**Poland’s foreign policy turn**

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Following the 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections, Poland has reversed its consistently-pro-European foreign policy, marking a radical break up with its post-1989 direction. Whether this turn is a result of some well-developed strategy, or merely a natural extension of illiberal domestic reforms introduced by the new government, is irrelevant.[[1]](#endnote-1) What matters is the outcome. Poland is no longer an engine of European integration, nor does it seem to value its relationship with Germany and France. Instead, the new government committed to revive an inter-war tradition of the alliance of central and eastern European (CEE) states, which Poland, as the largest country of that region, would naturally lead. A dominant narrative justifying this revolution is a familiar claim that Poland must protect is sovereignty and national interest against Brussels and Berlin. In particular, Poland must defend itself against the European Union’s (EU) un-Christian liberal values, German economic domination and being forced to accept migrant and refugees of non-Christian faith.

While Poland’s foreign policy turn is, naturally, important for the political future of this country, it also tells something more fundamental about European security governance. The alliance of CEE countries is bound to fail, as it did in the past. Furthermore, the populist right-wing government may lose the next elections, and Poland’s foreign policy may return to the post-1989 trajectory. The significance of the post-2015 Poland’s foreign policy, however, lies in its active contribution to the processes which, taken together, facilitate European disintegration – the very phenomenon which, in the past, has proven most deadly for the CEE region. Poland’s policy, of course, did not cause Brexit, the refugee crisis or the war in Ukraine. Its foreign policy actions (including the rhetoric), however, even if indirectly, have failed in each of these cases to defend the values which have so effectively secured the geopolitical interests of small and medium countries in Europe since the end of the Cold War.

The argument of the paper is not that Europe is entering a fully-fledged disintegration phase, nor that disintegration must inevitably lead to another major war. At the same time, however, it is all too easy to discard this scenario as inconceivable, while Stefano Guzzini was pointing to the return of ‘geopolitics’ in Europe as early as in 2012.[[2]](#endnote-2) This paper argues, instead, that if Poland’s government is truly concerned about the resurgence of power politics on the European continent, it must recognise its own responsibility for the processes which can indeed make the concert of Europe a self-fulfilling prophecy.

**European security between integration and disintegration**

The occurrence of war and peace in Europe has been directly correlated with the place European geopolitical situation occupies at any given historical moment on a scale between international integration and disintegration. This correlation can be traced back at least to the Napoleonic Wars, following which the Congress of Vienna attempted to integrate European powers into the governance system known as the Concert of Europe. This system was successful on some occasions, but its gradual erosion led to European disintegration resulting in a series of armed conflicts among European states in the second half of the 19th century. Already early in the 20th century, it became clear for some that a new system of governance was necessary to ensure peace in Europe – a task made urgent by the outbreak of World War I (WWI). Thinkers like Leonard Woolf and J.A. Hobson[[3]](#endnote-3) advocated a more permanent, automatic and representative structure to replace the shattered concert system. The League of Nations met these criteria, becoming the world’s first ever permanent international organisation, institutionalising and codifying the system of collective security, and opening up to all countries, rather than to a narrow oligopoly of powers.[[4]](#endnote-4) It also marked a new attempt at international integration in Europe, considered urgent particularly by those states which felt vulnerable in the post-WWI settlement. Disintegration soon followed, however, prompted – as ever – by insufficient international instruments to curb national egoisms. The system of governance in the 1930s became reminiscent of the old-style concert of Europe, in that it was dominated by great-power diplomacy, rather than the institutions envisaged by Woodrow Wilson. Right before and soon after the outbreak of World War II (WWII), new calls for international integration proliferated. Clarence Streit and W.B. Curry advocated a union of transatlantic democracies,[[5]](#endnote-5) whilst Ivor Jennings, R.W.G. MacKay and David Davies called for the federation of Europe.[[6]](#endnote-6) David Mitrany, in contrast, preferred international integration along functional, rather than federal lines.[[7]](#endnote-7) Post-WWII international integration combined federalist and functional elements.[[8]](#endnote-8) At the global level, states were thinly integrated through the United Nations system. In Europe, a thicker initiative was undertaken by France and Germany, inspired by the unique approach of Jean Monnet. Resolved to never engage in a war again, European states began the process of economic and political integration, gradually expanding its scope and depth. European integration has never been uncontroversial, but its largely elite-driven character effectively insulated its intricacies from mainstream politics.

