A Defence of R. G. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Art

James Camien McGuiggan

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Abstract
Academic Thesis: Declaration of Authorship

I, James Camien McGuiggan, declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

*This Is Art: A Defence of R. G. Collingwood's Philosophy of Art*

I confirm that:

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
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3. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
4. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
5. I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
6. Where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
7. Parts of this work have been published as 'What Is Collingwood's Project in *The Principles of Art*?'
IN MEMORIAM

Clare Bakhtiar

If a thunderbolt could also be a curling cat,
And a wave, and Frige;
Could also be a tweedclad scholar, ten minutes late;
And reel atop hrimpursar with a still-open heart…
Darling, it’d still not have the half of you.
Sufjan Stevens, ‘I Want to Be Well’
from *The Age of Adz* (2010)
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

Abstract

Faculty of Humanities
Department of Philosophy
Doctor of Philosophy

THIS IS ART: A DEFENCE OF R. G. COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

by James Camien McGuigan

R. G. Collingwood’s *The Principles of Art* argues that art is the expression of emotion. This dissertation offers a new interpretation of that philosophy, and argues that this interpretation is both hermeneutically and philosophically plausible. The offered interpretation differs from the received interpretation most significantly in treating the concept of ‘art’ as primarily scalarly rather than binarily realisable (this is introduced in ch. 1), and in understanding Collingwood’s use of the term ‘emotion’ more broadly (introduced in ch. 2).

After the exposition of ch. 1, the remainder of that chapter and the subsequent three chapters are each centred around one sort of objection. In ch. 1, I consider the objection that Collingwood’s scalar understanding of ‘art’ is deviant and unhelpful. I respond by first observing that the understanding is not deviant, and second that it is more philosophically and artistically illuminating. In ch. 2, I consider the objection that Collingwood’s understanding of ‘emotion’ is so narrow that it fails to do justice to the fact that art can be philosophically potent. I respond that his understanding of ‘emotion’ is broad enough that this objection fails. In ch. 3, I consider the objection that Collingwood has no theoretical room for the *prima facie* plausible thought that some emotions are not worth expressing in art. In response, I reinterpret the points that appear to support this contention in a way that makes them both more plausible and more Collingwoodian. Finally, in ch. 4, I consider the objection that Collingwood does not have the theoretical room to do justice to the value of the delight we take in art. I respond by arguing that although he does not have this room to say that this delight is itself an artistic value, it does yet have an important place in his philosophy.
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Introduction

Robin George Collingwood (1889–1943) was a great systematic mind. Not systematic in the sense that he had a comprehensive and totalising philosophical system – he had no time for such things\(^1\) – but in the sense that he had an astoundingly broad range of interests that he allowed to shine light on one another, giving each a glow of significance. His philosophy of art, of which this dissertation is a defence, illuminates not only the philosophy but the practice of art, and not only art but our shared life, the language with which it is forged, and the task of sustaining it. This is because it is written by not only a philosopher, but by an artist,\(^2\) a cultural historian,\(^3\) and a political activist.\(^4\)

Unfortunately, the subsequent literature on Collingwood has too often treated his works in isolation. This, we shall see, is especially true of his philosophy of art. The result of this is a profound misreading of the nature of his project, and the task of this dissertation is to offer and defend a new reading.

The four chapters of this dissertation fall roughly into two parts. The first chapter is primarily expository, and the latter three primarily each take on an objection that, for all that will have been said by that point, appears pressing. The exposition/criticism division is not nearly as neat as this schema suggests: objections crop up as early as ch.

\(^1\) See his *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (1933/2005; henceforth *EPM*), ch. IX.
\(^2\) Collingwood was a fine musician, painter and draughtsman. See Johnston (1967), pp. 13–4.
\(^3\) His work on archaeology, magic and history is always deeply human. See respectively Johnston (1967), ch. IV; Collingwood (2003); and Collingwood (1946/1994).
\(^4\) For instance, he abandoned his work on the philosophy of history to devote his final years to *The New Leviathan* (1942/1992; henceforth *NL*), explicitly (in the preface) a contribution to the war effort.
1, §1, and the latter chapters serve to bring out more aspects of Collingwood’s philosophy and so serve as further exposition. But such at least is the basic structure.\footnote{It is probably for the good Collingwoodian reason (which he gives in \textit{EPM}) that in philosophy, definition and exposition and criticism are all bound up with each other. But the more immediate (and less controversial) reason is simply that the material lends itself to this structure.}

Three strands run through chapter 1. There is, primarily, the exposition of the key points of Collingwood’s philosophy of art as found in his \textit{The Principles of Art} (1938; henceforth \textit{PA}): Art is the activity or experience wherein we express (or clarify) our emotions. This has to wait until §2, though, as it is preceded by an extended discussion of Collingwood’s philosophical methodology (§1). This methodology is foundational to Collingwood’s entire philosophical system, but has been almost entirely neglected in the reception of his philosophy of art. The close attention we will pay to this methodology will reveal the need to quite radically revise the accepted wisdom about his philosophy of art, and this is why this discussion opens the dissertation. The exposition of Collingwood’s philosophy of art in §2 is sufficiently rudimentary that mindfulness of his philosophical methodology is not immediately required; the limits of our understanding of his philosophy of art \textit{sans} an understanding of his philosophical methodology first become apparent in §3. There, we will see that under the standard methodological interpretation of Collingwood’s philosophy of art, he is unable to avoid a very serious quandary: he claims both that everything we say and do is art, and that only the very greatest of artworks are art. Neither position is plausible, and they are mutually inconsistent to boot. However, by rereading the offending passages through his philosophical methodology, implausibility and inconsistency both disappear.

Out of the frying pan into the fire, though, perhaps. For, as we see in §3.1, now it looks as if Collingwood is giving a perfectly consistent account of something that has got nothing to do with what \textit{we} call ‘art.’ But looks can deceive, and I argue in §3.2 that Collingwood’s use of ‘art’ is actually a perfectly normal use of the term; it is just not the \textit{only} way we use the term. In fact Collingwood’s philosophical methodology allows us to discern and characterise two different uses of the term, which I label ‘C-art’ and ‘D-art.’ It is the former in which Collingwood is interested in his philosophy of art, and in §§3.2-3.4 I argue that he is thereby interested in something that is not only profoundly important, but captures well what we are searching for when we are searching for what makes art in particular important.
A consequence of the radical rereading of Collingwood’s philosophy of art that I present is that most of the usual criticisms of it no longer get off the ground, and so they are answered in the course of the exposition, in footnotes and asides. Therefore, a new way to build the pressure that needs to be applied to any theory for its strength to become manifest is required. I apply the pressure by considering three important things that any philosophy of art must be able to account for if it is to be plausible, but that it appears that Collingwood’s philosophy of art, even under my new reading, cannot account for. In chapter 2, we will consider the ‘philosophical’ or ‘intellectuality’ of art; in chapter 3, we will consider the moral worth of art; and in chapter 4, we will consider the delight or pleasure of art. I will argue that Collingwood can account for them entirely satisfactorily.

Collingwood thinks that art is the expression of emotion; but the way that Collingwood expands this definition, and in particular the way he talks about ‘emotion,’ makes it look as if art and the intellect have got nothing to do with each other. In ch. 2, we will see that this position is wildly implausible: artworks from The Divine Comedy to Fountain are deeply intellectual. The Divine Comedy, for instance, involves detailed exposition of Thomist philosophy. After considering and rejecting the answer Collingwood gives in his early philosophy of art (§1), we will consider the various ways that Collingwood can respond to this objection (§2). Basically, he can either say that artworks such as The Divine Comedy are both artistic and philosophical (the ‘narrow delimitation’ of art that I consider in §2.2), or that the scope of art should be understood as so wide that the ‘philosophical’ aspect of The Divine Comedy is subsumed under art (the ‘broad delimitation’ of art that I consider in §2.3). I argue in §§2.4–2.5 that the broad delimitation is both critically and hermeneutically superior. A consequence of it, however, is that the term ‘emotion,’ which Collingwood uses to refer to what it is that art expresses, refers far more widely than the term does in contemporary discussions of emotion, and so is misleading. So in §3 we consider a number of alternatives, without any real success, and conclude that ‘emotion’ is no worse a term than its obvious alternatives. However, each captures a different aspect of what Collingwood means by ‘art,’ and so the discussion allows us to move freely, and without confusion, between the terms as the need arises.

Chapter 3 opens by considering Roger Scruton’s perceptive criticism of the finale of Tchaikovsky’s “Pathétique” symphony that it looks important that we be able to

6 “I wish for the seedling to become a tree... The tree needs storms, doubts, worms, and nastiness to reveal the nature and the strength of the seedling” (Nietzsche (1889/1974), §106).
make. Scruton argues that the failure of that symphony is moral as well as aesthetic: it expresses its "collusive and self-centred depression" extremely well, to be sure, but art has no business expressing that immoral emotion. (We will refer to this position as 'moralism.') As Collingwood thinks that the only criterion of aesthetic value is how well emotion is expressed, it looks as if he is unable to make the moralist criticism, to the detriment of his theory. However, we will see that Scruton's criticism can be interpreted in a more Collingwoodian way, and that when we interpret it this way we can better explain and ground the criticism. Then, in §1.2, we will consider other examples that could support Scruton's apparent moralism. We will find ourselves unable to say whether these examples support Collingwood's position or its moralist objection, but, as we will see in §1.3, when the moralist demand is divorced from a piece of art criticism such as Scruton's, there is no positive reason to accept it, and so, again, we should hew to Collingwood.

Then, in §2 of this chapter, we will consider some passages in *The Principles of Art* itself that suggest some reasons to doubt Collingwood's claim that only the adequacy of the expression of emotion is aesthetically relevant, namely, that surely it is aesthetically better to express deep and powerful emotions (§2.1), to express emotions about an important subject matter (§2.2), and to express emotions that we share (§2.3). We will see in each case that Collingwood's theory has the resources to do justice to the demands.

In the final, fourth chapter, we will ask whether Collingwood's philosophy of art is too austere: whether it fails to do justice to the importance of 'delight' or 'pleasure' in art. In §1, we will consider an excellent account of the nature and value of delight as it is found in art, after Marcel Proust and David Foster Wallace. In §2.1, we will see that this account has one major *prima facie* objection, and in §2.2, we will see that Proust and Wallace's defence of delight also admits of another interpretation, one which still captures the insight of it, but which is also consistent with Collingwood's claim that the only criterion of aesthetic value is how well it expresses emotion.

In §3, I will allow that this might seem to be cheating: sure, it turns out that Proust and Wallace do not actually defend the nature and value of delight in art; but is there is no-one else around who actually has? Or might not such a defence be founded at any point? Therefore, am I not being too sanguine in considering this objection to

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7 I refrain from using the term 'aesthetic' in the dissertation as it is too vague, generally preferring 'C-artistic'; until the discussion of 'C-artistic' in ch. 1, though, the common term is clearer.
Collingwood’s philosophy of art now dealt with? Perhaps, and so I will argue in this final section that Collingwood actually does give a place to delight in his philosophy of art, and that this place is sufficient to lay to rest any uncomfortableness about his theory in this regard.

This dissertation does not attempt to prove that Collingwood’s philosophy of art is correct. It does not even attempt to prove this philosophy’s superiority over alternative philosophies of art. This is for two reasons. First, too little is said about many parts of Collingwood’s philosophy of art that I consider him or his commentators to have adequately defended. Second, the sheer enormity of the project of demonstrating the superiority of any philosophy of art over the indeterminate number of alternatives renders that goal unachievable in a single dissertation. It is rather the work of a tradition than any single author – and not the tradition of aesthetics alone, even, but also the traditions of philosophical methodology, philosophy of mind, etc., which together with a philosophy of art form the system within which all but the most rudimentary philosophical work must take place – and certainly within which all of Collingwood’s philosophy takes place.

The goals of this dissertation are rather as follows. First, to highlight connections left implicit in Collingwood’s *aevum*. The most important connection is that between *PA* and *EPM*. Collingwood refers to *EPM* a few times in *PA*, but for the most part he appears to assume either that his readers have read *EPM*, or that the methodology he developed there is sufficiently intuitive that no recapitulation is required. Whatever the explanation, the history of the reception of *PA* demonstrates that he misjudged: *PA* has been misunderstood because its philosophical method has been misunderstood. A better reading is needed, and this requires connecting *PA* to *EPM*. Other connections are also forged: between art and philosophy (ch. 2); between Collingwood and contemporary debates about the ethical relevance of art (ch. 3), aesthetic delight or pleasure (ch. 4), and the place of ‘emotion’ in art (ch. 2); between Collingwood’s philosophy and liminal arts (ch. 1, §3.4.3 and *passim*), various important and wise thinkers about art (*passim*), and positions within contemporary philosophical debates outwith the philosophy of art (*passim*); to name just the more significant connections. These connections are not just uncritically noted: in considering what Collingwood has to say about the relevance to art of ‘delight’ (ch. 4) or on whether the subject-matter of

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an artwork is important (ch. 3, §2.2), for instance, I argue for the plausibility of Collingwood’s theory.

A second goal of this dissertation is to respond to influential or plausible objections that have been made against Collingwood’s philosophy of art, or that naturally arise on my proposed reading of it. The latter three chapters are structured around such objections, but I respond to other objections *passim* for instance, David Davies’ interpretation of Collingwood as believing that artworks are performances, which position is implausible (ch. 1, §2.4); or the ‘standard’ objection that Collingwood confuses the descriptive and evaluative senses of the term ‘art’ (ch. 1, §3.1). I hasten to add that I do not defend Collingwood dogmatically, but only because he is so often right. (I occasionally disagree with Collingwood, but not on any matter of substance.)

I have not attempted comprehensiveness in the forging of such connections and responses. In particular, I have spent very little time on the connections and responses that Collingwood himself makes, and on those that have been made adequately by his commentators. As such, this dissertation is best read in tandem with that body of work, to which the reader is directed at the appropriate points. I have also only gestured towards connections beyond the philosophy of art.

The final goal, to which the above two goals can almost be considered the means, is to demonstrate that Collingwood’s philosophy of art, far from being the historical footnote it has been taken to be, or the interesting and insightful but obviously fatally flawed work of a maverick, is a profound and viable way of thinking about that in art which still affects us most deeply. This goal has a negative and positive aspect. Negatively, the goal is to clear away those misreadings and confusions that have hampered a fair reception of Collingwood’s work. Positively, the goal is to sound a fanfare: beneath the dust of neglect lies not a quaint artefact of a philosophy that could, once, have been useful, but which we have gotten by without and which is by now obsolete; no: what we find is a shining stone that can light our way yet.
I

Philosophy and Art

Collingwood’s mature work on the philosophy of art is The Principles of Art (1938; henceforth PA), which concerns itself with what art is and why art matters. It is the task of this dissertation to argue that Collingwood’s theory of the nature and value of art is plausible, and to muster some evidence toward what I believe but cannot argue in this dissertation, that his philosophy of art is more profoundly insightful than any of its currently more popular rivals. So much as understanding his philosophy of art, however, has proven deceptively difficult, and so a second task of this dissertation is to argue for a new reading of it. Collingwood is offering a definition of art, true enough. The introduction of PA opens, after all, with: “The business of this book is to answer the question: ‘What is art?’” And this is indeed his undertaking, under a certain interpretation. But here is the first difficulty – what is that certain interpretation? what is his project? The answer to this question is not obvious, nor can it be given briefly; it will be given over the course of §1. Once we have understood this general project, it will then fall to us to understand what his definition amounts to. Collingwood says what art is a few times throughout PA: “By creating for ourselves an imaginary experience or activity, we express our emotions; and this is what we call art” (p. 151); “The aesthetic experience, or artistic activity, is the experience of expressing one’s emotions; and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language or art” (p. 275). These expressions, though, are not terribly transparent (I have not encountered, nor been able to concoct, any more transparent ex-
pression); and insofar as there is a natural interpretation of them, it has little connection with what they in fact mean. Our second difficulty, then, is to establish what the terms of the definition mean; not just ‘expression,’ ‘emotion’ and ‘imagination,’ but ‘art’ and even the definitional ‘is.’ This will be the subject of §2 (and ch. 2). In §3, we will consider how, given the understanding of Collingwood’s project developed in §1 and the definition given in §2, Collingwood’s philosophy of art connects to our lived artistic lives.

To §1, then. Understanding what Collingwood’s project in PA is requires taking a step back from the philosophy of art and seeing what kind of thing he understands his (or even a) philosophical project to be in general. Before expositing Collingwood’s philosophy of art, therefore, we need to turn to his account of his philosophical method.

1. Collingwood’s Philosophical Method

Collingwood is an unashamedly systematic philosopher (see An Essay on Philosophical Method (1933; henceforth EPM), ch. IX), which means of course that each part of his philosophical system needs to be considered in light of the whole. To my knowledge, only one discussion of Collingwood’s philosophy of art does this, and this discussion takes place toward the end of a book which is primarily about Collingwood’s philosophy in general, and has had little if any impact on Collingwood’s reception in academic philosophy of art. Unsurprisingly, then, Collingwood is almost universally misunderstood by contemporary philosophers of art; as we will see over the course of developing the more accurate reading of this dissertation. However, and fortunately,

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9 Or so I suspect – but I am not really sure, any more, how someone coming to Collingwood for the first time would read them.

10 The book is Louis O. Mink’s superb Mind, History and Dialectic (1969). Collingwood’s best defenders in contemporary aesthetics are probably Aaron Ridley and Jenefer Robinson, neither of whom mention Mink’s work or Collingwood’s methodology. The same is true for those few other texts in contemporary aesthetics which discuss Collingwood’s philosophy of art in any detail. See, e.g., Graham (2000), S. Davies (1994) and (2006), and Kemp (2012). Sparshott’s monumental but itself neglected The Theory of the Arts (1982) is the exception here – Sparshott even acknowledges that EPM is “fundamental for all of Collingwood’s mature philosophy” (p. 327) – and so I will return to this work as its objections are pertinent.
we do not need to give a full and detailed account of every part of Collingwood’s philosophical system in order to understand his philosophy of art. In this section, I will focus on the most pertinent parts of his philosophical methodology, namely the ‘overlap of classes’ and the ‘scale of forms.’ Naturally, given Collingwood’s philosophy’s systematicity, the various parts interrelate; as such, the discussion will hop back and forth a bit, and we will encounter other relevant parts of his philosophical methodology much later in the dissertation. But the lion’s share of the relevant parts of Collingwood’s philosophical method will be exposited now.\textsuperscript{11}

I will do relatively little by way of defence of Collingwood’s methodology. My main concern is to make clear what his methodological claims are, that we might understand his philosophy of art. This exposition will require some critical engagement, and defending his philosophy of art of course requires defending those methodological commitments on which it is built. But the focus of the dissertation will not lie here.

\textbf{I.I}

In science and philosophy both, we classify; we group things (objects, animals, concepts, whatever) together in virtue of them having some commonality. But in the sciences, Collingwood observes, classification obeys a number of rules that philosophical classification does not. First, scientific concepts within a genus and at the same level of generality do not overlap (or very rarely do),\textsuperscript{12} but philosophical concepts do this as

\textsuperscript{11} My reading of Collingwood’s methodology is, except where noted, consonant with Mink (1969), which is to my mind still the best exposition of it. D’Oro and Connelly (2015, §2) is also excellent, as is their Editor’s Introduction to the 2005 edition of EPM.

Collingwood changes his mind on a number of philosophical matters throughout his life. I will note changes of mind as and when they arise, but his methodology changed very little from EPM through to \textit{PA} and even his later work (although, as he died only five or six years after writing \textit{PA}, there is not much time for further change), so we can treat what he says in \textit{EPM} to be more or less his mature methodological position. (There are more striking changes between his methodology as expounded in \textit{EPM} and what he says in his earlier works such as \textit{Speculum Mentis} (1924) and \textit{An Outline of a Philosophy of Art} (1925/1964), but I will not discuss these changes here.)

\textsuperscript{12} Collingwood sometimes allows that there may be cases in which scientific concepts can overlap (\textit{EPM}, ch. II. §13), but other times denies this (\textit{EPM}, p. 54, where he says that such an overlap is “unthinkable”). The matter, though, is immaterial, because Collingwood is not really interested in giving an accurate account of scientific classification. His concern is rather to
a matter of course. (EPM, ch. II) Consider, as an example of scientific classification, apples. We classify apples into a number of species (or cultivars): Granny Smith, Golden Delicious, and so on. If something is a member of one species, it is not also a member of another species under the same genus. So if a cultivar is a Granny Smith, then it cannot also be a Golden Delicious. It may be similar to a Golden Delicious in its taste or texture, but it can never be a Golden Delicious while also being a Granny Smith. Similarly, an animal cannot be both a mammal and a reptile, both a domestic cat (Felis catus) and a wildcat (Felis silvestris). (This is not to deny that there can be cases that are hard to determine—e.g., whether a platypus is a mammal or a reptile, whether Pluto is a planet, or whether Felis catus is a subspecies of Felis silvestris—because of a poor epistemic situation or an inadequate classificatory system.) However, not everything is adequately classified in this way, and Collingwood contends that philosophy has traditionally been interested in things which are not so classifiable.\(^{13}\) To take the example of the concept of goodness: An act is never only one of either good or bad; rather, every act is somewhere between being perfectly good and perfectly bad, better than some possible alternative acts and good to that extent, but worse than some other possible alternative acts and bad to that extent. The concept of ‘art’—to anticipate what we will consider in detail later\(^{14}\)—has the same structure: it is not something done only by some people (e.g., artists), but something done, to some extent, by everyone whenever they act—but this is not to deny that we simultaneously do other things, or that our actions have other aspects.

Second, whereas every member of a species is equally a member of that species in scientific classification, members of species can be so to a greater or lesser extent in

\(^{13}\) He is not particular about whether philosophical concepts always or only normally function in the way he describes, or about whether this is to do with the essence of philosophy or to do with it as it has historically emerged. (See, e.g., EPM, p. 32 for a typically ‘hedged’ mode of expression.) He does not say anything about why he keeps quiet about these choices, but his methodological arguments do not require him to commit himself to any of these positions.

\(^{14}\) Where I will refer to as ‘C-art’ what I refer to here as ‘art’.
philosophical classification (EPM, ch. III).\textsuperscript{15} Every Granny Smith is equally a Granny Smith if it is a Granny Smith at all; ice, water and steam are equally H\textsubscript{2}O; however much it may be uncertain how to classify a marginal species such as ‘platypus’, whichever class it is a member of it is a full member of. Not every good act, however, is equally good; not everything beautiful is equally beautiful. That goodness and beauty come in degrees (that they are ‘differentially’ or ‘scalarly’ realisable) is incontrovertible, but what, precisely, does this mean? Does it mean that although a moderately good act does not have as much goodness as a saintly act, it equally partakes of the concept of goodness, or has goodness equally truly predicated of it? Or is it not only that a moderately good act not only has less goodness than a saintly act, but is less truly good at all? To make sense of what Collingwood means here, we need to turn elsewhere, to what he calls the ‘scale of forms’ (EPM, p. 57).

Some species of a genus differ from each other quantitatively (books of different sizes), and some things differ from each other qualitatively (a parabola and a circle). Some species of a genus, however, differ from each other in both ways. Ice is not only colder than liquid water\textsuperscript{16} (a quantitative difference), but solid rather than liquid (a qualitative difference). When a genus contains species which differ from each other both qualitatively and quantitatively, Collingwood calls the system a scale of forms. This is a system in which (a) the members of the species all embody what Collingwood calls the ‘generic essence’ (\textit{ibid.}) but differ relative to some variable attribute, and (b) the forms are connected in such a way that they replace each other as the variable changes on reaching certain ‘critical points.’ So ice and liquid water are both H\textsubscript{2}O, but differ relative to their matter state (more generally, their form), and replace each other at the freezing/melting point. To give another example (also Collingwood’s (\textit{ibid.})), we can have a genus of ‘taxable income,’ with species of the different incomes, which all share the generic essence of being taxable income, but differ relative to the variable

\textsuperscript{15}The claim about ‘scientific classification’ here is probably false, if ‘scientific’ includes whatever sort of classification people do under empirical psychological observation. Psychological evidence is strong that people often consider category membership variable, even with regard to categories that look surely ‘scientific’ rather than ‘philosophical,’ e.g., ‘bird’ or ‘vegetable.’ See Lakoff (1973), Rosch and Mervis (1975). This is not of concern to Collingwood (\textit{e.s. n. 12}), although if Lakoff is still right that philosophers by and large think that category-membership is binary (as he claims on p. 458) then it is grist to Collingwood’s mill if this is an odd position to hold from the point of view of linguistic felicity.

\textsuperscript{16}At the same atmospheric pressure, etc.
of the rate at which they are taxable. (Obviously, not every quantitative change in a scale of forms need coincide with a qualitative change.)

Scales of forms are somewhat unusual: not every genus has a scale of forms. (I cannot think of any in the genus (or class) mammal.) But neither are they peculiar to philosophy. What is peculiar to philosophical scales of forms is that, whereas in non-philosophical scales of forms the variable relative to which the species of a genus differ from each other is extraneous to the generic essence, in philosophical scales of forms the variable relative to which the species differ from each other is identical with the generic essence (EPM, ch. III.§1.5-6). Take again the example of H2O. Ice, water and steam vary relative to temperature, but temperature is no part of the definition of H2O. Ice, water and steam are all equally H2O because they do not differ relative to anything essential to H2O. Take, by contrast, a philosophical concept – Plato's notion of truth or reality (again, this example is Collingwood’s (EPM, ch. III.§1.6)\(^\text{17}\)). The scale of forms of reality in Books VI-VII of The Republic has as its variable something Plato variously refers to as ‘truth’ (ἀλήθεια (aletheia)),'definiteness'(σαφήνεια (saphénæia)), or, of course, ‘reality’ (οὐσία (ousia)). The nature of the physical world is such that it is confused and indeterminate, not ‘genuinely’ or ‘ultimately’ real.\(^\text{18}\) This ‘reality’ is, however, participated in by the Forms. But this reality is not only the variable, participated in by the Forms to a higher degree than by the physical world; it is also the generic essence participated in (to a greater or lesser degree) by all the species of the genus. What is shared by both the Forms and the physical world, such that we can classify them together, is just that they are both real – they both participate in that generic essence – but what separates them is again just reality – they vary in their participation of that essence.

\(^{17}\) Or rather, Collingwood seems to elide two examples of his point: the scales of forms of reality and of knowledge. In the below I separate them, although Collingwood's elision is not as unfair to Plato as it might seem to modern ears. See White (1992).

\(^{18}\) Ultimately' and 'genuinely' are Lee's terms (Plato (c. 380BC/1955/2003): pp. 194-5). Lee also sometimes translates ἀλήθεια as 'genuine' (cf. 510a). Vlastos (1965, p. 1) uses the adjectives 'completely,' 'purely,' 'perfectly,' and 'really'.

It should also be noted here that Collingwood's interpretation of what it is about the Forms that make them real in a way that the physical world is not is controversial. (Cf. White (1992) for an alternative account.) For our purposes, it is enough that Plato has the notion that reality can come in degrees, and that the generic essence and variable are identical. On this point Collingwood's position is mainstream.
Corresponding to this scale of forms is the scale of forms of knowledge, whose variable is clarity, lucidity or precision (σαφήνευσι/sapheneia (478c, 51τε)). Because of the imperfection of the physical world, the way in which we know it is correspondingly less perfect than the way in which we know, say, the Forms, even when we are not mistaken about what we know, and even when we are fully justified in our belief. But if we cannot really know the physical world, then our 'knowledge' is missing something that would make it more truly knowledge; that something is participated in by knowledge of the Forms, which knowledge is the highest species of the genus. The variable which prevents knowledge of physical things from being truly knowledge is clarity. But, again, to be clear that something is so is just to know it: clarity is the generic essence as well as the genus.

Collingwood gives other examples of philosophers who have treated other philosophical concepts as possessing this structure (EPM, ch. III, §1.4-6 and passim), but I will not repeat the examples. This is because it is immaterial, for my purposes,

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19 Clarity is Lee's term and Shorey's (Plato c. 380BC/1969 at τις; 'lucidity' and 'precision' are Shorey's at τις. Note how σαφήνευσι can be applied both to the world and our thoughts about the world. For more on σαφήνευσι in Plato, see Lesher (2013), and in Aristotle, Lesher (2010).

20 Mink (1969, p. 67) goes slightly wrong here. Collingwood's claim is not just that what is possessed by the species higher up a scale of forms more fully instantiates the variable possessed to some degree by every species in the genus, as Mink claims Collingwood claims: it is also that this variable is the generic essence itself.

21 I will, however, briefly add to Collingwood's examples, to demonstrate that his position here is even more common than he takes it to be, and crops up in even more philosophical traditions.

First, 'epistemic contextualism,' the view that knowledge-ascription is properly context-dependent, is a live option in contemporary Analytic epistemology. There are a huge variety of views of this sort on offer, though, which are variably consonant with Collingwood's methodology, and I will not go into this here; but any position that considers knowledge to be ascribed contextually but epistemically non-arbitrarily will be in broad agreement with Collingwood here. See Rysiew (2011). Second, some philosophers see personhood as differentially realisable. Scruton (who is in this respect, as is Collingwood, Hegelian) endorses this view (1978, p. 225). A notion of personhood consonant with this part of Collingwood's methodology is also found in Akan philosophy: see Wingo (2006). Third, 'responsibility,' one of the most important moral and legal terms, is naturally understood in a scalar way: adults are more responsible for their
whether Collingwood is right that this structure is (taken to be) common or universal among philosophical concepts: it is enough that some of them are plausibly sometimes so structured, because I am keen here only to show that it is plausible that a philosophical concept might be structured this way. This is because, as we shall see, Collingwood believes that ‘art’ is structured in this way.

It is worth making clear at this point that Collingwood is not attempting to monopolise the usage of the concepts that he says have the ‘scale of forms’ structure. He allows that concepts may have different ‘phases’ (EPM: ch. II. §2.4–6). He does not say what these are, or how many of them concepts have, but he mentions scientific and philosophical phases. His thought seems to be that we categorise to certain ends, and that depending on the ends of a particular science (construed so as to include at least philosophy), conceptualisation will work differently; but the concept-term is not therefore simply equivocal. Rather, Collingwood seems to think that such concept-terms refer to polysemous concepts, whose various ‘phases’ or ‘aspects’ are at play in different contexts. ‘Matter’ is one example, used in Newtonian physics to refer to “a certain class of things, separate from other classes of things, such as minds, and appearances like colours or sounds”, but used in the corresponding metaphysics “it is the name of reality as a whole” (p. 34). Another example – to briefly anticipate – is art, which “for the critic, is a highly specialized thing, limited to a small and select body of works outside which lie all the pot-boilers and failures of artists, and the inartistic expressions of everyday life; for the aesthetic philosopher, these too are art, which becomes a thread running all through the fabric of the mind’s activity” (p. 35). Neither the scientist nor the art critic is obliged to use the concepts as the philosopher does.22

What we have said about the scalar realisation of philosophical concepts might seem implausible (as Collingwood entertains in ch. III. §2.7). To return to the example of Plato: the scientist who knows that, say, the chemical structure of oxygen is so-and-so, if she knows it at all, just knows it. What could it mean for her to know it to only some degree? And what could it be for oxygen to be real only to a certain degree? Surely it either exists or it doesn’t. To answer this, we must turn to Collingwood’s account of how philosophical concepts relate to each other.

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22 We will return to the notion that concepts can have different phases, that may come apart, in greater detail in §3.4.
Briefly, he thinks that, in philosophical concepts, (1) differences of kind and of degree (viz., of qualitative and quantitative difference respectively) always come together: every philosophical difference between two species of a philosophical genus is both (ch. III.§3.14-16); and (2) distinction and opposition also always come together: every philosophical concept within a class is both distinct from and opposed to everything else in the class (ch. III.§3.17-18). (1): Collingwood gives the example of felt heat: if we put our hand into a basin of 20°C water, and then into a basin of 40°C water, the latter experience will be one of greater heat – and so a quantitative difference – but also a different type of heat – we may find the former uncomfortably chilly, the latter pleasantly warm. Considering a similar example, Collingwood writes, “I can detect as many differences in kind as I can detect differences of degree; and these are not two sets of differences” – as would be the two sets of differences between ice at -1°C and water at 1°C – “but one single set.” (ch. III.§3.15) Felt heat is, of course, not philosophical, and so this feature is not suspiciously unique to philosophical concepts. Neither is (2). Felt heat and felt cold again have this characteristic: ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ are opposed to each other, opposites, as well as being different. Relative to the basin of 40°C water we might say the water in the basin of 20°C water feels cold, and relative to that water we might say that the water in the former basin feels hot. ‘Hot’ and ‘cold’ are here opposed. 

In physical (i.e., not felt) heat, opposition and distinction are two separate modes of difference. The molecules of water in the basin of 20°C water vibrate more slowly than those in the basin of 40°C water, and in that respect the water in the two basins are distinct but not opposed – there is no ‘opposite’ of 40°C – but under another aspect we can attend to the fact that the warmer water has a certain amount of heat that the cooler water does not, and under this aspect there is opposition – having heat is opposed to having no heat. Both the felt and physical heat in the basins of water differ by both opposition and distinction, then, but only in the case of felt heat are opposition and distinction ‘fused.’

Plato can again furnish us with a philosophical example of these two principles. The four modes of reality adumbrated in the Divided Line analogy differ not only in that the Forms are more real than physical objects, but also in that they exist in a different sway: they are abstract rather than physical. And relative to the Forms, physical objects are not just ‘less real’ (and so distinct) but unreal (and so opposed). Consider also goodness. Faced with the choice of either communicating or withholding a hard but important truth, the latter option is not just ‘less good’ or ‘the worse option’ – which it is – but also, relative to the former option, positively bad, and so opposed; and
this is entirely consistent with that option being better than still other options, such as shooting our interlocutor and good relative thereto. Neither is telling the truth just the same sort of goodness except more so: it is forthright rather than assuasive, and manifests the different sort of moral character indicated by the rich difference between these two terms.

We can now make sense of the thought that a generic essence can be realised to degrees, and so that species can be members of a class to degrees. The degrees are not of percentages or anything so calculable: it is not a matter of certain acts being $x\%$ good or certain artworks being $n$ beautiful. It is rather a complex matter, in which certain species of a genus exhibit or instantiate the generic essence relative to certain other species which correlativeiy do not exhibit that generic essence, but which in turn exhibit the essence relative to other species which exhibit it less still. But this relation is only inadequately so described: it is also a matter of various species all possessing the generic essence but to various degrees. Collingwood says by way of illustration: “Every achievement of truth involves combating some particular error, which again is regarded not as one among possible errors, still less as (what incidentally it always is) a partial and fragmentary truth, but as identical with error at large.” (EPM, p. 84) One might again put it this way: when considering two species in a genus, everything they share is taken for granted; wherein they differ is the grounds on which we say one does and the other does not embody the essence of the genus to which they both belong. Even from the perspective of the whole scale, though, we cannot speak of percentages or suchlike; the relative embodiment of the generic essence is as precise as one can be. This is because philosophical scales of forms are infinite. There can be no highest or lowest point on the scale (EPM, ch. III. §5) – or rather, there can be, but it is infinitely removed, in God’s realm alone. This non-quantifiable infinity of variable conceptual realisation is of relevance to Collingwood’s philosophy of art for two reasons: first, there is something jarring or infelicitous in the thought that some things are artworks to some precise extent. Asking whether a poor (what might be called liminal) work of art (say, McGonagall’s The Tay Bridge Disaster) is art or not, it seems that one answer we ought not to be able to give is, “It is $x\%$ art.” Collingwood’s methodology does not allow us to give this bad answer, while still doing justice to our discomfort regarding its art status. What he would say instead is that compared to a masterpiece, McGonagall’s poetry is not art, but that compared to a ‘mere thing’ such as a rock, it is; and also that it is less art than a masterpiece, more art than a rock. Second, the infinity of realisation gives Collingwood a quick route to the claim that art is ubiquitous in human
activity and expression. In vanishingly artistic cases, in which it is hard to discern any creativity at all, Collingwood would say that it is a case of infinitesimal rather than no artistry. However, although Collingwood is clearly keen to say that art is ubiquitous among human action and experience, the rest of his theory can equally well cope if art is just very common, with the label of ‘art’ withheld from these liminal cases altogether, and so I will not consider this point further.

1.2 Summary

What I hope the foregoing demonstrates is that Collingwood’s philosophical method is prima facie plausible: it is clear, prima facie consistent, and a good account of many philosophers’ implicit philosophical method. It has been a quick and partial exposition, but this dissertation is not primarily a defence of Collingwood’s philosophical method, and so I will not explicitly inquire any more deeply into it. We will, however, return to it, and apply it, throughout this dissertation, and this will constitute an indirect further defence of it, insofar as one important test of a method is how well it allows us to get on with doing precise and illuminating philosophy. We turn now to an exposition of the basics of Collingwood’s philosophy of art.

2. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Art

What then is Collingwood’s philosophy of art? The simple answer is that it is his answer to the question, ‘What is art?’ (“The business of this book is to answer the question: What is art?” (PA, p. 1)) But this is twice ambiguous. It is first ambiguous between the definitional question, ‘What is it for something to be art?’—which assumes that we can reliably distinguish art from non-art and asks what grounds the distinction—and the classificatory question, ‘Which of these are art?’, which asks to find out whether whatever thing at hand is art. And, as we can now see from discussion of Collingwood’s methodology, the question is also ambiguous between what ‘phase’ of the concept ‘art’ Collingwood has in mind. Is it the scientific phase, the philosophical phase, or some other phase (the ‘art-critical’ phase)? That is, is Collingwood trying to sepa-

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23 Collingwood is aware of and discusses this ambiguity (PA, ch. 1, §1).
rate all those things that are ‘art’ from those that are not, much as a taxonomist separates mammals from other classes? or is he trying to find something that is more pervasive, as goodness and truth are? Given that \( PA \) is a work of philosophy, we might think that he is surely engaged in the philosophical phase of the concept. But on the other hand, \( PA \) is also a book directed toward artists and critics, and one that Collingwood wrote because of a resurgence in the England of the time of art and reflection on art—art here narrowly understood as poetry, drama, painting, sculpture and the like (\( PA \), pp. v-vi). This suggests that Collingwood’s inquiry is into art as a discrete activity, practiced by those few people who are called poets, playwrights, painters, sculptors and so on, in their writing of poems and so on; not everyone always. I will argue that he is in fact engaged in both of these projects: he is interested in both the scientific and philosophical phases of ‘art.’ This argument will have to wait, however, till §3, after I have explicated the details of his philosophy of art.

We now better understand what question Collingwood says it is the business of \( PA \) to answer. Next, we must answer it. I have said in the introduction that Collingwood’s answer—in one expression, “[t]he aesthetic experience, or artistic activity, is the experience of expressing one’s emotions; and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language or art” (\( PA \), p. 275)—requires exposition of every term before we can even roughly grasp its meaning. This exposition, which will take us into his philosophy of mind, is the next task.\(^{24}\)

2.1 Emotion

I start with emotion, i.e., that which is expressed in art. Emotion, as Collingwood uses the term, has its roots in feeling, which he distinguishes from thinking (\( PA \), pp. 157ff.). He observes that we can use ‘feeling’ broadly to encompass everything with a phenomenal character, from feeling emotions to feeling sensations: we say we feel hot or cold, and we could say that we ‘feel’ smells, colours and sounds in the same way. (We do not use ‘feel’ so broadly in English, but we use other words that are general over heat/cold and sight/hearing/smell/taste, e.g., ‘sense.’) The problem with this term is that ‘sense’ cannot be used felicitously and without change of meaning with regard to emotion. This linguistic awkwardness does not worry Collingwood, and he happily claims

\(^{24}\)In the following, I rely primarily on the account Collingwood offers in Bk. II of \( PA \), but see also the largely consonant account (if expressed in different terms and to different ends) in Part I, and esp. chs. III-VI, of \( NL \). See also Dreisbach (2009), ch. 2.
that feeling emotions and feeling what we feel through our senses are of a genus.) To distinguish feeling emotion from feeling through our senses, he adopts the terminology that we feel emotions and sense what he calls sensa (singular: sensum). Sensa are roughly sense data, but he considers that term misleading (see pp. 169, 196, 214). Collingwood propaedeutically distinguishes feeling from thinking by saying that thinking, unlike feeling, admits of failure: “what... may be called mis-thinking or thinking wrong” (p. 157). Further, thinking is public in the sense that it is coherent to speak of different people thinking the same or contrary thoughts. Therefore, thoughts can be in contradiction with each other. Collingwood illustrates this contrast by noting that two people, if in the same room, can disagree over what the thermometer temperature is, in which case at least one of their thoughts will be mistaken; but they cannot disagree over whether that temperature feels warm or cold to each of them themselves, though they may differ over it, if one feels warm and the other cold (p. 158).

This distinction between thinking and feeling—which correspond to what Collingwood calls the ‘psychical’ and ‘intellectual’ levels of the mind respectively—made, Collingwood then argues that emotion and sensation are related very closely in our experience and in a particular way: “When an infant is terrified at the sight of a scarlet curtain blazing in the sunlight, there are not two distinct experiences in its mind, one a sensation of red and the other an emotion of fear: there is only one experience, a terrifying red.” (p. 161) The sensation is logically prior to the emotion, in the sense that emotions have to be about, or have to attend on, something; so Collingwood refers to the emotional aspect of the experience as the ‘emotional charge’ on the sensum (p. 162). The priority is logical, though, not temporal. We feel the emotion immediately on our sensing the sensum. Note that this distinction is purely formal, and so offers almost nothing regarding the content of sensa and emotions. This puts Collingwood’s use of ‘emotion’ at odds with the terminology of contemporary philosophy. We will return to the oddness of this understanding of ‘emotion’ at length in ch. 2, where we will see (in §3) that ‘emotion’ is a terrible term for what Collingwood is trying to pick out; but for now I beg the reader’s patience as I follow Collingwood’s terminology.

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25 This ‘aboutness’ is not strongly intentional: Collingwood is not claiming that we have to judge sensa as terrifying in the way that anger requires a judgement of something like that we have been wronged; the point is the minimal one that emotions can never be entirely free-floating.
The next step is that “every sensum presents itself to [us] bearing a peculiar emotional charge… sensation and emotion, thus related, are twin elements in every experience of feeling.” (pp. 162–3, emphasis added) Collingwood concedes that this is hard to verify, though he seems quite certain that sensa at least normally have an emotional charge (\textit{NL}, chs. 4.11, 5.55). Indeed, this is impossible to verify, as the psychical level of consciousness is beyond our ken (\textit{v.i. n. 26}). His strong claim is not necessary to his theory of art, however, and he does not build anything on it; as such, I will leave it be. What he does need is the claim that emotion always arises (at least indirectly) from this attendance on sensa, and he argues for this not by claiming to have insight into inaccessible sensa but by pointing out that an emotion not attendant on some sensum is oxymoronic.

All this takes place on the ‘psychical’ level of experience, “which exists and functions below the level of thought and is unaffected by it.” (p. 163) The other, higher level of experience, that of thought, is divided into two ‘sub-levels’ of experience. The lower of these is the level of imagination or consciousness, the higher the level of intellect (p. 171). Intellect is the level of experience where most of what we would recognise as thought takes place: developing concepts, asking questions, making judgements, etc. This does not play a significant role in Collingwood’s philosophy of art, and we need not consider it here. (We will, however, return to the role of the intellect in art in ch. 2.) The ‘imagination,’ though, is far more pertinent, because it is on this level of the mind that art takes place.

Consciousness is how feeling is transformed into ‘ideas,’ which are on the level of imagination or consciousness (pp. 171, 215). Sensa are fleeting and so, as sensa, ungraspable.\footnote{If sensa are ungraspable, how can we talk about them at all? Or, what amounts to the same question, is Collingwood committing himself here (as Ridley (1998, §1) claims he does) to the implausible thesis that we have conceptually unmediated experience of the world? Collingwood does not discuss this question, and he doesn’t go out of his way to distance himself from the suggestion, but he has a few ways out. One could first read him as treating sensa as theoretical postulates. That is, anything of which we can have conscious experience is conceptually mediated in some way, but there must be something – sensa – ‘behind’ or ‘before’ this. If we see something even as a red patch, this seeing is mediated by concepts, e.g., ‘red’ and ‘patch,’ but there must be something behind this that leads us to that sight – even if we’re blind and are being sent our ‘vision’ of the red patch through some system of electrodes. (That he is so confident in speaking about the properties of sensa (both in \textit{Pa} and in \textit{NL}, ch. 4) could then}
need to apply various concepts to it: see that humans have bounded it by a hedge, see
that the same lawn exists at different times, and so on. But this cannot be done with
mere sensa, which, being fleeting, do not admit of any conceptualisation: as soon as
my sensation of the lawn passes, it passes. As sensation, it leaves no trace; there is no
material for me to conceptualise. Consciousness is the capacity whereby this flux of
feeling is calmed: it is the process of attending to sensa, by which we become aware of
them (pp. 170, 206). It thus allows us to attend to these sensa, which are now become
ideas, and to remember them when they are no longer before us. (Part of this process
is ignoring. When we attend to the lawn, we focus on it and so ignore other sensa,
such as of the windowsill, the sky, birdsong, and so on. But these ignored sensa are not
left at the level of psychical experience. We rather attend to them enough to consider
that they are not worth attending to further. “[W]e cannot ignore a thing unless we
give it a certain degree and a peculiar kind of attention.” (p. 205)) ‘Ideas’ are important
for Collingwood’s philosophy of art, because it is they, rather than sensa, that he says
it is art’s goal is to express.

