THE INCLUSION PARADOX OF ENFRANCHISING EXPATS IN LATIN AMERICA

ABSTRACT:Enfranchising emigrants involves an implicit invitation to have a voice and increasing engagement in home politics, thus maintaining membership to the nation of origin active. However, in the Latin American Southern Cone (as well as in several other countries in the region), both state policies and expats’ responses have fallen short of making that invitation effective. What explains this inclusion paradox? Why enfranchising is expanding but effective political inclusion of citizens living abroad has not materialized? This paper addresses these questions for the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Conclusions highlight relatively unexplored explanatory factors and enhance our understanding of the links between migration policy innovation and political inclusion beyond borders in some of the least studied cases in the literature.

INTRODUCTION

Enfranchising expats in the Latin American Southern Cone (LASC) exhibits an “inclusion paradox” today in the sense that it combines contradictory elements. LASC countries have recently reached out to their citizens abroad, ending with a long record of neglect and silence and framing those efforts in a socio-political agenda driven by human rights and equality considerations. Together with other measures, enfranchising emigrants is part of the invitation issued to expats to have a voice in the fate of the country, participate in home politics, and make membership to the nation effective. It is framed in a nationalist discourse that promises to enhance democratic participation. It is not the only but the most visible indicator of whether political inclusion actually exists for this segment of society. However, regarding the exercise of entitlements, both states and citizens abroad fall short of enacting them. In comparison to other diaspora engagement initiatives, extra-territorial voting rights were not the priority. Governments did not act on this diligently or consistently; they have not always facilitated the exercise of rights for non-residents citizens. Parliamentary representation of emigrants has been discussed but not approved yet. There is little effort to expand voting rights beyond national presidential elections, encourage political mobilization, and increase turnout. As for citizens abroad, turnout has been quite low and political mobilization ambivalent and intermittent; thus, expats are often unable to seize the chance of being included as full members of the nation.

This study investigates why political inclusion has not fully materialized yet or achieved its full potential. It addresses this question for the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay where states’ acknowledging and acting on the emigration problem in the last ten-to-fifteen years is sign of policy innovation. Brazil took note of emigration trends in the mid-1990s; a broad consular reform to improve and manage relations with citizens abroad was institutionalised a decade later. In the 2000s, both Argentina and Uruguay implemented specific measures to reach out to expats. In the former, those efforts were launched in 2003, peaked in 2008-2009, and stalled since then. In the latter, state initiatives continued to advance since 2005, though not exempt of tensions, delays, and setbacks.[[1]](#endnote-1)

The existing literature on these policies has been largely oblivious of these cases; it has mainly adopted a top-down approach to explaining policy innovation, and has offered very few comparisons. The stages of franchise reform are not usually disentangled as this article does to unveil explanatory factors. Thus, this comparative work broadens the scope of our knowledge by bringing in original insights about new cases based on rigorous empirical investigation.[[2]](#endnote-2) It confirms the need for integrating state-led and migrant-led perspectives, and invites us to revisit some assumptions, namely that a) states are relatively well positioned to succeed in policy innovation, b) migrants are eager to become involved in transnational politics, and c) state initiatives generally lead to increasing diaspora engagement with home politics. More concretely, the LASC countries expand our understanding of transnational political engagement in significant ways by showing 1) the variety of motivations behind half-hearted efforts by states and migrants to make inclusion feasible; 2) the way historically constructed notions of citizenship and belonging enable or constrain policy innovation, and what the potential drivers of further reform might be, and 3) the role of some relatively underexplored explanatory factors such as the reshaping of institutional capacities in transitional contexts, the post-neoliberal underpinnings of governmental projects, the segmented character of both diasporas and policies, and citizens’ views of political elites and institutions. These contributions engage not just with the literature on diaspora policies but, more broadly, with debates about the nexus between migration and development. In that discussion, the assumptions mentioned above have nurtured a celebratory view of transnational practices which are often deemed as more intense and frequent than what they actually are (Faist et al. 2011, among others).

Following this introduction, this study first presents the analytical framework which highlights the need to integrate various disciplinary perspectives and the bottom-up and top-down dynamics that shape today political inclusion in transnational space. The third section reviews several explanations to the inclusion paradox vis-à-vis the evidence, focusing on three main stages in the adoption and implementation of policy reform (i.e., the political act of enfranchising expats; the exercise of extra-territorial voting rights, and the potential expansion of political inclusion). It shows that existing approaches fall short of capturing the key factors at play in the LASC. This section also identifies differences and similarities across the three cases and ends with suggestions of promising venues for future research. The concluding section proposes some others and summarizes the main policy lessons for our understanding of the politics of franchise and citizenship reform, as well as the challenges that lie ahead for both policymakers and societies.

THE POLITICS OF TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP

Emigration policies and citizenship reform in the three cases studied here remain relatively under-investigated and descriptive. Diaspora issues are usually addressed from a sociological or anthropological point of view that underestimates the political dimension of migrant inclusion in the polity, the policymaking process, and the politics of the country of origin. Given that nation- and state-building was closely intertwined with being countries of immigration, there was historically little scholarly (and political concern) with nationals abroad. In addition, most studies on enfranchising and extra-territorial voting are framed within either citizenship or electoral behaviour discussions, thus setting aside the fact that expanding enfranchising beyond borders is a crucial aspect of a broader political process (i.e., enhancing political inclusion) and part and parcel of states’ attempt to redefine the nature and scope of membership via emigration policies.

This study builds on various bodies of literature to make the case for a suitable analytical framework. On the one hand, some anthropologists pioneered the study of contemporary forms of transnational membership (e.g., Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Laguerre 1998, among others). Although the state is a central actor in those studies, the analytical focus is understandably on social dimensions rather than political institutions, techniques of government or the state itself. On the other hand, although not constituting a formal theory yet, some studies on diaspora engagement policies help to explain the top-down dynamic by which states may seek to promote expats inclusion (e.g., Ancien et al. 2009; Gamlen 2008; Ho 2011; Ragazzi 2009). The most recent syntheses include cases from all regions; South American cases are rarely included in the typologies drawn, except for Colombia and Brazil. Yet, these two cases are usually classified in a cluster that does not do justice to their strategies toward emigrants (Délano and Gamlen 2014; Ragazzi 2014).

