An ‘undeliberate determinacy’? Changing migration strategies of Polish migrants in the UK in times of Brexit

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In this paper we investigate the changes in Polish migrants’ so-called habitus of ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ as consequence of the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union. The paper reformulates classical questions regarding migrants’ plans to remain in the host country or to leave, in a ‘rights-based’ framework, where we consider migrants attitudes towards ‘civic integration’ measures such as permanent residence and naturalisation. Based on the quantitative analysis of original survey data we investigate the factors behind Polish migrants’ migration strategies, and we argue that basic socioeconomic and demographic factors are inadequate, on their own terms, to explain future migration and civic integration plans. Instead, we find that aspects such as interest in and awareness of one’s rights, as well as anxieties about the future are stronger determinants.

Keywords: Polish migrants, strategies, Brexit, United Kingdom

# Introduction

The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union – or ‘Brexit’, as it became colloquially known – raises various theoretical and empirical questions for migration scholars studying what less than a decade ago was still an emerging ‘new European migration system’ (Favell 2008), in which the ‘free movement of people’ served as the main driving force behind ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ (Mau and Verwiebe 2014). In the UK the largest single national group among the new arrivals were Polish citizens (White 2011; Burrell 2009), and early research into this new migratory phenomenon has identified transience and flexibility as one of its main characteristics (Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007). However, concomitantly with their settlement in the UK, research on Polish migrants over the past decade has increasingly emphasized the ideals and desires of achieving a settled, ‘normal’ life (Galasińska and Kozłowska 2009; Lopez Rodriguez 2010; McGhee, Heath, and Trevena 2012). The UK’s departure from the European Union and the inevitable change in the legal status of resident Polish nationals – whatever particular shape that will take – will unavoidably impact on the two contrasting trends of ‘transience’ and ‘settlement’.

In this paper we provide an early assessment of how ‘Brexit’ affects Polish migrants in the UK, focusing specifically on the question of migration plans and strategies, which has been a core theme in the research literature from the very early post-Accession studies to the present (Drinkwater and Garapich 2015; Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007; Burrell 2010). As Burrell (2010, 299) noted, Polish migrants have long constituted ‘a diverse, not entirely predictable, population, all existing within the same economic framework but formulating different strategies of migration and return’ which will most likely ‘change over time’. The Brexit vote has introduced an additional element of uncertainty to the complexity of Polish migrants’ active and passive plans and strategies, and the aim of this paper is primarily to further explore such strategies in the context of Brexit. To this end, we present results from a quantitative analysis of data obtained from a purposefully-designed and ‘targeted’ online survey carried out in the months leading up to the EU Referendum. The survey had the broader goal of assessing different EU migrants’ opinions on the Referendum, their future plans and coping strategies in the event of a potential Brexit vote, as well as their attitudes towards British citizenship. The focus on the latter was driven by the already noticeable surge in applications for British citizenship by EU nationals, stirred by fears regarding the UK’s uncertain future EU membership (McGhee and Piętka-Nykaza 2016; Ryan 2015). In this paper we focus on a sample of 894 Polish respondents. This allows us to draw closer parallels with the existing literature, and provides more reliable grounds for extrapolation to a Polish migrant community which is currently the largest non-British national group in the UK, estimated at 916,000 individuals, and making up 29% of all EU nationals living in the country (ONS 2016).

This paper, therefore, makes a contribution to the literature on migrants’ intentions and strategies, while breaking new ground in our understanding of the effects of Brexit as perceived by the UK’s Polish migrant community. First, we examine more closely the literature on migration intentions, with a particular focus on the concept of ‘intentional unpredictability’, or ‘deliberate indeterminacy’, which has been repeatedly highlighted as one of the most distinguishing characteristics of mobility throughout the first decade of post-Enlargement Polish migration (Eade 2007; McGhee, Travena, and Heath 2015). We then discuss our data and methods before moving on to our analysis and findings, and contextualising the latter in the existing scholarship.

# Polish migration and the habitus of ‘indeterminacy’

A key theme in the literature on post-Accession migration to the UK is concerned with the new migrants’ intended length of stay and their plans with regard to either returning to their ‘home’ country or settlement in the country of destination (Burrell 2010). The interest in ‘return migration’ appeared mainly as part of wider sets of research questions, and has gained significant complexity over the years not least due to the proliferation of interest in different modalities of transnational belonging (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Ryan 2011; Heath, McGhee, and Trevena 2011). The ease of travel and communication afforded by the so-called ‘time-space compression’ (Harvey 1989), complemented in Europe by the policy regime of free movement and equal treatment of EU citizens, allows for more opportunities not only for travelling but also for ‘living transnationally’, and this necessarily engenders novel mobility habita (Viry and Kaufmann 2015; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004).

One such ‘mobility habitus’, in the context of post-Enlargement Polish migration to the UK, is the ‘intentional unpredictability’ of many recent migrants with regard to their future plans and their tendency to ‘keep their options deliberately open’ (Eade 2007, 34). Whether referred to as ‘intentional unpredictability’, ‘liquid migration’ or ‘deliberate indeterminacy’, this disposition was evidence that rather than being ‘immigrants’, Central Eastern European labour migrants can be more accurately described as ‘regional free movers’ (Snel, Faber, and Engbersen 2015, 6; cf. Favell 2008). It is not least owing to the mobility habitus of indeterminacy that the study of return migration, particularly in the case of intra-EU mobility, has remained somewhat ‘problematic’ (Parutis 2014, 159). The discrepancy between planned and actual return has become a truism in migration research, and it is also true of Polish migrants (Anwar 1979; Ryan 2015). Qualitative studies were successful in identifying some of the main factors which have an influence on migrants’ strategies. The role of familial obligations with regard to children, grand-children, elderly parents and other relatives in the host and home countries (McGhee, Heath, and Trevena 2013; White 2011; White and Ryan 2008), of childbearing decisions (Janta 2013), the length of stay in the destination country (Ryan 2015) and the level of social integration and transnationalism (Haas and Fokkema 2011) in particular have been shown to strongly influence migrants’ decisions to settle or re-migrate. A few studies have recently attempted to examine these various factors based on primary quantitative data, and to disentangle the relationships between migration strategies and migrants’ indeterminacy habitus. Snel, Faber, and Engbersen (2015), for instance, examined the return intentions of three EU national groups (Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian) in the Netherlands using survey data (N=654). They focused on disclosing the factors which determine the self-declared planned length of stay in the Netherlands. The authors treat migrants’ answers that they ‘do not know’ for how much longer they plan to remain in the host country as a manifestation of intentional unpredictability. In their findings, one’s involvement in transnational activities significantly reduced the chances of migrants wanting to settle permanently, while their level of socio-cultural integration significantly increased their intention to settle. Age was also a factor increasing the likelihood of settlement, while the influence of gender, education and socio-economic status produced mixed results: males were more likely to plan shorter stays of up to two years; those with medium or high educational levels were more likely than those with lower qualifications to stay up to ten years only; and labour market participation seemed not to have any influence on migrants’ plans.