As pure feeling is not conceptually mediated, truth and falsity cannot be applied to
this level of experience. That is, our sensa are just given. They cannot be misleading,
because they do not suggest any interpretation. Consciousness transforms feeling into
imagination, but it is the intellect (or ‘reason’) which relates these ideas to each other
and organises them according to concepts that can be adequate or inadequate (ch.
VIII, §3; p. 216). It might seem then that truth and falsity cannot be applied to ideas
any more than to sensa. I look out my window and see a budding tree. I may be mis-
taken in various ways – what I call a tree may in fact be a bush, or what I think is my
window could in fact be a sophisticated television screen. But this kind of judgement
is made at the level of intellect. At the level of consciousness, all we say is that I feel
this, and am aware that I am feeling it. It is hard to see how we can be mistaken here.

be explained as justified by extrapolation.) Alternatively, we could read Collingwood as saying
that sensa strictly speaking do not exist, but that some pseudo-sensa are less conceptually
mediated than others, and that imagination/consciousness (see just below in the main text for
explication of these terms) brings pseudo-sensa from relatively unmediated to relatively me-
diated levels of our minds. From the point of view of strict hermeneutics and his philosophy
of mind, there could be disagreement about which of these alternatives is superior. (Black
(1982) seems to synthesise them.) However, because his philosophy of art, as we will see below,
is concerned with the imaginative level of the mind, what account of the psychical level we
adopt is somewhat free.
However, in one of the most important and impassioned sections of *PA* (ch. X, §7), Collingwood insists that we can indeed be mistaken here. On the psychical level of experience, we do not think anything about what we feel: we just feel. At the level of consciousness, we are aware of our feeling, and aware of it as ours, and so think, for example, ‘I feel this.’ But this thought is, if not as conscious as I have suggested by articulating it in English, still conceptual, and so still negatable: one can also think, correspondingly, ‘I do not feel not-this’ and here there is room for truth and falsity at the level of consciousness. When we feel something that we do not want to feel, we may refuse to acknowledge that we feel it, and so attempt to ignore it as we ignore those things which are genuinely of no concern to us, such as the shape of a cloud. When we feel something that we refuse to acknowledge, however, simply ignoring it is impossible: we have already started the process of converting it to the level of consciousness, so all we can now do is disown it (p. 218). We shall have cause to return to this phenomenon of disowning what one feels in §3.3.11 for now, we only need note that Collingwood calls it the corruption of consciousness (p. 217).

Now, just as sensa all have emotional charges, so do ideas. We can have psychical emotions in response to ideas, but we can also have ‘emotions of consciousness’ (p. 232), which, unlike psychical emotions, admit of imaginative expression (on which shortly). These emotions are distinguished from psychical emotions by the fact that they “arise only through a consciousness of self.” (p. 231) Consider anger: it attends not on bare sensa, but on our consciousness that, say, some injustice or dishonour has been done to someone in whom we feel ourselves invested (e.g., us). It is both these emotions of consciousness and psychical emotions as attended-to and so brought to the level of consciousness, that are what Collingwood says it is the business of art to express (pp. 238, 273).

### 2.2 Expression

Accordingly, ‘emotion’ is one of the most important concepts in Collingwood’s philosophy of art. It is also, though, one the most difficult to understand, and the above exposition is woefully inadequate. The extent of this inadequacy will be revealed in ch. 2, which will be largely devoted to ‘emotion.’ But this detailed discussion cannot be done without first giving an overview of the rest of Collingwood’s philosophy of art, and so we will put ‘emotion’ on the long finger now and turn to ‘expression,’ the other key term in his definition of art as ‘the expression of emotion.’ First, we will consider
the most basic sort of expression, psychical expression. An instance of this is the way
our face may turn white if we are scared. This pallor is commonly said to be an expres-
sion of fear; in Collingwood’s account, it is specifically a psychical expression of that
fear, because it “occurs independently of consciousness and is a feature of experience
at its purely psychical level” (PA, p. 229), and is beyond our control (p. 234). Every sen-
sum has both a corresponding emotional charge and a psychical expression (p. 230).
This psychical expression need not be dramatic: as in the above case of being scared,
the expression may be as commonplace as a pallor, or a quickening of our heart; it may
even be a glandular discharge.27

To imaginative experience, then, and its expression: Imaginative expression is the
expression that goes on in what Collingwood calls art.28 Imaginative expression cor-
responds to the level of consciousness, and psychical and imaginative expression are
related to each other in a similar way to how psychical and imaginative experience are
related. Psychical and imaginative experience differ in that imaginative experience is
somewhat under our control (we can focus on, ignore and disown ideas; and attention,

27 Collingwood is quite definite that every sensum has both an emotional charge and a psy-
chical expression, but offers little justification. It appears that he considers psychical experience
to by definition have this tripartite structure of sensum, emotional charge and expression. Pos-
sibly, though, his claim is an empirical psychological claim. Either way, though, his position
seems unjustified. If it is taken to be an empirical claim, it is in need of empirical evidence
that Collingwood does not supply – and, if we understand psychical experience strictly, this
evidence may not even be accessible (v.s. n. 26). If it is a conceptual claim, though, then what
is the philosophical evidence? Presumably, it is the plausibility of Collingwood’s general phi-
losophy of mind of which it is a part. But how does the general theory support the particular
claim? The only evidence I can find is the theoretical parsimony of having a parallel structure
between the psychical and imaginative (on which below) levels of mind; but this is a weak
argument, because Collingwood does not rule out the possibility that the parallel may simply
fail to hold. I mention these problems, though, to dismiss them: Collingwood is interested in
the imaginative level of mind, which is where art happens, as we shall see presently. Whether
psychical experience has this tripartite structure, or has it only some of the time, does not affect
what we can say with regard to imaginative experience.

28 The automatic expression of the psychical level could, of course, be incorporated into an
artwork; but even in the extreme case of someone’s psychical expressions being recorded and
exhibited as art, it would, according to Collingwood and plausibly, be the decisions to record
and exhibit that would be the art rather than the psychical expressions, which would be just
the content.
by being an action, is at least somewhat voluntary), in that imaginative experience requires being conscious of one's having that experience, and in that imaginative experience is richer than psychical experience (because rather than seeing just a confusing mess, we can distinguish ideas, see them as similar to or different from other ideas, etc.). Similarly, we have a control over imaginative expression that we don't have over psychical expression (we can choose to keep an anger to ourself, for instance, or modulate our laugh to fit our social context) (p. 235), imaginative expression involves a consciousness of self (that is, we are aware of the expression as our own) (ibid.), and imaginative expression is more highly differentiated than psychical expression (because the ideas we express are richer than the sensa psychical expression expresses) (p. 237).

Imaginative expression can take many different forms. The most primitive example is of a child who cries ‘on purpose’ (as Collingwood puts it on p. 236), not quite “in order to call attention to its needs and to scold the person to whom it seems addressed for not attending to them” (ibid.), but moving toward that, and away from “the automatic cry of uncontrolled emotion” (ibid.). (Of the most primitive example of a child’s imaginative expression, it is going to be attributing a bit much to say that the child has such complex concepts as ‘scold,’ and it will indeed be hard to tell the psychical and imaginative cries apart. But this is natural in considering limiting cases. As the child grows older, and its mental life more sophisticated, it will become less an exaggeration to say that its cries can be scolds and deliberate calls for attention.) Sophisticated examples of imaginative expression range from certain bodily actions (such as dance) to some uses (especially artistic) of language, and of course to painting, the creation and performance of music, and indeed even (as we shall see just below) to attentive reception of these things, as when we listen to a poem or look seriously at a painting. The important thing about imaginative expression is that by expressing ourself in this way, we clarify to ourself the emotion we are expressing. In the clearest case, this is by bringing a psychical emotion to the level of consciousness. (I said above that it is by attention that psychical emotions are brought to the level of consciousness; but to attend to an emotion is also to express it. They are two sides of the same coin (see PA, pp. 238f.).) But the task of expression does not end there: we can express ourselves better and better, acquiring in the process an ever-clearer understanding of our emotion.

29 Collingwood infamously claims that all, or at any rate the vast majority of, language is expressive (PA, p. 225, but cf. p. 269), but there is no need to take a stance on this here.
To see all this, consider someone who, walking in the country, sees a beautiful vista. At the purely psychical level, they will just experience a mass of sounds, sights and smells; the emotional charge on all this, let us say, is one of something like calm (strictly, something that when brought to consciousness will become calm (NL, ch. 5.9)). As they attend to their experience, they will be able to distinguish between trees and fields and rivers, and their feelings will become correspondingly articulate and complex, such that they can now attend specifically to, say, the sound of the flowing of the river and its emotional charge. But in order to attend to this, they must also express themselves imaginatively: by applying to it in various ways the concepts of ‘river’ and ‘flowing,’ as well as richer and more idiosyncratic concepts such as ‘gurgling,’ ‘Achaean’ and ‘peaceful,’ but also by imaginatively going down to the river and dipping their toes into it, by mimicking the sound of the river, and so on. The rambler now has a clearer idea of what they feel about the scene. But all the terms used to describe it are (ex hypothesi) general: they are imagining dipping their toes in a river rather than that river, and their ear is not sufficiently finely attuned to hear all the complexities of the river’s music; whereas the scene is, of course, in reality more detailed than their experience of it. In order to more fully express the emotion they feel in looking out at the scene, they must attend to it more fully. This may involve, for instance, sketching it, or notating the birdsong. (“[A] good painter... paints things because until he has painted them he doesn’t know what they are like” (PA, p. 304).30)

Through this process, we uncover our emotions. It is important to note, though, that expression is not just the externalisation of emotions, but also gives them their form. The act of painting what we see – the expression – itself affects how we see it. ‘Expression’ is not external to ‘emotion’ as the postman is to his letters. This means that art, for Collingwood, has a double-structure of, on the one hand, being a process by which we understand ourselves – we learn about our emotions through expressing them – but also a process by which we change: our emotions change through their expression. (And as we will see more clearly in ch. 2, for our emotions to change is for our worldview to change, and this is no small matter.) This change is not open-ended, though: our emotions can only change in certain ways. This double-structure exists

30 See also Landin (2015), who makes the point in the realm of biological drawing: “[D]rawing in biology class develops observation skills and cements understanding of biological concepts. More importantly, when we draw, we see the things we’d otherwise overlook.” When Landin says that one draws in order to be able to see, she means it more narrowly than Collingwood (v.i. ch. 2, §2.3 on what art reveals).
even in simple cases. A clear image – a photograph, say, of a fruit-laden table – is in one sense the same as its out-of-focus counterpart – it is a clearer version of the same image – but in another sense, it is different: it is clear whereas its counterpart is obscure. However, the analogy of clarification (which I owe to Ridley (1998)) is still misleading, because the table is entirely unchanged by the clarity of its photograph. If we take the photographed object to be the analogy of the emotion (and the image to be the expression) then this is disanalogous, because the emotion is partially determined by its expression. There is in fact no perfectly adequate term. Collingwood’s thought here is common, and people have captured it in many different ways. But no expression is Pareto superior, and each draws out certain aspects that are more salient in certain contexts, so I use each as I find it more perspicuous.

Prima facie, this ‘self-becoming’ may seem like peculiar conceptual territory: surely, we want to say, things cannot be both different from and the same as each other. When Ridley represents Collingwood as saying that “an emotion is not revealed for what it is through being expressed: it becomes what it is through being expressed” (1998, p. 27), surely we want to call obfuscation: it makes no sense to say that something can ‘become what it is’! But in fact the relation is very common. An unclear and confused thought can be clarified and so become a clear one while still being, in some sense, the same thought; and this despite the fact that the unclear thought will involve different propositions, commitments, etc. We naturally say in such a circumstance that the clear thought is ‘what we meant all along’ prior to the thought being fully clear, there is contradiction in it, insofar as one feels that the thought is best expressed in such a way while being simultaneously aware that this expression is inadequate; this contradiction being (ex hypothesis) not part of the thought, we say that our ability to

31 Brooks, for instance, in his classic The Well-Wrought Urn (1947, p. 199), favourably quotes W. M. Urban: “The artist does not first intuit his object and then find the appropriate medium. It is rather in and through his medium that he intuits the object.” Heaney writes that “we go to poetry to be forwarded within ourselves” and that literature gives “an experience that is like foreknowledge of certain things which we already seem to be remembering” (quoted in Warner (2013)). The thought is perhaps most fully worked out in Hegel, in whose philosophical system the notion of the self-realisation and self-becoming of the ‘spirit’ through Entäußerung (‘alienation’ or ‘externalisation’) is crucial. Alas, it would take us too far afield to properly consider this important and rich thought, or how it influenced subsequent thinkers from Nietzsche to Heidegger to Collingwood himself.

32 Dilworth (2004) makes this objection.
express our thought is not adequate to the thought, or that our thought is not itself; which contradiction and lack of identity is overcome when the thought is fully clari-
fi ed.

Neither is there an epistemic difficulty here.\textsuperscript{33} It is true that, because (as we will see) a perfectly expressed emotion will not be expressible in any other way, there is no other expression against which we can compare that expression in order to determine its adequacy. But again consider searching for an expression of a thought just beyond our grasp, or even more humbly, a word on the tip of your tongue. Various stories can be told about how it is that we can tell whether the word we find was the word for which we were looking, but there is no doubt that we (fallibly) do so. We will return to this point in ch. 3, §1.2.3, but we can briefly anticipate by saying that our emotions are not entirely peculiar to us now, and because they are not entirely otherwise inexpressible, differently imperfect expressions can still serve to symbiotically criticise and correct each other.

This, finally, is what Collingwood means when he says that art is the expression of emotion. He means that in art we attend to, and simultaneously imaginatively express, an emotion. This emotion, through being expressed, becomes clarified, and indeed changes to become a better version of itself. The more perfect the expression, the clearer and more realised the emotion, and the better the art (p. 280).

\section{2.3 Total Imaginative Activity}

A few words need saying concerning the phrase ‘total imaginative activity’ in the def-
inition, “[t]he aesthetic experience, or artistic activity, is the experience of expressing one’s emotions; and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language or art” (\textit{PA}, p. 275). First, the activity of expressing an emotion is that imaginative activity. Collingwood adds ‘total’ not because he thinks that absolutely every element of anyone’s experience (e.g., the artist’s) is part of the artwork, but because our experience of the world is always multimodal: we do not only see, but also smell and hear, trees; and an expression of our experience thereof will, to the extent that it is an adequate expression, reflect this (see ch. VII, §6). There is nothing unusual here: we often say of paintings, for instance, that they are rhythmic (consider Krasner’s

\textsuperscript{33} As Sparshott (1982, pp. 325-9), for instance, worries.
Night Creatures) or fleshy (O'Keeffe's Black Mesa Landscape); that Hughes' Crow is black; and though you might have heard that Fauré's Pavane is saccharine, to test this by clambering atop the stage and licking a flautist would be to commit more than just an error of etiquette. The nature of these descriptions is of course contestable, and there is an obvious sense in which paintings are purely visual. But this is irrelevant. The point, for Collingwood, is that visual experience does not exhaust what we find in a painting: experiences from the other senses are necessary for us to capture all the ways in which it strikes us.

The second point is that 'imaginative' does not mean 'taking place only in the imagination' or 'not real' or anything of this sort, as he has been taken to mean. Artworks are not 'ideal'; paintings do not exist only in people's heads. 'Imaginative' is not opposed to 'real' or 'physical,' but to 'psychical,' and serves not to place the artwork in anyone's head but to clarify its status as something done with the imagination (but by no means only the imagination). Collingwood does not deny that the physical painted canvas is the artwork on the grounds that it is rather some sort of idea we have that is the artwork. His point is rather that the artwork is not merely the painted canvas, but the canvas as imbued with intentionality.

The third point, concerning art as an activity, is also not as implausible as it might seem. At face, it sounds an awful lot as if, in calling art an activity, Collingwood is saying that paintings are not the objects hanging in art galleries, but rather an activity such as the artist's creation of that object, or something along the lines of the 'performances' that David Davies (2004) has suggested artworks are. This view has Davies' allegiance, but few others', and so Collingwood had better not find himself committed to it. However, showing that he is not so committed requires a bit of work, which we will do now.

34 See Zangwill (2015), esp. ch. 2, for a recent summary of some of these debates.
35 On this point I say very briefly what Ridley (1997) comprehensively demonstrates. Ridley does not go far enough, though: as D'Oro and Connelly (2015, §3.3) point out, Collingwood did not only think that artworks are not 'ideal' or 'imaginary:' he was not in general an idealist in the sense to which Ridley takes objection. As D'Oro and Connelly put it, "his commitment to idealism is not a commitment to immaterialism, but to the claim that there is no epistemically unmediated access to reality." (But cf. §5.3 of this article.) It is heartening to see D. Davies (2008), Swale (2015), and Wiltcher and Meskin (2016, pp. 182-4) move beyond the received reading.
This is because Davies has actually noticed this tendency in *P4*, and has persuasively argued that Collingwood is a fellow traveller.\textsuperscript{36} Davies musters some important quotations in a similar vein to the definition quoted above,\textsuperscript{37} but his interpretation runs against the grain of much of *P4*. For instance, Collingwood writes that in attending to a painting, “we... find ourselves enjoying an imaginary experience of total activity like that which [the painter] enjoyed when painting it” (*P4*, p. 150). Painting what? If art is an activity, then painting an activity – but that is semantically nonsensical. The same infelicity would recur many times – throughout ch. XIV, for instance – as would similar ones, such as that readers of poetry read experiences (pp. 310, 322).\textsuperscript{38} Perhaps more significant, though, is how little notice Collingwood pays to what would be a radical revision of our understanding of art. It is not that Collingwood is averse to raising eyebrows, but he *revels* in denying that pleasure is ever aesthetic (\textit{v.i.} ch. 4) and in insisting that we are all always dancing (p. 246). By contrast, he evinces almost no interest in the bizarre claim that art is an activity – the term is not even mentioned in any relevant way in the usually helpful index (that Collingwood probably compiled himself (p. 95)).

All this suggests that there is something amiss in Davies’ interpretation. And indeed a final reason for doubting this interpretation also leads to a better interpretation. The claim that artworks are activities is theoretically unmotivated: the argument is just that if art is language, and language activity, then by transitivity art is activity. But this does not get us to the objectionable conclusion that *works* of art are activities, and indeed Collingwood never says that *artworks* are activities, just that *art* is. What we should rather say, with regard to both artworks and language tokens, is that they are *embodied* activities. The sounds emitted from our mouths, or the multi-coloured splotches of paint on a canvas, are the “motor side” (p. 247), or expression, of that the obverse of which is ‘experience,’ or emotion. It is this \textit{whole} that is the activity. If we want to focus on one aspect of that activity – the patterned canvas – then we may do so, and inquire into its ontological status if we consider it noble, but we will not be inquiring into *art* if we ignore the other aspect of art. As above, when we saw that the ‘idealist’ reading of Collingwood misreads him as opposing ‘imaginative’ to ‘real’ rather

\textsuperscript{36} See his ‘Collingwood’s “Performance” Theory of Art’ (2008).
\textsuperscript{37} D. Davies (2008), p. 168.
\textsuperscript{38} Davies has a way out of this problem (he makes it in his *Art as Performance* (2004)), but as Collingwood makes no such move, we should expect him to not speak this way.
than to ‘psychical,’ we misread him if we take him to oppose ‘activity’ to ‘object’ rather than to ‘passivity.’

This response is plausible in cases where the total activity is very similar to the ‘motor’ aspect of it: in extemporised speech, for instance. As Davies notes, though, it is less obviously plausible as these diverge, as they do in heavily-revised artworks. In these latter cases, it seems more plausible that there are a myriad activities that lead to the artwork having its final structure, which is a structure rather than an activity, and which it seems we can understand without knowing much about those various activities. But this would be to misunderstand what Collingwood means by ‘activity.’

This sentence, for instance, is an embodied activity: I have an intellectual experience that I express through the activity of writing (or thinking, or thinking-through-writing) it. The fact that I have revised and reappraised it does not cause us to suddenly come over all sceptical and ask which of the many experiences I had in its formulation are the ones it expresses: assuming I have spoken as I meant to, it obviously expresses the experience captured by its meaning. The situation is no different with art.

Now it might be responded that philosophical sentences express thoughts or propositions, not experiences. This, though, is to take an overly restricted view of how we use language. There is no limit to what experience we may ‘put into’ a sentence, and no limit to what we may ‘take out’ of one. So long as these experiences are ‘public,’ that is, in principle shareable, and so long as the utterer and apprehender of the sentence have some shared identity (e.g., by being in a language community), this can be done intelligently. It is just the same with art:

[I]f [an artist] paints his picture in such a way that we, when we look at it using our imagination, find ourselves enjoying an imaginary experience of total activity like that

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39 This, I think, is also the way to read McCloud when he says “I think we should remove the focus from the *objects* or *products* of art — An look instead at the *process*. Art as branch of human *behavior*. So in order to sort out what we mean when we say ‘art,’ instead of sorting *objects* — we should begin by sorting *actions.*” (2000, p. 45, emphases in original). It is also, I think, the way to read Murdoch when she says that “[a] work of art is of course not a material object” (1992, p. 2).


41 Swale, in his attempt to defend Collingwood against Davies’ criticism (2015, ch. 1), does not make this point (see pp. 34-5), and to my mind therefore concedes too much.
which he enjoyed when painting it, there is not much sense in saying that we bring this experience with us to the picture and do not find it there.

P4, p. 150

(The immediate context supplies the needed additional point: that the art is only successful if the artist in some sense deliberately ‘put’ the experience into the work.)

This talk of community brings us to the next section; but before leaving Davies’ re-interpretation, let us summarise. Art, for Collingwood, is indeed an activity, but this does not mean that artworks are activities that we somehow perceive through their products. Rather, artworks are embodied activities, their ‘product’ – paintings, tunes and novels – being the obverse of what these products express – experiences or emotions.

2.4 Art as Deeply Social

A word also needs to be said about how we understand others, because expression and art are social, and it is important to stress that Collingwood’s theory does not focus one-sidedly on the artist. It looks, though, as if this social aspect has been overlooked in Collingwood’s account as we have so far presented it. What goes on in the gallery-goer in attending to, for instance, Picasso’s final Weeping Woman? Collingwood has given us an account of what happens to Picasso: he expressed his emotions by attending to them, and this he did through the medium of paint. But us? All we do is look at his painting; we don’t re-paint it. And we have not had the emotions – concerning Dora Maar and the Spanish Civil War – that Picasso expressed through it. How is it, then, that we too discern its expressiveness? In other words: if Prima expresses to Secondo that she feels some emotion, how is it that Secondo, who has not had the initial experience which Prima has had, or gone through the process of expression that Prima has, can also feel that emotion, just by hearing Prima express it? It looks as if Prima has expressed the emotion for Secondo; but there is no room for this in Collingwood’s theory.

Collingwood’s answer is that Secondo does express the emotion, but in rather a different way to how A expresses it (P4, ch. XI, §5). Secondo treats Prima’s expression (words, art, etc.) as his own, and imagines through a sort of imaginative re-creation of

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42 D. Davies (2008, p. 167) makes what seems to me a restricted version of this criticism.
the expression what one would have to feel in order to utter them.\footnote{This ‘imaginative re-enactment’ is also central to Collingwood’s philosophy of history, and is one of the most persistently influential of Collingwood’s ideas. See D’Oro and Connelly (2015), §4.6, and ‘simulation theories’ of empathy in philosophy of mind and empirical psychology (see Stueber (2013), §2). Within aesthetics, Wollheim (1987) argues for the isomorphism of spectator and artist in much the same way. Collingwood quotes Coleridge in making this point on p. 118 of \textit{PrA} “we know a man for a poet by the fact that he makes us poets.”} If Prima says that she is “doing fine” when she has just suffered, as Secondo knows, a calamity, Secondo imagines what sort of person one would have to be to say that one is fine when one has suffered such a calamity. He may not arrive at the right answer – it could be that it wasn’t really a calamity, or it could be because Prima is stoic, or lying – in which case he won’t fully understand her. Or for one reason or another, Secondo may be able to arrive at the answer, in which case he will understand her. When we attend to art, the same thing goes on. When we look at a painting, we follow the brushstrokes of the canvas, and imagine the emotion that we think must have led the hand to be moved in the way that created them (p. 308). Van Gogh, with his impasto, provides a particularly striking example of this we can see the fury with which he attacked the canvas; but it is a general point. Of course, looking at a painting is a fairly mental affair, and it may be that through looking alone we can never fully understand any really profound painting (that many people literally sketch out the paintings to which they are attending in art galleries, and how musicians hear more in music than non-musicians, is evidence that just looking is not enough); but, as Collingwood points out (p. 311), understanding, like expression, comes in degrees. I don’t doubt that I don’t understand the half of Beethoven’s 14\textsuperscript{th} String Quartet; but I understand something of it.

3. Collingwood’s Philosophy of Art through His Philosophical Methodology

We now know what art, for Collingwood, is – it is the total imaginative activity of the expression of emotion – and we know what he means by this. But there is a problem: the class of objects or acts delineated by this definition is exceedingly broad. Collingwood himself says that it includes all of language (\textit{PrA}, p. 225), but even if we deny this, as we might if we think that there are some utterly unemotional uses of language, certainly language often fits this definition. This is terrible overgeneration for a theory
of art, but Collingwood, who is well aware of the consequence (as we know because he explicitly (and one is tempted to say even triumphantly) states it), is remarkably unconcerned by it.

This has often taken to be a decisive objection to Collingwood’s theory. But before we respond on Collingwood’s behalf, we should note how peculiarly easily the objections have been made. No attempt has ever been made to ask how Collingwood—who in other ways is acknowledged by those who criticise him to be an exceptionally insightful and competent philosopher—could have made such a simple error, and could have failed to realise how far off-piste he had gone, even while explicitly stating—indeed, claiming as important truths—his absurd conclusions. This clear-eyedness should give us pause. Are we interpreting him correctly? Have we missed something important?

And indeed we have. The ‘art’ which Collingwood defines so broadly is ‘art’ in its philosophical phase. Collingwood does not explicitly claim this: all his works are pre-

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44 See, e.g., Kivy (1994), pp. 64–5 and Dilworth (2004), p. 11. Dilworth acknowledges that Collingwood’s project is not what it is normally taken to be, and says that his criticism is of problems Collingwood’s theory would have, were it the “conventional theory of art” (Dilworth’s phrase (ibid.)) it is often taken to be. This is still problematic, though: firstly, Dilworth does not ask why it is that Collingwood’s project is so often taken to be other than it is; secondly, he does not ask why Collingwood undertook the project he did rather than the one Dilworth takes him to have undertaken, or what the relationship is between Collingwood’s actual project and what is taken to be his project, and so does not inquire into whether Collingwood’s choice of project is to do with a concern about the legitimacy of the ‘conventional’ project; and, thirdly, it assumes that the project Collingwood is normally taken to be undertaking is ‘conventional,’ which to my ear illicitly suggests that Collingwood’s is somehow on the fringes of the philosophy of art, its legitimacy or relevance in need of particular justification. I reject assumption and suggestion both.

45 Blackburn (1998) writes that “Collingwood was the greatest British philosopher of history of the twentieth century”, and that “his writings on art, religion and science confirm his stature as one of the greatest polymaths of twentieth-century British philosophy.” Sparshott (1982, p. 386) writes that “[T]o many thinkers, not necessarily in accord with his basic positions, Collingwood’s *Principles of Art* has seemed the one essential book in aesthetics.” Even the unsympathetic Wollheim (1980, p. 133) credits *PA* for being singular in “academic aesthetics” for being “free of the errors of spectator-oriented aesthetics.” Consider finally that *PA* has been read, admired, criticised and anthologised continually since it was first published.
sented as self-standing; references between them are few, and he never relies on terminology developed in one work in another work. However, he was nonetheless a systematic philosopher, and so we should expect PA to be consonant with EPM. If we read him as understanding ‘art’ as a philosophical concept, what otherwise is an egregious error becomes perfectly sensible. I will now give this reading, before considering some problems it encounters.

Perhaps the most bizarre self-contradiction from which this reading saves Collingwood is what we have just considered: the scope of the term ‘art.’ I will take a moment to stress just how troublesome this problem would be for Collingwood. As we have seen, ‘art’ is often very broad for Collingwood, extending over “[e]very utterance and every gesture that each one of us makes” (PA, p. 285). However, he also suggests—and often and forcefully does more than suggest—that he thinks far less than this qualifies as art. For instance, he argues in ch. II of PA that craft is not art, and then, to make sure that there is no misunderstanding, that specific varieties of craft—representation (ch. III), ‘magic’ (ch. IV) and amusement (ch. V)—are not art. Although he does not devote as much time to them, he also states in no uncertain terms that puzzles, instruction, advertisement, propaganda and exhortation are not art (p. 32). “None of them has anything to do with art proper.” (ibid.) And, lest it be thought that Collingwood is, in Book I, saying things he knows to be false for propaedeutic purposes that he revises later, he repeats himself in ch. XII, §2: “a pot-boiler… cannot ever become a work of art.” (p. 278) But Collingwood can hardly be denying that there are magical utterances, representational gestures. So what is he up to?

On the traditional interpretation, it is hard to know what he can say: the extension of ‘art’ logically cannot be both all utterances and only pure artistic masterworks, and it cannot plausibly be either. But with EPM’s methodology in place, we can very easily dissolve this contradiction, by understanding art as a philosophical concept. For just as what is good from one point of view is bad from another, every human artefact and activity is art from one point of view, craft from another. (Collingwood explicitly says this in PA: see p. 22, n., where he even refers to EPM.) In the case of art, the genus (or generic essence) is, of course, art, or equivalently, the expression of emotion. If we accept Collingwood’s claims that every idea has an attendant emotion, that every emotion is expressed, that gestures and utterances are means of the imaginative expression of emotion, and that art is the imaginative expression of emotion, then it of course follows that utterances and gestures are works of art. But emotions, as we have seen

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46 On his systematicity, see EPM, ch. IX, and Mink (1969), ch. 1, §1.
above, can be expressed to a greater or lesser extent, which is to say that they can realise the generic essence to a greater or lesser extent. As such, there is no absolute answer to the question of whether some expression is or is not a work of art.

If we see Collingwood’s project in this light, we realise that his theory of art is not in direct competition with the other project of giving an account of what art is, much more common in Analytic aesthetics, engaged in by philosophers such as Danto, Dickie, Kennick and Robinson.\textsuperscript{47} This sort of theory is interested in separating the class of objects or events that are artworks from those that are not. What sort of project this is is perhaps best illustrated by the opening of Danto’s \textit{The Transfiguration of the Commonplace} (1981). Indeed, it is well illustrated by the title of the first chapter: ‘Works of Art and Mere Real Things’. Danto opens this chapter with a wonderful description of an imaginary art exhibition of (almost-)identical red rectangles, each with a radically different history. (One is a representation of nirvana, another of the Red Sea, another the lead ground of what would have been a masterpiece had the artist not died before he could start it, etc.) Some of these objects are artworks, and some are mere real things, Danto assumes. His question is: what makes them one rather than the other? Collingwood does not offer an answer to that question. In fact, he would consider it a non-philosophical question, because it is interested in ‘art’ in its non-philosophical phase.

3.1 Objection: Collingwood’s ‘Art’ Is not Our ‘Art’

It might be objected at this point that, although we of course can’t stop Collingwood from using the term ‘art’ in this way, his use of the term is not how ‘we’ use it, and there is no reason for us to accept his idiosyncratic terminology, or to be interested in his idiosyncratic philosophical project.\textsuperscript{48} However, I dispute that this usage of the term ‘art’ is idiosyncratic, even though I accept that his is not the question asked by mainstream Analytic aestheticians of the past few decades.

To defend his claim that art is a scale-of-forms concept first: We often say things like, ‘now that’s a work of art.’ The ontological implication of this is interesting. To say, without stress, that ‘that is a work of art’ implies just that whatever it is at which the speaker is pointing is a work of art. It is consistent with everything being simply either

\textsuperscript{47} See Danto (1981), Dickie (1969), Kennick (1958) and Robinson (2005). The project is as common now as ever: see, for recent examples, see Cook and Meskin (2015) and Maes (2015).

\textsuperscript{48} D. Davies (2008, pp. 171ff.) makes this objection.
a work of art or not a work of art. But when the stress is added, the utterance suggests that some things are ‘really’ works of art (another natural phrase), or something of this sort. But what in turn does this mean? One obvious answer is that being a work of art is ‘differentially’ or ‘scalarly’ realisable, i.e., that some objects realise ‘artness’ to a certain moderate extent, and so more or less count as works of art, but that others realise it more, and so are ‘really’ works of art. This, of course, is perfectly consonant with Collingwood’s methodology. It is the same as with goodness: one act can be unobjectionable and fairly beneficent, and so more or less count as good, and another act can be positively saintly, and that we would say is really good; or equally felicitously, we might say: ‘now that’s goodness.’ Locutions suggesting a similar structure are common. Attending Turner Prize shortlists, people often express incredulity: ‘this may technically be art, but it’s not really art’, for instance. Jones (2 May 2016) embodies this attitude when he lambasts royal portraits as “not real art”. Why not just say “not art”?\footnote{Knobe, Prasada and Newman (2013) offer empirical support for this claim, as well as for the claim I make below (§3.4), that some concepts are what they call ‘dual-aspect’ by this they mean that although there we can mean different things by a term (e.g., C-art and D-art), the meanings are connected as aspects of a single concept. Liao, Meskin and Knobe (manuscript) offer support for this claim as it applies to art concepts in particular, and also offer an explanation of this double-aspectuality that is broadly consonant with Collingwood’s account, though it is far less developed.} This attitude is hard to square with Danto et al.’s approach. If we were to walk around a warehouse gushing to W. E. Kennick about how “this one – now that’s really a work of art!... this one, not so much,” one imagines him becoming confused, and asking with regard to the liminal cases to make our bloody minds up. For an art insurer, this impatience is entirely legitimate (“Do you want to insure it or not!”). But it is hardly clear that we should get so bothered about it qua philosophers. (Indeed, I will argue in §3.4.3 that we should not.)

Such locutions are sometimes explained away as betraying a confusion between an evaluative and descriptive concept of art, and Collingwood is said to fall prey to this confusion too. Robinson, for instance, considers this “standard” objection “indisputable.”\footnote{See Robinson (2005), pp. 253-4; see also Weitz (1956) and Dickie (1997), p. 67.} Far from being indisputable, this criticism is jejune. Collingwood explicitly differentiates the two scales – giving a section heading to each – in PA, ch. XII, §§2-3. He could not have been clearer that he has not elided the scales. It is true, of course, that Collingwood says that “[t]he definition of any given kind of thing is also the
definition of a good thing of that kind” (PA, p. 280), but we need only interpret Collingwood as speaking of concepts in their philosophical phase for the implausibility of this claim to melt away. Expression is a success term: to express an emotion at all is to do it at least somewhat well, and to do it better is to more truly do it. Indeed, we can read Collingwood as arguing (throughout EPM as well as in PA) precisely that the ‘confusion’ is no such thing. Further, because Collingwood is doing justice to a common locution, he is actually closer to our standard usage of ‘art’ than those who explain away the locution as confused.

Consider finally that other authors have explicitly said that art has a structure something like the structure Collingwood says it has. Croce, for instance, has a similar philosophical method, but it is perhaps out of order to mention him here, because he shares so much with Collingwood philosophically.\(^5\) Dewey, from the distant philosophical tradition of American pragmatism,\(^5\) also draws together artistic masterpieces with the everyday, speaking of the former as just ‘intensified’ versions of the latter:

A primary task is... imposed upon one who undertakes to write upon the philosophy of the fine arts. This task is to restore continuity between the refined and intensified forms of experience that are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and sufferings that are universally recognized to constitute experience. Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not just rest upon the earth. They are the earth in one of its manifest operations.

Dewey (1938), p. 2 (emphasis in original)

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\(^5\) See his Aesthetic (1902). The two theories are so similar that they have been referred to collectively as the ‘Croce-Collingwood theory’ (see, e.g., Wollheim (1980), §22, who calls this appellation “usual nowadays,” and more illuminatingly, Sparshott (1982), p. 627, who also quotes Collingwood writing to Croce that “the doctrine taught in [PA] is in all essentials your own”). A comparative study is not part of the current dissertation; but suffice it to say here that although the similarities are indeed striking, Collingwood and Croce differ on a number of points. Perhaps most notably, Collingwood does not, like Croce, think that artworks are purely mental.

Regardless, it is not entirely out of order to mention Croce, because it still shows that Collingwood’s philosophy of art and philosophical method are not entirely idiosyncratic.

\(^5\) Distant in influence; but Mink (1969, ch. 1, §2) notes important philosophical similarities.
Scott McCloud, with a very different philosophical background again, also expresses the sentiment: “[I]n almost everything we do there is at least an element of art.” And more recently, Ben Lerner writes in *The Hatred of Poetry* (2016) that “we are all poets simply by virtue of being human.” I take this from its quotation in Becca Rothfeld’s *LARB* review of the book, which review does not consider this hugely broad delimitation of ‘poet’ odd, even while acknowledging that ‘poetry,’ for Lerner, serves as a “stand-in for literature or art more broadly” (Rothfeld’s phrase). And again, Novalis wrote that “*Jeder Mensch sollte Künstler sein. Alles kann zur schönen Kunst werden*” (“Everyone should be an artist. Everything can become fine art”), which sentiment has been endorsed by Beuys, who often said that “*Jeder Mensch ein Künstler*” (“Everyone is an artist”), and again by countless compilers of ‘words of wisdom.’ Even Danto, in *flagrante philosophicum delicto*, says that it is a “commonplace” that every metaphor is “a little poem.” If this is meant to indicate that metaphors are on the ‘art’ side of the art/non-art divide, then he is open to precisely the overgeneration objection levelled against Collingwood; but if it is interpreted in a Collingwoodian way, ‘little’ indicating liminality, then the sentiment is entirely natural.

This evidence mustered, it might be granted that ‘art’ can be felicitously understood to have the conceptual structure Collingwood claims for it, but objected nonetheless that he is mistaken that the essence is the expression of emotion. But that the expression of emotion is the essence of art is precisely what Collingwood argues in *PA*, and of what this dissertation as a whole is a defence.

### 3.2 C-Art and D-Art

The foregoing shows that there is *prima facie* reason to believe that our concept of ‘art’ sometimes has a scale-of-forms structure. That its essence is the expression of emotion I will treat as shown by *PA* as a whole, with this dissertation as a whole as further defence. However, there are two further related features of Collingwood’s philosophy of art we must understand before we can fully see his theory’s scope and worth. First, ‘art’ for Collingwood has a lot to do with ‘art’ as Danto, Dickie *et al.* use the term (*viz.*, as a concept that separates those things that simply are art from those that are not at all art). Although Collingwood is not, as I have said, in *direct* competition with them,

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54 Novalis (1798).
neither is his project unrelated. Second, art for Collingwood is extremely important; sometimes indeed he talks as if it is the supremely important human activity.\footnote{See, e.g., his claim that bad art is the root of all evil (P4, ch. X, §7; ch. XII, §3).}

We will discuss these two points in the next two sections, but some brief setting-up is required now. First, some terminology. For clarity’s sake, we will henceforth refer to Collingwood’s philosophical phase of the concept of art as ‘C-art,’ and Danto et al.’s concept of art as ‘D-art,’ but a word of methodological caution is needed here. These terms are not to be understood as stipulative, primarily identified with whatever definition I offer (in the case of C-art, ‘the expression of emotion’) and only secondarily with whatever definition arises from our lived experience of art. Nor are the terms to be identified primarily with the implicit definition of our lived experience (in the case of C-art, that mystical something that makes art so special and which drives us to philosophise about it, something like ‘fine art’ or ‘real art’), which Collingwood’s definition is to fit as accurately as possible (although this order of things is closer to the truth). Rather, the Collingwoodian account is offered as a model that contradicts our ‘pre-theoretical’ understanding of art – our ‘intuitions’ concerning art – only to clarify it (and so to no longer contradict it). The way in which ‘pre-theoretical’ experience and philosophical understanding can mutually contradict and expand each other is obscured by my choosing what are literally terms of art in ‘C-art’ and ‘D-art;’ however, the debate into which this dissertation is an intervention is now so confused, with the obvious candidates of ‘aesthetic’ and ‘artistic’ (and cognates) used in so many different ways, that appropriating any of them seems to me so liable to mislead that fresh terminology seems in order. However – to stress – D-art and especially C-art refer to things of which we have experience in our artistic and philosophical life, and their definitions are not stipulative.\footnote{On Collingwood’s rich position on the relation of philosophy to what it philosophises (in the course of which the reason I have put scare-quotes around ‘pre-theoretical’ and ‘intuition’ will become clear), see EPM, esp. chs. IV, VIII (esp. §3), X (esp. §2), XI.}

Now: for all we have said so far, these two concepts of ‘art,’ C-art and D-art, might have nothing to do with each other. D-art may indeed always involve the expression of emotion, just by virtue of the fact that all utterances and gestures do; but what I have said so far gives us no reason to think that D-art’s being valuable correlates with emotion being expressed well, or even to think that the expression of emotion is valuable. However, Collingwood clearly thinks that C-art is relevant to those concerned with D-art. We see this from the preface right through to the conclusion of P4. On
the first page of the preface, he writes that “we have a new and very lively... growth of aesthetic theory and criticism, written mostly not by academic philosophers or amateurs of art, but by poets, dramatists, painters, and sculptors. This is the reason for the appearance of the present book.” The natural reading of this – that the various sorts of artist are D-artists – is doubtless correct, as is bolstered by the differentiation of them from ‘amateurs of art’ and ‘academic philosophers’; there can be people better and worse at C-art, insofar as some express their emotions better than others, but there is no amateur/professional distinction. Further, the book makes constant reference to D-artists, such as those of Cézanne, Beethoven, T. S. Eliot; and examples from painting and poetry, references to symphonies, and so on, are staple. Collingwood also of course makes reference to C-art that is not found in D-artworks – for instance the baby who removes its bonnet in ch. XI, §1 – but such examples do not dominate the book like D-art does.

So Collingwood evidently thinks that there is some strong connection between C-art and D-art. And he is not alone. Sparshott claims that it is with “art proper,” which term he explicitly takes from Collingwood and which is not too far in meaning from ‘C-art,’ “that writers on aesthetics... are chiefly concerned”. But this does not establish whether there is in fact such a connection, and still less what its nature might be. I will argue that there is such a connection below. But the connection is built on the value of C-art, so I will first give Collingwood’s account of this value.

The answer here involves – naturally – some of the most impassioned and urgent passages of PA. Briefly, C-art’s value is sixfold: creating and experiencing C-art is to (1) self-understand and (2) self-become. This is a public activity, and so (3) to create and experience C-art is also to understand others. Self-understanding and self-becoming (they are two sides of the same coin) lead to three sorts of good. (4) It immediately leads to a sort of emotional self-government, in the sense that our emotions become civilised and rational rather than affecting us in ways we can neither understand nor predict; (5) it is necessary for the ‘intellect’ to do its business securely and well; and (6) the sanity and self-government it creates has various effects on our physical health. Defending the general ethical value that Collingwood thinks art realises relies on general ethical principles and so is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but a defence of Collingwood’s philosophy of art cannot entirely disclaim a defence of its value. As such, I will now expound and motivate this sixfold account of the value of C-art.

58 For Sparshott’s discussion, see Sparshott (1963), pp. 125ff.; for the quotation, see pp. 126-7.
3.3 The Value of C-Art

C-art is the total imaginative activity wherein emotion is imaginatively expressed. What's so valuable about that? To see this, we should look more carefully at 'emotion' and 'expression' in the definition of art as the expression of emotion. First, recall what we said in §2.2: in expressing our emotions or our worldview those emotions change and grow, becoming more perfect versions of themselves. I gave the analogy there of a photograph of a table of fruit. It is, though, obviously very much a contingent matter whether it is better for a photograph of a table of fruit to be clear: there are all sorts of reasons why one might want the shot to be out of focus. Collingwood is far less accepting of unclarity in emotion, though. It is perhaps on the last page of PA that his statement of the value of art is best put:

The artist must prophecy not in the sense that he foretells things to come, but in the sense that he tells his audience, at the risk of their displeasure, the secrets of their own hearts. His business as an artist is to speak out, to make a clean breast. But what he has to utter is not... his own secrets. As spokesman for his community, the secrets he must utter are theirs. The reason why they need him is that no community altogether knows its own heart; and by failing in this knowledge a community deceives itself on the one subject concerning which ignorance means death. For the evils which come from that ignorance the poet as prophet suggests no remedy, because he has already given one. The remedy is the poem itself. Art is the community's medicine for the worst disease of the mind, the corruption of consciousness.

PA, p. 336

Art (C-art) is a way of not falling into a particular sort of error, the corruption of consciousness. We have touched on this concept briefly above (§2.1); we must now consider it in greater detail. (This will involve a bit of recapitulation.)

3.3.1 The Corruption of Consciousness

The function of consciousness, according to Collingwood, is to convert sensa into ideas (or, bearing in mind the problems with this formulation (v.s. n. 26), perhaps pseudo-ideas into ideas proper). This is not a one-step process, but a potentially endless series of conversions into ever-clearer, or ever-better-expressed, ideas. This can be done better or worse: accurately or inaccurately, honestly or dishonestly. If consciousness does its job unreliably, it is corrupt. The standard of goodness here is, as we have seen, a
certain sort of sameness, but clearer. The reason accuracy and honesty have been put together is due to an interesting feature of consciousness, that it is on the edge, as it were, of intellect, and on the edge of freedom. Consciousness, for Collingwood, is a semi-automatic process. To the extent that it is automatic, whether the conversion is done well is beyond our direct control, and to this extent it is just accurate or inaccurate. To the extent that it is conscious, though, it is under our control, and so can be honest or dishonest. The liminal nature of this is clear when Collingwood says:

The symptoms of a corrupt consciousness...are not exactly crimes or vices, because their victim does not choose to involve himself in them, and cannot escape from them by deciding to amend his conduct. They are not exactly diseases, because they are due not to functional disorder or to the impact of hostile forces upon the sufferer, but to his own self-mismanagement. As compared with disease, they are more like vice; as compared with vice, they are more like disease.

