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A cooperative game-theoretic approach to the social ridesharing problem

A cooperative game-theoretic approach to the social ridesharing problem
A cooperative game-theoretic approach to the social ridesharing problem
In this work, we adopt a cooperative game theoretic approach in order to tackle the social ridesharing (SR) problem, where a set of commuters, connected through a social network, form coalitions and arrange one-time rides at short notice. In particular, we address two fundamental aspects of this problem. First, we focus on the optimisation problem of forming the travellers' coalitions that minimise the travel cost of the overall system. To this end, we model the formation problem as a Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (GCCF) one, where the set of feasible coalitions is restricted by a graph (i.e., the social network). Our approach allows users to specify both spatial and temporal preferences for the trips. Second, we tackle the payment allocation aspect of SR, by proposing the first approach that computes kernel-stable payments for systems with thousands of agents. We conduct a systematic empirical evaluation that uses real-world datasets (i.e., GeoLife and Twitter). We are able to compute optimal solutions for medium-sized systems (i.e., with 100 agents), and high quality solutions for very large systems (i.e., up to 2000 agents). Our results show that our approach improves the social welfare (i.e., reduces travel costs) by up to 36.22% with respect to the scenario with no ridesharing. Finally, our payment allocation method computes kernel-stable payments for 2000 agents in less than an hour—while the state of the art is able to compute payments only for up to 100 agents, and does so 84 times slower than our approach.
86-117
Bistaffa, Filippo
c3867bb6-ac44-472e-bb89-e5ed315cdedd
Farinelli, Alessandro
d2f26070-f403-4cae-b712-7097cb2e3fc6
Chalkiadakis, Georgios
50ef5d10-3ffe-4253-ac88-fad4004240e7
Ramchurn, Sarvapali
1d62ae2a-a498-444e-912d-a6082d3aaea3
Bistaffa, Filippo
c3867bb6-ac44-472e-bb89-e5ed315cdedd
Farinelli, Alessandro
d2f26070-f403-4cae-b712-7097cb2e3fc6
Chalkiadakis, Georgios
50ef5d10-3ffe-4253-ac88-fad4004240e7
Ramchurn, Sarvapali
1d62ae2a-a498-444e-912d-a6082d3aaea3

Bistaffa, Filippo, Farinelli, Alessandro, Chalkiadakis, Georgios and Ramchurn, Sarvapali (2017) A cooperative game-theoretic approach to the social ridesharing problem Artificial Intelligence Journal., 246, pp. 86-117.

Record type: Article

Abstract

In this work, we adopt a cooperative game theoretic approach in order to tackle the social ridesharing (SR) problem, where a set of commuters, connected through a social network, form coalitions and arrange one-time rides at short notice. In particular, we address two fundamental aspects of this problem. First, we focus on the optimisation problem of forming the travellers' coalitions that minimise the travel cost of the overall system. To this end, we model the formation problem as a Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (GCCF) one, where the set of feasible coalitions is restricted by a graph (i.e., the social network). Our approach allows users to specify both spatial and temporal preferences for the trips. Second, we tackle the payment allocation aspect of SR, by proposing the first approach that computes kernel-stable payments for systems with thousands of agents. We conduct a systematic empirical evaluation that uses real-world datasets (i.e., GeoLife and Twitter). We are able to compute optimal solutions for medium-sized systems (i.e., with 100 agents), and high quality solutions for very large systems (i.e., up to 2000 agents). Our results show that our approach improves the social welfare (i.e., reduces travel costs) by up to 36.22% with respect to the scenario with no ridesharing. Finally, our payment allocation method computes kernel-stable payments for 2000 agents in less than an hour—while the state of the art is able to compute payments only for up to 100 agents, and does so 84 times slower than our approach.

PDF 2017aij - Accepted Manuscript
Restricted to Repository staff only until 24 February 2018.

More information

Accepted/In Press date: 15 February 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 24 February 2017
Published date: 1 May 2017
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 407399
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/407399
PURE UUID: 29bbbbd9-a6c6-4391-b897-112c11e3decc
ORCID for Sarvapali Ramchurn: ORCID iD orcid.org/0000-0001-9686-4302

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 05 Apr 2017 01:07
Last modified: 10 Nov 2017 11:17

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Contributors

Author: Filippo Bistaffa
Author: Alessandro Farinelli
Author: Georgios Chalkiadakis
Author: Sarvapali Ramchurn ORCID iD

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