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Incentive ratios of Fisher markets

Incentive ratios of Fisher markets
Incentive ratios of Fisher markets
In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e?1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.
464-475
Chen, Ning
52f917c7-bcbf-4a36-9a60-d613627972a3
Deng, Xiaotie
772c0705-a735-43dc-8988-f5c527572574
Zhang, Hongyang
c4c6ac3a-194a-4c01-88b1-a3edeee78535
Zhang, Jie
6bad4e75-40e0-4ea3-866d-58c8018b225a
Chen, Ning
52f917c7-bcbf-4a36-9a60-d613627972a3
Deng, Xiaotie
772c0705-a735-43dc-8988-f5c527572574
Zhang, Hongyang
c4c6ac3a-194a-4c01-88b1-a3edeee78535
Zhang, Jie
6bad4e75-40e0-4ea3-866d-58c8018b225a

Chen, Ning, Deng, Xiaotie, Zhang, Hongyang and Zhang, Jie (2012) Incentive ratios of Fisher markets. At conference; 2012-01-01 conference; 2012-01-01. 700 pp, pp. 464-475. (doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_42).

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Other)

Abstract

In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most e1/e?1.445 for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight.

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More information

Published date: 2012
Venue - Dates: conference; 2012-01-01, 2012-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 402589
URI: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/402589
PURE UUID: 9b697f6d-073f-441e-87fd-be134f5a74c7
ORCID for Jie Zhang: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0003-1380-9952

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 29 Nov 2016 16:32
Last modified: 06 Jun 2018 12:14

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Contributors

Author: Ning Chen
Author: Xiaotie Deng
Author: Hongyang Zhang
Author: Jie Zhang ORCID iD

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