PA, p. 220

The business of the artist – the D-artist professionally, but the C-artist (i.e., all of us) too – is to do this conversion well. It is however extremely demanding, not in the sense that it requires long labour or an incisive intellect (although it normally does), but in the sense that it demands that we exert control over that which is at the very edge of what it is possible for us to control, because it is that which is at the edge of our will’s domain.\textsuperscript{59} Collingwood gives a hint as to the nature of the work required by the term

\textsuperscript{59} I suspect that this makes the work of the artist particularly demanding. The technical side of being a concert pianist – the lightning fingers and so on – is hard in one sense, but in another not, because one just goes into the practice room, and with enough time one simply will be able to play Alkan. Nothing in particular is required (except, in certain cases, certain physical attributes, such as large hands), just that one puts in the hours (but intelligently, of course; which suggests that there nothing entirely devoid of creativity). But no amount of time can guarantee that one will become a good artist: it is much harder to do the work at all, hard even to know whether one is doing or has done the work, and this never gets easier or more tractable. It requires constant mindfulness. It is like (indeed it is a species of) the work of becoming a better person. This liminal space between the active and the passive is one of the most important undercurrents in Collingwood’s work, and indeed to many others’. Haworth (2014), for instance, reads Kant’s and Derrida’s conceptualisations of ‘genius’ to be getting at the same thing. And:
'self-mismanagement'; the work is a question of managing oneself, in general, such that the automatic process of conversion is accurate, rather than making the right decision when faced with a particular conversion choice. The type of will required is that which Murdoch describes in *The Sovereignty of the Good* (1970). Murdoch there (pp. 17ff.) gives the example of a mother who dislikes her daughter-in-law for being silly and vulgar, unworthy of her son, but who for whatever reason wants not to regard her daughter-in-law in this way. Murdoch argues that the way that the mother can change her mode of regard is not by *directly* choosing to think of her daughter-in-law as good, but by trying to interpret her various actions and words in a more positive light. The focus, that is, is not directly on actions or people, but on the conceptual frameworks underlying the actions and people (*ibid.*, p. 32). Similarly for Collingwood: the artist's labour is not in the first instance to create certain marks on pages or stones, but to live in such a way that – to inhabit a conceptual scheme such that, to have an attitude toward the world such that, even to have a practical relationship with their artistic instruments such that – their marks are correct, or honest.

There are two related ways in which consciousness can be corrupt. It can *fail* to clarify, and it can *misclarify*. The first sort of error involves *not engaging in* the work of clarification, or *halting* the work; it is saying that thus far is far enough, that this expression is satisfactorily clear. Collingwood must think that no expression is *ever* entirely satisfactorily clear, as if clarity is a scale-of-forms concept then every expression can always be clearer. This philosophical baggage is not needed to make the present point, though: it is plain that most, if not all, expressions of thoughts and emotions are ambiguous, misleading, silencing, partisan, etc., in various ways and to various extents. But to fail to clarify is also to misclarify, insofar as an expression of a thought rarely if ever just remains neutral and ambiguous between the various possible further clarifications of it, but implicitly or explicitly hews to one or some specifications. For instance: if we say that 'goodness has something to do with pleasure,' then this is unclear – for instance, what does the 'something to do with' relation amount to? – but it is also

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I wandered out to the balcony to join
the smokers here against the railing, looking out
at the star-studded black and the street where small groups
enter and exit—the constantly moving margin, made up
of those who believe the shivering edge,
not the bright nucleus, is where things happen.

Jessica Sequeira, 'Interlude'
(if you will) misclear, insofar as it involves the implicature that pleasure is particularly central to goodness (rather than something conspicuously not mentioned, such as ‘love’), or that it is what should be in focus in thinking about goodness. "The picture which [a corrupt] consciousness has painted of its own experience is not only a selected picture (that is, a true one so far as it goes), it is a bowdlerized picture, or one whose omissions are falsifications." (*P4*, p. 218)

This account of the corruption of consciousness is hopefully beginning to clarify the value of C-art: C-art is a way of being honest, of being accurate; it is the avoidance of a particular sort of error. But there are many errors and many ways of avoiding them. Discarding statistically insignificant but suggestive data when redoing an experiment on a larger scale is a way of avoiding a certain sort of statistical error, but this is not as important as art: Collingwood's language of 'evil' and 'prophecy' would be hyperbolic in describing it. C-art is more important first, of course, by being more general. It is a way of being honest or correct for *everyone*, in *everything* they do, not just a way for statisticians to be honest or correct in the realm of experimental design. But there is even more than this. Insofar as we are our emotions (*v.i. ch. 2*), being good C-artists is a way of more fully knowing ourselves (thus part (1) of the sixfold breakdown of the value of art at the end of the previous section), and insofar as expression involves both the clarification and realisation or enforming of the emotions (*v.i. §2.2*), being good C-artists is a way of more fully *becoming* ourselves (thus part (2)). Ridley traces this value back to Spinoza, and articulates it well:

> Feelings about which we're not clear... tend, because we have not understood them, to affect our lives in ways over which we have little control: we are at their mercy. We must, therefore, fix "our attention on the very feeling which threatens to dominate us, and so learn to dominate it"... If we succeed in [clarifying] emotions, we free ourselves from their tyranny, and so, by an increase in self-knowledge, enjoy an increased capacity for self-government.

1998, pp. 6–7; the quotation is from *P4*, p. 218

The language of 'domination' and 'domestication' (which Collingwood uses in *P4*, p. 217) suggest that the emotions lose intensity or are somehow defeated, perhaps by our rational 'self.' However, it is important that this reading, insofar as it suggests that emotions are somehow external to us, and that they are enemies to be brought to heel, is mistaken. Collingwood has a lot of respect for the rationality of emotion (see *P4*, p. 122), and considers it as fully part of our selves as reason – indeed, he thinks they can
hardly be separated (see, e.g., *PA*, ch. XI, esp. §§8-9, and *v.i.* ch. 2). Ridley gets it right when he says that a clarified emotion becomes “endowed with meaning”, and “gain[s] rather than los[es] in the process” (1998, p. 7). Perhaps a better analogy than ‘domination’ would be ‘civilisation,’ which, under one benign interpretation of the process (as found in, e.g., *NL*, ch. 34-5ff.), does not destroy or deny the ‘animal’ that is civilised, but allows that animal nature to manifest in a higher way. (This is part (4).)

3.3.2 Other Values

This, then, is how C-art has the value of emotional self-understanding and self-gov-
ernment. Collingwood also thinks that C-art is valuable by acting as a foundation for ‘thought’ or ‘intellect’ (*v.i.* §2), and that corruption of consciousness is like imperfection in the foundation of a building, rendering it cracked and unstable (*PA*, pp. 284-5) (this is value (5)). Note that ‘cracked’ and ‘unstable’ are different types of fault: for a building to be cracked is for it to now be imperfect; for it to unstable is for it to be liable to further imperfections. Corrupt consciousness leads to both, and they are related. To continue the building analogy: cracks, as well as being a current failing, are liable to extend and lead to further problems, and to the extent that this is so they are a form of instability. Or consider again our rough definition of ‘goodness:’ if we say that good-
ness is something to do with pleasure, the error in this definition is of course almost certain to lead to errors in whatever theories and institutions we build upon it – and so whatever we build will be cracked – but also, the errors in the theories, although they might be minor enough that we can improvise workarounds for the time being, are liable to increase through tension with other theories and institutions, or simply with reality. Collingwood does not spend any time saying how likely or serious such imperfections are, but we need not look hard to see how a misclarified thought, its false expression taken too literally, can have disastrous consequences. (Just one exam-
ple: ‘freedom,’ and how a confused conception of it that fetishises what Berlin (1958) calls ‘negative liberty’ has led some U.S. political groups to veto minimal government legislation concerning, e.g., gun control. (I do not suggest that this confusion is the only reason for that political position.))

Related to this is the final value, *viz.*, that of bodily health (*PA*, p. 284) (this is value (6)). This point is first just as above: we strive for bodily health based on beliefs about what is efficacious, and beliefs about this – imperfect as any belief can be when founded on corruption – can be mistaken and so not in fact improve bodily health,
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even perhaps work against it. Second, though, Collingwood thinks that unclear emo-
tions, which are beyond our control, can more immediately work against our bodily
health, much in the way that many mental disorders (such as stress) can. Someone
whose consciousness was (*per impossibile*) entirely corrupt “would suffer simultaneously
every possible kind of mental derangement, and every bodily disease that such de-
rangements can bring in their train.” (*PA*, p. 283) Whether C-art does in fact promote
bodily health or mental ease is partly an empirical question; it may be that too much
C-art would cause us to perish of the truth. Collingwood is clearly more optimistic
than this, but he acknowledges that it is an empirical question; in any case, the other
values of C-art are not conditional on this one.

These last two values (*viz.*, (5) and (6)) are somewhat removed from C-art as such.
Emotional self-government is intrinsic to C-art, indistinguishable from it: the act of
expressing, or clarifying, one’s emotions *is also* the act of controlling and ‘domesticat-
ing’ them. The values of this section are separate: once emotions are clarified, it is the
business of another faculty, the intellect, to build from them theories and institutions,
as a builder builds a house from bricks. However, although this value is extrinsic to C-
art, it is one to which C-art is necessary. A house is not its foundation, but it cannot
be built without a foundation.

It is important finally to note that C-art is not important just as one thing among
many. Because it is a condition for any other human value, it is superlatively important.
To elaborate: the statistical rule I mentioned above (§3.3.1) is important, insofar as it
allows us to do statistical analysis better, but the rule’s value and importance is twice
conditional on consciousness’s integrity. First, the rule is built on a foundation of con-
sciousness, and if that foundation is weak (unstable), so is that which is built upon it.
It could not have been formulated in the first place, and its reliability could not be
determined, if people’s consciousnesses were too corrupt to be able to reason. Second,
the rule is valuable to a certain end – felicity or truth, perhaps (we need not take sides)
– but this end can only be secured when consciousness functions well (is not cracked).
So it is for everything else. Medicine, as a whole, is undoubtedly immeasurably good.
But the technologies and philosophies that undergird it rely on consciousness not be-
ing corrupt, and the health advantages that ensue are conditional on people having the
sanity to appreciate and utilise their health, which is to say again, having uncorrupt
consciousnesses. Note that Collingwood is not saying that the uncorrupt consciousness is the only good. No doubt there are other values equally foundational. Collingwood's point is just that, whatever other fundamental values there, uncorrupt consciousness is among them. For our purposes, it is enough that uncorrupt consciousness is plausibly seen as extremely valuable. A full consideration of the matter is a matter for ethics rather than aesthetics, and so must remain outside the scope of this dissertation. However, it is an important point for Collingwood, so something must be said about it, however inadequate.

3.4 C-Art's Connection to D-Art

So much for the value of C-art. We now need to see how this relates to D-art, which is perhaps closer to what we thought we were going to hear about when we started reading $P_A$, and which is what most contemporary aestheticians are interested in.

Collingwood does not think that art is not valuable except insofar as it is C-art. He mentions often, albeit in passing, that D-art is valuable under aspects other than C-art (most passionately as magic$^{61}$). But he does not discuss these other aspects in any detail, for two reasons. First, he is interested primarily in C-art rather than D-art in $P_A$. Second, more interestingly, and as is evident from the fact that he talks about C-art as if it just is art whilst speaking of magic as if it is not art but magic (ditto mutatis mutandis) for entertainment, etc., he thinks that C-art has some special relation to D-

$^{60}$ David Foster Wallace, in Infinite Jest, makes this point by juxtaposing the rudely healthy but mentally tortured US characters with the Canadians who have suffered terribly from the USA's toxic-waste dumping but who are wiser and more eudaimonic. This tension is by my reading one of the major themes of the novel. However, it is worth stressing that Collingwood's point is weaker than Wallace's: the Canadians, in a better position regarding C-art but in a worse one regarding physical health, may or may not on the whole be better off than the Americans; Collingwood's point is that however well off they are, it is thanks in part to the integrity of their consciousnesses.

$^{61}$ See, e.g., $P_A$, p. 278. His serious interest in and respect for magic, and in its connection with (both D- and C-)art, is more manifest in other works, such as collected in his The Philosophy of Enchantment (2005). Magic has a precise meaning for Collingwood as, primarily, "the genera[on] in the agent or agents certain emotions that are considered necessary or useful for the work of living", and, secondarily, "the genera[on] in others, friends or enemies of the agent, emotions useful or detrimental to the lives of those others." ($P_A$, p. 67)
art, such that a treatise on D-art can legitimately focus on C-art, and such that C-art is somehow a ‘central’ case of D-art. What is the nature of this connection? This is the question of the present section.

The only clue in Collingwood’s *œuvre* about what the connection might be is his brief discussion in *EPM* of how concepts in different ‘phases’ (or what could also be called ‘aspects’) of concepts relate to each other. In ch. II.§2.6 of that work, as we have briefly seen in §1, he claims that there are “regular and uniform” differences in meaning between words used to describe the non-philosophical and philosophical phases of concepts, and that beneath the differences “something fundamental in their meaning [remains] unaltered”, and that it is for this reason that the words are polysemous rather than just homonymous. He mentions ‘matter’ by way of illustration. He claims that we can trace “a general connexion between the physical and metaphysical notions of matter, in spite of the difference between them” — although he declines to do so or even suggest how it might be done — and also “a special connexion between a particular physical theory of matter and a particular metaphysical theory corresponding to it; for example, the concept of matter in what may be called classical nineteenth-century materialism is the metaphysical counterpart of the scientific concept of matter in the classical Newtonian physics.” Collingwood says almost nothing more on the matter than I have quoted. It is very suggestive, but, for me at least, too cryptic to illuminate.\(^{62}\) There is a more superficial connection between D-art and C-art, and I will explore this instead. Very briefly, it is that C-art is the highest aim for D-art, and for that reason central to it.

### 3.4.1 Collingwood’s Account of the Connection

Why has C-art got more to do with D-art than do the many other things that D-art can do (such as magic, entertainment and all else that Collingwood refers to as ‘pseudo-art’)? Many philosophers are more ecumenical than Collingwood and call these things equally legitimate and central aspects or values of D-art.\(^{63}\) This appears to be a healthily anti-élitist stance, but I will argue below that its egalitarianism is misdirected, because C-art is by no means the preserve of the canon.

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\(^{62}\) It also goes too quickly over the differences between polysemousness, analogicality, *pros hen* ambiguity and simple homonomy. See McDaniel (2009) for discussion.

\(^{63}\) See, e.g., Aiken (1950), Gaut (2007), ch. 2.2.
Collingwood does not, as I have said, say much about what he takes the connection between C- and D-art to be, so my account is rather speculative. There is no suggestion in Collingwood’s *Aeuvre* that he thought about this connection; but the connection is there. Perhaps it is a consequence of the deeper connection he evidently takes there to be between D- and C-art, or perhaps not. Perhaps, or perhaps not, I will unknowingly just articulate that deeper connection in the below. In any case, the connection I will make is as far as I can tell consistent with everything Collingwood says, and independently plausible. The connection is this: *the nature of D-art renders certain ends differentially feasible relative to other activities and institutions, which ends are differentially valuable,* and that specifically, *C-art is the most valuable end feasible for D-art,* and *D-art is the activity or institution most capable of C-art.* In other words: there are many things that D-art can do, and some of them are more easily done by D-art than by any other activity or institution. When these things are valuable, D-art has a special obligation to them. One of them, C-art, is more than just valuable, but a foundation of any valuable human activity or institution, and so D-art has an especially strong obligation to do it.

This way of making the connection is not going quite as far out on a limb as it might initially appear to be. We do not need to say anything about the essential nature of D-art (thankfully, as no account of the essence of D-art has ever reached wide acceptance, nor even has the position that there is such an essence); we need only say that certain features and practices are common among those whom we naturally call D-artists at the present time, and since the emergence of the artistic tradition as we recognise it in the eighteenth century, are such as to render C-art more realisable by this activity, or in this institution, than in alternative activities or institutions. Or, in

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64 See, e.g., Margolis (2010, p. 215): “The philosophy of art may be doomed, again and again but always once and for all, to define what it is to be ‘a work of art,’ an ‘artwork,’ ‘art’ in the sense best suited to ‘the fine arts.’ Modern efforts seem to end in exhaustion or bafflement or sheer scatter or a sort of bad faith that assures us that it was never worth the bother in the first place.” (Of course, this has not stopped people trying: see, e.g., Fokt (2013) and S. Davies (2015).)

65 Or naturally call artists when by that term we mean D-artists. ‘D-artist’ is of course not (yet) a natural thing to call anyone.

66 Liao, Meskin and Knobe (manuscript) also (tentatively) make this point. Sparshott (1982, pp. 351ff.) suggests that an expressivist (such as, according to Sparshott, Collingwood) might like to connect C-art and D-art (or what Sparshott calls ‘the fine arts,’ which is admittedly a
other words, all that is needed is for it to be the case that if it's C-art you're after, your best shot of getting it is currently in D-art. Further, it does not mean that all D-artists to dedicate themselves to C-art, much more than that is required of anyone. In art as in any other practice, people are not obliged to always aim for the highest value.67

(In fact, not even this much is required. For Collingwood — and all of us — could be mistaken in thinking that C- and D-art are connected in this way. If so, consolation can still be had. If philosophers of D-art are in fact interested in C-art, then even if the connection between the concepts is not as strong as Collingwood thinks, he is still ‘in the same conversation’ as those other philosophers who are officially interested in D-art; it would just also be the case that everyone is mistaken about the connection between C- and D-art. Collingwood would not be offering a theory of D-art, as per the common criticism of him; but neither would his rivals; and this would suggest that the criticism rather than Collingwood is at fault. I will not consider this possibility in much detail, as the connection between C- and D-art is, I will argue, strong; but I will, in §3.4.3, discuss some new developments in art history, from avant-garde academic art to new folk arts like comics, graffiti and internet memes, that suggest that those interested in C-art should not restrict their philosophising to D-art, or worry about whether some human activity counts as D-art.)

Some of the elements of the connection I have offered need defence. I will now discuss them in turn. First, most simply, is that D-art is better fitted to some roles than others. Obviously, D-artworks typically make poor aeroplanes, even if some particular D-artwork might be a good one; and this is not accidental, but is because the aims of D-art, and so the kinds of skills required of D-artists, are not conducive to the manufacture of efficient and safe aircraft. Second, that C-art is especially valuable I take to have adequately shown in §3.3, and will not defend further. But that D-art is particularly well-suited to C-art is less obvious, as is the claim that activities and institutions particularly well-suited to some valuable end therefore have some particular connection with that end. So it is these two claims I will support now.

67 Which is not to deny that D-artists have any particular obligation to C-art. See Wolf (1982) on the legitimacy of not always aiming for the highest value within the moral sphere.
To determine whether D-art is particularly well-suited to C-art, we should have an idea of what its competitors are. Of course, any human activity is a possible contender, but it would be an endless task to determine whether D-art is better-suited to C-art than any other possible contender; the task, though, is both unnecessary and beyond a certain point confused. It is unnecessary because that D-art is best-suited to C-art is a stronger claim than Collingwood needs: it is enough that D-art has some big advantages over some obvious pretenders,\(^{68}\) that we can see how it is especially well-suited to C-art. It is confused beyond a certain point because to ask whether some particular emotion is better expressed by one means or another (by D-art or by something else) is to make the fallacy, discussed above, of separating emotion from its expression. Picasso’s *Weeping Woman* is not in any sort of immediate competition with any other means of expressing emotion, because it is through the particular artistic activity of painting that work that the emotion finds expression (see §2.2). What I will now defend is something weaker and more general: that D-art has greater potential, as an institution and tradition, than its contenders for C-art.

### 3.4.2 D-Art’s Rivals

It is not built into the concept of C-art that D-art is best suited to its realisation: if it is the expression of emotion, then any means of expressing emotion could conceivably be more efficient at it than D-art. This said, most pretenders to D-art’s throne are dismissed by a simple and general answer: D-art is well-suited to C-art because C-art has been one of D-art’s increasingly central aims for hundreds of years, and this aim has shaped D-art and D-artists in ways that render C-art more possible in a host of ways: D-artworks that are also C-art to a high degree will tend to be preserved, practices friendly to C-art will tend to flourish, and so on. It is hard to imagine how accountancy could be a home for C-art: someone interested in C-art will most likely not turn to accountancy, and accountancy’s aims, no matter how they are construed, do not encourage, and are perhaps incompatible with, C-art. (This does not mean that there is a *technique* of C-art, as we will shortly see – just that some things more than others lend themselves to it.) This, note, is not to make the strong empirical claim that all or most D-art is C-art – either specifically that the central aim of D-art is exactly what Collingwood says C-art is, or more loosely that some cluster of similar things

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\(^{68}\) Or, if we are willing to settle for the consolation, that philosophers have reasonably but mistakenly taken it to have such advantages.
are – but to make the weaker empirical claim that this sort of thing goes on it D-art an awful lot more than in other practices.  

We can see how this response plays out with regard to one example that is more *prima facie* plausibly seen as a rival to art than accountancy: ordinary speech. After all, Collingwood himself says that C-art is found in it. This is still not a serious contender, but it gives us an excuse to highlight another part of Collingwood’s philosophy, namely, its account of ‘technique.’

D-art has many advantages over ordinary speech. The most obvious one, of course, is that D-art is typically done much more carefully than any ordinary utterance. Where ordinary utterances are almost always extemporised, or at most worked on for a few minutes, even minor D-artworks are agonised over, and large-scale works can take years. (*Finnegans Wake*, for instance, took Joyce seventeen years to write, and the still-under-construction *Sagrada Familia* occupied Gaudí for his final forty-four years.) Of course some D-artworks are created more quickly: Shelley wrote *‘Ozymandias’* in perhaps a single sitting; Mozart famously wrote quickly, and there are many improvised D-artworks, most commonly perhaps in jazz. But such counter-examples are rarer and less problematic than they seem. *‘Ozymandias’* is of course only fourteen lines long; Mozart’s ability to write masterpieces spontaneously has been overestimated and mythologised, and many of his greatest works were in fact agonised over; improvised works are never entirely improvised but use familiar structures and ideas, and are – if we ignore that they are improvised, which is admittedly part of the point – typically C-artistically inferior to non-improvised works, and even bearing in mind their improvisedness never (I make bold to say) reach the heights of, say, Schoenberg or Picasso. Of course, it is not impossible that an extemporised work or speech utterance could be so complex, rich and perfect as to reach C-art’s heights; but it is much more difficult to do so than when, as is typically the case in D-art, time and care is given to the work. Relatedly, D-art typically allows for revision. The artist can first run a draft or a sketch past herself *qua* spectator; can second run it by peers prior to public release (if there is such a stage); and can third revise it in response to its public response. A

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69 I use ‘practice’ in MacIntyre’s (1981, p. 194) sense to refer roughly to inherited traditions, institutions, pedagogy, etc.

70 See *The Economist* (21 December 2013).

71 See Zaslaw (1994) for a general criticism of Romantic notions of Mozart’s creativity, as well as more specific criticism of the notion that he composed entirely in his head and at breakneck speed.
composer can play her sonata to herself with a critical ear, can run it by visiting friends, and can revise the published score. Collingwood stresses the importance of an audience’s reaction for the artist (see esp. PA, ch. XIV, §5; v.s. §2.4; v.i. ch. 3, §2.3), as the audience may be critical where the artist has been lazy or cowardly, and can force her to look harder at her offering. Such revision is typically not possible with regard to ordinary speech, although this is, again, not necessarily so, especially with regard to speech that approaches D-art: oratory, rhetoric, and suchlike (but then, of course, it approaches D-art, so no longer rivals it). Yet another advantage is that D-artworks are typically permanent in a way that ordinary speech is not, and so can be learnt from and so can contribute to the future development of their tradition. And so on.

This is all obvious enough; I run through it for two reasons. First, of course, in order to respond to the objection I have mentioned above, and to show that D-art is conducive to C-art. The second reason, though, is to continue the exposition of Collingwood’s philosophy of art, and to bring out what Collingwood means, and what he does not mean, when he says that C-art is something “of which there can be no technique.” (PA, p. 111) Understood too strongly, Collingwood might here be read as saying that all that we can learn from study of the canon is how the individual canonical artists succeeded in creating C-art, but that, our situation being different, we cannot apply them to our own work. One can imagine an early-twentieth-century music-theory textbook instructing young composers that to write good music they should avoid unresolved minor ninths, this having been resoundingly successful for music up till then, but had Schoenberg followed this foolishly absolute advice there would never have been a Second Viennese School, so central is that trope to that tradition. It might be thought that Collingwood is committed to this being the case for all advice short of the utterly general and unhelpful ‘express thyself.’ However, we should not read Collingwood as understanding ‘technique’ so broadly. It is textually unwarranted, and it leads one to implausible positions that Collingwood himself disparages (see, e.g., PA, ch. II, §4). ‘Technique,’ we see on inspection, refers rather to something external to the process of expression, something that relates to it much as (to recall the analogy of §2.2) the postman relates to his letters, and it is only technique narrowly understood that Collingwood says has no place in art. Collingwood even uses a broader notion of technique on p. 323. There is no reason why there cannot be education which is internal to expression. To listen to Beethoven, for instance, is to express one’s emotions, and to give one’s emotions a clarity upon which one’s further expression – in one’s own artistic creation – build. Listening to Beethoven is, then, a form of education which is
not an imparting of some spurious ‘technique,’ and a form of education which D-art, much more than ordinary language, is in a position to give.\footnote{For more on ‘technique’ and the ‘technical theory of art’ in Collingwood, see Ridgely (1998) and (2002).}

This is not quite the end of the objection concerning D-art’s privileged position \textit{vis-à-vis} C-art, though: some philosophers, such as Hegel and even Collingwood himself, have nonetheless wondered whether, despite D-art’s lending itself to C-art, it contains some insurmountable obstacles to C-art. The objections that come from this position are, to my mind, pretty weak (though they are the best of their sort of which I am aware); but they are worth covering as giving voice to a type of objection that might otherwise lead to a nagging but inarticulate dissatisfaction with my argument.

Collingwood’s early \textit{Speculum Mentis} (1924; henceforth \textit{SM}) is an attempt to sketch out, as the subtitle suggests, a map of knowledge. He distinguishes five ‘provinces’ of knowledge or experience (we might refer to them as \textit{Weltanschauungen}), forming a dialectical progression that runs from art, through religion, science and history in that order, before culminating in philosophy, each province having conceptual resources more adequate to the task of understanding the world. (Hegel would say ‘to the task of revealing absolute spirit.’) In orthodox Hegelian fashion, each province proves inadequate and confused even by its own standards, and so is superseded (or sublated) by the province that overcomes that inadequacy. In the case of art (see \textit{SM}, ch. III, esp. §6), the inadequacy is a confusion concerning the relationship between hard-nosed reality and capricious imagination. The artist, Collingwood says, sees these as distinct types of experience when in fact they are “correlative elements in [any] experience” (p. 83). This inadequacy is not just abstract, but plays out in the life of anyone who tries to identify with the artistic \textit{Weltanschauung}, whose “life is torn in two between the ecstasy of a fruition which, though it solve the riddle of the universe, is itself another riddle, and the despair of those dark hours when the universe is not even a riddle but a tissue of meaningless fact, a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing” (p. 91), as Collingwood puts it with a rhetorical fervour typical of the work. The relation between imagination and reality (or ‘assertion’ or ‘logic’) is more clearly seen in the religious \textit{Weltanschauung}, which is thus the next stage in the dialectic (see ch. IV, §1; see also Collingwood (1916)).

Collingwood’s point here is that the artistic \textit{Weltanschauung} by its very nature involves certain confusions, which prevent art from reaching truth; the resources of the longest and best-passed-down tradition in the world will not allow art to embody...
values that it cannot by its very nature embody. If Collingwood is right here, all I have said above is as nothing; even if D-art does lend itself to C-art in the ways I have enumerated, its potential is less than the potential of religion and the still-higher dialectical stages.

But of course he is not right, as he himself obviously came to see between the writing of SM and of PA. The argument of SM fails, to briefly mention the most pertinent failing, in virtue of the overly narrow understanding Collingwood has there of art. His insistence that the artist (qua artist) must see (what I have called) reality and imagination as distinct experiences is unmotivated, and can easily be denied. Of course, the Collingwood of SM would respond that to simply deny this would be to miss the point. He is interested, in SM, in constructing an abstract dialectic which makes salient features that are never purely manifest in concrete. This response, though, opens up the counter-response that he has no right, then, to accuse, as he does, actual (D)-artists of the error that only these idealised artists commit. Here, I think, Collingwood has no response, and indeed I do not think there is even much of SM’s account of art that can be salvaged – as is indicated by the fact that PA has a deeply different account of art.

3.4.3 Is the Proposed Connection Implausibly Fortuitous?

It is hopefully now plausible that C- and D-art have a very close connection, and that this connection is a matter of D-art having a particularly strong potential for C-art. However, it looks as if the connection is a bit ‘accidental’ for all I have said, some social change could come about such that the advantages D-art currently enjoys were lost – economic pressure on D-artists could make the time and care they have typically given their work prohibitively difficult, copyright laws could make post-publication revision of work impossible, etc. – and then C- and D-art would have very little to do with each other.73 This, however, is not a problem for Collingwood. It is enough for him

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73 Two qualifications on this: first, if such changes in the broader world did come about, our notion of what art is and where it is to be found might well change as well, such that we would expect to find C-art in places that we, now, would not expect; and perhaps we would in that possible future refer to those places where we found C-art as D-art. Maybe, indeed, this is not entirely hypothetical: as I argue below in the main text, we find nothing strange any more about finding C-art in video games or performance art, and we also happily refer to such things, as once we did not, as D-art. At the same time, it is common for people to deny that modern art of the sort that wins the Turner Prize is art, though this sort of art is the most
that it is currently the case that there is such a connection. Indeed, he would be quite happy to find a high concentration of C-art in places that have little to do with D-art. This is a strength of Collingwood’s theory: it allows us to consider more directly and openly that certain activities and institutions are highly C-artistic without having to first wonder whether they are D-art.

To see why this is a strength, let us consider a liminal case of D-art. The world is full of such things – design, jokes, ditties, linguistic devices like metaphor (v.s. n. 53), extemporised showersinging, folk art, etc. – but I will focus on one ‘artwork’ that challenges the art/not-art dichotomy by not clearly either being or not being D-art while certainly embodying C-art. This example is intrinsically aesthetically interesting qua C-art, and Collingwood’s philosophy of art allows us to see it qua C-art without getting bogged down in the distraction of whether it is D-art.

The example is Patrick Rodriguez’s Twitter feed, “Is it art?” This is an algorithmically generated feed, in which locutions along the lines of ‘Are x art?’, or ‘Can x ever be art?’, with the x replaced by procedurally chosen nouns, were posted every few hours for a few years. The resulting tweets are often funny in their absurdity: e.g., “I’ll believe hockey is art when I see it in a museum”, or, “Emptiness? Okay, but is it art?” There is a satirical point here – the question (or worry) concerning whether certain things are art is tedious and unhelpful – but my point is that determining whether this Twitter feed is itself (D-)art does not help us understand what it is ‘up to.’ The evidence for this is in the fact that despite the difficulty of deciding whether or not the Twitter

obvious heir to traditional D-art. This suggests that what people are tempted to deny to Turner Prize-style artworks is C-arthood.

The second qualification is that the connection between C- and D-art could never be totally severed, because there is already a huge body of D-art in which we also find C-art, and that fact will remain even if our opinions concerning where C-art can still be created changes.

74 See Parsons (2013).

75 URL: twitter.com/IsItArtBot. The only indication as to the authorship of this site is a link to Patrick Rodriguez’s Twitter. Rodriguez, a browse reveals, is the creator of this and many other twitterbots: see thelightaesthetic.com/games (accessed 16 Feb 2015). Rodriguez’s brief explanation at that site suggests that he created IsItArtBot as a response to those who doubt that computer games can be art.

76 These posts are from 2 February 2015 (URL: twitter.com/IsItArtBot/status/5612202114712898 (accessed 16 Feb 2015)) and 20 December 2014 (URL: twitter.com/IsItArtBot/status/5465735116113568 (accessed 16 Feb 2015)) respectively.
feed is D-art or not, we can still easily engage with it under the aspect of C-art. Concerning its D-art status, what even is our candidate? The individual tweets? the computer programme? the tweets that, as a whole, are the result of the programme? But despite our uncertainty here, it is clear what is happening with the Twitter feed: *inter alia*, it is a clever bit of satire that refers to new and old arts, avant-garde and folk art, philistinist beackpointing attitudes in the artworld, itself and liminality. (I will not engage in art criticism here, but it is clear how it would go, and more importantly, that there is plenty to say.) We know that it is C-art, simply because it is an artefact, and we are also able to get good traction on the question of whether it expresses emotion well. But if we are labouring under the impression that C-art is restricted to D-arts, and if our taxonomising rules the Twitter feed to be, in Danto’s words, ‘a mere real thing’, then unless our perception outpaces our theorising, we will be blind to the C-artistic value of the feed.

It might be responded at this point that if IsItArtBot is as C-artistically rich as I have argued, then a good theory of D-art will include it. The example, continues the response, does not highlight the inadequacy of the project of attempting to define D-art, but just the inadequacy of a single, hypothetical, theory of D-art.

This response fails, because so long as D-art is binarily realisable there will always be liminal cases, their inclusion into or exclusion from D-art will always be as arbitrary as the exclusion of IsItArtBot, and their inclusion or exclusion will always conflict with other natural, scalar, ways of speaking about art. This is because C-art is found to some extent in all human activity and experience: there is no ‘natural joint’ that we can use as a way of separating art from non-art, there is just the infinitely fine-grained scale. IsItArtBot is one of any number of things that may or may not count as D-art but which are certainly expressions of emotion, and which we can look at in ways similar to how we look at D-art: viz., *qua* C-art.\(^77\) Further, we can see this without

\(^77\) I would go so far as to say that anyone interested in where the avant-garde has been in the last ten or twenty years would do well to start searching here. See, e.g., contemporar-yarddaily.com, a site which daily reports contemporary-art happenings, typically art exhibitions: most, I would estimate, of what I see on that site (I subscribe to its RSS feed) is liminal in this way, and thejogging.tumblr.com, a blog of liminal ‘art’. See also Wershler (4 April 2012) and Goldsmith (22 October 2013) for lists of and references to things that occupy this space. Two interesting very recent examples of such liminal ‘art’ are #cachemonet (URL: cachemonet.com (accessed 16 Feb 2015)) and *Secret Habitat* (2014), the latter of which is given an illuminating discussion at Rock, Paper, Shotgun (21 December 2014).
having any idea whether or not they are D-art, just as we can in the case of IsItArtBot. Why ask whether they are D-art?  

More than just a waste of time, asking whether something is D-art is positively harmful: it acts as a malign sort of elitist gate-keeping. Something which has acquired the status of ‘art’ (i.e., D-art) is naturally seen, by virtue of the close connection it has with C-art that I have argued for, as more worthy of an attention interested in C-art than something that has not won this status. Now, for various reasons, our canon of D-artworks is disproportionately (and even predominantly) the product of white, cissexual, European men, has been created in upper-class, monied and well-educated contexts, has been created before the Second World War, and contains works of limited variegation. It is natural, then, to infer that C-art is disproportionately realised by works that arise from, and people who inhabit, this sort of Lebensgefühl. But C-art is, as we have seen (§3.3), a value that is deeply important to everyone, and its realisation involves values such as self-government and sanity that are simply part of what it is to be a full human being. Is this found predominantly among those Lebensgefühlen that differentially create D-art? That would be an awfully elitist thing to say — that non-Europeans, the poor, transsexuals, women, recent generations, and so on, tend to be less free and sane. One response to this is to expand the boundaries of D-art. This battle has been successfully fought by, for instance, film-makers and comic book artists (and, before them, musicians, architects, painters, et al.), and that is well and good. But there are two limitations to this approach. First, the challenge is harder when the proposed D-art candidate has little surface similarity with established D-art genres: for instance, the ‘Is it art?’ Twitter feed, food and drink, non-Western arts that reject

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78 As Lopes says with regard to comics, are we “likely to gain much insight into that genre by campaigning for its [D-]art status, once its character and value have been fully appreciated?” (2014), p. 204; quoted in Shiner (2015, p. 392), who endorses the sentiment with regard to perfume.

79 A similar argument to the one I make here, though concerning philosophy rather than art, is made by Dotson in her ‘Why Is This Paper Philosophy?’ (2012a). Cf. also Priest’s reply (2012) and her counter-reply (2012b).

80 This German-idealistic term, which can be translated as something like ‘manners of living,’ I take from Scruton (1978/2013), p. 49. Vi. ch. 2, §3.

81 Baker (manuscript) argues that beer can be a fine art — what I would call C-artistic to a high degree — on grounds of its similarity to established artistic masterpieces.
notions fundamental to Western art such as the ‘work’ taxonomy,\textsuperscript{82} and those things I have mentioned in n. 77 above. Second, it cedes the terms of the debate to those in a position of power. It is to argue that the proposed D-art is similar to what is already acknowledged to be D-art. If the argument is that it is similar only in that it involves C-art to an extent commensurate with admitted D-artworks, then the argument is unproblematic; but if it argues for its similarity in any other respect, then it is liable to undermine or obscure the C-art of the proposed D-art, because the candidate’s C-art may manifest precisely in its dissimilarity, in that respect, to D-art. To give a simple example: if beauty is seen as central to D-art, as it has been, then a proposed D-artwork that expresses emotion by being ugly will have great difficulty being admitted as D-art. The situation then is the paradoxical one of a proposed D-artwork having to be misrepresented in ways which undermine its C-artistic meaning and value in order to gain the prestige that would allow that meaning and value to be understood. Worse, to the extent that the non-C-artistic properties of D-art bear the signature of the \textit{Lebensgefühl}/I have delineated above, there is a danger that what the D-art candidate is going to have to undermine in order to gain the honorific ‘D-art’ is precisely those of its aspects that challenge this \textit{Lebensgefühl}.

It would be better, I propose, for us to ‘cut out the middleman’ and ask directly whether and to what extent this candidate instantiates C-art. This is not to say that we should discard the category of D-art: it is a concept essential to the understanding of much art,\textsuperscript{83} and indeed of much deliberately transgressive art, e.g., everything from Duchamp’s \textit{Fountain} to IsItArtBot. Nor is it to deny that the institution of D-art has been a fertile source of C-art. It is rather to say that, with regard to liminal cases that do not require the concept of D-art to be understood, we should not grant the easily-gatekept concept of D-art much authority or prestige in trying to understand them, and should keep the concept separate from C-art, which, by being scalarly realisable, does not lend itself to gates which might be kept, and which, by being more general, does not carry the same problematic baggage; and to say that we should be mindful of the tensions which the concept of D-art can suffer, as in liminal cases of D-art, and be open to the possibility that the source of the tension is not the dubious quality of the liminal D-artwork but the artificiality and limited usefulness of the concept of D-art.

\textsuperscript{82} See Goehr (1992).

\textsuperscript{83} And much besides. Lindner (2015) fruitfully if haphazardly uses the D-art boundary to understand and critique the role given aesthetic pleasure and the category of ‘the popular’ by art theorists and academics in the humanities.
3.4.4 Summary

The point of the above discussion is to show two things. First, the connection between C- and D-art is not immutable. Second, when the two come apart, our interest often follows C-art rather than D-art. This, I think, is so for Danto, Scruton, and many others (and certainly for me). These claims together suggest that these philosophers would better pursue their own interests, and give a better account of that of which they are particularly interested in giving an account, if they were to follow Collingwood and focus their philosophising primarily on C-art, rather than, as they have done, D-art. This is why I said above that Collingwood and Danto et al. are not in direct competition. Their theories are not in competition insofar as one is philosophising about C-art and the others about D-art: these are just different concepts (or different aspects of the same concept). But Collingwood and the others are in competition over which of the concepts, given certain shared interests, is philosophically more important.84 I hope to have clarified this tension, and perhaps also to have begun to muster some strong arguments in Collingwood’s favour. The remainder of this dissertation will muster others.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have expounded Collingwood’s theory of art, and said something about its relationship to other theories of art that it has been taken to be competing against as an analysis of art. I have argued the standard line that Collingwood’s account of art is that it is the expression of emotion, where the terms used have the very specific meanings he gave them. Less standardly, I have argued that expression of emotion, for Collingwood, is not binarily realisable – it is not something that one either does or does not do – but scalarly or differentially realisable – it is something one does to a

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84 Collingwood would probably want something stronger. First, he would probably say that anyone with any philosophical interest in art at all is interested in C-art rather than D-art, because D-art is simply not a philosophical category. (The project of Danto et al., then, is just not philosophical.) Second, he considers C-art a supremely important value, and so objectively philosophically more important than just about any rival, other than those which are equally general and fundamental. (The project of Danto et al., then, is relatively unimportant.) But there is neither need nor space to discuss these disagreements at any length here.
greater or lesser extent in all one's utterances and actions. Correspondingly, whether or not some utterance or action – or the resulting embodied artefact – is art is not simply true or false.

We often use words in this way, and we often use the word 'art' in this way. But in adopting this usage, we move away from the usage of the term that Analytic aestheticians typically use, whereby any given thing simply either is or is not an artwork, whereby this is not gradiental or context-dependent. I have argued, however, that there is a strong, albeit contingent, connection between the two senses of 'art', which I call C-art and D-art respectively.

Highlighting the separateness of C-art and D-art allows us to see clearly that however good a place D-art is to look for C-art, it is not C-art; and as C-art is, I contend, what at least some philosophers of art are primarily interested in, we should follow Collingwood and primarily (but not solely) philosophise about C-art when we philosophise about art. I will adopt this strategy in the following chapters, turning first, in ch. 2, to the scope of 'emotion' in art.
The Philosophy in Art

In ch. 1, we saw that according to Collingwood, that phase of our concept of ‘art’ that we have called ‘C-art’ is a total imaginative activity of the expression of emotion. However, I said very little about what ‘emotion’ actually means. I in §2.1 expanded ‘emotion’ as a ‘charge’ on our non-emotional experience, something like ‘the affective aspect of experience.’ As I admitted then, though, this is not to say very much about what the term means, and what is said about what it means is liable to appear implausible. The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of what it is that art expresses – that is, of ‘emotion’ as Collingwood uses the term – and in particular, to give an account of it that steers a path between two opposite excesses both of which Collingwood courts: an account that neither makes emotion so intellectually/philosophically barren that it is unable to do justice to how philosophically rich (C-)art can be, nor so intellectually/philosophically rich that it fails to distinguish art from philosophy. To put this tension in other words, it sometimes looks as if Collingwood thinks that what C-art expresses is the ‘merely’ affective aspect of experience, but at other times it looks as if he thinks that it expresses the entirety of our experience, our entire worldview in all its richness. Which (if either) does he in fact think? And is he right to think that? And if he is mistaken or confused on this count, how problematic is it for his overall theory of art (or for its salvage)? These are the questions of the current chapter. It is crucial to Collingwood’s overall theory that he has a good account of ‘emotion,’ as this is as it were the ‘content’ of art. The breadth of ‘emotion’ is therefore determinative of the breadth of ‘art.’

The chapter runs as follows. In §1, we will consider the delimitation of ‘art’ Collingwood offers in his earlier writings, and argue that it is inadequate. In §2, we will turn to *The Principles of Art (PA)*. In §2.1 we will exposit those parts of Collingwood’s un-
derstanding of ‘emotion’ in this text that are hermeneutically uncontroversial. How-
ever, Collingwood is not consistent with regard to how broadly he understands the
domain of C-art (or of ‘emotion’), and in §2.2 and §2.3 we will consider two inter-
pretations permitted by what he says. The first, ‘narrow’ delimitation of ‘emotion’ delimits
it narrowly as only the affective aspect of our experience. C-art, correspondingly, is
only able to express this aspect. I will argue in §§2.2.1-2.2.4 that this delimitation runs
into trouble because there are artworks that appear to be philosophically potent qua
C-art in a way that this interpretation of Collingwood’s theory cannot account for. So
we will turn then to the broader delimitation of ‘emotion,’ which allows it to also be
an active, philosophically potent, aspect of our mental life. C-art, accordingly, can be
philosophically potent. This delimitation, though, invites the objection that C-art has
now become indistinguishable from Collingwood’s understanding of philosophy,
which is problematic insofar as it seems that art and philosophy are different (§§2.3.1-
2.3.3). I will argue, though, that Collingwood’s understanding of philosophy is suffi-
ciently dissimilar to our understanding of philosophy, and sufficiently similar to our
notion of art, that this is not a problem for his philosophy of art. I will then conclude
that the broad delimitation is preferable both hermeneutically (§2.4) and critically
(§2.5).

All of this, though, will create a new problem: this understanding of ‘emotion’ is
plausible as an account of what C-art expresses, but, as we will see in §3, it is pretty
terrible as an account of what we mean by ‘emotion.’ I will canvas alternative terms,
but argue that because they are all just as bad as ‘emotion,’ we should not abandon that
term, but use it advisedly, and in tandem with these other terms as context demands.

1. What the Early Collingwood Thinks Art Is

In order to get an initial grip on how Collingwood might want to delimit the scope of
emotion and of C-art, and on why he might want to delimit them in that way, we
should turn to his early work, primarily to An Essay on Philosophical Method (EPM),
but also to Speculum Mentis (SM). In EPM, Collingwood is of course primarily inter-
ested in the nature of philosophy. He is primarily keen to distinguish philosophy from
science, but he does spend ch. X exploring some connections between philosophy,
prose and poetry.

Collingwood changes his mind significantly between EPM and PA about the phi-
losophy of art. One important difference is that ‘emotion’ is not yet an important term
for him. As such, this section will focus on the delimitation of art rather than of emotion, but with the same end in mind, viz., of understanding and critically assessing the place Collingwood gives to art. Further, much of what he says in EPM about the connection between philosophy and poetry sounds preposterous, and indeed it often is; but these mistakes are rectified in PA. We will work through some of these mistakes in the course of the exposition, and in §2 turn to his delimitation of emotion in PA.