Drinkwater and Garapich (2015) adopt a similar study design to investigate the migration strategies of Poles in the UK (N=700). Building on their earlier research on ‘intentional unpredictability’ (Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007), their specific aim was to develop a new typology of Polish migrants in light of their planned stay in the UK, factoring in changes in their intentions over time. The authors also treated those who did not know for how long they were planning to stay, as exponents of the habitus of deliberate indeterminacy. Overall, of the respondents in their sample, 11% intended to stay in the UK permanently upon arrival, and 18% felt the same at the time of the interview, while 32% and 44% were indeterminate at the time of arrival and at the time of the interview, respectively. Their analysis shows that the length of stay in the UK determines whether migrants change their intentions.

These two studies are significant in that they attempt to operationalise the concept of ‘deliberate indeterminacy’, and examine it in relation to other strategies and changes in plans over time. However, they remain constrained by self-declared migration intentions at a specific point in time, and the different contributions of each paper are yet to be integrated within a unifying framework. As a consequence, our knowledge of how migration plans change over time and what factors determine this change remains to be synthesised with the rather inconclusive findings regarding the determinants of particular plans and strategies at given points in time. Furthermore, there is a lack of consideration in the broader literature of the relationship between migrants’ self-declared preferences and the constellation of rights and options available to them. At the same time, we now must consider ‘Brexit’ as a new factor which potentially affects migrants’ plans and strategies. Based on the sporadic evidence in this respect in the recent literature (Ryan 2015; McGhee and Piętka-Nykaza 2016) we can assume that the outcome of the referendum on EU membership is likely to disrupt Polish migrants’ reported habitus of ‘deliberate indeterminacy’.

In response to the gaps in current knowledge identified in the literature review, our aim in this paper is to reframe questions regarding migration strategies and their determinants within a more focused ‘rights-based’ approach, while also addressing the latest political development that potentially affects the lives and future plans of Polish migrants in the UK. Such an approach acknowledges that long-term plans are changeable and hard to determine (Burrell 2010; Parutis 2014), and also that ‘indeterminacy’ and settlement can both be manifestations of different forms of transnational living (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Ryan 2011; White and Ryan 2008). Consequently, we propose to examine the various plans and strategies in respect to a medium-term timeframe and we consider possible actions (e.g. applying for permanent residence or British citizenship) that would expand migrants’ constellation of civic rights. Given the legal framework which applies to EU citizens residing in the UK, civic-integration-related strategies (i.e. acquiring the official status of permanent resident or British citizen) over a period of 5 years satisfy such criteria.[[1]](#endnote-1) Our aim here is therefore to find out what factors contribute towards determining the migration and ‘civic integration’ strategies of Polish migrants in the UK (1) over the medium-term and (2) under the conditions created by the UK’s vote to leave the European Union.

# Data and Methods

## Study design and data structure

To answer our research questions, we analyse data originating from a purposefully designed ‘targeted’ online survey (Polish-only sample N=894). The purpose of the survey was to assess the attitudes of EU migrants towards the Referendum on EU membership, its effect on their lives and their strategies in case of a vote for Brexit, and thus contribute to the public debate on the issue. The online survey data collection method was chosen with the aim to obtain a geographically dispersed large sample under strict time constraints (see Sue and Ritter 2012, 10-1).

The survey was created using software designed by [information withheld]. In order to achieve greater representativeness among the respondents, the survey was translated into Polish.[[2]](#endnote-2) Data collection was undertaken in the four months leading up to the EU Referendum; the questionnaire was launched on 11 March 2016 and closed at midnight on 23rd June 2016 (i.e. the date of the EU Referendum). The main body of the questionnaire contained a total of 194 items, and it took respondents 25 minutes on average to complete (min=6, max=111, standard deviation=13.9).

To avoid the respondent- and coverage biases often considered as ‘innate’ to online surveys (Couper 2000; Sue and Ritter 2012), we used an active data collection method, directly targeting members of Polish online communities and readers of UK-based Polish language online media portals. The social networking site Facebook served as the largest participant recruitment platform, where we advertised the survey in twenty-one Polish-language ‘groups’. Two large UK-based Polish online newspapers have also helped to distribute the survey through their websites and official Facebook groups. Such strategies of ‘appropriate targeting’ have been proven particularly successful in research with hard-to-reach populations, and generally recommended as good practice for online data collection (Miller and Sønderlund 2010; Temple and Brown 2011). Furthermore, recent migration research has shown that migrants are increasingly less affected by ‘coverage bias’, as access to internet is broadening while their involvement with the so-called ‘online migration industry’ is extensive (Dekker and Engbersen 2014; Moreh 2014).

In order to assess the representativeness of our collected data, *Table 1* compares the personal characteristics of our sample with those of the 2015–2016 Annual Population Survey (APS), which is itself based on the Labour Force Survey, and is the main source of information regarding the number and attributes of migrants in the UK.

### Table 1 around here

As detailed in *Table 1*, females are clearly overrepresented in our sample (66%) compared to the APS, as are migrants in the 40–49 age group, those who had been living in the UK for less than 5 years, and those with secondary and postgraduate educational qualifications. However, in respect to educational qualifications and length of residence in the UK the APS itself is unrepresentative of the Polish migrant population, often failing to record foreign qualifications adequately and not accounting for migrants with less than one year of residence.

In respect to the core personal and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents in our sample we can further see that the average age is 38, and the average time spent in the UK is 7 years and 2 months, with 47% of our participants having been in the UK for 5 to 10 years. Those living in England constitute 80% of the sample, with a very broad distribution by counties and those in London making up less than 6.5 per cent of the entire sample (not displayed in *Table 1*). Concerning their relationship status, 52% of the respondents were married or in a civil partnership, and 16% were in unofficial long-term relationships and cohabitating. About 40% had a secondary degree and 42% some post-secondary degree. Regarding respondents’ economic activity and socio-economic status, 61% were employed full-time, 17% part-time, 9% were self-employed, and 13% were inactive; of those in employment, 18% worked in professional occupations in the highest two groups of the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification, 34% in technical and semi-routine occupations, and 33% in routine occupations reflecting lower socio-economic status. As seen in *Table 1*, the major differences compared to the APS sample are in respect to those inactive (19% in the APS), presumably due to the higher proportion of elderly respondents, and those in higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations (8% in our sample compared to 3% in the APS), which parallels the already mentioned difference in the share of those with postgraduate qualifications.

## Methods

We undertake a combination of bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses on the survey data described above. Our aim is to identify and explain the factors which potentially determine the migration and civic integration plans of Polish migrants in the medium-term, and as a short-term reaction to the Brexit vote.