Moreover, states’ involvement with citizens abroad has been generally understood as a response to migrants’ demands and increasing capacity to organize and lobby, and more likely to happen in the cases of massive migrations that may have a significant political impact, such as Mexicans in the US (e.g., Goldring 2002; Smith 2003). The attempt to capture remittances and/or benefit from the lobby capacity of emigrants in the host country, and the role of the state apparatus and political parties have been identified as the main drivers in the establishment of links with emigrants (e.g., Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). This calls attention to the link between diaspora policies and development projects which in the last few decades turned to emigrants for support. Yet, it misses the intricate and complex interplay of political and economic transitions which re-shaped state capacity to enlist them. A few studies on other regions focus on transitional cases and implications for state reshaping (e.g., Brand 2006; Kapur 2010), but the path to transitions and the distinct features of political systems preclude extrapolations to the LASC and generalizations.

LASC countries have received little attention in the literature and defy neat classification for a number of reasons. States rely on disarticulated, inefficient apparatuses which have undergone multiple and diverse reforms in the last half century.Emigration policy is usually highly centralized in few offices around the Executive power rather than balkanized; there is little to none local level involvement –two assumptions typically inferred from the Mexican case (Fitzgerald 2006). Migrant organizations are relatively few, participation and mobilization is low and intermittent, and home-town associations are not the locus of migrant activities. Thus, the agenda-setting capacity of social actors in a transnational space cannot be assumed to be as effective as in other regions (e.g. Brand 2013).Furthermore, the three cases selected here have low dependency on remittances. They all lack political parties with strong transnational outreach capacity and electoral cycles show that parties face serious troubles to re-build and/or maintain allegiances today.In short, the particularities of their transition to democracy (and to the market) since the 1980s set the stage for different state capacity to engage with citizens abroad and emigrant responses and, thus, needs to be included in the analysis.

In addition, it is argued that the widespread adoption of diaspora policies is best explained by a particular form of governmentality deemed “neoliberal” which has presumably swept the entire world, one that “glorifies markets and prescribes light-touch, out-sourced forms of regulation that mimic markets and instills values of self-responsibility and participation into networks of active citizens” (Délano and Gamlen 2014: 46) and typologies are drawn accordingly (Ragazzi 2014). In contrast, this article explores cases in which a distinct, post-neoliberal rationale prevails and makes the inclusion paradox become particularly relevant. The term post-neoliberalism is currently used to describe political positions, ideas, and policy approaches based on a critique of the neoliberal reforms favoured by the Washington Consensus after the debt crisis in early 1980s. Accordingly, the post-neoliberal agenda of several Latin American governments has included, among other things, a nationalist and (neo)populist rhetoric,[[3]](#endnote-3) increased state interventionism in the economy, nationalisations of industries and key economic resources, and welfare social programmes to reduce poverty.[[4]](#endnote-4) Given the promise to address inequality and enhance democratic participation, one would expect that the overarching ideas underpinning post-neoliberal projects would translate into consistent and sustained measures to make inclusion effective for expats, among other groups. However, the following sections show that this is not the case and only an enhanced analytical framework would capture the nuances and tensions of post-neoliberal policies. In practice, post-neoliberal projects have exhibit contradictory elements: market-oriented principles, highly protectionist economic policies, a strong role for the state in social welfare based in human rights and developmental considerations, and neo-populist tendencies that erode the representative, republican dimension of democratic governance.[[5]](#endnote-5) And not all countries have followed the same strategy and phases of neoliberal and post-neoliberal restructuring.[[6]](#endnote-6) As a result, they have exhibited a pragmatic approach to neoliberal principles, within which one pending task stands out: the indefinitely postponed reform of the state, which has old roots and recurrently creates obstacles to policymaking and implementation. Hence, although capitalizing on emigrants’ contributions has been part of the attempt to foster development in the LASC, the legacies of neoliberal attempts and the lack of progress in changing bureaucratic culture and practices impinges upon state capacities and keeps emigration policies caught in a stop and go cycle, inconsistencies, and/or delays. This study documents this distinctive feature and, building on new evidence and comparative works on other regions (e.g., Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Ho 2011; Larner 2007), provides further evidence that country-specific variables help to explain variants of neoliberalism and degrees of inclusion/exclusion.

Again, on this respect I note that, while case-studies in other regions analyse the impact of regime transition on policy reform, they do not account for recurrent crises and long transitional processes (e.g., dramatic financial crises, political instability, institutional breakdown, etc. –all factors affecting the LASC). Such processes have affected state capacities to implement public policies in general, and emigration policies in particular. These domestic political processes are relevant to political inclusion because they have required not only the reconstitution of social order but they have also prompted the recasting of national narratives in which membership to the polity is “officially” defined and socially re-imagined. As it is further explained in the following sections, the LASC nations exhibit a tragic record of state violence over its citizens and dramatic memories of both violations of human rights and economic debacles to which emigrants refer when responding (with outreach and disappointment) to state policies. These nations are still struggling to consolidate and improve the quality of democratic institutions, as the recent presidential impeachment in Brazil illustrates. It is not evident, then, how state initiatives might contribute to recast the notion of political inclusion, and this needs to be investigated at both ends of the state-society relationship.

At the emigrants’ end, their actions to make inclusion effective have been addressed from several perspectives and methodologies. Studies on ethnic lobbies highlight the role of the nation-state as the key level of articulation of demands and main arena for mobilization. Yet generalizations about what factors are crucial in making migrant associations successful and politically influential remain elusive (Rubenzer 2008, among others). As the comparative evidence across regions shows, organizational dynamics and transnational political involvement vary considerably across ethnic groups, contexts of settlement, type of political engagement, immigrant generations, and other variables, thus making it difficult to infer unequivocal conclusions (e.g., Morales and Morariu 2011). The role of states of origin and how states attempt to mobilise migrants with political purposes is a factor neglected by comparative studies (e.g., Morales and Pilati 2013). Nor has it been a key explanatory factor in comparative studies on migrant organizations (e.g., Pries and Sezgin 2012). Most studies emphasize either the impact of the host citizenship regimes and immigrant integration policies (e.g., Bloemraad 2005; Morales, González, and Jorba 2009) or the relative amount of (ethnic) social capital of immigrant groups (e.g., JEMS special issue, May 2004). Although considerable emphasis has been placed on policies towards highly qualified and wealthy emigrant elites, there is only an incipient literature on the implications of a selective approach to emigration policy that caters to specific (and often multiple) segments of the diaspora (e.g., Tsourapas 2015) and how this may give place to the emergence of new geographies of national membership, or not, as the case of Uruguay seems to suggest. The call to analyse such process as “geographically and historically embedded” (Dickinson and Bailey 2007:761) has not been answered yet.

