Efficient voting with penalties
Efficient voting with penalties
Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters' preferences. This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism with two alternatives when the designer may use non-trasferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer faces a dilemma – a punishment may induce a more correct choice, but its cost is socially wasteful. The efficient mechanism is a weighted majority. Weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments are applied if preferences are relatively homogeneous. Eliciting types through punishments in order to construct type-specific weights should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous.
Voting, Mechanism Design
468-485
Kwiek, Maksymilian
84ba7dab-b54b-4d22-8cf3-817b2a2077cf
July 2017
Kwiek, Maksymilian
84ba7dab-b54b-4d22-8cf3-817b2a2077cf
Abstract
Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters' preferences. This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism with two alternatives when the designer may use non-trasferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer faces a dilemma – a punishment may induce a more correct choice, but its cost is socially wasteful. The efficient mechanism is a weighted majority. Weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments are applied if preferences are relatively homogeneous. Eliciting types through punishments in order to construct type-specific weights should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous.
Text
Eff-vot-somenotes-17-clean-with-keywords
- Accepted Manuscript
More information
Accepted/In Press date: 16 May 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 25 May 2017
Published date: July 2017
Keywords:
Voting, Mechanism Design
Organisations:
Economics
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 411135
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/411135
ISSN: 0899-8256
PURE UUID: 95bf164a-88c2-4a36-b5b4-854e9c20a661
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Date deposited: 14 Jun 2017 16:31
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 05:23
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