Analysing security protocols using refinement in iUML-B
Analysing security protocols using refinement in iUML-B
We propose a general approach based on abstraction and refinement for constructing and analysing security protocols using formal specification and verification. We use class diagrams to specify conceptual system entities and their relationships. We use state-machines to model the protocol execution involving the entities' interactions. Features of our approach include specifying security principles as invariants of some abstract model of the overall system. The specification is then refined to introduce implementable mechanisms for the protocol. A gluing invariant specifies why the protocol achieves the security principle. Security breaches arise as violations of the gluing invariant. We make use of both theorem proving and model checking techniques to analyse our formal model, in particular, to explore the source and consequence of the security attack. To demonstrate the use of our approach we explore the mechanism of a security attack in a network protocol.
Virtual LAN, Security, Event-B, iUML-B
84-98
Snook, Colin
b2055316-9f7a-4b31-8aa1-be0710046af2
Hoang, Thai Son
dcc0431d-2847-4e1d-9a85-54e4d6bab43f
Butler, Michael
54b9c2c7-2574-438e-9a36-6842a3d53ed0
16 May 2017
Snook, Colin
b2055316-9f7a-4b31-8aa1-be0710046af2
Hoang, Thai Son
dcc0431d-2847-4e1d-9a85-54e4d6bab43f
Butler, Michael
54b9c2c7-2574-438e-9a36-6842a3d53ed0
Snook, Colin, Hoang, Thai Son and Butler, Michael
(2017)
Analysing security protocols using refinement in iUML-B.
In,
Barrett, Clark, Davies, Misty and Kahsai, Temesghen
(eds.)
NASA Formal Methods: 9th International Symposium, NFM 2017, Moffett Field, CA, USA, May 16-18, 2017, Proceedings.
(Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 10227)
9th NASA Formal Methods Symposium (16/05/17 - 18/05/17)
Springer, .
(doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57288-8_6).
Record type:
Book Section
Abstract
We propose a general approach based on abstraction and refinement for constructing and analysing security protocols using formal specification and verification. We use class diagrams to specify conceptual system entities and their relationships. We use state-machines to model the protocol execution involving the entities' interactions. Features of our approach include specifying security principles as invariants of some abstract model of the overall system. The specification is then refined to introduce implementable mechanisms for the protocol. A gluing invariant specifies why the protocol achieves the security principle. Security breaches arise as violations of the gluing invariant. We make use of both theorem proving and model checking techniques to analyse our formal model, in particular, to explore the source and consequence of the security attack. To demonstrate the use of our approach we explore the mechanism of a security attack in a network protocol.
Text
VLANTAG_NASA17
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 4 February 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 9 April 2017
Published date: 16 May 2017
Venue - Dates:
9th NASA Formal Methods Symposium, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, United States, 2017-05-16 - 2017-05-18
Keywords:
Virtual LAN, Security, Event-B, iUML-B
Organisations:
Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering, Electronic & Software Systems
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 406508
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/406508
ISSN: 0302-9743
PURE UUID: 2dfb641f-61d1-4537-b7e2-8133af981d30
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 18 Mar 2017 02:21
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 04:22
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Contributors
Author:
Colin Snook
Author:
Thai Son Hoang
Author:
Michael Butler
Editor:
Clark Barrett
Editor:
Misty Davies
Editor:
Temesghen Kahsai
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