In sum, this paper makes the case for an integrating various disciplinary perspectives and both the top-down approach followed by state agencies to reach out to (some) expats and the bottom-up perspective of emigrant’s activities and stances towards membership and participation in home politics. It also proposes some qualifications and refinements to existing explanations, mainly drawn from the incorporation of distinctive domestic variables related to the impact of political and economic transitions on institutional capacities, the post-neoliberal underpinnings of governmental projects, the segmented character of both diasporas and policies, and citizens’ views of political elites and institutions. Such an approach faces limitations, though, namely the reliance on a small sample of cases and partial information about emigrants’ views and practices. A comprehensive survey of migrant opinions across cases and sites of destination is out of the limits of this study. I acknowledge these in the conclusions and suggest a number of inferences that nevertheless can be made from these cases.

EXPLAINING THE INCLUSION PARADOX

Enfranchising Expats

The first stage of enacting expats’ inclusion usually entails constitutional or legislation amendment, since political rights are typically established in the national constitution and its implementation is regulated by specific laws. Was this possible (or is it likely to happen) in the LASC, and how? Only partially and through different paths. Comparisons require accounting for the factors that made change possible and this brings political actors to center-stage.

It is generally assumed, when constitutional or legislation changes are needed, the lack of political entrepreneurship may delay and/or block franchise reform projects.The assumption is not fully confirmed in the cases under consideration here, for emigrants’ enfranchising has not been contingent on major reform but closely related to two major transitions: from dictatorship to democratization and from an inward-oriented, state-led development strategy to economic liberalization and market-oriented policies. These transitions implied a deep transformation of state-society and state-market relations. As a result, a few features are worth mentioned: a) the democratization process and the impact of neoliberal reforms in the LASC encouraged state activism and policy innovation as they brought questions of citizenship and political rights to the centre stage; b) the transition from authoritarianism to democracy took different forms across cases, leaving state institutions and governments to cope with various credibility and capacity problems[[7]](#endnote-7); c) the external debt crisis hit Latin America the same decade and encouraged austerity measures, structural adjustment, and pro-market reforms, including rolling back and reforming the state –a task these countries tackled with different modality and scope; d) processes of social reconciliation after human rights abuses and subordinating the military to civilian control also differed across cases, faced limitations and, to some extent, gave place to the idea that mending relations with former political exiles was a pending task, and e) the persistence of economic and political instability prompted new waves of “economic” emigrants at the turn of the last century, when the social costs of neoliberal reforms were evident, and provided additional reasons to call for their participation in the reconstruction of the home country after several crises

Therefore, the path and timing to enfranchising expats differed across the three cases. In Argentina, extra-territorial rights pre-existed the launch of a specific emigration policy (i.e., a set of measures, programmes, and institutional changes aimed at addressing the needs and claims of emigrants). The initiative to grant emigrants’ voting rights was launched during the democratic transition (mid-1980s) as a symbolic move towards political exiles that left during the dictatorship and supported democratization from afar. Thus, since 1991 Law 24.007 (regulated by Decree 1138 of 1993) allows Argentine citizens residing abroad to vote in national elections at consular offices provided that they are previously registered. This right became effective for the first time in the 1993 mid-term legislative elections. Likewise, Brazilians abroad have the right and the obligation to vote for president and vice-president, provided that they have previously registered in the closest consulate to their place of residency. However, this neither emerged as part of policy innovation nor became a contested issue. It has been included in electoral regulations since 1965 (Chapter VII of Law 4737 of 15 July 1965), when the 1965 Electoral Code was promulgated, establishing voluntary registration and voting for citizens residing abroad, and limiting voting to the presidential elections.[[8]](#endnote-8) Implementation was obviously not possible under dictatorship because presidents were not popularly elected, thus the exercise of the right became effective for the first time after the return to democracy in 1989 (Limongi 2016).

Uruguay contrasts with regional trends as it is one of the very few nations that still moves slowly and reluctantly towards enfranchising its citizens abroad. To incorporate voting rights for Uruguayan citizens residing abroad would require a constitutional amendment or a new law to allow for absentee ballot by postal or other means. The issue has been in the public debate for the last decade, as emigrants consider the enactment of this right crucial and the measure that would make all other diaspora engagement efforts relevant. Lack of political entrepreneurship is not the main obstacle, though. The coalition in government since 2005 (the *Frente Amplio*, Broad Front) has showed commitment and encouraged innovation on this matter, therefore disconfirming the assumption above. Three bills were discussed in parliamentary commissions. Congress finally voted down a revised bill in October 2007. The project was subject to a national referendum on October 25, 2009 for which the *Frente Amplio* developed an intense campaign in collaboration with migrant organizations within and outside the country, again with no success (only 36,93 per cent of voters supported the initiative[[9]](#endnote-9)). The government re-launched the project, expecting to make emigrants’ absentee voting rights effective by the 2014 presidential elections; it has recently included the topic in the main document drafted by the *Junta Nacional de Migración* (the main collective body dealing with migration issues), together with the main guidelines that would steer national migration policy in the next few years, approved by the Executive power (Res No. 576) on 29 August 2016.[[10]](#endnote-10) These efforts did not succeed yet. A new bill was sent to the Congress in 2015 but it is dormant. Key informants confirm that the stalemate is there, where the necessary two thirds of affirmative votes cannot be achieved yet. Only political negotiations and compromise might unlock the situation.