We first examine bivariate associations between migrants’ plans for the next 5 years (5-year plans) and various demographic, socio-economic, interpersonal, migration- and civic status-related, and attitudinal variables. Given the nature of our variables, we employed Chi-square tests of independence as a general measure of association, followed up by measures of associational strength and directionality (employing Cramer’s V, and Goodman and Kruskal tau tests). Some relevant results of this analysis are included in *Table A1* in the Appendix. This preliminary analysis enabled us to identify the potentially most relevant predictor variables and the internal structure of associations. Based on this, we undertake a multinomial logistic regression analysis on a polytomous variable describing our participants’ 5-year plans. As a next step, we also run the multinomial regression model on a variable describing the respondents’ planned actions in case of a Brexit outcome (Brexit action). This analysis examines the factors determining plans not in a time-frame confined to 5-years, but as an indication of how Polish migrants confront their ‘immediate context of action’ (Stones 2005, 166). This will also provide an initial estimation of what we conceptualise as the ‘Brexit effect’ and discuss elsewhere [reference withheld]. The statistical analysis was performed using the IBM SPSS 23 software package.

Decisions regarding the variables to be included and the comparative structure of the regression model were made on the basis of both theoretical and data-driven considerations. Thus, some basic demographic and socio-economic variables were included even though they did not significantly correlate with our dependent variable or contributed to the model, yet they needed to be accounted for in relation to other variables (e.g. gender, due to the overrepresentation of women in our data). Some variables were excluded or recoded due to low counts in certain categories, and ­– where it also aided explanation – initial variables were recoded based on the internal structure of the adjusted standardised residuals in their association with the dependent variable (see *Table A1* in Appendix). For our theoretical aims, since we were mostly interested in understanding how migrants formulate their actions in respect to their current status and their options within a rights-based framework, we chose as the reference category of our dependent variable the one which can be most closely associated with the habitus of ‘indeterminacy’, as we detail in the following section describing the structure of our measurement variables.

## Measurement variables

The two main survey questions that organise our analysis in this paper relate to the respondents’ future plans in respect to migration and civic integration: (1) “if the UK votes to leave the EU, what will your most likely action be?” (Brexit action) and (2) “Regardless of the EU referendum, what is your most likely plan for the next 5 years?” (5-year plan). The two questions shared the same six answer options: “Move to a non-EU country (not your country of origin/citizenship)”, “Move to another EU country (not your country of origin/citizenship)”, “Move to your country of origin/citizenship”, “Remain in the UK and apply for a permanent residence certificate (for yourself and your family, if applicable)”, “Remain in the UK and apply for British citizenship (for yourself and your family, if applicable)”, and “Remain in the UK without any concrete plan/take no action”. In our analyses, several of these answer options were combined in order to increase counts or to enhance explanation. For instance, the two options relating to moving to a third country are combined in the category ‘re-migration’ (as in *Figure 1*). In other analyses, the answer option of return to Poland is also added to form the category ‘Leave the UK’. Similarly, plans to remain and apply for the Permanent Residence Certificate (PRC) or for citizenship can be combined to describe more broadly intentions of civic integration.

Confining the approach taken by Snel, Faber, and Engbersen (2015) and Drinkwater and Garapich (2015) to a more time-restricted and rights-based framework, we consider those who choose to ‘remain in the UK without any concrete plan’ to represent the habitus of ‘deliberate indeterminacy’. However, the focus of this paper required that those in the sample who already hold a PRC be distinguished from those who do not, given that a PRC guarantees one’s rights of residence and work in the UK and is largely equivalent to the Indefinite Leave to Remain obtainable by non-EU migrants. Those who already hold or have applied for a PRC may still select applying for PRC or taking no action as options for either a 5-year timeframe or in case of Brexit, yet their ‘indeterminacy’ has a different interpretation in respect to the rights and privileges they already hold, and the freedoms that these confer upon them. To highlight this latter case, a new category called ‘No plan/action (with PRC)’ was created and is presented in *Figure 1*, but was excluded from all bivariate and multivariate analyses, reducing the valid sample size by 61.

The two variables ‘5-year plan’ and ‘Brexit action’ will serve as our dependent variables. The independent predictor variables are a combination of core socio-demographic characteristics that have been singled out in the literature as influencing some aspects of migrant behaviour related to our focus in this paper, and other characteristics concerning family relationships, perceptions on civic rights and opinions related to the context of Brexit that were specific to our survey. Some of the main socio-demographic characteristics were already presented in *Table 1*, and other survey-specific variables excluded from *Table 1* due to a lack of comparability with the APS are: children (in the UK), partner’s economic activity (if not single); the language spoken in a work-place environment (English or other); whether the respondent is planning to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in the future’, and whether they were eligible to do so at the time of the survey (or within one year); whether they have close relatives who are eligible for a PRC within one year; whether they feel ‘anxious’ about the possibility of Brexit; and their preference for the outcome of the EU Referendum.

These above variables were all considered in the bivariate analysis (see *Table A1*), but some were changed for the multivariate analyses. The variables relating to relationship status and children were excluded due to a lack of statistically significant influence, but the category of ‘single’ was included within the variable coding the ‘partner’s economic activity’, while a dichotomous variable describing having ‘close relatives in the UK’ was created to include those who were not single and/or had children and/or parents in the UK. The variable considering the partner’s economic activity status was deemed important due to the overrepresentation of women in the sample and the significant correlation between gender and economic activity (coded as in *Table 1* χ2=106.22 (3, N=838), p=0.000; Cramer’s V=.356; 3.8% of the men in the sample were ‘inactive’, compared to 18% of the women). By also controlling for the partner’s economic status, we hope to further reduce any bias caused by the underrepresentation of men in our sample. Considering intentions to naturalise as a British citizen ‘at any time in the future’ enables us to grasp the relationship between subjective intentions and the rights-based framework we have introduced. It can indicate, for instance, what migrants’ general disposition is towards acquiring British citizenship, and whether their attitudes translate into concrete actions in a 5-year timeframe or as a reaction to the vote for Brexit. The variable measuring self-reported eligibility for British citizenship not only indicates the respondents’ status, but also their awareness of the legal requirements for naturalisation, by distinguishing the answer option ‘Do not know (the eligibility requirements)’.

Finally, the two variables referring to attitudes towards the EU Referendum and the possibility of Brexit were included for the purpose of assessing the influence of the respondents’ state of mind and outcome favourability on their planned actions. Feeling ‘anxious’ about Brexit is a variable derived from two different survey questions: “How likely do you think it is that the UK will leave the EU after the Referendum?” and “What effect would it have on your (and your family’s) life if the UK chose to leave the EU?”, both measured on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘very unlikely’ to ‘very likely’ and from ‘very negative’ to ‘very positive’ accordingly. The derived dichotomous variable codes as ‘anxious’ those who felt that there is at least an equal likelihood that Brexit may occur (point 3 and above) *and* that they would be affected by it negatively or very negatively (point 4 and 5). The variable referring to the preferred outcome for the EU Referendum is based on the survey question asking “Which one of the options below would you prefer?” and providing four answer options: ‘The UK to leave the EU’, ‘The UK to stay in the EU only if it gains more freedom to make its own laws’, ‘The UK to stay in the EU under the current conditions’, and ‘The UK to stay and become even more integrated in the EU’. The dichotomous variable used in analyses combines the first two options as ‘Leave (or conditional stay)’, and the latter two as ‘Remain (and integrate further)’.

