Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration
Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration
The stable presence of punishing strategies in various cooperative species is a persistent puzzle in the study of the evolution of cooperation. To investigate the effect of group competition, we study the evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods Game with punishment in a metapopulation that consists of separate communities. In addition to (a) well-mixed non-interacting communities, we model three distinct types of interaction between communities, (b) Migration independent of fitness; (c) Competition between whole communities, where entire communities replace each other depending on average fitness; (d) Migration where the probability of an offspring replacing an individual in another community depends on fitness. We use stochastic simulations to study the long-run frequencies of strategies with these interactions, subject to high mutation and migration rates. In cases (a) and (b), the transition between cooperation/punishment and defection regimes occurs for similar parameter values; with migration (b), the transitions are steeper due to higher total mixing. Fitness-based migration (d) by contrast can help support cooperation, changing the locations of transitions, but while group selection (c) does stabilise cooperation over much of the parameter space, fitness-based migration (d) acts as a proxy for group selection only in a smaller region.
Public goods game with punishment, Group selection, Community-structured population, Migration
116-126
Kaiping, G. A.
4d404a11-78ea-4ab9-b013-bb0c63fc535b
Cox, S. J.
69132b65-0a24-4a90-ac41-cae409362d8e
Sluckin, T. J.
8dbb6b08-7034-4ae2-aa65-6b80072202f6
21 September 2016
Kaiping, G. A.
4d404a11-78ea-4ab9-b013-bb0c63fc535b
Cox, S. J.
69132b65-0a24-4a90-ac41-cae409362d8e
Sluckin, T. J.
8dbb6b08-7034-4ae2-aa65-6b80072202f6
Kaiping, G. A., Cox, S. J. and Sluckin, T. J.
(2016)
Cooperation and punishment in community-structured populations with migration.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 405, .
(doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.016).
Abstract
The stable presence of punishing strategies in various cooperative species is a persistent puzzle in the study of the evolution of cooperation. To investigate the effect of group competition, we study the evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods Game with punishment in a metapopulation that consists of separate communities. In addition to (a) well-mixed non-interacting communities, we model three distinct types of interaction between communities, (b) Migration independent of fitness; (c) Competition between whole communities, where entire communities replace each other depending on average fitness; (d) Migration where the probability of an offspring replacing an individual in another community depends on fitness. We use stochastic simulations to study the long-run frequencies of strategies with these interactions, subject to high mutation and migration rates. In cases (a) and (b), the transition between cooperation/punishment and defection regimes occurs for similar parameter values; with migration (b), the transitions are steeper due to higher total mixing. Fitness-based migration (d) by contrast can help support cooperation, changing the locations of transitions, but while group selection (c) does stabilise cooperation over much of the parameter space, fitness-based migration (d) acts as a proxy for group selection only in a smaller region.
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Accepted/In Press date: 24 December 2015
e-pub ahead of print date: 18 January 2016
Published date: 21 September 2016
Keywords:
Public goods game with punishment, Group selection, Community-structured population, Migration
Organisations:
Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Engineering and the Environment
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 406380
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/406380
ISSN: 0022-5193
PURE UUID: 0f533ac6-3b41-4e4b-be14-4bc66d432771
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Date deposited: 10 Mar 2017 10:46
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 02:32
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Author:
G. A. Kaiping
Author:
S. J. Cox
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