Thus, these cases expand our knowledge of when and how country-specific factors and domestic politics have a role in the redefinition of citizens’ rights beyond borders (Collyer 2014; Lafleur 2011). They also suggest the need to revisit the question of the drivers of reform and the relative capacity of both state and party apparatuses to act transnationally. Since constitutional reform and legislation update require Congress’ action or a special assembly to form, political parties may be considered key intermediaries in the process of making reform happen. To some extent, cases where transnational political practices are regular and intense seem to confirm that parties are key actors in fostering diasporas’ engagement with home politics (e.g., Itzigsohn 2000). However, the argument can hardly be extended to the LASC countries where a) presidential systems give the executive power an overwhelming role in policymaking, b) coalition building within Congress is extremely hard to achieve in contexts of fragmented representation, c) political parties have undergone a long crisis of representation, with political party systems becoming more fluid since democratization, and parties do not have a tradition of engaging in transnational electoral campaigns and, more broadly, d) democratic political practices are far from stable and consolidated (Roberts 2014; Levitsky et al. 2016).[[11]](#endnote-11)

Therefore, political parties cannot be assumed as the most effective channel for citizens’ claims –let alone for citizens residing far away. Political parties’ reaching out to expats is less frequent and less articulated in the LASC cases than in other regions (e.g., in North and Central America and the Caribbean); it is probably less consequential than what the transnational studies literature would lead us to expect. Only individual leaders may be able to provide crucial impact. This was the case of former presidents of Brazil and Uruguay da Silva and Mujica and, to a lesser extent, Kirchner in Argentina, who held meetings with migrant associations and migrant leaders during electoral campaigns and their tenure in office. In particular, da Silva and Mujica relied on their charisma and personal experiences of repression under dictatorship to connect with former political exiles still living abroad. These encounters strengthened other symbolic moves to embrace the diasporas and gave a boost to migrant activism. Yet, they appear as a fragile basis (i.e., too intermittent and personalized) to have a sustained and significant impact on dispersed populations’ engagement with home politics.

Exercising Political Rights

Moving from granting rights to the exercise of political rights, voting is only one of the forms this exercise may take and an indicator (albeit partial) of inclusion. Mobilization of both migrants and state resources is necessary at this stage. Most studies link outcomes to the latter: the logistics of implementing extra-territorial vote is always mentioned as an obstacle to migrant involvement, especially when consular offices are far away from home, not able to cover all destinations, and not well-endowed with material and human resources. In those cases, then consulates are unable to improve the logistics of voting and reduce the cost migrants face to actually cast their vote. In other words, state intervention is needed to make extra-territorial voting possible and may affect turnout.

LASC have, indeed, relied on their consular offices for these matters (except, obviously, for Uruguay), but state actions only partially explain the mixed results. Voter registration has increased among Argentines abroad (from 8,814 in 1993 to 35,704 in 2005) but voting has decreased: in presidential elections only it passed from 52.85% of registered voters in 1995 to 33.92% in 1999 to 21.92% in 2003 (Emmerich 2016: 9). More recent studies are not available. Accessing primary data is difficult because the norms establish that votes of Argentines abroad are registered in the last district of residency in the country. Therefore, official electoral results online are not disaggregated by residents and non-resident voters.[[12]](#endnote-12) As in other cases, the argument about logistics at long distance was used to explain the low turnout record (Tullio 2010:87; Novick 2007:362). Improvement mechanisms were under discussion in the past decade. In 2007, groups of expats mobilized to encourage political participation and demand more governmental attention, with very limited success. For the past few years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have considered that emigrants’ willingness to register and vote is not high enough as to justify the addition of more polling stations.[[13]](#endnote-13) The problem is not currently voiced by political parties and does not generate public debate; no references to migration were made during the most recent electoral cycle (August-October 2015). Yet, a few political actors took note of the potential votes (around 2% of the total electorate). The then candidate and today’s President Macri issued a letter to expats[[14]](#endnote-14) and his party designed a program called “Argentines abroad” to diffuse information and encourage voting.[[15]](#endnote-15) But for the last few years, emigration policy has not been a priority and largely follows an inertial mode today. As it is explained in detail below, political mobilization of Argentines living abroad is unlikely to be the source of change, mainly for reasons related to weak organizational capacity and negative perceptions of state institutions, political elites, and politics more broadly.

In the case of Brazil, political participation is also relatively low, although voting is still compulsory for Brazilians residing abroad. The explanations revolve around three main factors: very little information reaches out to emigrants; those who are in irregular status tend to stay away from any procedures and offices that may require registration, and not all destination localities are close to embassies or consulates where polling stations are usually set (de Ribas Guedes 2009). In 2006 there were 86,000 Brazilians abroad registered to vote in presidential elections, but only half of them did it. In 2010, numbers almost tripled: over 200,000 people registered. However, only 60% of those who were registered did actually cast a vote (SGEB 2012: 43). According to the Superior Electoral Court, registration continued to increase lately: in the last (2014) presidential election, 354,154 Brazilians abroad were registered. A few destinations gathered most of them: New York, Miami, Boston, Nagoya, Lisbon and London.[[16]](#endnote-16) Actually, only 141,501 cast their vote on 5 October 2014.[[17]](#endnote-17) Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admit that such low turnout discourages the implementation of further changes; opening more polling stations is a work in progress and often faces resistance from both consulates and the Superior Electoral Court.[[18]](#endnote-18)

The consulate in London, for instance, considers it too onerous to increase the number of polling stations given the uncertainty about the number of voters who would actually show up on election day.[[19]](#endnote-19) Leaders of migrant associations argue that sports and music are the main motivations for associational life for Brazilians in London; politics, including voting, is not a priority for economic migrants who struggle to make ends meet.[[20]](#endnote-20) At present, the emigrant community in this destination appears too fragmented and unable to overcome organizational problems (e.g., leadership capacity; internal disagreements) in order to make claims and/or set an agenda effectively. This contrasts with the experience of Brazilians in other major destinations and alert us of misleading generalizations: in some localities emigrants have organized forums leading to important documents that summarized their concerns and expectations and paved the way for new state-diaspora dialogues. Such was the case of the *Cartas* (Letters) issued after the meetings in de Lisbon in 2001, Boston in 2005, Brussels in 2007, and Barcelona in 2009 (see details in Milesi and Fantazini 2009). In particular, the role of the *Casa de Brasil de Lisboa* (a migrant association created in 1992) played a crucial role in articulating migrant demands with policymakers’ initiatives; it built on its leaders’ contacts within the PT (Worker’s Party) to gain visibility and access to policy circles both in Portugal and Brazil, thus contributing to broaden emigrants’ transnational activism (Feldman-Bianco 2011). However, in general social organization of Brazilians at most destinations is fragmented and volatile inasmuch as migrant participation in associations is low and intermittent, mostly relying on the activism of a few leaders. This, in combination with frequent replacement of officials at consulates and embassies, is detrimental to stable and solid relationships with state institutions.

