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Belief, experience and the act of picture-making

Belief, experience and the act of picture-making
Belief, experience and the act of picture-making
Which mental states are involved in representing the world via pictures? According to the Belief-Involving View, belief is necessary. According to the Mere Experience View, belief is dispensable; one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts, so the mere experience of an object is sufficient. I examine Dominic Lopes' defence of, and Berys Gaut's objections to, the Mere Experience View. I argue Gaut's objections are unsuccessful since they (i) require the defender of the Mere Experience View to endorse a theory of action that is optional, at best; (ii) undermine Gaut's own positive claims and (iii) are question-begging. I argue that the real problem with the Mere Experience View is that it is too permissive in circumscribing situations in which one can depict objects. I further argue, contra Lopes, that the fact that one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts supplies no argument for or against either view.
1386-9795
1-14
Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel
23ff735a-7f44-437f-9f42-d2002cf8de8a
Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel
23ff735a-7f44-437f-9f42-d2002cf8de8a

Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel (2014) Belief, experience and the act of picture-making. Philosophical Explorations, 17 (1), 1-14. (doi:10.1080/13869795.2013.814802).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Which mental states are involved in representing the world via pictures? According to the Belief-Involving View, belief is necessary. According to the Mere Experience View, belief is dispensable; one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts, so the mere experience of an object is sufficient. I examine Dominic Lopes' defence of, and Berys Gaut's objections to, the Mere Experience View. I argue Gaut's objections are unsuccessful since they (i) require the defender of the Mere Experience View to endorse a theory of action that is optional, at best; (ii) undermine Gaut's own positive claims and (iii) are question-begging. I argue that the real problem with the Mere Experience View is that it is too permissive in circumscribing situations in which one can depict objects. I further argue, contra Lopes, that the fact that one can depict objects for which one does not possess concepts supplies no argument for or against either view.

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More information

Accepted/In Press date: April 2013
e-pub ahead of print date: 26 July 2013
Published date: March 2014
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 405218
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/405218
ISSN: 1386-9795
PURE UUID: 4d614198-3261-4adc-9f00-944b490f3330

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Date deposited: 30 Jan 2017 13:53
Last modified: 15 Jul 2019 19:43

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