Beliefs-in-a-Vat
Beliefs-in-a-Vat
The over-arching claim that I intend to defend in this paper is that while widespread ‘local’ error is conceivable, we cannot, in the end, make sense of the radical sceptical idea that all our perceptual beliefs might be false – that no one has, as it were, ever been in touch with an ‘external world’ at all. To this end, I will show that an asymmetry exists between ‘local’ and ‘global’ sceptical scenarios, such that the possibility of ‘local’ error does not imply that ‘global’ error must also be possible. Instead, we will see that what gives rise to the radical sceptical problem is an unquestioned acceptance of the ‘New Evil Genius Thesis’ (NET) – the notion that I and my ‘envatted’ counterpart share the same perceptual experiences, even though my benighted twin has never had any contact with an ‘external’ reality. Although most contemporary epistemologists take NET for granted, I will show that it cannot, ultimately, be rendered intelligible, and, consequently, that neither can the ‘global’ sceptical scenario that depends on it.
radical scepticism, brain-in-a-vat, new evil genius thesis, private language, Davidson, Wittgenstein
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Schönbaumsfeld, Genia
586652b5-20da-47cf-9719-4fc587dfa4e8
Abstract
The over-arching claim that I intend to defend in this paper is that while widespread ‘local’ error is conceivable, we cannot, in the end, make sense of the radical sceptical idea that all our perceptual beliefs might be false – that no one has, as it were, ever been in touch with an ‘external world’ at all. To this end, I will show that an asymmetry exists between ‘local’ and ‘global’ sceptical scenarios, such that the possibility of ‘local’ error does not imply that ‘global’ error must also be possible. Instead, we will see that what gives rise to the radical sceptical problem is an unquestioned acceptance of the ‘New Evil Genius Thesis’ (NET) – the notion that I and my ‘envatted’ counterpart share the same perceptual experiences, even though my benighted twin has never had any contact with an ‘external’ reality. Although most contemporary epistemologists take NET for granted, I will show that it cannot, ultimately, be rendered intelligible, and, consequently, that neither can the ‘global’ sceptical scenario that depends on it.
Text
Beliefs-in-a-Vat II
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 28 February 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 3 October 2017
Keywords:
radical scepticism, brain-in-a-vat, new evil genius thesis, private language, Davidson, Wittgenstein
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 407853
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/407853
PURE UUID: 8203b587-6013-49d8-bf33-ca22d1ea10a2
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Date deposited: 27 Apr 2017 01:06
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 05:15
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