Uruguay might be a good case to test the possibilities of inclusion through voting. At present, physical presence in the country at the moment of elections is a general condition to exercise this right, and registration in the National Civic Registry has to be effective. In early 2014, a special parliamentary commission met to study the possibility of extra-territorial voting again. A new bill has been awaiting parliamentary debate since 2015. The persistence of opposite views among political parties and upcoming elections appeared as the main obstacles to act promptly.[[21]](#endnote-21) Uruguayans abroad seem eager to vote from afar, perhaps more than other emigrant communities. Two social organizations with links to migrant associations and Consultation Councils (the *Ronda Cívica por el Voto*, today counting on the endorsement of 40 migrant associations from all around the world, and the Coordinator of Extra-territorial Vote) submitted a proposal to all political parties to encourage, in the short run, an interpretation of constitutional norms to reaffirm and facilitate voting rights of citizens living abroad and, within five years, the formation of a working group to elaborate a new bill and make changes effective by the following presidential elections in 2019. These groups have also been very active in organising forums and generating open debate in the country and abroad, as well as keeping the issue alive through social media. The Frente Amplio endorses these proposals which are posted in the governments’ official site[[22]](#endnote-22) but, like in Brazil and Argentina, mechanisms to include the diaspora in policymaking (e.g., consultation councils) are contested and not totally institutionalized. The stalemate on enfranchising reflects tensions. Thus far, both policy elites and society have hold a strong attachment to a territorially-based notion of the nation and citizenship, and this represents an obstacle to policy innovation. There are signs of a favourable disposition towards change in domestic public opinion, as illustrated by a recent opinion poll recording a 59.3% of agreement with extra-territorial voting proposals.[[23]](#endnote-23) This might help to gain momentum for migrant activism and legislators’ engagement in the near future, thus opening a door to unlock the stalemate in Congress.

In sum, states efforts to improve turnout have been limited in terms of tools and scope. Both political and academic analyses of the outcomes have been short of examining reasons other than the cost of voting and logistics. An integrated approach is needed because states might implement some measures to create incentives to vote but turnout is affected by several other variables, too. This suggests the need to incorporate the idea that expats’ response to opportunities to exercise voting rights is part and parcel of a broader, complex link with the country of origin and it reflects migrants’ ambiguous relationship with home politics. Some studies have started to document this for other emigrant communities of Latin American origin who exhibit lack interest in exercising voting rights and have an ambivalent attitude to voting, shaped not necessarily by political motivations alone but a mix of patriotism, nostalgia, daily pressing needs that supersede concerns with home politics, and negative attitudes about the institutions and/or politics that prompted their departure (e.g., Bermúdez and McIlwaine 2015; Boccagni 2011; Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011). Other analyses question that voting is driven by party politics or state outreach and propose to situate external voting in the context of the broader circulation of norms, practices, values, and institutional arrangements across home and host political communities (e.g., Boccagni and Ramírez 2013; Boccagni, Lafleur and Levitt 2015).

Extensive investigation might be necessary to extend the comparisons and the use of those lenses to the cases under examination here. For instance, the case of Argentines in Southern Europe confirms some assumptions on the importance of country-specific factors (Collyer 2014). The intention to break ties with homeland and blend with the receiving society seems to delineate an individualistic “strategy of invisibility” for this group. Given the socio-economic and educational profile of the emigrants that left Argentina in the 2000s, they were relatively well-equipped in terms of cultural and social capital to integrate fast and have an assertive and pro-active attitude. This helps explain their refusal to define their own condition as equal to other immigrants and reluctance to seek assistance: in contrast to other immigrant groups, they hardly resort to consulates or religious organizations for help and support (González Martínez 2009); they rely normally on family or professional networks and ties with locals (rather than co-nationals) to integrate quickly through the labour market (Golberg 2006:126); their associational life varies considerably across destinations and, overall, it remains fragmented and informal, revolving around specific claims (e.g., regularization of migrants’ status in Spain in the mid-2000s) and with little impetus towards coordination and the formation of broader, umbrella organizations or federations (Aparicio and Tornos 2004). Those few who are involved in associational efforts note state ambiguity and often resent officials’ lack a clear, comprehensive plan to develop and institutionalize links with expats. In addition, numerous personal testimonies of both migrant association leaders and ordinary migrants attest of their disenchantment with home politics and the negative imprint of the context of crisis at the time of emigration. Just as an example, a 24-year-old Argentine migrant living in Spain summarizes the generalized feeling of not having high expectations of changes at home: he talks of his emigration journey as an escape from a sinking ship, arguing: “Here I Spain, one can be fine notwithstanding the crisis. That is, earnings are low but we know where the horizon is and when things will start to improve. In Argentina, you never see the horizon.”[[24]](#endnote-24)

This example offers a contrast with the case of Uruguay, in which voting has become the central goal of mobilization for some emigrant groups. The author’s participant observation at the 4th Regional Meeting of Consultation Councils and personal communications with members of the diaspora confirm the highly symbolic component of this claim, especially for those who exiled under dictatorship.[[25]](#endnote-25) Councils and other associations are using the slogan *Uruguay somos todos* (Uruguay are we all) and *Todos tenemos derecho a votar* (we all have the right to vote) to make a clear link between national identity and political rights. Some of them would also argue that “voting is the umbilical cord” that ties them to the country. However, migrant activism is led by those who left several decades ago; associations do not manage to entice young migrants to join them, have had diverse objectives and capacity to survive over time, face very different challenges in each locality of residency today, and collaboration with political parties in the host and home countries is limited. These features would make an exercise of generalization futile.

Only exploring and comparing these insights in depth across all communities in several destinations might allow delignating empirically-grounded case studies and shed light on differences in relative engagement with home politics.

