later Parkes put into circulation a memorandum entitled 'Christianity and Judaism: Conversion or Co-operation?', the intention of which was to stir discussion on Christian missionising policy.¹⁸⁰ The paper was grounded in the thesis that official Christian missions to Jews warred against the efficacy of cooperation that was needed between Christian and Jews to combat antisemitism.¹⁸¹ In the minds of Christian respondents, however, the issue of antisemitism was unrelated to official church attitudes on Jewish missions and after being initially rejected it was not mentioned in the ensuing five month debate. The first rejection had come from Canon John Campbell of Canterbury Cathedral, secretary of Church Missionary Council and soon to be member of BICCAJ, who charged that Parkes' thesis was based on an 'emotional reaction to the dangers of antisemitism'. While granting that Parkes was looked to in the area of antisemitism, Campbell reproved him for involving himself in 'controversial historical and theological issues' of Christian-Jewish relations.¹⁸² Edwyn Bevan, Professor of Religions at Oxford, shared Parkes' concern for the 'horrors' of antisemitism and 'dreadful wrongs' that Christians had inflicted on Jews in the past, but held firmly that such concern did not equate to a 'viable' case for the change in Christian tradition which Parkes was suggesting.¹⁸³

The point of agreement brought to the forefront in all of the sharply stated criticisms and rebuttals between April and October 1942 was unequivocal rejection of Parkes' plea for reevaluation of official Christian attitudes toward missions to Jews. Temple, whose responses were short and to the point, maintained that 'missionary attitude toward the Jews' should not be abandoned, but that methods could be improved.¹⁸⁴ Paton, who charged Parkes with 'prejudice against those concerned with missions to Jews', rejected the claim that Christians and Jews

¹⁷⁸ Parkes to Temple, 16 April 1942, PP MS60/17/10/2.

¹⁷⁹ Temple to Parkes, 19 April 1942, PP MS60/17/10/2. .

¹⁸⁰ Parkes, 'Christianity and Judaism - Conversion or Co-operation?', 29 April 1942, MS60/17/10/2.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Canon John McLeod Campbell to Parkes, 8 May 1942, PP MS60/17/10/2. Campbell was appointed to the board of BICCAJ on 12 May 1942, BICCAJ Minutes, WCC.261207.7.

¹⁸³ Edwyn Bevan to Parkes, 12 May 1942, PP MS60/17/10/2. Bevan had been called upon in the past by ICCAJ to refute Jewish complaints about Christian evangelization of Jews. See Bevan, 'Considerations of a Complaint Regarding Christian Propaganda Among Jews', *IRM*, Vol. 22, Issue 4, 1933, 481-499.

¹⁸⁴ Temple to Parkes, 11 May 1942. See also Temple to Parkes, 5 October 1942, PP MS60/17/10/2.

could only come together successfully if they did so in absence of a missionary attitude.¹⁸⁵ He also denied that Christians could only approach Jews on a basis of equality, arguing on the grounds that Christianity was in possession of something that Judaism not only lacked but was in need of.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, he went on to elaborate to the 1942 anniversary meeting of Church Mission to Jews a few months later that those who did not believe in 'an imperative behind the preaching of the Gospel to the Jews...h[ad] surrendered something which [wa]s vital to the Christian faith'.¹⁸⁷ Temple also addressed Church Missions to Jews later that fall in an attempt to harmonize missionary intentions with advancement of Christian-Jewish relations, by pointing out that the 'great enterprise of missions to Jews is prompted by our Christian spirit'.¹⁸⁸

To keep these responses in perspective, C.H. Gill, general secretary of Church Mission to Jews, was also chairman of ICCAJ, BICCAJ, and the BCMS Committee for Work Among Jews, and, in all of these capacities, he was one of Paton's driving forces in post-war planning of Jewish missions. Gill had also been chairman of the June 1940 mission conference that set those plans in motion, as well as chairman of the sub-committee that produced the projected fields of 'occupation' in September 1941. Gill, like Paton and Temple, held that Jewish missions were manifestation of the Christian spirit and therefore benevolent in nature, but, like Temple, Paton, and others, he was increasingly aware that methods of approach to Jews were 'often extremely gauche' and that there was need for 'even greater tact than [wa]s called for in other efforts to convert'.¹⁸⁹ They all remained assured, however, that ICCAJ and its constituencies, including Church Missions to Jews, were engaged in a 'noble but difficult work', an ongoing part of which was research on new and non-alienating methods that would reflect Christian love for Jews in the post-war world.¹⁹⁰ With this as context, it was also the case that Parkes' insistent call for reappraisal of official Church policy on Jewish missions between April and October 1942, coupled with the actual emergence of the British Council of Christians and Jews, brought into bold relief for them that 'doubt' did in fact exist about the Christian position on evangelization of Jews.¹⁹¹

It was at this point that Paton's twin initiatives began to take shape in the forms of a Christian institute to stress the theological basis for Jewish missions, in the first instance, and ICCAJ collaboration with WCCIF to herald the message in post-war Europe, in the second.

¹⁸⁵ Paton to Parkes, 19 May 1942, PPMS60/17/10/2.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Parkes, 'Third Memorandum on Conversion or Co-operation', 30 September 1942; Paton to Parkes, 2 October 1942, PPMS60/17/10/2.

¹⁸⁸ Temple, Extract from *The English Churchmen*, 15 October 15 1942, PP MS60 17/19/2.

¹⁸⁹ For example, Temple to Parkes, 19 April 1942, 11 May 1942, 5 October 1942; PP MS60/17/10/2.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ BICCAJ Minutes, 4 December 1942, WCC.271207.

While the latter was contingent on post-war plans emanating from WCCIF in Geneva, the former was a developmental aspect of mission planning which had been in process since the 1927 Budapest-Warsaw conferences. That the Christian Institute for Jewish Studies was developed in *reaction* to the emerging Council of Christians and Jews is clear, but it would be a mistake to say that it was wholly reactive. Hoffmann had urged as early as January 1940 that the Institutum Judaicum Delitzschianum could be of service in the study of mission methodology, and the June 1940 mission conference had discussed its potential use for the training of Jewish missionaries.¹⁹² The decision in December 1942 to proceed with the Institute was made with this history but it was primarily influenced by the launching of what was perceived to be a challenging 'goodwill' organization. In fact, the official November launching of the Council of Christians and Jews prompted Paton to argue that its formation 'made it all the more important to strengthen the basis of missionary work by sound scholarship' on the Christian imperative to evangelize Jews.¹⁹³ The battle to be fought against CCJ and other 'goodwill' bodies, as perceived at the time, was in the area of promulgating an indubitable biblical validity for Jewish missions *as Christian duty*, while countering all 'goodwill' or 'toleration' reasons for placing that duty in abeyance.¹⁹⁴

There was yet another highly significant factor informing ICCAJ's decision to launch the Institute, which must not go unmentioned. It was also the case that the potentiality of an official Christian institute to strengthen and theologically validate ICCAJ mission initiatives was well in line with the post-war planning that had been under way since January 1940. Over the course of some three years Jewish refugee populations had been tracked as best as possible to determine redistribution figures for post-war allocations of Jewish missions and geographical mission spheres. By the time the decision was made in March 1943 to establish the Christian Institute for Jewish Studies, the redistribution of Jewish refugee populations was being studied with the ongoing aims of developing the best possible plan for not only geographic spheres and mission allocations but for field-specific training as well. As illustrated by the demographics in Table VI below, which were being discussed in December 1942, some 5,083,330 Jews were accounted for, with some 87 percent (4,460,000) said to be located in Greater Germany, the General Government, and other eastern European areas:¹⁹⁵

¹⁹² BICCAJ Minutes, 12 January 1940; Hoffmann to Baker, 11 March; Report on Hoffmann-McLeish meeting, May 1940; Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews, 11 June 1940, WCC.261207.7 and 261201.6.

¹⁹³ BICCAJ Minutes, 17 March 1943, WCC.261207.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Table VI was compiled from 'Distribution of Jewish Population', an addendum to BICCAJ Minutes, 4 December 1942, the demographics of which had been extracted for ICCAJ planning from a report by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; WCC.261201.7

Table VI. Distribution of Jewish Populations for ICCAJ Evaluation of Post-War Mission Fields, December 1942

	Number	Refugees
Greater Germany (Austria, Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Luxembourg)	305,000	
Hungary (Sub-Carpathia, Transylvania, Banat)	800,000	
Rumania	297,000	
Poland	2,100,000	
Polish Jews in (Asiatic) Russia		600,000
Vichy France	110,000	70,000
Spain		1,300
in transit 1/41-5/42		2,000
Portugal		12,400
in transit 1/41-5/42		13,000
Switzerland	18,000	6,300
Yugoslavia	68,000	7,000
Italy	40,000	7,000
Sweden	7,000	2,000
<hr/>		
North Africa (Algiers, Tunis, Morocco)		7,800
Turkey		200
Iran		800
Shanghai		22,000
Japan		4,500
Philippines		1,200
Argentina	300,000	55,000
Bolivia	150	5,000
Brazil	85,000	25,000
Chile	13,000	12,000
Colombia	4,000	2,850
Cuba	8,000	6,000
Dominican Republic	10	1,100
Ecuador	1,000	2,700
Uruguay	30,000	7,000
Other Central South American Areas	24,065	4,955

While it was understood that these were not the final planning numbers, percentages of distribution were not expected to shift dramatically, and, as such, areas of densest population fitted well with the training and research staff of the new Institute: Hans Kosmala, who was being promoted as 'expert' on German Jewish questions, and Rev. Lev Gillet, who had begun to be heralded as an 'authority' on the Jewry of eastern Europe.¹⁹⁶ Integration of the Institute into existing ICCAJ plans fell uniformly in line with projections for post-war reconstruction of European Jewish missions, as well as post-war promulgation of the theological basis for Jewish missions on a wider world scale.

¹⁹⁶ Rev. Lev Gillet was a French priest in the Russian Orthodox Church, currently working for the Mildmay Mission to the Jews in London. For discussions about the Institute's need for an eastern European expert on Jewry, see Macanna to Paton, 22 December 1942, Paton to Macanna, 28 December 1942, Paton to Fisher, 18 January 1943, Paton to Cadegren, 5 February 1943, Fisher to Paton, 16 April 1943; WCC.261213.2.

That an institute to conduct 'serious study' of post-war Church policy on Jews would take root at precisely the same time in which Visser't Hooft was engaged in the Aide Memoire on Jewish refugees is of course reflective of the different aspects of ecumenical concerns about Jews.¹⁹⁷ But it is also reflective of the different ways in which the two WCCIF secretaries responded to mounting documentation of exterminatory Nazi atrocities against Jews. In addition to numbers garnered from the December 1942 demographics of forced redistribution of Jews in Poland's ghettos¹⁹⁸ - Warsaw, 530,000; Lodz, 150,000; Lvov, 120,000; Bialystok, 80,000; Otwock, 60,000; Lublin, 40,000; Czestochowa, 20,000; Kielce, 20,000; Cracow, 11,000 - the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs had confirmed to BICCAJ on 12 March 1943 that 'there was no doubt about Hitler's determination to exterminate the Jews'.¹⁹⁹ That this was confirmed just one week before adoption of the Institute's founding resolution is instructive for it reveals how informed Paton was when he vented against Visser't Hooft's participation in the Aide Memoire, and points to the degree in which evangelization of Jews was looked upon as the only long range solution to antisemitic persecution.

Paton, like Hoffmann and other ICCAJ principals, ardently believed that persecution of Jews would not cease so long as Jews insinuated Jewishness upon society, and that the only hope for both Jews and society was the diluting and unifying effect of Christianity. As stated in Paton's 'Foreword' to the 1942 Kosmala and Smith book that formed the foundation for Institute scholarship, Christians had failed to probe the depths of the Jewish problem by refusing 'to face the religious questions which the juxtaposition of "Christendom" and "Jewry" necessarily raise[d]'.²⁰⁰ In the ICCAJ 'mind' it was impossible to consider 'the Jew in the Christian world' without facing the religious issue', by which was meant both 'the duty of evangelical witness to the Jews' and a forthright truthfulness about it.²⁰¹ Christians had to embrace a rigorous honesty which sought to understand and expound 'real Christianity' to Jews and 'real Judaism' to Christians.²⁰² The purpose of the book, as well as that of the Institute, was to reveal the 'real'

¹⁹⁷ Memorandum on Proposed Christian Institute for Jewish Studies, 17 March 1943; BICCAJ Minutes, 17 March 1943; WCC.261213.3.

¹⁹⁸ 'Distribution of Jewish Population', 4 December 1942, prev. cit. Reductions in Jewish populations in Greater Germany (67%) and Rumania (75%) were also noted, as were the numbers of refugees in transit. Some 35,000 refugees had moved through Spain, Portugal, or Casablanca since 1939, marking a trend that was to be referred to missionary organizations in those areas. Refugee settlement patterns in Central and South America were also discussed, with the aim of alerting area churches to the numbers of Jews 'in their midst'.

¹⁹⁹ Harold Beeley of the Royal Institute briefed ICCAJ, making clear that physical extermination was underway and that 'economic extermination' was complete; BICCAJ Minutes, 12 March 1943, WCC. 261207.

²⁰⁰ William Paton, 'Foreword', Hans Kosmala and Robert Smith, *The Jew in the Christian World* (London: SCM Press, March 1942), 5-7.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

natures of Christianity and Judaism and in so doing to cast light on the inseparable connectedness between the Jewish problem, the problems of Jewish-Christian coexistence, and the 'duty of evangelical witness to the Jews'.²⁰³

The formal proposal to establish the Institute, adopted five days after the Royal Institute confirmed extermination of Jews on 12 March 1943, pointed to both 'fundamental changes' taking place in the Jewish world and the resulting 'grave problems' facing the Church. And it pointed to them, together, as constituting 'demand [for] serious study of [Church] policy in relation to the Jews'.²⁰⁴ The Institute was to meet that demand by way of scholarly research, courses on Jewish questions for theological colleges, missionary training in Jewish questions, apologetic literature, and conferences on church-wide Jewish missions. The 'combating of antisemitism w[as] to be a collateral aim' of Institute work, but, in contradiction to the Council of Christians and Jews, it was to be fought on religious rather than humanitarian grounds.²⁰⁵ As had been explained in January 1943, there would be no 'competition' in this area so long as the CCJ did not inveigh against Jewish missions as religious intolerance.²⁰⁶ Paton was more explicit about the Institute's contradictory purpose when stressing its importance for 'gaining more extensive church support for Jewish Missions'.²⁰⁷ He made clear that the Institute would not only 'meet the need for a sound theological basis for missionary work', it would also diffuse the 'vaguely syncretistic position' that was likely to be broadcast by CCJ.²⁰⁸ Moreover, as indicated by the summary phrase adopted as the Institute's aim, the forthrightness of its research would promote 'a truer understanding of Christianity among Jews and a truer understanding of Judaism among Christians'.²⁰⁹

Paton's sudden death in August 1943 did not in any way impede the official October 1943 launching of the Christian Institute for Jewish Studies. The results of his campaign to gain support, gather organizational strands, overcome internal doubts, and fire-brand Institutional aims were given over to Robert Smith, who was thrown into overseeing position with Hoffmann bringing up the rear from America. The early financial backing and involvement of Church Mission to Jews, Church of Scotland, Presbyterian Church of Ireland, and Swedish Missionary Council was followed by other mission and church agencies, including, at a later date, the World Council of Churches. As planned, it was based in London, international in scope, staffed

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Memorandum on Proposed Christian Institute for Jewish Studies, 17 March 1943, *prev. cit.*

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Kosmala to Paton, 2 January 1943, WCC.26213.6.

²⁰⁷ BICCAJ Minutes, 16 July 1943, WCC.261213.3.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. The phrase was subsequently used on the letterheads of both Institute stationary and its periodic publication.

by Kosmala and Gillet, and governed by a board of mission principals and theological scholars, which included by spring of 1944 academics from Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Manchester, Birmingham, and Bangor, one of whom was on the Provisional Committee of WCCIF.²¹⁰

Parkes had known about the Institute from its December 1942 inception but he had been aware of the Kosmala and Smith book since spring. He had criticized the book to Paton in March as faulty scholarship with 'confused and even superficial' verdicts, and later to Hoffmann in August, as 'untruthful and calculated to create prejudice and enmity'.²¹¹ After the first periodic *Bulletin of the Christian Institute for Jewish Studies* appeared in March 1944 with its board of prominent scholars, Parkes issued a confidential memorandum to Christian members of the CCJ, calling attention to the 'nature' of publications emanating from the Institute.²¹² While granting that the CCJ was not in a position to either disclaim or promote Jewish missions and that a 'middle' position of abstaining from the issue was necessary in order to act as a unified body, he yet argued that Christian members of CCJ could (and should) at least voice concern about the denigrating ways in which Christian missions to Jews were being promoted by the Institute.²¹³ Attitudes in Institute publications were repeatedly expressed in ways that created false and negative impressions of Jews and Judaism. Kosmala especially, though Smith was not 'exempt', injudiciously used selective and strictly interpreted passages from Jewish texts to point out and highlight unfavourable aspects of Judaism and Jewish history. Kosmala's and Smith's *Jew in the Christian World*, as one of many examples offered by Parkes, likened the idea of the Jewish commonwealth in the Book of Ezra to the 'gospel' of Nazi racial legislation, referring to Israel as 'a kind of *herrenvolk*, religiously and otherwise'.²¹⁴ The negative tone of the authors, the incriminating textual references out of all proportion and balance, and the persistent attempts to 'expose' allegedly ingrained negative attitudes of Jews toward Christians, Parkes argued, occurred all too frequently to be considered anything less than deliberate. As summed to fellow CCJ Christians, the publications coming from the Institute, as currently constituted, would 'do more to create an atmosphere friendly to antisemitic propaganda than anything else in the country'.²¹⁵

²¹⁰ The WCC Provisional Committee member was Professor Newton Flew of Cambridge, who had hosted and promoted Kosmala's series of lectures on antisemitism in early 1941.

²¹¹ Standley to Parkes, 18 February 1942; Parkes to Paton, 8 May 1942; Paton to Parkes, 11 May 1942; Hoffmann to Parkes, 4 August 1942; Parkes to Hoffmann, 30 August 1942; Hoffmann to Parkes, 13 October 1942; PPMS60/17/10/2.

²¹² Parkes, Confidential, 'The Council of Christians and Jews and the Christian Mission to the Jews', March 1944, PPMS60/17/8/2.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

Parkes' contentions against Christian missions to Jews were aired more publicly a few weeks later when he circulated for publication in both Christian and Jewish journals a revised version of the memorandum that had sparked the five-month debate in 1942. 'A Christian Looks at the Christian Mission to the Jews' was accepted by *Metsudah*, but it was rejected by World Dominion Press, who was involved with ICCAJ in producing a world survey on Jews, Judaism, and Jewish missions.²¹⁶ In July, *Theology* accepted the manuscript with the stipulation that it appear in the October issue with a rebuttal from the Christian Institute of Jewish Studies. The opportunity 'to answer' Parkes was welcomed by Robert Smith, who revealed in correspondence that both he and the late Paton viewed him as 'a dangerous influence'.²¹⁷ While allowing that Parkes was a 'clever fellow' who was somewhat right 'in his criticisms' of older missionary tactics, Smith yet charged him with being an '[un]balanced thinker' who 'sometimes goes badly off the rails'; with 'detest[ing] the Jewish missionary'; with being 'determined to undermine' distinctions between Christianity and Judaism.²¹⁸ Smith said that he himself had tried to address some of his contentions in the July 1944 issue of *IRM*, but that Parkes' 'criticism [wa]s so radical' that it could not be fully countered without re-examination of the 'foundations of the missionary approach'. Like Paton, Smith insisted that 'Judaism [remained] the "acid test" of evangelization', that missions to Jews had bearing on 'the missionary movement as a whole', and that the Christian imperative to Jewish evangelization was a crucially important answer to the 'dangerous challenge posed to the Christian faith' by Nazi racial doctrine. Such foundational points about the Church and its relationship to Judaism, he argued, 'under[lay] all...concern about the sufferings of the Jews and their political destiny'.²¹⁹

As these contradictory sets of views played out in the pages of *Theology* in the fall of 1944 and beyond, the positional-entrenchments being dug throughout the war deepened as parties involved made clear that the goodwill/toleration movement vs. evangelization of Jews was not just a British problem playing out on British soil.²²⁰ As laid out by Hoffmann in a December 1944 report, which began with the words 'The Eternal Jew is still with us', the Church was 'slowly but surely being split into two camps' in its efforts to 'find answers to the question "What Shall We Do With the Jews?"'.²²¹ This was a question that would be reiterated

²¹⁶ Macleish to Parkes, 22 May 1944; Parkes to MacGregor, 27 May 1944; PP MS60 17/3 and 9/5/15.