# Analysis and findings

We first examine the distribution of responses to the two main survey questions that we explore in this paper, namely medium-term migration plans in a 5-year timeframe, and actions in case of Brexit measuring immediate reactions to changing external policy structures within the rights-based framework available to Polish migrants in the UK. As shown in *Figure 1*, in the next five years 40% of the respondents were planning to apply for a PRC, 32% for citizenship, 5% were planning to return to Poland while merely 1% wished to move to a third country, and 22% were ‘indeterminate’, choosing to remain in the UK without any concrete plan. However, 7% were ‘indeterminate’ while already holding a PRC, and only 15% chose to remain as a non-permanent-resident EU citizen without planning any other action.[[3]](#endnote-3)

### Figure 1 around here

We can also see that in the case of Brexit a much higher proportion of the respondents would apply for permanent residence (51%), while in the share of those who are planning to naturalise we observe a decrease of a comparable magnitude (down to 21%). As we discuss elsewhere, this change is primarily attributable to those who would not qualify for naturalisation immediately after Brexit, and would therefore apply for PRC instead, which is nevertheless a required step before a potential future application for British citizenship [reference withheld]. The number of those planning to stay in the UK without taking any further action also decreases to 11%, while more respondents would choose to migrate to a third country (6%). There is only a negligible difference in the percentage of those who would return to Poland. In broad terms, we find that in case of a vote for Brexit 10% of the Poles in the UK would leave the country (compared to 6% otherwise), an overwhelming majority (72%) wished to remain and formalise their residence through civic integration measures regardless of the referendum result, and Brexit does seem to somewhat reduce the level of ‘indeterminacy’, giving support to a hypothesis that Brexit pushes Polish migrants towards having to formulate more concrete plans for the future.

The bivariate analysis examining the association between different variables and 5-year plans discloses that age, education, socio-economic status, the language spoken in a workplace environment, wanting to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in the future’ and eligibility to do so within one year, having close relatives eligible for PRC, and the respondent’s preference as to the outcome of the EU Referendum are all significantly correlated (at p<.05 level) with stated 5-year plans (*Table A1* in Appendix, which also includes descriptive statistics for the discussed variables). On the other hand, key socio-demographic and migration-related variables such as sex, economic activity, time spent in the UK, relationship status or having children do not seem to be on their own significantly related to migration plans. Apart from having future naturalisation intentions, however, the strength of the significant associations is small (the Cramer’s V statistic is below .2 in all cases) and the examined factors each explain less than 2% of the variance in 5-year plans (based on the Goodman and Kruskal tau test). As we might expect, having plans to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in the future’ is very strongly associated with medium-term plans (Cramer’s V=.542, p=0.000) ­– which includes plans to apply for citizenship in the next five years ­– and explains 11% of the variance in migration strategies (Goodman and Kruskal tau=.109, p=0.000). From the distribution of adjusted standardised residuals we also find that those open to naturalisation in general were significantly more likely than expected to be planning to apply for British citizenship in the next five years (z=13.8), and significantly less likely to consider leaving the UK, applying for PRC only, or taking no action (z=–6.6, –3.4 and –9 respectively).

Some other highly significant associations worth highlighting here are: speaking English in a workplace environment, which significantly increases the likelihood of naturalisation planning (z=4.2) and decreases ‘indeterminacy’ (z=–4.7); perceived eligibility to apply for British citizenship within one year has a similar effect, with those eligible significantly more likely to be planning naturalisation within the next five years (z=5.2) – notably, however, *not* being eligible does not have a significant effect in the opposite direction, but ‘not knowing the requirements’ for naturalisation does (z=–4.6) and it also significantly increases the likelihood of having no concrete plans (z=3.6); the same pattern of effects applies in respect to having close relatives who are eligible to apply for PRC, which increases the likelihood of naturalisation plans (z=3) and decreases both intentions to leave (z=–3.1) and of being ‘indeterminate’ (z=–3) – again, not knowing the requirements for permanent residence increases the likelihood of remaining in the UK without any concrete plans (z=4.3) (for other results see *Table A1*, in Appendix).

To account for the effect of all these variables, however, we also examine their interaction in a logistic regression model. *Table 2* reports results from two separately run models, one only accounting for six core socio-demographic variables, namely sex, age, education, employment status, time spent in the UK and having close relatives in the UK (Model I, N=746, Nagelkerke R2=.105), and one also including the survey-specific variables (Model II, N=683, Nagelkerke R2=.468). The purpose of Model I is primarily to highlight the change in some of the effects following the inclusion of more specific variables. For example, gender has a very marginal significance in respect to plans to ‘leave the UK’ (p=.092) when only controlling for core socio-demographic variables, and this marginal effect disappears altogether when keeping all the examined variables constant, while in respect to planning citizenship it gains a very marginal significance (Model II, p=.094). Overall, as also shown in the bivariate analysis, gender does not significantly determine migration plans.

### Table 2 around here

By contrast, the effects of age and education proved more significant. Compared to those under 30, migrants aged 40 and over are twice to three times more likely to be planning civic integration (PRC or citizenship) as opposed to not having concrete plans, and less likely to leave the UK. Those in their thirties are also twice more likely than those in the younger age-group to be planning permanent residence or citizenship (in Model II). Those whose highest achieved educational qualification is at secondary school level have proven significantly less likely to be planning either to leave or to become British citizens, than those holding post-secondary educational qualifications. Highly qualified individuals are four times more likely than those educated at the secondary level to be planning to leave the UK in the next five years, while at the same time twice more likely to apply for citizenship than those with secondary education, and 2.6 times more likely than those with vocational qualifications. Employment status, the length of time spent in the UK and having close relatives in the UK present more complex effects. For instance, employment status is not at all significant when accounting only for core socio-demographic characteristics (Model I), but it gains significance when also holding constant other attitudinal and interpersonal variables (Model II). Interestingly – and somewhat counterintuitively – having any kind of employment (compared to being economically inactive) appears to very significantly reduce the odds of planning citizenship as opposed to not having concrete plans. Apparently, those economically inactive are six to eleven times more likely to be planning to apply for citizenship than those in any form of employment, and also three times more likely to apply for PRC than those employed part-time. However, these effects gain significance only when controlling for the language spoken at the workplace. As we can see from Table 2, being exposed to English language in a workplace environment very significantly increases the odds of planning to apply for citizenship as opposed to having no concrete plans (those speaking English at work are in fact seven times more likely to have such plans). What this shows is that it is not the fact of being in employment per se, but rather having a job in which they do not speak English which significantly decreases the likelihood of civic integration plans.