Finally, the evidence indicates that, when sending and receiving sites are geographically apart as it is for the LASC, transnational practices either state- or migrant-led are relatively weak (Actis 2009; Queirolo Palmas and Ambrosini 2007; Boccagni 2013, 2011). Long distance adds an extra cost to the mobilization of human and material resources that are necessary for sustained and substantive engagement. In spite of the advantages created by new technologies and more affordable transportation, physical encounters remain sporadic and communications are usually short and superficial, not including politics. Thus, emigrants may take part of transnational networks and help to reproduce them but this does not necessarily translate into strong attachments and incentives to engage in home politics.

Expanding Political Inclusion

The promise of inclusion may involve some other dimensions beyond voting in general elections. LASC countries have taken tepid steps in this realm, though. The emphasis has been on formal rather than substantive aspects of the franchise and other political initiatives face delays, opposition, and setbacks.

For instance, regarding dual citizenship, Argentina simply allows retention of citizenship in case of naturalization in another country. Dual citizenship is not formally incorporated in the Constitution but regulated in practice through bilateral agreements. Political rights are suspended for the time the individual resides in the adopted country or other and can be regained if s/he moves back home (Escobar 2007). Awarding political representation to the diaspora was not part of the policy innovations launched in 2003. The Province 25 Programme (created in 2004 by the Ministry of Interior) attempted to reconstruct links with expatriates and encouraged political participation, assuming that Argentines abroad represents the fourth largest province in terms of population.[[26]](#endnote-26) Formally, this programme still has as main goals guaranteeing the exercise of political rights, increasing participation in elections, and fostering a project to award migrants political representation in Congress. [[27]](#endnote-27) But in practice it has become simply a source of information and assistance to migrants; it relies on few resources and personnel and is subject to constant intra-state political disputes.[[28]](#endnote-28) Initial ideas did not receive enough endorsement in Congress and meetings with migrant representatives did not lead to the institutionalization of a mechanism of dialogue and collaboration like in other countries (e.g., consultation councils).[[29]](#endnote-29) The bills are not under discussion today. Thus, the project to award emigrants parliamentary representation has stalled.

Likewise, Brazilian officials do not see action in this realm as a priority. Some bills were sent to Congress to broaden the scope of voting rights beyond the presidency and to amend the National Constitution regarding representation (see details in de Ribas Guedes 2009). At present, Brazilians abroad do not enjoy any formal representation in Parliament. Senator Cristovam Buarque submitted a proposal in 2005 to create a special, extra-territorial jurisdiction (PEC 05/05). The Joint Parliamentary Commission supported the project, but recommended a previous broad debate within Congress and society at large. From the perspective of officials in charge of diaspora matters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this has not been an urgent or desirable goal. Consistent with their cautious and gradual approach to incorporating migrants’ input into policymaking since mid-1990s, they do not plan major innovations on this respect. Although they argue that the guiding force is today migrant empowering, they do not see political representation as a means. Regarding dual nationality, according to Article 12 of the Constitution, Brazilians may lose it if they acquire another nationality voluntarily through naturalization.[[30]](#endnote-30) However, given the Constitutional Amendment Number 3 of 7 June 1994, Brazil allows nationality retention if the foreign law (of the country of naturalization) recognizes the nationality of origin or naturalization was imposed by foreign law as a condition to remain in the territory of the country in question.[[31]](#endnote-31)

In Uruguay, the specific office in charge of diaspora issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is popularly known as the 20th Department, that is, the extra-territorial jurisdiction that symbolically represents Uruguayans abroad.[[32]](#endnote-32) However, expats’ political representation in Congress is not in the plans yet since it would require the approval of extra-territorial voting rights first. In general, legislation update on citizenship matters has been minimal. The National Constitution is not totally clear on the distinction between nationality and citizenship, and has undergone very few changes. In fact, nationality does not receive any explicit treatment (a gap that persists since the first 1830 Constitution), while citizenship is the focus of Section III of the current constitution, together with the suffrage. Citizenship-retention is allowed in case of naturalization in another country. In other words, inclusion is limited and tied to territory as effective access to citizenship right still requires action on the part of individuals: they have to be present in the country, take residency, and register (Sandonato de León 2007:437).

In sum, the tasks that lie ahead for expanding political inclusion might involve a) broadening voting rights to encompass all levels of elections (no under discussion yet); b) discussing political representation of expats in national legislative bodies, an idea that some migrant organizations entertain and has given place to the submission of bills but has not received endorsement by legislators in none of the countries under consideration here; c) regulating citizenship and nationality norms beyond the first generation of emigrants, a step recently taken by Uruguay with the approval of Law 19,362 of 2015, extending citizenship to foreign-born grandchildren of Uruguayans;[[33]](#endnote-33) d) in the case of Uruguay, ending with the regulation that eliminates from the electoral registry the names of voters who do not fulfil their duty in two consecutive elections, and e) promoting cultural change to re-conceptualise the nation beyond territorial borders, an implicit goal of all diaspora engagement policies that frames state-diaspora relations on transnational language and, yet, finds only partial confirmation in tangible results. As this work shows, there has been little progress in these dimensions of inclusion and, therefore, there is no enough evidence to be analysed. They suggest, though, promising venues for future research.

This study also shows that the current limits to the expansion of political inclusion run deeper than what political and academic diagnosis lead us to expect. Some country-specific factors and domestic politics are, indeed, contributing to redefine citizens’ rights beyond borders but still in a segmented, intermittent, and somehow contradictory fashion. he examples above suggest the need to further investigate: a) the slow and reluctant adaptation of bureaucratic and political practices to the needs and claims of societies that span across borders; b) the low permeability of the decision-making process to societal input –a factor that reinforces a top-down dynamic and somehow discourages migrant-led initiatives, and c) policy elites’ and society’s traditional notions of citizenship and nationality that closely tie territory, borders, membership to the nation, and exercise of political rights, thus precluding institutional and normative innovation. These factors account for a paradoxical gap between rhetoric and actual inclusion policies and suggest new venues for further research.