²¹⁷ Smith to Gillett, 26 July 1944, WCC.261213.12.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Robert Smith, 'The New Dimension in Evangelism', *International Review of Missions*, Vol.33 No.3 (July 1944), 304-311, reprinted and distributed as a pamphlet, WCC. 261213.4.

²²⁰ James Parkes, 'A Christian Looks at the Christian Mission to the Jews', 218-224, and Lev Gillet, 'Some Remarks on Dr Parkes' Article', 224-227, *Theology, A Monthly Review*, Vol. 47, No. 292 (October 1944). For Parkes' manuscript and follow-up letters to Gillet and the Editor of 'Theology', PP MS 17/10/3.

²²¹ Hoffmann, 'Summary of report submitted to Meeting of Advisory Committee on the Christian Approach to Jews of the Board of National Missions, 1 December 1944, WCC. 261207.

over and over by Hoffmann on behalf of ICCAJ in the immediate post-war years, one asked so persistently that it would not only become a major topic at the founding assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1948, but a primary issue at the first joint conference of WCC and ICCAJ at the new Ecumenical Institute in March 1949.

Between 1940 and 1944 ICCAJ and WCCIF had been brought into closer relations not only by virtue of overlapping leadership and goals but, also, because of the accelerating Nazi aggressions creating the ever-increasing Jewish refugee crisis. Each responded by taking on new refugee-related roles which led incrementally to collaboration on issues relating to Jews. Central to the understanding of each was that the primary duty of refugee response was to protect Christian interests by drawing attention to the plight of non-Aryan Christian refugees. Decisions about the precise focus of response were intrinsically related to advancement of organizational mandates. ICCAJ emphasis on post-war planning was steeped in the conviction of a divine mandate to evangelize Jews. With rare exception, the nature of planning remained the same as that of the 1940 conference, namely, it remained 'severely practical'.²²² Jews were discussed as *mission objects* whose salvation depended upon conversion; as *unequals* lacking what only Christianity could offer; as *subjects* of study on the effects of escalating persecution in softening resistance to conversion; as *victims* of antisemitism for which they were held in part responsible. Jewish populations were tracked to determine redistribution figures for post-war allocations of Jewish missions, with emphasis placed on cooperative consideration of mission society rights when dividing geographical spheres of projected Jewish mission fields. The post-war restoration of human rights for Jews was discussed in the unequivocal context of ensuring that Christianity retained the post-war right to evangelize Jews. The fact that more interest was expressed in demographic numbers rather than in the state of well-being of Jewish refugees followed the logic of ICCAJ planning as well as its 'severely practical' nature. This is not in any way to imply an absence of expressed compassion, but it is to say that it was scarce in its proportion to matter-of-fact planning discussions. This must be seen, however, as part of a developmental trend to abstain from the effusive proclamations of love for Jews which were so prevalent in the Budapest-Warsaw materials, and not the result of indifference or non-caring. It went without saying among these seasoned mission advocates that Christian love for Jews was the grounding of all ICCAJ efforts. There was full acknowledgment of the suffering which European Jews were enduring, and periods of prayer were called 'during these times of terrible persecutions'.²²³ Yet at the same time that one of these periods was being called - immediately after it had been confirmed in March 1943 that Jews were being exterminated - regular monthly

²²² Report of a United Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews, 11 June 1940, prev.cit.

²²³ For example, BICCAJ Minutes, 17 March 1943, WCC.261229.

prayer meetings for the expansion of post-war Jewish evangelism were also being considered. Prayers for the suffering of Jews and prayers for expansion of the work that would bring Jews salvation were all of one piece in ICCAJ logic about the missionary task inherent in any work 'among the Jews'.²²⁴

Like ICCAJ, WCCIF believed in 1940 that the post-war world was to be approached as a 'spiritual and missionary task'.²²⁵ Shortly before Visser't Hooft issued the joint Aide Memoire on refugee relief with the WJC in March 1943, he had posed as a decisive question in post-war reconstruction whether or not the churches would allow themselves to be transformed into 'militant confessing churches', by which was meant churches that acted as if they had 'the word of salvation for the whole of humanity'.²²⁶ Immediately after WCCIF broke with its non-protest refugee policy in June 1944 to speak out against the rapid extermination of Jews at Auschwitz, he explained that equitable post-war solution of the 'Jewish question' involved much more than just humanitarian concerns or 'love for one's neighbour', for the Church was 'little by little recovering consciousness of the unique links which b[ound] it in the history of salvation to the people of Israel'.²²⁷ At the time that was written, and through the remainder of war, discussions about ICCAJ's role in advancing that consciousness were clear in concept but hazy in terms of concrete form.²²⁸ The points that were clear by October 1944 were that 'the Jews c[ould] be reached more easily by the ecumenical movement than by the single denominations', and that a 'class cooperation' between ICCAJ and WCCIF was 'indicated' in the areas of refugee relief, Jewish missions, and 'other theological problems' associated with the Church and the Jews.²²⁹ It was also understood that WCCIF refugee work had 'led to a...living contact between the ecumenical movement and the Jews', that the contact had broken down 'ancient enmity and deep rooted mistrust' in Jews, allowing for 'a freer hearing of the message of Christ', but that it had also stirred among Jewish religious leaders 'an anxious defensive against supposed Christian attempts to exploit the need of the Jews for missionary ends'.²³⁰

²²⁴ Ibid. This was typical phrasing to describe all facets within the realm of ICCAJ conversionary efforts.

²²⁵ Visser't Hooft, 'The Ecumenical Church and the International Situation', April-May 1940, prev. cit.

²²⁶ Visser't Hooft, 'The Church and International Reconstruction', January 1943, FCC B9F20.

²²⁷ WCCIF Minutes, 7-9 July 1944, FCC B23F1.

²²⁸ For ICCAJ discussions on WCC association, see BICCAJ Minutes, 4 December 1942, WCC.261207; CBMS Minutes, 7 June 1943, WCC.261229.2; BICCAJ Minutes, 30 September 1943, WCC.26213.3; BICCAJ Minutes, 8 February 1944, WCC.261207; Freudenberg to Birger Pernow, Vice Chairman of ICCAJ and Director of Swedish Missions to Israel, 4 October 1944, WCC.301.4331.9.

²²⁹ Ibid., Freudenberg to Pernow, 4 October 1944. Current discussions were being conducted between Hoffmann, Pernow, Visser't Hooft, Freudenberg, and Robert Smith.

²³⁰ Ibid.

Chapter Five
IN THE EMBERS
GUILT, RECONCILIATION, AND REPARATION
1945-1948

The ecumenical crisis over German guilt in WWI, which had played such a critical role in shaping official expression of ecumenical attitudes about Germany during the Nazi years, bore heavily on the reconstruction of ecumenical relations with the German Church at the end of WWII. The unity-threatening implications of that history pushed to the forefront in early 1945 as claims of collective guilt rained down on Germany in an atmosphere of public incrimination. Reports about the 'doubtable', 'overstated', and 'exaggerated' acts that had peppered world news in the early years of WWII had now changed to the 'indubitable', 'understated', and 'impossible to exaggerate' crimes of the German nation as a whole.¹ Claims of collective German guilt had spurred public debate on both sides of the Atlantic by January,² and international media outcry following the liberation of Buchenwald on 12 April and Bergen-Belsen three days later had but intensified the claims as incontrovertible evidence of inconceivable crimes continued to unfurl.³ Few in the waking public had been left untouched by the dawning reality of crimes committed, and it is certain that members of the WCCIF Provisional Committee gathering in London in late April were not among them. The 'most difficult problem' of post-war ecumenical business was understood to be that of 'Germany', and it would take a full six months to resolve the problem of how to formally re-establish relations with the German Church while dealing with undeniably valid questions about German guilt.⁴ The document sealing that October 1945 reconciliation would come to be known as the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt; and it would be hailed as the first and necessary step on the path toward unification of post-war ecumenical churches, one critical to the 1948 assembly that would transform the WCCIF into a World Council of Churches and formulate its first official statement on Jews, antisemitism, and Jewish missions.

Karl Barth had set the general tone for ecumenical attitudes about German war-guilt in a series of early 1945 lectures that were printed and debated in the Swiss and English press. While holding that 'collective guilt' was an impossible concept, he had argued for the 'collective

¹ See Lipstadt, *Beyond Belief*, prev. cit., 267-268, for discussion on international press terminology.

² See, for example, January-February 1945 lectures by Karl Barth which were concurrently printed and debated in the Swiss and English press, later published in *The Only Way: How can the Germans be Cured?*, Trans., Neufeld and Smith (Philosophical Library, 1947); Hannah Arendt, 'Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility', *Jewish Frontier* (January 1945), 19-23, in *The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age*, Ed., Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1978); Karl Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt* (Doubleday, 1948), for 1945 lectures on the problems of collective guilt, which were also a matter of public discussion.

³ Allied policy was to leave camp and death-march 'evidence' untouched until government and press delegations could 'see for themselves'. See Harold Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933- 2001* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 47-54; Yehuda Bauer, 'The Death Marches, January-May 1945', *Modern Judaism*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Feb.1983), 1-21.

⁴ WCCIF Minutes of Provisional Committee, London, 26 April 1945, WCC.301.010.3.

responsibility' of the German nation, including that of the German churches, insisting that all Germans must share responsibility for what had happened since 1939, by which was meant *admittance* of responsibility. Barth's concern was not so much 'with guilt itself', or even of admittance of actual 'crimes committed', but, rather, with admittance of the path that led to the crimes committed:

...they all took the road leading to those crimes, either in the form of actions or negligence, direct or indirect participation, explicit or tacit consent, unequivocal, active or *pro forma* party membership, political indifference...political errors and miscalculations.⁵

As with Barth, it was this general admittance of German responsibility that occupied WCCIF leaders in April 1945. WCCIF had maintained contact with German churches during the war by way of messages going to and coming from leaders of the Confessing Church. In December 1944 those leaders gathering around Bishop Theophil Wurm had made clear through confidential reports distributed to the Provisional Committee that they wanted to remain 'part of the ecumenical movement'.⁶ As soon as Stuttgart had fallen to the French, Visser't Hooft had responded to Wurm in kind by way of chaplains who were attached to the French army. The questions being put before the Provisional Committee gathering in London thus had nothing to do with whether ecumenical relations should be re-established but, rather, with *what* should be said formally to German church leaders about official re-establishment, when and how it should be said, and the response expected in return.

To cast needed light on this dilemma facing the WCCIF Provisional Committee in the spring of 1945, it is necessary to glimpse a 'Confidential' report circulated to members in December 1943. In the final section of an apologetic account of the German Church since onset of Hitler's reign, Visser't Hooft had surmised that 'the attitude of the German Protestant Church toward other churches' and its 'readiness to collaborate' in the post-war world would be largely dependent upon the attitude that non-German churches took 'toward the German church and the German nation'.⁷ Post-war collaboration of the German Church would be conditional, in other

⁵ Karl Barth, January-February 1945 lectures in *The Only Way: How Can the Germans Be Cured?*, prev. cit.

⁶ Dr. A.C Craig was responsible for securing translation of four 'Strictly Confidential' reports from the Confessing Church in October 1944, which were analyzed and sent on to Visser't Hooft in November. English titles of the reports forwarded to the Provisional Committee in December 1944 included: 'The Life and Struggle of the German Evangelical Church in 1943/1944' (I and II); 'Suggestions for the Self-Aid Work of the German Evangelical Church after the End of the War'; 'Administration of the German Evangelical Church: Its Structure and Functions in the Future'. The Confessing Church was explained as a church struggling under totalitarianism, one that had strengthened overall in spiritual and organizational structure so that it was 'more capable of discharging' its duty to Germany while contributing to the 'Oecumenical Council'; WCC.301.110.3. For quotation, see WCCIF Minutes, 26 April 1945, prev. cit.

⁷ Visser't Hooft, 'The Situation of the Protestant Church in Germany', 15 December 1943, WCC.420077.

words, and it would hinge on the question of how non-German Christians dealt with the question of WWII guilt.

There is...in the [German] church, and not only in the church, a readiness to recognize guilt. And there is a readiness to meet Christians of other countries on the basis of a common recognition of guilt. But from the standpoint of the German church it will have to be definitely a *common* recognition and not a unilateral condemnation of the German nation alone. For while Christians in Germany are to a large extent aware of the fact that their nation bears a crushing responsibility for the catastrophic happenings of these last years. they are convinced that the other nations by their sins of omission and commission have also greatly contributed to the creation of the international chaos.⁸

With this as backdrop, Visser't Hooft proposed on 26 April 1945 that a statement which held 'spiritual influence and significance' should be sent by WCCIF to the German Church, and that it should recognize the presence of 'a true and living Church' in Germany' while making points about guilt, sin, and repentance. 'Crimes committed in the name of the whole German nation, murder of Jews, Russian prisoners of war, innocent hostages, extermination of whole villages' should all be included, *but* so should acknowledgement of German Church 'protests... against [racial] persecution' as well as the failings of British Christians to neither recognize the dangers of National Socialism nor support 'those in Germany who were fighting for freedom'.⁹ To state this more generally, categories of crimes committed in the name of Germany could and should be broached in an official WCCIF statement so long as *attributes* of German churches and *failings* of Allied nations were simultaneously acknowledged.

Provisional Committee responses fell into two categories of dissent, the first of which centred around rejection of any attempt to 'put on the same level the sin of the allied nations and that of the German nation'.¹⁰ Members refused to return to the ameliorating solution of the WWI guilt problem by admission of common guilt on any level, and it was made clear that although Allied errors of judgments had 'contributed' to Nazi power they must not be considered on the same level of guilt or 'sin'. Dissenting responses of the second type dwelt on problems involved with statements that called attention to 'delicate' or 'controversial' issues, with emphasis on the effects that they might have on churches 'in recently liberated countries'. The general feeling was that a revisiting of criminal issues in order to provoke German Church repentance might also provoke 'undesirable reactions' in churches that had been victims of German aggressions.¹¹ Joseph Oldham, architect of the 1937 conference that led to formation of WCCIF, summed this

⁸ Ibid., 7-8,. See also WCC. 301.103.1

⁹ WCCIF Minutes of Provisional Committee, London, 26 April 1945, prev. cit.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

overriding concern from the perspective of Great Britain by saying that 'any attempt to put into words at this juncture what was felt by the churches here...would... alienate either one group or the other'.¹² The concluding unanimous agreement, which covered all aspects of dissent from Visser't Hooft's proposal, was that 'no message should be sent, at least for the present' which might defeat WCCIF unifying intentions, that 'contact [should] only be re-established [through] personal meetings', and that a WCCIF delegation should proceed to Stuttgart at the earliest date possible.¹³

WCCIF's first face-to-face contact with the Confessing Church took place in early June when Eugen Gerstenmaier, who had served under Bishop Wurm on the Reich Advisory Council while acting as liaison between the Confessing Church and German opposition groups, arrived in Geneva with an International Red Cross delegation.¹⁴ On 15 June Visser't Hooft's colleagues, Schoenfeld and Freudenberg, left Geneva for meetings on church reconstruction in the French and American zones of central and south western Germany, with Gerstenmaier joining the next week.¹⁵ By 26 June the two had already met with Bishop Wurm in Wiesbaden, and over the coming three weeks they would meet with other Confessing Church leaders, including Martin Niemoeller and Hans Asmussen, both of whom, like Wurm, would play decisive roles in the formal reconciliation with WCCIF.¹⁶ Some detail is necessary here for standard works on the German Church Stuttgart Declaration that sealed reconciliation do not reflect the WCC papers that document this round of meetings, nor were they revealed in Visser't Hooft's published accounts of the reconciliation in 1954 and 1973. Contrary to impressions created by this lacuna, it was decidedly not the case that there was no pre-discussion between WCCIF and post-war German Church leaders prior to the meeting that produced the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt.¹⁷

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid. Unanimity about proceeding cautiously was extended when Provisional Committee members from North America met with Visser't Hooft, Bell, and Boegner the following month in New York.

¹⁴ 'Confidential', Schoenfeld to Oliver Tomkins, 26 June 1945, WCC.301.110.3.

¹⁵ Ibid. The other person scheduled to travel with Schoenfeld and Freudenberg in Germany was Eduard Waetjen, a German attorney and *Abwehr* intelligence agent who had worked at the German consulate in Zurich while serving as undercover liaison between German resistance groups. For more on Waetjen, see Reinhard Doerries and Gerhard Weinberg, *Hitler's Intelligence Chief: Walter Schellenberg* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009), 143-144. For Paton's guarded assessment of Gerstenmaier, see 'Gerstenmaier', addendum to 'Strictly Private & Confidential Notes on a Visit to Copenhagen, October 18-22, 1939', WCC.301008.

¹⁶ 'Confidential', Schoenfeld to Oliver Tomkins, 26 June 1945, prev. cit.

¹⁷ See, for example, John Conway, 'How Shall the Nations Repent? The Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, October 1945', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (October 1987), 596-622; Matthew Hockenoss, *A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past* (Indiana University Press, 2004). See also Armin Boyens, 'Das Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis Vom 19. Oktober 1945 Entstehung und Bedeutung', *Viertel Jahrhefte Fuer Zeitgeschichte* 19. 4 Heft (October 1971, 574-597, who cites a 1970 German reference to Schoenfeld's and Freudenberg's reports without apparent knowledge of their contents. For Visser't Hooft's accounts, see 'The Genesis of the World Council of Churches', *A History of*

Just five weeks after Germany's surrender, Schoenfeld and Freudenberg were already making rounds on more than 17 German areas, meeting with church leaders, assessing the needs of churches, and discussing the course of action to follow in spiritual, moral, and physical reconstruction of the German Church.¹⁸ What was reported firsthand to Geneva was that the Confessing Church was well aware that it needed to put its household in order.¹⁹ Although there is no indication in reports as to who broached which issues, the necessary removal of 'unsuitable Church leaders' who had 'bowed down to Nazism', an 'imperative' to inform the nation of 'the plain and unvarnished truth, and a 'duty' to 'stir up the nation's conscience and lead the people to repentance' were all posited as points of discussion with church leaders in the American and French zones.²⁰ While meetings with Otto Dibelius in Berlin had not been possible, Schoenfeld and Freudenberg were aware that Wurm was organizing the first conference of German church leaders for August, to which Dibelius was expected.²¹ One week after they had reported back to Geneva on 18 July, Visser't Hooft penned a letter to Dibelius himself.²² After assuring that WCCIF would do whatever it could to 'restore' ecumenical fellowship, Visser't Hooft laid out the conditions of reconciliation that would satisfy the Provisional Committee.²³

Do I need to say that considerable obstacles have to be overcome, especially in the churches which have suffered...under the German occupation? A fraternal conversation will be required. This conversation would be greatly facilitated if the Confessing Church of Germany should speak very frankly - not only about the crimes of the Nazis, but especially about the sins of omission of the German people, including the church.²⁴

A month later the August conference of German church leaders at Treysa formed a governing Church Council but no such admission was obtained. Four weeks hence Karl Barth wrote to Martin Niemoeller, vice-chairman of the new German Council, urging him to urge others to provide 'a frank statement of German responsibility' to a WCCIF delegation that would be attending its October meeting in Stuttgart. Indeed, Barth went so far as to provide Niemoeller with a specific draft of three admittances he deemed would be acceptable to WCCIF:

the Ecumenical Movement, Volume I (1954), prev. cit., 714-715; 'The First Post-war Task: Reconciliation', *Memoirs*, prev. cit., 189-194.

¹⁸ Schoenfeld to Tomkins, 16 June 1945, WCC.301.110.3. See also Freudenberg, 'Impressions Gained During a Visit to Germany from June 15th to July 18th' and 'Notes on Church Conditions in Germany in July 1945', WCC.301.43.30.3. Areas visited included Freiburg am Breisgau, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, Mannheim, Weinheim, Frankfurt am Main, Wiesbaden, Eisenach, Weimar, Naumburg, Leipzig, Halle, Goettingen, Kassel, Marburg, Bad Nauheim, and Saxony.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid. Schoenfeld and Freudenberg had actually assisted Wurm in Wiesbaden with obtaining Allied permission for German churches to travel and convene for the August conference.