The length of time spent in the UK, on the other hand, correlates with one’s eligibility for naturalisation, and we can see how it gains statistical significance when controlling for the latter in Model II: those who had been in the UK for more than 10 years are significantly less likely to leave than those with shorter residence, but only when knowledge about one’s civic status is also considered; simultaneously, those who are aware that they are not eligible for British citizenship within one year are more likely to have plans to leave the UK within five years than those who are either eligible or who do not know whether they qualify for naturalisation or not. On the other hand, being unaware of one’s eligibility significantly increases the odds of ‘indeterminacy’ as opposed to having plans of naturalisation for the next five years, compared to *knowing* that one is *not* eligible (Exp(B)=.425); put differently, those *aware* of their short-term ineligibility are 2.4 times more likely to still intend to apply for citizenship within a 5-year timeframe than those who had not shown interest in acquiring this knowledge about the requirements for naturalisation. In conjunction with the finding that awareness of having close family members who are eligible for PRC makes one three times more likely to be planning PRC oneself, and 2.5 times more likely to be planning naturalisation (while having close relatives in the UK, in itself, is not significant, see *Table 2*), the conclusion to be drawn is that prior interest in and awareness of one’s rights and those of other close family members, are what most determine civic integration decisions, rather than simply the length of residence in the UK.

The strong statistical significance of having general future naturalisation intentions in determining medium-term plans is not the least surprising, yet the odds ratios that it generates are noteworthy; as we can see in Table 2, planning to apply for British citizenship at any time in the future understandably decreases the odds of planning to leave the UK in the next five years as opposed to planning to remain without any concrete plans of civic integration in the medium-term, while increasing the odds of applying for permanent residence. We can also see that those with a general intention to naturalise are 101 times more likely to apply for British citizenship *in the next five years* rather than in the more distant future.[[4]](#endnote-4) This finding may have considerable policy implications, especially since in our overall sample 66% of the Polish respondents have expressed their intentions to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in the future’.

In respect to the three remaining independent variables that we have not yet discussed, we find that being single – in contrast to having a partner who is either ‘employed’ or ‘inactive’ – generally increases the odds of being ‘indeterminate’ compared to all other optional future plans (although there is no statistically significant difference in respect to planning citizenship when the partner is in employment). As mentioned in the previous section, the variable regarding the partner’s economic status was mainly included as a control due to the overrepresentation of women in the sample, who were themselves significantly overrepresented among those in part-time employment and the economically inactive. Feeling ‘anxious’ about a possible ‘Brexit’ was not significant in determining Polish migrants’ most likely plan for the next 5 years ‘regardless of the EU referendum’, but respondents’ preference in respect to the outcome of the Referendum *was*: those who preferred that the UK left the European Union or remained a member only conditionally (‘if it gained more freedom to make its own laws’) have significantly higher odds of being among those with a concrete plan for the future, be they plans to leave, to apply for permanent residence or to naturalise as British citizens.

### Table 3 around here

We also ran the full model on another dependent variable referring to planned actions in case of a Brexit vote. The results are shown in *Table 3*, and we will highlight here some of the main differences compared to the results discussed above. Generally, the determinants of planned actions in case of Brexit are more difficult to reduce to any socio-economic or demographic factors; while the independent variables selected for analysis explained 46.8% of the variance in ‘5-year plans’, they only explain 32.5% of the variance in ‘Brexit actions’ (Nagelkerke R2). As we can see, age loses its significance in respect to plans of leaving the UK or applying for PRC; education is no longer significant either, and nor is the partner’s economic activity status. Length of residence in the UK also loses its significance in respect to plans to leave, but gains significance in respect to permanent residence: those who had been in the UK for less than 5 years are 2.6 times more likely to apply for PRC rather than to take no action compared to those who had lived in the UK for over 10 years.

General intent to apply for British citizenship ‘at any time in the future’ also loses its significance in respect to plans to leave following Brexit, and the odds by which it explains plans to apply for citizenship in the ‘immediate context of action’ created by Brexit is also reduced to a nevertheless still considerable level (Exp(B)=42.797). The changes in the explanatory power of eligibility for citizenship are, however, more interesting. While in case of Brexit it no longer explains plans to leave, it gains significance in respect to post-Brexit plans to naturalise. Following a Brexit vote, those eligible for British citizenship are almost seven times more likely to apply for citizenship than not to take any action, compared to those who are not eligible; furthermore, while unawareness of one’s eligibility acted to reduce one’s likelihood to contemplate naturalisation as a 5-year plan, following Brexit those not knowing whether they are eligible are 3.3 times more likely to want to apply for citizenship – as opposed to not taking any action – than those aware of their immediate ineligibility for citizenship. Again, these results highlight the relevance of rights-awareness, and at the same time reveal one of the central effects of Brexit on Polish migrants’ strategies, namely its emotionally ‘mobilising’ effect.

In a Brexit scenario, having close relatives eligible for permanent residence and the outcome favourability of the EU Referendum still significantly – albeit more weakly – determine plans to apply for PRC, but not other planned actions. Lastly, feeling ‘anxious’ about Brexit emerges as a highly significant determinant of post-Brexit migration strategies. As mentioned in the previous section, this derived variable combines opinions regarding the likelihood of a Brexit vote with opinions on what the personal effects of a Brexit would be. We can therefore assume that those who had not only thought that Brexit would have a negative effect on their lives, but also that it was something likely to occur (i.e. they felt ‘anxious’ about it) would have given more consideration to their options and planned actions following Brexit. As shown in *Table 3*, those ‘anxious’ about Brexit were 3.5 times more likely to plan to leave the UK than to stay without taking any action, 2.6 times more likely to want to apply for PRC, and 2.7 times more likely to plan applying for British citizenship following a Brexit vote. It seems, therefore, that it is the combination of rights-awareness, active consideration of one’s options, and the emotional stress caused by the EU Referendum that most powerfully determines the migration strategies of Polish migrants in the UK following the Brexit vote.

# Discussion and conclusions

The above analysis allows us to draw several conclusions regarding the medium-term plans and migration strategies of Polish nationals living in the UK, within the framework of civic and mobility rights available to them and in relation to the UK’s prospective departure from the EU. As the descriptive results have shown, the overwhelming majority of our respondents (72%) were aiming for civic integration over the next five years, thus tying their legal status to UK law rather than relying solely on the constellation of rights provided by EU citizenship. We could also see that Brexit has little effect on this outcome on the ‘aggregate’ level [cf. reference withheld].

The results from the bivariate analysis broadly indicate that Polish migrants in the UK are not only a very diverse population in respect to socio-economic and demographic characteristics (see Burrell 2010, 299), but that these characteristics play a less important role in determining their future migration strategies under the terms discussed here. More meaningful is their general attitude towards British citizenship and the UK, their configuration of rights and knowledge thereof, and their exposure to the local cultural environment (as partially and indirectly measured by the use of English at work). This finding is also supported by the regression results: we could see that neither the length of residence nor having close family members in the UK significantly determined one’s plans, but awareness of one’s civic rights (which largely depend on residence) or the rights of family members do have a significant influence. To some extent, this finding corresponds with that of Snel, Faber, and Engbersen (2015, 17), who find that ‘it is not so much the duration of their stay as such that affects migrants’ return intentions as their level of socio-cultural integration’. While we do not have comparable measurements of ‘integration’ to include in our model, and we have reframed our analysis in terms of ‘rights’ rather than the intended length of stay in the destination country, the underlying message behind our findings shares obvious similarities.