‘Literature,’ in EPM, does not mean just ‘literary fiction,’ but is a much broader term, something like the linguistic artefact resultant from thought. Philosophical thought leads to philosophical literature, scientific thought leads to scientific literature, and so on. Now, “[l]iterature as a genus is divided into the species poetry and prose. Prose is marked by a distinction between matter and form: what we say and how we say it.” (EPM, p. 199) In poetry, by contrast, this distinction “does not exist. Instead of two linked problems, finding out what to say and finding out how to say it, the poet has only one problem… The sole business of a poem is to be beautiful… [T]he poet… is trying simply to speak.” (EPM, p. 200) On one natural reading, Collingwood is saying something uncontroversial: form and matter (or content) are bound up with each other in poetry, such that poems are not paraphrasable, and ‘what to say’ and ‘how to say it’ are bound up as one problem. Collingwood means something stronger than this, though: it is not that form and content are intricately connected but still distinguishable, but that the distinction does not exist at all. This is less plausible (and we will see below that it is false), but it is not as preposterous as it might sound. Collingwood is doing philosophy, and so he is interested in the philosophical phase of the concepts of ‘prose’ and ‘poetry.’ (We could call them ‘C-prose’ and ‘C-poetry’ to show their connection to ‘C-art.’) He is not claiming that in the ‘philosophy’ or ‘prose fiction’ sections of the bookstore form and content are utterly distinct, whereas that distinction does not apply to anything in the ‘poetry’ section. Nor is he claiming that the writer of any prose passage knows exactly what she is going to say apart from how to say it, or that poets can never decide in advance of the writing of a poem what if any content the poem will have. Rather, every instance of literature is prose under one aspect, to some extent, and poetry under another aspect, to some other extent; much as, as we saw in ch. 1, every human activity or experience is, for the Collingwood of PA, art under one

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85 As Lamarque (2015) notes, the tight connection of form and content in poetry, and its non-paraphrasability, are “commonplaces.” This has not stopped some from denying them, of course. See the discussion by Lamarque (2015), who defends the theses.
aspect, to some extent, while also being, for instance, craft under another aspect, to some other extent. (As with art in PA, though, Collingwood in EPM clearly thinks that ‘C-poetry’ has some close connection with ‘D-poetry,’ and it is far from clear that he can justify this, as we saw in ch. 1, §3.4.2.)

Although there can be no such thing as ‘pure prose’ for Collingwood, something that approaches that limit is ‘dry,’ ‘styleless’ prose, such as is a virtue in scientific writing. It is as true in such cases as anywhere that content and form come apart. Scientific facts, for instance, can be equally well expressed and understood in any number of ways (e.g., in different languages, using different technical terminology). In poetry, by contrast, to repeat, the distinction between form and content does not exist; and what this means is plain if we recall his later philosophy of art. (C- art in PA, as we saw in ch. 1, §2.2, is the expression of emotion, but the expression and the emotion are not external to each other as are the postman and his letters; rather, the emotion is changed by how it is expressed, something like how a thought, in being clarified, differs in various ways from its unclear counterpart. The form – how, and how well, the emotion is expressed – therefore affects the content – that which is expressed. Art, in SM and PA, is more or less just the poetry of EPM writ large (we will look more closely at this in §2.1). Philosophy, in EPM, in this respect occupies a space between science and poetry. (“[P]hilosophy represents the point at which prose comes nearest to being poetry.” (EPM, p. 213)) Unlike science, the distinction between form and content is not absolute; but philosophy is not ‘mere’ poetry: it is rather poetry “of the intellect. What is expressed in it is not emotions, desires, feelings, as such, but those which a thinking mind experiences in its search for knowledge” (EPM, p. 212). A bit later, he further articulates the distinction between prose and poetry:

[W]hereas the poet yields himself to every suggestion that his language makes, and so produces word-patterns whose beauty is sufficient for their existence, the philosopher’s word-patterns are constructed only to reveal the thought which they express, and are valuable not in themselves but as means to that end. The prose-writer’s art is an art that must conceal itself, and produce not a jewel that is looked at for its own beauty but a crystal in whose depths the thought can be seen without distortion or confusion; and

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86 See EPM, p. 201. It is debatable whether Collingwood is correct that pure prose is impossible. Nothing at issue here, however, hangs on the matter.
the philosophical writer in especial follows the trade not of a jeweller but of a lens-grinder.

_EPM_, p. 214

This fittingly purple description is yet not as crystalline as might be desired. Particularly, does Collingwood think that form and content come apart in philosophy or not? It sometimes appears that he thinks they do not; but if not, then they are deeply bound up with each other, and how then can one be a means to the other? It is, after all, because the content of a poem is so bound up with its expression that we cannot more efficiently paraphrase it, state its ‘point’ or ‘end’ or ‘content’ to which its expression or ‘form’ is a ‘means.’

Although Collingwood does not spend much time on the matter, a hermeneutically plausible answer can be inferred: In philosophy and poetry both, there is no distinction _in practice_ as it were, between form and content; but in philosophy alone, there is a conceptual distinction: in philosophy alone, the form is what it is because it is directed at a content which, although unspecified apart from in the way it has been specified, is nonetheless separate. We will now consider a passage that will simultaneously illustrate what this separation of form and content means, and refute Collingwood’s claim that philosophy alone involves this separation.

Can’t hear with the waters of. The chittering waters of. Flittering bats, fieldmice bawk talk. Ho! Are you not gone ahone? What Thom Malone? Can’t hear with bawk of bats, all thin lifleying waters of. Ho, talksave us! My foos won’t moos. I feel as old as yonder elm. A tale told of Shaun or Shem? All Livia’s daughtersons. Dark hawks hear us. Night! Night! My ho head halls. I feel as heavy as yonder stone. Tell me of John or Shaun? Who were Shem and Shaun the living sons or daughters of? Night now! Tell me, tell me, tell me, elm! Night night! Telmetale of stem or stone. Beside the rivering waters of, hitherandthithering waters of. Night!

Joyce, _Finnegans Wake_, last paragraph of I.8 (pp. 215-6 of OWC 2012 edition)

Early commentators on the _Wake_ claimed—sometimes in praise!—that it is a meaningless romp in language, with no plot or characters; a beautiful ‘word-pattern,’ Collingwood might have said. “My foos won’t moos,” for instance, in the above passage, sounds lovely, but to ask whether it is true is, according to the early Collingwood and plausibly, to miss the point: the _Wake_ does not point ‘beyond’ itself to any truth, it is a jewel to be looked at for its own sake. This, however, will not do. The problem is that
it is not adequately explanatory: for why does “My foos won’t moos” sound lovely? It is not ‘just because’ (a phrase as pernicious as ‘common sense’): it is because of how it contributes to the rustic crepuscular atmosphere of the passage. The repeated ‘oo’ brings to mind an owl’s call complementary to the mention of bats and field mice, as well as, because the sentence is a cacography of ‘my feet won’t move,’ a baby’s coo and the creeping paralysis of the mouth due to the speaker’s metamorphosing into an elm. And so on. Collingwood could grant this, but insist that, although the passage’s beauty resides not merely in its word-patterns, and has to do with their content (already a big concession, for now we have a distinction between form and content), their content is just an image, more poetry, still not something truth-apt as the content of philosophy can be. But this just pushes the problem back a step: why is this imagery beautiful? One natural answer is expressed in alethic vocabulary: the imagery (or the language itself) ‘rings true.’ But what does this mean? In PA, as we saw in ch. 1, Collingwood discovered how to capture this ‘truth’ in a theory: it is not propositional truth, to be sure, but a truth, or correspondence, to the emotion expressed. But in EPM, Collingwood has no answer to this.

This then establishes the inadequacy of Collingwood’s early account of poetry: the distinction between form and content that he says does not exist in poetry in fact does exist. (Collingwood’s account of philosophy is mistaken too, this time for understanding philosophy far too narrowly: much philosophy is much closer to science than he sees. This, though, is not something with which I will take issue here: this dissertation is not a defence of Collingwood’s theory of philosophy. In §2.3.2, we will briefly see that some important philosophical traditions do fit Collingwood’s description; but that can wait: nothing I am going to say for the moment is affected by it.)

Collingwood’s early distinction between philosophy and poetry, then, is incoherent. It does, however, square with the text, and also with SM, in which Collingwood explicitly equates art with play, which is more plausibly not truth-oriented (play is the practical form, and art the theoretical form, of the aesthetic level of consciousness; see ch. III, §8, esp. p. 107). And it does give us some rough idea of how Collingwood wants to delimit art. Poetry is the realm of literature not answerable to truth, and not so answerable because it is concerned only to draw out of language all its suggestions,
images, associations and beauty, to attend to “the finegrainedness of language, its textures and intricacies, its opacity”\textsuperscript{87} – not to critically assess them. Art, then, being poetry writ large, is the realm of experience or activity not answerable to truth, and not answerable because it is concerned only to draw out of the world all its suggestions.

2. The Delimitation of Art in \textit{The Principles of Art}

We turn now to \textit{PA}, in which Collingwood tentatively delimits ‘art’ and ‘emotion’in a different way, a way which I will argue is in fact two mutually inconsistent ways. We will consider the two things in turn, starting with the delimitation closest to that of \textit{EPM} that we have just considered. However, before we do this, I will introduce some of the basics of Collingwood’s understanding of ‘emotion’ that are common to the two delimitations.

2.1 Basics

To repeat what we said in ch. 1, §2.1, first: ‘Sensation’ and ‘emotion’ are the two basic elements of ‘feeling,’ where sensation refers to that which we experience through our senses (e.g., ‘the five senses’) and where emotion refers to that which attends on, or is a ‘charge’ upon, these sensations. This takes place on the ‘psychical’ or pre-conceptual level of the mind. At the higher level of the mind’s life, the level of ‘consciousness,’ ‘ideas’ (expressed or conceptualised sensa) also have this ‘charge,’ and it is the charge at this level of the mind that it is (C-)art’s business to express. Collingwood refers to this charge as an ‘emotional charge,’ but as a definition of ‘emotion,’\textsuperscript{88} ‘emotional charge’ is clearly unhelpful (the vicious circle looms); so I prefer to read it without the adjective. The problem then, though, is that it is not clear how broadly Collingwood understands ‘charge.’ It is largely this ambiguity that it is the purpose of this chapter to clarify, but some initial clarification can be done now. Collingwood specifies what he takes the relationship between a sensation and its emotional charge to be only by analogy. In the main discussion (\textit{PA}, pp. 161–2, from which I take all the quotations in this paragraph), he says that (1) although a sensation (e.g., some particular red) and its

\textsuperscript{87} Lamarque (2015), p. 36.

\textsuperscript{88} It is not clear that Collingwood is interested in defining emotion (I suspect that he takes it as obvious that we know what he means by the term), but I am.
emotional charge (e.g., a terror of that red) can be analysed into “two elements,” “this is not to divide it into two experiences, each independent of the other, like seeing red and hearing the note of a bell”; rather, “there is only one experience, a terrifying red”; (2) sensation is logically but not temporally prior to its emotional charge; (3) we feel the emotion ‘because’ we feel the sensation, and this ‘because’ operates much as the way it operates in locutions such as ‘the hand rises ‘because’ the biceps contracts,’ and this relation is neither one of causation nor logical ground/consequent.89

This all helps narrow down what ‘emotion,’ for Collingwood, means; it also helps us locate his usage in relation to contemporary Analytic philosophy’s usage. Most importantly, Collingwood uses the term roughly as we do now, at least at first blush. It can refer to immediate responses such as the ‘startle’ response as well as sophisticated responses such as shame and curiosity. This is also seen by the examples Collingwood gives of emotion: for instance, pity and fear (PA, pp. 50–2); high morale (p. 67); team spirit and a sense of fair play (p. 74); malice, snobbery, and delight in power (pp. 84ff.); the feeling of C-art going well (p. 117; v.i. ch. 4); pain (PA, p. 230); and the emotion attendant on intellectual success (p. 267). These all look like emotions to me. But there are some differences: First, emotion is experiential, and so ‘moods,’ as that term is now used in Analytic philosophy to refer to emotions (or emotion-like things) that are only dispositional rather than (also) occurring, are not, for Collingwood, what art is in the business of expressing. However, and importantly, they are not necessarily experiential in the way that, say, a particular bout of anger is. They can be something like what we normally (and some contemporary theorists: see Robinson (2003), pp. 392–3) call ‘moods’ colorations of our mental life that persist below or alongside more prominent emotions (but which are not therefore merely dispositional). Think of the tragic emotion that persists throughout a tragedy, not just at the dénouement. It is a particular emotion, yes – the tragedy of Hamlet is not the tragedy of Oedipus – but it is not particular to any one individual’s specific empirical experience. (It is because of this that Collingwood is not vulnerable to the standard objection that the emotions we feel on attending to even successful C-art cannot be the same as those felt by the artist, because we are experiencing the artwork’s emotions in one distilled swig whereas the artist took breaks, revised the work, etc., and so had very different emotions to us. (Robinson (2005, p. 256) also considers and rejects this objection.)

89 Collingwood does not offer a positive characterisation, but the relation at play here is probably something such as the fraught concept of ‘metaphysical grounding.’ See Bliss and Trogon (2014), esp. §6.1.
Second, Collingwood’s theory of emotion is incompatible with contemporary judgementalist theories of emotion (i.e., any theory that considers emotions judgements on the model of intellectual judgements), insofar as judgements are not felt. (Though this is not to deny similarities along the lines adumbrated by Robinson (2005), ch. 1, as well as further similarities (which I will leave implicit) if we adopt the broad delimitation.)

Third, Collingwood’s ‘emotion’ explicitly includes desire, or at least those aspects thereof that we feel (PA, pp. 84–5); this too is unlike most (but not all) contemporary usage. However, this is only a terminological difference.

Fourth, emotion is a process for Collingwood. An emotion that is attendant on a given sensum is, in a sense, identical with the emotion (‘of consciousness’) that is attendant on the idea that is the clarification of that sensum; this is despite it being, inevitably, in another sense different. This is actually in accord with Robinson’s account (2005, ch. 3); but Robinson’s account does not command universal assent.

Finally, the contours of an emotion will be determined by its clarification (expression), and also by the medium in which it is expressed (v.s. ch. 1, §2.2).

With these basics out of the way, we can now turn to those parts of the definition of ‘emotion’ that are not shared by the two delimitations. We will turn first to the narrow delimitation, and raise some objections against it that I will argue cast serious doubt on it, before considering the broad delimitation in §2.3.

2.2 The Narrow Delimitation

The narrow delimitation is the delimitation that Collingwood’s theoretical groundwork more naturally supports, but it also goes against the ‘spirit’ of much of what he says about art; additionally, it leads to a more idiosyncratic delimitation of C-art, and so is less useful if we are trying to use Collingwood to connect to the concerns of contemporary Analytic aesthetics. However, this delimitation is closer to his account in EPM and SM: there is still the divide between prose and poetry, though this is now rephrased (as we will see) ‘intellect’ and ‘imagination,’ and philosophy is (roughly) still the sort of prose, or intellectual activity, that is closest to art.

In Bk. II of PA, as we saw in ch. 1, Collingwood distinguishes thinking (or thought) from the psychical and imaginative realms of the mind that we have just been considering. “[I]t seems that our sensuous-emotional nature, as feeling creatures, is inde-
pended of our thinking nature, as rational creatures, and constitutes a level of experience below [in the sense of being a foundation for] the level of thought." (p. 163) However, the ‘attention’ by which psychical experience is made available to consciousness is itself a form of thought, albeit only the beginning of thought. (p. 204) It is the lowest level of thought (‘lowness’ here indicating foundationality rather than insignificance or baseness), or the liminal point where feeling becomes thought. (pp. 215-6) However, because this attention is a species of thought, it is something that can succeed or fail (p. 157): sensa can be more or less well translated (or converted) into ideas. The standard of goodness here is truth: whether or not the converted ideas are true to their sensa. (ch. X, §7) This activity is C-art, though C-art is more than the conversion of sensa to ideas: it is also the further clarification of partially-clarified ideas.90

So far so good; but, according to the present interpretation of PA (it is here that the interpretations begin to diverge), what C-art is not is the intellectual clarification of thoughts. An immediate problem arises, though: ideas are in the realm of thought, so are they not therefore thoughts? The answer here is that Collingwood sub-divides the realm of thought into the realm of intellect and thoughts on the one hand, and the realm of imagination and ideas on the other, and restricts art’s domain to the latter. (To be explicit: Collingwood (explicitly) redefines, by narrowing his definition of, ‘thought.’) He distinguishes intellect/thoughts and imagination/ideas in ch. XI, §6:

The general distinction between imagination and intellect is that imagination presents to itself an object which it experiences as one and indivisible; whereas intellect goes beyond that single object and presents itself a world of many such with relations of determinate kinds between them.

PA, p. 252

As Collingwood goes on to explain, he does not mean by this that imagination presents what it presents as undifferentiated. His claim is rather that imagination presents what it presents as a Gestalt, whereas intellect, by contrast, abstracts and analyses: it

90 It is in finding room for truth in art that Collingwood in PA to my mind most strikingly improves his account over that offered in SM and EPM. This is a discovery that is even now not obvious, as evinced by the continuing debate on ‘aesthetic cognitivism.’ Graham, in writing that “at the base of [artists’] activity lies not truth but imagination” (1997/2009, p. 50), opposes truth and imagination in a typically unhelpful manner. See Scruton (2015) for a good (and totally Collingwoodian) articulation of how they can be not opposed.
presents things “as a manifold, a network of things with relations between them.” (p. 253) Neither does Collingwood mean that intellect is the active or inquisitive, and imagination the presentational, aspect of our psyche. Both aspects are both of these things.91 The presentation of an aggregate as a whole is active, and something that can be done accurately or inaccurately, according with how seriously we inquire into what the whole is. Obversely, intellect, as Collingwood himself says in the above quotation, presents what it presents as well as inquires into it. However, intellect and imagination have different domains, and with regard to each other’s domains they are merely presentational.

Consider a heard song. Imaginatively, we represent it as one, as a unified whole, or Gestalt, intellectually, we represent it as consisting of various notes at various pitches and dynamics, ordered in a certain way, and so on. We abstract from the sung rubato, for instance, so that we can understand the rhythmical relations between the composition’s parts; we analyse it so as to compare its notes: one note louder, higher, longer than another, and so on.

These two modes of representation are closely connected. In order to analyse the song as consisting of, for instance, a beginning and an end, there must be a (logically-)prior imaginative representation of it as a whole; but these concepts of ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ must themselves then be “imported” (PA, p. 253) into the imagination’s representation of the song if the imagination is not to miss those aspects or properties of the song – for instance, those properties that are the result of an intellectual engagement on the part of the artist (see PA, ch. XIII, §3) – that require this awareness. (This dialogue between the imagination and the intellect can go on indefinitely, and in great art can be extremely complex, as Collingwood was aware: “[art] may also include elements drawn from [the] level [of the intellect], in which case [this level], too, will contain elements of which, until we find expression for them, we are not conscious.” (PA, p. 293) Consider, e.g., the richly allusive and self-referential ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ episode of Ulysses.) Perhaps there is no actual experience or expression without both aspects. That, though, is immaterial: Collingwood’s point is just that only one of these aspects – the imaginative aspect – is C-artistic.

91 Collingwood does float the possibility of distinguishing between the intellect and the imagination by making it co-extensive with the inquisitive/presentational distinction. He rejects it, however; v. i. §2.3.3.
2.2.1 Too Narrow?

The main problem with delimiting emotion and C-art in this narrow way, at least as compared to the broader delimitation that we will consider in the next section, is that it appears that the separation of C-art and intellect prevents C-art from contributing to intellectual life, and, most pressingly, insofar as no-one thinks that art can much contribute to mathematics or the hard sciences, to philosophy. If it can only understand things as a *Gestalt*, then it cannot of course understand things as a manifold or network. How then can Collingwood account for the ways in which the C-artistic aspect of things – such as we find in those who use artistic techniques to philosophical ends, from Plato to Adorno, from Sophocles to Toby Fox – give us this latter sort of intellectual insight? There are two very similar ways of formulating this objection, a better and a worse. We will consider the worse first. On this formulation, the objection is that imagination – or art – cannot present as ‘a network of things’ what it presents, and is thus excluded from the intellectual realms, such as philosophy, that do concern themselves with understanding things’ connectedness. Of course, no-one is accusing Collingwood of claiming that D-art is intellectually impotent. The concern is that by Collingwood’s account the imaginative presentation, the C-artistic aspect, is intellectually impotent. So, there is no doubt that, say, *The Grapes of Wrath* can contribute to debates about immigration and capitalism, *qua* what Collingwood calls *(PA, p. 32)* propaganda or instruction, or through external facts about it such as its popularity, the concern is that it cannot do so *qua* C-art, according to Collingwood.

This attitude to art’s philosophicality is deeply myopic, and Collingwood had better not fall into the error. Sometimes it sounds as if he does: he allows that Dante expressed what it feels like to be a Thomist, but not that Dante argued for Thomism. *(PA, pp. 295, 297)* But his actual position is subtly different: it is that C-art can be philosophically potent, but that it can only be so by providing the ground on which the intellect builds. Dante did not *argue* for Thomism, but he provides *grounds* for such

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92 The denial of *this* much would be foolish, first because, as Gibson (2008, p. 3) notes, “we can learn from anything under the sun... if we are clever enough to ask the right questions of it”, but more interestingly because D-artworks can obviously engage in everything from philosophy to naval reform. Just consider the history of philosophy toward the end of *War and Peace*, which would not be out of place in an anthology of philosophies of history. But Tolstoy’s philosophical excursions are not philosophical *qua* C-art.
argument; indeed, without the contribution of art, such argument would be impossible. His art serves, that is, to present the material or evidence on which philosophical argument can be constructed.

This might strike the objector as unsatisfying: art is still removed from philosophy proper, and plays a merely supporting role. An indispensable handmaid it may be, but a handmaid still. Is there not more of the intellect in art than this? In order to capture the inadequacy, we can reformulate the criticism (this is the better formulation I promised above): Does Collingwood have room in the narrow delimitation of emotion for art itself, and qua C-art, to be immediately intellectually potent? That is, can C-art not only serve as the ground of intellectual inquiry or philosophy, but also engage in that inquiry? And if he does not have room for this, what has gone wrong? Is it that we should not restrict the domain of C-art to the domain of the imagination, or that Collingwood has too-narrowly characterised the imagination?

On the narrow delimitation I have been articulating, the answer is simply that there is no extra move Collingwood can make, nothing to be added to the above account. Art cannot qua C-art be intellectually potent. But how severe a problem is this for the narrow delimitation of ‘emotion’? To find out, let us consider some examples of artworks that appear to be intellectually potent qua C-art. I will argue that this seeming is, at least in some cases, persistent, and so that there is a clash between our intuitions and the interpretation of Collingwood’s account of ‘emotion’ that delimits it narrowly.

2.2.2 Spurious Examples of Philosophical Art

We will now consider a number of examples of artworks that look philosophically potent qua C-art. In the next section, we will consider an example that is a counter-example to the narrow delimitation, but in this section, we will consider some examples that are not counter-examples, despite initial seemings. They show that C-art’s intellectual power often is in its ability to ground intellectual inquiry, and, to repeat, the narrow delimitation of ‘emotion’ does not lead to the implausibility of denying this role to C-art. We will consider three examples that illustrate three ways in which C-art can be intellectually potent with which the narrow delimitation is consistent. We’ll turn to the examples of The Grapes of Wrath and The Divine Comedy now, and then introduce the example of Nietzsche. (In the interests of philosophical clarity, I will not do justice to the richness of the texts; I beg the reader’s patience here.)
In reading *The Grapes of Wrath*, we are given a vision of a people in equal parts neglected and oppressed by the pullulation of capitalism, and of their doomed attempt to flourish under its strictures. In presenting this world, Steinbeck obviously (and explicitly) hoped to persuade people of the evil of capitalism. Now, the opinion that capitalism is evil is clearly an intellectual one (whatever else it may also be), but yet Steinbeck thought that the novel was an appropriate method through which to argue for this conclusion. It might seem, then, that the narrow interpretation will have trouble dealing with it. But no: it is easy to read *The Grapes of Wrath* as just a ground for the intellect; it is after all no substitute for Marxist theory. It presents its horrors vividly, but it does not diagnose them. Steinbeck, reasonably enough, perhaps considered the extent and nature of the evils he presented to be such that his audience would not need his diagnosis.

On the importance of the intellect to *The Divine Comedy*, ‘the Summa in verse,’ little needs to be said. Its Thomism is explicit and prominent. But it is a great work of C-art. So again, does this stumble the narrow interpretation? Again, no, and this time for a reason that Collingwood himself adumbrated with regard to this poem: *The Divine Comedy* is anterior to the intellectual inquiry of philosophy. Consider, for instance, *Purgatorio* XVII.89ff., which begins (in Longfellow’s translation):

‘Neither Creator nor a creature ever,
Son,’ he began, was destitute of love
Natural or spiritual; and thou knowest it.

The natural was ever without error;
But err the other may by evil object,
Or by too much, or by too little vigour.

While in the first it well directed is,
And in the second moderates itself,
It cannot be the cause of sinful pleasure;

But when to ill it turns, and, with more care
Or lesser than it ought, runs after good,
’Gainst the Creator works his own creation.

This passage is highly philosophical, to be sure; but it only *expounds* philosophical doctrines; it does not argue for them. The narrow delimitation of ‘emotion’ easily includes
intellectual emotions such as those attendant on philosophical beliefs, so there is no problem for that delimitation here. (V.i. §2.3.3 for further discussion of this distinction.)

The final spurious counter-example is Nietzsche’s Thucydydes’ Zarathustra, as viewed through the understanding of art’s intellectual power Nietzsche himself adumbrates primarily in §106 of The Gay Science (1887/1974). Philosophical doctrines, he observes here, can appear laughably implausible on first blush, even if they are strong. It can thus be difficult to get people to properly engage with them. In such a case, what recourse do their advocates have? Nietzsche argues that art can fill this role: “I am thirsting for a composer… who would learn my ideas from me and transpose them into his language; that way I should seduce men to every error and every truth: who could refute a tone?” To use another image (also from §106): when an idea is first implanted in our mind, it is like a weak seedling, its nature and strength only hidden potential. For it to be (rationally) refuted (rather than merely destroyed by a mockery that does not take it seriously), it must be allowed to grow into a tree; for it to be able to grow into that tree, it must be believed (even considered irrefutable); for it to be believed, it must somehow infiltrate our scepticism; and art is a means by which this can be done, by for instance burning the idea onto our mind by the power of its imagery so that we “learn[ it] by heart” – as Nietzsche thought Thucydydes’ Zarathustra did.

Again, Collingwood is able to account for this role of art even on the narrow delimitation: even on Nietzsche’s telling, there is an obvious distinction between art and the intellect. The expression of a philosophical doctrine is explicitly transposed to a new language, not that it may be further developed, but that it may be more memorably communicated. As in the case of The Divine Comedy above, the intellectual work of philosophy is completed (here by Nietzsche, there by Aquinas) by the time art’s role with regard to it begins. Art serves an almost propagandistic role. And so there is no impediment to the narrow delimitation.

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93 I am indebted to Ridley’s excellent commentary (2007, pp. 97-100) here.
94 Nietzsche (1889/1974), §106.
95 Nietzsche (1883/1969), Part One, ‘Of Reading and Writing’.
96 This at any rate is Ridley’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s claim that “Perhaps the whole of Zarathustra may be reckoned as music” in Ecce Homo (1908/1967, ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra’, §1).
2.2.3 Undertale

We have seen, then, three ways in which art can, on the narrow delimitation of ‘emotion,’ be intellectually potent. We will now consider an example that is more challenging for this delimitation. I am by no means the first to argue for this, but rather than defend any particular previous account,⁹⁷ let us, in order to bring out the breadth of the art that can be intellectually potent, consider a further example: Undertale.

Undertale is a 2015 JRPG/bullet-hell video game created almost entirely by Toby Fox. It tells the story of a child, the player-character, who has fallen down a hole into the ‘Underground,’ a sort of prison for the race of Monsters, whither they were banished after a war with humans. The player’s prima facie goal is to escape back to the surface, and prima facie the means of doing this are, in standard JRPG fashion, defeating all those who engage you in battle en route. However, the game allows an entirely peaceful playstyle too, and by so doing criticises the ‘violence-as-default-and-reasonable’ trope that is almost ubiquitous in video games (especially RPGs). It does this not by just having nothing to do with violence at all, but by using all the tropes of the RPG genre – ‘boss battles,’ ‘fighting’ being a prominent option in ‘random encounters’ against non-player characters who mean you harm, the player’s killing of their oppo-

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Nussbaum’s ‘Flawed Crystals’ (1983/1990), Danto’s ‘The Philosopher as Andy Warhol’ (1999), Cavell’s reading of Beckett’s Endgame (1969), MacIntyre’s discussion of Austen as a philosopher (1981, pp. 241ff.), Mulhall’s book-length study of Coetzee’s philosophicality (2008), Nehamas’ extended discussion of irony in Mann (1998, ch. 1), and of course Collingwood’s own discussion of Eliot’s The Waste Land (PA, pp. 333ff.) As well as these texts that bear testament to the philosophicality of specific artworks, there are general accounts of art’s philosophicality, such as Diamond (1982) and Gaut (2007, chs. 7-8). Such defences of ‘aesthetic cognitivism’ are given a good (if already dated) overview in Gibson (2008). The most substantial ‘anti-cognitivist’ text is probably still Lamarque (2009). For recent overviews of this debate, see Mikkonen (2015) and Scruton (2015).

Some artworks, it seems to me, need no such discussion for their philosophicality to be revealed; I have in mind anything of the sort that literary theorists agonise over (Dostoevsky, Joyce, Beckett, Woolf, Toni Morrison, et al.). It would, to be sure, help my case to prove that all of these authors’ works are intellectually potent through being C-artistic, but it would require too much space. It is in any case superfluous: it is a serious problem if the narrow delimitation cannot account even for one artwork being philosophically potent through being C-artistic. But this is to get ahead of ourselves.
nents being rewarded with EXP (normally ‘experience’ in RPGs, but here, as is revealed at the end, ‘execution points’ – a switch as hammy and effective as anything in Gaudi) and currency – so that the norms are ‘operationalised,’ before undermining them by insisting that this violence is not justified, and that the player is morally culpable for thinking otherwise. It allows the player to play violently, but if they do so, the game treats them as evil. The game encourages a different play-style: one in which you are kind and loving to all whom you meet. When you tread this path, the gameworld reciprocates enthusiastically.

_Undertale_ is thus a criticism of how unexceptional murderous violence is in video games, as I have said; but more than that, it is a paean to love, and a call to us to choose kindness and understanding in our dealings with each other, and in particular with regard to those weaker than us, throughout our lives. (Many games reviewers rated it extremely highly (it won a number of ‘game of the year’ awards over blockbusters, an unprecedented achievement), and has acquired a passionate fandom.) The challenge here, though, is whether _Undertale itself_ argues for the place it gives love, etc., in its worldview; and whether this argument looks to be so closely connected to what it is doing as art that it looks implausible to deny that it does so _qua_ C-art. And indeed, this looks to be so. It is through playing the game that you come to adopt its worldview. To take a specific example: At the beginning of the game, before you realise that this game is a critique of the trope, you murder some of the gameworld’s characters, thinking little of it – after all, that’s ‘what one does’ in computer games. However – In the first ‘act’ of the game, a tutorial of sorts, you are guided by a kindly mother-/tutor-figure, Toriel, who you battle as a ‘boss’ at the end of the act (she doesn’t want you to leave because leaving would put your life in danger); and if you have killed every monster you have encountered up to this point, then this ‘boss battle’ will not be the drawn-out, demanding climax that such encounters normally are in RPGs, but shockingly brief: Toriel will die by your first attack after saying, “Y... you... really hate me that much?/ Now I see who I was protecting by keeping you here./ Not you.../ But them!/ Ha... ha...” Alternatively, if you play in a way such that you receive a lot of damage from Toriel’s attacks (as you will if you spend a lot of time trying to find ways to end

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98 There’s no ‘moral dilemma’ here, such as is so popular among putatively high-minded games. The game is entirely explicit that not murdering people is a good thing.

99 As bookiegeek put it in a comment on a YouTube video, “This game is really flawed./ How the fuck am I supposed to play a bullet hell game if I can’t see the screen through my fucking tears?” (URL: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fh4aMniXMAw, accessed 17 June 2016)
The battle non-violently, as you do the second time you play), you will notice that beyond a certain point she will lose the heart to attack you.

That Toriel can die so quickly, and that she is unable to bring herself to kill you, are deep transgressions of the ‘boss’ mechanic, and as such they bring home that *Undertale* is no normal RPG; but they are also criticisms of that boss mechanic, as being attentive to narrowly ludic aspects at the cost of attention to the ‘world’ in which the play takes place: those who fight, their hatred and love, their hopes and confusions. Every game has some story to tell about those who battle, even if the story is there only to support the gameplay, and *Undertale*’s criticism here is that these stories are typically inconsistent with their mechanics. But *Undertale*’s point here is deeper even than this criticism of video game tropes: it is also saying that we should *generally* be critical of roles that encourage us to be cruel, be they the fictional role of ‘RPG protagonist’ or ‘real-life’ roles of ‘lawyer’ or ‘immigration official.’ It does this by allowing us to act in accordance with a role, but then revealing to us that this does not exculpate our cruelty. Or rather, we realise *ourselves*, through our active engagement with *Undertale* and our guilt on realising the significance of our behaviour, that our role does not absolve us.

### 2.2.4 The Moral

This last point is important, and allows us to see why we should want to say that *Undertale* is philosophically potent *qua* C-art. For (a) that roles do not absolve us of wrongdoing is clearly a moral claim, and as such lies fully within the intellectual sphere of philosophy; and (b) the argument for it is not in any obvious way distinct from the C-artistic activity of playing the game: unlike in *The Divine Comedy*, in which the philosophical point is defended in the *Summa* and merely reported in the poem, the
philosophical point or argument of *Undertale* is embedded seamlessly into the C-artistic experience.\textsuperscript{100} So we should tentatively claim (pending our discussion of the broad delimitation) that ‘emotion’ should not be delimited narrowly.\textsuperscript{101}

Actually there are two objections here against the narrow delimitation of emotion. First, the seamlessness of C-art and philosophy suggests that Collingwood’s theory does not have the resources to differentiate the narrow activity of the expression of emotion from intellectual activity. But even were that problem surmounted, there remains an objection that I will more tentatively level against the separation: it is un-gainly: there emerges a sharp division between what a D-artwork is doing *qua* C-art and what it is doing *qua* philosophy that does not correspond to anything in our experience, and so which seems unnecessary. I will consider the first objection now, and the second objection in §2.3.2. (It has to be put on the back-burner for the moment because ‘un-gainly’ is of course a relative term, and before we can really consider it, we have to see how (un)gainly the broad delimitation is.)

Collingwood himself levels the first objection against the delimitation on pp. 292–9 of *PA*, and it is well-captured by the oddness of the activity Collingwood mentions here:

> The poet converts human experience into poetry not by first expunging it, cutting out the intellectual elements and preserving the emotional, and then expressing this residue;

\textsuperscript{100} I am persuaded by Plumer’s argument (2015, §5) that the type of argument here is, as it normally is in art, transcendental, but there is no need to go into this here. Other (consistent) possibilities concerning how we can learn from art are that the argument is enthymematic, as Danto (1981) and Mikkonen (2013) think; that it is emotional, as Diamond (1982) argues; or that our imagination is epistemically revelatory, as Gaut (2007, ch. 7) argues. There is in any case no obvious limit on how various the “tools of inquiry” of C-artistic philosophy may be. (Gibson (2008, pp. 5–6) stresses the importance of the cognitivist being able to identify such tools.)

\textsuperscript{101} Lamarque (2009, pp. 239–54) points out that to argue that C-art is philosophically potent *qua* C-art is not yet to establish that this potency is C-artistically *valuable*. (As ever, I am translating terminology; Lamarque actually talks of valuing artworks “as art” or “artistically”; see, e.g., pp. vii, 261.) It could rather be, for instance, philosophically valuable. Just below in the main text, though, I argue that this distinction is unsustainable. *V.i.* also §2.3.2 and §2.4.
but by fusing thought itself into emotion: thinking in a certain way and then expressing how it feels to think in that way.

P4, p. 295

The ‘expurgation’ Collingwood mentions is not something anyone thinks that the artist does, and he mentions it just to remind us that art expresses imaginative and intellectual, as well as psychical, emotion. But we can take more than that point from it. We can also take from it that it is hardly clear what sort of activity that expurgation could be, if thought and emotion are fused.\(^\text{102}\)

If this additional point is right, then the broad delimitation is not only superior to the narrow delimitation, but the only possible position: for how can something invisible be jointly expressed by two separate activities? The anger I feel in response to a slight, for instance, cannot be expressed apart from an expression of how I understand that slight; the emotion cannot be characterised apart from a characterisation of its intentional object. Contra the narrow interpretation, that is, art cannot express the experience (of anger, say) without also expressing the thoughts concomitant with that experience. Obversely, we cannot express Thomism without expressing what it feels like to adopt it, because Thomism is not just a “collection of doctrines” or a “reduc[tion of] the whole of [one’s] experience to private formulae” (P4, pp. 295-6) but also a systematic approach to living life (a worldview, to which term we will return in §3), and this includes emotion.

2.3 The Broad Delimitation

Things are looking bad, then, for the narrow delimitation. Even if it is coherent, which I have just doubted, it appears to fail to do justice to the philosophicality of C-art in artworks such as Undertale. Let us park the discussion here, though, and turn now to the other delimitation of C-art, before levelling some objections against it (§§2.3.1-2.3.3), and then comparing the delimitations critically (§2.4) and hermeneutically (§2.5).

The best way to articulate this broader delimitation is via someone who (relatively) explicitly and unambiguously advocates it: Arthur Danto, in his The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981; henceforth Transfiguration). We have encountered Danto in a

\(^{102}\) We can also take from it the hermeneutic point that this is evidence that Collingwood himself adopts the broader interpretation; we will discuss this in §2.5.
different context in ch. 1, where he served as an example of a philosopher who is interested in D-art rather than C-art. However, as I intimated at the end of §3.1, Danto’s official project is somewhat at odds with his actual project. Here, we will engage with what I take to be his real project by understanding him as arguing that it is the business of C-art to express not just the affective, non-intellectual aspect of our experience, but also thought – the province of the intellect – and also even deeper parts of us, what we might call a standpoint or worldview (we will return to these terms in §3). All this is ‘emotion’ too, under the broad delimitation that we will now consider of that term. The important distinction for the moment is this: Given that C-art is the clarification and communication of our experience, the question is whether Collingwood thinks (and whether he should think) that C-art is the clarification and communication just of how we feel (this is the narrow delimitation) or also of how we think (this is the broad delimitation); not just an affective aspect of the artist’s mind, but any or all of it.

Danto expresses his view thus: “It may just be one of the main offices of art less to represent the world than to represent it in such a way as to cause us to view it with a certain attitude and with a certain vision.” (Transfiguration, p. 167) Later, he says that Warhol’s Brillo Boxes is doing “what works of art have always done—externalising a way of viewing the world” (p. 208). ‘Emotion’ is never too far away from Danto’s discussion, as if the emotional aspect of what it’s like to view the world is peculiarly central to what it’s like to view the world in general. We will indirectly return to this observation in §3, but for now it is enough to note that emotion is not the only aspect of our vision of the world. What Danto rather focuses on is the visual aspect, and it is hardly to be expected that this will overlap exactly with the emotional aspect (and it does not, though again v.i. §3). It is not clear, though, how we are to cash out this ‘visual’ metaphor. One possibility is that Danto is referring to what Collingwood would call ideas rather than their emotional charge. On the narrow delimitation of ‘art,’ art’s business is only the expression of emotions, not the expression of the non-emotional aspect of our experience of these objects. One way this delimitation could be broadened is to include this aspect. However, it is unlikely that this is what Danto has in mind. Even in the most obvious case, the visual art in so many ways Danto’s starting-point, art’s high office is hardly that it causes us to literally view the world in a different way. Lichtenstein’s Portrait of Madame Cézanne (to use one of Danto’s own examples) does a very good job of causing us to see Cézanne’s portrait on which it is based in a different light: vectors and planes become visible, for instance. But this will
not do. What does Portrait of Madame Cezanne have about it that the critic Erle Leron’s diagram in his (Loran’s) Cézanne’s Compositions, which diagram is isomorphic with Portrait of Madame Cezanne, does not, such that Danto thinks Lichtenstein’s painting, but not Leron’s diagram, such a great work of art? Clearly it is not just that it causes some literal seeing, for in that respect, Portrait of Madame Cezanne and Leron’s diagram are identical.

Rather more promising is to understand Danto as extending the scope of art in an intellectual or critical direction. Portrait of Madame Cezanne not only causes us to view the world in a different way, but to think about it in a different way. This gets us closer to what it is about art that is so valuable. As Graham (1997/2000, ch. 3), who sees things in much the same way as Danto but uses more explicitly cognitivist vocabulary, puts it, what is at issue is understanding. Lichtenstein not just causes us to see better the planes and vectors of Cézanne’s portrait, but causes us to think differently about what kind of man Cézanne was: as Danto argues, it shows us a certain sort of dehumanising monstrousness in Cézanne, that he could regard his wife “as though she were a Euclidean problem” (Transfiguration, p. 143), and so causes us to consider him to exhibit that sort of monstrousness; and this is of course a thought, not (just) a vision or an emotion. (There will no doubt also be a related emotional what-it’s-like in which we see him as a monster, but this fits neatly into the narrow delimitation, and so we can leave it aside.)

Before going further, it is worth taking a moment to digress and look at the causal relation to which Danto attributes art’s office. One obvious problem with Danto’s way of putting things is that an artwork can cause us to view things differently for all sorts of adventitious reasons, and there can be ‘deviant causal chains’¹⁰³ between the artwork and us. For instance, Triumph des Willens could cause us to think even less sympathetically of Nazism by virtue of how disturbing it is, but though that value may indeed be a value of the film, it is hardly what it is doing qua C-art.¹⁰⁴ Or even more bizarrely, it could cause someone to think differently of the world by causing that person to attend more carefully to a different artwork entirely, and so allow them to have how

¹⁰³ Deviant causal chains are perhaps best characterised as causal chains in which some x causes y according to one’s theory of causation, but intuitively does not cause y, or vice versa. They were first described by Davidson (1963).

¹⁰⁴ Of course, that Triumph des Willens hardens attitudes toward Nazism, if it does, may well be a D-artistic property of the film, if we use a catholic (or indiscriminate) notion of D-artistic properties. My point is just that it is not C-artistic.
they think changed by that other work. And that is hardly a reason to praise Triumph des Willens, even though the film does cause us to think differently about the world. But according to Danto, it is a reason to aesthetically praise the film. So much the worse, then, for Danto.

Rather than refining Danto’s account, though – this dissertation is not on Danto, and so I don’t wish to spend much time on him – I will convert him into Collingwoodese. This is simply done, though it does involve a bit of bracing violence to some parts of Danto’s philosophy that are irrelevant here. To translate Danto, we just replace his talk of ‘cause’ with Collingwood’s talk of ‘expression.’ Where Danto says that an artwork causes us to view the world in a certain way, or externalises a way of viewing the world, Collingwood would say that the spectator, artist, or artwork expresses a certain way of viewing the world. The violence to Danto’s theory lies in how the distinction between what is expressed and what expresses is closer for Collingwood than for Danto (e.g. ch. 1, §2.2): first, Collingwood would not say that an artwork ‘externalises’ a way of viewing the world, because that ‘way of viewing’ cannot be well-characterised apart from through the artwork, as is suggested (at least to my ears) by ‘externalisation,’ with its implication of a strong internal/external distinction; second, if the artwork does ‘cause’ us to view the world in a certain way, this causation is only part of the story, for the agents whom it so causes to view the world in that certain way are active, and cause the change themselves as well. But I will not go into all this now: we have already covered the ground in ch. 1; and, although one concern of this chapter is to demonstrate that Collingwood is involved in the same conversation or tradition as Danto, it is not my concern to demonstrate that Danto is just Collingwood bearded, so I am happy to misrepresent Danto in this respect in order to better bring out his affinity to Collingwood in other respects. I will quietly replace Danto’s ‘cause’ with Collingwood’s ‘expression’ locations in what follows.

To return, then, to our Danto-inspired proposal that what it is C-art’s business to express is a certain way of viewing the world. What does this mean, beyond the narrow account I gave in §2.2, and beyond what I have said earlier in this section, that it is more a matter of intellectual than literal vision?

Further light can be shone on this office of art by considering Danto’s discussion of Rembrandt’s Bathsheba with King David’s Letter. This painting is a portrayal of Rembrandt’s lover, Hendrijke Stoeffels, as the Biblical beauty Bathsheba. Danto argues that this type of portrayal – the portrayal of x as y (which he calls metaphor) – is central to artistic representation. This portrayal acts as an invitation for the viewer to
consider the ways in which \( x \) is \( y \). The viewer, importantly, fills in this answer themselves— they are not told how \( x \) is \( y \), even if the set-up is such that their answer is all but inevitable. This \textit{(inter alia)} gives the viewer an \textit{active} role in connecting \( x \) and \( y \), and so makes the viewer, even if only briefly or imaginatively, endorse the metaphor. In the case of \textit{Bathsbeba}, the invitation is to consider Stoeffels as "a woman of beauty enough to tempt a king to murder for the possession of her" (\textit{Transfiguration}, p. 195); but more than that, it invites the viewer to see Stoeffels in the loving way that Rembrandt did: to share in his 'way of seeing the world' (or his 'worldview,' to which term we will return in \S 3). This loving regard of Stoeffels is more than emotional or visual, but it is also more than \textit{intellectual}, just as love is: alongside what I have mentioned there is a certain axiology, and, correspondingly, a disposition to act in a certain way (where 'action' is understood broadly to include everything under the power of our will (which is not to say that every action is affected by a love, just that any in principle may be)).