²² Visser't Hooft to Dibelius, 25 July 1945, in *Memoirs* (1973), 190, prev. cit.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

...that the German people erred when they placed themselves in the hands of Adolf Hitler...that the misery, which has spread over Europe and Germany, is a consequence of that error...that through false statements and silence the Evangelical Church in Germany shares in the responsibility for this error.²⁵

With all of this *antecedent* the only thing of surprise to the German Church Council when the WCCIF delegation arrived in Stuttgart on 17 October 1945 was the number and identification of the delegates in the party. The German Council was well aware that this was a WCCIF delegation on WCCIF business, and not just a collection of ecumenical church leaders from various world churches, even though it was indeed that secondarily. Coming from France, Holland, Switzerland, England, and America, the men were representatives of national church bodies in a delegation from a supra-national organization, and each was either a member of the Provisional Committee, a named representative of a Provisional Committee member, or, in the case of two, members of a Provisional Committee Commission, whose united purpose was 'to arrive, if possible, at the resumption of full ecumenical relationships'.²⁶ The German Council was not only aware of this purpose but also of what needed to be said to the WCCIF delegation.

For its part, WCCIF had agreed in advance that 'expression from the German church as to its attitude to the acts...committed in the name of the German nation' was 'necessary', but that it would be 'impossible' to state it as a condition, 'for that would mean that the declaration to be given by German church leaders would not have the character of true spontaneity'. Yet what was said to the German Council on 18 October was reiteration of what had already been stated, which was in fact *conditional*. Speaking on behalf of the WCCIF delegation, Visser't Hooft expressed gratitude for the Confessing Church struggle against Nazism and what it meant to the ecumenical movement. He expressed hope that ecumenical relations could be re-established because the World Council 'needed' the German Church 'witness', but, in so doing, he restated what he had said to Dibelius in July: that there were 'obstacles to be removed and questions to

²⁵ Barth to Niemoeller, appearing in Hockenoss, 80, is taken from Hartmut Ludwig, 'Karl Barth's Dienst', in *Der Kompromiss von Treysa: Die Entstehung der Evangelischen Kirchen in Den 1945*, Gerhard Besier, Hartmut Ludwig, and Joerg Thierfelder, Ed. (Weinheim, 1995), 317-318.

²⁶In addition to Visser't Hooft, permanent members of the Provisional Committee included Anglican Bishop George Bell; Dr. Alphons Koechlin, President of Swiss Protestant Federation of Churches; and Dr. Samuel Cavert, General Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches and NAICCAJ, who was on loan to WCCIF in Geneva. Appointed representatives of Provisional Committee members included Pierre Maury, who stood in for Marc Boegner, Chairman of both the Administrative Committee and the French Protestant Federation; and Dr. Reidar Hauge (who failed to arrive on time), representing Bishop Berggrav of Norway. The remaining two were Dr. S.C. Michelfelder, Commissioner in Geneva from the Am. Lutheran World Convention and member of the Provisional Committee Commission for Chaplaincy Service to Prisoners of War, and Professor Hendrik Kraemer of the Netherlands Reformed Church, who would become Director of the new WCC Ecumenical Institute in 1946. For quotation, see Visser't Hooft, 'Report on the Visit of a Delegation from the World Council of Churches to Germany, 23 October 1945', WCC.301.103.1.

be answered'.²⁷ Answering on behalf of the German Council, Hans Asmussen said that he understood this to mean 'that the ecumenical delegation would like to have a definite declaration from the Council of the German Church'.²⁸

The statement made to the WCCIF Provisional Committee delegation the following morning on 19 October spoke of suffering, guilt, struggling, accusing, and cleansing, in that order.²⁹ Neither the German Council drafting it nor the World Council approving it spoke of the suffering of Jews, of guilt for Germany's crimes against Jews, nor were the words 'antisemitism' or 'Jews' mentioned. Such specificity had been neither sought nor expected since the Provisional Committee meeting in April, so there was no expressed regret by any member of the delegation that anything was missing in the German admission. A press release issued one week later by WCCIF to editors of 25 church and secular newspapers helps to clarify why the admission was not only accepted but praised as a 'truly Christian message' which laid the basis for restored fellowship.³⁰ Shaped in the form of a WCCIF announcement, the opening paragraphs informed that the 'new' Protestant Church of Germany had joined the World Council of Churches as the 90th participating body and that the step represented 'a formal entente between the German churches which survived the Nazi terror and churches in such recent enemy nations as Britain, the United States, France and Holland'.³¹ The foremost goal being reached and publicized, in other words, was not a declaration of German guilt, but, a repair of the breach in ecumenical unity between non-Roman churches of previously warring nations. The admission of German guilt that had been called for by WCCIF was the means by which that goal had been reached, and that was made abundantly clear in its publicized account of the German Church admission:

The delegation told the German leaders that it hoped to arrive again at fully fraternal relationships but that there were obstacles which had to be removed. The German leaders said they wished to express...implication in the guilt of the German nation, in which the Church had shared, and presented a statement signed by eleven German members present.³²

The actual admission, which followed by way of block quotation in the press release, was framed within 114 words, some 55% of which had to do with suffering and struggles of the Confessing Church itself, as indicated by added italicizing below:

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ 'World Council of Churches: Declaration of the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany', 19 October 1945, FCC.B23F1.

³⁰ This press release, issued by WCC Assistant General Secretary Oliver Tomkins between 26 and 29 October 1948, has not been part of the academic discussion. For drafts, lists of recipients, and various corresponding letters, see WCC. 301.110.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

*...we know ourselves to be with our people in a great company of suffering, but also in a great solidarity of guilt. With great pain do we say: through us has endless suffering been brought to many peoples and countries. What we have often borne witness to before our congregations, that we declare in the name of the whole Church. True we have struggled for many years in the name of Jesus Christ against a spirit which has found its terrible expression in the National Socialist regime of violence, but we accuse ourselves for not witnessing more courageously, for not praying more faithfully, for not believing more joyously and for not loving more ardently.*³³

Yet that was enough to satisfy the WCCIF delegation, for the 45% that dealt with German guilt had met its general conditions for recognition, admittance, and repentance, and it did so within the context of a reminder that the Confessing Church had in fact struggled against Nazism. It was neither necessary, nor expedient, to expect specificities of guilt so long as it was made clear that the 'new' German Church was being wholly reunited with the Christian principles from which it had strayed, as the press release went on to report:

Pledging a new beginning being made in the German churches, the [Stuttgart] statement said, 'We are cleansing ourselves from influences alien to faith and hope God will use the churches to make His will obeyed through the land'.³⁴

With guilt and cleansing declared, and the 'formal entente' in place, WCCIF was thus in the position to promote the German Church as a post-war model of ecumenical repentance and renewal. Repair of the breach between the church of the country that produced Nazism and the churches of countries that suffered because of Nazism, so the reasoning and publicizing went, allowed the German church to resume ecumenical relations with other national churches and play its needed role in the advancement of a unified World Council of Churches engaged in the healing of a 'disordered' post-war world.

While this obtained declaration of guilt can indeed be seen as a first step on the German Church path of coming to terms with its Nazi past, it should not be seen as the spontaneous admission of guilt that the WCCIF delegates had convinced themselves they were seeking. Even though the statement was not coerced, admission that has been both pre-requested and pre-discussed on numerous occasions is not in any sense a product of spontaneity. WCCIF meetings with Wurm, Niemoeller, Asmussen, and others in Germany; Visser't Hooft's letter to Dibelius; Barth's letter to Niemoeller; and the statements of WCCIF delegates upon arrival in Stuttgart had all made clear that admission from the German Church was expected. The world outcry after 'discovery' of the extent of Nazi crimes, as well as Allied occupation-attempts to impress upon the German people responsibility for those crimes, undoubtedly contributed to conditions

³³ Ibid.
³⁰ Ibid.

under which the Stuttgart admission of guilt was issued. But it was the '*required*' ecumenical 'conversation' that compelled the admission on 19 October 1945, and it is that which explains why WCCIF came to be not only the *urging* but the *approving* body of the declaration of guilt. WCCIF's artful manoeuvring - the causes and processes of which cannot be suitably explained outside the history of the WWI ecumenical debacle over German war-guilt - circumvented a repeat of the bitter entanglement that had blunted the ecumenical movement in the inter-war years. Even though the admission of guilt has other relations and implications which must not be ignored, its origins most certainly lay in the WCCIF request for a statement about both the crimes of the Nazis and the 'sins of omission of the German people, including the church'.³⁵

The relationship between the German declaration of guilt and the advancement of WCC unity was unambiguously pointed out at the February 1946 Provisional Committee meeting in Geneva, to which newly appointed members Bishop Theophil Wurm and Martin Niemoeller were in attendance.³⁶

At its meeting in Stuttgart, to which the World Council had sent a strong delegation, this new Council of the German Church issued an important declaration in which it expressed its sense of solidarity in the guilt of the German people and its desire to participate in the ecumenical fellowship. In this manner the way was made clear for full participation of the German church in the World Council.³⁷

Some 28 years later that ever-important relevance was elaborated more forcefully in Visser't Hooft's *Memoirs*:

It was due to the Stuttgart meeting that the ecumenical movement could now go ahead and turn to the future. If that meeting had *not* been held or if it had *not* succeeded in restoring fraternal relations, it would have been *impossible* to create the necessary spiritual conditions for the inauguration of the World Council at Amsterdam in 1948.³⁸

In turning to that future it was also significantly the case that the World Council made immediate use of those German Council members who were present at Stuttgart. Of the Declaration's eleven signatories, five were assigned key places in the February 1946 Provisional Committee meeting in Geneva, and four of the remaining six were added in preparation for the Founding Assembly in 1948. In addition to their appointments to the Provisional Committee at

³⁵ Referring back to Visser't Hooft's explicit request to Dibelius on 25 July 1945.

³⁶ Both Wurm and Niemoeller were appointed as permanent members to the WCC Provisional Committee at Stuttgart, the latter as the permanent alternate to the former. For Samuel Cavert's interventions to obtain Allied permission for Wurm and Niemoeller to attend the 1946 Provisional Committee meeting in Geneva see Cavert to Director of Military Government, 16 November 1945; 17 December, Cavert to Robert Patterson, Secretary of War, 17 December 1945; Cavert to Wurm on behalf of Visser't Hooft, 17 January 1946, WCC.420084.

³⁷ WCC Provisional Committee Minutes, February 1946.

³⁸ Visser't Hooft, *Memoirs* (1973), 193-194, prev. cit., italics added.

Stuttgart, Wurm was named to the Committee for Reconstruction and Inter-Church Aid and Niemoeller was made vice-chair of the steering committee for the Ecumenical Training Centre. Hans Asmussen was appointed to the Ecumenical Commission for Chaplains to POWs as well as the Assembly Arrangements Committee. Hans Lilje was assigned to the Editorial Board for an Ecumenical Journal, and Dr. Rudolf Smend was named to the Committee for International Affairs. In preparation for the 1948 founding assembly, Hans Meiser was given place on the Committee on the Church and the Disorder of Society; Dibelius was appointed vice-chairman of the Committee on the Church and International Disorder; Niemoeller was made vice-chair of the Committee on the Church's Witness to God's Design and placed on the Assembly Message Committee; and Dr. Heinemann, who would later become President of the Federal Republic of Germany, was named to the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs. Moreover, Professor Wilhelm Niesel was appointed to a landmark Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews, while Hans Asmussen, along with five other German church leaders, was given place on a parallel alternate committee of the same name, the two of which, combined, would forge the first official words of the World Council of Churches on Jews, antisemitism, and Jewish missions in September 1948.

II. Five days after the Stuttgart Declaration was issued on 19 October 1945, Dr. Otto von Harling, a senior member of the executive ICCAJ before the war, and Dr. Karl Heinrich Rengstorff, issued a resolution on behalf of the Lutheran Evangelical Central Committee for Mission to Israel, stating that the work would be taken up as soon as conditions permitted, 'hopefully, within the year'.³⁹ In the same period, they wrote to Conrad Hoffmann, urging him 'to come as soon as possible for counsel and help'.⁴⁰ Hoffmann too was anxious for contact because he realized that 'spiritual isolation' during the war had left his German colleagues with 'little conception of the radical changes that ha[d] taken place in Jewry'.⁴¹ In his understanding, 5.7 million Jews, 'one third of all Jews in the world', had been 'exterminated', European Jewish survivors were both physically and spiritually ravaged, and anti-Jewish prejudice was on the rise 'everywhere'.⁴² It was also the case that the 'goodwill and religious tolerance' movement was gaining ground by agitating for 'toleration' in the face of the Jewish devastation, which in his promulgated view was 'endanger[ing]' Jewish missions. There was also the problem of rapidly

³⁹ 'Beschluss zur Wiedergruendung des Zentralverins vom 24. Oktober 1945', Evangelisch-Lutherischer Zentralverein fuer Mission Unter Israel, in *Die Kirchen und das Judentum: Documents von 1945 bis 1968*, Ed. Rolf Rendtorff and Hans Henrix (Munich, 1989), 529-530.

⁴⁰ Hoffmann to Standley, 22 December 1945, WCC.261201.8.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² BICCAJ Minutes, 16 May 1945; NAICCAJ Minutes, 3 October 1945; Report to IMC Ad Interim Committee, 30-31 October 1945; WCC.261207 and 261201.8, respectively.

increasing Zionism which was being stimulated by a rise in antisemitism, and, along with it, increasing division in Christendom. On one side were Christians who agreed with political Zionists about the need for a Jewish state in Palestine and, on the other, those who opposed a Jewish state while granting that Palestine should be an area of refuge for Jews.⁴³

While all of these were matters of concern as Hoffmann's presence was called for by von Harling and other European colleagues, the one receiving the most effort was the related problem of rehabilitation of Jewish missions and ICCAJ's prominence in it. Hoffmann, in fact, had just recently returned to America from his first post-war rounds in Britain and Geneva in order to advance ideas that had taken shape during the years of war. Discussion had been in the works since early 1944 about a possible ICCAJ 'Coordinating Centre for Jewish Work' under auspices of the WCC Department of Reconstruction in Geneva, but it was far from clear as to how such alignment would be arranged.⁴⁴ What was clear was that collaboration on Jewish missions and related theological problems was indicated, and that WCC would work closely with the 'various aims of the ICCAJ'.⁴⁵ Concurrent with this understanding, Samuel Cavert had chaired the re-organizational meeting of NAICCAJ in November 1944,⁴⁶ and Hoffmann had been placed at the head of an IMC-ICCAJ commission to study reconstruction of Jewish work on the Continent.⁴⁷ By early 1945 he was being urged to proceed to Europe as soon as possible to promote the idea that WCC-ICCAJ collaboration should become ecumenical policy in the areas of Jewish missions and refugee relief.⁴⁸ Efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to coordinate his trip with Visser't Hooft's April Provisional Committee meeting in London had failed, but consultations between the two were held in Geneva a few weeks later.⁴⁹ Upon Hoffmann's return to America agreement was reached in New York on 3 October that 'every effort' should

⁴³ Ibid. See also Hoffmann, Report to Advisory Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews of the Board of National Missions, 1 December 1944, WCC.261207.

⁴⁴ For ongoing discussion about ICCAJ-WCC collaboration through WCC Reconstruction, see BICCAJ Minutes, 4 December 1942, WCC.261207; CBMS Minutes, 7 June 1943, WCC.261229.2; BICCAJ Minutes, 30 September 1943, WCC.26213.3; BICCAJ Minutes, 8 February 1944, WCC.261207. See also Freudenberg to Birger Pernow, vice-chair of ICCAJ, 4 October 1944, WCC.301.4331.9.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ NA ICCAJ minutes, 3 November 1944, WCC.261207.3. The NA sector of ICCAJ functioned in a more or less truncated manner during the war because of conflict over affiliation with the Home Missions Council (HMC), who argued that American participation in any Christian approach to Jews abroad should be handled through the Foreign Missionary Board of NA (FMB). Continued negotiations resulted in the November 1944 decision that 1 each from HMC and FMB would be appointed as permanent ICCAJ members, and 1 each from HMC, FMB, and IMC as permanent consultants.

⁴⁷ NA ICCAJ minutes, 3 November 1944, WCC.261207.3. See also WCC Reconstruction Coordination Minutes, 1 December 1944, FCC B23 F1.

⁴⁸ NAICCAJ Minutes, 28 Feb 1945, WCC.261207.3.

⁴⁹ For IMC requests to the British Ministry of Information to expedite permission for Hoffmann to enter the country on business involving Jewish missions, see Goodall to Williams, 1 March 1945; Williams to Goodall, 6 March; Goodall to Williams, 14 March; William to Goodall, 15 March 1945; WCC.261201.8.

be made to insure that Church responsibility for Jews became an integral part of the developing WCC agenda. Within days, intentions to that effect had been set out in a formal letter to Samuel Cavert, who was by this time on loan to WCCIF in Geneva, and, as it turned out, part of the delegation that would be receiving the Stuttgart Declaration.⁵⁰

As discussion about the collaborative efforts of ICCAJ and WCC unfolded over the following months, two lines of alliance came into focus. The first followed the earlier train of thought about collaboration through the Department of Reconstruction, although there was some initial concern about overt identification of that relationship so soon after the war. It was thus initially suggested that the ICCAJ appointment should be that of liaison, rather than staff, and that Jewish mission work 'should not in any way implicate' either the Department of Reconstruction or the World Council.⁵¹ By the time details had been worked out in mid-1946 that ambivalence had resolved and the candidate of choice, Rev. Goete Hedenquist, who was head of Swedish Mission to Jews in Vienna before the war and would become assistant director of ICCAJ in 1949, was placed within the secretariat staff of the WCC.⁵²

The second line of alliance being sought was more complex. As discussed in chapter four, WCCIF had served as liaison between IMC and European mission agencies during the war and those efforts had been promoted as proof that integration of the missionary and church arms of the ecumenical movement was gaining momentum. Talk of merging into 'one body' the church and missionary aspects of the movement had surfaced by mid-1944.⁵³ By February 1946, in a ten-day period of WCCIF and IMC administrative meetings, three formal resolutions had been built around that idea: the WCCIF-IMC Joint Committee decided that the two Councils would seek out areas of 'closer cooperation and relationship';⁵⁴ the Ad Interim Committee of IMC resolved to 'offer' ICCAJ for collaboration with WCC on 'the witness of the Church to the Jewish people';⁵⁵ and the WCCIF Provisional Committee agreed that evangelism should be considered as an area of 'special concern' within its organizational structure.⁵⁶ The tenets behind that triad of resolutions hinged on the shared beliefs that evangelism was a mutual concern of all

⁵⁰ NAICCAJ Minutes, 3 October 1945, WCC.261207.3.

⁵¹ BICCAJ Minutes, 9 May 1946, WCC.261207. For ongoing discussion about collaboration with WCC Reconstruction, see BICCAJ Minutes, 27 September 1945, WCC.261207; NAICCAJ Minutes, 3 October 1945, WCC.261207.3; BICCAJ Minutes, 5-6 March 1946, WCC.261207; Cockburn to Smith, 16 March 1946, WCC.261207.2; Cockburn to Smith, 2 May 1945, WCC.261208; BICCAJ Minutes, 9 May 1946, WCC.261207.

⁵² Hedenquist served within the secretariat of the WCC from 1946 through 1949, at which time he was named assistant director of ICCAJ. Upon Hoffmann's retirement in 1952 Hedenquist became Director of ICCAJ.

⁵³ WCCIF Report on Activities during the Period July 1943-July 1944, FCCB23F1.

⁵⁴ WCCIF-IMC Joint Committee Minutes, Geneva, 14-16 February 1946, Appendix B, p.44.

⁵⁵ IMC Ad Interim Committee Minutes, Geneva, 16-19 February 1946, 11.

