Incentive ratios of Fisher markets
Incentive ratios of Fisher markets
In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.
464-475
Chen, Ning
52f917c7-bcbf-4a36-9a60-d613627972a3
Deng, Xiaotie
772c0705-a735-43dc-8988-f5c527572574
Zhang, Hongyang
c4c6ac3a-194a-4c01-88b1-a3edeee78535
Zhang, Jie
6bad4e75-40e0-4ea3-866d-58c8018b225a
2012
Chen, Ning
52f917c7-bcbf-4a36-9a60-d613627972a3
Deng, Xiaotie
772c0705-a735-43dc-8988-f5c527572574
Zhang, Hongyang
c4c6ac3a-194a-4c01-88b1-a3edeee78535
Zhang, Jie
6bad4e75-40e0-4ea3-866d-58c8018b225a
Chen, Ning, Deng, Xiaotie, Zhang, Hongyang and Zhang, Jie
(2012)
Incentive ratios of Fisher markets.
Czumaj, A., Melhorn, K., Pitts, A. and Wattenhofer, R.
(eds.)
In Automata, Languages, and Programming : Proceeding ICALP 2012.
vol. 7392,
Springer.
.
(doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42).
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e ≈ 1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.
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More information
Published date: 2012
Venue - Dates:
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, University of Warwick, Warwick, United Kingdom, 2012-07-09 - 2012-07-13
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 402589
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/402589
PURE UUID: 9b697f6d-073f-441e-87fd-be134f5a74c7
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Date deposited: 29 Nov 2016 16:32
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 22:14
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Contributors
Author:
Ning Chen
Author:
Xiaotie Deng
Author:
Hongyang Zhang
Author:
Jie Zhang
Editor:
A. Czumaj
Editor:
K. Melhorn
Editor:
A. Pitts
Editor:
R. Wattenhofer
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