We are getting closer to a promising broad delimitation, but we are now also in danger of making the delimitation broad in a way that is clearly implausible: whatever we come to share with Rembrandt in properly attending to \textit{Bathsbeba}, it is not full-blooded love for Stoeffels. More generally, although there is a sense in which we share in an artist's worldview when we attend to their work, we certainly don't share their worldview in every particular. Although there is certainly some truth in the claim that we see Stoeffels with Rembrandt's love, this is reduced to absurdity if it entails that we are put in anything like the situation we would be in if we felt an impossible love for a long-dead woman. (One can imagine someone getting rather too much out of the painting, and marking Stoeffels' birthdays with tear-sodden roses on her grave. This poor soul would not by virtue of that love better understand \textit{Bathsbeba}.) Danto is aware of this danger. He evades it by arguing that whereas one's consciousness is transparent to one—it is something through which one views the world—it is an object of consciousness for others. (\textit{Transfiguration}, p. 206) So Rembrandt, for instance, just viewed Stoeffels with love, and his loving representation of her was not, to him, a

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105 Similarly, one can understand Mishima’s encomium to Imperial Japan in \textit{Runaway Horses} without oneself longing for its return, or Bach’s \textit{Mass in B Minor} while remaining a devout atheist. This is despite the fact that (D-)artists often intend their works to persuade their audiences to full-bloodedly adopt those artists’ ways of viewing the world. For (remember ch. 1) a D-artwork can contain craft—here, proselytisation—as well as C-art. (See Neill and Ridley (2010).)
loving representation, but just a representation. It is only to us that this love can be an object of consciousness, something we can see suffusing the representation. (To speak of ‘Rembrandt’ and ‘us’ here is slightly misleading: as Wollheim (in Collingwoodian vein) observes in Painting as an Art (1987, p. 43), these words refer to roles more than people. Rembrandt, being a great artist, was self-conscious enough to see and respond to the love in his regard for Stoeffels, and to build this self-awareness into the work, even though, as Danto insists (Transfiguration, p. 207), Rembrandt’s self-awareness could not have been complete without him falling into what Collingwood would call craft.) To be brief if cryptic: we do not see Stoeffels with love, but we see her as she is seen with love.

Rembrandt’s loving regard for Stoeffels, and more generally an artist’s worldview, being seen ‘from the outside’ as we see it because we come to it from our own, different worldview, is thus distant from us. This ‘distance’ is the distance of comprehensiveness: of our ‘more comprehensive’ worldview (more comprehensive in that it includes both his and our worldviews, but I put the phrase in scare-quotes because in a sense our worldview is not more comprehensive: Rembrandt will not have put the entirety of his worldview into Bathsheba) allowing us to bracket, trump or in sundry other ways keep aspects of Rembrandt’s worldview from perverting our rationality. Or, more simply and more generally: context alters meaning. It is for this reason that we do not necessarily fall in love with Stoeffels. To the question, then, of what of the artist’s worldview art may qua C-art express, Danto’s answer is any of it; and in response to the objection that this implies that full understanding of an artwork could require the spectator to absolutely identify with the artist, he says that in attending to an artwork, because she approaches the artist’s worldview from another (the spectator’s) worldview, their worldviews will still differ, even if the spectator – imaginatively – shares every part of the worldview the artist puts into the artwork.

\[106 I am waving my hands in lieu of giving a full explanation of this; but any decent story of why imagination in general need not impair our rationality, or how it is possible for us to ‘quarantine’ imaginings, will suffice. See Gendler (2011, §§3.1, 5.3, 5.4, 6.3, and the bibliography) and Sinhababu (2016).\]
2.3.1 Too Broad?

This, I think, is an accurate interpretation of what Danto thinks it is the business of (C-)art to express, a plausible interpretation of what Collingwood thinks it is the business of C-art to express (or, equivalently, of what he means by ‘emotion’), and an independently plausible account of what it is C-art’s office to express. However, it risks being too broad in two directions. First, it might be objected that it is not plausibly C-art’s business to express very personal emotions/feelings, such as a particular mother’s love for her particular son. Second, it might be objected that if we consider it C-art’s business to express intellectual elements of our worldview, then we lose its distinction from philosophy. I will consider the objections in turn.

So, then, the first objection: The broad account, as we have introduced it, in claiming that the worldview that it is the business of C-art to express may in principle include absolutely any element at all of our mental and spiritual life, means that a C-artist may be fulfilling her office perfectly well by expressing her very particular love of some person, her anxiety over her bowel movements, her annoyance at breaking yet another of those lovely mugs she got only last year in that nice little store by the odd church, her habitual aimless wondering about how difficult it would be to lift a tonne of feathers as opposed to a tonne of bricks— in short, any trivial or tedious element of our soul, or any element that is of only first-personal interest. But surely C-art has a nobler calling than this? Without denying that C-art may express trivia, is it not implausible that it is its office to do so?

Danto does not explicitly consider this objection, but concocting a consistent response is simple. It is C-art’s office to express petty parts of our soul, and insofar as it does so well, it is good qua C-art. But to fully express even trivia is no small matter, and cannot be done without seeing the trivia in the broader context of the worldview of which they are a part. The obvious example here is *Ulysses*, in which we largely perambulate the disconnected meanderings of its various protagonists’ minds. To be sure, there is something beautiful and refreshing about just this, but it is not for its scatological disinhibition that *Ulysses* is the masterpiece it is, and nor is it just for the obviously great parts (e.g., the linguistic virtuosity) between which the trivia is filler; its greatness lies also in how it weaves the trivia into a greater context, and, in so doing, more fully expresses even that trivia. This is obvious enough, but let us very briefly illustrate the point with one passage that is particularly striking in this regard:
The trajectories of their, first sequent, then simultaneous, urinations were dissimilar: Bloom’s longer, less irruent, in the incomplete form of the bifurcated penultimate alphabetical letter, who in his ultimate year at High School (1880) had been capable of attaining the point of greatest altitude against the whole concurrent strength of the institution, 210 scholars: Stephen’s higher, more sibilant, who in the ultimate hours of the previous day had augmented by diuretic consumption an insistent vesical pressure.

Joyce, Ulysses, episode 17 (‘Ithaca’)

See how even such a simple act as a Bloom’s urination can be invested with significance – in this case (to mention only the most obvious significance), of the pride of having once being eminent in manliness. It is this sort of significance that Joyce finds in everything quotidian.\textsuperscript{107}

The more challenging objection – that if we interpret Collingwood as delimiting ‘emotion’ too broadly then we lose the ability to distinguish art from philosophy – does not doubt the importance of what is putatively ‘emotion,’ but worries that the delimitation lacks the resources to honour important conceptual demarcations, and that Collingwood’s ‘C-art’ is therefore so distant from our ‘art’ as to be an unhelpful way of thinking about it. And indeed, distinguishing art from philosophy on Collingwood’s theory is sufficiently difficult that he himself sometimes seem to give up on the task, unhappily equating them (\textit{v. i.} §2.3.3). I will consider this objection now, first by characterising that ‘philosophy’ that Collingwood is charged with equating with art.

2.3.2 ‘Philosophy’ According to Collingwood

Before characterising Collingwood’s understanding of ‘philosophy,’ though, let us take a moment to stress the importance of this question. The broad delimitation is in danger of falling into implausibility by making D-art indistinguishable from the intellectual activity of (D-)philosophy.\textsuperscript{108} After showing how we approach this danger and why it looks so dangerous, I will characterise Collingwood’s understanding of ‘philosophy,’ and finally argue that the broad delimitation of art need not worry about a philosophy so characterised.

\textsuperscript{107} We will return to this point in a slightly different context in ch. 3, §2.2.

\textsuperscript{108} Graham (1997/2000, pp. 39–42) levels this same objection when he says that Collingwood’s understanding of emotion “extends [it] until it loses all usefulness.” (pp. 40–1)
We saw in §2.2.1 that the narrow delimitation fails to allow art to itself, and \textit{qua} C-art, contribute to intellectual inquiry, and relegates it to the status of a handmaid: it can present what it’s like to engage in an inquiry or endorse a philosophy, or serve as the ground of such an inquiry or philosophy, but it cannot itself engage in that inquiry.

Where this approach is criticisable, the broader alternative is irreproachable: art not only \textit{can} itself engage fully and \textit{qua} C-art in intellectual inquiry, but has every bit as much capacity and legitimacy to do so as philosophy itself does. However, the cost at which this is won looks to be art’s distinctness from philosophy. Collingwood, as we noted, appears to accept this equation on p. 298 of \textit{PA}, where he says that “[g]ood philosophy and good poetry are not two different kinds of writing, but one; each is simply good writing.” One problem with this is the hermeneutic puzzle of why Collingwood wrote a book called \textit{The Principles of Art} rather than something such as \textit{The Principles of Art/Philosophy}. But there is more than just that puzzle: If we are interested in bringing Collingwood’s philosophy into conversation with contemporary philosophy, or if we are interested in bringing him to bear on the state of the world at the moment, by for instance deploying his arguments in contexts of arts funding or education, then what Collingwood and what we mean by ‘art’ had better be at least similar to each other, or to differ in not too much more than that Collingwood’s understanding is a better articulation of the same concept. If Collingwood’s philosophy is in fact of something else altogether, some concept which is no more than whatever gerrymandered set of properties fits his arbitrary definition, then his relevance to the philosophy of art will be very limited. It may be that he is not ‘wrong,’ in the weak sense that the various claims he makes for what he calls ‘art’ are not mutually contradictory, but it even so makes Collingwood’s infamous neglect\textsuperscript{109} by subsequent philosophers of art seem rather better justified.

In tackling this problem, we should first inquire more carefully into some aspects of Collingwood’s theory of philosophy that we passed over in ch. 1. For if Collingwood’s notion of philosophy bears little relation to our contemporary notion of philosophy, but has a lot to do with our contemporary notion of D-art, then it will not be problematic if Collingwood assimilates his concepts of C-art and philosophy. His assimilation does not lead his theory of art to creep outside the boundaries of art and inadvertently become a theory of philosophy too, but draws philosophy into art’s boundaries. This may be to the detriment of Collingwood’s account of philosophy, of

\textsuperscript{109} See Cogburn (6 July 2013), in which he coins the term ‘Collingwood paradoxical’ for a philosopher who is widely acknowledged to be insufficiently acknowledged.
course – for what concept now remains for characterising the sort of inquiry in which he is engaged? – but that is not a problem for his philosophy of art.\textsuperscript{110} We shall thus now look more closely at what Collingwood’s theory of ‘philosophy’ is. I will argue that it bears sufficiently little relation to what currently goes by the name philosophy, and sufficiently close relation to D-art, that it is not problematic for Collingwood’s philosophy of art if he assimilates the two, which removes one major obstacle to the plausibility of the interpretation of his theory of C-art that delimits it more broadly. However, we will also see that Collingwood’s notion of philosophy does well characterise some traditions of philosophy, and that this brings out not unwanted but important continuities between what we call philosophy and what we call art.

We have seen in passing above (§1) how Collingwood distinguished philosophy and art in \textit{EPM} and \textit{SM}. In art, there is no distinction between form and matter, but in philosophy they come apart, albeit minimally: for in philosophy the richness of language is utilised in order to capture something, in order “to reveal thought” (\textit{EPM}, p. 215). Philosophy is therefore truth-acceptable, insofar as it can succeed or fail in revealing thought.

Now, I have argued that Collingwood is mistaken in denying art alethic valence in \textit{EPM} (and he appears to have come to this conclusion between \textit{EPM} and \textit{PA} himself), so this distinction will not do. What we can still take from Collingwood’s discussion, though, is the literariness of philosophy. That philosophy is like literature (and so art) rather than like science by using language in what we might call a ‘poetic’ way remains constant through to \textit{PA}. But what does Collingwood mean in saying that philosophy “must [use metaphors and imagery], poetic things themselves, in the domestication of prose: using them just so far as to reveal thought, and no farther” (\textit{EPM}, p. 215)?

First, why must the philosopher “go to school with the poets” (\textit{EPM}, p. 214) at all? Why can she not just say what she means, without getting distracted by metaphors, imagery and so on? After all, Collingwood allows that scientists rightly stay clear of poets. \textit{EPM} as a whole is an argument that philosophy hamstrings itself if it tries to ape this anemic style, and I will not summarise the argument here – this dissertation is not a defence of Collingwood’s philosophical methodology – but briefly, the reason that philosophy has to adopt a literary writing style is that it never as such encounters

\textsuperscript{110} I am insouciant about throwing Collingwood’s philosophy of philosophy under the bus here because I think that it has the resources to escape; but this is not a matter for the present dissertation.
anything more than relatively or partially new to us, and so only as such involves concepts that are correspondingly relatively and partially new, and so requires a language which can grow in light of, and in correspondence to, such conceptual and experiential growth. (See EPM, ch. X, §2, and especially, “[philosophers] do constantly need relatively new words for relatively new things: words with which to indicate the new aspects, new distinctions, new connexions which thought brings to light in a familiar subject-matter; and even these are not so much new to us as hitherto imperfectly apprehended.” (pp. 205-6)) The strictly-defined terminology of scientific writing does not allow this incremental growth. Philosophers, then, need to use non-technical language: but this hardly means that they need to go to school with the poets: non-technical language, as Collingwood himself argues (e.s. ch. 1), is just normal and ubiquitous everyday language, not a reserve of the poets. We do not need to study poetry to speak.

Well – indeed, except that, as we saw in ch. 1, Collingwood considers art continuous in this respect with everyday language. It is not so much that we need poetry to speak as that in speaking we are minor poets, and so that if we wish to speak well, we ought to study with the poets. 111 The point of studying with the poets is in the first instance the richness and subtlety of living language that poetry exemplifies. Separate but related is the use of metaphor, imagery, and so on, which Collingwood briefly defends as important for making things vivid, for finding new meanings in old words, and so on (EPM, p. 214).

Now, this account of philosophy is certainly a good account of some philosophy. Literary philosophers from Parmenides to Derrida, as well as Collingwood himself, 112 clearly do philosophy in the prescribed way. I have already mentioned Nietzsche in this connection (§2.2.1); we could add countless examples, from Kierkegaard’s use of the unsynthesised opposition of A and Vilhelm in Either/Or, to Adorno’s use of for-

111 I am conflating terms slightly here. The account of poetry (or more broadly art) we gave in ch. 1 was the account Collingwood gives in PA, but here we are concerned with exposition of EPM. The reasons for which we need to study with the poets of PA we have given; but why do we need to study with the poets of (according to) EPM? The short answer is that what the poets have to offer the philosopher is the same in EPM and PA: the non-scientific, everyday use of language, honed to a high degree.

biddingly dense prose in Aesthetic Theory in order to “breach the externality of aesthetics to art”, from Plato’s use of irony to mock his readers, to Heidegger’s use of literary devices such as ecstatic in The Origin of the Work of Art. Further, Collingwood briefly argues (e.g., EPM, pp. 202, 213) that less obvious figures – Hegel, Descartes, Kant, et al. – also fit this mould. However, it is equally certainly a very poor characterisation of much other philosophy. Is Collingwood really arguing that Analytic philosophy of logic, for instance, is hamstrung by its reliance on symbology, its use of words with precise and stable meanings?

Officially, he emphatically is (unless he could somehow recategorise this sort of philosophy as science), and indeed, one proximate cause of EPM was the growth of the Analytic, scientistic style of philosophy in Oxbridge at the time, as well as philosophical ‘realism,’ a reaction to the British idealism of the previous generations. Collingwood was keen to see off this degeneracy. But I would rather not leave what I am saying here hostage to the success of Collingwood’s general arguments against the validity and promise of philosophy that approaches science rather than literature, however urgent and cutting his criticisms may be, and however frequently similar criticisms independently recur. A less controversial route (which is not inconsistent with

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113 Hullot-Kentor (1997), p. ix. See pp. viii-xviii for further discussion of the importance of the form of this work to its philosophical aims.
114 For discussion, see Nehamas (1998), ch. 1.
115 For discussion, see Mulhall (manuscript).
116 Barbs directed at these targets are found throughout EPM and indeed throughout Collingwood’s oeuvre. See also his Autobiography, ch. IV, and Connelly and D’Oro (2005), pp. xxi-xxxvii, for a broader story of the genesis of the essay.
117 This sort of philosophy (which is often taken to be the whole of philosophy) is criticised on such grounds as this so often that references are hardly needed, so I will just say that it seems to me that the emergence of philosophy blogs has allowed such doubts to be aired more than before. See, e.g., Schliesser’s Digressions & Impressions blog, most recently, Why Philosophy Cannot be (normal science-style) Kuhnian; On Bosanquet & Russell’ (13 May 2015), and Weinberg’s Daily Nous, e.g., recently, Wisdom, Not Mere Love of It’ (16 March 2015) and ‘The Dualism of Philosophy’s Purpose’ (27 July 2015), which latter opens a discussion of Stern (2015). Also see Unger’s monograph Empty Ideas (2014), which attacks Analytic philosophy from rather a different point of view, but which sparked lively and variegated blog discussions (at, e.g., Leiter (19 June 2014)). The comments sections of all of these posts are instructive with regard to how continually relevant Collingwood-style criticisms are felt to be in the community (as well, of course, as to how tired they are felt to be by others).
Collingwood’s position, just weaker) is to distinguish this notion of philosophy from the philosophy that approaches science, which latter Nehamas calls ‘theoretical philosophy.’ Nehamas characterises this latter philosophy thus: It “avoids personal style and idiosyncrasy as much as possible. Its aim is to deface the particular personality that offers answers to philosophical questions, since all that matters is the quality of the answers” (1998, p. 3); this is opposed to the type of philosophy that Collingwood champions, what Nehamas calls ‘practical philosophy,’ and which he says “requires style and idiosyncrasy” and is “composed in a self-consciously literary manner” (ibid).

This weaker position strips Collingwood’s philosophical methodology of its important aspect of being a challenge to the feasibility of any philosophy that models itself on the sciences. This, however, is a problem for the project of defending Collingwood’s philosophical methodology, which, again, is not mine. For the present argument, the point to note is that Collingwood’s conception of philosophy is not related to the institution of philosophy in quite the way that C-art is related to D-art. One might read the set-up I have offered above as parallel to the C-/D-art distinction. By this account, C-philosophy would be a differentially realisable concept with the character I have described, and D-philosophy would be that binarily realisable concept that is whatever our best scientific taxonomy dictates. So far the parallel holds; but it breaks down when it comes to how wise it is to search for C-philosophy in D-philosophy. That is, it diverges in that whereas D-art (as I have argued in ch. 1, §3.4) is still an excellent place to turn to for C-art, D-philosophy is not a good place to search for C-philosophy. To be sure, it is hard to establish how wise it would be to search for C-philosophy in D-philosophy: no proper inquiry into the matter has been undertaken, so my evidence is anecdotal; and in any case this is a question to be answered across theoretical, empirical and pragmatic realms. Nevertheless, it is striking that both Gibson (2008) and Lamarque (2009, p. 227), important figures in Analytic aesthetics and in particular in the debate on aesthetic cognitivism (and so people who one might expect to have thought about the relationship between art and philosophy in this regard), both seem to consider it self-evident that philosophy is in the unliterary business of establishing true propositions. So, without taking too strong a position on the matter, it is certainly plausible that many jobbing D-philosophers, at any rate in the Anglophone world, will not find the characterisation Collingwood offers of the discipline as essentially literary accurate or appealing, and I will continue on this assumption.

The point of saying this, to repeat, is that it does not trouble Collingwood’s philosophy of art that he assimilates C-art and (what we can now call C-)philosophy if C-
philosophy has little to do with D-philosophy, but a lot to do with D-art. It looks as if C-philosophy has little to do with D-philosophy. It remains to ask how much C-philosophy has to do with D-art.

If we adopt the broad interpretation of ‘emotion,’ the answer is, of course, ‘quite a lot;’ it is, after all, the argument of this chapter that C-philosophy has a lot to do with C-art, and the argument of ch. 1, §§3.1–3.4, that C-art has a lot to do with D-art. I do not think that more needs to be said here, except to make explicit that, as I argued in §2.2.1, the C-philosophy that is important to C-art is one of the things about C-art that is important to D-art. The argument there was not conclusive: I discussed the C-philosophicalty of one D-artwork (*Undertale*), and referred to some other examples given by other authors, which does not establish C-philosophy’s importance to D-art in general. However, the claim is art-critical rather than philosophical, and so it could only be made more convincing by expanding examples *ad nauseam*, which would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. By discussing *Undertale* and mentioning the other examples, though, I hope to have given the position enough *prima facie* plausibility as to shift the burden of proof to those who would deny the importance of C-philosophy to D-art.

### 2.3.3 A Final Attempt to Separate Art and Philosophy

In the name of completeness, let us briefly consider one last way of separating (C-)art and (C-)philosophy. This section is a bit redundant: if the broad delimitation is right, there is no need to separate C-art and C-philosophy. However, Collingwood considers it himself (even if only to reject it, as I will do), so a brief discussion is no harm. He writes:

> The business of St. Thomas himself is not to expound Thomism, but to arrive at it… For the poet, there is, perhaps, none of this dynamism of thinking. He finds himself equipped, as it were, with certain ideas, and expresses the way in which it feels to possess them. Poetry, then… may be described as expressing the intellectual emotion attendant upon thinking in a certain way: philosophy, the intellectual emotion attendant upon trying to think better.

*PA*, p. 297
The poet who Collingwood most immediately has in mind here is Dante, whose poetry expresses “what it feels like to be a Thomist” (PA, p. 295) Dante, being a poet, ‘exposits’ rather than ‘argues,’ ‘expounds’ rather than ‘arrives at’ (PA, p. 297).

Collingwood offers this distinction as a last-ditch attempt to separate art from philosophy, in what I read as a response to his previous attempt in EPM; but his heart is no longer in it, and he abandons it.

[The distinction... is... arbitrary and precarious. I see no reason why the intellectual experience of building up or criticizing a philosophical view should not afford the poet a subject-matter no less fertile than that of merely holding it. And I am sure that a philosopher who expressed the experience of developing a view, without making it clear to himself and his readers what view he was developing, would be doing only half his work. The result would seem to be that the distinction between philosophical writing... and poetical or artistic writing is... illusory... Good philosophy and good poetry are not two different kinds of writing, but one; each is simply good writing... [I]n the limiting case where each was as good as it ought to be, the distinction would disappear.

PA, pp. 297-8

Collingwood’s dissatisfaction with this attempt to separate art from philosophy should be even more strongly felt by us. As the example of Undertale above (§2.2.1) shows, C-art clearly can build up and criticise a philosophical view; it is not the mere possibility that Collingwood envisions. And indeed this should not surprise us, as it fits neatly into Collingwood’s general theory of art, in which the presentation and the exploration or clarification of emotion have always been two sides of the same coin. The problem is not just, as Collingwood says in this section, that the philosopher who only explores, and neglects to present, is “doing only half his work” (p. 298): it is that Collingwood has long before defined C-art as being both the presentation and exploration of emotion. Once ‘emotion’ has been broadened to include the intellect, as Collingwood did just before, it follows that C-art both explores and presents the intellect, and so that there can be no distinction between philosophy and art here.

2.4 Choosing Between the Delimitations Critically

We come then to the question of which of these two theories we should prefer, first as an adequate account of art (this section), and then (§2.5) as an interpretation of Collingwood. To a large extent, the questions have been implicitly settled. I argued in
§2.2.1 that the narrow delimitation looks not only to fail to do justice to the intellectuality of C-art, but to be incoherent. Then I argued in §§2.3.2–2.3.3 that the broad delimitation, by contrast, meets its objections entirely adequately. However, there is one other objection that can be levelled against each delimitation, which we have not considered before because it is deeply comparative. We saw in §2.2.1 that the narrow delimitation may not be coherent, because it separates art and philosophy within what looks to be a single thing. But suppose for the sake of argument that the narrow delimitation is coherent, and that some way can be found to make a distinction between the expression of emotion and intellectual inquiry. What then? One option is to call the intellectual inquiry ‘C-philosophy’ and the emotional expression ‘C-art.’ But why would we want to do that? Why not just say that there is intellectual and emotional expression, both of which are done by both C-philosophy and C-art, and leave it at that?

In this eventuality, it seems to me that there is no compelling consideration in favour of either delimitation. If we can find a way to make a distinction between intellectual and emotional expression, the narrow interpretation is neither incoherent nor grossly implausible. The choice then is down to whether we consider theoretical cleanliness more important than using terms in ordinary ways. What I mean by this is that if we separate C-art and C-philosophy (as per the narrow delimitation), then we have two concepts that match up nicely to two other concepts, the expression of emotion and of thought respectively, with no messy overlap, but neither of which, despite first appearances, has a uniquely strong connection to the D-art and D-philosophy from which they take their names. Of course, it remains the case that C-art and C-philosophy are not entirely practically separable: there is nothing that does not contain both C-art and C-philosophy, if it contains either. But they are separate theoretically, and because both concepts are philosophical and so differentially realisable, there is still significant scope for practical differentiation. If we take the broad route, and make C-art and C-philosophy theoretically co-extensive, we lose this nice correspondence of art to emotion and philosophy to intellect. However, we gain a closeness of C-art to the intellectual and philosophical traditions of D-art, and a closeness of Collingwood’s theory of art to others’ – such as Danto’s – theories of art, and so we render Collingwood’s theory more relevant to contemporary debates in what goes by the name of ‘philosophy of art.’ To those who find the aesthetic considerations compelling – to

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118 With the possible exceptions of entirely non-intellectual emotional expression and entirely non-emotional intellectual clarification, if either of these limiting cases is possible.
those who have a taste for a certain sort of theoretical landscape – I have nothing more to say than that I believe that Collingwood has more to teach us if we read him as philosophising about D-art; but as there has been no serious attempt to read Collingwood as not philosophising about D-art, this is hard to establish; and in any case, how compelling one will find this consideration depends on what one’s metaphilosophical priorities are, and this question lies outside the scope of this dissertation.

2.5 Choosing Between the Delimitations Hermeneutically

The discussion above of whether the broad or narrow delimitation is better theoretically has actually gone a long way to answer the question to which we now turn, viz., which of them we should attribute to the historical Collingwood. Although Collingwood vacillates between the broad and narrow delimitations, it seems to me that the broad view is, on balance, closer to both the letter and the spirit of PA. Most of what Collingwood says to suggest that he holds the narrow delimitation is consistent with the broad view (even if not on the most obvious reading), and so by the principle of charity this reading should be preferred.

I will give two examples. First, I have spent some time above arguing that it is not problematic for the broad delimitation that it assimilates C-philosophy and C-art, despite the prima facie worry that such an assimilation would render puzzling Collingwood’s writing The Principles of Art rather than something like The Principles of Art/Philosophy. But if it is not a theoretical problem, then of course it is not a hermeneutic problem, because the hermeneutic worry is predicated on the theoretical worry.

The second example is Collingwood’s claim that “[a]rt as such contains nothing that is due to the intellect.” (PA, p. 292) This looks like an affirmation of the narrow delimitation, but – as Collingwood explicitly says a page later – it is not. The ‘as such’ is key here: Collingwood does not mean that C-art can never contain anything that is due to the intellect, just that it need not do so. The broad delimitation has room for non-intellectual art, for although C-art, according to it, can express thoughts and attitudes and so on, and indeed though D-art may almost always do so (as Collingwood believed; see PA, pp. 293ff.), it need not do so. And because the intellect in intellectual art is not extrinsic to art by virtue of not being essential to it as such, as we have seen (the intellect is fused with emotion, which whole is expressed), there is no challenge to the broad delimitation here.
3. Is ‘Emotion’ a Good Word for what Art Expresses?

If the broad delimitation of Collingwood’s theory is right, then one final consequence is that ‘emotion’ looks to be a very poor term for what art expresses. This is important, and the time has now come to look more closely into this: to see just how bad ‘emotion’ is, and to see if a better term is available. I will conclude that ‘emotion’ is “quite spectacularly unhelpful” (to borrow Ridley’s phrase (1998, p. 3)), but that, despite this, it is not more spectacularly unhelpful than any of the other terms available. My response to this unfortunate situation will be to continue to use the term ‘emotion,’ but advisedly, and with occasional recourse to the other terms I consider.

Why is ‘emotion’ such a poor term? There are a few reasons. One is that ‘emotion’ is typically opposed to ‘reason’ in a way that is unhelpful. This is not just because what Collingwood says art expresses is not irrational, arational or passive in the way that emotion is taken to be. This understanding is increasingly widely appreciated to be false,119 and so not as such much reason to decide against the usage. The trouble is, though, that the increasing acceptance of the rationality of emotion comes from an increasing understanding of a relatively stably-defined, and relative to Collingwood very narrowly-defined, subject-matter. This is fine, but this subject-matter is not Collingwood’s, which as we have seen has far more to do with the intellect, with ways of looking at things, and with other things that are not ‘emotions’ as contemporary philosophers typically use that term; and so using the term to refer to this other, broader subject-matter is liable to confuse.

A second reason is that emotions are typically seen as occurring, and are distinguished from dispositional moods or (to use Ridley’s (1995) umbrella term) passions. This is behind the common criticism of expressivism that art cannot express its artist’s emotions, because it is incoherent or at least implausible that the artist must feel the emotion expressed by the artwork throughout its creation. This criticism is, as we have seen (§2.1), mistaken, but to talk of ‘emotion’ invites it; and it is hard to respond to it while using the language of emotion, because what the artist expresses is not a mood, either, and the type of thing it in fact is—neither simply dispositional nor occurring—is hard to capture in the concepts used in current discourse about emotion. The fault

119 See any of the recent philosophical or psychological work on emotion and rationality, e.g., Diamond (1982), Nussbaum (1996), Robinson (2005), Kirman, Livet and Teschl (2010).
for this unhelpfulness need not be Collingwood’s: how ‘emotion’ is used in Analytic philosophy may have changed since Collingwood’s time. Regardless, this linguistic disconnect is good reason not to use ‘emotion’ in this dissertation.

Of course, ‘emotion’ is not without its advantages. The thought that one can be deeply wrong about one’s emotions, as Collingwood insists, is easy to stomach; that emotions are a process that change as they are expressed, ditto; and the terminological closeness of this dissertation and PA is convenient. Indeed the advantages are such that ‘emotion’ should probably not be abandoned. However, it is still a misleading term, and so let us turn now to the pretenders.\(^{121}\)

Although there is perhaps no definitive ranking to be had here, the unhelpfullest of the unhelpful terms that strike me as nonetheless helpful enough to be worth considering\(^ {122}\) is ‘Lebenswelt.’ This literally translates as ‘life’s world’ or ‘life-world.’ Understood in a way close to this literal meaning, the term is not too bad: ‘world’ suggests, appropriately, that art expresses something indefinitely broad; the artist’s life in general affects the art he creates, as Mont Saint-Victoire is present “like a table over the back of [a child’s] head” (PA, p. 144) in Cézanne’s work. And modified by ‘life,’ it suggests, again appropriately, that this world is not the world under the aspect of physical laws and atoms, but the world as lived. The problem, though, is that this literal meaning is

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\(^ {120}\) This point has been argued with particular force by Robinson (2005), who explicitly follows Collingwood in this regard. I am unsure, though, how much critical acceptance her dynamic account of emotion has received. To the extent that her arguments have not received general acceptance, and so to which emotions are still not conceived as processes, this is another reason for not using ‘emotion’ to refer to what Collingwood says art expresses.

\(^ {121}\) There is one putative advantage of ‘emotion’ that I will not consider: that it brings Collingwood into connection with the many other thinkers, from Aristotle to Wordsworth to Tolstoy to Robinson, who have located a central and distinctive value of art in its having something to do with the expression of what is commonly called emotion. This omission is deliberate. The desire to locate art’s value here is misguided, and ‘emotion’-talk has distracted philosophers from that the expression of which is of much more profound value. I break with this tradition (of which Collingwood has often been seen as the quintessential exemplar (whatever the irony of this, Collingwood, in using the term ‘emotion,’ is not blameless)) only to encourage others to join me.

\(^ {122}\) Perhaps controversially, I consider ‘soul’ and ‘spirit,’ and their rough equivalents in other languages (e.g., Geist) to be, despite very promising, just too much Pandora’s boxes altogether, and therefore so unhelpful that they are not even worth considering. Similarly, I do not consider ‘attitude.’
rendered unavailable by the fact that the term has been so richly theorised by phenomenologists such as Husserl, wherein it takes on a specific, and for us unwelcome, meaning. It would take me too far afield to connect this tradition to Collingwood: whatever its affinities, it is still historically and philosophically far distant. Particularly, Lebenswelten are very basic, somewhere at the level of sensa in Collingwood’s schema – they are “the pregiven basis of all experience”\textsuperscript{123} – whereas what art expresses is always already experienced. And so I will not further consider this term.

The second-least-helpful term is perhaps Collingwood’s own ‘philosophical system.’ He uses this term to refer to what art expresses here:

I am not saying that every poet has a philosophical system, and that his poetry expounds it. But my reason for refusing to say this is not so much because it would be untrue as because it would be misleading. What most people think of as a philosophical system is a collection of doctrines deliberately invented by an individual philosopher in the attempt to reduce the whole of his experience to private formulae. I do not believe that any such things exist. What I find in the writings of any one philosopher is nothing like that; it is more like a series of attempts to think, more clearly and consistently than his contemporaries, in ways more or less common to them all.

The poets share these ways of thinking, and express them in their poetry.

\textit{P4}, pp. 295–6 (emphasis added)

The advantages of ‘philosophical system’ are that it makes explicit the connections between art and philosophy that Collingwood insists upon, that it makes clear the intellectual aspect of art, and that it highlights that art expresses not just something passive and static – a what-it’s-like – but also something active and dynamic – a thinking. The disadvantages are that it is too intellectual – the affective or emotional side of things has dropped out entirely – and that, despite Collingwood’s explicit repudiation of this understanding, ‘philosophical system’ still sounds, to my ears at least, very much like the outcome of a process rather than a process. And indeed Collingwood cites just this reason for calling the term “misleading”, and does not use the term more than this once.\textsuperscript{124}

Thirdly, let us consider ‘Lebensgefühl.’ This term translates literally as ‘life feeling.’ Gefühl (feeling) can be used in more or less all the ways ‘feeling’ can be used in English,


\textsuperscript{124} Collingwood talks of philosophical systems in \textit{EPM}, ch. IX, too, and in a broadly similar way, though emotion or affect is very much out of the picture there.
but *Lebensgefühl*, in German, has come to mean something like ‘attitude to(wards) life,’ ‘feeling of being alive,’ or ‘awareness of life.’ (It is roughly synonymous with *Lebensstellung*, lit. ‘attitude towards life.’) It has no real usage in English (it has no *OED* entry), but has occasionally been used in German-Idealist tradition. Scruton, for instance, quotes Wölfflin’s claim that “architecture expresses the ‘*Lebensgefühl*’ of an epoch” (1978/2013, p. 49), and leaves *Lebensgefühl* untranslated. Whether used in German or carried over to English, though, the meaning is similar. It is not a bad term. The prominence of ‘feeling’ or ‘*Gefühl*’ is of course welcome, and the thought that art expresses *Lebensgefühl* is a natural one.\(^{125}\)

The main disadvantage, besides its clunkiness, is that, like *Lebenswelt*, it tends to mean something necessarily foundational – ‘pre-rational’ – and so be more akin to Collingwood’s ‘absolute presuppositions’ than to that which art expresses. Secondly, and relatedly, it tends to apply at a wider level than the individual, and so be more like a *Zeitgeist* (and, perhaps, like a ‘standpoint,’ which term we will consider below).\(^{126}\) As such, *Lebensgefühl* lack the dynamism – the ability to radically change through their expression – that what is expressed by art must have.

I turn then to the fourth pretender, ‘orientation,’ which I owe to Kreitman’s ‘Art as Orientation’ (2011). In this paper, Kreitman offers a way toward understanding artistic value that is broadly consonant with Collingwood’s. Kreitman’s thesis is that “the fundamental, possibly defining, function of art is to provide the individual with an option for re-orientation in relation to his surroundings, understood as covering all aspects of the environment, including, of course, the social and moral contexts.” (p. 643) Art “helps us to understand ourselves and our place in the world” (*ibid.*), to be sure, but this vague sentiment is made precise by the language of ‘orientation.’

I take no issue with Kreitman’s thesis (though being just a journal article it is inevitably less developed than Collingwood’s), but ‘orientation’ is, grammatically, not a happy substitute for ‘emotion.’ Orientation is rather what happens when emotion is expressed. Of course, ‘expression of orientation’ could be read in a different way: an artwork, it could be said, expresses the artist’s orientation to the world. But this phrase seems to me to suppress what is crucial for Collingwood (and also Kreitman), that the artwork is itself the means of orientation. ‘Orientation,’ therefore, seems as unhelpful as any of the other choices. Now, to be sure, this hesitation is only grammatical; but to

\(^{125}\) Carnap, who thought a bit about the concept, argued this. See Vrahimis (2013), ch. 2, §12.

\(^{126}\) See *ibid.* for both points, but more markedly see Spengler’s *The Decline of the West*.
change the formulation more substantially would be to break the connection with Collingwood too strongly.

‘Standpoint,’ the penultimate term we will consider, is almost a very helpful term. It is a common term in contemporary standpoint epistemology, and has perhaps become primarily associated with this tradition. It refers to one’s point of view, especially with regard to matters of intellectual, moral and political significance. In many ways this term is excellent. Although it does not highlight either the emotional or intellectual aspects of what art expresses, neither does it obscure them. They are equally weighted, which is just what Collingwood wants. Further, ‘standpoint’ does not have any unwelcome visual associations, as ‘worldview’ does, and it is possible – indeed the point is often stressed by standpoint epistemologists – that one can be deeply wrong about the nature of one’s standpoint, and this uncertainty is entirely in keeping with Collingwood’s account of what art expresses. Relatedly but additionally, standpoints, like Lebenswelten and even more so like Lebensgefühl and Zeitgeister, are very deep: well below the level of propositional belief or occurrent emotion, and perhaps even below the level of disposition, insofar as one’s dispositions can change as one comes to know one’s standpoint.

This deepness, though, is a mixed blessing, and one of the reasons I will not use the term: standpoints are so deep that it is hard to see the term as dynamic in the requisite way. Although in certain cases one’s standpoint can change – as, for instance, in the case of gender transition – this is rare. For the most part, if one is, say, a woman,

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127 See, e.g., Hartsock (1983), the earliest article of which I am aware that is self-consciously in this tradition, and Haraway (1988). The tradition traces its roots to Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, in which the standpoint of the slave is epistemically revelatory, and to Marx, who argues that the material conditions of society shape theorising in that society, and in particular, that the standpoint of the proletariat can see the contradictions of capitalism better than the capitalist (Hartsock (1983), pp. 283–7, Harding (1993), pp. 53–4).

128 See, e.g., Hartsock (1983), p. 285, where she insists upon this possibility as an essential feature of standpoints: “The vision available to the oppressed group must be struggled for and represents an achievement which requires both science to see beneath the surface of social relations in which all are forced to participate, and the education which can only grow from struggle to change these relations.”

129 Whether one’s standpoint changes or not in gender transition is a difficult topic: if a trans woman was a trans woman even before realising this and transitioning, then surely, in transitioning, her standpoint remains what it always has been, that of a trans woman. This point is needed in order to account for the particular experiences of pre-transition trans people, which
then one’s standpoint is ineluctably that of a woman. It is important for standpoint theory that standpoints be static in this way, because they are typically understood as politically salient categories that correspondingly cover large groups of people, and which are therefore as static as is the nature and lot of these groups. Because my standpoint is not just mine, it is not mine to unilaterally alter. This social aspect is not entirely unwelcome to Collingwood’s project – *v.i.* ch. 3, §2.3 on how emotions are public – but although we can be deeply wrong about our emotions, and although our emotions are created and situated societally, they are still in the last analysis *ours*, and in principle our emotions can take radically idiosyncratic paths.

I am less confident of the unhelpfulness of ‘standpoint’ than I am of the other terms. It seems possible that ‘standpoint’ could be stretched in a way that allows for very individual standpoints. If one of my standpoints is the very particular standpoint of the historical individual that I am, then maybe that standpoint can develop in a way entirely consonant with Collingwood’s theory. And indeed this could be a philosophically rich connection to explore: maybe it would allow us to see what Ralph Ellison (1955) meant when he said, “I recognize no dichotomy between art and protest”. However, this would bring us too far afield; here, I just say that as currently theorised, standpoints are not what Collingwood says art expresses, and because the term does not have much of a life outside of standpoint epistemology, stretching its meaning into Collingwoodian shape is more liable to obfuscate than clarify.

The last term we will consider is *Weltanschauung* or ‘worldview.’ The German term literally translates as ‘world mode-of view,’ ‘world-opinion,’ ‘world-intuition,’ or the term that I use but which has taken on its own life, ‘worldview.’ As the translation

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are of course unlike the experiences of cis people. On the other hand, some standpoint epistemologists (e.g., McKinnon (2015) and Markey (2016), ch. 6) are keen to stress the change in standpoint that occurs in transitioning (and to do justice to those trans people who experience their transition as a change in gender), and this too is important insofar as the experiences of pre- and post-transition trans people necessarily change.

This strange way in which the standpoint simultaneously does and does not change as one transitions is uncannily reminiscent of the way that what Collingwood calls emotions simultaneously do and do not change in expression, and so it seems that the parallel here is strong enough that, again, ‘standpoint’ is an excellent word for what art expresses. In response, however, I note that these philosophers think of standpoints as changing only under specific and dramatic circumstances – coming out as trans – and that even this much dynamism is rare in standpoint epistemology.
options demonstrate, ‘world’ is a pretty good translation of Welt, but Anschauung is trickier. Alone, it translates well to ‘perception,’ and derives from ‘ansehen, which translates to ‘to look at,’ ‘to behold,’ ‘to (visually) observe,’ or ‘to view.’ We will return to this etymology in a moment. I use Welt in the way I suggested with regard to Lebenswelt above, as a lived, experienced world. (One could hardly otherwise schaut an it.)

Weltanschauung has often been used in a grandiose sense to mean something like a comprehensive worldview, comprehensive in the way that religions are comprehensive: as providing an Anschauung which colours all of one’s lived life, and which does so in a consistent and systematic way. This meaning is not entirely misleading — think of Mahler’s dictum that the symphony must contain the whole world\textsuperscript{130} — but it is certainly not part of Collingwood’s philosophy that all art contains a comprehensive worldview (even if he might think that there is some correlation between how comprehensive the worldview of a work is and how good it is — consider, for instance, his claim that “the beauty of a comic epigram, however perfect, is not only the beauty of a small thing compared with the Iliad, but a lesser as well as a different beauty” (EPM, p. 78); v. i. n. 144). I understand Weltanschauung/worldview in a looser sense, without any requirements of consistency, completeness or systematicity. (I leave implicit the scale-of-forms considerations that are obviously at play here.)

Worldview has strong visual connotations. These are unwelcome, for two main reasons. First, they suggest a priority of vision over other modes of experience: the modes of the other senses such as touch and hearing most directly, but also higher-order modes of experience: emotion in contemporary Analytic philosophy’s sense, abstract thought, etc. Neither priority is any part of Collingwood’s theory: on the one hand, he gives examples from across the arts — literature to music to sculpture, and does not assimilate the experiences of these arts at all to vision — and on the other hand, he of course himself chooses the term ‘emotion’ to capture what art expresses, which is without such visual suggestion. The second reason the visual connotations are unwelcome is that they arguably elevate certain groups’ typical mode of engagement with the world over others: e.g., men’s over women’s, the sighted’s over the blind’s, the technocratic

\textsuperscript{130} In a letter to Anna von Mildenburg dated 18 July 1896, he wrote that his aim in composing symphonies was to create a work “so great that the whole world is actually reflected therein” (Selected Letters of Gustav Mahler (1979), p. 190). Mahler’s music, indeed, has been referred to as Weltanschauungs musik, a late–Romantic genre that also includes works such as Schoenberg’s Gurrelieder and Wagner’s operas. See Danuser (1994), esp. pp. 79ff.
West's over other cultures. In each case the deeper criticism is that vision, and ways of interacting with the world that are metaphorically visual, is only partially revelatory. Again I stress that this aggrandisement of vision is no part of Collingwood's philosophy, and it is to subdue such associations that the German 'Weltanschauung' as well the English 'worldview' is worth considering as the preferred term: remember that 'Anschauung' in this context can also be translated 'intuition' or 'opinion,' terms almost ('intuition' has visual etymology) without visual associations. To repeat: the artist, in expressing a Weltanschauung need not only express a way of seeing the world (although that may well be what he expresses), but can also express a way of hearing and indeed a way of feeling the world.

'Worldview' and even more so Weltanschauung, like 'Lebenswelt' and 'standpoint,' have been used in specific ways in certain traditions. In the case of Weltanschauung, the most obvious tradition is the Hegelian. This, though, is not a problem. First, unlike 'Lebenswelt' and 'standpoint,' this history of use has not dominated the term, and so it is easier to depart from it. As well as the term's use in other, largely unrelated, philosophical and theological traditions, it is also used outside of any particular theoretical context. Second, what overtones and associations there are are not so unwelcome, because Weltanschauung in the Hegelian tradition is often relatively close to what Collingwood says art expresses, and so the overtones are not so misleading. True, Weltanschauung is sometimes conceived 'broadly' or 'abstractly' in Hegel, similar to how 'standpoint' is conceived broadly in standpoint epistemology: Kierkegaard's Either/Or, for instance, can be read as a juxtaposition of two Weltanschauungen, the ethical and the aesthetic, which aspects are about as abstract as you can get. What art expresses

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131 See Ong (1969), Haraway (1988), pp. 58ff., and Naugle (2002), pp. 332–4. Ong suggests that these problems with 'world view' might merit its supersession by 'world sense' or 'world presence.' (p. 646) However, I find these terms insufficiently sensitive to the intellectual aspect of what art expresses.

