The dollar auction with spiteful players
The dollar auction with spiteful players
  The dollar auction is an auction model used to analyse the dynamics of conflict escalation. In this paper, we analyse the course of an auction when participating players are spiteful, i.e., they are motivated not only by their own profit, but also by the desire to hurt the opponent. We investigate this model for the complete information setting, both for the standard scenario and for the situation where auction starts with nonzero bids. Our results give us insight into the possible effects of meanness onto conflict escalation.
  
  
  
    
      Waniek, Marcin
      
        b0604cb4-d515-4e1f-8fd2-09a9cc420db4
      
     
  
    
      Tran-Thanh, Long
      
        e0666669-d34b-460e-950d-e8b139fab16c
      
     
  
    
      Michalak, Tomasz P.
      
        18675d03-00c5-449c-9215-ba0f11d3302f
      
     
  
    
      Jennings, Nicholas
      
        ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
      
     
  
  
   
  
  
    
    
  
    
    
  
    
      4 February 2017
    
    
  
  
    
      Waniek, Marcin
      
        b0604cb4-d515-4e1f-8fd2-09a9cc420db4
      
     
  
    
      Tran-Thanh, Long
      
        e0666669-d34b-460e-950d-e8b139fab16c
      
     
  
    
      Michalak, Tomasz P.
      
        18675d03-00c5-449c-9215-ba0f11d3302f
      
     
  
    
      Jennings, Nicholas
      
        ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
      
     
  
       
    
 
  
    
      
  
  
  
  
    Waniek, Marcin, Tran-Thanh, Long, Michalak, Tomasz P. and Jennings, Nicholas
  
  
  
  
   
    (2017)
  
  
    
    The dollar auction with spiteful players.
  
  
  
  
   In Proceedings of the Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the Twenty-Ninth Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference. 
  vol. 1, 
      AAAI Press. 
          
           7 pp
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      Record type:
      Conference or Workshop Item
      (Paper)
      
      
    
   
    
    
      
        
          Abstract
          The dollar auction is an auction model used to analyse the dynamics of conflict escalation. In this paper, we analyse the course of an auction when participating players are spiteful, i.e., they are motivated not only by their own profit, but also by the desire to hurt the opponent. We investigate this model for the complete information setting, both for the standard scenario and for the situation where auction starts with nonzero bids. Our results give us insight into the possible effects of meanness onto conflict escalation.
         
      
      
        
          
            
  
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      Accepted/In Press date: 12 September 2016
 
    
      e-pub ahead of print date: 4 February 2017
 
    
      Published date: 4 February 2017
 
    
  
  
    
  
    
  
    
     
        Venue - Dates:
        Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, , San Francisco, United States, 2017-02-04 - 2017-02-09
      
    
  
    
  
    
     
    
  
    
  
    
     
        Organisations:
        Electronics & Computer Science, Agents, Interactions & Complexity
      
    
  
    
  
  
        Identifiers
        Local EPrints ID: 406360
        URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/406360
        
        
        
          ISSN: 2159-5399
        
        
          PURE UUID: c7de75ef-c7b0-481b-b39a-ecc6a33b1b35
        
  
    
        
          
        
    
        
          
            
              
            
          
        
    
        
          
        
    
        
          
            
          
        
    
  
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  Date deposited: 10 Mar 2017 10:45
  Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 12:19
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      Contributors
      
          
          Author:
          
            
            
              Marcin Waniek
            
          
        
      
          
          Author:
          
            
              
              
                Long Tran-Thanh
              
              
                
              
            
            
          
         
      
          
          Author:
          
            
            
              Tomasz P. Michalak
            
          
        
      
          
          Author:
          
            
              
              
                Nicholas Jennings
              
              
            
            
          
        
      
      
      
    
  
   
  
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