Social incentives in paid collaborative crowdsourcing

Abstract

Paid microtask crowdsourcing has traditionally been approached as an individual activity, with units of work created and completed independently by the members of the crowd. Other forms of crowdsourcing have, however, embraced more varied models, which allow for a greater level of participant interaction and collaboration. This article studies the feasibility and uptake of such an approach in the context of paid microtasks. Specifically, we compare engagement, task output, and task accuracy in a paired-worker model with the traditional, single-worker version. Our experiments indicate that collaboration leads to better accuracy and more output, which, in turn, translates into lower costs. We then explore the role of the social flow and social pressure generated by collaborating partners as sources of incentives for improved performance. We utilise a Bayesian method in conjunction with interface interaction behaviours to detect when one of the workers in a pair tries to exit the task. Upon this realisation, the other worker is presented with the opportunity to contact the exiting partner to stay: either for personal financial reasons (i.e., they have not completed enough tasks to qualify for a payment) or for fun (i.e., they are enjoying the task). The findings reveal that: (1) these socially motivated incentives can act as furtherance mechanisms to help workers attain and exceed their task requirements and produce better results than baseline collaborations; (2) microtask crowd workers are empathic (as opposed to selfish) agents, willing to go the extra mile to help their partners get paid; and, (3) social furtherance incentives create a win-win scenario for the requester and for the workers by helping more workers get paid by re-engaging them before they drop out.

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ORCID for Elena Simperl: orcid.org/0000-0003-1722-947X

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