132 "Cézanne [paints] like a blind man. His still-life studies, which enshrine the essence of his genius, are like groups of things that have been groped over with the hands; he uses colour not to reproduce what he sees in looking at them but to express almost in a kind of algebraic notation what in this groping he has felt." (PA, p. 144)

133 See Naugle (2002) for a good, if partisan, overview.

134 Kierkegaard, who for all his fulminating owed a lot to Hegel, develops the concept of 'Lebenswelt' or 'weltanschauelwelt,' terms which literally translate as 'life view' and 'world view' respectively and which are very close indeed to Hegel's 'Weltanschauung,' throughout his work. See Naugle (2002), pp. 73–81.
is nothing like as general as this: it is particular to the artist (though of course it is also public). But Hegel also allows for a narrower understanding, saying for instance that "every one may have his own way of viewing things generally." As Naugle notes (2002, pp. 70–1), Hegel allows for both particular and general Weltanschauungen. However, it must be conceded that there is a tendency in the Hegelian tradition to conceive of Weltanschauungen as general or abstract: consider, e.g., the early (and very Hegelian) Collingwood's schema of worldviews or Weltanschauungen.136

In sum, then, none of the other terms that I have considered are fantastic terms for what Collingwood says that C-art expresses. No doubt Collingwood would be very pleased about this bit of retribution—he’s been criticised for so long over his choice of term, but now it turns out we can do no better—but his ghost’s telling us that ‘I told you so’ does not help us extricate ourselves from this quandary. What does help us, however, is ch. X, esp. §2, of EPM, in which Collingwood argues that the desire for a single term for a concept—a technical term—is a carryover from scientific thinking, and out of place in philosophy. If he is right here, then there is not only no need to choose a more helpful term than ‘emotion,’ the demand is misplaced: the demand should rather be that a number of terms be used, in contexts when they bring out the aspect of the concept that it is at each point most important to bring out. So, for

135 Sibree’s 1861 translation and emphases, p. 89. The full sentence runs: “Those who adopt this standpoint maintain, that, as every one may have his own way of viewing things generally, so he may have also a religion peculiar to himself.” The original runs: “Jeder, sagt man von diesem Standpunkte, könne eine eigene Weltanschauung, also auch eine eigene Religion haben” (Hegel (1837), p. 81). Nisbet, in a later edition, translates the same sentence thus: “Those who adopt this point of view maintain that everyone is entitled his own personal beliefs, and hence also to his own peculiar religion.” (Hegel (1837/1975), p. 168) I quote the full sentence in both translations for two reasons: first, because it might look as if Hegel is denying that everyone can have his own Weltanschauung, so it should be noted that although he is arguing that not everyone can have his own religion, he accepts that everyone can have his own Weltanschauung. Second, to note the term Standpunkte, which Sibree translates literally as ‘standpoint,’ but which Nisbett translates as ‘point of view.’ The word is not used here in a way that has any particular connection with how it is used in standpoint epistemology.

Note also that neither Sibree nor Nisbett translate Weltanschauung in anything like the same way, nor indicate the term they are translating: even in Hegel, Weltanschauung is used outside its Hegelian context.

136 See SM. (It was with this sense that I used Weltanschauung in ch. 1, §3.4.2.)
instance, ‘emotion’ will pick out how what art expresses is felt ‘deeply’ and ‘internally’ like what art expresses often is; ‘worldview’ will pick out the intellectual and global nature of what art expresses, etc., and when it is important to focus on, say, the ‘felt’ nature of what art expresses, ‘emotion’ should be used, but when it is important to focus on something else, another term should be used.

I do not offer a critical opinion on this of Collingwood’s methodological principles, as it does not affect the present point, but it does get us out of our present quandary, and I will adopt it. (Indeed, I adopted it at the outset.) I will continue to use ‘emotion,’ and will tend to use it as a ‘default’ term, but I will supplement it, as needs be, with the other terms we have considered.

4. Conclusion

If the arguments of this chapter are right, then the ‘emotion’ that C-art expresses is not narrowly our senses of things ‘as wholes,’ but, in principle, any part of our life whatsoever, from our political commitments to the trivia that scamper around our idling minds, and in particular, to our philosophical and moral attitude to the world, what we might call our ‘worldview.’ When so understood, ‘emotion’ ends up rather a misleading way of referring to what C-art expresses, but as it is yet no worse than its alternatives, we will continue to use it, albeit advisedly and in tandem with these other terms. In the next chapter, we will consider Collingwood’s insistence that there are no moral constraints on what art can express, so long as it expresses what it expresses well.
This chapter has two related parts. First, we will consider the prima facie plausible but unCollingwoodian claim that some emotions (or worldviews or whatever we decide to call them (v.s. ch. 2, §3)), by virtue of their immorality, are unworthy of expression in art (§1). In §1.1, we will see how this claim can be made plausible through a particular art-critical judgement, but I will argue that on closer examination, the critical judgement looks unsustainable. However, I will then argue that it can be given a more Collingwoodian and more plausible interpretation. Then, in §1.2, we will consider another unCollingwoodian way of making a connection between the moral value of what an artwork expresses and that work’s C-artistic value; but this, I will argue, is either unmotivated or fits neatly into Collingwood’s overall account of art. Finally, in §2, we will consider some of Collingwood’s own words that appear unCollingwoodian in the same way and which appear to motivate the ‘moralist’ position, but I will argue that they in fact do not support this moralist position, and rather serve only to demonstrate the richness of Collingwood’s theory.

1. Scruton and Evil Emotions

In his The Aesthetics of Music (1997), Scruton writes:

For some listeners [the final movement of Tchaikovsky’s “Pathétique” Symphony] is ‘mortuary music’… a kind of ghoulish brooding which lacks both the dignity of grief and the tenderness of true affection. For such listeners the movement seems to be de-
manding an emotion that is best avoided—namely, a collusive and self-centred depression, decked out in the noble garments of mourning. To judge the movement in this way is... to recognise the questionable power of [Tchaikovsky’s] art.

Whatever about the fairness of this criticism as a criticism of the “Pathétique” in particular, this sort of criticism is doubtless legitimate and important, by which I mean that if Scruton is right that the “Pathétique” is ‘mortuary music’ and so on, then he is right to C-artisticly criticise it on those grounds as he does. If this is right, then Collingwood surely needs to have room for it in his theory. However, at first blush it looks as if this is not a demand that Collingwood can meet, because as we have seen, the only C-artistic criticism he can make is that expression is done inadequately. what is expressed is C-artistically irrelevant. It looks, then, as if Collingwood has inadequately characterised ‘C-art.’

I will argue, however, that that the above passage can be interpreted either so as to make it implausible and unCollingwoodian, or so as to make it plausible and Collingwoodian. The first interpretation is the more textually plausible. It is that there are some emotions (or worldviews) unfit for expression in C-art, such that a C-artwork that expresses them will be deficient qua C-art. I will refer to this as the ‘moralist’ interpretation. However, as I will argue, this interpretation is philosophically implausible. The second interpretation, which is more critically plausible but involves slightly more of a hermeneutic stretch, is that it is the dissimulation of emotion that makes an artwork C-artistically bad. This ‘immoralist’ interpretation, as we will see, is just a way of stating Collingwood’s position.

The moralist interpretation is reinforced by other passages. On p. 391, Scruton sketches a history of dance from the Viennese waltz to American grunge, and claims

137 I am uncertain, and Scruton appears ambivalent too. Schuller (1998, p. 53ff.) claims that the criticism has legs only because the movement is so often poorly conducted. But for the sake of argument, I will assume that it sticks.

138 Scruton of course does not have the concept of C-art, and so, as ever, I am translating some terminology here. Scruton is philosophically close to Collingwood, though, and so the translation is quickly done. For instance, that he does not think that only emotions narrowly understood can be unfit for expression is clear from the larger context of the quotation. See esp. pp. 390-1. V.s. ch. 1, §3.
that the dance that accompanies the music at each stage marks a change in our attitudes to love, sex, the body, courtship and so on. It is clear (although at this point in his larger argument it is not made explicit) that Scruton thinks that our current society’s attitudes to these things is mistaken, and that art which expresses these attitudes is to a correlative extent artistically deficient. But Scruton doesn’t suggest that the problem is that those who dance modern dance haven’t worked through their emotions and attitudes to love and so on enough, as Collingwood would have to say were he to criticise modern dancing on C-artistic grounds; the natural reading is that Scruton thinks that the worldview of those who dance modern dance is just immoral. Again, in his discussion of banality and sentimentality on pp. 479–88, these vices are understood primarily as ways of feeling certain emotions rather than others, rather than ways of not fully expressing certain emotions that are in some sense the same as the ones expressed.

The evidence is not decisive, however. Evidence that Scruton is more Collingwoodian than I am taking him to be comes first from the vagueness of the passages I cite (and in particular how the history sketch could be seen in a Collingwoodian light as a criticism of contemporary magical practice\textsuperscript{139}); but he also says some things that are quite naturally interpreted in a Collingwoodian manner. See, e.g., his discussion of sentimentality (pp. 485–8), which, aside from sounding Collingwoodian itself, builds on Tanner (1976/7), who is sympathetic to Collingwood; his (Scruton’s) claim that “our emotions can be corrupted” (p. 355); and his discussion in ‘The Great Swindle’ (2012), in which he claims that the emotional faker is also fooled by his faking. However, this evidence is rather more circumstantial.

In any event, what precisely Scruton’s position is is not a matter for the present dissertation. More significant is that the ambiguity in his writing indicates that even if he is ‘on board’ with Collingwood, it is Collingwood to whom we must turn if we are to really make sense of such concepts as the corruption of consciousness, fake emotion and self-deceit. Scruton, though often signally insightful, does not excavate as deeply as Collingwood, and is not as rigorous or as systematic. For clarity’s sake, I will refer to the first interpretation as the ‘moralist’ interpretation, and the latter as ‘immoralist’ or of course ‘Collingwoodian,’ and engage with these two positions without worrying further about whether either is fairly attributed to Scruton.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{139} ‘Magic’ in Collingwood’s specific sense: \textit{et al.} ch. 1, n. 61.

\textsuperscript{140} Scruton is far from the only moralist (if he is one), though it should be noted that I use these terms to refer to precisely those positions. In the vigorous contemporary debate on the
According to the moralist position, Tchaikovsky’s ‘ghoulish brooding’ is not an emotion which, as Collingwood would have to say (as we will see), would have ‘the dignity of grief’ and ‘the tenderness of true affection’ were it more fully expressed; it is *sui generis*, and bad just because of what it is. It is fully expressed, but what it is that is fully expressed is bad; and the symphony is the worse for it. Scruton does not say, beyond this, what exactly is wrong with what is expressed by the finale of Tchaikovsky’s Sixth, so a bit of elaboration is required now. First, the nature of the badness is moral: it is not that the bad emotions are (aesthetically) ugly (although they might be that too), but that they are immoral. The badness may also be a matter of aptness, accuracy, rationality, coherence, legitimacy, justice, etc.; but either this is just a separate badness, in which case it is not at issue in the present context; or it is a deeper badness underlying the immorality of the emotion, in which case we need demand only that it is not *inadequate expression* that underlies the badness of the emotion. (This demand may well seem *ad hoc*; but to press this charge is only to make the defence of Collingwood easier. For the sake of argument, then, I permit what in any case is surely eminently plausible, that there are *sui generis* bases for emotions’ immorality.) Second, the immorality need not immediately or directly accrue to the emotion: it changes nothing at

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aesthetic import of the moral expressed by artworks—the ‘value interaction debate’—the terms have different usages, and not all these usages are consistent with mine. The way we have set up the debate, the contemporary debate is only tangentially relevant, and so discussion of it will largely be relegated to footnotes. For an excellent overview of this contemporary debate, see McGregor (2014). (See also Carroll’s earlier review of the literature (2000).) McGregor is extremely critical of the debate, arguing that it is entirely deeply confused; it is also because his criticisms are so excellent that I will not do much to connect the present chapter with that debate. McGregor closes his paper by proposing that the debate would be improved if it were centered around the questions, “Is there a characteristically artistic value? And—if so—is this value instrumentally or finally valuable?” (p. 464) Quite; and Collingwood is miles ahead of him: The answer to the first question is, ‘Yes: C-art,’ the answer to the second is, ‘Both’ (e.g., ch. 1). But the answer cannot be insensitive to how we think about the relationship between ethical and artistic value, and so the present chapter.

The reason that the debate of this chapter does not quite match up with the current debate is that, although Collingwood does not think that an artwork can be C-artistically deficient for expressing an immoral emotion, he *does* think an artwork can suffer such a deficiency for expressing emotion *poorly*, and this is for him a moral as well as C-artistic and intellectual vice. So moral considerations are *sometimes* immediately C-artistically salient. But I leave this discussion aside.
issue if the emotion is consequent on, say, a certain disposition to act, and if it is that
disposition that is immediately immoral. Thirdly, although not much needs saying
about what morality amounts to, there are two requirements: first, C-artistic value
cannot be stipulated to be just a subset of moral value, for obvious reasons; second, if
the bar for something's being moral or immoral is fixed in such a way that Tchaikov-
sky's brooding ends up not being immoral (but is rather, say, just imperfectly moral),
then the moralist position will have to be rephrased as the rather clunkier 'some emo-
tions are (somewhat) unfit for C-artistic expression by virtue of their being insuffi-
ciently moral,' or something of this sort. Collingwood's methodological commitments,
particularly his doctrine of scalar realisability (u.s. ch. 1, ¶.1), make this a very easy
requirement for him to meet, and nothing in this chapter hangs on whether this re-
phrasing is required. Fourthly and finally, the upshot of the immorality of the emotion
is that we have a pro tanto moral reason not to express that emotion. This last condition
excludes the reason not to feel an emotion that derives from, say, one's being hooked
up to a machine which will kill people if one's neurological activity has a certain char-
acter; and (less fantastically) to exclude the reason not to feel an emotion (gladness
that your beloved is near, say) that derives from the fact that someone is pained by this
emotion (because, to continue the example, your beloved was once their beloved). Be-
yond this, the finer details will not affect the arguments of this chapter.\footnote{See, e.g., Pugmire (1998) and (2005), and Roberts (1991) for debate on whether and how emotions can be immoral. Remember, though, that 'emotion' is broader for Collingwood than for those in this debate.}

I take it, then, that emotions (or worldviews), for the moralist, can be bad, and that
for an emotion to be bad is for us to always have a pro tanto moral reason not to express
that emotion. In other words, there is a moral reason not to express the emotion, which
moral reason is defeasible, and which is not due to any contingent consequences that
may accrue from feeling the emotion. Our question, then, is whether there is a C-
artistic reason not to express the emotion.

To illustrate this understanding of emotional immorality by Scruton's criticism of
Tchaikovsky: Tchaikovsky's grief is bad because he has a pro tanto intrinsic moral rea-
son not to express the sort of grief found in the finale of his Sixth. The reason for this
is that the world ought to seem to him to not be as unredeemedly bad as it in fact
appears to him. If he were to see the world more reasonably, to be open to aspects to
which he in fact ignored or bowdlerised from his worldview, he would see that there
is dignity and tenderness in it as well, and he would see that it is not acceptable to be
self-centred in his grief as he is. This explanation, of course, relies on controversial empirical, ethical and musical claims, but this is beside the point: all I am doing here is briefly clarifying the moralist position.

Finally, although Scruton does not say anything explicit on the matter, he is almost certainly not suggesting that any representation of a bad emotion makes the artwork that represents it C-artistically worse: Othello’s jealousy does not make Shakespeare’s play worse, though Othello’s jealousy is surely immoral and though Othello certainly expresses that jealousy. Or to take an example that is more obviously a worldview rather than an emotion: Polyphemus’ callous attitude toward Odysseus and his men does not C-artistically harm the Odyssey, though he is archetypically villainous. *In abstracto*, the distinction is between endorsement and presentation: Shakespeare does not ‘endorse’ Othello’s jealousy as Tchaikovsky does his grief, but just presents it. It is true for Othello, Polyphemus and Tchaikovsky, but false for Shakespeare, that their worldview is immoral.\(^{142}\)

So much for the moralist position. Collingwood’s (immoralist) position is that the badness of an emotion expressed in an artwork does not as such affect the C-artistic value of that artwork. This is most explicit in the following passage.

Bad art is never the result of expressing what is in itself evil… Every one of us feels emotions which, if his neighbours became aware of them, would make them shrink from him with horror: emotions which, if he became aware of them, would make him horrified at himself. It is not the expression of these emotions that is bad art… On the contrary, bad art arises when instead of expressing these emotions we disown them, wishing to think ourselves innocent of the emotions that horrify us, or wishing to think ourselves too broad-minded to be horrified by them.

*PA*, p. 284

Collingwood does not even commit himself regarding whether there are ‘evil’ emotions, or just emotions which are seen as evil in certain societies or to certain people. This underlines that he is not directly interested in the moral worth of emotions: there may or may not be genuinely evil emotion as far as C-art is concerned, because all that matters is that we express it properly.\(^{143}\) Of course, in expressing an emotion, we may

\(^{142}\) This distinction is more or less identical to Gaut’s (1998, pp. 188–9).

\(^{143}\) Collingwood is arguably in agreement here with Wilde, who writes in the preface to *The Picture of Dorian Gray* that “[t]here is no such thing as a moral or immoral book. Books are
also find that we have an emotion regarding that emotion, such as a feeling that the emotion we feel is evil. Creating good C-art requires not denying or obscuring this second-order emotion; but this is not additional to the requirement of expressing emotions: our sense that the emotion is evil is another emotion, which we are under obligation not to falsify just as much as any more first-order emotion.\footnote{\text{Collingwood does not require that we go out of our way to express this emotion about our emotion: very many great artworks, such as Nabokov’s \textit{Lolita}, Joyce’s \textit{Dubliners}, and Murdoch’s \textit{The Black Prince}, all express emotions concerning which we can be sure the artists have emotions; but these meta-emotions are conspicuously absent in these works, which allow their audiences to reach their own conclusions about their subject-matters. Where these works differ from, say, a poster of war propaganda in which the artist has to mask or exclude her mixed feelings about the war is that they do not suggest that what is presented is the whole story. There is no suggestion in \textit{The Dead} that there is nothing more to Gabriel than what we see, that we shouldn’t feel a certain way about his lot, that Joyce didn’t feel a certain way about it, or even that he presents what he presents with a particular moral colouring. In a war-propaganda poster, by contrast, misgivings about the war are denied or treated as illegitimate: the case for war is presented as open and shut, and the (D-)artist presents her feelings about the war as clear and unwavering. (Collingwood has no issue with moralising art such as \textit{Crime and Punishment}: his concern is only with art which denies the complexity of issues. And he does not have any issue with propaganda either (\textit{v.g.} ch. 1, §3.2): he is only concerned to differentiate it from C-art.) To put all this in another way, suppose an artist feels}

well written, or badly written. That is all.” This is because to write well, for Collingwood, is just to express one’s emotions well (see \textit{PA}, pp. 298–9 (see also \textit{EPM}, ch. X, §7; but Collingwood in this earlier work has not yet fully worked through the issue, and he allows ‘beauty’ to sometimes play a role, which concept has by \textit{PA} been banished from the realm of aesthetics (see \textit{PA}, ch. 6, §6; \textit{v.g.} ch. 4))). He is also, arguably, in agreement with F. R. Leavis, at least as Leavis is presented by Tanner (1994, p. 65). Arendt, too, says things that could be understood in a Collingwoodian way (“[Brecht was] a poet—that is, someone who must say the unsayable, who must not remain silent on occasions when all are silent” (1966/1968), p. 228)), and at the very least considers honesty (which term she uses very much as Collingwood uses it) as central enough to art that its absence in Brecht’s later work is the (main? sole?) reason that that work is so poor (see \textit{ibid.}, esp. p. 242ff.)

\footnote{\text{The picture which [a corrupt] consciousness has painted of its own experience is not only a selected picture (that is, a true one so far as it goes), it is a bowdlerized picture, or one whose omissions are falsifications.” (\textit{PA}, p. 218)}}
angry at a friend for dying, and feels guilty because he considers that anger is evil, which is a meta-emotion or second-order emotion. The artist may, in creating an artwork expressing his anger, express the anger very well but also falsifies his second-order feeling about that anger. He might defend his falsification against Collingwood by saying that he was not in the business of expressing his guilt, that he was only interested in expressing his anger. But this is no excuse: if you are in the business of expressing your guilt at all, you are in the business enough to do it well. The work he creates, Collingwood would say, is rather propaganda than art. But none of this is to insist that the artist be in the business of expressing that guilt; it is legitimate and (probably) possible for him to leave it out of her work altogether.145 (The finale of Shostakovich’s Fifth Symphony provides a neat example of an artist expressing an emotion (the military peroration of the brass) while also expressing the composer’s reservations (the teeth-grating As of the strings and woodwind).)

The tension between Scruton’s moralist and Collingwood’s immoralist positions, then, is this: for Scruton, some emotions are not fit for expression in C-art, no matter how well—expressed they may be; for Collingwood, who does not even venture an opinion regarding the possibility of immoral emotion, every emotion is fit for expression in C-art, so long as the job of expression is done well.

How might Collingwood persuade Scruton of his position? One possibility is that he could argue that bad emotions, for instance the ‘self-centred depression’ of Tchaikovsky’s “Pathétique” or Othello’s jealousy, are just inadequately—expressed emotions. The only way we can express prima facie bad emotions is badly, because to express them fully would be to convert them into what we would naturally call good emotions. Othello’s jealousy, for example, is bad because it is all-consuming, not because it is jealousy, which can be appropriate in certain contexts. An all-consuming jealousy is an emotion which is not fully expressed, and that is whence the badness of the emotion. (Jealousy is perhaps always ugly, but that is not to say that it is always immoral.) Similarly, Collingwood might continue, we can only take pleasure in others’ pain if we have not worked through our own emotions, and find in sadism a way of avoiding dealing

145 I say ‘probably’ possible because if such excision were impossible, it could explain (or contribute to an explanation of) why small artworks cannot be as great as large artworks, which Collingwood notes in EPM, p. 78; and could also explain why it is legitimate to criticise artworks for not dealing with certain issues that are in the artwork’s background (e.g., slavery in Jane Eyre), and why one typical artist’s response – that that issue is outwith the scope of the artwork – can fall flat.
properly with these emotions. Again, racist worldviews are a result of false beliefs about race and about those subject to the racism, which falseness will become manifest if the worldview is expressed well, and so undermined. Tchaikovsky’s “Pathétique,” or jealous, sadistic or racist artworks, then, are C artistically deficient to the extent that they fail to express fully those emotions they partially express, and for the reason that they fail to fully express those emotions.

These explanations are sometimes plausible, but will often be little more than speculation, and are even implausible in cases (such as we will consider in §1.2.2) in which an artwork appears not to be C artistically weakened by its immoral emotion. A more significant problem is that this response, if applied generally, denies that we ever feel bad emotions once they are fully expressed. Whatever the intrinsic plausibility of this general claim about emotion (it seems optimistic), it is not something Collingwood himself ever claims: on the contrary: as we have seen, he explicitly allows that there may be evil emotions (even if this is an epistemic rather than metaphysical possibility). It would be safer, then, to respond to Scruton by agreeing that there are evil emotions, and then arguing that art is not worse qua C art for expressing these emotions.

1.1 Can Collingwood Make Scruton’s Criticisms?

In answering the question of this section, Scruton’s own example, the finale of Tchaikovsky’s “Pathétique,” is a natural place to start. If Collingwood can account for the work Scruton uses to illustrate his (Scruton’s) point, which Scruton presumably thinks illustrates that point particularly well, then that is good evidence for the general superiority of Collingwood’s account. Collingwood does have the resources to make the criticism Scruton does, and we will shortly see how he could go about doing so. However, before doing so, we will consider another, more abstract objection against Collingwood’s claim that the morality of what art expresses can never as such affect its C artistic value, that, if successful, will render the detailed art-critical work of considering Tchaikovsky’s “Pathétique” unnecessary, which would expedite things nicely.

1.1.1 Real and Imaginary Examples

This objection is rather a suggestion: that we consider a hypothetical, extreme case of an artwork that expresses an immoral emotion in order to determine whether this affects its C artistic merit. Using such examples is a standard and fruitful way of asking
and answering questions both within and outwith aesthetics, and so surely a fruitful way of going about things in connection here too. Removing from consideration any spurious but contaminating properties of the artwork will no doubt allow us to better consider the aesthetic effect of its moral. This suggestion has proponents: prominent aestheticians such as Walton and Carroll use such examples in this sort of context. Carroll, for instance, in ‘Moderate Moralism’ (1996), concocts the example of Saviour, a painting that represents the death of Hitler as a tragedy on a par with the crucifixion of Christ, and Walton argues his point about imaginative resistance on the basis of a number of very abstractly described examples in his ‘Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality (I)’ (1994) – for instance, “a story [that] has as its moral or message the idea that the practice of genocide or slavery is morally acceptable” (p. 28).

However, this approach is not helpful as a way of approaching the C-artistic effect of a work’s moral. There are two reasons for this. The first is that we cannot as easily judge the quality of an artwork in the abstract as Carroll and Walton suppose we can. It is tempting to say, with Carroll, that Saviour is bound to be bad: but is this not just speculation? Does it not have more to do with our general desire to deny any goodness to anything at all Nazi than any specifically aesthetic intuition? I rather suspect so; but it is at least a serious charge, and one that has not been met by those who advocate such a use of intuition.

A possible response presents itself, though: Carroll and Walton could protest thus: ‘It’s not mere speculation that Saviour would be artistically poor. No doubt there are variables (such as our aversion to anything Nazi) at play in our consideration of Saviour, but that doesn’t render our intuitions entirely useless. We do have some reason to believe that Saviour would be poor, even if it is possible to create a good artwork expressive of bad emotions; hypothetical cases such as Saviour are still helpful, even though our fallible intuitions do not prove anything.” This line of response is considered in some detail (albeit in a different context) by Ridley in his ‘On the Musically Possible’ (2013), in which he considers Artur Schnabel’s brilliant but error-ridden 1935 recording of the “Hammerklavier,” and a hypothetical performance which “has exactly the same virtues as Schnabel’s original, but is perfectly accurate throughout. It plumbs the depths and scales the heights just as Schnabel’s does, but is technically superior.”

Ridley’s aim is to demonstrate that we have good reason to believe, against the sceptical denial of these claims, that (a) the hypothetical performance is possible, and (b) we have good reason to believe that it would be C-artistically superior to Schnabel’s

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actual performance. It is worth briefly running through the dialectic of Ridley’s paper. The sceptical claim is buttressed by two claims found in a certain reading of Sibley: first, that “aesthetic concepts are not condition-governed”; or in other words, “[t]hings may be described to us in non-aesthetic terms as fully as we please but we are not thereby put in the position of having to admit (or being unable to deny) that they are delicate or graceful or garish or exquisitely balanced”. The second claim buttressing the sceptical position is that there is no way to judge from a work’s local C-artistic (what Sibley and Ridley call aesthetic) properties what its global C-artistic properties are; “what in vacuo is inherently an aesthetic merit may itself, in conjunction with other inherently positive features in [an artwork], become a defect.” Interpreted strictly and taken together, these sceptical concerns imply a strong and worrying scepticism about C-artistic predictions. For the first claim implies that there is no reason to think that were Schnabel to have played the written notes rather than the notes he did play (which would be a non-aesthetic change), he would still have plumbed the depths and scaled the heights as, in his actual performance, he has. But suppose that, per impossibile, we can predict that the passages in question would be C-artistically improved by their notes being the ones Beethoven wrote. These improvements would be local C-artistic changes, and, by the second claim, these changes would have unpredictable effects on the global C-artistic properties of the work. So we are left unable to judge whether Schnabel’s performance would have been better had he played the right notes.

Ridley argues that Sibley, on the current reading, takes too hard a line. I will not rehearse Ridley’s arguments, with which I take no issue. I will just give his conclusion: the claims supporting the sceptical position are not absolute: although we cannot guarantee that a given non-C-artistic change will have a certain C-artistic effect, or that a given local C-artistic change will have a certain global C-artistic change, we can still have some reason to believe that certain possible consequents will or will not follow

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149 Sibley (1983), quoted in Ridley, ibid.
150 Briefly: he makes a reductio ad absurdum argument against Sibley (Sibley’s account renders such practices as practicing a piece irrational), and supplants it with the account I give in the main text.
from changes to the antecedents. The antecedents give us stronger or weaker reason to predict certain consequents, which vary according to how similar the case in question is to previous cases. When a hypothetical artwork is similar to previous artworks in its tradition, we have, to an extent correlative to its similarity, reason to believe that its aesthetic properties will be similar to those other works. This is clearest in the examples Ridley chooses: performances, in the classical-music tradition, of classical music. Pianists have performed interpretations of the “Hammerklavier” to which we (individually and as a tradition) have responded differentially for centuries, and we are familiar with a lot of music similar to the “Hammerklavier.” So we are in a good position to judge, for instance, that the tempo should be stretched here but not here, the melody brought out here but the bassline brought out here, and, particularly, that the recommended notes be played here and also here. When Schnabel misses notes, we can confidently judge that his performance would have been better had he hit them, because we can compare his performance against other performances in which the correct notes were played, we can compare the performance to performances of other similar pieces which are better with the right notes, and so on.

So far, this is grist to Carroll and Walton’s mill. But note how incredibly modest Ridley’s examples are compared to Savioùr. Ridley rightly points out that even Glenn Gould, recording in 1955 the then-esoteric “Goldberg” Variations, could not be confident that he could do it successfully. The case of Savioùr is vastly more uncertain even than this. Most significantly, Gould knew what notes to play: without undermining the creativity and intelligence of Gould’s interpretation, the vast majority of the creative work of any performance of the “Goldberg” Variations is Bach’s. The artist inspired to paint Savioùr has no such collaborator. When we are in a poor epistemic situation, as for instance we are in concerning Savioùr, Ridley’s response to the sceptical claim doesn’t work (or rather, does not work well enough for Carroll and Walton’s purposes). Sibley’s position looks much more reasonable here. We cannot derive any C-artistic properties from the non-C-artistic properties Carroll supposes Savioùr to

151 Or, as Ridley puts it, we can have access to considerations that bear on the likelihood of the consequents (p. 8).

152 There are of course many other considerations as well. To give just one: if a new artwork is created that is extremely similar to an earlier artwork in the tradition, then this might give us reason to think that it is not good, even if the earlier artwork is excellent, because the new artwork is insufficiently original. However, we need not go into this here.

153 Ibid., p. ii.
have, and even if we suppose Saviour to have certain local C-artistic properties, we
cannot tell what effect they will have on the work's global C-artistic properties. And
this scepticism, unlike the scepticism Ridley considers, does not undermine any prac-
tices central to art (v.s. n. 150): we already know that the artist, facing a blank canvas,
proceeds more from hope than expectation. And Tanner, for one, is quite happy to
admit that “it is a matter for speculation... of whether, had the Third Reich had a
longer run for its money, any artists of stature would have appeared, who would have
been equally dedicated to the cause, but subtler and more lastingly successful in their
embodiment of it.”

1.1.2 Tchaikovsky’s “Pathétique”

It was too much to hope, then, that we could decide this question from the armchair,
and so we must go into the world (or at any rate to the record store). We will go hither
now, considering first, after Scruton, Tchaikovsky’s “Pathétique,” and subsequently, on
seeing that that work fails to support Scruton’s claim that some things are unfit for
expression, other, more promising examples.

As a criticism of the “Pathétique” in particular, what seems to me to make Scruton’s
criticism stick\textsuperscript{155} is firstly the relentlessness of the depression of the music. The first
theme’s sadness is barely broken by the major tonality of the contrasting second theme,
because in this theme as much as in the first, the heavy use of suspensions, inversions,
dissonance, etc., keeps the mood dark and unsettled. And even that lightness is
clouded over: toward the end of the movement, the second theme is reharmonised in
the tonic minor, in which key the music ends in a depression so deep that it cannot
even cry out. What secondly makes the criticism stick is the nature of the sadness of
the movement. It is first heavy and oppressive. This is achieved by, for instance, the
extremely slow tempo combined with long note-values, and the thick lower-register
harmonies (see, e.g., the last few bars, where a chord of B’-C#-E-G-B resolves to the
sustained B’-D-F# chord with which the symphony ends). Secondly, the music is list-
less, enervated. This is achieved, for instance, by the abundance of descending motifs,
for instance in both main themes; in the use of dissonances, suspensions and inver-
sions; and in the way the music never really reaches a satisfactory climax and, as it
seems to me, gives up on even trying to reach one. Thirdly, the movement is strikingly

\textsuperscript{155} Again, if indeed it does stick (v.s. n. 137).
inward-looking, as is achieved by, for instance, the frequently close voicing of the chords.

According to Scruton, the heaviness of the music comes not from an immense weight but from a lack of inner strength which makes any weight immensely heavy, and the absence of tenderness in Tchaikovsky’s sadness is due not to his insufficiently dedicated internal search after tenderness, but to his being uninterested in expressing tenderness. The listlessness of the movement is not the understandable listlessness of someone consumed by a depression so powerful that they cannot even fight it, but the listlessness of one culpably too lazy to fight what can be fought. Second, the movement is too inward-looking, to the point of being just self-centred. And by its being so relentlessly miserable, one wonders whether Tchaikovsky gets some sort of ghoulish pleasure from the despair, like one who enjoys spending time in morgues, not in order to grieve but in order to be made miserable by the presence of death (it matters not whose); and this done under the guise of, or ‘decked out in the noble garments of,’ mourning.156

We will now see how Collingwood could criticise these same features that Scruton criticises. From this point of view, the failing that Scruton refers to as “ghoulish brooding” is that it expresses a depression which arises from Tchaikovsky’s focusing on the depressing and ignoring the cheering, in order that he may sustain his depression. It is thus not the emotion that harms the work, but its falsity. It is, to an extent, fabricated: instead of looking into himself and expressing what is there, Tchaikovsky finds in himself some of what he wants to find there, and misrepresents himself so that it appears that that is all there is in him. In the terms Collingwood uses in the quotation above, Tchaikovsky disowns his emotions; or in the language of ch. 1, §3.3.1, his consciousness is corrupt. He does not disown the emotions that horrify him, necessarily (the impression in the quotation that Collingwood thinks this is dispelled by the larger context), but just those that, for whatever reason, he does not want to feel, or which he does not want to be thought by others to feel. A fabricated emotion is still expressed, and it is because of this that Scruton can still say that it is the emotion expressed itself which harms the finale. However, it is not the emotion per se that is bad, but the fact that it

156 I stress that no general claims about depression are implied here. Some depression of course is truly unbearably heavy. All Scruton is saying is that something about the “Pathétique” rings false such that it seems that in this case, the explanation of the darkness is more along the lines of what I have suggested.
is fabricated. This fits with Scruton’s criticism, and seems to me a plausible and illuminating distinction; but only Collingwood’s account allows us to draw it. As there is no respect in which the Collingwoodian interpretation of Scruton’s criticism is inferior to the moralist interpretation, there is some reason to adopt it.

But there is a complication. Every emotion, for Collingwood, is somewhat fabricated, because the process that converts psychical emotions into the emotions at the level of imagination creates as well as discovers the emotions (v.s. ch. 1, §2.2). Consider by contrast to the finale of the “Pathétique” the slow movement of Beethoven’s “Eroica,” which opens and ends with a leaden dirge much as the “Pathétique” does, but is much more emotionally complex and rich – and is followed by a scherzo. However, it was no doubt something of which the deafening Beethoven had to remind himself, that there was still much to rejoice; and quite possibly he had to force himself to feel that the symphony should have the form it does. Supposing this is so (which it surely sometimes is whether or not it was so for Beethoven), what is it about this fabrication of emotion that is not objectionable in the way that Tchaikovsky’s fabrication is? The difference comes down to the fact that to fabricate is not already to falsify, and that there is no falsification in the “Eroica.” The “Pathétique” fails because it disowns emotions contrary to what Tchaikovsky wanted to express; the “Eroica” succeeds because it works through the contradictions in its emotions. Tchaikovsky falsely denies that he sometimes feels the sun; Beethoven does not deny his grief, but places this grief alongside its already extant, if hard to excavate, opposite.157

Another criticism Scruton makes, collusiveness, is partly already accounted in the above. All art, for Collingwood, demands that its apprehenders themselves feel the emotion that is expressed by it, and demands that they think it appropriate, because expression is a deeply public activity (v.s. ch. 1, §2.4; v.i. §2.3): in the “Pathétique,” the demand is that they feel depressed and that they don’t think it self-centred. But the movement does not first express a self-centred emotion and then also demand that the audience feel that emotion. To express a certain emotion is already to demand that the audience feel it. What is not quite accounted for in the above, though, is the way in which the collusion also legitimises the composer’s emotions. In writing music, the composer demands of the listener a certain emotional response; the listener, in not

157 The language of this paragraph misleadingly suggests that Tchaikovsky is quite clear-headedly and deliberately falsifying his emotions. But as we have seen in ch. 1, falsification can (and in Tchaikovsky’s case almost certainly does) take place on the cusp of consciousness, where the ‘active’ and ‘deliberate’ terms I have been using are only minimally applicable.
refusing the demand, implicitly tells the composer (not to mention other listeners) that the demand is reasonable, which the composer thinks legitimizes their feeling (see, e.g., P4, p. 317). So, to separate out what in one sense is just the one action, the badness of the collusiveness of the "Pathétique" is that it asks you to (a) feel an immoral emotion, (b) consider it unobjectionable to feel that emotion, (c) present the emotion as unobjectionable to others, and (d) not admit to yourself or others that this is going on. None of this is inconsistent with Scruton's criticism, but Collingwood's account allows one to see the different parts of the action more clearly.

A third failing Scruton finds is self-centredness. This is hardest to capture in Collingwood's account. This is first because Scruton is relying on the general ethical badness of being self-centred in criticising art for that vice. Collingwood's theory of art, being quiet on such general ethical matters, may not be able to make the criticism at all, if being self-centred is ethically unobjectionable. Were being self-centred in fact not ethically vicious, Collingwood's inability to criticise art on that ground would, I think, be fine (and in any case he would be no worse off than Scruton, who also relies on the general ethical claim); but as being self-centred most likely is bad, it's an academic question. However, even supposing that it is ethically vicious to be self-centred in the way the finale of the "Pathétique" is, Collingwood cannot immediately C artistically criticise art on this ground. He can, however, do so indirectly. Tchaikovsky bids his self-centredness; as Scruton says, it is "decked out in the noble garments of mourning". It is this 'decking-out' which is all that Collingwood can, strictly, find C artistically problematic. Were an artist utterly unaware that their self-centredness was ethically vicious, they would not (ceteris paribus) disown it, and Collingwood would be unable to criticise their art on C-artistic grounds as self-centred, even granting the ethical badness of being self-centred in this way. To interpret Scruton's criticism in a Collingwoodian way, we have to read the mention of 'self-centred' as filling in a term of the decking-out relation in order to make the claim of decking-out more concrete and so more plausible, rather than as a separate criticism. This, though, is a plausible reading of the passage. There is one less criticism than in the non-Collingwoodian interpretation of the passage I gave above, and so the passage is on the whole slightly less critical, but this is hardly a failure, especially as the overall criticism is still perfectly robust. It is hardly obvious, in any case, that we should prefer the stronger criticism even if we can have it: not every ethical principle must also be an aesthetic principle, and there are times, it seems, when we quite definitely want our theory not to predict that an ethical failing translates into a C-artistic failing, as we will see in §1.2.2.
1.2 The Search for a More Compelling Example

The moralist might respond that although, sure, the problem with Tchaikovsky’s Sixth is that Tchaikovsky does not fully express his emotions, all my argument has done has shown that the example was chosen too hastily. Sometimes, to be sure, artworks are bad because they don’t fully express the emotion they purport to express; but sometimes, too, the emotion they express is just plain bad, and this too can make the artwork aesthetically worse. This response will of course have to be supported. I will now consider three artworks that look like they could serve as supporting examples: first, briefly, Nabokov’s *Lolita* and Bret Easton Ellis’ *American Psycho*, and then, at greater length, Gauguin’s *Te Tamari No Atua*. We will see that in no case does it look plausible that an emotion’s being immoral (as opposed to inadequately expressed) negatively affects the C-artistic value of the artwork which expresses it.

1.2.1 Specious Examples: *Lolita* and *American Psycho*

Consider *Lolita* first. The worldview expressed in this novel that we might think unfit for expression in art is of course the protagonist Humbert Humbert’s paedophilia. Paedophilia is bad, but the paedophilia in *Lolita* is, of course, Humbert’s, not Nabokov’s. The emotion, as Gaut would say (*v.s. n. 142*), is not endorsed, but rather represented or portrayed. Nabokov is not trying to persuade us of the virtues of paedophilia: he is just telling us a story of a paedophile; he is presenting a standpoint or worldview of which we are to make what we will. No-one since Plato has suggested that an artwork which even so much as presents an immoral emotion is thereby in C-artistic
Unworthy Emotion?

...This distinction shows *Lolita* to not be especially relevant: it no more expresses immoral emotions than do *Othello* or *Crime and Punishment*, and differs only in being more subtle in not also censuring them.  

Ellis' *American Psycho* is a better example. This novel does not endorse the protagonist Patrick Bateman’s murderous psychopathy, but Ellis (arguably) dedicates much more of the novel than is necessary to make his politically satirical point to the gruesome detail of Bateman’s murders and sexual abuse of women, and this suggests that Ellis rather enjoyed imagining what he describes. This sadism and misogyny, of course, are immoral. Do they mar the novel? Critics are divided. However, if we can get past literary-critical disputes, the philosophical issue is not that difficult. Suppose

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158 See *The Republic*, Bks. III and X. Arguably, Hume actually agrees with Plato here: “where... vicious manners are described, without being marked with the proper characters of blame and disapprobation, this must be allowed to disfigure the poem, and to be a real deformity.” (1757, para. 32) Walton (1994, p. 28), however, suspects that Hume takes the author's keeping her viewpoint out of the picture to be an implicit condoning of what is represented. This could well have been a reasonable (if even then defeasible) critical maxim in Hume’s time; but it is certainly not true now (Carroll (2013) refers to it as the “narrative fallacy”). In any case, if Walton is right, the disagreement is a literary-critical one, not a philosophical one.  

159 Burgess’ *A Clockwork Orange* (in the version without the twenty-first chapter); Field’s *Little Children*, many of the songs from Radiohead's *OK Computer*, such as ‘Electioneering’ or ‘Karma Police,’ or Leonard Cohen's ‘Memories’ could also have served as examples.  

160 Harron’s film adaptation could serve equally well as an example here, as could Kubrick’s adaptation of *A Clockwork Orange*. I use Ellis' novel because Carroll (1996) also briefly discusses it. Henry Darger’s *In the Realms of the Unreal*, in its obsession with the torture and death inflicted upon people and especially naked children, is arguably a very similar example; but as it remains unpublished, getting access to it enough to discuss it is hard. For what it’s worth, though, Castle (2011) doesn’t think that the paedophilia and sadism betrayed by Darger’s obsessiveness mar the work.  

161 Ellis’ interview with Roger Cohen (Cohen (March 6, 1991)) mentions a few critics of the work; Weldon (April 25, 1991) is particularly positive. It is worth noting, though, that only some of the criticisms are that the work expresses bad emotions. Weldon, for instance, criticizes the book for only presenting, and not attempting to make sense of, the world it satirizes; which in Collingwoodian terms is just not expressing emotions fully enough. My own opinion is that although the novel spends too long describing trivia, the depiction of the violence is necessary to demonstrate that Bateman is not a normal human who has gone too far along a certain path though who is yet still in some connection with normal humans; he is rather utterly disconnected from the rest of humanity: ‘off the radar’ entirely.
first that Ellis’ defenders are right: Ellis is no more a psychopath than any of us, and portrayed a psychopath to make his satirical point; and suppose that he had to describe the monstrosities he did in order to make his point. It is clear, in this case, that American Psycho raises no relevant philosophical issues beyond what we have discussed just above in connection with Lolita. Suppose that, although he is no psychopath, Ellis misjudged how much detail he needed to make his point. The novel, under this understanding, is certainly deficient — but its deficiency is clearly a technical deficiency: Ellis is unable to properly see the book through a general reader’s eyes.\textsuperscript{162} Suppose thirdly that Ellis is peculiarly psychopathic, and that the detail with which he describes Bateman’s actions is necessary to express Ellis’ bad emotions. Here we have to return to the distinction we made in ch. 1 between expressing in the sense of clarifying and in the sense of just presenting. If the novel is just presenting Ellis’ psychopathic emotion, then Collingwood would say that American Psycho is indeed C-artistically worse, because the expression is pointless: Ellis, under this interpretation, is just wallowing in his fantasies, and why should we care about this? If instead Ellis is clarifying his psychopathic emotions, Collingwood cannot criticise the work; but that interpretation of the novel seems to me entirely implausible, and so whether we should be content with Collingwood’s inability to make it is moot.

1.2.2 A More Compelling Example: Te Tamari No Atua

This final response is unsatisfying, of course; so we will turn now to a final example, Gauguin’s Te Tamari No Atua\textsuperscript{163} (1896), which is obviously what I have claimed American Psycho only very implausibly is: the good expression of an immoral emotion. This

\textsuperscript{162} This, I think, is Carroll’s criticism (1996, pp. 232-3). Carroll calls it a moral criticism because he thinks that the failure of understanding derives from a moral failing on Ellis’ part. It may well so derive, but because the moral failing is, as it were, one step removed from the criticism — what is directly problematic is not that Ellis’ morality but the more general problem that he wanted to create a certain effect on the reader but failed to do so — Carroll’s position is not in conflict with Collingwood’s. The irrelevance of immorality to this sort of failure is brought out by Weatherston (2004), who considers examples of similar but non-moral misjudgement, e.g., logical impossibility.

