Biosecurity and the risk to global health
Biosecurity and the risk to global health
Global health is potentially diminished by practices of biosecurity aimed at safeguarding the health of human populations within or across state boundaries against selected infectious disease risks. Some diseases inspire so much government concern that they are accorded the status of security issues, and adopting a security-based rationale for prevention and response efforts can garner extra resources and stronger powers for risk-reduction purposes. However, such an approach can sometimes result in practices that are counterproductive from a health perspective. This article shows that biosecurity can endanger global health in at least four areas of policy concern: the development of defenses against biological weapons; the management of security risks arising from laboratory research on pathogenic microorganisms; the prioritization of disease risks and response mechanisms as part of an agenda of global health security; and the use of national borders to contain transnational contagion.
biological weapons, Biosecurity, Borders, Global Health, prioritisation, Research, risks, security
179-195
Enemark, Christian
004b6521-f1bb-426a-a37b-686c6a8061f6
January 2018
Enemark, Christian
004b6521-f1bb-426a-a37b-686c6a8061f6
Enemark, Christian
(2018)
Biosecurity and the risk to global health.
In,
McInnes, Colin, Lee, Kelley and Youde, Jeremy
(eds.)
The Oxford Handbook of Global Health Politics.
(Oxford Handbooks)
Oxford.
Oxford University Press, .
(doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190456818.013.12).
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Book Section
Abstract
Global health is potentially diminished by practices of biosecurity aimed at safeguarding the health of human populations within or across state boundaries against selected infectious disease risks. Some diseases inspire so much government concern that they are accorded the status of security issues, and adopting a security-based rationale for prevention and response efforts can garner extra resources and stronger powers for risk-reduction purposes. However, such an approach can sometimes result in practices that are counterproductive from a health perspective. This article shows that biosecurity can endanger global health in at least four areas of policy concern: the development of defenses against biological weapons; the management of security risks arising from laboratory research on pathogenic microorganisms; the prioritization of disease risks and response mechanisms as part of an agenda of global health security; and the use of national borders to contain transnational contagion.
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Accepted/In Press date: 10 August 2017
e-pub ahead of print date: 4 January 2018
Published date: January 2018
Keywords:
biological weapons, Biosecurity, Borders, Global Health, prioritisation, Research, risks, security
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 413869
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/413869
PURE UUID: 2d8bffce-3c06-4c76-85f0-47c6e963baaa
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Date deposited: 08 Sep 2017 16:30
Last modified: 13 Sep 2024 01:52
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Contributors
Editor:
Colin McInnes
Editor:
Kelley Lee
Editor:
Jeremy Youde
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