

1 Contamination of hospital tap water: the survival and persistence of *Pseudomonas* 2 *aeruginosa* on conventional and 'antimicrobial' outlet fittings

3 SUMMARY

4 **Background:** *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* infections have been linked to contaminated hospital taps,
5 highlighting the potential for tap outlet fittings (OF) to harbour biofilm. *P. aeruginosa* may be
6 transferred to OFs via contaminated cleaning-cloths. Suggested interventions include flushing
7 regimens and alternative OF designs.

8 **Aim:** To investigate the transfer of *P. aeruginosa* from a contaminated cleaning-cloth to
9 conventional and 'antimicrobial/anti-biofilm' OFs and to determine whether this contamination
10 persists and/or leads to contamination of tap water.

11 **Methods:** Microfibre cloths contaminated with *P. aeruginosa* (10^8 CFU/mL) were used to wipe four
12 different types of OF (one of conventional design (OF-A) and three marketed as 'antimicrobial'
13 and/or 'anti-biofilm' (OF- B, -C and -D)). OFs were inserted into an experimental water distribution
14 system for up to 24-hours. Survival was assessed by culture. Single and multiple water samples were
15 collected and cultured for *P. aeruginosa*.

16 **Findings:** The median number of *P. aeruginosa* transferred from cloth to OF was 5.7×10^5 CFU (OF-A),
17 1.9×10^6 CFU (OF-B), 1.4×10^5 CFU (OF-C) and 2.9×10^6 CFU (OF-D). Numbers declined on all OFs during
18 the 24-hour period with log reductions ranging from 3.5 (OF-C) to 5.2 (OF-B; $p > 0.05$). All water
19 samples delivered immediately after OF contamination contained *P. aeruginosa* at ≥ 10 CFU/100mL.
20 Contamination of water delivered from OF-A persisted despite continued flushing. Water delivered
21 from OF-B did not contain *P. aeruginosa* beyond the first flush.

22 **Conclusion:** Contaminated cleaning-cloths can transfer *P. aeruginosa* to OFs, leading to
23 contamination of tap water. Whilst not removing the potential for contamination,
24 'antimicrobial/anti-biofilm' OFs may prevent *P. aeruginosa* from continually contaminating water
25 delivered from the outlet.

26 INTRODUCTION

27 Water outlets, particularly taps and associated pipework, are a recognised reservoir for
28 microorganisms, providing a large surface area for biofilms to develop and to harbour potential
29 pathogens, such as *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*¹. In the UK, *P. aeruginosa* is responsible for 3% of all
30 reported monospecies bacteraemias². There are also reports of non-bacteraemic infections^{3,4}. The
31 infection of immunocompromised individuals by *P. aeruginosa* carries a risk of fatality⁵ but, as
32 reporting is voluntary, the exact incidence and mortality of *P. aeruginosa* infections is unknown. The
33 association between hospital taps and *P. aeruginosa* infections is well documented^{6,7}, however, it
34 was not until 2013, that the Department of Health (DoH) issued guidance relating to *P. aeruginosa*
35 control⁸.

36 *P. aeruginosa* readily forms biofilms⁹, and the design and/or materials associated with different tap
37 components, such as thermostatic mixing valves (TMVs)¹⁰, solenoid valves¹¹ and outlet fittings
38 (OFs)¹², have been shown to facilitate biofilm formation. *P. aeruginosa* is able to persist on wet and
39 dry surfaces for extended periods of time^{11,13}.

1 Between November 2011 and January 2012, 25 babies admitted to neonatal intensive care units in
2 Northern Ireland acquired *P. aeruginosa*. These incidents were attributed to contaminated OFs¹².
3 However, in a laboratory-based investigation, colonisation of OFs was minimal¹¹. An acknowledged
4 limitation of this study was that the tap assemblies were inoculated systemically, simulating
5 contamination of the water supply. Hospital taps, however, may also be exposed to contamination
6 originating from the clinical environment, i.e. retrograde contamination.

7 Retrograde contamination could occur in a number of different ways, many resulting from human
8 behaviour. OFs can become contaminated via splashback from a contaminated waste trap¹⁴ or
9 surface¹⁵ (e.g. while rinsing contaminated equipment) or through inappropriate disposal and/or
10 splashing of contaminated patient fluids¹⁶. The potential spread of contamination during cleaning
11 has also been demonstrated¹⁷. Contamination of environmental surfaces via microfibre cloths is well
12 documented^{18,19}, and can occur even when using the previously published fold-and-refold method²⁰.
13 Data on the potential for microfibre cloths to contaminate OFs has not been published. However, in
14 response to reports of OF contamination and DoH guidance, several manufacturers have engineered
15 a variety of 'antimicrobial' or 'anti-biofilm' solutions, designed to prevent the survival of
16 microorganisms introduced to the OF, and/or to minimise the adhesion of microorganisms and
17 detritus.

