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Metaphysical interdependence

Metaphysical interdependence
Metaphysical interdependence
It is commonly assumed that grounding relations are asymmetric. Here I develop and argue for a theory of metaphysical structure that takes grounding to be nonsymmetric rather than asymmetric. Even without infinite descending chains of dependence, it might be that every entity is grounded in some other entity. Having first addressed an immediate objection to the position under discussion, I introduce two examples of symmetric grounding. I give three arguments for the view that grounding is nonsymmetric (I call this view ‘metaphysical interdependence’). These arguments are: (i) that metaphysical interdependence is the only theory able to reconcile competing intuitions about grounding; (ii) that it is the only theory consistent with both ‘gunk’ and ‘junk’; and (iii) that offers a satisfactory solution to the problem concerning whether or not grounding is itself grounded.
38-56
Oxford University Press
Thompson, Naomi
b382645c-7f77-428b-871a-8552466ec04d
Thompson, Naomi
b382645c-7f77-428b-871a-8552466ec04d

Thompson, Naomi (2016) Metaphysical interdependence. In, Reality Making. (Mind Association Occasional Series) Oxford. Oxford University Press, pp. 38-56.

Record type: Book Section

Abstract

It is commonly assumed that grounding relations are asymmetric. Here I develop and argue for a theory of metaphysical structure that takes grounding to be nonsymmetric rather than asymmetric. Even without infinite descending chains of dependence, it might be that every entity is grounded in some other entity. Having first addressed an immediate objection to the position under discussion, I introduce two examples of symmetric grounding. I give three arguments for the view that grounding is nonsymmetric (I call this view ‘metaphysical interdependence’). These arguments are: (i) that metaphysical interdependence is the only theory able to reconcile competing intuitions about grounding; (ii) that it is the only theory consistent with both ‘gunk’ and ‘junk’; and (iii) that offers a satisfactory solution to the problem concerning whether or not grounding is itself grounded.

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Published date: 2016
Organisations: Philosophy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 406439
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/406439
PURE UUID: 24df9267-afb2-4805-97c9-e232063aa22d
ORCID for Naomi Thompson: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-8605-6731

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Date deposited: 10 Mar 2017 10:47
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 12:16

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