It can be argued that European integration entered mainstream politics when the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in 2005 through referendums in France and Holland. The Lisbon Treaty was signed over two years later, but its ratification was also far from straightforward.[[9]](#endnote-9) Soon afterwards, other problems piled up. While it cannot be said that they have fully reversed the post-WWII integration trend, they have certainly challenged its fundamental premises. One problem concerns the growing hostility of the British public, media outlets and political class towards the EU. While it is true that the UK was never enthusiastic about European integration, it still came as shocking when the country decided to leave the EU. Brexit broke the taboo. The article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which regulates exiting from the EU, was never meant to be used, and was inserted to satisfy the UK.[[10]](#endnote-10) Although it is difficult to pin down their specific nature, it is clear that Brexit will have fundamental consequences for the EU and the future of European integration as such.

Another challenge to integration came from the refugee crisis, and in particular from the divisive role it has played in European politics. While German government accepted the majority of the incomers, CEE countries refused to contribute and effectively isolated themselves within the EU on this issue.[[11]](#endnote-11) The position of Poland has been particularly meaningful in this process. Being the largest country of the region, it has traditionally been presented as the proof that EU enlargement was successful and worth the effort. The Europeanisation of the CEE countries also served to demonstrate that the old division between western and CEE Europe has no meaning beyond simple geography. Poland’s position on refugees, combined with its domestic illiberal reforms and closer relations with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, risk to revers these positive images.

The third recent challenge to European integration came from Vladimir Putin’s Russia’s aggressive policy in eastern Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. This presented a challenge mainly to the external dimension of European integration, but the consequences have many dimensions. One concerns Poland’s efforts to create a block of CEE countries prepared to counter any further Russian infringements on state sovereignty in this region. Without working closely with Germany and France on simultaneous proposals aimed at building peace, Poland risks further isolation, *de facto* validating the intergovernmental approach preferred by the larger states.[[12]](#endnote-12) The reminder of the paper sheds more light on the 2015 turn in Poland’s foreign policy, and its correlation with the three challenges to European integration outlined above.

**Poland’s foreign policy turn**

Ever since the first fully-democratic elections in 1991, Poland’s foreign policy has been generally consistent. In the first phase, it focused on joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU.[[13]](#endnote-13) After these objectives had been achieved, it then concentrated on strengthening Poland’s position within these organisations, primarily through maintaining close relationship with the United States and Germany. Equally consistent has been Poland’s policy in the East, involving continuous efforts to pull Ukraine and (to a lesser extent) other countries in the region towards the Western institutions.[[14]](#endnote-14) Importantly, the eastern policy has been developed primarily through the institutional channels of the EU and NATO.[[15]](#endnote-15) In Poland’s foreign policy, the EU and NATO had always come first, reflecting the country’s aspiration to be fully associated with the Western civilization.[[16]](#endnote-16)

To paraphrase Lord Ismay,[[17]](#endnote-17)since 1989 Poland’s policy had been to keep Americans in Europe, to make Poland strong in (and through) a strong EU, and to leverage Poland’s position in the EU and NATO to pursue its policy objectives in the East. Only the first principle seems to remain valid after the 2015 parliamentary elections won respectively by a conservative Andrzej Duda and a political party of the same profile which supported his candidacy, Jarosław Kaczyński-led Law and Order (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS[[18]](#endnote-18)). Breaking with the traditional Polish pro- EU orientation, the new government has undertook to ‘correct’[[19]](#endnote-19) Poland’s foreign policy