\textsuperscript{163} Child of God is the literal translation of the Tahitian title. Nativity is another common English title. (In fact the literal translation is Children of God, but it is generally agreed, so far as I am aware, that Gauguin meant to use the singular, and that the mistake is explained by the
is perhaps the strongest example against Collingwood’s position; but it too, we will now see, fails.

_Te Tamari No Atuā_ expresses Gauguin’s affection for Pahura, the fourteen-year old girl, his _vahine_ (roughly ‘wife’) (see Mathews (2001), p. 179)), who is the subject of the painting, as having just given birth. (She was pregnant with Gauguin’s child at the time.) It is certainly a masterpiece – it has an episode of the BBC’s _The Private Life of a Masterpiece_ (Season 6, Episode 3) dedicated to it and is hung proudly in Munich’s _Neue Pinakothek_ – but it is also (_inter alia_) an expression of the affection Gauguin feels for a girl who is surely too young for the role she has been given. The emotion expressed by the painting, then, is surely immoral, if we accept that the sort of affection one (especially if this ‘one’ is a middle-aged nineteenth-century Frenchman) feels for a wife is not appropriate for a young girl. As we have formalised it in §1.1.2, Gauguin has a _pro tanto_ reason not to express or invite others to feel that way towards Pahura.

How might the moralist account for _Te Tamari No Atuā_? One possibility is to deny that it is a great painting. However, given the art-critical consensus, this would be quite some cost, and the move would incur the obvious charge that it is _ad hoc_ so I will not consider it further. Another possibility is to deny that it endorses paedophilia, and

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64 On the importance of our example’s being canonical, see McGregor (2014), pp. 461–3.
65 Eaton (2003) makes this move with regard to Titian’s _Rape of Europa_ to my mind successfully; but she does not just claim it, she argues for a sophisticated new reading of the painting in which its sexist contradictions and fantasising is laid bare. I do not see that such a reading could be made with regard to _Te Tamari No Atua_. Incidentally, Eaton’s ethical criticism of the _Rape of Europa_ is Collingwoodian in spirit (though there is no reason to impute influence): her criticism is that the painting expresses irrational emotions or attitudes in just the way that
say that it rather just 'presents' it. There is something to this: the painting is certainly no part of a campaign for the legalisation of paedophilia; it is not propaganda as, say Triumph des Willens is, and so not so clearly problematic. There is, however, a weaker but still strong sense in which the painting does endorse paedophilia: it presents it as unproblematic. Pahura's portrayal as sexually desirable is not undermined or critiqued; Gauguin betrays no guilt or conflict about it. This is already enough to be problematic; and it is in any case as much an endorsement of paedophilia as Saviour, by Carroll's brief account, is an endorsement of its moral attitude. (Lolita, by contrast, in representing all sides of Humbert's relation to Lolita, is no such implicit endorsement.)

A third response is to deny that Gauguin's attitude toward Pahura is immoral: Nancy Mowll Mathews (2001, ch. 11) points out that there would have been a lot of pressure on Gauguin from the Tahitian community to take a young wife, and so that judging Gauguin is at least not as obvious as it initially seems. One might also argue that different societies have different sexual mores. I am disinclined to get into this debate, though. Even if one could excuse Gauguin's taking a girl as a wife, there remains something extremely disturbing about the way in which Pahura is portrayed; again there is no hint of guilt or pity in the work, as you would expect there to be if Gauguin had been pressured into marrying. (And there is certainly no excuse for the attitude to Tehamana in Mano Tupapu.) And aside from this altogether, there is the invitation to the viewer to consider Gauguin as God, as he would have to be if Pahura were Mary, and Pahura's child Gauguin's. This assimilation is comparable to the assimilation of Hitler to Jesus in Carroll's imaginary Saviour, insofar as the smallness of all human virtue (especially Gauguin's) is insignificant as compared to God's infinite goodness. Carroll certainly thinks that this assimilation is morally objectionable (though for irrelevant reasons: v.s. n. 162), but Gauguin's assimilation is well known by the art community, and has obviously not dissuaded it of its judgement of the painting.

Finally, the moralist could respond by reminding us that the claim is that the badness of an emotion counts against the work, not that it counts so heavily that the work cannot still be a masterpiece. Perhaps the immorality of what these works express makes them worse, but to a sufficiently small extent that the works' other virtues still make them great. So Te Tamari No Atua is C-artistically bad insofar as it is paedophilic, but C-artistically good insofar as it highlights aspects of the Nativity – Mary's

I have argued the "Pathétique" does. Gaut's criticism of Drost's painting of Bathsheba at her bath (2007, pp. 14ff.) is Collingwoodian in the same way.
tiredness after the birth, for instance—normally downplayed in Gauguin’s artistic tra-
dition, and highlights the catholicism of Christianity by not presenting Mary as Eu-
ropean in race and culture.\footnote{Devereaux (1998) develops a response along these lines in connection with Riefenstahl’s \textit{Triumph des Willens}.}

We can test this response by imagining making \textit{Te Tamari No Atua}’s moral more palatable, and then seeing how our aesthetic reaction changes. Sibley’s scepticism of §1.1.1 does indeed have less traction here: we have much more to go on, in imagining an altered \textit{Te Tamari No Atua}, than we do in imagining \textit{Saviour}. However, Sibley’s scepticism still has plenty traction enough: It is extremely hard to change elements of an artwork without affecting the rest of it in unpredictable ways. We can imagine mistakes being corrected in a performance of a Beethoven sonata easily enough, but changing the moral outlook of a painting is a far bigger and deeper change than this, and is liable to have much greater and less predictable effects on other parts of the work. It is not enough to suggest that we just imaginatively ‘remove the paedophilia’ from \textit{Te Tamari No Atua}, and see whether it thus becomes better. For how are we to remove it? Are we to suppose that Gauguin portray Pahura/Mary as older? But that would introduce an element of dishonesty to the painting which, though not necessarily bad, might be perturbing in this particular case if it was done from a sense of guilt that was at odds with Gauguin’s immersing himself in Tahitian culture. It would also make the connection between Pahura and Mary weaker: for Mary was roughly Pahura’s age when she bore Jesus. Could we suppose instead that the Polynesian island in which Gauguin lived was like Tahiti in every way except that girls did not become sexually active as young? But how could its culture be different in only one way? Sexual mores do not arise in a vacuum, and are affected by, for instance, how aware of and interested in such notions as consent people are, and on the property and inheritance arrangements of the society. Further, even supposing that it is possible to imagine nineteenth-century Tahiti changed in this and only this way, this fact itself would change the island’s relationship to the West (both in Gauguin’s time and our own) and, again, to Mary’s Galilee; and this would both make the painting less shocking to Westerners and weaken its connection to the Nativity. All these changes would affect the meaning and so C-artistic value of \textit{Te Tamari No Atua}, perhaps massively. This is problematic for the moralist, because the changes are significant enough that they make prediction of the work’s new aesthetic properties difficult. At any rate, the onus
is clearly on moralist to show how we can predict the aesthetic properties and overall aesthetic value of *Tē Tamari No Atua*.

This might seem easily done. Not all moral differences are as big as that between being for and being against paedophilia. There could, for instance, be an artwork that portrays murder as really rather immoral, and another, otherwise identical, that portrays it as slightly worse. Could we not compare them C–artistically? And if we found ourselves responding differentially, would the only explanation of that not be that it is due to the relative merit of the moral attitudes expressed in the works?

It should first be noted that this response is in danger of returning us to the fantastical philosophising rejected in §1.1.1. The descriptions I have just given are very abstract, and so Sibley’s scepticism is legitimate for the reasons given above. However, even if this response is waived, there remains another problem that can be illustrated by attempting this comparison of incremental change in the case of *Tē Tamari No Atua*. For the suggestion that we imagine an artwork identical to *Tē Tamari No Atua* except that it portrays its paedophilia as just slightly less or more problematic is ridiculous: moral attitudes are not so fine-grained in this way. I cannot imagine what such a minor change would look like, and insofar as I can it seems to me a deceptively major change. For instance, perhaps we would consider Gauguin’s sin less if Pahura were a year older. Suppose then that she was a year older when Gauguin painted *Tē Tamari No Atua*. Is the painting now better?

The question is not even sensible: age is not precise in this context: *Tē Tamari No Atua* does not portray Pahura as being any precise age, we do not know exactly how old Mary was, etc. Even in imagined, perhaps more amenable cases, the suggestion is absurd. Does it involve referring to an antagonist as a “low-down good-for-nothin’ guy” rather than as a “low-down guy”? Portraying in a painting a devilish character with two-inch rather than three-inch horns? Appending a list of morally-valent claims to a novel? The addition of ‘good-for-nothin’ alters the rhythm of the sentence, alters the *type* of badness the antagonist exhibits, may alter how reliable we consider the narrator, etc.; the alteration in the length of the devil’s horns will affect the balance of the painting. One may disagree about how significant these non-moral alterations are; but we have at any rate seen that the onus is on those who think that such comparative work is helpful to show that it is so.

The same response can be made in the case of *American Psycho*, under the third interpretation of that novel I offered above. That interpretation, recall, is that Ellis is

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167 Gaut (2007, p. 171) considers this sort of alteration.
psychopathic but wallows in his psychopathy. Assuming this interpretation for the moment, we judge *American Psycho* to be psychopathic not just from the sheer fact that it represents psychopathy, but because of the length at which Ellis describes the murders and tortures, and the vividness with which he describes them. If we were to shorten and temper this, the work would (arguably) less express the immoral emotions it does, and we could discover whether or not it would be better. The reason I say it seems more likely that we can extract the bad emotions from the artwork in this case is that it looks like what we’re imagining doing is what editors do all the time: removing unnecessary material from a novel while retaining its C-artistic virtues. However, the plausibility is ephemeral. Even supposing that moral editing would C-artistically improve *American Psycho*, it is not clear that the reason it would be better edited has anything to with the badness of its emotions. It could well be, as I suggested above, that it would be improved because Ellis was to some extent incompetent, which explanation fits neatly into Collingwood’s account.\(^\text{168}\) Of course, perhaps *American Psycho* could be C-artistically improved just by its moral being improved: but this needs to be argued, not just stated. And so, at the end of all this, Collingwood’s immoralist position looks in rude health.

### 1.2.3 A Vicious Circle in Collingwood’s Theory?

An objection may arise at this point: that Collingwood’s thesis is viciously circular. The thesis is that those emotions that are inadequately expressed count against the C-artistic value of the artwork which expresses them, but that those emotions that are bad no matter how well expressed do not. I have offered examples of each kind of emotion, but there is no shortage of difficult cases, even those examples I have given can be argued over. I have assumed that Gauguin ‘just does’ have the paedophiliac emotions that he has. But perhaps it is rather a manifestation of imperfectly understood emotions, and perhaps if Gauguin were to try harder to express what in fact manifested itself as paedophilia its nature would appear totally different, and no longer bad. Or

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\(^\text{168}\) Interestingly, *Don Quixote* was given precisely this treatment in a 1954 English translation (this according to Russell (1969), p. 313). What was objectionable in *Don Quixote* was what the (unnamed by Russell) translator referred to as “unfeeling horseplay” (the translator’s words, quoted *ibid.*). Nietzsche also comments on this feature of the work, saying that “today we read the entire *Don Quixote* with a bitter taste on our tongue, almost with anguish” (1887, Second Treatise, §6).
perhaps not. It seems that I can say whatever I wish, because I have offered no way of distinguishing poorly expressed from just immoral emotions apart from judging whether they affect or fail to affect the quality of the artwork. But why the expression of certain emotions in an artwork C-artistically counts against the artwork, when the expression of others doesn’t, is just what the distinction between bad and poorly-expressed emotion was supposed to explain. This, it seems, is surely a vicious circle.

Three independent but consistent responses can be made. The first is that an artwork which expresses an emotion well is unlike an artwork that expresses one poorly beyond the bare fact that it is better. It has a certain clarity and well-definedness about it, every part looks to be in its right place, we can discern a good reason for every decision the artist made. This cannot be proven in a philosophy paper, of course: it is a matter of creating, criticising and attending to art. As such, the response thus cannot do much work here, but we should not expect a debate in the philosophy of art to be settleable without close consideration of art itself. In any case, the onus is as much on the opponent to show that there is nothing correlating to the better expression of emotion in art as it is for me to show that there is something that so correlates. But we can leave this response only suggested here, as there are other ways of showing that Collingwood’s account is not circular.

We can also (this is the second response) do so by pointing out that the creation and criticism of art is historical, and that factors can emerge over time which help us distinguish between poorly-expressed and just bad emotions. The twenty-four-year-old Thom Yorke took what he expressed in ‘Creep’ to be just his emotions, as clear as any might be (this at any rate is my reading of the song); but in retrospect that we can see that the obsession with one’s social status and the objectifying notion that women are like angels whose perfect souls can be known from a glance is immature. It is partly because Yorke grew out of these attitudes in his later work that we can see that they are confused. This case is unlike Gauguin’s, who was a paedophile until his death. This is not proof that Gauguin’s emotions just were what they were: many emotions are never clarified. But it is evidence that they were.

The final response is that emotions involve beliefs which are to a greater or lesser extent clearly held, and this can be determined independently of any artwork. Remember (ch. 2, §2) that ‘emotion,’ for Collingwood, is cognitively rich. No-one is ‘just’ racist, for instance: racist worldviews are founded on and involve beliefs about certain people’s moral character, intelligence, danger to one’s community and suchlike. If these
beliefs are inchoate, so will be the worldview that they comprise; and so, predicts Collingwood’s theory, will the art that expresses them. We can then engage critically with the work, and if we find that the work nonetheless excellent, then this puts pressure on Collingwood’s thesis.

These considerations do not constitute a simple test by which to determine whether any given emotion is confused or just bad, or whether an artwork is a good expression of a bad emotion or just a poor expression, but nor should they. Introspection and art criticism are both hard. All I claim of my responses is that they show that Collingwood’s position is not circular, because there are ways that it can be tested.

1.3 Summary

In this first half of this chapter, we have pitted Collingwood’s ‘immoralism’ against the ‘moralism’ represented primarily by Scruton. We saw that Collingwood’s theory begins to look preferable to the moralist alternative in §1.1 because it can account for the moral and C-artistic failing of the “Pathétique” better than the moralist can. Scruton’s criticism, I allowed, is important and insightful; but it looks to be unCollingwoodian. On closer inspection, though, we saw that the best interpretation of it is Collingwoodian. Then, in §1.2, we saw that the moralist is unable to concoct any other convincing example of an artwork that is aesthetically deficient for expressing well an immoral emotion.

The argument of §1.2 was rather more modest than that of §1.1. In §1.1, the superiority of Collingwood’s account was demonstrated; but in §1.2, all that was shown was that one argument against Collingwood’s theory fails. We did not foreclose the possibility that a better example than the ones we have considered could emerge, nor less did we consider any entirely other objections.

Why is §1.1 more ambitious than §1.2? Well, if Collingwood is right that C-art is the expression of emotion, then when we judge the “Pathétique,” our judgement is at the same time moral and C-artistic. To express one’s emotions is a (the) C-artistic activity, and this is itself a moral success, a way of living the good life; when we judge an artwork to have expressed emotion well, we do not have to then also ask whether it therefore succeeds C-artistically, because we have already answered the question. But if Collingwood is right, then this is unlike our judgement of the morality of Te Tamari No Atua. Expressing an (im)moral emotion was not Gauguin’s immediately C-artistic
act in painting *Te Tamari No Atua*. Immediately and *qua* C-artist, he was only expressing emotion. So, if we want to know whether good expression of an immoral emotion is C-artistically deleterious, we have to plug that gap somehow, and the difficulty of closing this gap that Sibley’s scepticism revealed explains why we are unable to speak confidently about the C-artistic import of the moral of what an artwork expresses: it cannot be closed to *either* the support *or* the detriment of Collingwood’s theory.

This modesty might seem frustrating, to lead to a grey scepticism; but actually it is grist to Collingwood’s mill. For the only even *prima facie* positive reason to adopt the moralist position was Scruton’s, which as we saw was in the end no reason at all. Absent that, there is no reason to so much as doubt Collingwood’s immoralist position, with the support it inherits from the general plausibility of his theory of art of which it is a part.

There are other positive *prima facie* reasons to adopt the moralist position than Scruton’s criticism of Tchaikovsky, though. Ironically, they are to be found in *PA*. I will turn to them now.

2. UnCollingwoodian Passages in

*The Principles of Art*

Collingwood says three things in *PA* that seem to contradict his core claim that only the goodness of the expression of emotion, not that emotion’s moral worth, is relevant to C-artistic evaluation. He says (1) that only an artist with “deep and powerful” emotions can create great art (p. 279), (2) that an “important subject-matter” is requisite for art to be good (p. 332), and (3) that the artist has at least some obligation to express emotions she shares with others in her society (ch. XIV, §3). What are we to make of these claims? Are they to be dismissed as rhetorical flourishes? Do they suggest challenges to Collingwood’s philosophy that cut deeper than the objections we have so far considered? Or can we square them with his theory, and by so doing reach a fuller and deeper understanding of his theory of art?
2.1 Deep and Powerful Emotions

Collingwood writes on p. 279 of PA that “an artist who is never furnished, independently of being an artist, with deep and powerful emotions will never produce anything except shallow and frivolous works of art.” This perhaps seems plausible enough,169 but it appears to contradict, for instance, the following passage:

[T]he poet’s difference from his audience lies in the fact that, though both do exactly the same thing, namely express this particular emotion in these particular words, the poet is a man who can solve for himself the problem of expressing it, whereas the audience can express it only when the poet has shown them how. The poet is not singular either in his having that emotion or in his power of expressing it; he is singular in his ability to take the initiative in expressing what all feel, and all can express.

PA, p. 119

It is clear from this passage that Collingwood thinks that the poet (and so the artist more generally) does not have any emotions any more deep and powerful than his audience: the passage is explicit that the poet is not singular in having any particular emotion. The claim that only someone with “deep and powerful” emotions can create art also looks to be in tension with the overall ‘mood’ of the book, which continually affirms that the artist is just a normal person, trying to do a job as well as she can (e.g., pp. 116-7, 312), which repeatedly attacks the individualist Romantic notion of the great artist (e.g., pp. 315-8), and which again and again stresses that art shares a lot with much – for example, language – that is quotidian and shared by everyone (“art [is] a thread running all through the fabric of the mind’s activity” (EPM, p. 35)).170 None of

169 And it is also something he claimed in his very early lecture on Ruskin (1922, p. 33): “Art is expression, and it cannot arise until men have something to express. When you feel so strongly about something – the joys and sorrows of your domestic or national life: the things you see round you: your religious beliefs, and so on – that you must at all costs express your feelings, then art is born.” Relatedly (if more obviously neutral relative to the present discussion), see his ‘Form and Content in Art’ (1929), in which he argues that art requires the artist to be interested in their subject-matter, to “have a sense of having something to say” (p. 344).

170 This sentiment has proponents beyond Collingwood. Forsyth (2013, p. 5), for instance, writes that “[a] poet is somebody who expressed his thoughts, however commonplace they may be, exquisitely. That is the one and only difference between the poet and everybody else.”
this sits easily with the notion that the artist is strongly separate from the rest of mankind in the way she would be by having peculiarly ‘deep and powerful’ emotions.

However, there is certainly something to the thought. It is for instance surely part of why Beethoven’s Ninth is such a masterpiece that the emotions we find in it are so deep and powerful. And if it is just a rhetorical mistake on Collingwood’s part, it is one he appears to have made more than once: he writes in EPM that “the beauty of a comic epigram, however perfect, is not only the beauty of a small thing compared with the Iliad, but is a lesser as well as a different beauty” (p. 77), and it is natural to think (although Collingwood does not expand on the point) that the difference lies in the depth and power of the emotions of the Iliad relative to those of a comic epigram. But what might he mean by the phrase?

His claim occurs in the context of a discussion of what role art can play in creating a better political system. Collingwood considers the battle-cry, “no artist can produce a fine work of art whose subject-matter he does not take seriously” (p. 279), as a reaction, by people keen to stress the political efficaciousness of art, against the notion that “what makes a work of art is not its subject-matter, but its technical qualities… a genuine artist should be quite indifferent to his subject-matter” (ibid.). He sympathetically interprets this claim, that ‘the artist must treat his subject-matter seriously if he is to create great art,’ as equivalent to his thesis that ‘the emotions an artist expresses in his artwork must pre-exist that artwork (albeit in unexpressed form) if that artwork is to be great.’ (They do not look equivalent as I have stated them, but I am taking the battle-cry out of context.) It is a corollary of this, Collingwood then goes on to say, that only people who, independently of being artists, have deep and powerful emotions can create great art. But ‘it is necessary that an artwork is created by someone with deep and powerful emotions, and expresses these emotions, if it is to be great’ and ‘it is necessary that an artwork is created by someone whose emotions that are expressed in that artwork pre-exist their expression in it, if it is to be great’ are hardly corollaries. For it looks as if it is not only deep and powerful emotions which pre-exist expression in art. It looks in fact as if all emotions pre-exist their expression in art (if they are expressed in art at all), except for those few emotions which arise in the process of creating art (on which v.i. ch. 4, §3). There is no harm in Collingwood claiming that those emotions that do not pre-exist their expression in art cannot lead to great art, but it is rather an over-reaction to do so by calling every other emotion deep and powerful.
I reluctantly submit that Collingwood is mistaken in saying that all emotions which pre-exist their expression in an artwork are deep and powerful. I cannot see any way in which it can be made both intrinsically plausible and a corollary of its ostensible antecedent. However, Collingwood does believe that great art must be born of deep and powerful emotions, and what Collingwood means by this is consistent both with his theory and a reasonable interpretation of the phrase ‘deep and powerful.’ I will give this interpretation now, abandoning the claim that all emotions which pre-exist their expression in an artwork are deep and powerful, but retaining the close connection between ‘deep and powerful’ emotions and all emotions that pre-exist expression in art; this will hopefully persuade the reader that the two categories are similar enough that Collingwood’s mistake is understandable.

This interpretation is that any of us may have deep and powerful emotions, so long as we fully express our emotions. That is, there really are deep and powerful emotions, and the adjectives are not just shorthand for talking about the better and worse expression of emotions which are not ‘in themselves’ profound or trivial, deep or shallow; but these emotions may be had by anyone, not just those with a certain psychological complexion. Neither, under this interpretation, does Collingwood claim that every emotion is deep and powerful, once fully expressed. We do not need to commit Collingwood to the claim that every time we feel anger at stubbing our toe, or disappointment at the grocer’s being out of potatoes, we feel an emotion that can be deep and powerful, if we express it fully. (Neither do we need to commit him to the denial of this claim, although his remarks on p. 279 of _P4_ suggest that he would deny it.) The claim is rather that at least some emotions can be deep and powerful, but that even those emotions which can be deep and powerful will not be so unless they are expressed fully. Thus it is not the case that there are certain people who, in general, feel more deeply or powerfully than other people, except insofar as some people, in general, express their emotions more fully than other people. The ‘except’ is important. Collingwood thinks that some people systematically ‘sterilise’ their sensa by ignoring the emotional charges on them (pp. 162–3; see also pp. 244–6, in which he claims that dress can encourage or discourage the expression of certain emotions). According to this reading, then, there are not certain people, such as artists, who are gifted by God with powerful emotions or something of this sort; there are only people who approach the business of the expression of emotion with a greater or lesser earnestness and seriousness; those who are more earnest find themselves able to plumb depths of emotional intensity denied those who shirk from the task. And, to my mind, to say that it is only
these latter who can create great art, work that is not “shallow and frivolous” (p. 279), is both plausible and enlightening.

2.2 Important Subject Matter

It is compatible with all of this, but does not follow from it, that some people’s lives are so without the bases of deep and powerful emotions (conflict, political conviction, hardship or whatever the bases may be) that they only rarely feel emotions that can even possibly be deep or powerful, and that some people’s lives are rich with these bases. Collingwood is not neutral on this matter: in fact he explicitly claims that that great art requires an important subject matter. I will consider now what he might mean by this. He writes:

Writers to-day are beginning to realize that important literature cannot be written without an important subject-matter... the subject-matter is the point at which the audience’s collaboration can fertilize the writer’s work.

_P4_, p. 332

The natural context-free reading of this quotation is that ‘important’ means something like, ‘important because it affects a lot of people’s lives’ (wars and revolutions being archetypal examples), and ‘subject-matter’ means something like ‘the events, people, places, etc. in the world which the literary work is directly about.’ This reading is both unCollingwoodian and manifestly false. The reading’s falsity is plain: it will suffice to mention _Ulysses_ and _Waiting for Godot_, whose subject-matter (the peregrinations of a newspaperman; the waiting of two friends for a third person) is hardly important in the sense just sketched. And if one were to extend the requirement to other arts, in line with Collingwood’s ambition that his theory be general over the arts, it would fare even worse: consider any of Cézanne’s still lifes, or art without a subject-matter. The reading is unCollingwoodian first because it is not the sort of philistinism he ever commits, second because it would make the claim the only reference to a restriction of subject-matter in the work, and most importantly because it imposes a strong curb on the artist’s freedom that Collingwood is elsewhere at pains to stress cannot be curbed by consideration of what one should express, as we have seen.

This, then, is clearly not a reading with which we can rest content. Collingwood’s remarks admit of another interpretation. He cites Louis MacNeice’s ‘Subject in Modern Poetry’ (1937) in this discussion, and our interpretation will be aided if we turn to
this article, which is broadly about the importance of subject-matter in literature.\textsuperscript{171} Immediately our first interpretation looks unlikely, because MacNeice’s opponent is not Joyce or Beckett, who write about trivia, but with the “literary self-containedness” of the “Pure Artist” who creates “Art for Art’s Sake”.\textsuperscript{172} “Look at me! I can make a work of art out of anything, look at my mastery of form!—this seems to me a thoroughly unsound attitude.”\textsuperscript{73} Against this artist, he takes the side of those who “are writing about things again”.\textsuperscript{174} And, explicitly aligning superficially trivial things with the kinds of things he wants to defend as important subject-matter, he writes, “Not only the muck and wind of existence should be faced but also the prose of existence, the utilities”;\textsuperscript{175} and, later:

pylons and gasometers [in literature] are not merely décor. The modern poet is very conscious that he is writing in and of an industrial epoch and that what expresses itself visibly in pylons and gasometers is the same force that causes the discontent and discomfort of the modern individual[.]

p. 156

The opposition, then, is not between those whose subject is ‘trivia’ and those whose subject is ‘matters of consequence’, but between those whose subject is relevant to people’s lives, and those whose subject is merely an excuse for the artist to demonstrate her artistic prowess. This account of importance in subject-matter is much more in line with what we would expect Collingwood to say about subject-matter, and fits well with what Collingwood actually says on pp. 332–3 of \textit{PA}. But a bit more work needs to be done. I have said that art with an important subject-matter is that which ‘is relevant to people’s lives’—but this is not a perspicuous phrase, and MacNeice does not elucidate it. One thread going through his paper is that important subject-matter is the world as the artist lives it (see, e.g., p. 147); another possibility is that it is that from

\textsuperscript{171} MacNeice uses the term ‘poetry.’ This term was at the time MacNeice and Collingwood were writing synonymous with literature, and refers to (what we would call) ‘high-brow’ poetry and literature, or perhaps to what I am calling C-art. (The \textit{OED} gives a definition of poetry as “imaginative or creative literature in general” (\textit{OED Online} (2014)).) I will use the word literature, because this definition of ‘poetry’ is (as the \textit{OED} notes) obsolete.

\textsuperscript{172} MacNeice (1937), p. 144.

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 145

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 144 (italics in original).

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Ibid.}
which we can learn a richer or healthier emotional life (MacNeice quotes Auden here: “There must be... art which shall teach man to unlearn hatred and learn love”). At another point again he suggests that the artist who adheres to the doctrine of art for art’s sake, insofar as he accepts the doctrine, does not properly appreciate ‘Otherness’ “his love is a private luxury, his beloved a temporary piece of furniture”. By contrast, as is partly explicit on pp. 156-8, the artist with the correct attitude toward subject-matter is concerned to appreciate and respect other people’s status as agents or subjects; they are “ends in themselves and must not be degraded into tapestried figures... or valets”. Finally, he writes on p. 158 that “Every man lives in a contemporary context which is of value and interest. That is the life which, directly or indirectly, he should write about.” The translation of these words of MacNeice into Collingwoodian terminology, it is clear from the context (wiz., PA, pp. 329ff), is that the artist’s obligation is to express those emotions which come from that life he shares with others; to express the emotions he feels in response to the world which he occupies along with others. It is those emotions (and their sensa) that are the subject-matter of art, and they are important when they are shared. Both Collingwood and MacNeice are at pains to insist that for a subject-matter to be important, it has to matter to more than just the artist. This brings us to the third claim Collingwood makes which appears to contradict or alloy the rest of his theory.

2.3 Shared Emotions

Collingwood insists that the artist express not just her own emotions, but those emotions which she shares with her society (see esp. ch. XIV, esp. §§5-6, 9; pp. 331-3). This looks to be in tension with Collingwood’s claim that whether an artwork is the expression of emotion is the only criterion of its C-artistic value; but also with his claim that one cannot know, in advance of the expression of it, what emotion it is that one is expressing (p. 115): if one can’t know what it is, one can’t know whether it is shared with others. Collingwood’s way of putting the thought that the artist has to express the emotions of her society is perhaps infelicitous. He vacillates between claiming that art is liable to be C-artistically better if the artist expresses the emotions she shares with her society (e.g., pp. 311-2), and claiming that she is only a C-artist if she does so

176 Quoted ibid., p. 149.
177 Ibid., p. 157.
178 Ibid.
(e.g., p. 313). There is some truth in each reading. The truth in the latter reading is seen when it is remembered that for Collingwood, it is impossible to express emotions which are only one’s own. What emotions you can feel is constrained by the dress you wear, the language you speak, and so on: in ch. XIV, §7, Collingwood adds to this list the artistic tradition you inherit. This, like clothes and language, is shared to a greater or lesser extent by others, and so what you express will be shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by others in that tradition.\footnote{I read Wittgenstein’s argument about the impossibility of ‘private language’ as concordant with Collingwood’s claim here, but we will not go into the connection now. See Hughes-Warrington (2003), pp. 82-90.} The truth in the former reading is this: Collingwood’s initial concern is that there are people who are striving to express their emotions regardless of whether anyone shares these emotions or understands the artist’s work, and that these people, by striving after this goal, are working under beliefs inimical to the creation of good art. If, however, as per the above argument, this goal is literally unreachable, then it seems that no matter what the artists do or believe, they will be expressing emotions – if they express any emotions at all – that they share with others. Now, Collingwood is not merely pedantically telling artists under this misapprehension that strictly, they are not doing what they take themselves to be doing. He believes that their art is the worse for their confusion (p. 324). How can this be? The answer is that being honest with oneself (i.e., expressing one’s emotions) is hard, and it is hard to know when one has succeeded. Thus it is wise, first, to not attempt to express emotions unaided; and second, to open one’s attempts to the criticism of others.

We have seen this before, briefly, in ch. 1, §2.4, but we will consider it more carefully now. Although our emotions are shared by others, we can still express emotions relatively idiosyncratic to us, and set ourselves somewhat apart from others; the more we do so, though, the harder our task is. To be sure, my strangest idiosyncrasy will not be mine alone: but it can still be very rare, and have little in common with those emotions I have seen expressed. The rarer it is, the more I am faced with something which I do not have the imaginative resources to understand. Or to put the thought in more technical Collingwoodian terms: sensa (and their emotional charges) are converted to ideas, but it is not always obvious which idea is the counterpart in the realm of imagination to a particular sensum; and similarly, it is not always obvious what more precise idea is the counterpart, at a more refined level of imagination, of an idea at a more basic level of imagination. The sensa I have of the window beside me I convert into
my ideas of the window, window-pane, grout, paint, etc.; but the conversions are helped by other people, who, for example, tell me the function of grout or tell me the history of that style of window. All this gives me a clearer understanding of the window. As with windows, so with art: if the artist attempts to express emotions which she has never seen dealt with before, she is liable to do the job badly, just as someone trying to get a clear idea of a window unaided is liable to do the job badly. (Collingwood nowhere says that it is impossible: just hard.)

But Collingwood is not asking the artist not to express idiosyncratic emotions. This request is in fact impossible: Collingwood has elsewhere insisted, as we have seen (ch. 1), that artists cannot choose which emotions to express, and he has not forgotten this here. The artist’s obligation is at an earlier stage: to live in such a way that one’s experience is close to others’.

[I]t is not so much a question of the author’s ‘choosing’ a subject; it is a question rather of his letting a subject choose him: I mean, a question of his spontaneously sharing the interest which people around him feel in a certain subject, and allowing that interest to determine what he writes.

p. 332

It is not the case that one must share emotions and interests with as many other people as possible. There is some reason to have emotions and interests which are widely shared, just because the more people share an emotion, the better expressed it can, ceteris paribus, be. This is what Collingwood has in mind when he says that it is important that English painters and literary authors deal with subjects that concern “English people, or some large and important section of them” (p. 333; see also p. 331).

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180 Perhaps I am making heavy weather of this. Perhaps it is self-evident that traditions of doing a certain thing give practitioners all sorts of resources to do those things.

181 In fact, Collingwood talks about subjects that English people (or some section) “want to see painted” (p. 333). This locution makes it sound like Collingwood has confused art with entertainment: but pp. 331-2 disproves this suspicion. Collingwood means ‘want’ in the sense that people want, whether or not they know or accept it, things that are very difficult and unpleasant but good for them: strenuous exercise, hard truths, to go on pilgrimage, etc. As Springsteen puts it, “You can’t conform to the formula of always giving the audience what it wants, or you’re killing yourself and you’re killing the audience. Because they don’t really want it either. Just because they respond to something doesn’t mean they want it.” (Quoted in Marsh (1981) and, as an epigraph to a chapter (thus indicating agreement), Gracyk (1996).)
However, the correlation between how widely shared an emotion is and how well it is expressed need not be very strong, and Collingwood elsewhere allows that one’s society “may consist only of a few friends” (p. 313).\textsuperscript{182} So Collingwood is not saying that there is no room in art for mavericks such as Satie or Scriabin, only that by pursuing such esoteric paths they are less certain of success. And this is plausible; indeed, it underlines, rather than undermines, the genius of these artists.\textsuperscript{183}

The difficulty of expressing an emotion previously only expressed very poorly is one reason why the emotions the artist should express in her art should be shared by others. There is a second, closely related, reason: knowing whether one has expressed an emotion is hard, just as expressing it is hard, and so one should open one’s (ostensible) expression to others’ criticism, in order that one’s audience may force one to see what one has been unable to see, or agree that one has expressed oneself as one had believed. When the artist sees, through her audience’s criticism of her offering, that she has not expressed her emotions as she thought she had, then she can do something about it.

\[\text{[P]}\text{robably no artist has ever been so conceited as to be wholly taken in by his own pretence. Unless he sees his own proclamation, ‘This is good’, echoed on the faces of his audience—Yes, that is good—he wonders whether he was speaking the truth or not. He thought he had enjoyed and recorded a genuine aesthetic experience, but has he? Was he suffering from a corruption of consciousness? Has his audience judged him better than he judged himself?}\]

\hspace{1cm} \text{p. 314}

The artist who misunderstands her task in a Romantic vein is liable to ignore her audience on the arrogant grounds that the audience is not qualified to judge whether she has expressed her emotions. This is in turn putatively supported by the claim that the emotion expressed by an artwork is had only by the creator of that artwork, and that only someone who has the emotion expressed by an artwork is competent to judge

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\textsuperscript{182} One might think that there is a more interesting correlation here: perhaps the goodness of the ‘timelessness’ of great art is related to the fact that it expresses the emotions of so many people – in the case of the \textit{Iliad}, people from every culture from Ancient Greece to modern Britain (see Hume (1757)). I am not sure that Collingwood has the theoretical resources to say that this sort of universality or timelessness is or indicates C-artistic merit, but neither am I inclined to think that he needs to: I will happily abandon the claim that there is any philosophically interesting corollary. But this is orthogonal.

\textsuperscript{183} Ridley (2013, pp. 10–1) makes a similar point.
whether the artwork expressed it well or badly. Collingwood accepts this last point (see pp. 314-5), but insists that the emotion expressed by an artwork is not had only by the artist, and so that the audience is qualified to judge the artwork. This is not to say that everyone is able to judge every artwork: not every emotion is had by everyone or can be had by anyone. It is just to insist that no emotion is had by only one person.

This, then, is the fuller explanation of Collingwood's insistence that the artist express emotions shared with others, and why this insistence is not at odds with the rest of his theory: expressing our emotions is hard, and knowing whether we have done so is hard. Our own powers of expression and self-criticism are not so perfect that we need no help. And so here, as in our discussion of the other two prima facie unCollingwoodian claims found in Pa, we can conclude that this prima facie unCollingwoodian claim not only is consistent with his claim that C-art is the expression of emotion, and C-artistically valuable only insofar as it does this, but reveals the richness of that conception.

3. Conclusion

We have seen, then, that the prima facie plausible objections to Collingwood's theory of art that cluster around the thought that the theory is blind to the importance of ethics to art fail. Collingwood can account for the various moralistic C-artistic impulses we have. It can do justice first to Scruton's criticism of Tchaikovsky's “Pathétique” for its ghoulishness, etc., as we saw in §1; and as we saw in §2, it can also do justice to the demands that the artist be furnished with 'deep and powerful emotions, that art have an important subject matter, and that art express common emotions. We can conclude, then, that with regard to the C-artistic relevance of the moral expressed by an artwork, Collingwood's theory appears to be in good shape.
Unworthy Emotion?
Finally, in this chapter we will consider a last consequence of Collingwood’s theory that looks objectionable: according to his theory, what we might call delight or pleasure has no intrinsic C-artistic value. The chapter is structured as follows: First, I will offer a specific account of ‘delight,’ while giving a particularly good defence of its value, namely the one given (independently) by Marcel Proust and David Foster Wallace (§1). This specific account of ‘delight’ is not that every species of delight or pleasure is C-artistically valuable, so I will refer to that delight that Proust and Wallace think is C-artistically valuable as ‘C-artistic delight.’ I will then (§2) argue that although Proust and Wallace have their finger on something important, their articulation of that ‘something important’ is inferior to Collingwood’s, who, as will be made explicit in this chapter, does not so much disagree that ‘C-artistic delight’ is important as subsume its value under the value of the expression of emotion: C-artistic delight is intrinsically C-artistically valuable only insofar as it furthers the expression of emotion, as Collingwood uses that phrase.

However, although this way of incorporating C-artistic delight into an aesthetic theory is superior to Proust and Wallace’s, it is still liable to appear to give implausibly short shrift to something widely held to be centrally valuable to art. That Proust and Wallace’s articulation of the delight we take in art and that delight’s value is inadequate does not prove that a better articulation may be developed. If Collingwood is only able to deny our intuition concerning the value of delight, and not also in some way incorporate it into his theory, then he will be constantly looking over his shoulder, awaiting an account of delight that will refute him. Fortunately, Collingwood is able to do more than just deny C-artistic value to delight, and in §3 we will consider some ‘conciliatory’ aspects of Collingwood’s theory that, I will argue, allow delight (not quite Proust and
Wallace’s ‘C-artistic delight’) a very close connection with that expression of emotion that is intrinsically C-artistically valuable, and so save his theory from this *prima facie* counter-intuitiveness. (If you do not share the intuition that delight is C-artistically valuable, then you can simply read this chapter as an argument for giving delight a more prominent place in an account of the value of C-art.)

1. The Value of Delight Defended

That something like delight, pleasure or enjoyment is at or near the core of art is perhaps one of the most widely-held attitudes concerning art. Consider even ‘beauty,’ perhaps the most common term in artistic discourse, and its close connection with delight. It seems a not at all philistine explanation (though of course an incomplete one) of the C-artistic goodness of, say, Beethoven’s Eighth Symphony or Cage’s *Sonatas and Interludes* that they delight us or give us pleasure. Accordingly, Collingwood should be able to do justice to this ‘pleasure’ or ‘delight,’ to give it a royal place in his philosophy. But in fact he does no such thing. Instead, he categorically denies any C-artistic value whatsoever to delight. This looks like trouble for his theory, and this chapter will investigate just how much trouble it is. This section will articulate a particularly good account of how we should think about delight and why we should think it intrinsically C-artistically valuable, after Proust and Wallace. I will then argue (§2) that Collingwood’s account is superior.

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184 I will not give a headcount: everyone from Aristotle (*Poetics*) to Kant (*Critique of Judgement*) to Levinson (1992) has a place for it. Its centrality is indicated by the fact that even the infa
dously hard-nosed Adorno feels the need to give it some sort of place in his theory (*1970/1997/2013*, esp. chs. 3, 5).

185 Nehamas (2007), who offers the best general account and history of ‘beauty’ of which I am aware, treats it as uncontroversial that beauty *always* has a close connection to something like pleasure (see esp. p. 25); and Scruton (2009) lists as the first of his platitudes that every theory of beauty must meet that “Beauty pleases us.” (p. 5) Again, Mothersill (1985, p. 347) defines beauty as that which “cause[s] pleasure in virtue of its aesthetic properties”.

186 Their attitudes are not idiosyncratic. Levinson (1992), for instance, has a similar account. See also, e.g., Nietzsche’s praise of Goethe’s “spreading a Homeric light and glory over all things” (*1889/1974*, §370). (For discussion of Nietzsche’s understanding of art as transfigurative in this way, see Ridley (2010).)
First, though, a brief note on terminology. Despite delight’s historical connection to beauty, which is so close that one might be forgiven for thinking that in discussing one we are almost discussing the other, I will for simplicity’s sake leave the connection unmade. I will use the term ‘beauty,’ but only stipulatively as the objective side of that of which delight is the subjective side.\textsuperscript{187}

It is time then to turn to Proust and Wallace’s account of delight. The account is found first in Proust’s essay on Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin, in his posthumous \textit{Contre Sainte-Beuve}. (Proust does not explicitly offer this account as an account of the delight of art, but I follow Wollheim in so reading it. (Actually, Wollheim takes it as an account of the \textit{visual} delight\textsuperscript{188} but I take it that this is simply because Wollheim’s discussion is in a book about painting, and that the account readily generalises. The discussion of Wallace further below indicates how I think it does so.])

Let us imagine a young man… sitting in a dining-room at that dreary, daily moment when the midday meal has been eaten but is still not completely cleared away… [H]e eyes with discomfort [malaise] and boredom [ennui], with a sensation approaching nausea [nausée], feelings bordering on despair [spleen], the pushed-back table-cloth dangling on the floor and a knife still lying beside the remains of an oozing, unappetising cutlet. […]

Execlating the ugliness [laideur] of his surroundings, and ashamed of having spent a quarter of an hour in finding them, not disgraceful [pas la bonte], but disgusting [dégoût] and somehow enthralling [comme la fascination], he… goes to the Louvre. […]

If I knew that young man… I would halt him before the Chardins. And when he stood amazed by this painting of what he had called commonplace, this appesenting painting of a way of life he had considered vapid [insipide]… I would say to him: So you are glad to be here? But really you have seen nothing more than a well-to-do tradesman’s wife pointing over to her daughter where she had made mistakes in her woolwork (\textit{La Mère laborieuse}) [and similarly Chardinesque scenes].

If this now strikes you as beautiful to the eye, it is because Chardin found it beautiful to paint; and he found it beautiful to paint because he thought it beautiful to the eye.

\textsuperscript{187} The two concepts may not be quite so closely related, and insofar as they come apart, it is to delight that we will to hew. Nehamas (2007), for instance, argues that beauty does not underlie delight so much as it \textit{promises} it. I do not offer my understanding of beauty as an alternative to Nehamas’. Collingwood, too, treats of the concepts separately: he discusses ‘beauty’ in \textit{PA}, ch. II, §6, and primarily discusses the various species of ‘delight’ or ‘enjoyment’ in ch. V.

\textsuperscript{188} Wollheim, \textit{Painting as an Art} (1987).
The pleasure \textit{[plaisir]} you get from his painting of a room where a woman sits sewing... is the pleasure—seized on the wing, redeemed from the transient, ascertained, pondered, perpetuated—that he got from the sight of a sideboard... Your pleasure and his are so inseparable one from the other that if he had not been able to rely on the first and had wanted to feel and convey the second, you would not be able to rely on the second and would inevitably turn your back on the first. You already experienced it subconsciously \textit{[inconscientement]}, this pleasure one gets from the sight of everyday scenes and inanimate objects, otherwise it would not have risen in your heart when Chardin summoned it in his ringing, commanding accents. Your consciousness was too sluggish to reach down to it. It had to wait for Chardin to come and lay hold on it and hoist it to the level of your conscious mind. Then you knew it, and for the first time knew it as enjoyment \textit{[goutte]}. If you can say to yourself when looking at a Chardin: This is home-like \textit{[intime]}, this is comfortable \textit{[confortable]}, this is living \textit{[vivant]}, like a kitchen, you will say to yourself, walking around a kitchen: This is singular \textit{[curieux]}, this is grand \textit{[grand]}, this is beautiful \textit{[beau]}, like a Chardin.

There is a lot happening here. First, Proust vacillates, as I have, between different terms: in his case, ‘pleasure’ and ‘enjoyment.’ We will return to this ambiguity, but these triangulating terms will suffice for now. More pressingly, note that the account Proust gives is clearly transfigurative. The young man, prior to his encounter with Chardin, is repelled by the dining room. On encountering the Chardins, he sees similar scenes in a kinder light, one under which such a scene is “home-like,” “comfortable,” “living” (\textit{vivant}, “full of life” in Wollheim’s translation\textsuperscript{189}). There is value in seeing things anew in this way, and delight in it—how exactly are they related?

