Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel (2014) Belief, experience and the act of picture-making. Philosophical Explorations, 17 (1), 1-14. (doi:10.1080/13869795.2013.814802).
Abstract
Which mental states are involved in representing the world via pictures? According to the Belief-Involving View, belief is necessary. According to the Mere Experience View, belief is dispensable; one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts, so the mere experience of an object is sufficient. I examine Dominic Lopes' defence of, and Berys Gaut's objections to, the Mere Experience View. I argue Gaut's objections are unsuccessful since they (i) require the defender of the Mere Experience View to endorse a theory of action that is optional, at best; (ii) undermine Gaut's own positive claims and (iii) are question-begging. I argue that the real problem with the Mere Experience View is that it is too permissive in circumscribing situations in which one can depict objects. I further argue, contra Lopes, that the fact that one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts supplies no argument for or against either view.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Identifiers
Catalogue record
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.