18 The aim of this study was to investigate retrograde contamination, specifically whether conventional
19 and 'antimicrobial/anti-biofilm' OFs can become contaminated with *P. aeruginosa* via cleaning cloths
20 and if this contamination can persist and/or lead to contamination of tap water.

21 **METHODS**

22 **Preparation of test suspension**

23 Cryopreserved *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*, previously isolated from an experimental water
24 distribution system (EWDS)²¹, was resuscitated from beads (Technical Service Consultants Ltd.,
25 Lancashire, UK) onto Tryptone Soya agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) and subcultured onto Cetrimide
26 (CN) agar (Oxoid). Liquid cultures were prepared by suspending a colony in 100mL of nutrient broth
27 (Oxoid) and incubating at 37°C with shaking at 120 rpm for 16-hours.

28 **Selection of outlet fittings (OFs)**

29 Four different OFs were selected for this study: one of conventional design (OF-A) and three
30 (currently on the market or in development) designed to reduce the risk of microbial colonisation. In
31 comparison to OF-A, a multi-layered plastic rosette¹¹, OF-B is simpler in design and comprises a
32 single-bore with a copper interior lining. OF-C has a similar simplified design but is made from a
33 plastic that the manufacturer claims reduces impurity (and bacterial) adherence. OF-D has a
34 conventional-style flow-straightening device (similar to OF-A) but made from a silver-impregnated
35 plastic. A copper alloy sheath (>76% Cu) projects beyond this internal device.

36 **Contamination of outlet fittings via microfibre cloth**

37 Microfibre cleaning cloths (80% polyester and 20% polyamide; Arco, Hull, UK) were cut into 10cm²
38 swatches, weighed and inoculated with 10mL of the bacterial test suspension (~10⁸colony forming
39 units (CFU)/mL). Each swatch was wrung and reweighed, before being used to wipe the accessible

1 surfaces of between 1 and 9 OFs for 10 seconds. Cloth-contaminated OFs were inserted into taps on
2 the EWDS and left *in situ* for 15 minutes, one-, four-, eight-, 12- or 24-hours.

3 **Survival of *P. aeruginosa* on outlet fittings**

4 At the appropriate time point, OFs (n=3) were removed from the taps and transferred to 5mL sterile
5 thiosulphate Ringers solution (Oxoid) or, to (when it was required) neutralise potential antimicrobial
6 ions, 5mL Dey-Engley neutralising broth (Sigma-Aldrich, Dorset, UK). Each OF was vortexed with
7 sterile glass beads for two minutes and the resulting suspension serially diluted (ten-fold). Aliquots
8 (100 µL) of each dilution were plated onto CN agar and incubated at 37°C for 24-48 hours. 3mL of
9 the remaining suspension was filtered through a 0.2µm membrane (Pall Life Sciences, Portsmouth,
10 UK) which was transferred to CN agar and incubated at 37°C for 24-48 hours. Each experiment was
11 repeated on four separate occasions.

12 **Detection of *P. aeruginosa* in water dispensed from contaminated outlet fittings**

13 OFs (contaminated as previously described) were inserted into the EWDS. Each tap was flushed (30-
14 seconds, 4.5 L/min) either once over a 24-hour period (OF-A only), or five times over a 20-minute
15 period to simulate an infrequently- or frequently-used tap respectively (all OF types). A TMV
16 associated with each tap ensured the temperature of the water delivered from each outlet was
17 ~43°C. Chlorine levels were approximately 0.03-0.22mg/L. During each flush, water samples (500mL)
18 were collected in sample bottles containing 20mg/L sodium thiosulphate (Scientific Laboratory
19 Supplies, Nottingham, UK). The presence of *P. aeruginosa* was determined by filtering 100mL of each
20 water sample through a 0.2µm membrane. Membranes were transferred to CN agar and incubated
21 at 37°C for 24-48 hours. Colonies were enumerated and results recorded as above (≥ 10 CFU/100mL)
22 or below (1-9CFU/100mL) the hospital alert limit for augmented care⁸, or below the detection limit
23 of the assay (<1CFU/100mL). Experiments were repeated on four separate occasions.