⁵⁶ WCCIF Provisional Committee Minutes, 21-23 February 1946, prev. cit.

churches, a uniting force that bound believers together, and a divine Christian imperative. In this wake of understanding and action, IMC Secretary John Decker predicted that ICCAJ would be one of the first agencies to be brought under the joint auspices of WCC-IMC, and four months later IMC announced that Hoffmann was returning to fulltime work on behalf of ICCAJ to advance that idea.⁵⁷

Two critical layers of WCC involvement were being sought through this plan: structural change that would move ICCAJ under joint auspices of the two Councils, so that each shared administrative power and financial responsibility, *and* WCC adoption of ICCAJ's theoretical and theological aims and principles. The argument for the case, unquestioned on either side, was that joint collaboration would make fuller use of ICCAJ's 'missionary dynamic', while taking advantage of the 'evangelistic opportunity...[within] the constituency of the WCC'. More specifically, the objects of ICCAJ's missionary aims were inhabited within the 'territory of the churches...directly related to the World Council', and joint collaboration would open 'vast new opportunities for evangelistic approach...to the suffering Jewish people in Europe and elsewhere'.⁵⁸

The deterrent to the alliance plan in mid-1946 was money. Even though WCCIF Assistant Secretary Henry Leiper had been in attendance when the unanimous decision was made in New York to pursue ICCAJ-WCC collaboration, he had to later inform Visser't Hooft that there was no means within the 'ordinary administrative budget' because staff increases and expanding Geneva facilities had nearly doubled expenses.⁵⁹ After consultations with IMC (in August) and Hoffmann (in November) Visser't Hooft placed the problem on the agendas of upcoming Administrative and Provisional Committee meetings.⁶⁰ In April 1947 the Provisional Committee passed a resolution affirming its intention to consider adding a WCC Department of Evangelization, which, if created, would 'definitely' include Jewish missions. In the meantime ICCAJ was 'authorised' to approach the Reconstruction Department for financial aid, with the understanding that requests would be considered according to 'merits in relation to other appeals

⁵⁷ BICCAJ Minutes, 5-6 March 1945, WCC.261207; Decker to Goodall, 10 June 1946, WCC.420038. Hoffmann continued as director of ICCAJ during the war but until July 1943 his time was divided in three ways between POW work for the YMCA, Jewish mission work for the Presbyterian Board of Missions, and ICCAJ. He emerged from the three-way split to work for just the Presbyterian Board and ICCAJ from July 1943 to September 1946, after which he again worked exclusively for ICCAJ.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Decker to Goodall.

⁵⁹ NAICCAJ Minutes, 28 Feb 1945, WCC.261207.3; Visser't Hooft to Goodall, 8 July 1946, WCC.261208.

⁶⁰ Decker to Warnshuis, with copy to Goodall, 12 June 1946; Visser't Hooft to Goodall, 8 July; BICCAJ Minutes, 17 July, WCC.261207; Smith to Decker, with copy to Visser't Hooft, 19 July; Standley to Goodall, 23 July 1946, WCC.261208; Hoffmann to Visser't Hooft, 28 October 1946, WCC.420038; BICCAJ Minutes, 6 December 1946, WCC.261208; CBMS Minutes, 6 December 1946, WCC.261229.

and demands'.⁶¹ The following June (1947) an enlarged ICCAJ meeting of 61 delegates from 15 countries convened in Basel to rule on structural changes that would advance ICCAJ-WCC collaboration, with four WCC representatives in attendance.⁶² The constitutional changes, which were informally agreed upon by ICCAJ, IMC, and WCCIF prior to convening, allowed for a 36% expansion of each regional sector comprising ICCAJ's executive committee, one that was to be chiefly allocated to WCC.⁶³ Continental European, British, and American sectors, in other words, were all increased from seven to eleven members, three of which in each sector were to be assigned by WCC. With allotment power of nine overall places, the revised constitution thus allowed WCC to appoint 27% of each of ICCAJ's three regional sectors.⁶⁴

The upshot of all of this, while not yet under its auspices, is that by mid-1946 ICCAJ had moved into new levels of relationship with WCC and that all subsequent plans proceeded on the assumption that collaboration on Jewish matters was to be the norm. By November 1946 the programming committee for the founding WCC assembly had already decided that it would be taking up the 'question of Israel' and that Hoffmann would be assisting.⁶⁵ By early December Hoffmann had already issued two of a number of memoranda that would ultimately inform the 1948 assembly statement on Jews, antisemitism, and Jewish missions. The clear intention of both memoranda was to lobby: lobby for WCC auspices of ICCAJ and lobby for WCC adoption of ICCAJ emphasis on Church responsibility for Jewish missions.

The first memorandum was sent to Visser't Hooft in response to ongoing discussion, and it was framed around the forthcoming theme of the 1948 founding assembly, 'The Order of God and the Present Disorder of Man'.⁶⁶ What is perhaps most remarkable about Hoffmann's attempt to place ICCAJ arguments within the context of the upcoming assembly theme is that it

⁶¹ Provisional Committee Minutes, April 1947, Buck Hill Falls, WCC.301.007; also quoted and discussed in BICCAJ Minutes, 19 May 1947, WCC.261208, and ICCAJ Minutes, Basel, 4-7 June 1947, WCC.261203.

⁶² WCC representatives at the ICCAJ Basle conference included Alphonse Koechlin, who had been part of the Stuttgart delegation; Dr. Werner Wickstrom of the Reconstruction Department; Gote Hedenquist, ICCAJ's representative to the WCC secretariat; and Professor Walter Horton, who was both chair of NAICCAJ and currently working in Geneva with the WCC Commission on God's Design and Man's Witness. Adolf Freudenberg, who had been pivotal to ongoing discussions between ICCAJ and WCC, had also been commissioned for one of the keynote papers, which was delivered by Hedenquist.

⁶³ ICCAJ-IMC-WCC discussion on ICCAJ constitutional changes began as early as December 1946: Hoffmann to Visser't Hooft, 29 December 1946, with copies to Norman Goodall and J.W.Decker, WCC.420077; Hoffmann to Visser't Hooft, 18 February 1947, WCC.420038.

⁶⁴ Ibid. The constitutional revisions expanded the international executive committee to 36 members, allowing 11 members each in 'at least' 3 sectors, while providing for the possibility of adding other full sectors. Each sector was to include appointees by IMC (7), WCC (3), and the Hebrew Christian Alliance (1). The allotments did not affect co-opting expansion powers granted to each regional sector to enlarge as it saw fit.

⁶⁵ CBMS Minutes, 6 December 1946, WCC.261229; BICCAJ Minutes, 6 December, WCC.261208.

⁶⁶ Hoffmann, 'The Christian Approach to the Jews,' to Visser't Hooft, 9 December 1948, WCC.420038.1.

was *not* the German Nazi state that had orchestrated extermination of Jews who was signaled as symbol of the 'Disorder of Man', but the Jewish people themselves.

We believe that the Jews as a people are a symbol as to other people of the disorder of man both in the past and in the present.⁶⁷

Yet Jews were not *just* a symbol of the disorder of man, they were also a 'mysterious...factor in the design of God for mankind' as well as the 'most universal neighbour of the...Church'. As such, according to the three connecting parts of Hoffmann's argument, it was only as the Church became immersed in the practice and profession of the Christian faith that the '*disorder of man*' so widespread and continuous in relation to the Jews ha[d]any hope of solution'.⁶⁸ His second memorandum on 'The Church and the Jews', which was also posted to Nils Ehrenstroem and Anglican Bishop Stephen Neill of the WCC Study Department,⁶⁹ strode on the same path by asking in opening and closing statements, 'What are you going to do with the Jews?'⁷⁰ Indeed, the memorandum was peppered with sub-questions meant to elucidate what he termed as that 'inescapable question'.⁷¹ Hoffmann's contention here and elsewhere was that the Church was repeatedly confronted with that question 'in at least three major forms' - antisemitism, Jewish missions, and Zionism - each of which, it will be remembered, had been integral to this line of argument since 'The Jewish Problem: Some Newer Aspects' appeared in *IRM* in October 1925.⁷² The perceived issues facing the Church in the aftermath of WWII, in other words, were the same as those in the aftermath of WWI, but with a critical difference. The Church now had to deal not only with the wake of war itself, but with the aftermath of 'Hitler's madness' wherein 'more than six million Jews were liquidated'.⁷³ Within that realm of difference, however, lay a point that Hoffmann believed should shape the ways in which the Church approached the same (but different) issues of Zionism, antisemitism, and Jewish missions:

⁶⁷ Hoffmann, 'The Christian Approach to the Jews', to Visser't Hooft, 9 December 1948, WCC.420038.1.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Anglican Bishop Stephen Neill was appointed to the WCC Study Department in early 1946, in lieu of Hans Schoenfeld, who was let go at the end of the year. Neill had become a missionary in south India in 1924, where he was bishop of the Tinnevely diocese from 1939 until his dismissal in 1945. He was closely involved with the WCC from 1946 to 1961, editing with Ruth Rouse in 1954 what is still the standard work on '*A History of the Ecumenical Movement*', prev. cit. For circumstances surrounding his hushed dismissal from India in 1945 for sexual anomalies, see Dyron Daugherty, *Bishop Stephen Neill: From Edinburgh to South India* (Peter Lang, 2008); Bishop Richard Holloway, 'The Mystery of Stephen Neill', *Church Times* 6718 (8 November 1991); Donald Coggan, 'Stephen Neill's Thorn in the Flesh', *Church Times* 6717 (15 November 1991).

⁷⁰ Hoffmann, 'The Church and the Jews', dated 20 November but not sent to Visser't Hooft et al until 9 December 1946, WCC.420038.1.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid. See also 'The Jewish Problem: Some Newer Aspects', *IRM*, Volume 14, Issue 4, October 1925, 598-607.

⁷³ Hoffmann, 'The Christian Approach to the Jews', 9 December 1946, prev. cit.

Had the voice of the Christian world through the Churches been loud and vigorous enough, perhaps th[is] great modern tragedy of Israel might have been prevented. Christendom, especially the Christian Church, must be both penitent and humble in confessing its great failure to be 'the brother's keeper' in this time of greatest need...⁷⁴

The humility and penitence being called for in the wake of that liquidation, however, did *not* extend to suppressing ICCAJ insistence on the need for Jewish missions in the face of the post-war 'disorder'. Conversely, as will become clear, it gave cause for belief and conviction in an expansive propagation of the 'best' that Christianity had to offer Jews, and it was precisely that which Hoffmann attempted to impress upon the World Council of Churches in December 1946. The term *reparation* had not been used thus far, even though all of the elements of the idea were present, but by June 1947 the term had been clearly articulated in an adopted statement by the 61 delegates from 15 countries at the ICCAJ meeting in Basle, Switzerland.

The Church as a whole must confess that its witness and protest were not vigorous enough to prevent the barbaric persecution of the Jews in Europe. Its indifference to the moral and spiritual needs of the Jews is equally blameworthy. The best *reparation* it can make is to recognize evangelization of the Jews as the responsibility and task of the whole Church, and in all its denominations it must organize and equip itself to carry out this task.⁷⁵

III. By spring 1948 two head-gates of ecumenical thought informing this idea of post-war reparation had opened. The first emanated from WCC Study Department research on the founding assembly theme, 'Man's Disorder and God's Design'. Four commissions had been appointed between August 1946 and June 1947 to research specific aspects of the theme and produce pre-assembly study volumes. Commission II on The Church's Witness to God's Design, headed by Professor Hendrik Kraemer and Bishop Stephen Neill, was to address the critical relationship between evangelism and the churches. As part of that volume 'A Message for Israel' was privately circulated for comment by Neill's office in early February 1948.⁷⁶ The nine-page document looked at surviving European Jewry in the wake of Nazi exterminations from the standpoint of the theological duty of the Church. The post-war plight of surviving European Jewry was explained as less tragic than during the war but more desperate because survivor-hope had been extinguished by ill-treatment, homelessness, and rising antisemitism, which were aggravating the 'evolution of Zionism'.⁷⁷ The theological response that was being urged in the

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Statement on The Church and Methods, ICCAJ Minutes, Basle, 4-7 June 1947, prev. cit., italics added.

⁷⁶ 'A Message for Israel', Commission II on 'God's Design and Man's Witness', Study 47E/230 (B), Chairman, Hendrik Kraemer, Secretary, Stephen C. Neill, for private circulation only; PP MS60 17/10/4. The document was dated December 1947 but was not issued for comment until February 1948.

⁷⁷ Ibid., paragraph 1.

'Message' was that the Church, as the 'New Israel', could not 'remain indifferent' or tolerate the rising persecution of Jews.⁷⁸ Such attitude, however, was not to be derived from 'pitying the Jews', but from the realization that Jewish and Christian destinies were bound together, and that attacks against Jews were in fact directed against the 'mystery of the Incarnation of the Word of God'.⁷⁹ While the Church was bound in solidarity with Jews, it was also bound by divine imperative to proclaim the Gospel to Jews, for Christian apathy about Jewish salvation was said to be as condemning as persecution of Jews.⁸⁰ Moreover, the duty of proclaiming the Gospel to Jews, while standing in solidarity, entailed that sensitive theological issues *not* be avoided in order to spare Jewish feelings. The complex nature of such issues, especially that of the crucifixion, was said to carry with it a particular danger.⁸¹

A Jew who ha[d] been stricken in body and soul by the trials of the last few years w[ould] tend to make no difference between an anti-Semite like Hitler, who declared he was fulfilling the will of the Almighty by annihilating the Jews, and the men who explain[ed] or even excuse[d] the persecutions by saying that they are God's answer to the cry... 'His blood be on us, and on our children'.⁸²

To remove such misunderstanding, the 'Message' advocated a more balanced explication of the causes and consequences of that 'curse'. While it was indeed true that 'the curse was invoked in the name of the whole Jewish people', it was equally true that Christ was condemned by Pilate 'in the name of all Gentiles' and that Jesus had asked God to forgive both.⁸³ It must therefore be explained that it was *not* the death of Jesus for which Jews were divinely reproached, but, for Israel's refusal to recognize the 'New Covenant [that] was sealed in His blood'.⁸⁴

To the persecuted people, the Church must say that their sufferings are not God's vengeance for the death of Jesus, but an appeal to conversion and to turn from their unfaithfulness.⁸⁵

While it was 'obviously very hard to use this language to the survivors of the Nazi massacres', the 'Message' went on, Christians had to understand that they could not sufficiently proclaim the Gospel to Jews 'unless they beg[a]n by affirming that...their unfaithfulness consists in their refusal to recognize Him as the Messiah'.⁸⁶ Israel's 'unfaithfulness', however, could not justify the antisemitic actions and attitudes of those who fashioned themselves as 'instruments of this

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., paragraphs 1-4, 46.

⁸⁰ Ibid., paragraph 8, referring to Matthew 25:27.

⁸¹ Ibid., paragraphs 5-7.

⁸² Ibid., paragraph 8, referring to Matthew 25:27.

⁸³ Ibid., paragraph 11, referring to Luke 23:24.

⁸⁴ Ibid., paragraphs 13, 16-17.

⁸⁵ Ibid., paragraph 19.

⁸⁶ Ibid., paragraph 19.

punishment'. Antisemitism was always 'an expression of justice self-administered', never an instrument of God, and all who 'attacked God's people' were also condemned.⁸⁷ It was also said to be the case that antisemitism was a major deterrent to Israel's conversion, for so long as Jews could suppose that 'Christians as a whole are anti-Semit[ic] or that the Church d[id] not fight anti-Semitism in every shape and form', they would continue to turn from the Gospel.⁸⁸

It followed from all of this, according to the winding argument, that distinctions had to be made between the antisemitic intention to negate Jews and the Christian imperative to convert Jews. More specifically, distinctions had to be made between the radically different natures of antisemitism and Christian anti-Judaism, both of which were said to convey the intention of destruction.⁸⁹ Unlike the malevolent destruction of antisemitism that sought to annihilate Jews, however, the benevolent intent that was implicit 'in every summons to [Jewish] conversion' sought *only* the 'spiritual destruction of Judaism' and *only* for the purpose of leading Jews to their spiritual destiny.⁹⁰ Clarification and elaboration of this benevolent quality was said to be especially important in the wake of the recent Nazi exterminations. While the mode of heralding the overall 'Message' would no doubt vary, the document concluded, its 'essence' could not: Christ's death was an act of redemption for all; there was no salvation elsewhere; and those who proclaimed such were to 'love' the Jews '*because they are Jews (and wretched)*', and 'not in spite of the fact that they are Jews (because they are wretched)'.⁹¹

Two responses to this Commission II document are particularly relevant. The first by Conrad Hoffmann, in March 1948, is significant for its agreement with the essence of the 'Message'.⁹² While Hoffmann indeed criticized the document, his objections were confined to comments about form, degrees of emphases, and generalizations. In terms of form, although he saw 'much valuable material in the document as submitted', he felt that it should be redrafted so that it presented a more 'realistic' (rather than solely theological) approach to the questions at hand.⁹³ In terms of emphases, he felt that the document's tone should be less self-righteous and more humble; that validity for Jewish missions should receive more attention; that 'the guilt of certain Jews in provoking anti-Jewish attitudes' should be mentioned, and that stress should be placed on 'joint responsibility' for antisemitism.⁹⁴ He also held, when speaking of 'desperate and

⁸⁷ Ibid., paragraphs 17, 21-24.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 25.

⁸⁹ Ibid., paragraph 26.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid., paragraph 47, italics implied by underlining.

⁹² Hoffmann to Nils Ehrenstroem, 9 March 1948, 'Comments on Study 47E/230 (B): A Message for Israel', 'God's Design and Man's Witness', WCC.420038.1.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

extremist' actions of Zionists, that it should be pointed out that such actions were partially the result of Christian failure to provide immigration opportunities, and he urged against the use of generalizations to describe the actions of 'certain' Jews or Zionists.⁹⁵ As for the structure of the theological argument, however, Hoffmann expressed no criticism or concern: not about cause of Jewish sufferings nor about need for the Church to say in the wake of the Nazi massacres that the sufferings were God's appeal to conversion. The only theological point on which Hoffmann disagreed had to do with the called-for distinction between antisemitism and anti-Judaism, and, there, he strongly rejected the idea that conversion of Jews was a form of anti-Judaism, stating in a single sentence that Christianity was not opposition to Judaism but, rather, its 'fulfilment'.⁹⁶ The end result on which both Hoffmann and the 'Message' agreed, of course, was that, in God's design, Judaism ceased to exist.

James Parkes, in contrast, rejected 'A Message for Israel' in its entirety by honing in on precisely the same point. His contention was that 'the whole complicated and difficult argument' dissolved as invalid because it hinged on the false premise that the aim of conversion was 'the spiritual destruction of Judaism'.⁹⁷ Such a statement, according to Parkes, could only mean that God's revelation at Sinai had 'no present validity' except as viewed with Christian lens through the 'revelation of Calvary'.⁹⁸ Parkes' refutation, summed in a single introductory sentence and elaborated over five pages of criticism, was that Judaism was still 'operative' and that it was part of God's design that it continued to exist *in its own right*. His argument, which was a concise summary of his Eliot Lectures at the New York Jewish Institute of Religion in 1946-1947 (an amplified version of which was just being released by University of Chicago Press), disavowed the very theological tenets on which the 'Message' was based.⁹⁹ As opposed to the traditional Christian thesis that the Church was the 'new Israel' whose duty it was to herald God's appeal to conversion, Parkes charged that the 'basic tragedy' of Christianity's historical attitude to Judaism was its twofold assumption that 'God subsumed His revelation of Sinai' at Calvary and that everything of permanent value was 'absorbed' by the Church. Contrarily, Parkes argued, it was decidedly *not* the case that Sinai and Calvary were 'alternative schemes of salvation', *nor* was it God's design that one should choose or accept 'either the one or the other'. In God's design both were included and, for that reason, mankind was in need of both.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ James Parkes, 'Comments on A Message for Israel', Assembly Commission II on 'God's Design and Man's Witness', Study 47E/230 (B), 30 April 1948, PP MS60/17/10/4.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid. See James Parkes, *Judaism and Christianity* (University of Chicago Press, 1948).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Two points need to be made about Parkes' submission of these comments on 30 April 1948. The first is that he was not solicited for comments, as in the case of Hoffmann, but, rather, that he sought out Commission II for permission to comment. The second is that he was made aware of the document by William Simpson, who as general secretary of CCJ remained in contact with both sides of the Jewish evangelism question. As illustrated earlier when he sent Hoffmann's summons for a counter programme against CCJ to Parkes in spring 1942, Simpson did not hesitate to comment to Parkes in a way that he would not comment to the other side, knowing that Parkes would respond in a way that he could or would not. In this instance he forwarded the 'Message' to Parkes, along with the note that it was 'so bad' he had no idea what to suggest short of 'interment'.¹⁰¹ Parkes, in turn, wrote to Stephen Neill, asking permission to comment while making clear that his thoughts would reflect a 'radically different' theological position.¹⁰² The following week Oliver Tomkins, assistant general secretary of WCC, notified Parkes that Neill was on leave but that the letter had been forwarded to his secretary in Geneva. While Tomkins was not directly involved with Commission II, he passed on to both Parkes and the Commission that it would benefit from Parkes' 'unique experience'.¹⁰³ Within a few days Parkes received confirmation from Neill's secretary that the WCC Study Department would 'very much' like his comments.¹⁰⁴

Yet neither Parkes', Hoffmann's, nor any other respondent's comments on the 'Message' influenced Commission II. By June the text (with only minimal editing) had been distributed to WCC church delegates in the Commission II pre-assembly volume, *The Church's Witness to God's Design*.¹⁰⁵ The only significant difference was that the title had been changed to 'The Approach to Israel' and authorship of the document had been revealed as the French Protestant Federation Committee on Witness to Israel. Respondents' comments on the 'Message', however, were turned over to WCC Committee IV. This second line of assembly preparation derived from a February 1948 decision to appoint committees (as opposed to study-commissions) which would formulate assembly statements on four 'concerns' of the churches. The committee to handle the concern about Jews was initially named the 'Committee on the Christian Attitude to

¹⁰¹ Simpson to Parkes, 9 March 1948. PP MS60/17/10/4. There is no indication that Simpson himself submitted comments on the document to Commission II. His subsequent involvement in this issue will be dealt with in more detail later in the chapter.