*Indifference towards the EU*

The PiS’s government continues to insist on American active involvement in European security, which constitutes continuity in Poland’s foreign policy. At the same time, however, it appears to be turning its back on the EU, particularly EU institutions and Germany. Drawing on its nationalistic and conservative ideology, PiS underlines the primacy of national communities over the transnational EU.[[20]](#endnote-20) Its EU-scepticism has been evident in the spheres of symbolic acts as well as political opposition to the EU’s central institutions. It is also nourished by the PiS’s traditional fear of ‘German dominance’.[[21]](#endnote-21) Symbolically, the most vivid expression of the government’s contempt for the EU was the removal of EU flags from the Prime Minister Beata Szydło’s weekly press briefings.[[22]](#endnote-22) Since then, the government and party leaders have missed hardly any opportunity to signal their disrespect towards the EU, its rules and norms. Poland’s hostility towards the EU has also found its expression in the government’s reaction to the European Commission’s concern over the rule of law in Poland. The government has rejected the concerns raised by the EU[[23]](#endnote-23) and the Council of Europe[[24]](#endnote-24) as ungrounded, biased, and essentially as interference by ‘foreign’ organisations into Poland’s affairs. Simultaneously, Poland has been among the most ardent critics of the EU’s reaction to the refugee crisis.[[25]](#endnote-25)

Poland’s foreign policy turn against the EU was reinforced in the first exposé of Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski in January 2016.[[26]](#endnote-26) The core of his message concentrated on Poland’s national security, and particularly the pivotal role of NATO and the United States. The EU was mainly considered important in the context of its cooperation with NATO, and as an instrument enabling to influence Poland’s eastern neighbours. The European integration as such was criticised for undertaking ‘not always realistic integration projects’, such as the common currency. Waszczykowski clearly favoured the model of the Union as a loose cooperation of the nation states limited to the original four freedoms. He emphasised Poland’s ‘particular position’ in the CEE region spanning from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic, favouring such regional cooperation over that within the EU with Poland’s Western partners. Among those, Waszczykowski prioritised the United Kingdom, and only mentioned Germany and France briefly at the very end of his list. In line with the overall rhetoric of PiS and the new government, the EU was treated primarily as a source of crises and instability, and Poland as a natural leader whose potential in CEE has yet to be realised.

*In search of regional followers: Three Seas*

President Duda often reminds that he draws inspiration for his foreign policy from late Lech Kaczyński, Poland’s President between 2005 and 2010, who died tragically in a Smolensk airplane crash. Twin brother of Jarosław Kaczyński, President Kaczyński shared his brother’s suspicions towards the EU and Germany in particular.[[27]](#endnote-27) He became especially infamous in the EU for delaying the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.[[28]](#endnote-28) At the same time, Lech Kaczyński was very active in the CEE region, particularly in two fields. First, he undertook a concerted effort to lessen Poland’s dependency on Russia’s energy sources, primarily through regional energy summits, the first of which took place in 2007 in Kraków and was attended by the Presidents of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Lithuania.[[29]](#endnote-29) Second, together with other leaders in the region, he got involved in the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008. He distinguished himself from most of the EU as the staunchest, uncompromising critic of the Russian aggression and by travelling to Tbilisi in order to support Georgia.[[30]](#endnote-30)

It is often observed that Kaczyński and Duda’s foreign policy draws from the Poland’s inter-war tradition known as Intermarium,[[31]](#endnote-31) which refers to the plan entailing that Poland would lead a unified block of countries spanning from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea in order to create an effective counter-balance to Germany and Soviet Russia. It never materialised, but has remained attractive for the conservative and anti-EU political circles in Poland, which since 2015 enjoy control over the country’s foreign policy.[[32]](#endnote-32) Even before being sworn as the President, Andrzej Duda announced that he supports strengthening cooperation in CEE, ‘from the Baltic Sea towards the Adriatic and the Black Sea’.[[33]](#endnote-33) As a result, in the public discourse, the Intermarium concept has been replaced by the regional cooperation idea known as Three Seas.

He also specified that a ‘centre’ should be established within the EU in order to facilitate the common interests of the countries of this region.[[34]](#endnote-34) He reiterated this idea during his visit to Estonia in August 2015, which was his first, symbolic foreign visit, signalling the priorities of his presidency. Referring to the anti-Soviet demonstration of 1989, known as the Baltic Chain of Freedom, Duda announced that a new chain of states should span from the Baltic Sea, through Central Europe, to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.[[35]](#endnote-35) In September, during the 70th Session of the United Nations, Duda met with the CEE leaders.[[36]](#endnote-36) Only over a month later, in November, he co-hosted, together with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, NATO’s Mini-Summit, attended by leaders of nine CEE countries.[[37]](#endnote-37) At the meeting, Duda emphasised that ‘a chain of security spanning from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea’ should be built to face the ‘new threat from the East’. In August 2016, President Duda signed a ‘Three Seas’ declaration in Dubrovnik covering cooperation in energy, transport, digitisation and the economy.[[38]](#endnote-38)