CONCLUSIONS

For various reasons, our conclusions are limited. Small samples obviously limit the scope of conclusions and generalizations. The policies and political processes analyzed here are a work in progress. They are part of a fluid, constantly changing political dynamic that defies definitive statements. Moreover, a comprehensive exploration of migrant political practices, definitions of forms of national membership, and reasons for relatively low engagement across all cases and destination sites would be necessary to assess the society-side of the paradox in detail. Yet, this study permits to infer that the limits to political inclusion identified above are mainly shaped by an incipient intermittent and often tense relationship between states and emigrants today. In other words, the LACS invite as to revisit to what extent states are well positioned to succeed in this area, migrants are indeed eager to engage in transnational politics, and policy reform leads to increasing diaspora engagement with home politics. These findings also suggest some policy-oriented lessons and venues for future research.

Indeed, this study demonstrates that LASC states are playing a crucial role in expanding or constraining the range of opportunities for emigrants’ mobilization to exercise political rights. Yet, state outreach efforts face internal (i.e., intra-bureaucratic) obstacles and seems contingent on a policymaking dynamic plagued by tensions. As in any transitional context, such dynamics incorporates new and old elements and practices. The drivers of policy innovation (i.e., the actors that have been able to give critical impetus to changes, such as presidents and a few top officials) act in an intermittent fashion and their leadership is not embedded in enough powerful or autonomous institutions that might take over the lead when necessary. In addition, lack of coordination, conflictive views and goals, frequent turnabout of public officials and political appointees, slow and reluctant adaptation to new bureaucratic practices, and intra-state disputes are a constant. This is certainly detrimental to policy consistency and sustain ability over time. Hence, we observe fragmented approaches to innovation or selective state interventions. Three decades of partial and uneven reform of the state underlies these problems in all cases. As a result, state efforts are constrained by state incapacity to transform its own internal structures and practices; post-neoliberal promises to enhance inclusion remain trapped between rhetoric and unmet expectations. This study suggests that existing analytical frameworks might benefit from opening the black box of the state beyond intra-state politics and levels of government relations to explore these tensions.

On the other side of the relationship, making inclusion effective finds little impetus due to the relatively low capacity of migrant associations to work as agenda setters, strong lobbyists or even veto actors. Selective state interventions mirrored fragmented diasporas struggling to organise effectively across long distances. Moreover, existing studies have neglected a subjective, difficult to measure factor: migrants’ views of political elites and offices. In these cases, we observe long-standing distrust of politicians and state institutions. The literature often assumes that all/most migrants, indeed, want to be “reached out” and included. However, for expats from the LASC distrust of the state is a generalized sentiment, rooted in a long-standing crisis of political representation, unmet social expectations, and memories of the political and economic crises that prompted emigration. This may discourage further engagement. The call to contribute to the country of origin’s development may resonate with feelings and aspirations of citizens abroad (including a vague, difficult to measure sense of patriotism and nostalgia), but it does not overcome the uneasiness caused by a traumatic record of state abuses and political disillusions. This work suggests that further investigation of the impact of this factor on political engagement might push the discussion further.

From a policy-oriented perspective, some lessons can be identified. The chances of seeing bold responses to address the inclusion deficit are meagre. In Argentina and Brazil emigration ceased to be considered an urgent matter and emigration policy is not the focus of governmental attention today. Other migration problems re-focused governmental attention, such as immigration in Argentina and refugees in Brazil. All three countries have faced new demands coming from returnees in the last few years. To some extent, the stabilization of migration outflows also moved emigration out of the spotlight in all of them, and notably in Uruguay. As it is explained below, emigration does not resonate with the general public and has not found a place in political debates or electoral campaigns. There is no apparent risk of policy reversal, though. Enfranchising expats seems to be anchored by an ideational regional consensus that makes dramatic changes unlikely (Margheritis 2016). Yet, post-neoliberalism has been recently challenged in Brazil and Argentina, exposing the contradictions of such model and creating uncertainty about policy developments. Hence, there are no signs of immediate further innovation.

In addition to the state- and society-related factors above, this study suggests that some other contextual conditions would have to change for effective and substantial inclusion to happen. For instance, states may need to explore multiple partnerships. Political parties may be obvious collaborators but they have had very little experience with constituencies residing outside of the territory, let alone in distant extra-hemispheric destinations. Learning may happen in this front, though. If that is not the case, collaboration with other actors who enjoy more credibility and rapport with emigrants may be fruitful (e.g., churches, religious organizations, and non-governmental organizations). These institutions have been crucial in offering general assistance; providing advice, space, and resources for migrant organization and claim-making; channeling demands; advocating for the defense of migrant rights, and supporting and facilitating relations with public offices. Likewise, collaboration with local authorities in receiving countries may be necessary to improve the logistics of extra-territorial voting or the implementation of dual nationality norms beyond the first generation of migrants.

Moreover, the nature and implications of the issue have to be recognized. Thus far, emigration has not resonated enough in domestic public debates. In Latin America in general, it has gathered attention temporarily. Not even in cases with large diaspora (e.g., Ecuador, Uruguay, Mexico), emigration has been a constant, high priority concern. Specialized offices in charge of diaspora affairs do not tend to play a high profile role in political and public debates. Therefore, emigrants’ needs, rights, and claims find limited echo in society. This is compounded by old criticisms and negative views towards those who left, thus raising limited support for their cause and for state investment in enhancing their rights.

Such intermittent visibility supports the idea that enfranchising expats can only advance through cycles of variable intensity of commitment and action. There has not been (and it is not likely to be) a progressive path towards increased engagement with expats in the LASC. In the absence of emigration crises or a dramatic increase in migrant mobilization, it is plausible to expect the continuity of fluid, selective interactions between states and diasporas with variable levels of both parties’ engagement. From an analytical and policy-oriented viewpoint, this indicates the need to explore the possibilities of overcoming the inclusion paradox through cycles of intense state involvement and bureaucratic inertia that may (or may not) converge with cycles of involvement and withdrawal in migrant activism and political mobilization.