The first thing to note is the specificity of the delight. Proust is defending the thought that some sort of delight is an intrinsic C-artistic value, but not \textit{any} delight. Three sorts of delight are excluded. The first is what Scruton calls ‘sensory pleasure.’\textsuperscript{190} The delight that is a candidate C-artistic value is rather (to use Scruton’s terminology again) ‘intentional,’ and “proceeds from an act of understanding: not a sensory gratification of the subject but a pleasing interest in an object. Such intentional pleasures have a cognitive dimension: ...their primary focus is not the feeling of pleasure itself, but the object that gives rise to it.”\textsuperscript{191} Proust talks of very bodily feelings such as ‘nausea’

\footnotetext{189}{Wollheim \textit{(op. cit.}, p. 99).}
\footnotetext{190}{In his \textit{Beauty}(2009), pp. 184–5.}
\footnotetext{191}{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 185.}
and ‘goûte,’ to be sure; but more significant are the cognitively rich feelings, such as
‘boredom,’ ‘enthrallment’ and the subjective side of ‘curieux.’ (Actually, whether Proust
excludes this sort of pleasure does not, to me, seem absolutely certain from the passage;
but it is consistent with what he says, and it is indubitable that Wallace excludes this
sort of pleasure, as we will see.)

The second sort of delight Proust excludes is delight that is adventitious to the
object. This means, first, that the delight in which he is interested is rather of the object
‘in itself’ or ‘for its own sake;’ it is what has traditionally been called disinterested. It
second means that the delight cannot be in the intentionally or contextually impover-
ished or misunderstood art object. The reason for this is clear enough: to take delight
in a Chardin because, for instance, of a conceited pleasure in one’s goûte, or because one
reads it as a commentary on late capitalism, is hardly to take a pleasure in the Chardin
at all. If we adopt a Collingwoodian general theory of art, we can say something more
precise: it is not to take delight in the Chardin as the communicative expression it is,
and so not to take delight in it qua C-art. (As adopting a Collingwoodian framework
in this regard does not prejudice our present inquiry against Proust’s position, I do not
hesitate to do so.)

The third sort of delight Proust excludes is non-transfigurative delight, viz., delight
that is just delight in what is represented, even if this delight is intentional. This is
apparent by when he writes that “He is a poor-spirited artist—artist at any rate by the
jargon and the painter’s smock—who looks for nothing in nature except persons in
whom he can recognise the ideal symmetry of allegorical figures.” That is, the artist
who does not transfigure hardly deserves the name, so unartistic is his activity. To see
the distinction between transfigurative and non-transfigurative delight, consider the
following: One may delight in a landscape painting’s beauty, but the delight the paint-
ing gives is not the same sort of delight one feels on attending to a landscape, even if
the painting is photorealistic. Or rather: a painting may be delightful in just the same
way, but that delight is not an intrinsic C-artistic value. Art, according to Proust, is C-
artistically beautiful only in virtue of some sort of transfigurative process. Here, he is
at one with Collingwood, who writes dismissively of those who attend to art for the
simple pleasure of its content: “There is a kind of person who goes to concerts mainly

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192 Levinson (1992, §3) also insists on this exclusion.

193 Wollheim (op. cit., pp. 98-100) employs Proust to make this point in his own account of
visual delight.

194 Proust (op. cit.), p. 246.
for the sensual pleasure he gets from the sheer sounds; his presence may be good for the box-office, but it is as bad for music as the presence of a person who went to a scientific lecture for the sensual pleasure he got out of the tones of the lecturer’s voice would be for science.” (P24, pp. 141–2) Unlike Collingwood, though, Proust does not support his assertion. The argument of this chapter is that Collingwood’s argument is entirely adequate, but we will see this in due course. For now, I say just that where Proust agrees with Collingwood, I will assume Collingwood’s framework (as I have done regarding the previous exclusion), and so assume that non-transfigurative artistic beauty is not an intrinsic C-artistic value.

However, even allowing that the delight Proust identifies is a particularly transfigurative delight, his account of the delight of the young man’s perception of the table does not seem to be exhausted by the transfigurativeness of the transfiguration. The delight is in fact twofold. First, we are delighted by the world that the artwork portrays: the dining room itself. This delight is in turn twofold: there is delight in its quotidian, and in its “grandness” or “singularity.” Second, we take delight in the painting, and this has the same twofold character: it is delightful because grand and singular, and delightful because humble and full of life. The relevant value of Chardin’s paintings is that they ‘hoist to our consciousness’ this (twofold) delight (or if you prefer, these (two-fold) delights). This account is of course very similar to Collingwood’s (and to Danto’s, incidentally), and I will not much expound it here, except to insist upon one crucial difference: for Collingwood, the value of Chardin lies simply in its transfiguration; for Proust, a further value attaches to Chardin when the transfiguration is into something ‘beautiful,’ ‘delightful’ or ‘pleasant.’ It is the purpose of this chapter to deny that this further value is C-artistic.

Apart from this difference, though, Proust’s account is consonant with Collingwood’s. The key point of agreement is that for Proust (and Wollheim, who explicitly endorses this point in particular96), the pleasure we find in the quotidian is not entirely new to us when we consciously feel it in attending to a Chardin: we “already experienced it subconsciously, this pleasure one gets from the sight of everyday scenes and inanimate objects”. Only minor rewording is needed to make this entirely Collingwoodian. Collingwood rejects the subconscious/conscious divide on the grounds that

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195 Or in its “beauty,” of course, but Proust uses ‘beauty’ in a more specific way than I do, and so to avoid confusion I will not use ‘beauty’ in Proust’s sense at all. (See Scruton (2009), pp. 15–17 on these two senses of ‘beauty.’)

196 Ibid., p. 98.
anything entirely not part of our consciousness would be unable to enter into our lived life at all (PA, pp. 205-6). But Proust is hardly committing himself to strong claims about the subconscious: his point is substantially unchanged if we say instead that our delight, before Chardin’s illumination, was experienced only vaguely and inchoately, just as any relatively unexpressed emotion is; and that it was overshadowed by other emotions – the young man’s ‘discomfort,’ boredom and ‘nausea.’ This way of putting the point is straight Collingwood.197

Now, what of these terms between which we have been sliding: ‘delight,’ ‘pleasure,’ ‘enjoyment’? Proust is using them to triangulate on something, and although he does not offer a direct characterisation of it, his remarks do suggest a characterisation: there is some hedonically positive mental state, and ‘hedonically positive’ in a rather simple sense. There is doubtless something valuable about negative emotions such as – to use Proust’s examples – discomfort, boredom, disgust, despair, that we feel in response to art, but the relevant value of Chardin is precisely that it replaces or these emotions with the positive ones that it hoists from our subconscious. Secondly, as I noted in the previous paragraph, delight is felt, but may be ‘subconsciously’ felt. Finally, ‘emotion’ is not a key term here, as it was in ch. 2 above, and I do not use it in the same way. The key point is that what we feel when we feel delight is felt and is a hedonically positive mental state. Whether it is an emotion – in Collingwood’s or any other’s sense – is irrelevant.

According to Proust, what we will call the ‘C-artistic beauty’ of the painting is that it “hoists” these (already-present) positive emotions to consciousness, but further, that it does so in a way that allows us to see not only the beauty of what the Chardin represents that is ‘obviously’ beautiful, the ‘grand,’ ‘singular’ beauty of fine art such as is found in the Louvre, but the ‘intimate,’ ‘comfortable,’ ‘vivacious’ beauty of the humble scene represented. That is, it is that it finds beauty not only in what is traditionally regarded or culturally marked as beautiful, but in what is by those lights ugly. Its C-

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197 This is not to mention the various other ways in which Proust and Collingwood speak in unison that are not here relevant. Proust, too, thinks that there is something of the artist about the attentive spectator (Op. cit., p. 244); also thinks that there is something unartistic about an unimaginative artist (p. 246); also thinks that the painter’s and spectator’s roles are intimately bound together (see the block-quotation above); etc.


*artistic* beauty, note, is not the beauty of the represented scene (the artwork’s content\(^{198}\)) under either the aspect of grandness/singularity or intimacy/comfort (although these sorts of beauty are at play here), but in how it reveals these two aspects to us. The corresponding delight we feel on attending to something artistically beautiful, which feeling we will call ‘C-artistic delight,’ is a delight in this artistic beauty: the delight of feeling our emotions hoisted to consciousness.

I am using ‘delight’ in a number of ways here – let us pause to take stock. There is *C-artistic* delight (and its objective correlate artistic beauty), and there are two types of ‘non-C-artistic’ delight. *C-artistic* delight is what Proust is giving an account of, the transfiguration committed by the artwork, and our pleasure in it. Non-C-artistic beauty is the beauty – which may be of any sort, and of which neither Proust nor I offer any general characterisation – of that which is represented by the artwork, the artwork’s ‘content.’ I say ‘non-C-artistic,’ but it may be C-artistic in a sense: even in Proust’s example, the paintings of the Louvre undoubtedly express emotion too, and so will be C-art, and so may be C-artistically beautiful. However, it seems that Proust is interested in another sort of beauty found therein: the ‘grandness’ and ‘singularity’ typical of paintings from that cultural milieu. Within ‘non-C-artistic delight,’ there is the delight typical of traditionally beautiful things, such as paintings in the Louvre – grandness and singularity and so on – and the delight typical of that which is not traditionally regarded as beautiful, such as a kitchen: ‘intimacy,’ ‘vivacity,’ and so on. To repeat: it is *C-artistic* delight that is at issue here.

Proust is not alone in thinking that the artist’s obligation goes beyond the portrayal of delightful things as delightful, and extends to the hoisting of hidden delight. It is common throughout the history of art. This is not the place for a historical survey,\(^{199}\)

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\(^{198}\) What artistic ‘content’ is is a thorny question that I will not discuss here. Very briefly: representational artworks such as the paintings we have been considering so far clearly have content, but although non-representational arts such as music normally cannot have content in just that way, they can have expressive content; and so Proust and Wallace’s account is general over all the arts. See Scruton (1997), ch. II.

\(^{199}\) It would be a long history. John Cage once said that “The history of art is simply a history of getting rid of the ugly by entering into it, and using it” (quoted in Dür (2003); the original context, as far as I can tell, is Julie Lazar’s ‘nothingtoseeingness’ contained within a box of materials created alongside his travelling exhibition *Rolywholyover – A Circus*). Cage goes on to say that the history is not one of art finding beauty in ugliness, but of transcending both
but let us consider one more articulation of this view from a different philosophical point of view: David Foster Wallace’s, who makes what is substantially the same point in a 1993 interview. We do this to show the breadth, and better see the shape, of the intuition behind the articulation.

[I]t’s a kind of black cynicism about today’s world that [Bret Easton] Ellis and certain others depend on for their readership. Look, if the contemporary condition is hopelessly shitty, insipid, materialistic, emotionally retarded, sadomasochistic, and stupid, then I (or any writer) can get away with slapping together stories with characters who are stupid, vapid, emotionally retarded, which is easy... If readers simply believe the world is stupid and shallow and mean, then Ellis can write a mean shallow stupid novel that becomes a mordant deadpan commentary on the badness of everything. Look man, we’d probably most of us agree that these are dark times, and stupid ones, but do we need fiction that does nothing but dramatize how dark and stupid everything is? In dark times, the definition of good art would seem to be art that locates and applies CPR to those elements of what’s human and magical that still live and glow despite the times’ darkness. Really good fiction could have as dark a worldview as it wished, but it’d find a way both to depict this world and to illuminate the possibilities for being alive and human in it.

McCaffery (1993)

Wallace is here decrying the tendency to depict the shittiness, insipidity, etc., of the contemporary condition without also taking the time to explore and discover how it is that human beings “still have the capacity for joy, charity, genuine connections, for stuff that doesn’t have a price” (ibid.). However, it can be generalised as a criticism of the tendency to just portray the disgusting as disgusting without taking the time to find delight in it, and if we do this, then Wallace’s criticism is entirely consonant with Proust’s criticism of the ‘artist’ who cares only to give delight in the beautiful (v.s. n. 197). In each case, the demand is that artists find delight in the ugly. In each case, the claim is that art that does so – that is C-artistically delightful – is C-artistically better for it.

There is one important difference between Proust’s and Wallace’s accounts. It is worth keeping in mind, because Proust’s account might seem to fail as an articulation

categories. If Cage is broadly right with this last claim, then so much the better for Collingwood’s theory.
of the delight that this section is characterising by virtue of being too complex. Wallace's account is one step simpler than Proust's. Wallace's demand of the artist is that they find beauty in the ugly: but it is not that they find two sorts of beauty, as Chardin does in the domestic scene. I take this weaker account to be no less plausible than Proust's account, and indeed it may have the advantage over Proust's account in being general over more of our attributions of delight in artworks. Second, Wallace more obviously understands 'non-C-artistic delight' broadly. The task of the artist is not just to hoist to our awareness obviously aesthetic emotions or features, but morally and cognitively rich emotions – worldviews, indeed – such that it is possible to be alive and human even in spiritually dark times. That these are things in which we can reasonably delight I assume; but nothing here hangs on the matter.

Let us sum up. Proust and Wallace claim that C-artistic delight is C-artistically valuable. They mean by C-artistic delight not just any delight, but something richer. The C-artistic delight we take in an artwork is the feeling attendant on the artwork's transfiguring of our experience of its content such that our delight in that content is hoisted to consciousness. Proust finds in Chardin another depth: Chardin not only hoists in our response to domestic scenes a delight we would rather expect to find in the Louvre, a 'grandness' and 'singularity,' but hoists in our response to domestic scenes a 'domestic' delight, a 'vivacity' and 'intimacy' – and then does this again with regard to the Chardin itself, hoisting in our response to the painting a delight in its grandness and a delight in its vivacity. This complexity seems to me too rich to figure in an account of C-artistic delight as such, and I take the core of the intuition to be found in what is common to Proust and Wallace. However, the argument of this chapter is not hostage to the fortune of which account is correct: the below criticism of Proust and Wallace's account will work against the account regardless of whether it includes this additional complexity.

2. Objections to Proust and Wallace’s Account

To say that there is C-artistic value in the hoisting of emotions to consciousness is of course just a way of putting the core claim of Collingwood's philosophy of art. And that C-artistic delight is valuable I don't doubt. But why do Proust and Wallace think that particular C-artistic value accrues to the hoisting of hedonically positive emotions? Neither offer much by way of an answer to this; they both seem to think that it is sufficient to utter it for its truth to be manifest. Obviously I disagree, but there is more
than a clash of intuitions here: there are reasons to doubt that the hoisting of positive emotions has value beyond the value of hoisting emotions simpliciter. I will consider three. The first is that there are artworks that ‘hoist’ disgust from our psychic depths but which seem to be valuable in the same way as artworks that hoist delight from our depths (§2.1). The second is that it is not clear what is doing the explanatory work even according to Proust and Wallace (§2.2). The third is that the insight articulated by Proust and Wallace can be captured by Collingwood’s theory, and in a theoretically neater way (§3).

2.1 The Case of Great but Ugly Art

If Proust and Wallace are right that C-artistic delight is C-artistically valuable, we should expect this to inform our art-critical judgements. Does it? And how can we find out? In this section, I will argue that although it is hard to be confident here, the sort of thing we want to say of Chardin’s work’s value is sufficiently relevantly isomorphic with the sort of thing we want to say of the value of great but ugly art that it seems that our intuition is actually that the value of Chardin’s art depends on its expressing emotion well rather than on anything to do with beauty.

‘Disgust’ is as vague a term as ‘delight.’ I coin the phrase ‘C-artistic disgust’ as the contrary of ‘C-artistic delight’ (and ‘C-artistic ugliness’ as the opposite of ‘C-artistic beauty’). This is a rather stipulative reduction of some rich concepts, but I am not interested here in defining ugliness or disgust. In any case, an artistically disgusting

\[\text{\footnote{The general strategy here is to argue that although, in one situation, our C-artistic reaction appears to suggest a certain philosophical underpinning, considering other cases that are largely similar but that cannot be explained in the same way suggests that we need to rethink what underpins our reaction in the first situation. This strategy is also what is deployed by those (see, e.g., Nehamas (2007), esp. pp. 21ff.) who draw attention to beautiful but C-artistically poor art to make the same point as I am making (\textit{viz.}, that C-artistic delight is not as such a C-artistic value). I have not considered this sort of art because for them to support my argument, they would have to be C-artistically poor because they are artistically beautiful. But those that Nehamas considers are all of works in which non-C-artistic beauty is a C-artistic vice, and I cannot think of any examples of C-artistic beauty being C-artistically vicious. (But then of course I cannot: Collingwood’s theory predicts that there can be no examples, as C-artistic beauty is for him always a C-artistic virtue.)}}\]
artwork will not find hidden delight in our experience of a humble kitchen, as a Chardin might do; it will find hidden disgust in our experience of the paintings of the Louvre. Or more abstractly, it will represent something that we considered delight and show us the hidden ugliness in this thing in virtue of the artwork manifesting this ugliness itself. Finally, if we take the additional complexity of Proust’s account seriously, it will contain not one but two uglinesses: first, ugliness typical of art (or perhaps some particular artistic genre), and second, ugliness typical of what the artwork represents.

Let us consider an example, so that we can test whether our critical judgements are isomorphic; that is, whether, when the ‘polarity’ of the hedonic valence of the emotions hoisted by an artwork is ‘flipped,’ our critical judgement is of the same sort it is in the case of Chardin, or whether it is reversed or otherwise changed by the ‘flip.’ Otto Dix’s *Großstadt*\(^{201}\) will suffice: it is an unrelenting bitter satire of Dix’s world, and of course a masterpiece. The centrepiece of this triptych is a packed *jazz-hall*, full of excited music and bejewelled socialites and civilised smiles. It portrays the 1920s Weimar Republic as fun, lively, attractive. One might even be reminded of the grandness of the Louvre. The outer panels, however, are bitter: they show socialites on their way to and from the party, sneering at or simply ignoring disfigured war veterans begging on the streets, even as one is attacked by a mongrel. The outer panels do not portray simply another part of Weimar Germany: they show an ugly side of the sort of person who in the centre panel is portrayed as so urbane, and in so doing they undermine that urbaneness, insofar as they reveal that the virtues portrayed in the centre panel are seen to be only skin-deep: displayed only in close social circles in which the display redounds to the interests of whoever displays them, and turning to disdain for anyone outwith those circles. The outer panels then also encourage a rereading of the centre panel. Now we can see through the costume jewellery and manic colours: the drummer looks furious, the central dancer is knock-kneed, a man sitting on the right looks not at all pleased by the faceful of feathers he is getting from the careless person in front of him, and the date on the kick-drum refers ominously to a meeting of French and British politicians concerning Germany’s reparations.\(^{202}\) The party in the central panel now seems not glamorous but sickly, not sophisticated but self-satisfied, not fun but desperate.

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\(^{201}\) ‘Metropolis’; 1927-1928; wood, distemper; \(71\frac{3}{10} \times 159\frac{3}{10}\)" (181 × 404 cm); Kunstmuseum Stuttgart.

\(^{202}\) Although this could less excitingly simply be the date the painting was finished.
Dix in *Großstadt*, then, does the opposite of what Chardin does in, for instance, *The White Tablecloth*. He takes something we see as pleasant, and portrays it as ugly, and this in a twofold way: on attending to the painting, we see it first as ugly *qua* painting – garish and unbalanced – and then ugly in the way that human and social corruption and vice are ugly. We then turn to the world and see it, too, as twofoldedly ugly: both as garish and unbalanced, and as corrupt and vicious.

What then are we to make of *Großstadt*? Proust and Wallace do not need to say terribly much about it – they can shrug it off as not something in which they were interested in the passages I have discussed – but what they *cannot* permit is that the C-artistic value *Großstadt* has by virtue of its hoisting disgust is the same as that Chardin has by virtue of its hoisting of delight. For if it is, then the value in each case has got nothing to do with C-artistic delight, and an account will be needed – such as, for instance, Collingwood’s – which treats them as on a par. However, it seems to me that the one thing that Proust and Wallace cannot say is the one thing they have to say. *Großstadt* hoists our disgust at the superficiality and vanity of a manner of life that we may naturally find glamorous, and which we may well not be aware that we are (also) disgusted by, and does so mercilessly and unrelentingly. But this is clearly no failing: it is, quite to the contrary, the main thing the painting is doing, and one of its core values. Of course, as I said at the outset, one can dispute my critical judgement of the work. But *prima facie*, the case of *Großstadt* puts pressure on Proust and Wallace’s account.

2.2 Proust and Wallace as Already Collingwoodian

I tried in §1 to do justice to the insights expressed by Proust and Wallace by articulating the theory underlying them. It is worth asking, though, whether my above formulation of the theory suggested by their remarks interprets them in the best way. Perhaps they are saying something else. In this section, we will explore this possibility, and we will see that there is some ambiguity in Proust and Wallace’s thinking such that another reading is consistent with all they say. This reading is also perfectly Collingwoodian. The purpose of this rereading is first to show that the wisdom of the passages can be captured by Collingwood’s theory, and second to supply further evidence for what I argue throughout this dissertation, that Collingwood’s *prima facie* idiosyncratic theoretical claims are in fact widely shared.
Some initial pressure can be put on the current interpretation of Proust and Wallace by asking what they would say if there simply were no beauty to be found in something. With regard to something ‘deeply ugly’ in this way, would the artist be obliged to represent it as beautiful? Even if the deep ugliness of (that part of) the world was such that such a representation would be dishonest? In other words: is the value of C-artistic delight predicated on the artwork accurately representing (in this respect) what it represents? There is a tension here between honesty and C-artistic delight that is not found in Proust and Wallace because they only consider things that are in fact beautiful (albeit whose beauty is hidden). But surely it is possible that such a tension could arise. The accusation, in fact, is made by Herman Hesse’s Harry Haller against Goethe:

‘You are… not outright [aufrichtig] enough. Like all great spirits, Herr von Goethe, you have clearly recognized and felt the riddle and the hopelessness of human life, with its moments of transcendence that sink again to wretchedness, and the impossibility of rising to one fair peak of feeling except at the cost of many days’ enslavement to daily drudgeries; and, then, the ardent longing for the realm of the spirit in eternal and deadly war with the equally ardent and holy love of the lost innocence of nature… this condemnation to the transient that can never be valid…; in short, the utter lack of purpose to which the human state is condemned – to its consuming despair. You have known all this, yes…; yet you give up your whole life to preaching its opposite, giving utterance to faith and optimism and spreading before yourself and others the illusion that our spiritual strivings mean something and endure… This is why we reproach you with insincerity [Unaufrichtigkeit].’

[Goethe] asked, ‘You must have a strong objection, then, to the Magic Flute of Mozart?… [That opera] presents life to us as a wondrous song. It honours our feelings, transient, as they are, as something eternal and divine.’

Hesse (1927/1929), pp. 112-4

(I will not discuss this passage very closely. I wish simply to illustrate and motivate that and how one might scorn C-artistic delight if it is done insincerely, apart from in an explicitly Collingwoodian way.203) Haller takes insincerity to manifestly be an ar-

203 Strictly, all Haller commits himself to in this passage is that there is some disvalue to insincerity, not the stronger claim that insincerity entirely undermines the C-artistic value of any C-artistic delight built upon it. I adopt the stronger reading as more likely given the overall
tistic failing, and does nothing to support it; but of course the claim is straight Collingwood, who justifies it in *Ph*, especially in the discussion of the corrupt consciousness on pp. 216–21 that we have seen already (ch. 1, §3.3.1). I find this defence of sincerity convincing, of course, and will assume it here. So the question is, how can Proust and Wallace respond?

Wallace can evade, if not quite respond to, this objection. (The response is consistent with but not suggested by Proust’s text.) Wallace appears not to think that there could be anything entirely without beauty. When he says that “[r]eally good fiction could have as dark a worldview as it wished, but it’d find a way both to depict this world and to illuminate the possibilities for being alive and human in it”, he implies that no matter how bleak an artist’s worldview is, it must allow that there is some beauty in the world, even if only in potentia. Although Wallace does not say why he uses such strong language, Collingwood has a philosophical defence of the position: as we saw in ch. 1, Collingwood’s theory of concepts dictates that philosophical concepts, such as beauty and ugliness, are infinitely differentially realisable, which means that there is nothing that is entirely beautiful or ugly; rather, everything is both beautiful to some extent and ugly to an inversely correlative extent. Therefore, Wallace will deny that ‘honesty’ and ‘delight’ can come apart in this way, and so asking what he would say if they were to do so is stopped at the blocks as incoherent.

This response suggests an affinity to Collingwood, but it does not establish that Wallace would deny the C-artistic value of delight. Other parts of the interview, however, put additional pressure on the above interpretation of him, and indicate that he is more Collingwoodian. Shortly after the long passage I have quoted, the interviewer (McCaffery) suggests a paraphrase of Wallace’s position: “Are you saying that writers of your generation have an obligation not only to depict our condition but also to provide the solutions to these things?” Wallace demurs, but the gist of his reply (as I read it) is that it is not that art should not be seeking solutions to our conditions – it should – but that rather than seeking “conventionally political or social action-type” solutions, it should be an exploration, dramatisation or illumination of our extant and potential capacity to be ‘fully human’; further, this exploration is at once both theoretical – it is concerned with what it is to be fully human – and practical: knowing what

context, but I will not defend my reading here. Conversely, Haller does commit himself to the strong claim that C-artistic delight must be built on insincerity, given the nature of the world; but I ignore this, as we only need the weaker conditional claim for our purposes.
to do and being motivated to do it are (probably) not much separable. This is the 'solution' it should be seeking. That is, Wallace thinks that the obligation artists have is not to delight in itself, but to delight because it illuminates what it is to be human and allows us to be human. So we don't have to wonder what would happen if, per impossible, an artist represented something without beauty as beautiful; it is already interesting that Wallace does not claim that artistic delight is a value in itself, contra my initial interpretation.

On this new interpretation of Wallace, there is a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that C-artistic delight is not itself C-artistically valuable. The positive claim is that what is intrinsically C-artistically valuable is the illumination of what it is to be human. This claim is pure Collingwood. I will not repeat my explanation of what Collingwood means by 'expression of emotion,' but Wallace's closeness to Collingwood is well brought out by reference to Collingwood's discussion of The Waste Land (PA, pp. 333-6). On Collingwood's reading, what Eliot does in that poem is depict "a world where the wholesome flowing water of emotion, which alone fertilizes all human activity, has dried up." The Waste Land, further, has no 'conventionally political or social action-type' solution: "The reader who expects it to be satire, or an entertaining description of vices, is as disappointed with it as the reader who expects it to be propaganda, or an exhortation to get up and do something." So far so Bret Easton Ellis. However, what Eliot does do is "utter" the "secrets" of "his community", and in this very act – this is the key – he offers a "remedy" for the community's spiritual malaise. That is, the uttering of secrets – or the expression of emotion, or the illumination of what it is to be human – is itself the remedy for what Collingwood calls the decay of our civilisation, and what Wallace calls the shittiness, insipidity, etc., of our times.

204 Collingwood holds forth on this in NL, ch. 11, and in ‘Goodness, Rightness and Utility’ (1942/1992), pp. 419ff., but this is a current debate. See Stroud (2014).

205 Wallace is of course feeding into a long and familiar tradition here, which counts among its defenders the German Idealist/Hegelian tradition, more recent philosophers such as MacIntyre, and Collingwood himself, wherein 'being human' is differentially realisable in the Collingwoodian manner, and is closely connected to living in a moral, free and fulfilling way. Perhaps Wallace's expression is unclear without a background in that tradition; but as to engage in this tradition would go well beyond the scope of this dissertation, I take it as read.
So much for Wallace: I have shown now that the *prima facie* accurate interpretation of him as attributing intrinsic C-artistic value to C-artistic delight is too quick, and that a more Collingwoodian interpretation is also reasonable.\footnote{The uncertainty is compounded by his prefixing all this with “[i]n dark times”. What would he recommend in fat times?}

What of Proust? Again there is ambiguity. In particular, in his praise of Chardin, for all he makes constant reference to Chardin’s ability to hoist pleasure in the world to our consciousness, it remains unclear whether Chardin’s value lies in hoisting pleasure, or in hoisting as such, where ‘pleasure’ is used simply as an illustration of the hoisting. If we take this more general reading, again we end up simply with Collingwood’s own account. Of course, the tone of the passage strongly implies that Chardin’s value is somehow connected to his ability to kick the young man’s disgust (etc.) toward his dining room, and we will inquire into this tone in §3. But for now, we should remember that ‘tone’ is not enough to determine an interpretation. Nowhere in his essay does Proust say anything that commits him to the anti-Collingwoodian position that C-artistic delight is itself a C-artistic value. Finally, Wollheim (1987), as we have seen, clearly takes Proust to be giving an account of something beyond the expression of emotion, and to be endorsing that account; but Wollheim’s discussion is too brief to really determine whether it can be rephrased in a Collingwoodian way.

### 3. Conciliation: Delight’s Place in Collingwood’s Theory

This chapter opened by presenting Proust and Wallace’s account of an intrinsic C-artistic value, an account that I have argued first is incorrect and second may not even be endorsed by its purported proponents. Why mention it at all, then, if it is not a good theory and it is unclear whether anyone else thinks it is a good theory?

Most generally, it is because the claim that something like pleasure or delight (I abandon the term and specific concept of ‘C-artistic delight’ from hereon in, for we have seen that it is unclear whether it is doing any philosophical work, and return to the vague intuition to which we are trying to do justice) is a crucial part of what makes art so valuable is one of the most common ideas people have about art, and so Collingwood’s categorical denial of any value to it is correspondingly counter-intuitive.
(v.s. §4). Further, even aside from this intuition that delight is central to art, it is undeniable that art (or at least D-art) is frequently delightful or pleasant. This is not only in mediocre D-art that is readily dismissed as ‘mere entertainment,’ either: remember the exuberance of the finale of Beethoven’s Ninth (‘Seid umschlungen, Millionen! Diesen Kuß der ganzen Welt!’), the ecstasy of *The Ecstasy of Saint Teresa*, the cheeky glee of *Scott Pilgrim*, or the joyful affirmation of *Ulysses* (“yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will Yes.”). Much of the greatest art is rapturous. It thus seems churlish, even blinkered, to exclude this delight from a theory of art, even if it is allowed readmission as valuable when connected to expression of emotion, and even if Collingwood considers the non-C-artistic role he does allow delight to be noble. Although the concern that ‘it still seems off somehow’ is not sufficient reason for altering a theory, and although I have been unable to articulate that vague concern into something that puts real pressure on Collingwood’s exclusion of delight, the vague concern is enough that I will say one further thing to address it. After all, we often see more than we can articulate, and we should be sensitive to our philosophical and artistic intuitions.207 There are other reasons for this discussion: first, too little has been said on the matter in commentary on Collingwood’s philosophy heretofore, and second, Collingwood’s response to the claim that there is a C-artistic value beyond the expression of emotion is not quite the simple and obvious denial that I have adumbrated thus far. In this section, we will consider some ‘conciliatory’ remarks found in Collingwood’s philosophy, which are, I will argue, adequate to counter the accusation that Collingwood’s account of art is objectionably brutal.

The directly relevant passages of *PA* are on pp. 117, 141–2, 279, 216–21, and 314. On p. 117, Collingwood writes that there is an emotion peculiar to art, what one might call a ‘meta-emotion’ that attends to the expression of other emotions. If this is pleasant or delightful, as Collingwood suggests here, then there is some pleasant emotion that attends specifically to good art. This looks conciliatory, but the question remains whether any C-artistic value attaches to this emotion beyond the value attaching to the expressions it attends. On p. 279 he says something similar. He indicates that it is a repetition of what he says on p. 117, but he actually says here that the ‘aesthetic emotion’ is itself the expression of emotion. So ‘expression’ is a particular sort of emotion, not just what attends the expression of emotion. On pp. 216–21 is found Collingwood’s

207 A point made by Collingwood himself at various points in *PA* (e.g., pp. 105–8, 172–4). See also *EPM* (throughout, but esp. ch. VIII, §§), where he gives what in modern parlance might be called a theory of (especially philosophical) intuition.
famous defence of the importance of consciousness being uncorrupt. We have discussed this above (ch. 1, §3.3.1), but it is worth noting here that one key element of the value is something like delight, or at least the avoidance of agony: “So far as... corruption [of consciousness] masters [someone], he is a lost soul, concerning whom hell is no fable.” (p. 220) On p. 314, finally, Collingwood seems to claim that the ‘meta-emotion’ of the expression of emotion, rather than being pleasant as he says on p. 117, is difficult, painful work, from which we shirk.

Despite appearances, then, Collingwood allows some sort of pleasure or delight to be very closely connected with the expression of emotion, even if negatively. But are his remarks on the matter consistent with each other and with the rest of his theory of art? and does he do enough to rid us of the suspicion that his theory is too brutal?

First, let us characterise the delight in question more fully. The first thing to note is that, as with Proust, ‘emotion’ here is understood relatively narrowly. It is an occurrent feeling attending on the temporally specific act of expression. Second, Collingwood writes on p. 117 that “an unexpressed emotion is accompanied by a feeling of oppression; when it is expressed... [it] is accompanied by a new feeling of alleviation or easement, the sense that this oppression is relieved. It resembles the feeling of relief that comes when a burdensome intellectual or moral problem is solved.” Also, on pp. 109-110 he says that the state of oppression is also one of ‘helplessness,’ and that the expression of emotion resembles catharsis, but differs in that the emotion undergoing the process does not dissipate – our anger does not soften, for instance – but rather, “we [become] conscious of our own emotion as anger”. We have seen all this before in ch. 1, but the relevant point now is that this becoming-conscious also has its own affective character as such. This characterisation is vague; but this is for good reason. The emotion is to some extent the ‘light’ ‘non-feeling’ of ‘everything going to plan.’ Collingwood richly describes the phenomenology of failing to express an emotion throughout PA (see esp. ch. 5, §5; pp. 218-21; 333-6), that is, on what the corrupt consciousness is like; but he spends relatively little time on what the ‘uncorrupt’ consciousness is like. This, presumably, is because ‘uncorruption’ or ‘integrity’ of consciousness does not have much by way of positive or distinctive phenomenology: it is mainly the absence of any displeasure. To say that it is a feeling of ‘relief,’ even, is to give a largely negative characterisation: for being relieved of a moral responsibility, of an illness, and of a physical
weight, are very different feelings; and even within these categories, to be relieved of, say, hayfever or of glandular fever feel different. 208

Thirdly and finally, Collingwood says on p. 314 that “no one enjoys having his unconscious emotions dragged into the light of consciousness, and consequently there is often a strongly painful element in a genuine aesthetic experience”. This seems to contradict what he has earlier said: why would one not enjoy having one’s emotions dragged into consciousness if the process is accompanied by feelings of alleviation and relief? Collingwood does not supply an answer, but one immediately suggests itself: the expression of emotion is accompanied by two feelings: one of relief or lightening, and one hedonically negative but otherwise not yet characterised. Collingwood is not committed to any particular connection between this latter feeling and the expression of emotion. It is consistent with everything Collingwood says, and to my mind independently plausible (and so probably what he meant), that it is an indirect connection: those emotions that it requires the hard work and institutional support of D-art to hoist to express are typically hidden for good reason – they are socially unacceptable, they reveal to us that we are not as loving as think we are, whatever – and so in expressing them we also have to face up to the fact we are (in part) socially unacceptable or small-hearted; and this is what is painful about the expression of emotion. So this pain is neither part of the expression of emotion, nor its phenomenology, as such. I will not consider it further.

The ‘aesthetic emotion,’ then, we can characterise as a feeling that has the pleasantness of relief from the oppression of confusion. Now we must inquire into its connection to the expression of emotion. Collingwood certainly thinks that the connection is necessary, in that one cannot express an emotion without also feeling this emotion – this falls out of his general position that everything human has both active and passive parts or aspects, which in the case of emotion are respectively feeling and expressing (v.s. ch. 1). But is a necessary connection sufficient conciliation? It seems not: the intuition in favour of the C-artistic value of delight, surely, is not that it accompanies something valuable, but that it is itself valuable. The question then is whether Collingwood thinks that there is some more intimate connection between the expression of emotion and the delight we take in it.

208 Schopenhauer (1818/2010, §58) is of course the locus classicus of the position that satisfaction or happiness is purely negative, but Collingwood is only saying that the particular delight of the expression of emotion is negative.
Here is where the tension between what he says on pp. 117 and 279 becomes important. On p.117 Collingwood says that the aesthetic emotion attends on the expression of emotion, and one is tempted to say it merely does so. However, on p. 279, as we have seen, he explicitly says that the aesthetic emotion “is itself a translation into imaginative form of an emotion” (emphasis mine). So which is it? Is the aesthetic emotion attendant on expression, or itself expression? If the former, then there is not, I think, sufficient conciliation, and Collingwood will simply have to bite the bullet. If the latter, then the value of C-art is not fully characterisable apart from reference to its pleasant phenomenology, and so pleasure is simply part of the expression of emotion. This seems to me sufficiently conciliatory that there can be no more hesitancy about his account of art from this quarter. However, it is hardly clear what it could mean for an expression and an emotion to be identical, if we are keen to keep them separate enough for emotions to be expressed: this separateness surely requires that expression is active, and emotion passive.

The answer, naturally, is that the dichotomy is false; and explaining why this is so will also improve our understanding of Collingwood’s philosophy of art. For Collingwood, as we have seen (ch. 1), philosophical concepts describe aspects rather than objects: C-art is an aspect of an entity that is also to some extent craft, propositions are both true and false under different aspects, and so on. So it is too with ‘action’ and ‘passion.’ This is generally true – links in any causal chain both cause what succeed them and are caused by what precedes them, for instance – but it has a distinctive flavour with regard to the mind, wherein there is nothing that is only one of an experience and an activity. Collingwood makes this point forcefully with regard to the corruption of consciousness, of which he says:

The symptoms and consequences of a corrupt consciousness…are not exactly crimes or vices, because their victim does not chose to involve himself in them, and cannot escape from them by deciding to amend his conduct. They are not exactly diseases, because they are not due to the impact of hostile forces upon the sufferer, but to his own self-mismanagement. As compared with disease, they are more like vice; as compared with vice, they are more like disease.

_Philosophy and connaît _p. 220

‘Vice,’ here, is explicitly “evil done” (ibid.) – activity – and ‘disease’ is “evil suffered” (ibid.) – what Leibniz would call a passion. Incidentally, there is a similar ‘bi-aspectuality’ concerning whether the symptoms of a corrupt consciousness are also its causes.
The present relevance of this passage, though, is not corruption, but consciousness. Everything in our mind is both active and passive. This means that when Collingwood says that art is ‘the expression of emotion,’ we should not understand this to mean that there are passions, emotions, which are acted upon by the separate activity of expression; we should understand it to mean rather that there is one entity that is passive under one aspect, active under another; emotion under one aspect, expression under another. C-art is the business of bringing action to passion, of making our passions actions. We have seen this already in ch. 1, but the bi-aspectuality goes deeper: just as expression is not separate from emotion, but emotion as active, expression has its own attendant emotion: ‘expression as passive,’ as it were. Further—and this is the keystone—expression does not just have an emotional aspect in virtue of its being the expression of a particular emotion: it also has an emotional aspect as such, and this is no more separable from it than is the emotional aspect it has in virtue of its being the expression of some particular emotion.

This might seem a cryptically scholastic way of putting things. To see the point better, consider that were we to fill out Proust’s portrait of the young man prior to his visit to the Louvre, we would eventually mention that he is oppressed by his unexpressed emotions (even though they would be pleasant when expressed). Proust even suggests this when he refers to the man finding his surroundings “somehow enthralling” (and this is not even to go into the phenomenology of disgust and its peculiar attraction): there is some pleasure in there somewhere, but its nature and extent is unclear to the young man. Proust describes eloquently how pleasant it is for the man to see his surroundings as grand and full of life; but he omits how pleasant the activity of hoisting is. Now, to be sure, the character of the pleasure the young man takes in the hoist is going to be particular to what he is hoisting, and not characterisable apart from reference to it. But neither is it characterisable apart from reference to its being a hoisting. This is the point I am making when I say that expression and emotion are aspects of the one thing. And this seems to me sufficient conciliation that Collingwood can be said to have an account of the delight of art, one that is not only superior to Proust and Wallace’s, but one that does not alert the suspicions of our intuitions concerning the place of delight in art. Collingwood’s theory does not allow us to say that the delight is itself artistically valuable, it is true, and perhaps this may leave some still unsatisfied that their intuition concerning the place of delight in art has been fully put to bed; but it does make the delight inextricably bound up with any characterisation of that expression of emotion which is intrinsically C-artistically valuable.
Finally, it is important to note one other consequence of Collingwood’s making the connection between art and pleasure in the way he does. He does not speculate as to the intensity of the delight that is the passive aspect of the expression of emotion as such; he only notes that it is present. This means that, for all it affects Collingwood’s theory, the pleasure could be weak, often outweighed by the pain of facing the depths of one’s soul; or hugely variable in intensity. This reinforces that C-art’s value is not, for Collingwood, hedonically grounded. It also connects well with the insight found for instance in Nietzsche, or in Toni Morrison’s *Beloved*, that emotions are sometimes so painful that the only thing to do, if one wishes to remain sane, is ensure that they remain unexpressed, *even though* this means that one is not in control of oneself, that one is imperfectly sane.\(^{209}\) In such a case, the pleasure that accompanies C-art is entirely outweighed, hedonically. If the value of C-art were hedonic, then to the extent that hedonic values and disvalues cancel each other out, there would be no reason at all to engage in C-art. But that there can be any ‘cancelling-out’ for those facing the dilemma of whether to face their emotions at massive hedonic cost seems, at any rate to Morrison and myself, counter-intuitive. Collingwood can respond more satisfyingly: the value of C-art is primarily alethic, and as that sort of value is not easily weighed against hedonic value and so not easily cancelled out against it, it is possible to see how one might rationally engage in C-art even at the cost of one’s sanity.

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\(^{209}\) For excellent discussion of Nietzsche’s position here, see Ridley (2010).
Conclusion

We have now reached the end of the substantive argumentation of this dissertation. In this conclusion, I will very briefly summarise the overall argument, and say a few words on the present dissertation’s significance for contemporary Analytic philosophy of art.

According to the received interpretation of Collingwood’s philosophy of art, when he asks, at beginning of PA, ‘What is art?’, he is asking what separates those entities that are art from those that are not. If this reading is accurate, then Collingwood’s answer to his question – that art is the total imaginative activity of the expression of emotion – is implausible, and not only this, but no plausible answer can be salvaged from the mess. But fortunately, Collingwood was a systematic thinker, and if we look to his other works, and in particular to EPM, we can see that the received interpretation is hermeneutically implausible. So in ch. 1, §1, I introduced the philosophical methodology of EPM, and, after a basic exposition of his philosophy of art in §2, I offered a reading of his philosophy of art explicitly and profoundly through his philosophical methodology in §3. This new reading allows us to see that Collingwood’s answer is not what it is according to the received interpretation, but something more sophisticated. Collingwood is actually asking into the nature of an ‘element’ or ‘aspect’ of all human experience and action, an aspect which is particularly prominent in art. Art has other aspects too, and to draw attention to this, I referred to that aspect of activity and experience in which Collingwood is interested ‘C-art,’ and the art of which C-art is such a prominent and valuable aspect ‘D-art.’

Most of the standard objections to Collingwood’s theory are predicated on the received reading, and on the new reading fail to so much as get off the ground. I have responded to them passim. However, the new reading is liable to appear implausible in a number of respects, and so in the latter three chapters, we have seen how Collingwood is able to respond to three important sorts of objection: that he does not do
justice to the intellectuality of art (ch. 2), that he does not do justice to the fact that some things are better left unexpressed (ch. 3), and that he does not do justice to the delight or pleasure central to art (ch. 4). In responding to these objections, I have also continued the exposition of Collingwood’s philosophy of art.

By choosing these three sorts of objections, I inter alia show how Collingwood can incorporate what are perhaps the most important offices of art into his theory; I also show how he can feed into what are perhaps the most vibrant debates in contemporary aesthetics. Broadly, ch. 2 engages with the debate on ‘aesthetic cognitivism,’ ch. 3 engages with the debate that could be labelled ‘aesthetic moralism’ or ‘value interaction,’ and ch. 4 engages with the debate on the value of aesthetic pleasure. In addition, ch. 1 engages with another of the most important questions in contemporary philosophy of art, namely that of what art is.

In arguing that Collingwood has plausible answers to these objections, I have referred continually to the contemporary debates, but the discussions have not been framed by these debates. This is firstly because the purpose of this dissertation is not comparative: arguing that Collingwood’s philosophy is superior to indefinitely many other theories is an endless task. This dissertation has a narrower aim: to show that Collingwood’s account is plausible in itself. The second, related, reason is that the framing of the debates is part of what is at issue here. The introduction of the philosophical method of EPM and the concept of C-art in ch. 1, and C-art’s distinction from D-art, means that although Collingwood is interested in the same art as that in which those in the contemporary debates are interested (as I argued in ch. 1, §3.4), his way of theorising it differs from those others so deeply that so much as stating the disagreements is a substantial task. (Even those thinkers with whom I have engaged, and around whom I have structured argument, I have interpreted with an eye to the dialectic of the arguments in which they feature rather than an eye to hermeneutic accuracy, and have asked for trust in that regard.)

However, notwithstanding this – or even because of this – I have shown that Collingwood has unique and plausible things to say about those things important and puzzling enough to be subjects of the most populous debates in contemporary Analytic philosophy of art. I believe that they are more than plausible, of course: as I said in the introduction, I consider Collingwood’s philosophy of art profound and viable, and I hope that I have made it seem as promising as it seems to me. But even if not, Collingwood can cast light on the methodological and aesthetic assumptions of contemporary aesthetics, and so open them to the possibility of fruitful rebirth.
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Abbreviations Used

BJA The British Journal of Aesthetics
JAAC The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
OUP Oxford University Press
SEP The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Edward N. Zalta)

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