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Mechanism design in social networks

Mechanism design in social networks
Mechanism design in social networks
This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual (the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neighbors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism to incentivize the buyers, who are aware of the auction, to further propagate the information to their neighbors so that more buyers will participate in the auction and hence, the seller will be able to make a higher revenue. We propose a novel auction mechanism, called information diffusion mechanism (IDM), which incentivizes the buyers to not only truthfully report their valuations on the commodity to the seller, but also further propagate the auction information to all their neighbors. In comparison, the direct extension of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in social networks can also incentivize the information diffusion, but it will decrease the seller’s revenue or even lead to a deficit sometimes. The formalization of the problem has not yet been addressed in the literature of mechanism design and our solution is very significant in the presence of large-scale online social networks
Li, Bin
e208428e-dd63-4ccb-bd1d-66a9ef8b648c
Hao, Dong
7462e67f-f537-48ed-b819-b0d7c9511fa3
Zhao, Dengji
731b17f8-df94-49cb-b45d-8edf05c59edf
Zhou, Tao
4fe333d2-a328-4a32-a4dd-65913c48e1fd
Li, Bin
e208428e-dd63-4ccb-bd1d-66a9ef8b648c
Hao, Dong
7462e67f-f537-48ed-b819-b0d7c9511fa3
Zhao, Dengji
731b17f8-df94-49cb-b45d-8edf05c59edf
Zhou, Tao
4fe333d2-a328-4a32-a4dd-65913c48e1fd

Li, Bin, Hao, Dong, Zhao, Dengji and Zhou, Tao (2016) Mechanism design in social networks. The Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San Francisco, United States. 04 - 09 Feb 2017. 7 pp . (In Press)

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

This paper studies an auction design problem for a seller to sell a commodity in a social network, where each individual (the seller or a buyer) can only communicate with her neighbors. The challenge to the seller is to design a mechanism to incentivize the buyers, who are aware of the auction, to further propagate the information to their neighbors so that more buyers will participate in the auction and hence, the seller will be able to make a higher revenue. We propose a novel auction mechanism, called information diffusion mechanism (IDM), which incentivizes the buyers to not only truthfully report their valuations on the commodity to the seller, but also further propagate the auction information to all their neighbors. In comparison, the direct extension of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in social networks can also incentivize the information diffusion, but it will decrease the seller’s revenue or even lead to a deficit sometimes. The formalization of the problem has not yet been addressed in the literature of mechanism design and our solution is very significant in the presence of large-scale online social networks

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: 12 November 2016
Venue - Dates: The Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San Francisco, United States, 2017-02-04 - 2017-02-09
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 403698
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/403698
PURE UUID: 955ffdb2-5353-4319-8406-d9a4549346a8

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 09 Dec 2016 10:27
Last modified: 20 Apr 2020 16:34

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Contributors

Author: Bin Li
Author: Dong Hao
Author: Dengji Zhao
Author: Tao Zhou

University divisions

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