The fact that those with a declared preference for the UK to leave the EU, or remain a member only conditionally, were also more likely to have formulated clear plans for the medium-term future rather than being ‘indeterminate’, was another interesting finding which opens up to various interpretations. To understand the mechanisms behind this association would require further qualitative research, but we can think of several plausible hypotheses: one would be that already conceived plans of civic integration are the ones that determine attitudes towards the UK’s EU membership, which may be shaped by an assimilation of mainstream majority attitudes, fears and insecurities about future immigration, or other factors that played a role in determining the result of the Referendum overall. This, however, would not explain mobility plans. Another possibility is the influence of general Euro-sceptic sentiments, and a further one could be, on the contrary, disillusionment with life in the UK and support for Britain’s exit from the European Union as a vindictive attitude coupled with intensions to leave the UK within five years. Examining these hypotheses, however, falls outside the scope of the present study.

In this paper we were particularly interested in assessing the continued validity of Polish migrants’ ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ (Snel, Faber, and Engbersen 2015; Drinkwater and Garapich 2015; Eade, Drinkwater, and Garapich 2007). Within the rights-based framework that we adopted, the habitus of ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ is still relevant, yet it is this opportunity to keep one’s ‘options deliberately open’ as EU citizens (Eade 2007, 34) – which, in a rights-based approach, would most closely be described by a lack of plans to leave in the medium-term coupled with a lack of intentions of civic integration – that is most jeopardised as a consequence of Brexit. As our analysis has highlighted, Brexit ‘anxiety’ was the main factor pushing Polish migrants away from ‘indeterminacy’ and towards having to formulate more concrete plans for the future, whereas the simple fact of having access to rights of civic integration is the strongest factor explaining preferences for civic integration. We have also seen that in case of Brexit those who had been in the UK for less than 5 years were more likely to apply for PRC than those who had been resident for longer than 10 years (while no other dimensions of length of stay proved significant in respect to ‘Brexit actions’). This may reflect that those who have arrived to the UK more recently and may not yet qualify for naturalisation, but at the same time would prefer to remain in the UK for at least another 5 years, are drawn to permanent residence in greater numbers than some of those who migrated more than a decade ago and, who in case of Brexit, would rather opt for British citizenship or conclude that the time to leave Britain has come. Based on our findings, therefore, it may be legitimate to ask whether one important effect of Brexit is to engender an antithetical habitus of ‘undeliberate determinacy’.

Following from the above discussion, the main argument that we put forward in this paper is that the socio-economic and demographic variables which have emerged in qualitative research as significant in determining settlement or re-migration plans – such as relationship status, children, length of stay or employment among others (Ryan 2015; White 2011; Janta 2013; McGhee, Travena, and Heath 2015) – are not on their own significant in determining the plans and strategies in respect to rights and options of civic integration and mobility in the case of as diverse a migrant group as that of Polish nationals in the UK. Rather, we argue, it is the additional element of rights-awareness, interest and social proximity to the available options of civic integration which carry more weight in explaining both medium-term plans and actions under the circumstances created by the UK’s vote to exit the European Union.

This paper, nevertheless, opens up a series of questions that require separate in-depth treatment and need further research. For one, by reconceptualising ‘deliberate indeterminacy’ within a temporally constrained rights-based approach, the need to (re)theorise it became more evident. It would be a legitimate objection to our present treatment of the concept to note that civic integration could very well be employed as a strategy to expand one’s options for remaining ‘indeterminate’ in the future. In other words, permanent residence and British citizenship may not be signalling the ‘settlement’ of Polish migrants, but rather new legal-structural moorings for transnational living. Understanding such processes will require a focused qualitative treatment, but recent research seems to indicate that more ‘settled’ lifestyles are compatible with transnationalism (cf. Ryan 2015). More research will also be required in order to understand the complexities involved in the changing meaning of ‘citizenship’ following Brexit, and how other EU migrant groups compare to Poles – questions that we also engage with elsewhere [reference withheld].

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Table 1. Personal characteristics of the survey sample and comparison with the APS

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | **EU-Ref survey** | **APS** **2015–2016** |
|  |  | **N** | **%** | **N** | **%** |
| Sample | Polish, over 16yo1 | **894** | **100** | **2453** | **100** |
| Sex | Female | 583 | 66% | 1324 | 54% |
| Age | Mean (min–max; SD) | 38(19–65; 9) | 35 (16–93; 10.4) |
| Age (groups) | Under 30 | 145 | 16% | 667 | 27% |
| 30 - 39 | 402 | 45% | 1182 | 48% |
| 40 - 49 | 234 | 26% | 379 | 16% |
| 50 and over | 106 | 12% | 225 | 9% |
| Years in UK | Mean (min–max; SD) | 7y2m (1m–18y3m; 3y4m) | 8.78 (0–71; 5.626) |
| Years in UK (groups) | Less than 5 | 267 | 30% | 464 | 19% |
| 5 - 10 | 417 | 47% | 1276 | 52% |
| More than 10 | 203 | 23% | 701 | 29% |
| UK Country | England | 715 | 80% | 2014 | 82% |
| Wales | 36 | 4% | 139 | 6% |
| Scotland | 122 | 14% | 252 | 10% |
| Northern Ireland | 18 | 2% | 48 | 2% |
| Relationship status | Married or in civil partnership | 450 | 52% | 1226 | 50% |
| Not married (cohabiting) | 140 | 16% | 504 | 21% |
| Not married | 276 | 32% | 723 | 30% |
| Economic activity status | Employed (full-time) | 512 | 61% | 1366 | 56% |
| Employed (part-time) | 139 | 17% | 364 | 15% |
| Self-employed | 79 | 9% | 269 | 11% |
| Inactive and unemployed | 110 | 13% | 454 | 19% |
| Socio-economic status (NS\_SEC) | I: Higher managerial, administrative and professional | 48 | 8% | 74 | 3% |
| II: Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations | 59 | 10% | 205 | 9% |
| III: Intermediate occupations | 39 | 6% | 135 | 6% |
| IV: Small employers and own account workers | 56 | 9% | 264 | 12% |
| V&VI: Lower supervisory, technical, and semi-routine occupations | 205 | 34% | 768 | 35% |
| VII: Routine occupations | 204 | 33% | 719 | 33% |
| Highest educational qualification | Master's Degree or above | 141 | 16% | 195 | 8% |
| Undergraduate/Bachelor's degree | 107 | 12% | 329 | 13% |
| College/post-secondary qualification | 129 | 14% | 221 | 9% |
| Secondary qualification | 353 | 40% | 265 | 11% |
| Vocational/professional qualification | 130 | 15% | 343 | 14% |
| Other qualification | 5 | 1% | 825 | 34% |
| No qualifications | - | - | 229 | 9% |
| Missing | 29 | 3% | 46 | 2% |
| 1 For reasons of commensurability, only respondents of Polish nationality [NTNLTY12] over the age of 16 were included in the APS comparison sample. |

Figure 1. Polish migrants' future plans in a 5-year timeframe and in case of Brexit