¹⁰² Parkes to Stephen Neill, 10 March 1948; Parkes to Simpson, 10 March 1948, PP MS60/17/10/4. .

¹⁰³ Oliver Tomkins to Parkes, 18 March; Parkes to Tomkins, 23 March; Parkes to Tomkins, 20 April; Tomkins to Parkes, 18 May; Parkes to Tomkins, 20 May 1948, PP MS50/17/10/4.

¹⁰⁴ Dorothy Grose (Secretary to Bishop Neill) to Parkes, 22 March 1948, PP MS60/17/10/4.

¹⁰⁵ Later published in Volume II of the official Amsterdam Assembly Series on Man's Disorder and God's Design, *The Church's Witness to God's Design: An Ecumenical Study Prepared Under the Auspices of the World Council of Churches* (London: SCM Press, October 1948), 190-199.

the Jews'.¹⁰⁶ At the time this decision to form the committee was made, it was determined that Conrad Hoffmann would be asked to provide materials that would address both evangelism and antisemitism. As set out to Hoffmann in a letter from Herbert Newell, who was charged with assembling those materials, the chief aim was to make as clear as possible the 'cutting edge' thought on the main issues.¹⁰⁷ Convinced as he was that ICCAJ was already the source of 'cutting edge' thought, the two memoranda Hoffmann provided to Newell in March and May of 1948 were fortifications of materials that were already in Newell's hand. More precisely, his March memorandum on 'Church and Israel' proceeded along the same line of emphases as did his comments on 'A Message for Israel'.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, his memorandum on 20 May followed the course of lobbyist argument laid out in his December 1946 memoranda to Visser't Hooft.¹⁰⁹ Other materials, including resolutions from the 1947 ICCAJ conference in Basle and a 1947 ICCAJ-sponsored conference in New York, were in that same vein of ICCAJ post-war argumentation.¹¹⁰

To these, Newell added two further sources. The (British) Council of Christians and Jews, as opposed to the National Conference of Christians and Jews in America, was solicited for a number of reasons. Dr. J.H. Cockburn, both head of the WCC Reconstruction Department and a member of the WCC Central Committee, was a founding member of CCJ, as was Henry Carter, who was also chair of the Ecumenical Commission for Refugees under Cockburn's Department. In 1946 Cockburn and Carter appointed CCJ General Secretary William Simpson to the Ecumenical Commission, and, in those dual capacities, Simpson had been involved in a WCC Round Table Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews in February 1947. As chairman of that conference, Visser't Hooft had led representatives from ICCAJ and Christian members of CCJ to the realization that basic differences 'centred around methods rather than principle'.¹¹¹ When Simpson was approached in the spring of 1948 for Committee IV material, it

¹⁰⁶ The Concerns of the Churches committees were: Life and Work of Women in the Church; Christian Attitude to the Jews; Significance of the Laity in the Church; Christian Reconstruction and Inter-Church Aid.

¹⁰⁷ Herbert W. Newell to Hoffmann, 14 February 1948, WCC.420038.1.

¹⁰⁸ Hoffmann to Newell, 31 March 1948, with enclosed memorandum on 'Church and Israel', WCC.420038.1.

¹⁰⁹ Hoffmann, 'Memorandum on the Church and Israel or The Christian Approach to the Jews', 20 May 1948, WCC.301.4329.7. See also Hoffmann's cover letter, 25 May 1948, which was circulated with the memorandum to an unspecified list of assembly attendees; WCC.261208.

¹¹⁰ ICCAJ reports from the Commissions on Church and Methods, Church and Evangelism, Church and Hebrew Christians, Basel Minutes, 4-7 June 1948, 16-19, WCC.261206.9-10. See also Findings of the Conference on the Christian Church and the Jewish People in America, New York, 7 October 1948, WCC.261207.

¹¹¹ Hoffmann to Visser't Hooft, 18 February 1947, WCC.420038.1. For more detail on the Round Table Conference on the Christian Approach the Jews', see WCC.261208.

was thus already understood that he was *not* of the school which insisted that Jewish missions were wholly inconsistent with cooperative goodwill between Jews and Christian. He was seen rather as secretary of an organization that based cooperation between Christians and Jews on 'common ethical ideals' while respecting religious differences.¹¹² Simpson's contributions were hence twofold: he provided recent CCJ resolutions to Newell's Committee IV study materials, and he later participated on a personal level in Committee IV discussions at the founding WCC assembly.

The remaining source for Newell's compilation of materials was the Brethren Council of the Evangelical Church of Germany. In order to understand the inclusion of this source it is necessary to first visit a German Evangelical Church 'Statement on the Question of Reparation', signed by Bishop Wurm in early March 1948 and forwarded to Geneva as part of an ongoing informing of German Church positions to WCC.¹¹³ The document was a positional statement on reparation for German Jews who had been persecuted during the Third Reich, with emphasis on distinction between 'the 'question of general reparation' and the 'special duty of reparation'.¹¹⁴ A 'special' guilt of the German nation for its actions against Jews was singled out as reason for not only 'special atonement' but a 'special understanding' of what constituted that atonement. The reparation could be made by way of 'sacrifices in care' through Aid for the Racially Persecuted in Stuttgart, 'in close contact with the Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews', but it had to be made with the understanding that it included 'a special responsibility' to meet Jews as brothers and proclaim the Gospel.¹¹⁵

With this background notion of reparative witness to Jews in hand, Newell included a German Church statement which set out its theological basis. He made such extensive use of the Brethren Council 'Word About the Jewish Question' issued on 8 April, in fact, that the full document, save for introduction, appeared in the WCC assembly materials for Committee IV.

¹¹² W.W. Simpson, 'The Jewish Problem: Notes for the Committee on the Concerns of the Churches', 26 May 1948, PPMS60/17/10/4.

¹¹³ 'Statement Regarding the Question of Reparation', Bishop Wurm, Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany, 5 March 1948, WCC.420084.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. This statement on reparation for Jews was notably different from the attitude reflected in a private report received by WCC in September 1945. As explained to WCC Secretary Oliver Tomkins, the Berlin 'Evangelical Assistance Centre' was able to cooperate with Catholics and Quakers in assisting racially persecuted non-Aryan Christians, but unable to cooperate with Jewish groups. The main deterrent was a matter of 'principle': 'We are of the opinion that the non-Aryan German has to bear all *general* consequences of the war, like all other Germans', and that 'only those losses and disadvantages which [were], directly or indirectly, caused by anti-Jewish laws...[should receive] compensation'. Jewish relief organizations, it was complained, were holding 'aloof' by insisting that Jews as such were not 'guilty of the war and its conduct', that they could not be held 'responsible for any of its consequences', and that they should therefore be 'compensated for *all* losses caused through the war'. Pastor Rieger to Tomkins, 'The Jews in Greater Berlin', September 1945, WCC.301.110.3.

Like the French 'Message for Israel', the German 'Word' relied on 'injunctions of the Scriptures' to supply the requisite foundation for post-war action in the wake of 'all that ha[d] happened'.¹¹⁶ Unlike the 'Message', however, the stated impetus of the 'Word' was guilt and sorrow for having stood in silence during the years of war, as well as for failing to have made 'united' admission of that guilt in the three years following the war. The 'Word' was thus both admission of wrongs against Jews during the years of the Third Reich *and* explication of theological tenets to guide Christian attitudes in the post-war years. Indeed, the stated guilt was explained, in fact, as the result of having abandoned the theological tenets that were now being posited as basis for the only 'right way' to approach the individual Jew, Jewry, or 'the Jewish question' in the post-war era.¹¹⁷ The 'correct' understanding which had been abandoned was said to be: that the election and designation of Israel had been fulfilled when Jesus was embodied as a Jew; that Israel had rejected God's fulfilment; that God had passed the election to the Church as the embodiment of Christ; that the election had carried with it a divine injunction for the Church to be 'a saving witness to Israel'.¹¹⁸ The present guilt of Christians in Germany, so the 'Word' argued, was that they had withdrawn from God's injunction to be that witness, justifying themselves 'by speaking of the curse laid on Israel' instead of believing in God's faithfulness to Israel.¹¹⁹ Christians in Germany had chosen not to remember that God's judgment followed 'after Israel even...in her state of rejection' and that 'Israel under the judgment' was the 'unceasing evidence' of God's truth and reality as well as 'God's unceasing warning to His people'.¹²⁰ The repentant path to be trod was to witness to Israel 'with special earnestness and renewed passion', 'tell[ing] her that the promises of the Old Testament [were] fulfilled in Jesus Christ'.¹²¹ And it was to be done while remembering that:

God is not mocked - that is the tacit lesson of the fate of the Jews, a warning for us, an admonition to the Jews to turn to the One in whose Name alone their salvation is to be found.¹²²

When Newell pulled all of these sources together in a revised document draft entitled 'The Christian Attitude to the Jews', the ICCAJ material and the German Brethren 'Word About

¹¹⁶ 'A Word about the Jewish Question from the Bruderrat (Council of Brethren) of the Evangelical Church in Germany', Darmstadt, 8 April 1948, WCC.301.4330.2. This English translation was made, circulated, and published by the WCC Study Department in 1948.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 'There was no longer any readiness to believe in the enduring nature of the promise to Israel, or to preach it, or to make it a reality by practical approaches to the Jews. In this way, we Christians supported all the injustice and harm and injury which Israel had to suffer from us'.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 3.

¹²² Ibid., 2.

the Jewish Question' constituted some 80% of its content.¹²³ The remainder was comprised of extracts from CCJ resolutions and James Parkes' rebuttal to the 'Message for Israel', which was attributed anonymously to an objecting 'correspondent'. Newell used the Brethren Council, the CCJ, and the unnamed 'correspondent' as illustrations of three conceptual approaches to Jews. The Brethren statement was to illustrate the theological necessity of Jewish conversion; the CCJ extracts were to illustrate the view of those who believed that cooperation could be had 'without prejudice' to differing theologies; and the 'correspondent' view was to represent those who argue for the 'continued validity of Old Testament revelation' and (by implication) the invalidity of Jewish missions.¹²⁴ The materials went through two circulated drafts as 'The Christian Attitude to the Jews' but, after the second draft was sent to Visser't Hooft for approval in June, the title of both the study document and name of Committee IV were changed to 'The Christian Approach to the Jews'. In the same period Conrad Hoffmann was appointed to serve as assembly secretary to Committee IV.¹²⁵

To round out the picture taking shape, on 18 and 30 June 1948 James Parkes received letters from the WCC Study Department indicating that he would be either a member or an invited guest of Commission II at the assembly in Amsterdam, but that, either way, he was expected to participate in a pre-assembly conference on 18-20 August.¹²⁶ Two weeks later, in a letter dated 13 July, Parkes received an apology from WCC Assistant General Secretary Oliver Tomkins, who explained that when he had recommended Parkes as consultant for Commission II and Committee IV, 'it was assumed that you would in fact participate in them'. The 'situation' for which Tomkins was apologizing was that he had just been informed that 'the number of consultants in that commission had already been completed, and therefore the official ruling at another level was that no one else could be added'.¹²⁷ Within a month's period, in other words, Parkes was included *and* excluded without even conciliatory mention of visitor status, even though such place was still being added to Committee IV as late as opening day of the assembly on 25 August. It should also be noted that the last-minute added visitor to Committee IV was a colleague of Hoffmann and a member of the NAICCAJ.¹²⁸

¹²³ Herbert Newell, 'The Christian Attitude to the Jews', first and second drafts, WCC.301.4330.2.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Newell to Visser't Hooft, 3 June 1938, with second draft of 'Christian Attitude to Jews', WCC.301.4330.2. For the published material, see 'The Christian Approach to the Jews', *Memoranda on Concerns of the Churches* (Geneva: WCC, 1948), 3-14.

¹²⁶ WCC Study Department to Parkes, with salutation 'To Members of the Study Department Commission and the Four Assembly Commissions', 18 and 30 June 1948, PP MS60/17/10/4.

¹²⁷ Tomkins to Parkes, 13 July 1948, PP MS60/17/10/4. See also Parkes to Tomkins, 17 July.

¹²⁸ See B.S. Bilheimer to Conrad Hoffmann on opening day, 25 August 1948, notifying that Dr. Charles Leber, a 'visitor by special commission', was being added to his committee; WCC.31005.13.

IV. WCC Assembly Committee IV on the Christian Approach to the Jews was a complex configuration from twenty countries. The Committee was made up of appointed delegates (22), alternates (34), consultants (17), fraternal delegates (3), observers (2), and accredited visitors (2).¹²⁹ All of the categories except visitors were allowed to deliberate the issues of the Committee statement but only delegates and alternates were allowed to rule on content. The overall Committee was divided into delegate and alternate sections which met separately but simultaneously to deliberate identical agendas while a liaison from the delegate section circulated between the two groups. At the end of the parallel meetings the officers from both sections met to coordinate the day's findings and make needed adjustments to the next day's agenda. This procedure was followed on four consecutive afternoons during the first week of the Assembly.

While input from both sets of officers was valued it was yet the case that those of the delegate committee were the presiding officers of the overall Committee and as such carried significantly more weight. Episcopal Bishop Angus Dun was chairman, Conrad Hoffmann was secretary, and Goete Hedenquist was the circulating liaison. On the first day of deliberations Bishop Dun outlined the Commission II 'Message' and Newell's memorandum while cautioning against 'outside' materials and views from 'special interest' groups. It was agreed at that time 'not to circulate' or 'invite' documents or visitors from 'the outside' unless it was deemed necessary by the governing committees of the Assembly.¹³⁰ The agenda was also pre-determined. After sorting out issues of concern to both delegate and alternate sections, topical boundaries were ordered along four corresponding lines: the theological place of the Jew in God's design, the role of Jewish evangelization in God's design; societal questions about both antisemitism and Christian-Jewish cooperation; and the emergence of Israel as a state.

The discussion on the place of the Jew in God's design was dominated by Pierre Maury of the French Protestant Federation and Wilhelm Niesel of the German Evangelical Church Council, both of whom had been present at the Stuttgart Declaration - Niesel from the German side and Maury from the WCC delegation.¹³¹ Both had also been involved with the materials compiled by Newell: Maury was part of the committee responsible for inclusion of 'A Message for Israel' in the Commission II volume, and Niesel was a member of the Brethren Council who issued 'A Word About the Jewish Question'. Each now argued, in agreement with the other, that

¹²⁹ For a compiled list of Committee IV, see Appendix VI. For working lists and ongoing pre-assembly revisions of members, see WCC.31005.13. Numbers cited are based on committee assignments reported in 'Lists of Participants', *The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches*, 236-267, prev. cit.

¹³⁰ Minutes of Committee IV, Session One, WCC.31005.14.

¹³¹ Ibid.

'the Jewish problem' required a 'strong theological' basis.¹³² Invoking the Brethren Council 'Word', while taking into account the German Church Council statement on 'Reparation', Niesel argued that it was only in the light of theology that the Church could understand the approach to Jews in God's design.¹³³ The 'right attitude' could only be attained when it was understood that 'the history and vocation of Israel was completed' with Christ's incarnation; that the Church was to be built from both Gentiles and Jews; that the Church was imbued with 'special responsibility' for Jews.¹³⁴ To an objection that such basis was not exclusively sufficient for all issues, as in the case of 'moral and social justice',¹³⁵ Niesel argued that a 'purely theological approach...did not exclude action in concrete situations, but that any action of the Church in favour of the Jews was always to be a witness for Christ'.¹³⁶ While there were no objections to the idea that 'the Jew was a witness to God', or that during the Hitler years 'the Jewish problem [had meant] fighting for the true revelation, the true ethos, the true God', it was yet suggested that the 'same radical stress on the theological issue' was not necessary in the much changed post-war conditions.¹³⁷ To this, Maury insisted that divine emphasis on the theological basis for Christian-Jewish relations did not change according to conditions, and that the Church must emphasize 'that the Jews were the chosen people of God'.¹³⁸ The agreement in the end, and cited from the Brethren Council 'Word', was that 'the election and designation of Israel had been fulfilled in Jesus Christ', and agreement was attained, it should be noted, without a single reference to Parkes' unidentified competing thesis.¹³⁹

With agreement on the basic premise that Israel's fulfilment lay in Christ, Hoffmann proffered as a fundamental proposition that 'the Gospel was to be preached to every man and woman in the world', including 'Jews'.¹⁴⁰ To this, no objection was raised by any member of the committee, including William Simpson. In fact, Simpson suggested in a later discussion that the 'starting point' of the Assembly statement on Jews should be 'recognition of the responsibility of mission to all men'.¹⁴¹ This across-the-board agreement on the fundamental relations between

¹³² Ibid., 2, as put forth by consultant Pierre Maury with Niesel in agreement.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 2-3. Niesel made explicit that 'in Germany the Confessing Church...[had come] to recognize that it was not enough to assist the Jews like any other needy people.'

¹³⁵ Ibid., 3, as put forth by consultant Dr. Regin Prenter of the Church of Denmark.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 3.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 3, as put forth by delegate Professor Haitjema of the Dutch Reformed Church. See also Minutes, Session Two, as put forth by consultant Rev. Charles Westphal of the Reformed Church of France.

¹³⁸ Ibid., Session One, 3; Session Two, 2.

¹³⁹ Ibid, Session Two, 1-2.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. Session Two, 2.

¹⁴¹ Minutes, Session Four, 2. See also Session Two, 2, where Simpson explained that clerical abstractions tended to mask the 'concrete task to be performed' and that the situation could be improved by teaching the laity 'how to approach their Jewish neighbours'.

the theological place of the Jew in God's design and the Christian imperative of missions to Jews moved the discussion on evangelization through a broad range of concerns about the difficulties of implementation, all of which reflected the ardour and seriousness with which missions to Jews was viewed.¹⁴² On the complex question of Christian-Jewish cooperation, however, Committee IV was decidedly split. There were those, like Simpson, who held that evangelistic aims could be placed in abeyance while aligning with Jews against antisemitism, but there were also those who warned of the dangers of such alliance between the two faiths. Niesel argued forcefully that such collaboration was 'based on the dangerous assumption' that Jews and Christians shared a common understanding of 'justice', 'liberty', and related concepts, whereas, in reality, such concepts and terms could only 'be understood through Christ'. Niesel rejected outright that the divine imperative could be left in abeyance while pursuing alliance with Jews, arguing that Christians 'were not allowed to deprive [their] Jewish brethren of Christ's message'.¹⁴³ Maury, in agreement, pointed to the consequences and implications of Jewish alliance while arguing that once the precedent was set the Church would have to 'collaborate in the same way with all other religions as well'.¹⁴⁴ The eventual agreement, which reflected concessions on both sides, was that Christian collaboration with Jews could be of value so long as it did not affect 'religious matters'.¹⁴⁵

In the briefer discussion on antisemitism, two primary points emerged. The first, on which no disagreement was found, proffered an anti-Christian nature of antisemitism while holding that antisemitism preceded Christianity.¹⁴⁶ Niesel captured for the group what was said to be a 'strong formulation' of that essence by defining antisemitism as 'anti-Christianism' and 'fighting against the elected people [as] fighting against God's design'.¹⁴⁷ Hoffmann buttressed this understanding (without committee objection) by adding 'where anti-Semitism survives, the Church cannot survive'. The second major point, on which no agreement was reached, was Hoffmann's assertion that 'any approach to the Jews [had to] be preceded by an admission of guilt' for Christianity's failure to solve antisemitism, prevent annihilation, and provide 'adequate

¹⁴² Minutes, Session Two, 2-4; Session Four, 2. Methodology, home and foreign missions, and literature directed specifically to the 'modern communistic Jew of Palestine', the 'capitalist Jew in the West', and the 'rabbinical Jews of the East' were all of primary concern. In terms of outreach, for example, Hoffmann cautioned that churches had to be 'very careful about baptising Jews', for many were 'only trying to escape the stigma of their race'. What to 'call' mission efforts was also a matter of concern and the suggestion was made that 'Christian Approach to the Jews' might be replaced by something that reflected 'Christian relationship to the Jews' so as 'not to provoke on the Jewish side the suspicion that we were out for nothing else than converting'.