24 **Data analysis**

25 Data analysis was performed using GraphPad Prism (version 7.00 for Windows). Parametric data
26 were compared using unpaired T-tests or one-way ANOVA followed by Šídák's multiple comparisons
27 test. Non-parametric data were compared using Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA in combination with
28 Dunn's multiple comparisons test. Statistical significance was set at $p < 0.05$. Chi-square (X^2) tests
29 were performed to test for independence between contamination levels of flushed water and the
30 number of flushes.

31 **RESULTS**

32 **Contamination of outlet fittings via contaminated microfibre cloths**

33 *P. aeruginosa* was transferred to all OFs via contaminated microfibre cloths. The median number
34 (n=12) of *P. aeruginosa* transferred was 5.7×10^5 CFU (OF-A), 1.9×10^6 CFU (OF-B), 1.4×10^5 CFU (OF-C)
35 and 2.9×10^6 CFU (OF-D). Significantly fewer bacteria were transferred to OF-C than to any other OF
36 ($p < 0.05$). No other differences were significant.

37 **Survival of *P. aeruginosa* over time**

1 Figure 1 illustrates the reduction in viable *P. aeruginosa* recovered from the different OFs up to 24-
2 hours after contamination. For all OF types, significant $\log_{(10)}$ reductions were observed by 15-
3 minutes ($p < 0.05$). There were also significant $\log_{(10)}$ reductions between one- and four-hours for all
4 OF types, with reductions of 2.7 (OF-A), 3.7 (OF-B), 2.2 (OF-C) and 2.6 (OF-D). The rate of *P.*
5 *aeruginosa* reduction decreased after the first four-hours, with significant $\log_{(10)}$ reductions of 1.8
6 (OF-A), 1.6 (OF-B), 1.3 (OF-C) and 2.6 (OF-D) over the following 20-hour period. No significant
7 reduction was seen between four and eight-hours ($p > 0.05$) and the subsequent four-hour period
8 saw variable trends across the OF designs, with only OF-B demonstrating a significant $\log_{(10)}$
9 reduction of 1.1.

10 No significant difference in *P. aeruginosa* viability was observed after 24-hours between the
11 conventional and 'antimicrobial/anti-biofilm' OFs. OF-B showed greater $\log_{(10)}$ reduction than OF-A
12 at 12-hours ($p < 0.05$), however this did not carry through to the 24-hour time point.

14 **Detection of *P. aeruginosa* in water dispensed from contaminated outlet fittings**

15 Taps fitted with OF-A were flushed once to simulate an infrequently-used tap. All water samples
16 ($n=6$) taken immediately after contamination of the OF were positive for *P. aeruginosa* at
17 $\geq 10\text{CFU}/100\text{mL}$ (above the augmented care alert limit). The level of *P. aeruginosa* in all water
18 collected at 15-minutes, one-, four- and 12-hours after contamination also exceeded the alert limit.
19 *P. aeruginosa* persisted on the surface of the OF and 24-hours after contamination, 3/6 (50%) of
20 water samples delivered through OF-A contained *P. aeruginosa* at levels $\geq 10\text{CFU}/100\text{mL}$.

21 Regardless of OF design, increased usage of the tap correlated with reduced water contamination
22 (Table I). In all cases, water delivered immediately after contamination of the OFs (flush 1) was
23 positive for *P. aeruginosa* at $\geq 10\text{CFU}/100\text{mL}$. Contamination of water delivered from OF-A persisted
24 despite continued flushing (or usage) and 6/12 (50%) in the fifth flush contained *P. aeruginosa* at
25 levels of $\geq 10\text{CFU}/100\text{mL}$ (Table I). In contrast, by the second flush, the level of *P. aeruginosa* in water
26 delivered through OF-B was always below the detection limit of the assay. Whilst two (17%) and one
27 (8%) of the 12 water samples collected during the second and third use of taps fitted with OF-C
28 respectively contained *P. aeruginosa* at $\geq 10\text{CFU}/100\text{mL}$, the majority of samples (11/12, 92%) were
29 below detection by the fourth flush. *P. aeruginosa* was recovered from water delivered from OF-D at
30 $\geq 10\text{CFU}/100\text{mL}$ until the fourth flush, by which point no *P. aeruginosa* was detected in 8/12 (67%)
31 samples. In contrast to OF-B and -C, water dispensed by contaminated OF-D contained *P.*
32 *aeruginosa* at detectable levels in 2/12 (17%) samples by the fifth flush. X^2 tests indicated that the
33 level of contamination was not independent from the number of flushes that had occurred for all
34 four OF types (i.e. there is an association between flushing and the observed reduction in *P.*
35 *aeruginosa* counts) ($n=12$. OF-A: $X^2(4) = 10.7$ $p < 0.05$; OF-B $X^2(4) = 60.0$ $p < 0.0001$; OF-C: $X^2(4) =$
36 46.2 , $p < 0.0001$; OF-D $X^2(4) = 49.3$, $p < 0.0001$).

