Easier done than undone: asymmetry in the malleability of automatic preferences
Easier done than undone: asymmetry in the malleability of automatic preferences
Dual-process models imply that automatic attitudes should be less flexible than their self-reported counterparts; the relevant empirical record, however, is mixed. To advance the debate, the authors conducted 4 experiments investigating how readily automatic preferences for one imagined social group over another could be induced or reversed. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that automatic preferences, like self-reported ones, could be readily induced by both abstract supposition and concrete learning. In contrast, Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that newly formed automatic preferences, unlike self-reported ones, could not be readily reversed by either abstract supposition or concrete learning. Thus, the relative inflexibility of implicit attitudes appears to entail, not immunity to sophisticated cognition, nor resistance to swift formation, but insensitivity to modification once formed.
implicit, IAT, attitude, malleability
1-20
Gregg, Aiden P.
1b03bb58-b3a5-4852-a177-29e4f633b063
Seibt, Beate
77ff4397-28c2-424d-b0f4-fe363c39ae98
Banaji, Mahzarin R.
2630d3fc-a334-4b63-a1ba-3cd9449cb693
2006
Gregg, Aiden P.
1b03bb58-b3a5-4852-a177-29e4f633b063
Seibt, Beate
77ff4397-28c2-424d-b0f4-fe363c39ae98
Banaji, Mahzarin R.
2630d3fc-a334-4b63-a1ba-3cd9449cb693
Gregg, Aiden P., Seibt, Beate and Banaji, Mahzarin R.
(2006)
Easier done than undone: asymmetry in the malleability of automatic preferences.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90 (1), .
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.1.1).
Abstract
Dual-process models imply that automatic attitudes should be less flexible than their self-reported counterparts; the relevant empirical record, however, is mixed. To advance the debate, the authors conducted 4 experiments investigating how readily automatic preferences for one imagined social group over another could be induced or reversed. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that automatic preferences, like self-reported ones, could be readily induced by both abstract supposition and concrete learning. In contrast, Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that newly formed automatic preferences, unlike self-reported ones, could not be readily reversed by either abstract supposition or concrete learning. Thus, the relative inflexibility of implicit attitudes appears to entail, not immunity to sophisticated cognition, nor resistance to swift formation, but insensitivity to modification once formed.
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j.1467-985X.2006.00439.pdf
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Published date: 2006
Keywords:
implicit, IAT, attitude, malleability
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Local EPrints ID: 40337
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/40337
ISSN: 0022-3514
PURE UUID: ef3c0e99-43fb-4aec-bdcc-75785420f950
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Date deposited: 03 Jul 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 08:18
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Author:
Beate Seibt
Author:
Mahzarin R. Banaji
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