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The good will and the priority of the right in Kant's Groundwork I

The good will and the priority of the right in Kant's Groundwork I
The good will and the priority of the right in Kant's Groundwork I
In Groundwork I Kant seems to derive his conception of the moral law from a prior claim about the value of the good will, contrary to the argument he puts forward elsewhere to the effect that any conception of moral worth must be derived from an antecedent recognition of the law. This suggests to some interpreters that a moral conception of worth in fact underlies the Categorical Imperative, securing its validity and providing its content. In this paper I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Kant’s conception of the good will is not derived from an assumed moral value in Groundwork I, but rather follows analytically from the concept of a categorical imperative.
Walter De Gruyter
Mudd, Alexandra
104e14da-7e8c-49b0-a7fe-9853bddbb8c5
Mudd, Alexandra
104e14da-7e8c-49b0-a7fe-9853bddbb8c5

Mudd, Alexandra (2017) The good will and the priority of the right in Kant's Groundwork I. In Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress : Nature and Freedom. Walter De Gruyter. 10 pp .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

Abstract

In Groundwork I Kant seems to derive his conception of the moral law from a prior claim about the value of the good will, contrary to the argument he puts forward elsewhere to the effect that any conception of moral worth must be derived from an antecedent recognition of the law. This suggests to some interpreters that a moral conception of worth in fact underlies the Categorical Imperative, securing its validity and providing its content. In this paper I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Kant’s conception of the good will is not derived from an assumed moral value in Groundwork I, but rather follows analytically from the concept of a categorical imperative.

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Accepted/In Press date: 1 March 2015
Published date: 2017
Organisations: Philosophy

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Local EPrints ID: 410237
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/410237
PURE UUID: 5ab9d26a-daeb-4359-a18d-0d5d8c5c6d16

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Date deposited: 06 Jun 2017 04:02
Last modified: 11 Dec 2021 19:49

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Contributors

Author: Alexandra Mudd

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