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1. Uruguayans abroad are estimated at around 600,000 people, that is, 18% of the total population in 2006. Main destinations include Argentina, Brazil, the USA, and Spain. Brazil’s emigrant community is estimated at 1% to 2% of the total population, that is, around 3 million of people. Top destinations include the USA, Paraguay, Japan, the UK, Portugal, Italy and Spain. Around 1 million Argentines reside abroad and this represented 2.4% of the total population in 2010, mainly distributed in Spain, the USA, and some Latin American countries. For details on the emigration phenomenon in each country and related policies, see OIM 2010, 2011, and 2012. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Various rounds of field research were conducted in the three countries and selected destinations in Europe. The research strategy mostly relied on qualitative methods such as analysis of texts, elite interviewing, and participant observation. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. For the distinction between populism and neo-populism in Latin America, see Roberts 2007. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. During the period under consideration, the governments in office in the three countries were part of the so-called “pink tide” or “leftist turn” in the region (Weyland et al. 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011, among others). Although their radical orientation is debatable, these administrations converged around the idea of bringing back the state to compensate for the “excesses” of the market under neoliberalism, promoting a socio-political agenda based on human rights considerations, and cooperating in the construction of regional citizenship. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. The paradox analysed here becomes more evident if one extend the lenses beyond the selected cases and policies. Overall, migration policy in Latin America today is plagued by tensions. Looking at the entire set of immigration laws, political discourses, agreed regional norms, diaspora engagement policies, and border control policies across the Latin America, we observe contradictory trends: rhetoric emphasis on free mobility, universal rights of migrants, anti-racism, and anti-criminalization of migration together with restrictions to immigrants of certain ethnic origin and security-oriented measures to curb irregular immigration (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. While some countries have applied draconian neoliberal measures in a relatively short period of time (e.g., Argentina in the 1990s), others have taken a slow, cautious, and selective path (e.g., Brazil and Uruguay). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. The 1985 transition was managed and, to a considerable extent, graduated by the military in Brazil, leading to open, free elections only in 1989. The transition was negotiated between the military and political elites in the case of Uruguay in 1984/1985. It was encouraged by the debacle and discredit of the military regime in Argentina in 1983. For details, see O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1993. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. See <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L4737.htm>, accessed 15 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Cf. http://elecciones.corteelectoral.gub.uy/20091025/SSPMain.asp, accessed 6 September 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. See <https://medios.presidencia.gub.uy/legal/2016/resoluciones/08/cons_min_388.pdf>, accessed 2 September 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Since the return to democracy in Latin America in the 1980s, institutional crises have been recurrent and societies have exhibited a significant disconnect between political elites and constituencies. Party identities and allegiances have become more fluid than ever before. Lack of confidence on political parties and leaders has been a constant since then, as well as disappointment with the performance of democratic institutions and low confidence in state capacities (see database at www.latinobarometro.org). As the 1995-2015 report puts it: “This is the decade of citizens; it seems that they are saying: too little, too late” (Latinobarómetro 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. See <http://www.elecciones.gob.ar/articulo_princ.php?secc=2&sub_secc=9>, accessed 3 May 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Interviews with Gabriel Servetto and Nora Pérez Vichich, Directorate of International Migrations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, June 13, 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. See <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1827647-massa-apunta-al-votante-en-el-exterior>, accessed 17 March 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. See <http://www.iprofesional.com/notas/221611-Cuntos-argentinos-que-estn-en-otras-partes-del-mundo-pueden-votar->, accessed 13 November 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. See http://english.tse.jus.br/noticias-tse-en/2014/Agosto/tse-authorizes-electoral-sections-abroad-outside-embassies, accessed 28 March 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Cf. <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2014-10/brazilian-voter-turnout-abroad-63>, accessed 28 March 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Interview with Maria Luiza Ribeiro Lopes da Silva, Brasileiros No Exterior Office, Ministry of Foreign Affai, Brasilia, May 27, 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Interview with Marcio Guimaraes, Secretary Vice-Consul, Head of the Press and Communication Office, London, 26 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Interview with Carlos Mellinger, President, Casa do Brasil em Londres, London, 26 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. See http://www.d20.org.uy/IMG/pdf/LA\_DIARIA-Carta\_al\_Presidente--.pdf. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. See http://www.d20.org.uy/Proyecto-de-ley-y-Comunicado. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. See <http://www.uruguayos.fr/La-opinion-publica-uruguaya-favorable-al-voto-en-la-distancia>, accessed 2 September 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Online testimonies, Alejandro Rolandi, available at <https://argentinossiempreshay.wordpress.com/2009/11/29/expatriados-en-barcelona/>**, accessed 14 May 2016.** [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. The event was held at the Embassy of Uruguay in Paris on 28-30 August 2016 and gathered around 50 members of Consultation Councils of Uruguayans Abroad and related migrant associations from France, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, USA, Norway, Switzerland and Germany. See briefing at <http://www.mrree.gub.uy/frontend/page?1,dgacv,DGACVAmpliacionVinculacion,O,es,0,PAG;CONC;2013;21;D;4o-encuentro-regional-de-consejos-consultivos-del-departamento-20-en-paris-34025;2;PAG>, accessed 2 September 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. The immediate goals of the programme had to do with facilitating certain procedures (ID and passport renewals, clean police record certificates, etc.) and increasing expats’ participation in national elections. From the point of the government, the latter was a key component of the programme. In the long run, the programme sought other goals too, such as the homogenization of the institutional format of emigrants’ associations and the allocation of some seats in the Congress for expatriates’ representation. In other words, in policymakers’ view, emigrants’ political inclusion was at the core of the programme, although such goal is today dormant. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. A bill to create the “Exterior” (extra-territorial) District and grant emigrants parliamentary representation was submitted in 2009. See http://boletinargentino.blogspot.com/2009/12/argentina-creacion-del-distrito.html, accessed October 16, 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. See http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/provincias/p25\_mision, accessed 12 April 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. A bill to create councils of residents abroad and a general council of emigration was sent to Congress in 2004 but it has not been approved yet. See http://www.diputados.gob.ar/proyectos/proyecto.jsp?id=49684, accessed 16 April 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. See <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/BRZ_Constitution_as%20enacted_ORIGINAL%20LANGUAGE.pdf>, accessed 8 May 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. See <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/Emendas/ECR/ecr3.htm#art12%C2%A74ii>, accessed 8 May 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Uruguay’s territory is divided into 19 departments or administrative jurisdictions. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. See <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1589-new-law-grants-citizenship-to-grandchildren-of-uruguayan-citizens-who-reisde-abroad>, accessed 2 September 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)