37 **DISCUSSION**

38 Although the colonisation of OFs with *P. aeruginosa* has been reported since the 1960s²¹, very few
39 studies have investigated how such contamination can occur. Of those that have, the focus has been
40 on post-incident investigation¹² or systemic contamination¹¹. This is the first study to investigate the

1 transfer of *P. aeruginosa* from a cloth to an OF (i.e. cross-contamination during cleaning). The high
2 load of *P. aeruginosa* used to inoculate the microfibre cloths was comparable to contamination
3 levels found in cleaning-cloths in previous studies²² and resulted in OF contamination at levels
4 comparable to that recovered from the OFs implicated in the Northern Ireland incidents
5 (1.8×10^5 CFU)¹². *P. aeruginosa* can survive on dry surfaces¹³ and in the absence of flushing, *P.*
6 *aeruginosa* survived on the surface of all OFs for at least 24 hours.

7 The antimicrobial effect of copper and silver ions is well documented and such studies have led to
8 the design and manufacture of OFs that incorporate 'antimicrobial' materials^{23,24}. However, results
9 from laboratory-based assays do not necessarily translate when applied²⁵. Copper surfaces can, in
10 laboratory studies, achieve a 6- $\log_{(10)}$ reduction in bacterial viability²⁶. In contrast, within the
11 healthcare setting, copper surfaces have been shown to reduce the level of environmental
12 contamination by just ~ 2 - $\log_{(10)}$ ^{27,28}, and despite microbial reductions being significantly greater than
13 on control surfaces, copper surfaces are still contaminated at levels above the accepted limit for
14 healthcare (2.5 CFU/cm²)²⁹. The results of the current study demonstrate that OFs can become
15 contaminated when wiped with a contaminated cloth, and this contamination can persist. In
16 comparison to the conventional OF (OF-A), the OFs incorporating antimicrobial materials including
17 copper (i.e. OF-B and -D) did not significantly reduce microbial contamination over a 24-hour period.
18 The clinical tap industry is increasingly incorporating copper and brass components within new
19 designs whilst also attempting to reduce surface roughness to minimise niches for bacterial
20 attachment. However, a study by Zeiger *et al* highlighted the importance of surface roughness in the
21 efficiency of copper contact killing, demonstrating a superior killing effect by electroplated copper
22 compared to polished or deposited copper surfaces³⁰.

23 The transfer of *P. aeruginosa* to OFs led to contamination of the first sample of water delivered from
24 all outlets at ≥ 10 CFU/100mL. Should the tap be used less frequently (i.e. once within a 24-hour
25 period) then the ability of *P. aeruginosa* to persist on the surface of conventional OFs could result in
26 'high-risk' water (containing ≥ 10 CFU/100mL⁸) being delivered 24-hours after the contamination
27 event. Regardless of OF design, *P. aeruginosa* levels in water dispensed from affected taps reduced
28 with increased tap usage. The 'antimicrobial/anti-biofilm' OFs reduced contamination more
29 efficiently than conventional OFs over a series of flushes. The contamination of water delivered by
30 OF-B and OF-C was reduced to a level below the detection limit of the assay (< 1 CFU/100mL) after
31 one 30-second flush. However, unlike OF-B, OF-C did not consistently clear residual contamination,
32 meaning that water samples delivered during the second (2/12) and third flush (1/12) were
33 contaminated at ≥ 10 CFU/100mL. OF-B and -C are both single bore OFs. OF-D is more complex and
34 was less efficient than OF-B and -C at clearing contamination. This could be due to the additional
35 flow control provided by its internal device, which is similar to OF-A. It is possible that antimicrobial
36 agents from OF-D acted upon *P. aeruginosa* in the water sample, hence its superior performance to
37 OF-A.