Table 2: Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis on 5-year plans (odds ratios)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Leave the UK | Permanent residence | Citizenship |
|  | I | II | I | II | I | II |
| Female | 0.523" | 0.735 | 0.939 | 0.818 | 0.849 | 0.624" |
| Age 40 and over | 0.46 | 0.247\* | 2.021\* | 2.859\*\*\* | 1.568 | 2.205\* |
| Age 30 - 39 | 1.136 | 0.778 | 1.541 | 1.978\* | 1.576 | 1.808" |
| Qualification: vocational | 0.804 | 0.945 | 0.919 | 0.951 | 0.363\*\* | 0.383\*\* |
| Qualification: secondary | 0.276\*\* | 0.244\*\*\* | 0.716 | 0.743 | 0.416\*\*\* | 0.502\*\* |
| Employed full-time | 1.264 | 0.653 | 1.363 | 0.733 | 1.207 | 0.163\*\* |
| Employed part-time | 1.001 | 0.493 | 0.805 | 0.344\*\* | 1.11 | 0.113\*\*\* |
| Self-employed | 2.022 | 0.738 | 1.794 | 0.768 | 0.925 | 0.090\*\*\* |
| Less than 5 years in UK | 0.79 | 0.279\* | 1.351 | 1.428 | 0.72 | 0.792 |
| 5 to 10 year in UK | 0.626 | 0.315\*\* | 1.117 | 1.094 | 0.692 | 0.748 |
| Has close relatives in UK | 0.52 | 1.948 | 1.387 | 1.32 | 1.381 | 1.166 |
| Partner: employed |  | 0.286\* |   | 0.472\* |   | 0.684 |
| Partner: inactive |  | 0.26" |   | 0.309\* |   | 0.298\* |
| Speaks English at work |  | 1.963 |   | 1.645" |   | 6.939\*\*\* |
| Plans naturalisation |  | 0.341\*\* |   | 2.933\*\*\* |   | 101.284\*\*\* |
| Eligible for citizenship |  | 0.256\* |   | 0.665 |   | 0.811 |
| Does not know if eligible for citizenship |  | 0.329\* |   | 0.938 |   | 0.425\* |
| Close relatives eligible for PRC |  | 1.149 |   | 2.991\*\*\* |   | 2.509\*\* |
| Feels anxious about Brexit |  | 1.013 |   | 1.239 |   | 1.512" |
| Prefers UK to leave or only conditionally stay in the EU |  | 2.100\* |   | 1.751\*\* |   | 1.65\* |
| Nagelkerke R-square | .105 | .468 |  |   |  |   |
| N | 746 | 683 |   |   |   |   |
| Notes: The dependent reference category is "No plan/action". The independent reference categories are: male; Under 30; post-secondary education; inactive; more than 10 years in UK; does not have close relatives in the UK; single; does not speak English at work; does not plan to apply for British citizenship anytime in the future; is not eligible for citizenship now or within one year; does not have close relatives who are eligible for PRC; does not feel ‘anxious’ about Brexit; prefers the UK to remain in the EU under the pre-referendum conditions or to become even more integrated in the EU. |
| Model I Chi-sq (33) = 74.919, p<.001; Model II Chi-sq (60) = 377.262, p<.001. Model II was rescaled for underdispersion based on the Deviance statistic (φ=0.64) |
| "p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001 |

Table 3: Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis on actions in case of Brexit (odds ratios)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Leave the UK | Permanent residence | Citizenship |
| Female | 0.536" | 0.746 | 0.698 |
| Age 40 and over | 0.782 | 1.889" | 2.613\* |
| Age 30 - 39 | 0.558 | 1.445 | 2.083" |
| Qualification: vocational | 0.943 | 1.622 | 0.767 |
| Qualification: secondary | 0.528" | 1.038 | 0.719 |
| Employed full-time | 0.823 | 0.652 | 0.096\*\* |
| Employed part-time | 0.509 | 0.333\* | 0.047\*\*\* |
| Self-employed | 0.758 | 0.459 | 0.064\*\* |
| Less than 5 years in UK | 1.734 | 2.61\* | 1.73 |
| 5 to 10 year in UK | 1.489 | 1.751" | 1.641 |
| Has close relatives in UK | 1.562 | 1.348 | 2.332 |
| Partner: employed | 0.633 | 1.043 | 1.253 |
| Partner: inactive | 0.342 | 0.691 | 0.688 |
| Speaks English at work | 1.03 | 1.448 | 6.859\*\* |
| Plans naturalisation | 1.062 | 2.523\*\*\* | 42.797\*\*\* |
| Eligible for citizenship | 1.141 | 1.877" | 6.841\*\*\* |
| Does not know if eligible for citizenship | 1.062 | 1.584 | 3.276\*\* |
| Close relatives eligible for PRC | 1.62 | 1.969\* | 1.007 |
| Feels anxious about Brexit | 3.471\*\*\* | 2.56\*\*\* | 2.691\*\*\* |
| Prefers UK to leave or only conditionally stay in EU | 1.188 | 1.594\* | 1.546 |
| Nagelkerke R-square | .325 |
| N | 683 |
| Notes: The dependent reference category is "No plan/action". The independent reference categories are: male; Under 30; post-secondary education; inactive; more than 10 years in UK; does not have close relatives in the UK; single; does not speak English at work; does not plan to apply for British citizenship anytime in the future; is not eligible for citizenship now or within one year; does not have close relatives who are eligible for PRC; does not feel ‘anxious’ about Brexit; prefers the UK to remain in the EU under the pre-referendum conditions or to become even more integrated in the EU. |
| Model Chi-sq (60) = 234.761, p<.001. The model was rescaled for underdispersion based on the Deviance statistic (φ=0.68) |
| "p<.1, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001 |

Appendix Table 1: Bivariate statistics for 5-year plans by personal characteristics (row percentages and adjusted standardised residuals in parantheses1)

