Chomsky and Penrose on the Explicable and the Inexplicable
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Chomsky thinks there are truths the human mind may be unable to understand or explain. Penrose thinks thinking is not computation and that human intuition can discover truths that cannot be computed (perhaps with the help of quantum processes in the brain). One can agree that thinking is not just computation without having to resort to quantum mechanics: Classical mechanics is already noncomputational. But the thought processes underlying intuition could still be computational; and intuitions can also be wrong. And whatever is inexplicable by the human mind and language could be inexplicable for shallow reasons (not enough time and luck) not mental or linguistic ones. If there are truths that are inexplicable for deeper reasons, it is hard to explain in words how or why, apart perhaps from quantum uncertainty and Gödel-unprovability. And there the reasons are not mental ones.
||language, mind, creativity, computation, Chomsky, Penrose, effability, quantum uncertainty, gödel's theorem, intuition
||Web & Internet Science
|2006||e-pub ahead of print|
||23 Nov 2016 19:56
||22 Feb 2017 02:39
|Further Information:||Google Scholar|
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