While President Duda has been active in promoting Three Seas among the countries of the CEE region, PiS began tightening relations with Viktor Orbán. Jarosław Kaczyński made no secret of the fact that he admired the Hungarian Prime Minister. Already in 2011, he stated: ‘Viktor Orbán gave us an example of how we can win. (…) The day will come when we will succeed, and we will have Budapest in Warsaw.’[[39]](#endnote-39) In January 2016 Prime Minister Orbán met with Kaczyński informally and in the atmosphere of secrecy near the Polish-Slovak border.[[40]](#endnote-40) While it is unclear what exactly they discussed, the views of those two political leaders overlap on a number of important international issues, including their disregard of, and often hostility towards the EU and a strongly anti-refugees attitude. At the same time, they differ on the question of Russia.[[41]](#endnote-41) Regardless of this significant difference, however, the evidence suggests that Poland has begun seeking closer relations with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, and in return the Hungarian Prime Minister promised that he would veto any potential EU sanctions against Poland.[[42]](#endnote-42)

**Concert of Europe: a self-fulfilling prophecy?**

There is a fundamental paradox embedded in Poland’s foreign policy since 2015. On the one hand, the new government, supported by its political and intellectual base, is chronically worried about the emergence of a new concert of Europe. In fact, foreign minister Waszczykowski already observed that ‘Russia and Germany form, above the heads of the Poles, a concert of superpowers.’[[43]](#endnote-43) The anti-German phobia and the near-hysterical fear of Russia, reinforced by the constant references to historical past, seem to underpin Poland’s new foreign policy. On the other hand, the government does not seem to realise that its very policy actively contributes to the disintegration process on the European continent, which in turn facilitates conditions for the potential reincarnation, in some form, of the concert of Europe.

*Poland, disintegration and Brexit*

The exit of the UK from the EU (Brexit) is the obvious example. Although never a fully-heartedly committed to European integration (particularly its political aspects), the UK, nonetheless, is one of the three most powerful EU member states, and its departure must have enormous consequences for the EU and Europe. Notably, the UK has been one of the staunchest critics of President Putin’s policy in Ukraine, providing so desperately sought-after reassurances for CEE countries. There is no reason to assume that London’s policy will change after Brexit, but CEE countries will, inevitably, loose an influential voice within the EU, one which is sympathetic to their security anxieties. Poland, of course, did not support Brexit directly. Its actions, nonetheless, do not amount to a strong case for European integration. As already discussed, the opposite is the case. Poland’s government has entered into an open conflict with the European Commission and European Parliament, ostentatiously disregarding their recommendations concerning the restoration of the rule of law in Poland. PiS’s comments and symbolic acts are notoriously EU-sceptic, and the party belongs to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament – the same which also unites British Conservatives. In fact, it was Kaczyński who worked together with David Cameron in 2009 to create the ECR. By identifying the anti-EU UK as Poland’s strategic partner within the EU, Poland’s government *de facto* validated the British hostile view towards further European integration. Consequently, it played in the same team as those who favour Europe of the strong nation-states, with minimal influence of transnational institutions – the very same institutions which, ironically, have traditionally protected the interests of small and medium member states, such as Poland.

