The University of Southampton
University of Southampton Institutional Repository

Topology-dependent rationality and quantal response equilibria in structured populations

Topology-dependent rationality and quantal response equilibria in structured populations
Topology-dependent rationality and quantal response equilibria in structured populations
Given that the assumption of perfect rationality is rarely met in the real world, we explore a graded notion of rationality in socioecological systems of networked actors. We parametrize an actors' rationality via their place in a social network and quantify system rationality via the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between the games Nash and logit quantal response equilibria. Previous work has argued that scale-free topologies maximize a system's overall rationality in this setup. Here we show that while, for certain games, it is true that increasing degree heterogeneity of complex networks enhances rationality, rationality-optimal configurations are not scale-free. For
the Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, we provide analytic arguments complemented by numerical optimization experiments to demonstrate that core-periphery networks composed of a few dominant hub nodes surrounded by a periphery of very low degree nodes give strikingly smaller overall deviations from rationality than scale-free networks. Similarly, for the Battle of the Sexes and the Matching Pennies games, we find that the optimal network structure is also a core-periphery graph but with a smaller difference in the average degrees of the core and the periphery. These results provide insight on the interplay between the topological structure of socio-ecological systems and their collective cognitive behavior, with potential applications to understanding wealth inequality and the structural features of the network of global corporate control.
1539-3755
Roman, Sabin
3d9e299a-cde8-4c5c-91d8-98e3e6c4f119
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7
Roman, Sabin
3d9e299a-cde8-4c5c-91d8-98e3e6c4f119
Brede, Markus
bbd03865-8e0b-4372-b9d7-cd549631f3f7

Roman, Sabin and Brede, Markus (2017) Topology-dependent rationality and quantal response equilibria in structured populations. Physical Review E, 95, [052310]. (doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.95.052310).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Given that the assumption of perfect rationality is rarely met in the real world, we explore a graded notion of rationality in socioecological systems of networked actors. We parametrize an actors' rationality via their place in a social network and quantify system rationality via the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between the games Nash and logit quantal response equilibria. Previous work has argued that scale-free topologies maximize a system's overall rationality in this setup. Here we show that while, for certain games, it is true that increasing degree heterogeneity of complex networks enhances rationality, rationality-optimal configurations are not scale-free. For
the Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, we provide analytic arguments complemented by numerical optimization experiments to demonstrate that core-periphery networks composed of a few dominant hub nodes surrounded by a periphery of very low degree nodes give strikingly smaller overall deviations from rationality than scale-free networks. Similarly, for the Battle of the Sexes and the Matching Pennies games, we find that the optimal network structure is also a core-periphery graph but with a smaller difference in the average degrees of the core and the periphery. These results provide insight on the interplay between the topological structure of socio-ecological systems and their collective cognitive behavior, with potential applications to understanding wealth inequality and the structural features of the network of global corporate control.

Text
prepaper - Accepted Manuscript
Download (426kB)

More information

Submitted date: 1 January 2017
Accepted/In Press date: 23 April 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 11 May 2017
Published date: 2017
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity, Electronics & Computer Science

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 408312
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/408312
ISSN: 1539-3755
PURE UUID: 2b05cd9a-8d6c-4a9c-92d1-d547814b6fb0

Catalogue record

Date deposited: 19 May 2017 04:03
Last modified: 06 Oct 2020 22:17

Export record

Altmetrics

Download statistics

Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.

View more statistics

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact ePrints Soton: eprints@soton.ac.uk

ePrints Soton supports OAI 2.0 with a base URL of http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/cgi/oai2

This repository has been built using EPrints software, developed at the University of Southampton, but available to everyone to use.

We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we will assume that you are happy to receive cookies on the University of Southampton website.

×