|   | Leave the UK | Remain in the UK and | N |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Apply for PRC | Apply for citizenship | No plan |
| Sex:  χ2=6.521 (3, N=817), p=0.089 |
| Male | 9.1 (2.2) | 44.7 (0.7) | 32.4 (-0.8) | 13.8 (-1.4) | 275 |
| Female | 5.2 (-2.2) | 42.3 (-0.7) | 35.1 (0.8) | 17.5 (1.4) | 542 |
| Age: χ2=22.735 (9, N=818), p=0.007 |
| < 30 | 8.6 (1.1) | 37.9 (-1.4) | 30.7 (-0.9) | 22.9 (2.3) | 140 |
| 30 - 39 | 8.3 (1.9) | 39.5 (-1.9) | 36.8 (1.5) | 15.5 (-0.7) | 375 |
| 40 - 49 | 1.9 (-3.1) | 48.6 (1.9) | 35.2 (0.4) | 14.3 (-1) | 210 |
| 50 < | 6.5 (0) | 52.7 (2) | 25.8 (-1.8) | 15.1 (-0.4) | 93 |
| Highest educational qualification: χ2=25.802 (6, N=794), p=0.000 |
| Post-secondary higher | 8.2 (2) | 38 (-2.8) | 41.1 (3.8) | 12.7 (-2.4) | 353 |
| Secondary | 3.7 (-2.5) | 46.7 (1.6) | 29.7 (-2.1) | 19.8 (2.3) | 323 |
| Vocational | 7.6 (0.6) | 50.8 (1.8) | 24.6 (-2.3) | 16.9 (0.2) | 118 |
| Economic activity status: χ2=15.853 (9, N=775), p=0.07 |
| In full-time employment | 6.9 (0.5) | 43.9 (1) | 34 (-0.2) | 15.2 (-1.5) | 462 |
| In part-time employment | 4.6 (-1) | 33.1 (-2.4) | 41.5 (1.9) | 20.8 (1.3) | 130 |
| Self-employed | 9.2 (1) | 53.9 (2.1) | 23.7 (-2) | 13.2 (-0.9) | 76 |
| Inactive | 5.6 (-0.4) | 39.3 (-0.7) | 33.6 (-0.1) | 21.5 (1.4) | 107 |
| Socio-economic status: χ2=33.186 (9, N=563), p=0.000 |
| I + II | 10 (1.3) | 30 (-2.8) | 54 (4.6) | 6 (-3.1) | 100 |
| III + IV | 4.5 (-1) | 44.9 (0.5) | 36 (0.4) | 14.6 (-0.5) | 89 |
| V + VI | 8.6 (1.1) | 43.5 (0.4) | 29.6 (-1.7) | 18.3 (0.9) | 186 |
| VII | 4.8 (-1.4) | 46.8 (1.5) | 27.7 (-2.3) | 20.7 (2) | 188 |
| Time spent in the UK: χ2=8.45 (6, N=817), p=0.207 |
| Less than 5 | 8 (1.1) | 46 (1.2) | 30.8 (-1.4) | 15.2 (-0.5) | 263 |
| 5 to 10 | 5.7 (-1) | 43.8 (0.4) | 33.2 (-0.6) | 17.4 (0.9) | 386 |
| More than 10 | 6.5 (0) | 36.3 (-2) | 42.3 (2.4) | 14.9 (-0.5) | 168 |
| Relationship status: χ2=11.199 (6, N=799), p=0.082 |
| Single | 8.9 (2) | 44.6 (0.6) | 33.3 (-0.5) | 13.2 (-1.5) | 258 |
| Married/civil partnership | 4.8 (-1.9) | 44.7 (1) | 33.3 (-0.8) | 17.1 (0.9) | 414 |
| In long-term relationship | 6.3 (0) | 33.9 (-2.3) | 41.7 (1.8) | 18.1 (0.7) | 127 |
| Partner’s economic activity: χ2=6.676 (6, N=767), p=0.352 |
| Single (respondent) | 9 (2.1) | 44.1 (0.5) | 33.6 (-0.4) | 13.3 (-1.5) | 256 |
| Employed | 4.9 (-2.1) | 42 (-0.6) | 35.6 (0.7) | 17.5 (1.3) | 452 |
| Inactive | 6.8 (0.1) | 44.1 (0.2) | 32.2 (-0.4) | 16.9 (0.2) | 59 |
| Children: χ2=8.800 (6, N=805), p=0.185 |
| No children | 8.7 (2.2) | 41.7 (-0.4) | 34.5 (0) | 15 (-1) | 333 |
| All in UK | 5.2 (-1.7) | 42.2 (-0.2) | 35.2 (0.4) | 17.5 (0.8) | 446 |
| Some/all not in UK | 0 (-1.4) | 57.7 (1.6) | 23.1 (-1.2) | 19.2 (0.4) | 26 |
| Whether speaks English at work: χ2=29.873 (3, N=799), p=0.000  |
| Yes | 6.3 (0.1) | 41.9 (-0.6) | 38.7 (4.2) | 13.1 (-4.7) | 602 |
| No | 6.1 (-0.1) | 44.2 (0.6) | 22.3 (-4.2) | 27.4 (4.7) | 197 |
| Whether planning to apply for British citizenship at any time in the future: χ2=239.766 (3, N=817), p=0.000 |
| Yes | 2.5 (-6.6) | 38.9 (-3.4) | 50.5 (13.8) | 8 (-9) | 550 |
| No | 14.6 (6.6) | 51.3 (3.4) | 1.5 (-13.8) | 32.6 (9) | 267 |
| Whether eligible for British citizenship within one year: χ2=37.039 (6, N=821), p=0.000 |
| Eligible | 5 (-1.5) | 38.3 (-2.6) | 43.3 (5.2) | 13.4 (-2.2) | 397 |
| Not eligible | 9.1 (1.7) | 46.9 (1.2) | 30.9 (-1.1) | 13.1 (-1.3) | 175 |
| Not know (the requirements) | 6.4 (0.1) | 47.4 (1.7) | 22.9 (-4.6) | 23.3 (3.6) | 249 |
| Whether has close relatives eligible for PRC within one year: χ2=40.279 (9, N=787), p=0.000 |
| Yes | 4.1 (-3.1) | 45.1 (1) | 38.1 (3) | 12.8 (-3) | 415 |
| No | 7.6 (0.3) | 50.6 (1.4) | 26.6 (-1.3) | 15.2 (-0.3) | 79 |
| Does not know (the req.) | 7.7 (0.5) | 41.5 (-0.5) | 21.5 (-3.1) | 29.2 (4.3) | 130 |
| No close family | 12.3 (3.2) | 37.4 (-1.7) | 33.7 (0.1) | 16.6 (0) | 163 |
| Whether feels anxious about the possibility of Brexit: χ2=6.753 (3, N=824), p=0.080 |
| Yes | 5 (-1.6) | 42 (-0.5) | 38.3 (2.2) | 14.8 (-1.1) | 379 |
| No | 7.9 (1.6) | 43.6 (0.5) | 31 (-2.2) | 17.5 (1.1) | 445 |
| Preference for the outcome of the EU Referendum: χ2=11.269 (3, N=817), p=0.010 |
| Leave (or conditional stay) | 5.6 (-1.1) | 46.1 (1.9) | 35.7 (1) | 12.6 (-3) | 414 |
| Remain (and integrate further) | 7.4 (1.1) | 39.7 (-1.9) | 32.5 (-1) | 20.3 (3) | 403 |
| Notes:1 Generally, cells with standardised residuals greater than ±2.6 significantly contribute to the chi-square statistic at p<.01 |

1. Obtaining a Permanent Residence Certificate as an EU national requires 5 years of (almost) continuous residence while exercising EU Treaty Rights; once the certificate is obtained, an application for British citizenship requires a further one year of continuous residence (as well as passing a ‘Life in the UK’ test, and subject to other more specific criteria). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. For a detailed description of our study and methodology, consult our research report available at [information withheld]. The survey research project underwent ethical screening and was approved by the University’s Ethical Governance Committee [number withheld]. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. As mentioned earlier, the category of those ‘indeterminate’ who already hold a PRC are only presented here for descriptive purposes and will be excluded from statistical analyses. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Given the impressive size of this odds ratio it is worth noting that the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for Exp(B) was 42.254, and the upper bound was 242.779. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)