*Poland, disintegration and partnerships*

As the UK is leaving the EU, the quality of future integration in Europe depends even more heavily than ever on the commitment of Germany to the European project. Germany, together with France, resumes the role of the engine of Europe integration, not unlike in the 1950s, when Robert Shuman and Konrad Adenauer initiated the European Coal and Steel Community. Whether Europe will remain committed to integration, or whether further disintegration paves the way to the resurgence of the concert of Europe, depends on how much German and French societies and political leaders will believe that pursuing European integration is the right thing to do. That, amongst other considerations, depends on the commitment to European integration of other European states. In this context, it is peculiar that Poland has suddenly relegated France and Germany to partners of secondary importance, prioritising the UK (soon to leave the EU) and the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) over the Weimer Triangle (Poland, Germany and France). Not only does Poland, through this strategy, voluntarily withdraw from the mainstream of European politics, but it also seeks to ally countries which share almost nothing more than geographical proximity, the communist past and anti-immigration sentiments. This was already the case during the inter-war period, when Poland pursued the strategy of Intermarium. It proved unsuccessful because of the Lithuanian resistance and because south-eastern Europe was divided into two rival blocks: the Little Entente including Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia (directed against Hungarian revisionism rather than Soviet Russia[[44]](#endnote-44)) on the one hand, and Hungary with Austria on the other hand.[[45]](#endnote-45) In this context, Poland’s efforts were further complicated by the continuous Polish-Czechoslovak differences causing Prague’s resistance to form an alliance with Poland, and by numerous other regional ethnic-based acrimonies.

Today’s Poland’s government seems to assume that other CEE states want to form a unified block opposed to the alleged German hegemony and protecting its members against the Russian threat. What could be the common basis of the Polish-led CEE cooperation? One possibility is that the states ‘between the seas’ share certain common values enabling and facilitating some degree of distinctive supranationalism in the region. As the example of the post-WWII European integration amply demonstrates, the states would have to, in the first place, renounce nationalism as a principal ideology informing their international behaviour. Nationalism drives states away from integration and cooperation, so it would have to be overcome and give place to the values which are more conductive of international cooperation.[[46]](#endnote-46) The paradox in this case is, of course, that it is the very *rejection* of Western liberal values which drives countries like Poland to initiate cooperation within the CEE regional framework. It is no coincidental that the new government in Poland sought, among its foreign policy priorities, to improve relations with Hungary ruled by the nationalist and anti-EU Viktor Orbán.[[47]](#endnote-47) How stable, however, can cooperation be between governments which are driven by the rejection of liberal values, traditionally associated with international cooperation?

*Poland, disintegration and (dis-)engaging Russia*

Another factor potentially unifying the CEE countries is the recognition of a common enemy. Two enemies in particular appear to have brought some countries of the region closer together: Russia and the refugee crisis in Europe. Russia has been recognised as a common enemy by some countries, most notably Poland and the Baltic states, in reaction to its aggression against Ukraine. The Three Seas initiative, even if indirectly, is therefore constructed as a defence against an imperialistic war-mongering powerful eastern neighbour (not unlike during the inter-war period).[[48]](#endnote-48) The large influx of Islamic refugees and immigrants to Europe, on the other hand, has brought together the countries of the Visegrád.[[49]](#endnote-49) Two problems emerge when international cooperation is constructed on the basis of resisting a common enemy. One is that in such a diverse group of countries as those comprising the Three Seas region, there are significant differences in perceptions of the common enemy. The most obvious case in point is that neither Hungary nor Czech Republic share Poland’s fundamental concern over Russia.[[50]](#endnote-50) This divergence in fact represents one real element of continuity with the inter-war period. The other problem is that a common enemy as a unifying factor can only be temporary. Once the constructed threat is removed from the top of the international agenda, the cooperation is exposed.

There is another, more fundamental problem with a foreign policy organised around constructing a common enemy: it will inevitably lead to the further isolation of Poland and other CEE countries in the process of negotiations between the West, Ukraine and Russia. Granted, Poland’s historically-motivated suspicion of Russia has to some degree been vindicated by the Russian annexation of Crimea and its destabilising operations in eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, it is not at all clear whether the current leadership in Moscow is genuinely interested in normalising relations with the West and is ready to respect Ukraine’s autonomous foreign policy choices. Regardless of these obstacles, however, or perhaps because of the scale of the difficulty, new diplomatic initiatives will likely continue to be undertaken if only because Russia will not go away as a country.

Consequently, if Poland fears the resurgence of the concert of Europe, it must separate containing the Russian threat from constructively working towards building peace.[[51]](#endnote-51) Admittedly, in the current situation, no grand, fundamental deal between Russia and the West appears feasible. There is at present no scope for the new, Pan-European security governance system or for the free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok.[[52]](#endnote-52) At the same time, however, smaller-scale initiatives should not be discarded, such as facilitating cultural and educational exchanges. Poland and other CEE countries risk further isolation in the discussions with Moscow if they are perceived to be concerned exclusively with containing Russia, and working against engaging it. In this scenario, it is indeed possible to imagine that Germany, particularly governed by someone else than Angela Merkel, may find it counterproductive to consult Warsaw and instead deal exclusively with Moscow.