¹⁴³ Minutes, Session Three, 1.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 2.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Minutes, Session Three.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 2.

rescue for survivors', all of which he tied to the current 'crisis in Palestine'.¹⁴⁸ By 'crisis', he was referring to the Declaration of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948, the Arab attack on Israel the next day, and ensuing war over territory in Palestine surrounding Israel.¹⁴⁹ The crux of the argument, as he had been warning since 1945, was that Christianity's failure to provide rescue to Jews both during and after the war had enflamed an 'aggressive political Zionism' which had serious repercussions not only for Jewry but for the Church and the world.

Three very different responses were given to Hoffmann's argument about Christianity's guilt for not solving antisemitism or providing rescue. The first stressed that considerations of antisemitism had to take into account Jewish causes, citing current Jewish hatred of Christians in Palestine as a present-day example.¹⁵⁰ The second held that the 'big nations' who had closed doors to the Jews of Europe were responsible for the Palestine crisis and that, rather than 'acknowledgement of [Christian] guilt', churches had to be concerned with 'finding homes for the dispossessed Jews of Europe'.¹⁵¹ The third, which was unrelated to Palestine, held that any confession of guilt had to include historical insistence upon 'the crime of Israel' in Christian theology.¹⁵² While there was no agreement on any part of this, the question of Christian guilt lingered on in the discussion of the state of Israel. When Hoffmann argued a second time that Christian failure to provide rescue had exacerbated the conflict in Palestine, Newell, who like Hoffmann spoke as a consultant, sharply stated that the committee could not say 'that the situation of the Jews was caused by the failure of the Churches'.¹⁵³ Newell also vetoed the idea of issuing an emergency call for nations to offer temporary homes to Jewish DPs on grounds that it would be unjust to the majority of DPs who were *not* Jews.

It was not only Newell and Hoffmann who were in disagreement, however, for quite literally the whole of the committee was divided in one way or another on what could and could not be said. Indecisiveness had marked the matter since the opening day of discussions when Chairman Angus Dun laid out the WCC condition that Committee IV 'should not include...the Palestine problem', and that if it did decide that it needed attention 'it would have to be referred to Section IV on International Problems rather than to this Committee'.¹⁵⁴ As further explanation of the assembly policy, Newell assured 'that this would not mean that any reference to the

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁴⁹ See Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel, 14 May 1948; <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Declaration%20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israel.aspx>.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 2, as put forth by consultant Stanley Morrison, Church of England.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 3., as put forward by delegate Bishop of Worcester, Church of England.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 3, as put forward by consultant Professor Clavier, Reformed Church of France.

¹⁵³ Minutes, Session Four, 1.

¹⁵⁴ Minutes, Session One, 1.

present State of Israel would have to be excluded, in so far as it had a bearing on the general Jewish problem'.¹⁵⁵ Yet, for reasons unexplained, by the second day the WCC condition had been amended to allow Palestine and Zionism to be discussed by Committee IV.¹⁵⁶ At the outset of that subsequent discussion the Bishop of Worcester had warned that any official statement had to be carefully made since 'the State of Israel was only partly recognized by the nations'.¹⁵⁷ The possibilities of offence or negative bearing on Christian missions to Jews and Arabs were also expressed as matters of concern and caution. There was also argument from the standpoint of expectations, namely, that the 'Jewish Christians' in the area 'were expecting some form of pronouncement. In the same breath, however, it was conceded that the WCC could *only* say that it could *not* make a political statement but that it viewed 'with horror' the DP situation that was contributing to the crisis in Palestine.¹⁵⁸ Rev. Charles Westphal, a consultant from the Reformed Church of France disagreed, insisting that a political statement should be made and that 'right and justice' demanded 'recognition of the State of Israel'.¹⁵⁹ The myriad of unsettled differences led to consultation with Commission IV on International Problems, headed by former BICCAJ associate Kenneth Grubb. The opinion sent back on the last day of deliberations was that 'it was most inappropriate for the World Council to take position on a political issue', but, if Committee IV should decide 'to refer to the moral issue underlying the situation', it should state that:

this question could only be settled satisfactorily on an international and truly impartial basis; [that] any solution had to give justice to the rights of all three parties; [that] the Churches had a particular interest in the preservation of the Holy places; [that] it was the Churches' duty and opportunity to take care of the refugees of all parties.¹⁶⁰

Two points need to be made about this course of deliberations leading to the WCC Committee IV statement. In terms of the driving force, it is strikingly clear that even though consultants were not allowed to vote on content of the statement they dominated all categories of influence: preparatory materials (100%), officers (60%), deliberations (66%), and drafting sub-committee (44%).¹⁶¹ Moreover, it was consultant Conrad Hoffmann who actually compiled

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Minutes, Session Two.

¹⁵⁷ Minutes, Session Three, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Minutes, Session Four, 1.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., as reported by consultant Stanley Morrison, Church of England.

¹⁶¹ The combined Committee IV officers consisted of 3 consultants (C), 1 delegate (D), and 1 alternate (A). The distribution of 62 contributions to Committee IV Minutes was C (41), D (14), observer (7). Members of the drafting sub-committee, which consisted of 5 officers plus 4 appointees, was composed of C (4), D (3), A (2). The artificer of materials, Herbert Newell, was consult to Committee IV, as was Liaison Goete Hedenquist. For names and affiliations of other consultants, see Appendix I.

the drafting-committee statement, parts of which were either paraphrased or extracted verbatim from earlier ICCAJ writings.¹⁶² The second point to which attention must be paid is the spread of topical emphases. Because the theological place of the Jew in God's design was precisely the same as the theological basis for missions to Jews there was no line of demarcation between the two mutually dependent topics. As illustrated in Table VI below, evangelization of Jews was in this way given far greater place than other agenda topics in both deliberations and statement, receiving from three to four times more emphasis in deliberations, and as much as four to eight times in the statement per se.

Table VII. Emphases of Committee IV on the Christian Approach to Jews, 1948 World Council of Churches Founding Assembly

<u>Area of Concern</u>	<u>Deliberations</u>	<u>Statement</u>
Evangelization	.56	.64
(Theological Basis)	(.29)	(.19)
(Implementation)	(.27)	(.45)
Cooperation	.14	.08
Antisemitism	.13	.15
Israel as State	.17	.13

As will become clear, the 1535 word statement was formed around justification for and explication of evangelization of Jews, including its heralded section on antisemitism. Bearing the now familiar title, 'The Christian Approach to the Jews, and beginning with the words 'A concern for the Christian approach to the Jews confronts us inescapably', the statement was made up of three structural parts - introduction, body, and recommendations - constituting 10, 73, and 17 percent of the text respectively. The main body of the statement was divided into five sections, the first four of which had to do with evangelization of Jews. As W.W. Simpson had suggested in committee deliberations, 'The Church's commission to preach the Gospel to all men' was the first theological point to be made.¹⁶³

All of our churches stand under the commission of our common Lord, 'Go ye into the world and preach the Gospel to every creature'. The fulfilment of this commission requires that we include the Jewish people in our evangelistic task.¹⁶⁴

The second point was more complex and multifaceted. Following from an assertion made in the introduction - that God had bound Christians and Jews together in 'a special

¹⁶² More will be said about this presently.

¹⁶³ Committee IV Statement on the Christian Approach to the Jews, quotation appears as subtitle of part I.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

solidarity' that linked the two destinies together - the 'meaning' of that stated solidarity was presented as the theological basis for God's commission to evangelize Jews:

In the design of God, Israel has a unique position. It was Israel with whom God made His covenant by the call of Abraham. It was Israel to whom God revealed His name and gave His law. It was to Israel that He sent His Prophets with their message of judgment and of grace. It was Israel to whom He promised the coming of His Messiah. By the history of Israel God prepared the manger in which in the fullness of time He put the Redeemer of all mankind, Jesus Christ. The Church has received this spiritual heritage from Israel and is therefore in honour bound to render it back in the light of the cross. We have, therefore, in humble conviction to proclaim to the Jews, 'The Messiah for Whom you wait has come'.¹⁶⁵

This argument for the second point continued by moving beyond theological justification to making a strong concluding assertion that presented God's commission to evangelize Jews as the 'only sufficient explanation' for the persistent 'existence' of Jews.

For many the continued existence of a Jewish people which does not acknowledge Christ is a divine mystery which finds its only sufficient explanation in the purpose of God's unchanging faithfulness and mercy.¹⁶⁶

There was no recognized reason for the continued existence of the Jewish people *in itself*, in other words, after Israel's spiritual heritage was passed to the Church. Jewish perseverance through centuries of the 'disorder of man', including, as pointed out in the introduction, 'the extermination of 6 million Jews', found its only explanation in God's intended destiny for Jews to become Christians.

'Barriers to be overcome' before the churches could fulfil the evangelical commission inherent in God's design was the concern of the third point of the statement, and, in this context, it was unequivocally admitted that churches had 'too often helped to build' the barriers that had to be overcome. There was thus admittance of guilt on the part of past churches, coupled with a call to the churches of the present to 'denounce' attitudes that had given rise to the barrier of antisemitism. Antisemitism was in this way denounced, 'no matter what its origin, as absolutely irreconcilable with the profession and practice of the Christian faith'.¹⁶⁷

We must acknowledge in all humility that too often we have failed to manifest Christian love towards our Jewish neighbours, or even a resolute will for common social justice. We have failed to fight with all our strength the age-old disorder of man which anti-semitism represents. The churches in the past have helped to foster an image of the Jews as the sole enemies of Christ, which has contributed to anti-semitism in the secular world.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., part II, subtitle 'The special meaning of the Jewish people for Christian faith'.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., part II.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., part III, subtitle 'Barriers to be overcome'.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

At the same time antisemitism was denounced as 'sin against God and man', however, it was posited as the predominant post-war barrier that had to be overcome in order to fulfil God's commission to evangelize Jews.¹⁶⁹ More precisely, the statement recognized that there had to be 'evidence' that the churches were overcoming that barrier in order to create amenable conditions for Jewish reception to God's commission.

Only as we give convincing evidence to our Jewish neighbours that we seek for them the common rights and dignities which God wills for His children, can we come to such a meeting with them as would make it possible to share ...the best which God has given us in Christ.¹⁷⁰

The fourth point of the statement, constituting a full third of the main body text, was the long-honed ICCAJ argument for Jewish missions to become integral to the evangelization outreach of every world church. An attendant appeal was then made in Recommendations for WCC 'member churches' to 'recover the universality of our Lord's commission by including the Jewish people in their evangelistic work', and a separate appeal was made to the WCC itself to 'stimulate and assist' those churches in 'carrying out of this aspect of their mission'.¹⁷¹ These were tied together by the recommendation that the WCC and IMC bear 'joint responsibility for the Christian approach to the Jews'.¹⁷²

Even the fifth and final part of the statement had mission implications when viewed from the standpoint of Committee IV concerns about possible negative bearing on Christian missions to Jews.

The establishment of the state 'Israel' adds a political dimension to the Christian approach to the Jews and threatens to complicate anti-semitism with political fears and enmities.¹⁷³

There is no indication, however, that those not privileged to committee deliberations viewed the equivocal passage in the same way when the statement was presented to the full Assembly by Bishop Dun. While this last section on the State of Israel was the most debated section of the statement, the primary concern in plenary discussion centred around that part of the statement which had been advised by Commission IV on International Problems:

On the political aspects of the Palestine problem and the complex conflict of 'right' involved we do not undertake to express a judgment.

Dr. W.F. Golterman, Secretary of the Dutch Ecumenical Council, rejected this point altogether, arguing that the Committee IV Report would be unacceptable unless it stated 'the right of the

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., part IV, subtitle 'Witness to the Jewish People; Recommendations 1 and 2, respectively.

¹⁷² Ibid., part IV; Recommendations, 2.

¹⁷³ Ibid., part V, subtitle 'The emergence of Israel as a state'.

Jews to live in their own country'. Canon Henry Baines of the Church of England, who spoke on behalf of Committee IV alternates, agreed with not making political statements but argued that the assembly would fail 'in its bounden duty' if it did not make clear that 'the problem' was more than political.¹⁷⁴ Dr. Ernest Perkins of the British Methodist Church expressed similar concern. The proposed corrective, which was seconded and accepted, was to insert an amendment which affirmed Kenneth Grubb's Commission IV position on not making political statements while re-contextualizing 'the Palestine problem':

Nevertheless, we appeal to the nations to deal with the problem not as one of expediency, political, strategic or economic, but as a moral and spiritual question that touches a nerve centre of the world's religious life.¹⁷⁵

Beyond moral and spiritual concerns about the emergence of Israel, there was also praise and condemnation for the evangelistic emphasis of the Committee IV Report. Dr. B.E. Mays of the Northern Baptist Convention in America praised the clarity of intention 'to bring the Jews into full Christian fellowship here and now', while Dr. H. Heering of the Remonstrant Brotherhood in Holland condemned it for the same reason. Speaking on behalf of himself and his church, Heering argued that, to those 'who had at heart the sufferings of Jews, it must seem impossible to preach to a people which had gone through so much'. He went on to propose that the Report be 'dropped' on the grounds that it was 'hypocritical' and 'quite unacceptable', but the motion was not adopted by the assembly.¹⁷⁶ Nor was a motion to send a message of sympathy to the Jewish community of Amsterdam, the city in which it was meeting, 'where no less than 100,000 Jews were taken and murdered only five years ago'.¹⁷⁷ To these concerns, Chairman Bishop Dun recounted that Committee IV was 'of the opinion that once they began expressing sympathy with special groups, they would not know where to stop'.¹⁷⁸ When the issue was raised a second time, Dun 'expressed doubts' as to its wisdom, 'particularly as the trials of the Jews had already been mentioned in the body of the Report'. In the end the decision was left to the full assembly, who, while accepting the Committee IV Report as a whole, did not approve the motion for a message of sympathy to Jews.¹⁷⁹

The formal statement adopted by the 1948 World Council Assembly, which lamented the extermination of six million Jews while calling attention to the 'continued existence of a Jewish people who did not acknowledge Christ', was unequivocal in its conviction that God's

¹⁷⁴ Discussion in Plenary Meeting, *The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches*, 164-165.

¹⁷⁵ Committee IV statement part V. The remainder of part V outlined duties incumbent on Christians regardless of attitude toward establishment of a Jewish state.

¹⁷⁶ Discussion in Plenary Meeting, 165, *prev. cit.*,

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 164, 166. The motion was made by Rev. Allan de Vere of the Church of England.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 165-166.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

design for the world included Jewish acquiescence to Christianity.¹⁸⁰ This adoption by the voting portion of the 1200-person Assembly of 147 world churches from 44 countries was a particularized affirmation of the constitutional mission-function of WCC adopted the same week, namely, 'to support the churches in their task of evangelism'.¹⁸¹ A keynote speaker on opening day of the Assembly, Dr. John Mackay of Princeton Theological Seminary, had in fact argued that 'the universal right and obligation of Christian missions must be steadily upheld' against those who held otherwise, whether religious or secular.¹⁸²

The ecumenical vision of supranational unity, which formalized in the constitutional founding of WCC in September 1948, had always been that of unity *within* a Christianized world, such that the vision of unified churches had been - from its first organized beginnings at Stockholm in 1925 - inexorably linked to world evangelization. Aim and impetus to evangelize the world was thus fully present before a more specified impetus for Jewish evangelization began to be formalized at the 1927 conferences in Budapest and Warsaw. Yet, in considering the theological mission convictions inherent to the 1948 Assembly statement on Jews, it is impossible to do so sufficiently without taking into account the twenty year post-Budapest-Warsaw history that led to the replication of ICCAJ aims and thought in the text of the WCC statement.

Moreover, as this study clearly reveals, WCC reconciliation with the German Church at Stuttgart in October 1945 and its subsequent role in deliberation and drafting of the WCC statement must also find place in discussion of the proclamations made by WCC in the post-war embers of Nazi exterminations of Jews.¹⁸³ While this is in no way meant to imply that German post-war contributions to the WCC statement were theologically exceptional, it was yet the case that Wilhelm Niesel's assertive argumentation influenced Committee IV deliberations on the theological place of the Jew in God's design, and that his argumentation was in defence of the Brethren Council 'Word' that had been selectively included as material to inform Committee IV deliberations. It should also not go unmentioned that both the Brethren Council 'Word' and the Commission II 'Message' of the French Protestant Witness to Israel, which were not only in theological agreement with one another but with the tenets of ICCAJ, were published again by WCC in *The Relationship of the Church to the Jewish People* some sixteen years after the 1948

¹⁸⁰ Committee IV statement, part II.

¹⁸¹ WCC Constitution, Article III.vii, adopted on 30 August 1948, *The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches*, 198, prev. cit.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁸³ The German Evangelical Church was assigned 9 places on Committee IV, 8 of which had voting privileges: delegates (1), alternates (7) consultant (1). Of the 20 countries represented on Committee IV, only Britain and the U.S. had more representation than Germany. Germany also held 2 places on the 9-man drafting sub-committee.

founding Assembly. At the time the 1948 WCC assembly statement drew on both documents, and in the decade and a half following, those documents were viewed by WCC as two national expressions of the theological truths on Jews that the churches of all post-war nations were urged to come to terms with.¹⁸⁴

The impress of ICCAJ on the assembly statement was copiously more, however, than just advocacy of its theological basis. From the title 'A Christian Approach to the Jews' to the closing passage of the final section on Israel, there was no part of the statement which did not bear the imprint of ICCAJ. Indeed, as illustrated in Table VIII below, no aspect of the founding assembly statement on Jews was left untouched by ICCAJ thought. Passages were taken either verbatim or in paraphrased form from the 1947 ICCAJ Basel Conference reports on the 'Church and Evangelism', 'Church and Methods', 'Church and Zionism', 'Church and the Hebrew Christian', as well as from Hoffmann's May 1948 memorandum on 'The Church and Israel'.

Table VIII: ICCAJ Sources of 1948 World Council of Churches Statement on The Christian Approach to the Jews¹⁸⁵

Section of 1948 WCC Assembly Statement	H	ICCAJ	B	W
Introduction	1946M			
1. The Church's commission to preach the Gospel to all men.				W.I.
2. The Special meaning of the Jewish people for Christian faith.	1948M	1947B	B.Iii.	W.II
3. Barriers to be overcome.			B.Ii B.V	W.Vb W.I W.Vi.c
4. The Christian witness to the Jewish people.	1948M	1947B	B.V.III B.IV B.VI	W.Iiii W.II W.III
5. The emergence of Israel as a state.		1947B		

Moreover, except for the introduction and part five on the state of Israel, points being made in every section were paraphrased forms of the Findings of the Budapest-Warsaw Conferences on

¹⁸⁴ *The Relationship of the Church to the Jewish People: Collection of Statements Made by the World Council of Churches and Representative Bodies of Its Member Churches*, collected by Commission of Faith and Order in cooperation with the Committee on the Church and the Jewish People (WCC, 1964). A preface to the Brethren Council statement explains that: 'The relationship of the Church to the Jewish people has been an issue within the Evangelical Church of Germany for many years prior to the Second World War. The theological implication of this subject, however, were not sharpened until the tragic events of the War years took place. *This emphasis now dominates and guides the thinking on this issue*'. (italics added). It should also be noted that the Brethren Council statement appeared as a document from WCC member churches. The French Federation document, in contrast, was reproduced as a WCC document, which is in keeping with the fact that it emanated from WCC study Commission II.

