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Photographic phenomenology as cognitive phenomenology

Photographic phenomenology as cognitive phenomenology
Photographic phenomenology as cognitive phenomenology
Photographic pictorial experience is thought to have a peculiar phenomenology to it, one that fails to accompany the pictorial experiences one has before so-called ‘hand-made’ pictures. I present a theory that explains this in terms of a common factor shared by beliefs formed on the basis of photographic pictorial experience and beliefs formed on the basis of ordinary, face-to-face, perceptual experience: the having of a psychologically immediate, non-inferential etiology. This theory claims that photographic phenomenology has less to do with photographs themselves, or the pictorial experiences they elicit, and is a matter of our cognitive response to those experiences. I illustrate this theory’s benefits: it is neutral on the nature of photography and our folk-conception of photography; it is consistent with photographic phenomenology’s being contingent; and it accounts for our experiences of hyper-realistic hand-made pictures. Extant theories of photographic phenomenology falter on one or more of these issues.
0007-0904
71-89
Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel
23ff735a-7f44-437f-9f42-d2002cf8de8a
Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel
23ff735a-7f44-437f-9f42-d2002cf8de8a

Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel (2015) Photographic phenomenology as cognitive phenomenology. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 55 (1), 71-89. (doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayu098).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Photographic pictorial experience is thought to have a peculiar phenomenology to it, one that fails to accompany the pictorial experiences one has before so-called ‘hand-made’ pictures. I present a theory that explains this in terms of a common factor shared by beliefs formed on the basis of photographic pictorial experience and beliefs formed on the basis of ordinary, face-to-face, perceptual experience: the having of a psychologically immediate, non-inferential etiology. This theory claims that photographic phenomenology has less to do with photographs themselves, or the pictorial experiences they elicit, and is a matter of our cognitive response to those experiences. I illustrate this theory’s benefits: it is neutral on the nature of photography and our folk-conception of photography; it is consistent with photographic phenomenology’s being contingent; and it accounts for our experiences of hyper-realistic hand-made pictures. Extant theories of photographic phenomenology falter on one or more of these issues.

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Published date: January 2015
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 405204
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/405204
ISSN: 0007-0904
PURE UUID: 99d5c8db-e1e4-4bf7-96c3-96363c75bc8f

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Date deposited: 30 Jan 2017 12:01
Last modified: 15 Jul 2019 19:43

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