**Conclusion**

History indicates that European integration and disintegration are always in motion. On the one hand, big traumatic events (Napoleonic wars and the two World Wars) have led to the upsurge of international efforts at integration both at the European and global levels. The post-WWI integration, institutionalised through the League of Nations, did not last very long. The unsuccessful Briand Memorandum had indirectly paved the way for the post-WWII processes leading to the Council of Europe and the EU. The shock of another, even more deadly war within such a short period of time seems to have had a much stronger impact, and thus European integration is in its seventh decade of development. On the other hand, however, the history also suggests that as the time passes, the memory of the traumatic events fades and peace is becoming to be taken for granted. It is not the ambition of this paper to offer a definitive answer to the question whether Europe has reached the peak of its integration momentum and entered a path towards disintegration. There are, however, fundamental challenges which are putting European commitment to integration to the test. Among these, Brexit, refugee crisis and the war in Ukraine stand out. Others, like crisis of the EU common currency, are of similar magnitude.

Poland and other countries of the region had joined the EU before any of these crises entered the EU horizon. For those countries, the rule-based system of EU governance, with its dense institutional framework, its treaties and the protective role of the European Commission, has provided more than an opportunity for economic advancement. These features of European integration have also offered solid guarantees that the status of small and medium states would be protected and respected, and that these states would never have to worry about being on the receiving end of the geopolitical processes beyond their control. This aspect of EU membership appears to have been so obvious that it has hardly ever been stated explicitly. And yet, countries like Hungary and Poland raise concerns that the EU does not offer sufficient protection against arguable geopolitical ambitions of countries like Germany. In fact, it is the EU itself which is accused of infringing the sovereignty and security of its members. What the governments of those countries do not seem to realise is that their very own policies, directly or indirectly, contribute to those processes in Europe which pull the EU towards disintegration, and which, in turn, can expose those countries to the very dynamics which they want to avoid.

After WWII, geopolitical dynamics associated with the old-style concert system have been replaced by the ‘domestication’ of international politics in Europe, largely due to the gradually-advancing integration process. Without the commitment to integration of key European countries like Poland, and with the memory of WWII fading away, European integration is at risk. As a result, larger European states may find it sensible to conduct foreign policies affecting European continent without consulting the EU in its current form. Instead, it is likely that they will either revert to the old-style intergovernmental diplomacy, or, at best, implement multi-speed Europe. In none of these scenarios, the CEE countries will maintain the current level of influence over European politics, including the matters affecting their own interests.