¹⁸⁵ Ledger of Table VIII: H (Hoffmann's Memoranda; ICCAJ (1947 Basel Conference); B (1927 Budapest Conference); W (1927 Warsaw Conference). For more detail about sources, see the annotated Assembly statement in Appendix II.

the Christian Approach to the Jews, each of which had become fundamental to ICCAJ argumentation in the twenty years thereafter. As such, there was little, if any, difference between the pledge of the 1927 Budapest-Warsaw conferees to aid God in 'bringing Israel to her destiny' and the 1948 statement adopted by the electorates of the 1200-person WCC Assembly, which 'humbly proclaimed' to Jews that the 'Messiah for whom you wait has come', even though some six million Jews had been exterminated in the interim.¹⁸⁶

V. While this was perceived as a remarkable advance on the part of ICCAJ, and one wholly celebrated at the ICCAJ Stockholm conference following the assembly two weeks later, it was yet inwardly realized that there still remained a field of hurdles within Christianity before full implementation of world-church missions to Jews could be realized. An attempt to remove or at least de-heighten those hurdles was scheduled within a month after the close of the WCC assembly. The reasons given in the invitational material for the WCC Ecumenical Institute conference at Bossey in March 1949 were three-fold.¹⁸⁷ First, 'the problem of the Jewish people' was still one of the 'most urgent' facing the Church, and sponsors were 'anxious' that it be addressed from ecumenical perspective. Second, there still existed profound differences that created divergence of Christian opinion and thus in effect prohibited the Church from speaking in a single voice. Third, the conference was being called with the hope of bringing about a corrective which would lead toward 'a common Christian mind'.¹⁸⁸

As part of this attempt to gain unity in Christian thought, James Parkes, who had been denied participation in deliberations preceding WCC adoption of Jewish mission policy, was allowed participation in the 1949 conference. When Oliver Tomkins had written to Parkes in July 1948 to inform that he would not be included in Commission II or Committee IV, he had disclosed to Parkes that he was 'keen' for him to receive 'a fair hearing'. Tomkins was aware that a follow-up conference was being discussed and he had already suggested to Hendrik Kraemer, who was head of both Commission II and the Ecumenical Institute, the possibility of including Parkes. He had also forwarded to him an advance copy of *Judaism and Christianity* which he had received from Parkes earlier.¹⁸⁹ Less than a month after the Assembly Parkes received invitation to participate in the conference on 'The Church and the Jewish People', which was being sponsored not only by the WCC Ecumenical Institute but the 'International ICCAJ' as well. The invitation was sent by Dennis Baly, on behalf of Kraemer and Hoffmann, who added in a personal note: 'the more I consider your arguments the more I am driven to the

¹⁸⁶ Budapest I.ii; WCC Christian Approach to the Jews, part two.

¹⁸⁷ Baly to Parkes, 3 October; Invitation, 3 November; Kraemer to Parkes, 5 November 1948, prev. cit.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, invitational materials.

¹⁸⁹ Tomkins to Parkes, 13 July 1948, PP MS60/17/10/4.

conclusion (a little unwillingly, I confess!) that you make out a case which is very difficult to answer'.¹⁹⁰ Parkes was being included in the conference, in other words, just as he had been anonymously included in Newell's Committee IV study materials, as purveyor of the outlier position.

The subject being assigned to Parkes was 'The Church and the Jewish People in the Light of Biblical Teaching', and he was being matched on the topic against Professor Karl Rengstorf, who held the New Testament chair at University of Muenster, the chair of the Evangelical Committee for Mission to Israel, and the directorship of the revived Institutum Judaicum Delitzschianum.¹⁹¹ It is also important to note that it was Rengstorf, along with Dr. Otto von Harling Sr., who solicited Hoffmann's advice on re-establishing German missions to Jews in October 1945; that he was subsequently appointed to the executive ICCAJ and the governing committee for the Christian Institute of Jewish Studies;¹⁹² and that his vein of argumentation on the theological principals underlying Church attitude to Jews was the same as that of the Brethren Council 'Word' informing the WCC Assembly statement on Jews.¹⁹³

Although Parkes was amenable to, and eager for, rational discussion of differences, the idea of attempting to delineate 'a common Christian mind' was of great concern, and he made that clear in a series of written exchanges with Kraemer.¹⁹⁴ In late December 1948, three months before the conference, he asked whether any attempt would be made to pass resolutions that 'only obtained majority assent'.¹⁹⁵ Kraemer replied that no final decision could be made until he consulted with Hoffmann but that, in his opinion, 'where there are great differences of opinion between majorities and minorities, [they] will be clearly stated'.¹⁹⁶ Parkes in turn 'most strongly beg[ged]' that such procedure *not* be adopted, on the grounds that it was 'almost impossible' to word resolutions so that implications of the wording justly represented the minority opinion.¹⁹⁷ He realized of course that he would be the minority opinion on 'most points' but his concern was

¹⁹⁰ Baly to Parkes, 3 October; Invitation, 3 November; Kraemer to Parkes, 5 November 1948, prev. cit.

¹⁹¹ The Delitzschianum was re-established under the auspices of the University of Muenster on 13 May 1948, with Rengstorf as Director and von Harling as Director Emeritus. ICCAJ Minutes, Stockholm, 14-19 September 1948; ICCAJ Minutes, Edinburgh, 13-18 June 1949, WCC.261206.

¹⁹² The Christian Institute for Jewish Studies was brought under full auspices of ICCAJ between 1947 and 1948, during which time an international governing committee of 8 was formed.

¹⁹³ Rengstorf, 'The Church and the Jewish People in the Light of Biblical Teaching', WCC. 301.4330.2. For the Rengstorf-von Harling request, see Hoffmann to Standley, 22 December 1945, WCC. 261201.8.

¹⁹⁴ Parkes to Kraemer, 10 November 1948; Parkes to Baly, 18 November; Parkes to Kraemer, 30 Nov.; Baly to Parkes, 3 December; Kraemer to Parkes, 16 December; Parkes to Baly, 19 December 1948; PP MS 60/17/10/4.

¹⁹⁵ Parkes to Kraemer, 22 December 1948, Kraemer to Parkes, 30 December; Parkes to Kraemer, 5 January; Kraemer to Parkes, 11 January 1949; PP MS 60/17/10/4.

¹⁹⁶ Kraemer to Parkes, 30 December 1948, prev. cit.

¹⁹⁷ Parkes to Kraemer, 5 January 1949, prev. cit.

also that of a conference organizer who had come to believe, through years of experience with ISS, that parleys on controversial issues were 'morally bound to safeguard' the minority opinion. It was also the case, as he explained to Kraemer, that he was repeatedly 'misquoted by name in the literature of the missions to the Jews' and that it would be wrong for him to aid the problem by participating in a conference that would offer more opportunity 'for misquoting'.¹⁹⁸ Parkes' suggestion to Kraemer for allaying such potential problems was that either the conference be regarded as a private discussion of differences, with no attempt to arrive at joint resolutions, or that a full record of speeches and discussion be circulated for approval to conference members before its distribution.¹⁹⁹

When the Bossey conference convened on 24 March outside Geneva, it was an arduous seven day affair which, even after Parkes' explicit pre-conference concerns, reaffirmed Church responsibility for proclaiming the gospel to Jews. Moreover, the report preceding the Findings interpretively stated that, on the issue of evangelism, 'the reluctance of certain members...was directed against some of the methods employed [and] not against the preaching of the Gospel as such'.²⁰⁰

In trying to understand how this result prevailed, there are at least four indications which point to a conference intention that, from the beginning, had been more about bringing minority views into line with those of the majority. First, the WCC-ICCAJ conference was chaired by Hendrik Kraemer, who, along with editorship of the Commission II volume, was author of the 1938 IMC volume on missions, which made clear that the Church 'obligation' to evangelize Jews was 'even more stringent' than for 'the rest of the Christian world'.²⁰¹ Secondly, the deck of invited participants had been clearly stacked to that advantage. Of 25 conferees only two can be identified as holding contra positions to evangelization of Jews: James Parkes and a German 'representative of the Jewish faith', Dr. Joachim Schoeps.²⁰² Third, instead of precise record-keeping, as requested by Parkes, an *interpretative* five and a half page description of the seven-day conference summarized what were deemed 'some of the main issues' of discussion, and it did so in a way that discussants (for the most part) were non-specifically identified as 'one member of the group', 'several members of the group', or, even more abstractly, as 'it was said'. The overall effect was that of a conference voice speaking as a whole in spite of differences. Fourth, in looking specifically at Parkes, the corrected conference Findings issued along with

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Report of Study Conference on The Church and the Jewish People, 24-30 March 1949, Ecumenical Institute at Bossey, 8, WCC.301.4330.2.

²⁰¹ Kraemer, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (1938), 227, prev. cit.

²⁰² Schoeps was viewed as an enlightened Jew whose theological views moved toward Christianity.

the report *after* the close of the conference belie the evidence of Parkes' dispute of the Findings on the last day of the conference. More precisely, Parkes struck from his drafted copy of the Findings the very two paragraphs dealing with evangelization of Jews.

The first, which would have been rejected in its entirety, had to do with conference affirmation of the WCC 1948 Assembly statement and the WCC-ICCAJ alliance.

We recommend that the [WCC] should take action on the lines of the recommendations of Amsterdam on this subject, and in particular that in order to give expression to the Churches' total responsibility in respect of the Jewish people, the invitation of the [IMC] to the [WCC] to share with a joint responsibility for the Christian Approach to the Jews be accepted, and that this be done in the first place by the setting up of a Joint Committee to bear the name of the Committee on the Church and the Jews.²⁰³

The second, which would have been rejected for the same reasons, recognized both the ICCAJ and the CCJ as necessary and valid organizations which bore the burden of 'interpreting the Church to the Jews', going so far as to speak of them as performing 'complementary tasks' which 'must ultimately become the concern of the Church as a whole'.²⁰⁴ Even though Parkes would have agreed about the validity and necessity to the Church of CCJ, it would never have been so in the case of ICCAJ. Moreover, it is clear that Parkes - in contrast to his CCJ colleague William Simpson who was also present at the conference - *never* viewed the ICCAJ and CCJ as two organizations that performed 'complementary tasks'.²⁰⁵ While we have no way of knowing how Parkes argued at Bossey, his argumentation did in fact result in both contested paragraphs being removed from the corrected Conference Findings. Yet, as illustrated below, they were replaced with three sequential others, which, though singling him as a third and 'different' view on the issue in paragraph two, did not disassociate him from the 'We' of the conference voice in paragraph three. The improvement of the first two paragraphs over those that had been removed was thus fogged by the implicative leap in the evangelistic call of the conference 'We' in the third.

On the subject of the total responsibility of the Church towards the Jewish people two main points of view were developed. The first emphasized that the proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ to the Jews belongs to the essential nature of the Church. The second emphasized the importance in the

²⁰³ Drafted Findings of Study Conference on The Church and the Jewish People, 24-30 March 1949, PP MS60/17/10/4.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Simpson explained to the ICCAJ Edinburgh Conference, which was held two months after the Bossey Conference, that the CCJ 'was not an alternative to the missionary effort but was simply an attempt to meet an immediate need'. He was recorded in the minutes as saying that he 'was convinced that the two movements were not mutually exclusive'. ICCAJ Minutes, Edinburgh, 13-18 June 1949, p.7, WCC.261206.10.

present situation of cultivating mutual understanding between Christians and Jews and of developing cooperation in matters of common concern.

In addition Dr. J. Parkes was asked to interpret a different point of view, recently developed by him in his book 'Judaism and Christianity'.

We recommend that the WCC accept responsibility for the proclamation of the Gospel to the Jews and that it give serious attention to the need for developing relations of good-will between Christians and Jews.²⁰⁶

While there is no conference recording of Parkes' response to all of this, there is ample recording of his response in the wake of the conference. As Hoffmann often did after staking what was deemed an evangelizing victory, he had written to Parkes a few months after the conference to nudge him toward reconciliation of differences, suggesting *again* that he meet conciliatorily with ICCAJ associate Hans Kosmala. Parkes replied in early July with what was perceived by Hoffmann as unjust condemnation of both Kosmala and others as well as ICCAJ itself. In turn Hoffmann penned a letter of both ICCAJ defence and Christian rebuke, which, as so often since 1930, was threaded with the rhetorical question, 'Is Jesus Christ God's answer to the whole world's need or not?'²⁰⁷

Parkes' response on 31 August 1949 stands not only as a classic moment in his refusal to come to terms with fellow Christians on this issue, but, also, as a classic example of the 20-year 'hurdle' which ICCAJ was much aware of but neither understood nor overcame.

I cannot accept your suggestion that it is [un]Christian to condemn and to refuse cooperation to those who, however sincere and however zealous, appear to me to be doing appalling harm to the cause of God in the present generation. I would always be ready to help them as human beings, if they are in need. But I will not only do nothing to assist them to propagate their theological views, I will oppose them wherever I can.²⁰⁸

Parkes went on to say:

I do not believe that you can solve such questions by asking the single phrase: 'Is Jesus Christ God's answer to the whole world's need or not'.It leads to an emotional and unbalanced theology, and Bossey showed what appalling perversion of Biblical scholarship it produces. The 'Bible juggling' of Bossey seems to me not profound but a blasphemous and perverted human vanity.

There seems to me a perfectly legitimate standpoint which is neither... uniformity and intolerance nor an indifferent neutrality between truth and error. I try to avoid the first, but I am equally convinced of the importance of avoiding the second; and *nothing* would make me struggle to bring into the port of success a cargo which I believed to be largely compacted of the most

²⁰⁶ Report of the Study Conference on The Church and the Jewish People, 24-30 March 1949, Ecumenical Institute at Bossey, 8, WCC.301.4330.2.

²⁰⁷ Hoffmann to Parkes, 19 July 1949, PP MS60/17/8/12.

²⁰⁸ Parkes to Hoffmann, 31 August 1949, PP MS60/17/8/12.

lamentable error. I cannot help if it gets there, but I will not help it to do so.²⁰⁹

Hoffmann's response to this long and explicit rejection of the theological views of ICCAJ and related organizations two months later was also classic. In the same unyielding manner as he had answered Parkes' criticisms since 1930, Hoffmann remained convinced that the difference between he and Parkes 'seemed to be a question of method'.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Hoffmann to Parkes, 2 November 1949, PP MS60/17/8/2.

CONCLUSION

In Uriel Tal's 1970 critique of World War Two era Protestant protests in Johan Snoek's *Grey Book*, he asked the pointed question 'are there any pronouncements of the Church that offer a Christian-Jewish relationship other than of conversion?' Tal was concerned that among the post-war statements condemning antisemitism he could find none that acknowledged 'the right of Judaism to exist on its own terms'.¹ He cited in particular a declaration presented by a group of some twenty theologians to the second assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1954, pointing out that even though it 'was composed years after the wholesale extermination of the Jews,' they 'could find no solution' but to hope as a group for the conversion of Jews. Tal went on to say that 'when these circles in the Church desire for reasons of conscience and remorse to express "the grievous guilt of the Christian people towards the Jews throughout the history of the church", they find no better way...than to revert to "Findings...of the American Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews..."'.² He was referring to resolutions from a NAICCAJ conference held just before the second World Council of Churches assembly, which restated its promulgated belief that 'The Church cannot rest until the title of Christ is recognized by His own people according to the flesh'.³ What Tal did not discuss was the pre-assembly volume by WCC, ICCAJ, and IMC on *The Church and the Jewish People*, which elaborated the position of the 1948 WCC assembly statement on Jews: namely, that 'the continued existence of a Jewish people which does not acknowledge Christ is a divine mystery which finds its only sufficient explanation in the purpose of God's unchanging faithfulness and mercy'.⁴ As outlined in that volume by familiar ecumenical figures, Bishop Stephen Neill framed 'the survival of the Jewish people [as] a mystery, a challenge, and a problem' for any 'Christian who takes his religion seriously',⁵ and Robert Smith held as a consensus among spokesmen 'of all denominations' that

¹ Uriel Tal, 'Introduction,' *The Grey Book: A Collection of Protests Against Anti-Semitism and the Persecution of Jews Issued by Non-Roman Catholic Churches and Church Leaders During Hitler's Rule* (1970), prev. cit., XXIII-XXIV.

² 'Statement on the Hope of Israel' (1954), containing the NAICCAJ finding, was signed by 24 theologians associated with WCC, including Martin Niemoeller, Pierre Maury, Alphons Koechlin, Marc Boegner, and Oliver Tomkins. It was presented to the fourth plenary session of the second WCC assembly and later included in *The Relationship of the Church to the Jewish People: Collection of Statements made by The World Council of Churches and Representative Bodies of Its Member Churches* (WCC Commission on Faith and Order in cooperation with The Committee on the Church and the Jewish People, 1964).

³ 'Findings of the Pre-Evanston Conference of the American Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews', Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, 8-11 August 1954.

⁴ 1948 WCC Assembly Report of Committee IV, The Christian Approach to the Jews, section 2, reprinted in *The Church and the Jewish People* (Edinburgh House Press, 1954), a collection of 12 essays edited by Goete Hedenquist, who became director of ICCAJ when Hoffmann retired in 1951. The volume included chapters by Robert Smith, Karl Rengstorf, Hans Kosmala, Bishop Stephen Neill, and William Simpson, who were all clear on the responsibility to evangelize Jews. Included were two chapters by Leo Baeck and Hans Joachim Schoeps who argued on behalf of Judaism and, in the case of Baeck, asked 'Some Questions to the Christian Church from the Jewish Point of View'.

⁵ *Ibid.* Stephen Neill, 'Introduction', 11-25.

the world had 'no category' to which Jews 'belong[ed]', that Jews were 'a people with a divine destiny which they themselves c[ould] not fully understand', and that it was only 'from the Christian standpoint' that Jews could be understood and explained to the world.⁶ For Professor Karl Rengstorf, who captured the overall essence of this concern in 'The Jewish Problem and the Church', 'the existence and the form of the Jewish people *post Christum natum*' created multiple theological problems for the Church.⁷

This widely-accepted theological conception of the continuing existence of the Jewish people as a 'problem' for the Church has been the primary focus of this thesis. This study has described a framework of ecumenical Protestant aspirations for world expansion of Jewish evangelization around which such belief was constructed and promulgated in the years before, during, and after Nazi extermination of European Jewry. A particularized understanding of the Jewish problem as a matter of concern to both Christianity and world society was central to the theoretical underpinnings of those aspirations. In 1925 the Jewish problem began to be viewed as an issue of Jewish conversion and, by 1927, the consensus of 175 representatives from 104 Protestant organizations in 25 countries had given rise to a series of conference findings on relations between the perceived Jewish problem and the *need* for Jewish conversion, as well as a mandate for the creation of an international body to centralize efforts for Jewish missions. The International Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews, which was born from this initiative and whose theoretical base was grounded in the claims of those findings, developed widely promulgated views on relations between the Jewish problem, antisemitism, and the Christian duty of Jewish missions beginning in 1930. Belief in an unchanging divine mandate to deliver the message that Christ is the fulfilment of Jewish destiny guided every development.

Conversion of Jews was seen as a method of reparation for historical Christian injustice to Jews, but it was also believed to be a method for the defence of Christendom against the incursion of Jewish thought and influence. Increasing influence of Jews in all areas of society, increasing movement toward Bolshevism, Marxism, Zionism, and the underlying unity of world Jewry were all explained as developments of danger to the world unless directed into Christian channels. The dispersion of atheistic Jews, Jewish movement away from the moral constraints of Judaism, and a surging racial and national consciousness, were matters of particular concern, for such uncurbed developments could hinder the Church by the 'aggressive presence of a people who deliberately rejected Christ'.⁸ In the interwar years of theoretical development such claims were used to explain the Jewish problem to Christian audiences without awareness that tenets of antisemitism were being affirmed and propagated. That these assertions were wrapped in professions of Christian love and repentance for Christendom's past treatment of Jews made

⁶ Ibid. Robert Smith, 'The Christian Message to Israel', 189-200.

⁷ Ibid. Karl Heinrich Rengstorf, 'The Jewish Problem and the Church', 27-62.

⁸ 'Memorandum to IMC Regarding Budapest-Warsaw Conferences,' 9 February 1928, WCC.2612130.21.

them no less a medium of transmission for the idea that Jews were in varying degrees the source of their own persecution and suffering. Statements of repentance for not loving the Jews enough to want to convert them were mixed with claims that Jewish traits, behaviours, and ingresses provoked anti-Jewish and antisemitic backlash. The antisemitism of the day was thus explained in part as an ineffective societal response to a real Jewish problem, one cyclically propagated. Antisemitic backlash to Jewish provocation was said to strengthen the bonds of Jewish coalition while increasing Jewish national and racial consciousness, which, in turn, increased antisemitic backlash. Although Jews were not unblameable victims in this cyclical schemata, they were yet to be defended, for racial antisemitism militated against Christian universalism and love, which made no distinctions in humanity. If all of this appeared as a confused and bifurcated quest of ambivalence, it was in fact a unified quest of certainty in which doubting about aims and basis played no part.

