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The fining system in the enforcement of EU competition law: a time for reassessment?

The fining system in the enforcement of EU competition law: a time for reassessment?
The fining system in the enforcement of EU competition law: a time for reassessment?
For over more than 50 years the EU Commission has used a deterrence approach in the imposition of fines to enforce EU competition law and pursue the EU competition policy. Although, it has adopted many other instruments to enhance its detection rate and provide more efficient and forward-looking outcomes in pro of competition; the aim to deter in order to achieve prevention has not changed. Nevertheless, empirical evidence has shown that the optimal deterrence framework based on the legal-economic theory is far from even deterring let alone prevent.

Criminology and behavioural economics have provided new insights that call for the adoption of a more realistic approach that seeks to elevate the perception of certainty of punishment by increasing the informal costs for individuals and undertakings’ subunits who can prevent competition law violations in the first place. In this regard, a compliance approach that seeks to elevate the immediate costs perception and create a monitoring network that can effectively influence social norms that constraint behaviour, is able to result in a culture of compliance that makes non-compliance a less likely option. By embracing instruments such as compliance programmes, designation of external monitors and availability of whistleblowing rewards among others, the social internalization of compliance norms is feasible and thus, prevention possible.
University of Southampton
Leines Jimenez, Cesar
2e570c46-2579-491c-98f2-7e5338139cfb
Leines Jimenez, Cesar
2e570c46-2579-491c-98f2-7e5338139cfb
Todd, Paul
ccd4b3f3-16ae-474f-90ac-bba7d8bba9fc

Leines Jimenez, Cesar (2016) The fining system in the enforcement of EU competition law: a time for reassessment? University of Southampton, Southampton Law School, Doctoral Thesis, 456pp.

Record type: Thesis (Doctoral)

Abstract

For over more than 50 years the EU Commission has used a deterrence approach in the imposition of fines to enforce EU competition law and pursue the EU competition policy. Although, it has adopted many other instruments to enhance its detection rate and provide more efficient and forward-looking outcomes in pro of competition; the aim to deter in order to achieve prevention has not changed. Nevertheless, empirical evidence has shown that the optimal deterrence framework based on the legal-economic theory is far from even deterring let alone prevent.

Criminology and behavioural economics have provided new insights that call for the adoption of a more realistic approach that seeks to elevate the perception of certainty of punishment by increasing the informal costs for individuals and undertakings’ subunits who can prevent competition law violations in the first place. In this regard, a compliance approach that seeks to elevate the immediate costs perception and create a monitoring network that can effectively influence social norms that constraint behaviour, is able to result in a culture of compliance that makes non-compliance a less likely option. By embracing instruments such as compliance programmes, designation of external monitors and availability of whistleblowing rewards among others, the social internalization of compliance norms is feasible and thus, prevention possible.

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Published date: December 2016
Organisations: University of Southampton, Southampton Law School

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 404886
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/404886
PURE UUID: d0211d6f-a73b-4d02-addc-20c1d2302b09

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Date deposited: 18 Feb 2017 00:23
Last modified: 13 Mar 2019 20:18

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Contributors

Author: Cesar Leines Jimenez
Thesis advisor: Paul Todd

University divisions

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