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Welfare ratios in one-sided matching mechanisms

Welfare ratios in one-sided matching mechanisms
Welfare ratios in one-sided matching mechanisms
We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of ?(?n) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms and we show that a very well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial achieves a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property
1297-1298
Christodoulou, George
a6890185-8c0b-4b9d-9cc3-61310576a751
Aris, Filos-Ratsikas
3fb10248-5600-48b0-b745-b6fbd75a36ac
Søren Kristoffer, Stiil Frederiksen
48ffcf47-134e-44ce-a968-bf3bc0247cc8
Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
Zhang, Jie
21de2303-4727-4097-9b0f-ae43d95d052a
Zhang, Jinshan
dceaf1fe-451c-4cdd-87d8-1ed661bf468e
Christodoulou, George
a6890185-8c0b-4b9d-9cc3-61310576a751
Aris, Filos-Ratsikas
3fb10248-5600-48b0-b745-b6fbd75a36ac
Søren Kristoffer, Stiil Frederiksen
48ffcf47-134e-44ce-a968-bf3bc0247cc8
Goldberg, Paul W.
46b110bb-a7df-406d-babc-291a17fff863
Zhang, Jie
21de2303-4727-4097-9b0f-ae43d95d052a
Zhang, Jinshan
dceaf1fe-451c-4cdd-87d8-1ed661bf468e

Christodoulou, George, Aris, Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer, Stiil Frederiksen, Goldberg, Paul W., Zhang, Jie and Zhang, Jinshan (2016) Welfare ratios in one-sided matching mechanisms. 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems (AAMAS '16), Singapore. 09 - 13 May 2016. pp. 1297-1298 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both ordinal mechanisms, where agents submit preference lists over the items, and cardinal mechanisms, where agents may submit numerical values for the items being allocated. We present a general lower bound of ?(?n) on the Price of Anarchy, which applies to all mechanisms and we show that a very well-known mechanisms, Probabilistic Serial achieves a matching upper bound. We extend our lower bound to the Price of Stability of a large class of mechanisms that satisfy a common proportionality property

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More information

e-pub ahead of print date: May 2016
Venue - Dates: 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems (AAMAS '16), Singapore, 2016-05-09 - 2016-05-13
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 402581
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/402581
PURE UUID: f36d8cbd-d19b-4379-a526-5c9dc4f86f3a

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 09 Jan 2017 08:32
Last modified: 20 Apr 2020 16:32

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Contributors

Author: George Christodoulou
Author: Filos-Ratsikas Aris
Author: Stiil Frederiksen Søren Kristoffer
Author: Paul W. Goldberg
Author: Jie Zhang
Author: Jinshan Zhang

University divisions

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