Are all normative judgments desire-like?
Are all normative judgments desire-like?
In this paper I first argue against one attractive formulation of the motivation argument, and against one attractive formulation of non-cognitivism. I do so by example: I suggest that other-regarding normative judgements do not seem to have motivational powers and do not seem to be desires. After defending these two claims, I argue that other views can accommodate the motivational role of normative judgement without facing this objection. For example, desire-as-belief theories do so, since such theories only say that some normative judgements constitute desires, not that all such judgements do so. (I also briefly present similar reasoning in favour of the claim that desire-as-belief is superior to non-cognitivism with respect to the Frege-Geach objection.) In short, I argue that if we are seeking a theory that explains the motivational role of normative judgement, some theories are better than others insofar as they do so without committing to the claim that all normative judgements play such a motivational role.
29-55
Gregory, Alexander
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f
September 2017
Gregory, Alexander
4f392d61-1825-4ee5-bc21-18922c89d80f
Gregory, Alexander
(2017)
Are all normative judgments desire-like?
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 12 (1), .
(doi:10.26556/jesp.v12i1.212).
Abstract
In this paper I first argue against one attractive formulation of the motivation argument, and against one attractive formulation of non-cognitivism. I do so by example: I suggest that other-regarding normative judgements do not seem to have motivational powers and do not seem to be desires. After defending these two claims, I argue that other views can accommodate the motivational role of normative judgement without facing this objection. For example, desire-as-belief theories do so, since such theories only say that some normative judgements constitute desires, not that all such judgements do so. (I also briefly present similar reasoning in favour of the claim that desire-as-belief is superior to non-cognitivism with respect to the Frege-Geach objection.) In short, I argue that if we are seeking a theory that explains the motivational role of normative judgement, some theories are better than others insofar as they do so without committing to the claim that all normative judgements play such a motivational role.
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are all normative judgements desires for JESP
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Accepted/In Press date: 27 June 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 28 September 2017
Published date: September 2017
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Local EPrints ID: 413377
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/413377
ISSN: 1559-3061
PURE UUID: 78b3bec6-d227-462c-bc80-80b98f141587
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Date deposited: 23 Aug 2017 16:31
Last modified: 16 Mar 2024 04:16
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