38 When wiped with a contaminated microfibre cloth, significantly fewer bacteria were transferred to
39 OF-C than to any of the other OFs, which, when considered alongside the rapid removal of
40 contamination through tap usage, implies that *P. aeruginosa* is unable to attach as easily or as
41 strongly to this OF design. OF-C is marketed as being 'anti-biofilm'. However, it is unclear whether
42 clearance of *P. aeruginosa* was an artefact of being retrofitted into another manufacturer's tap, or
43 due to the materials used. Not all OFs are able to maintain flow regulation performance across all

1 spout designs. It is feasible that turbidity of flow and the resulting shear forces may enhance
2 sloughing of attached bacteria. Nonetheless, as was observed during the current investigation, poor
3 flow regulation can lead to splashing (data not presented). Implications of water (and its microbial
4 content) spreading to the surrounding environment must be taken into consideration, both in
5 droplet and aerosol form³¹.

6 This study has demonstrated that OFs could become contaminated with *P. aeruginosa* in a
7 retrograde manner, for example, during cleaning. If not immediately removed, this contamination
8 can persist and lead to contamination of tap water. Whilst not removing the potential for retrograde
9 contamination, 'antimicrobial/anti-biofilm' OFs may, in combination with a flushing regimen,
10 prevent *P. aeruginosa* from continually contaminating the water delivered from the outlet.
11 Retrofitting taps with 'antimicrobial/anti-biofilm' OFs is possible but this may not be easy or
12 appropriate. Some designs would require the replacement of the entire tap assembly, whilst the
13 simplification of other designs has had a negative impact upon the original function of the OFs (i.e.
14 to regulate and straighten the flow of water).

15 Furthermore, relying on the antimicrobial properties of material (or OF) is an insufficient infection
16 control measure. Flushing and frequent tap use reduces water system stagnation allowing any
17 decontamination agents added to the tank water to reach the tap outlet and OF. It is important to
18 remember that augmented care units, where taps tend to be used very frequently³², are not the only
19 wards that immunocompromised patients spend time on, and *P. aeruginosa* infections have been
20 acquired from outpatients clinics³³. Immunocompromised outpatients receiving prolonged
21 treatment, such as oncology and cystic fibrosis patients, visit day wards and clinics regularly, and
22 also make unexpected presentations to emergency departments³⁴. Retrograde contamination of
23 sinks, taps and OFs could occur regardless of ward. It is, therefore, important to maintain and flush
24 all hospital taps regularly and essential that factors contributing to retrograde contamination (be it
25 human behaviour or otherwise) be investigated and addressed.

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29 **Conflict of interest statement**

30 The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and not of Public Health England.

31 **Funding sources**

32 Healthcare Infection Society

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1 **Figures and Legends:**

2 **Table I** The number of water samples delivered through contaminated outlet fittings that contained
3 *P. aeruginosa* at levels above (≥ 10 CFU/100mL) or below (1-9CFU/100mL) the hospital alert limit for
4 augmented care, or below the detection limit of the assay (<1CFU/100mL). Samples (n=12) were
5 collected over five consecutive tap usages (i.e. five consecutive 30 second flushes).

6 **Figure 1. Reduction ($\text{Log}_{(10)}$) in cloth-transferred *P. aeruginosa* on outlet fitting types [mean (n=12)
7 \pm standard deviation]**

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Table I The number of water samples delivered through contaminated outlet fittings that contained *P. aeruginosa* at levels above (≥ 10 CFU/100mL) or below (1-9CFU/100mL) the hospital alert limit for augmented care, or below the detection limit of the assay (< 1 CFU/100mL). Samples (n=12) were collected over five consecutive tap usages (i.e. five consecutive 30 second flushes).

OF type	<i>P. aeruginosa</i> (CFU/100mL)	Frequency of tap use				
		1 st flush	2 nd flush	3 rd flush	4 th flush	5 th flush
OF-A	≥ 10	12	11	8	8	6
	1-9	0	1	2	1	2
	< 1	0	0	2	3	4
OF-B	≥ 10	12	0	0	0	0
	1-9	0	0	0	0	0
	< 1	0	12	12	12	12
OF-C	≥ 10	12	2	1	0	0
	1-9	0	0	0	1	0
	< 1	0	10	11	11	12
OF-D	≥ 10	12	11	2	0	0
	1-9	0	1	4	4	2
	< 1	0	0	6	8	10




Figure 1. Reduction (Log_{10}) in cloth-transferred *P. aeruginosa* on outlet fitting types [mean ($n=12$) \pm standard deviation]