1. One study argues that Poland’s foreign policy turn results from the determination of the new government to introduce radical domestic reforms. The break up with the past in domestic politics is so deeply embedded in the government’s narrative that foreign policy had to be affected as a result. See Adam Balcer, Piotr Buras, Grzegorz Gromadzki, Eugeniusz Smolar, *Jaka zmiana? Założenia i perspektywy polityki zagranicznej rządu PiS* (Warsaw: Batory Foundation, 2016) [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Stefano Guzzini, *The return of geopolitics in Europe? Social mechanisms and foreign policy identity crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Leonard Woolf, *International government* (New York: Brentano’s, 1916); J.A. Hobson, *Towards international government* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1915). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Evan Luard, *Basic texts in international relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1992) [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. W.B. Curry, *The case for Federal Union* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939); Clarence Streit, *Union now: The proposal for Inter-democracy Federal Union* (London: Harper & Brothers, 1940). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. W. Ivor Jennings, (1940) *A federation for Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940); R.W.G. MacKay, *Federal Europe: Being the case for European federation together with a draft constitution of a United States of Europe* (London: Michael Joseph, 1940); David Davies, *A federated Europe* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1940). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. David Mitrany, *A working peace system* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943). [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. W.B. Curry, *The case for Federal Union* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939); Clarence Streit, *Union now: The proposal for Inter-democracy Federal Union* (London: Harper & Brothers, 1940); W. Ivor Jennings, (1940) *A federation for Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940); R.W.G. MacKay, *Federal Europe: Being the case for European federation together with a draft constitution of a United States of Europe* (London: Michael Joseph, 1940); David Davies, *A federated Europe* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1940); David Mitrany, *A working peace system* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943). [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. See the Commentary section in Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2009, 5:3. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. The Independent, ‘Brexit: Article 50 was never actually meant to be used, says its author’, 26 July 2016, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-referendum-britain-theresa-may-article-50-not-supposed-meant-to-be-used-trigger-giuliano-a7156656.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. The Economist, ‘Big, bad Visegrad’, 30 January 2016, available at http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21689629-migration-crisis-has-given-unsettling-new-direction-old-alliance-big-bad-visegrad. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, *Jak uniknąć rozmów ponad naszymi głowami? Polska wobec Rosji w dobie konfrontacji* (Warsaw: Batory Foundation, 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. See Roman Kuźniar, *Poland’s Foreign Policy after 1989* (Warsaw: Scholar, 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Ilya Prizel, *National identity and foreign policy: nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Timothy Snyder, *The reconstruction of nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Heaven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003); Mathias Roth, ‘EU-Ukraine relations after the Orange Revolution: the role of new member states’, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 8:4, 2007, pp. 505–527. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Nathaniel Copseyand Karolina Pomorska, ‘The influence of newer member states in the European Union: the case of Poland and Eastern Partnership’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 66:3, 2014, pp. 421–443; Ruxandra Iordache, ‘Poland and the creation of the EaP: between Western preferences and Eastern concerns’, in Valentin Naumescu and Dan Dungaciu, eds, *The European Union’s Eastern neighbourhood today* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), pp. 26–52. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Kuźniar, *Poland’s Foreign Policy*. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO from 1952 to 1957, is famously credited with defining NATO’s purpose as ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down’. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. The paper will subsequently refer to the Law and Order party by its Polish acronym ‘PiS’. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. President Duda, when announcing his foreign policy objectives in an interview on 5 August 2015, emphasised that he does not support revolutionary changes in foreign policy. Instead, he spoke of making necessary corrections, ‘sometimes deep’ ones. Among policy areas which required such corrections, according to Duda, was foreign policy, which was in need of becoming ‘activated’. The strategy of Three Seas, therefore, is constructed as a necessary correction to Poland’s foreign policy, rather than a revolutionary change. Available at http://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/duda-nie-jestem-za-rewolucja-w-polityce-zagranicznej-ale-beda-korekty (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 17 May 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. This argument appeared, for example, in Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski’s address on priorities of Polish diplomacy (subsequently ‘Waszczykowski on priorities of Polish diplomacy’), 29 January 2016, http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/c/MOBILE/news/minister\_witold\_waszczykowski\_on\_priorities\_of\_polish\_diplomacy. In the European Parliament PiS belongs to the EU-sceptic and anti-federalist European Conservatives and Reformists Group. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Marta Solarz, ‘Polish opposition leader: Kaczynski warns of Germany's “imperial” ambitions’, Spiegel Online, 5 October 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/polish-opposition-leader-kaczynski-warns-of-germany-s-imperial-ambitions-a-790034.html; Christoph Hasselbach, ‘Opinion: German criticism of Poland hits wrong notes’, Deutsche Welle, 4 January 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-german-criticism-of-poland-hits-wrong-notes/a-18958290. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Financial Times, ‘Poland removes EU flag in Brussels snub’, 24 November 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Andrew Rettman, ‘Poland rebukes ‘left-wing’ EU commission’, 12 January 2015, https://euobserver.com/justice/131799. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Judy Dempsey, ‘Interview with Witold Waszczykowski’, 17 March 2016, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63057. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Eric Maurice, ‘Refugee quotas “unacceptable” for Visegrad states’, 4 September 2015, https://euobserver.com/migration/130122. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. ‘Waszczykowski on priorities of Polish diplomacy’. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Spiegel Online, ‘German papers: how bad is Lech Kaczynski?’ 25 October 2005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/german-papers-how-bad-is-lech-kaczynski-a-381576.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Kamil Zwolski, ‘Euthanasia, gay marriage and sovereignty: the Polish ratification of the Lisbon Treaty’, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 5:3, 2009, pp. 489–497. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Anita Orban, *Power, energy, and the new Russian imperialism* (London: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 135–136. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Andrew Curry, ‘Old Europe vs. New Europe: will Poland split EU over Russia policy?’ Spiegel Online, 14 August 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/old-europe-vs-new-europe-will-poland-split-eu-over-russia-policy-a-572105.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. The media outlets sympathetic to the PiS government, when discussing the Three Seas (or Intermarium) foreign policy of President Duda and the new government, often make references to, and comparisons with Poland’s inter-war policy. When introducing the candidacy of Andrzej Duda in 2014, Jarosław Kaczyński in fact compared him to Lech Kaczyński and Józef Piłsudski. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. There is a widespread support for the Three Seas (Intermarium) policy among the analysts and commentators associated with the PiS government and President Duda; some relevant media outlets include: wPolityce.pl, fronda.pl, kresy24.pl. tygodniksolidarnosc.pl, Gazeta Polska. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. Andrzej Duda Interview of 5 August 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Andrzej Duda Interview of 5 August 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Andrzej Duda, ‘World peace impossible without respect for international law’, 23 August 2015, http://www.prezydent.pl/en/news/art,18,world-peace-impossible-without-respect-for-international-law.html [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. Atlantic Council, ‘Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea leaders meeting’, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/adriatic-baltic-back-sea-leaders-meeting. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Martin Sobczyk, ‘NATO’s Eastern members plan November summit to demand increased security’, *The Wall Street Journal*, 17 August 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Presdient.PL, ‘Three Seas initiative countries sign joint declaration’, http://www.president.pl/en/news/art,245,three-seas-initiative-countries-sign-joint-declaration.html [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Neil Buckley and Henry Foy, ‘Poland’s new government finds a model in Orban’s Hungary’, *Financial Times*, 6 January 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Buckley and Foy, ‘Poland’s new government’. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Robert Coalson, ‘NATO's Eastern countries fractured over response to Russia’, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 19 May 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-europe-divisions-ukraine-czech-hungary-poland-slovakia/26569958.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Henry Foy, Jim Brunsden and Andrew Byrne, ‘Orban promises to veto any EU sanctions against Poland’, *Financial Times*, 8 January 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Witold Waszczykowski for Fronda.pl, 18 February 2015, http://www.fronda.pl/a/witold-waszczykowski-dla-frondapl-potrzeba-mezow-stanu-a-nie-politycznych-gierek,47653.html. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Piotr Wandycz, *France and her Eastern allies, 1919-1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno* (Minneapolis: The Lund Press, 1962), pp. 193–194. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Piotr Wandycz, *Polish diplomacy 1914-1945: aims and achievements* (London: Orbis Books, 1988), p. 18. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Frank Schimmelfenning talks in this context about the process of socialising the former Communist countries in the CEE region to the Western *liberal* values, and the role of Western international organisations (the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe) in this process. The socialisation affects both domestic and international behaviour of states, but as it is only a process, it does not have to be fully successful; see Frank Schimmelfenning, ‘International socialization in the New Europe: rational action in an institutional environment’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 6:1, 2000, pp. 109–139. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. On the new-found Polish-Hungarian friendship see Annabelle Chapman, ‘Poland and Hungary’s defiant friendship’, *Politico*, 1 June 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/poland-and-hungarys-defiant-friendship-kaczynski-orban-pis-migration/. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Russian imperialism as the underpinning motive for regional cooperation was already signalled during President Duda’s visit to Estonia in August 2015, when he said ‘[w]e must not consent when international law is violated, when borders are violated, when countries’ sovereignty and independence is violated. Unfortunately this is happening again in Europe’; see Andrzej Duda, ‘”World peace impossible”’. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Maurice, ‘Refugee quotas “unacceptable”’. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. It can be easily noted that ‘[t]he Ukraine crisis has fractured the so–called Visegrad Group – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. From alarmist Poland to Kremlin–friendly Hungary, the group runs the gamut of possible positions.’ See Coalson, ‘NATO’s Eastern countries’. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Jak uniknąć rozmów ponad naszymi głowami? [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. The ideas of this kind have been promoted, for example, by President Medvedev in 2008. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)