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Kind properties and the metaphysics of perception: towards impure relationalism

Kind properties and the metaphysics of perception: towards impure relationalism
Kind properties and the metaphysics of perception: towards impure relationalism
A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception is between those who hold that perception is a detection relation of sensory awareness (naïve realists) and those who hold that it is representational state akin to belief (representationalists). Another key debate is between those who claim that we can perceive natural or artifactual kind properties, e.g.?‘being a tomato’, ‘being a doorknob’, etc. and those who hold we cannot. The current consensus is that these debates are entirely unrelated. I argue that this consensus is wrong: the perception of natural or artifactal kinds favours representationalism. Naïve realists who wish to accommodate such perception should embrace a disunified metaphysics of perception, one that combines relational and representational events; call such a view ‘impure relationalism.’
0279-0750
487-509
Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel
23ff735a-7f44-437f-9f42-d2002cf8de8a
Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel
23ff735a-7f44-437f-9f42-d2002cf8de8a

Cavedon-Taylor, Daniel (2015) Kind properties and the metaphysics of perception: towards impure relationalism. [in special issue: The Disunity of Perception] Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96 (4), 487-509. (doi:10.1111/papq.12112).

Record type: Article

Abstract

A central debate in contemporary philosophy of perception is between those who hold that perception is a detection relation of sensory awareness (naïve realists) and those who hold that it is representational state akin to belief (representationalists). Another key debate is between those who claim that we can perceive natural or artifactual kind properties, e.g.?‘being a tomato’, ‘being a doorknob’, etc. and those who hold we cannot. The current consensus is that these debates are entirely unrelated. I argue that this consensus is wrong: the perception of natural or artifactal kinds favours representationalism. Naïve realists who wish to accommodate such perception should embrace a disunified metaphysics of perception, one that combines relational and representational events; call such a view ‘impure relationalism.’

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Accepted/In Press date: December 2014
Published date: 23 December 2015
Organisations: Philosophy

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Local EPrints ID: 405220
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/405220
ISSN: 0279-0750
PURE UUID: fdf61ed7-5bc2-40f5-89d0-2116e70b4c50

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Date deposited: 30 Jan 2017 13:56
Last modified: 20 Jul 2019 05:25

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