Aspiring to speak on behalf of the Church, ICCAJ had christened itself by 1932 as the responsible body for staying the progress of racial prejudice, seeking the removal of causes and consequences of anti-Jewish feelings, and cultivating 'right' Christian attitudes toward Jews. While the early years were characterized by development of well-worn arguments, the middle period between 1933 and the onset of World War Two entailed elaboration of arguments into theory, as well as restatement of causal explanations in ways that would adapt them to changing circumstances. Development and promulgation of the argument that contemporary Judaism was a vehicle for racial advancement reached its peak in this period. Complaint of an increasing racial consciousness which emphasized Jewishness was repeatedly expressed as part of a causal explanation of antisemitic backlash, even as it was being coupled as more or less identical with the 'racial emphasis of Hitler'.⁹ This theoretical claim was used in other ways as well. Espoused dangers of an alleged renaissance of Jewishness stressing the racial and national aspects of Jewry, Jewish involvement with nationalism and antireligious movements, and disintegration of Judaism which steadily increased the number of atheistic Jews in Christendom continued to be seen as an 'undeniable entrenchment of Jewry in opposition to Christianity'.¹⁰ If the problem for Jews was surviving in an increasing alien world for which they were in part responsible, the problem for ICCAJ was how to approach the increasing challenge of world Jewry so that Jews acquiesced to Christianity rather than militating against it.

Opposition to antisemitism played an important role in this, for it was realized that inaction would add to the stain of past Christian injustices to Jews. Combating of antisemitism was a matter of concern from ICCAJ inception and the term was widely used in occasional papers, meetings, reports, letters, and articles, *but* formal statements were framed as protests against 'prejudice' and 'discrimination' with distinctions between 'race prejudice', 'anti-Jewish

⁹ Confidential Director's Report, September 1933, *prev. cit.*

¹⁰ Director's Report, September 1935, *prev. cit.*

prejudice', and 'race discrimination'. A formal statement that protested antisemitism per se did not appear until 1937 and, by that time, antisemitism was being distinguished as something that created 'more crucial issues for Christianity' than did 'ordinary' racialism. Although racialism was viewed as a menace to be deplored, antisemitism was seen as an 'extraordinary menace' against which Christians had to rise in defence of the Church. Racial antisemitism was a 'cloak' for the 'anti-Christ', and Christians had to be warned that they could not remain silent in the face of Nazi antisemitism without betrayal of Christ and undermining of the Church.¹¹ This line of argument gained ground as Nazi persecution of Jews increased. By 1935 it was already being argued that Nazi persecution of Jews was 'evidence' that Nazism was in fact contention against Christianity, and, by 1940, that wherever antisemitism raised its head 'the real struggle [was] about Christianity'.¹² Over time ICCAJ warnings to Christians about antisemitic involvement became so intertwined with warnings about the dangers of antisemitism to the Church as to become the two sides of a bonded coin. Moreover, always on the back of warnings about Christian involvement with antisemitism were the ideas that anti-Jewishness and antisemitism hindered evangelization efforts to bring Jews into the fold, but that opposition to antisemitism would advance the efficacy of Jewish missions by rendering 'tangible evidence' of Christian sympathy for the plight of persecuted Jews.¹³

Throughout the interwar and war years it was considered Christian moral failure to not evangelize Jews. During the years of war, concern about Jewish refugees was a hallmark feature of ICCAJ mission planning. The understanding that antisemitism was the cause of Jewish refugees was intrinsically bound to belief in Christianity's conversionary cure for antisemitism. All effort on behalf of refugees, whether of present relief or post-war planning, was thus to be approached in combination with combating of antisemitism and propagation of Jewish missions, for it made no sense to relieve the refugee symptom without simultaneously treating the disease. Increasing information about swelling refugee numbers and worsening conditions did not affect this understanding, either in theory or in practice. Heightening concern about Jewish refugees did have effect on responses, however, and it showed particularly in three different ways. First, as information about escalating atrocities and refugee populations increased, ICCAJ became increasingly defensive toward goodwill toleration movements that were rising in response to Jewish persecution. Second, although not absent, there was significant diminishment of harsh claims about Jewish racial identity, threats of Judaization, and threats of Jewish influence as knowledge increased about Jewish suffering. Third, as persecution, suffering, and knowledge increased so did ICCAJ urgency to evangelize and convert Jews. If indifference was reflected in any of these responses, it was not in relation to the plight of Jewish suffering. There was no lack

¹¹ Vienna Conference Statement on 'Anti-Semitism and the Church' (1937), *prev. cit.*

¹² William Paton, 'Extracts from Address at United Conference on the Christian Approach to the Jews', June 1940, *prev. cit.*

¹³ Vienna Conference Statement on 'Anti-Semitism and the Church' (1937), *prev. cit.*

of ICCAJ concern, sympathy, or interest in the mounting evidence about extermination of Jews, and, in fact, the second response reflects what may well have been the result of exercised empathy. But ICCAJ was unresponsive in terms of the effect that accumulating evidence had on organizational aims, policy, and course of action. ICCAJ's unwavering single-mindedness was consistent with the belief that Jewish missions carried the best that Christianity had to offer to both Jews and society, and it reflected in bold relief the perceived unchanging nature of the divine mandate to evangelize Jews, even in the most drastically changing conditions for Jews. The same held true in regard to ICCAJ's increasing entrenchment against goodwill movements within Protestant Christianity which were stimulated by compassion for persecuted Jewry.

The language of 'extermination' was used by both ICCAJ and WCCIF from December 1939 through 1944 to describe what was happening to Jews, although the grasping of what that meant seemed to pass through stages marked by increasing numbers of Jews being murdered. The internal dynamics of arriving at organizational responses while not impeding the guiding mandates reveals much about the priority of concerns behind official responses. Refugee relief-work through WCCIF in Geneva provided continuous access to information on conditions and increasing atrocities, but the protective policy to guard ecumenical unity guided what was said officially and publicly about Jewish refugees. As inheritor of UCCLW in 1938, WCCIF kept to a path of cautious response marked by its leaders in 1933 when the problem which threatened ecumenical unity at the end of World War One was re-ignited by German Church furore over ecumenical protest against Germany's handling of its 'Jewish problem'. While decisions on refugee response were not made in the context of theological beliefs about Jews, they were made in the context of theological belief in the divine mandate on which supranational unity was grounded. From 1939 WCCIF deliberations over official statements on issues having to do with persecuted Jews were part of its general struggle over what to say, to whom it should be said, and whether it should be said openly or covertly. At the outbreak of war it was understood that the first line of WCCIF action was standing in defence of ecumenical principles. The policy set in 1940 - that speaking out on incendiary issues might erect barriers but that silence would allow churches of warring nations to reunite at the end of the war - determined that the course of refugee response would be relief, rather than protest, based. The policy was rigorously guarded until June 1944, even though its boundaries were skirted in March 1943 when Visser't Hooft issued the joint Aide Memoire on Jewish refugee relief with the World Jewish Congress. It was not until after the Auschwitz Protocols' detailed description of ongoing selection, gas chambers, gassing, and crematoria - along with specific numbers amounting to 1,715,000 Jews gassed at Birkenau between April 1942 and April 1944 - that a clear break in policy was made in the form of a 'solemn and public protest'.¹⁴

¹⁴ Numbers and origins of Jews said to have been gassed at Birkenau between April 1942 and April 1944: Poland (900,000); Holland (100,000); Greece (45,000); France (150,000); Belgium (50,000); Germany

Protective concern about the advancement of ecumenical unity carried over in the post-war world as WCCIF approached the priority task of acquiring and publicizing a statement of German Church responsibility and repentance for Germany's aggressions as a necessary means to post-war unification of ecumenical churches. ICCAJ's chief post-war concern was contoured to the WCCIF priority of unifying world churches through the founding of WCC, with specific effort directed toward structural changes that would move ICCAJ more and more under the joint auspices of IMC and WCC. It was understood that collaboration would create vast opportunity within the geographic areas of WCC constituencies for evangelization of 'the suffering Jewish people...'.¹⁵ In late 1946, after it had been determined that ICCAJ would be involved with the WCC founding assembly, ICCAJ leaders argued that the war and Nazi extermination of Jews had inflamed the perennial question 'What are you going to do with the Jews?' and that WCC was now faced with deriving positional answers in the areas of antisemitism, Jewish missions, and Zionism. By the time the WCC assembly convened in fall 1948 positional answers being asked of its Committee on the Christian Approach to the Jews included the emergence of the State of Israel in lieu of Zionism per se. All positions in the resulting report - received by the electorate of a 1200-person assembly of 147 churches from 44 countries - were circumscribed around 'the special meaning of the Jewish people for Christian faith', and all bore the impress of thought that ICCAJ had been commissioned to carry by the Budapest-Warsaw conferences in 1927.¹⁶

The formal statement on Jewish evangelization, antisemitism, and the State of Israel, which lamented extermination of six million Jews while pointing to the 'continued existence of a Jewish people which does not acknowledge Christ', was unequivocal in its strong conviction that God's design for Jews was acquiescence to Christianity, with no hint within its 1535 words that Jewish existence had significance other than its 'special meaning'. It was not the case that those formulating the statement and voting on its reception looked at Jews solely in that narrow theological light, but, rather, that official profession of the theological position took precedence over the sentiments of concern that were being expressed in its deliberation. The statement was never intended to reflect anything other than the relationship between 'God's eternal purpose for His Church' and the fulfilment of Jewish destiny. As such, every aspect of the post-Holocaust profession was hinged on belief in the Christian responsibility to evangelize Jews and not, as James Parkes had argued since 1930, the Christian responsibility of allowing Jews to exist *as Jews* while making the world safe for them to do so.

(60,000); Yugoslavia, Italy and Norway (50,000); Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, Slovakia (30,000); foreign Jews from various camps in Poland (300,000). See abridged version of the Auschwitz Protocols, WCC. 301.4329.

¹⁵ Decker to Goodall, 10 June 1946, prev. cit.

¹⁶ 1948 WCC Assembly Report of Committee IV, The Christian Approach to the Jews, section 2 heading: 'The Special Meaning of the Jewish People for Christian Faith'.

APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appendix I: Members of the 1948 WCC Founding Assembly Committee IV on the Christian Approach to the Jews¹

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¹ Compiled from 'List of Participants', 236-267, *The First Assembly of the World Council of Churches*, Ed. W.A. Visser't Hooft (London: SCM Press, 1949).

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Appendix II: Report of 1948 WCC Assembly Committee IV, The Christian Approach to the Jews, with Annotated ICCAJ Sources²

Introduction

A concern for the Christian approach to the Jewish people confronts us inescapably, as we meet together to look with open and penitent eyes on man's disorder and to rediscover together God's eternal purpose for His Church. This concern is ours because it is first a concern of God made known to us in Christ. No people in His one world have suffered more bitterly from the disorder of man than the Jewish people.³ We cannot forget that we meet in a land from which 110,000 Jews were taken to be murdered. Nor can we forget that we meet only five years after the extermination of 6 million Jews. To the Jews our God has bound us in a special solidarity linking our destinies together in his design. We call upon all our churches to make this concern their own as we share with them the results of our too brief wrestling with it.

1. The Church's commission to preach the Gospel to all men

All of our churches stand under the commission of our common Lord, "Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature." The fulfilment of this commission requires that we include the Jewish people in our evangelistic task.⁴

2. The special meaning of the Jewish people for Christian faith

In the design of God, Israel has a unique position. It was Israel with whom God made His covenant by the call of Abraham. It was Israel to whom God revealed His name and gave His law. It was to Israel that He sent His Prophets with their message of judgment and of grace. It was Israel to whom He promised the coming of His Messiah. By the history of Israel God prepared the manger in which in the fullness of time He put the Redeemer of all mankind, Jesus Christ. The Church has received this spiritual heritage from Israel and is therefore in honour bound to render it back in the light of the cross. We have, therefore, in humble conviction to proclaim to the Jews, "The Messiah for Whom you wait has come."⁵ For many the continued existence of a Jewish people which does not acknowledge Christ is a divine mystery which finds its only sufficient explanation in the purpose of God's unchanging faithfulness and mercy (Romans xi, 25-29).⁶

3. Barriers to be overcome

Before our churches can hope to fulfil the commission laid upon by our Lord there are high barriers to be overcome. We speak here particularly of the barriers which we have too often helped to build and which we alone can remove.⁷

We must acknowledge in all humility that too often we have failed to manifest Christian love towards our Jewish neighbours, or even a resolute will for common social justice. We have failed to fight with all our strength the age-old disorder of man which anti-semitism represents. The churches in the past have helped to foster an image of the Jews as the sole enemies of

² Annotations correspond to Table VIII in Chapter Five, p. 211.

³ Hoffmann, December 1946 memorandum.

⁴ Warsaw I: 'We are convinced that there is a special urgency today to evangelize the whole Jewish people - some fifteen and a half million Jews of the present day dispersion. This very dispersion is a call of God to his Church. The basis and authority for missions to the Jews rest primarily on the special command and love of our Lord Jesus'. Fundamental ICCAJ argument.

⁵ Budapest I.ii: 'Our message to the Jews is the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ, crucified, risen, glorified, the fulfilment of the law, and the true Messiah. He is the incarnate Word, the Redeemer of the world, the Saviour from sin, who is bringing Israel to her destiny, viz., to become a blessing to all humanity'. Warsaw II is an elaboration. Fundamental ICCAJ argument.

⁶ Paraphrase from 1947 ICCAJ Basel Conference, Report on the Church and Hebrew Christian, 18; Hoffmann, May 1948 memorandum.

⁷ Budapest I.i: 'We believe that all unchristian treatment of the Jews and all race-prejudice are great stumbling blocks to the acceptance of the Christian message'. Warsaw V.b: 'The sins of Christendom against the Jews which we frankly confess - past persecution, and present indifferent and ignorance - have hindered the work, foreclosed opportunities, shut doors that were ajar, and dissipated power'. Fundamental ICCAJ argument.

Christ, which has contributed to anti-semitism in the secular world. In many lands virulent anti-semitism still threatens and in other lands the Jews are subjected to many indignities.⁸

We call upon the churches we represent to denounce anti-semitism, no matter what its origin, as absolutely irreconcilable with the profession and practice of the Christian faith. Anti-semitism is sin against God and man.⁹

Only as we give convincing evidence to our Jewish neighbours that we seek for them the common rights and dignities which God wills for His children, can we come to such a meeting with them as would make it possible to share with them the best which God has given us in Christ.¹⁰

4. *The Christian witness to the Jewish people*

In spite of the universality of our Lord's commission and of the fact that the first mission of the Church was to the Jewish people, our churches have with rare exceptions failed to maintain that mission. This responsibility should not be left largely to independent agencies. The carrying on of this mission by special agencies has often meant the singling out of the Jews for special missionary attention, even in situations where they might well have been included in the normal ministry of the Church.¹¹ It has also meant in many cases that the converts are forced into segregated spiritual fellowship rather than being included and welcomed in the regular membership of the Church.¹²

Owing to this failure our churches must consider the responsibility for missions to the Jews as a normal part of parish work, especially in those countries where Jews are members of the general community.¹³ Where there is no indigenous church or where the indigenous church is insufficient for this task it may be necessary to arrange for a special missionary ministry from abroad.¹⁴

Because of the unique inheritance of the Jewish people, the churches should make provision for the education of ministers specifically fitted for this task. Provision should also be made for Christian literature to interpret the Gospel to Jewish people.¹⁵

Equally, it should be made clear to church members that the strongest argument in winning others for Christ is the radiance and contagion of victorious living and the outgoing of God's

⁸ Budapest V: 'Believing that the time has come for Christian Churches to put on record their attitude the Jewish people, we, as a Conference of Christian workers, deplore the long record of injustice and ill usage of Jews on the part of nominally Ch people'. Repeated in Warsaw I. Fundamental ICCAJ argument except for admission about fostering the image as sole enemy; this did not find place until after 1937 Vienna Conference and, then, only infrequently and not as strongly stated.

⁹ Budapest V, 'We declare such injustice and ill usage to be a violation of the teaching and Spirit of Christ; we call upon Churches and Christians everywhere to oppose all such injustice and ill usage, and to express to Jews by word and act the Spirit of JC our Lord, their Saviour and ours'. Repeated Warsaw I. Fundamental ICCAJ argument.

¹⁰ Warsaw V.i.c: 'The defective example of the average Christian life and conduct has hindered the manifestation of the power of Jesus Christ to redeem and bless. As the best argument for Jesus is a worthy Christian life, so the worse enemy of spiritual power is an inconsistent life'. Fundamental ICCAJ argument.

¹¹ Budapest V.III: 'As a result of the...increasingly great share taken by Jews in the whole life of the modern world, millions of Jews are now living in the midst of Christian communities and under the shadow of Christian Churches. These Jews represent various elements, for the most part outside the range of existing Jewish missions, and they [will] remain unevangelised unless the local churches themselves undertake this work. This situation is a distinct call to God to all churches [with] Jews in their parishes and to home missionary agencies to include them in their ministry'. Fundamental ICCAJ argument.

¹² Verbatim from Hoffmann May 1948 memorandum.

¹³ Warsaw I.iii: 'In view of the wide distribution of Jews in many Christian lands and...residence within the bounds of Church parishes, we recognise the providential opportunity thus afforded to preach the Gospel to our Jewish neighbours. Therefore we urge upon the pastors of such churches the importance of Jewish evangelism...' Fundamental ICCAJ argument.

¹⁴ Paraphrase from 1947 ICCAJ Basel Conference, Report on Church and Methods, 16.

¹⁵ Budapest IV, VI. Warsaw, II, III. Fundamental ICCAJ argument.

love expressed in personal human contacts. As this is expressed and experienced in a genuine Christian fellowship and community the impact of the Gospel will be felt. For such a fellowship there will be no difference between a converted Jew and other church members, all belonging to the same church and fellowship through Jesus Christ.¹⁶ But the converted Jew calls for particular tenderness and full acceptance just because his coming into the Church carries with it often a deeply wounding break with family and friends.

In reconstruction and relief activities the churches must not lose sight of the plight of Christians of Jewish origin, in view of their special suffering. Such provision must be made for their aid as will help them to know that they are not forgotten in the Christian fellowship.¹⁷

5. The emergence of Israel as a state

The establishment of the state "Israel" adds a political dimension to the Christian approach to the Jews and threatens to complicate anti-semitism with political fears and enmities.¹⁸

On the political aspects of the Palestine problem and the complex conflict of "right" involved we do not undertake to express a judgment. Nevertheless, we appeal to the nations to deal with the problem not as one of expediency - political, strategic or economic - but as a moral and spiritual question that touches a nerve centre of the world's religious life.¹⁹

Whatever position may be taken towards the establishment of a Jewish state and towards the "rights" and "wrongs" of Jews and Arabs, of Hebrew Christians and Arab Christians involved, the churches are in duty bound to pray and work for an order in Palestine as just as may be in the midst of our human disorder; to provide within their power for the relief of the victims of this warfare without discrimination; and to seek to influence the nations to provide a refuge for "Displaced Persons" far more generously than has yet been done.²⁰

Recommendations.

We conclude this report with the recommendations which arise out of our first exploratory consideration of this "concern" of the churches.

1. To the member churches of the World Council we recommend:

- that they seek to recover the universality of our Lord's commission by including the Jewish people in their evangelistic work;
- that they encourage their people to seek for brotherly contact with and understanding of their Jewish neighbours, and cooperation in agencies combating misunderstanding and prejudice;
- that in mission work among the Jews they scrupulously avoid all unworthy pressures or inducements;
- that they give thought to the preparation of ministers well fitted to interpret the Gospel to Jewish people and to the provision of literature which will aid in such a ministry.

2. To the World Council of Churches we recommend:

- that it should give careful thought as to how it can best stimulate and assist the member churches in the carrying out of this aspect of their mission;
- that it give careful consideration to the suggestion made by the International Missionary Council that the World Council of Churches share with it a joint responsibility for the Christian approach to the Jews;
- that it be RESOLVED that, in receiving the report of this Committee, the Assembly recognise the need for more detailed study by the World Council of Churches of the many complex problems which exist in the field of relations between Christians and Jews, and in particular of the following:

¹⁶ Verbatim, beginning with 'the strongest argument', from 1947 ICCAJ Basel Conference, Report on the Church and Evangelism, 18.

¹⁷ Fundamental ICCAJ argument since 1935 on 'relief': since December 1942 on 'reconstruction'.

¹⁸ Fundamental ICCAJ argument on Zionism since call was issued to the Budapest-Warsaw Conferences in October 1925.

¹⁹ Added as Addendum in Plenary Session, beginning with 'Nevertheless'.

²⁰ Paraphrase from 1947 ICCAJ Basel Conference, Report on the Church and Zionism, 21.

- a) the historical and present factors which have contributed to the growth and persistence of anti-semitism, and the most effective means of combating this evil;
- b) the need and opportunity in this present historical situation for the development of co-operation between Christians and Jews in civic and social affairs;
- c) the many and varied problems created by establishment of a State of Israel in Palestine.

The Assembly therefore asks that these and related questions be referred to the Central Committee for further examination.

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